In the beginning of 2022 Russia began their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, most expected that Russia would be able to exploit sea control within the Black Sea area uncontested, mostly because of their numerical and material superiority. At the same time, the maritime domain of the war between Ukraine and Russia during 2022-2024 shows that a weaker state without a conventional navy successfully can achieve a lasting sea denial. Drawing on Milan Vego´s theoretical framework on sea denial this study examines how Ukraine has been able to dispute Russian sea control while they lack a conventional navy. Additionally, the case has been examined through a qualitative single-case study, where the focus has been on the maritime domain and how different methods can be applied to achieve sea denial within a littoral operational environment. The results concludes that Ukraine’s success in the maritime domain can be understood through several factors, or in this case methods. It shows that Ukraine’s ability to achieve sea denial can be understood as a combination of multiple methods working together, rather than methods working on their own. By asymmetric means, such as USV and long-range weapon systems, they have altered the Russian perquisites to achieve sea control within the Black Sea area. Furthermore, the study concludes that the weaker opponent’s capability to achieve sea denial also depends on their ability to adapt. It´s shows the importance of adapting you’re means and methods, but also the ability to exploit geographical and operational environment to your own advantage, and through that create favourable perquisites to deny the adversaries sea control.