This thesis aims to investigate how three Swedish government agencies, the Swedish Tax Agency, the Enforcement Authority and the Social Insurance Agency, formulate and manage conflicts between efficiency, legal certainty and democratic control in the use of foreign cloud services. Through a qualitative content analysis of official documents, the study examines how different agencies prioritize between efficiency gains and risks related to privacy, foreign jurisdiction and loss of state control. The theoretical framework uses Jon Elster's “three-cornered dilemma”, where efficiency, democracy and the principle of legality are understood as values that an administration cannot maximize at the same time. The results show that the agencies prioritize the values differently and develop three separate strategies for managing the conflict. The Swedish Tax Agency prioritizes efficiency and modernization through a risk-management strategy based on hybrid solutions. The Swedish Enforcement Authority gives priority to legal certainty, privacy and state control, where legal and democratic risks limit cloud computing. The Swedish Social Insurance Agency emphasizes both efficiency and democratic control through state-controlled infrastructure. These differences can be understood through Elster's dilemma and political science models discussing a fragmented public administration. The Swedish state does not act as a unified actor, but delegates decisions involving value conflicts to individual agencies. The thesis concludes that foreign cloud services challenge administrative efficiency, but also legal certainty, and democratic control over digital infrastructure.