Self-Preferencing by Dual-Role Platforms: An Evaluation of EU Regulatory Approaches
2025 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE credits
Student thesis
Abstract [en]
Digital platforms have become key players in the European Union’s digital economy and market. In recent years, some of these vertically integrated platforms have started to look for new ways to maximize their position and profitability. Consequently, driven by distinct managerial incentives, many of these platforms have started to not only host third-party sellers but also offer their own competing products. In business literature, these kinds of platforms are denominated ‘dual-role platforms’. This dual role is often prone to a practice called ‘self-preferencing’, which occurs when platforms favour their own products over third-party products that are sold in their marketplace. This practice has raised increasingly regulatory and competitive concerns in the European Union. Through a qualitative legal research method, this dissertation explores how is the European Union limiting self-preference practice done by dual-role platforms and if those limitations are appropriate, seen from a competitive perspective. The research found that while self-preferencing can, under certain conditions, be considered a legitimate business strategy, it can also produce anti-competitive effects, which is the reason for the significant regulatory and competitive concerns in the European Union. The findings indicate that EU law limits dual-role platforms, through Article 102(c)TFEU and the 6(5)DMA, targeting platforms that hold a dominant position or have been designated as gatekeepers; however, it does not cover platforms that are neither dominant nor classified as gatekeepers, leaving them generally free to engage in self-preferencing practices without regulatory constraints. The imposition of these legal limitations directly impacts the way platforms structure their business strategies and respond to competitive pressures. Additionally, the research concludes that the most appropriate way to regulate self-preferencing from a competitive perspective is through a case-by-case assessment. In line with this, the ex-post approach of Article 102 TFEU provides a more suitable regulatory framework than the blank ex-ante prohibition established under Article 6(5) DMA.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2025. , p. 57
Keywords [en]
self-preferencing, dual-role platforms, vertical integration, digital platforms, competition law, EU regulatory framework, Article 6(5) DMA, Article 102(c)TFEU, dominant position, gatekeepers, ex-ante regulation, ex-post enforcement, case-by-case assessment, blanket ban, market contestability, consumer welfare.
National Category
Social Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-562417OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-562417DiVA, id: diva2:1978550
Subject / course
Commercial Law
Educational program
Master's Programme in International and European Law and Business
Presentation
2025-06-05, 11:44 (English)
Supervisors
Examiners
2025-06-302025-06-272025-06-30Bibliographically approved