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Privacy and Security of DNS Resolvers used in the Nordics and Baltics
Karlstad University, Faculty of Health, Science and Technology (starting 2013), Department of Mathematics and Computer Science (from 2013).ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0961-9489
2025 (English)In: Secure IT Systems: Conference proceedings-30th Nordic Conference in Secure IT Systems, NordSec / [ed] Raimundas Matulevičius, Liina Kamm, Mubashar Iqbal, Springer, 2025, p. 266-284Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The Domain Name System (DNS) is the critical Internet infrastructure responsible for translating domain names to IP addresses. The DNS resolver, which performs tasks such as caching, forwarding, and querying authoritative name servers on behalf of clients, serves a key role within this system. However, DNS resolvers also introduce several security and privacy concerns as a machine-in-the-middle between client queries and name server responses. In this study, we examine DNS resolvers used by clients in the Nordic and Baltic countries, conducting active measurements to assess the adoption of security and privacy features. We utilize the RIPE Atlas network of volunteer-run probes for our measurements in July 2025 and analyze 1066 unique probe-resolver pairs. We reveal that 92% supported IPv6, 87% were validating DNSSEC, 70% implemented QNAME Minimization, 83% avoided using EDNS Client Subnet, and 78% returned minimal responses to the client. We categorize the resolvers based on their network proximity to the client, allowing for more in-depth analysis. We find that private, within-AS, and public (outside-AS) resolvers show varying levels of feature adoption across these categories. We compare the Nordic and Baltic countries against each other focusing on preconfigured resolvers in the same AS as the probe (typically operated by ISPs). Norway has the highest adoption of IPv6 support and minimal responses, Denmark has a 100% adoption of DNSSEC, Estonia has the highest adoption of QNAME Minimization, and all countries avoid using the EDNS Client Subnet. We also identify strong adoption correlations between data minimization features, such as QNAME Minimization and minimal responses, as well as a relationship between DNSSEC and IPv6 support.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2025. p. 266-284
Series
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 0302-9743, E-ISSN 1611-3349 ; 16325
National Category
Computer Sciences
Research subject
Computer Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-109545DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-14782-0_15ISI: 001773560400015Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-105036722784ISBN: 978-3-032-14781-3 (print)ISBN: 978-3-032-14782-0 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kau-109545DiVA, id: diva2:2050483
Conference
The 30th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, Tartu, Estonia, November 12-13,2025.
Available from: 2026-04-02 Created: 2026-04-02 Last updated: 2026-06-29Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Measuring Adoption, Implementation, and Impact of Available Privacy Solutions in DNS Resolvers
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Measuring Adoption, Implementation, and Impact of Available Privacy Solutions in DNS Resolvers
2026 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Alternative title[sv]
Mätning av införande, implementering och effekter av tillgängliga integritetslösningar i DNS-resolvrar
Abstract [en]

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a fundamental component of the Internet, yet its resolution process exposes highly sensitive information about client activity. DNS resolvers, positioned between clients and authoritative name servers, typically observe both query contents and client identifiers, making them a focal point for privacy risks and a natural target for privacy-enhancing mechanisms. This thesis investigates privacy challenges involving DNS resolvers and analyzes how proposed technical solutions are deployed and implemented in practice.

The thesis adopts an empirical approach, using active and passive Internet measurements from multiple vantage points to study resolver behavior. The results show substantial growth in the adoption of DNS privacy mechanisms such as Query Name Minimization (QMIN), largely driven by defaults introduced by major public resolvers. However, adoption remains uneven across regions and resolver types, and persistently low for mechanisms enabling encrypted resolver discovery among non-public resolvers.

We identify significant deployability challenges: strict QMIN configurations cause resolution failures, increased latency, and higher traffic overhead due to widespread misbehavior by authoritative servers, while DNS resolution over the Tor anonymity network provides strong anonymity guarantees at the cost of reduced performance. The thesis further reveals systematic deviations from standards that enable fingerprinting of resolver software, as well as widespread misconfigurations in encrypted DNS transport signaling that reinforce resolver centralization. Overall, while privacy-enhancing DNS mechanisms are increasingly deployed, their real-world effectiveness is constrained by implementation gaps, performance trade-offs, and centralization pressures, highlighting the need for improved interoperability, validation tools, and greater attention to operational realities.

