The purpose and research problem of this thesis aim to investigate whether the government's reassignment of agency directors serves solely as a means of controlling authorities or if there are other reasons for such reassignments. Appointing a director-general is one of the government's tools to influence agencies in implementing desired policies. The question arises whether the removal of a director-general can similarly be viewed as a method of influencing an agency, and if there are alternative motivations for such actions. What are the reasons behind government decisions to reassign director-generals? Is it a matter of control, accountability, or protecting a cabinet minister? This thesis seeks to answer these questions and explore the multifaceted motivations for government reassignments. The chosen methodology for this research is qualitative content analysis, aiming to systematically analyze and interpret textual data to identify patterns and themes related to the reasons behind government decisions to reassign director-generals. In an effort to synthesize these points, the government's reassignment of director-generals is multifaceted, encompassing control mechanisms, reputation management, and organizational restructuring. The qualitative content analysis employed in this research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the motivations behind these reassignments.