Abstract [en]

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a core Internet infrastructure that mainly translates domain names into network addresses, yet its operation reveals sensitive information about client activity. This thesis investigates the privacy challenges involving DNS resolvers, which occupy a central position between clients and authoritative name servers, and examines how privacy-enhancing DNS mechanisms are deployed and function in real-world settings. Using large-scale active and passive Internet measurements from multiple vantage points, the thesis analyzes the adoption, performance, and interoperability of modern DNS privacy technologies. The results show increasing deployment of mechanisms largely driven by major public resolvers, alongside persistent challenges including uneven adoption, performance penalties, specification deviations, and growing centralization. Overall, the thesis highlights the tension between improved DNS privacy and operational constraints, underscoring the need for more robust, interoperable solutions.

Abstract [sv]

Domännamnssystemet (DNS) är en grundläggande komponent i internets infrastruktur, men dess uppslagningsprocess exponerar omfattande känslig information om klienternas aktivitet. DNS-resolvrar, som är placerade mellan klienter och auktoritativa namnservrar, observerar vanligtvis både innehållet i förfrågningarna och klientidentifierare, vilket gör dem till en central punkt för integritetsrisker och en naturlig plats för integritetsskyddande mekanismer. Denna avhandling undersöker integritetsutmaningar relaterade till DNS-resolvrar och analyserar hur föreslagna tekniska lösningar används och implementeras i praktiken.

Avhandlingen använder ett empiriskt tillvägagångssätt, med aktiva och passiva internetmätningar från ett flertal olika utsiktspunkter för att studera beteendet av resolvrar. Resultaten visar en betydande ökning i användningen av integritetsmekanismer såsom Query Name Minimization (QMIN), i stor utsträckning driven av standardinställningar som införts av stora offentliga resolvrar. Användningen är dock fortfarande ojämn mellan olika regioner och resolvertyper, och fortsatt låg för mekanismer som möjliggör upptäckande av krypterade anslutningspunkter bland icke-offentliga resolvrar.

Vi identifierar betydande utmaningar när det gäller implementerbarhet: strikta QMIN-konfigurationer orsakar fel i uppslagningen, ökad latens och högre trafikvolymer på grund av felaktigt beteende hos auktoritativa servrar. DNS-uppslagning över anonymitetsnätverket Tor ger starka anonymitetsgarantier på bekostnad av prestandaförluster. Avhandlingen visar på systematiska avvikelser från standarder som möjliggör unik identifiering av mjukvara samt utbredd felkonfiguration i mekanismer för att signalera krypterad DNS-transport som förstärker centralisering. Även om mekanismer för integritetsskydd i DNS används i allt större utsträckning, begränsas deras faktiska effektivitet av brister i implementeringen, avvägningar runt prestanda samt centralisering. Detta understryker följaktligen behovet av förbättrad interoperabilitet, valideringsverktyg och större hänsyn till operatörers praktiska förutsättningar.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2026. p. 37
Series
Karlstad University Studies, ISSN 1403-8099 ; 2026:33
Keywords
Domain Name System, Resolver, Privacy, Internet Measurements, Domännamnssystemet, resolver, personlig integritet, internetmätningar
National Category
Computer Sciences
Research subject
Computer Science
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-109643 (URN)10.59217/mwtl6138 (DOI)978-91-7867-716-0 (ISBN)978-91-7867-717-7 (ISBN)
Public defence
2026-08-27, 1A305 Lagerlöfsalen, Universitetsgatan 2, Karlstad, 09:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Funder
.SE (The Internet Infrastructure Foundation), 6458
Available from: 2026-05-27 Created: 2026-04-13 Last updated: 2026-06-11Bibliographically approved

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