Identifying and resolving conflicts of interests is a key challenge when designing autonomous agents. For example, such conflicts often occur when complex information systems interact persuasively with humans and are in the future likely to arise in non-human agent-to-agent interaction. We introduce a theoretical framework for an empathic autonomous agent that proactively identifies potential conflicts of interests in interactions with other agents (and humans) by considering their utility functions and comparing them with its own preferences using a system of shared values to find a solution all agents consider acceptable. To illustrate how empathic autonomous agents work, we provide running examples and a simple prototype implementation in a general-purpose programing language. To give a high-level overview of our work, we propose a reasoning-loop architecture for our empathic agent.

In a previous publication, we introduced the core concepts of empathic agents as agents that use a combination of utility-based and rule-based approaches to resolve conflicts when interacting with other agents in their environment. In this work, we implement proof-of-concept prototypes of empathic agents with the multi-agent systems development framework Jason and apply argumentation theory to extend the previously introduced concepts to account for inconsistencies between the beliefs of different agents. We then analyze the feasibility of different admissible set-based argumentation semantics to resolve these inconsistencies. As a result of the analysis we identify the maximal ideal extension as the most feasible argumentation semantics for the problem in focus.

A multitude of agent-oriented software engineering frameworks exist, most of which are developed by the academic multi-agent systems community. However, these frameworks often impose programming paradigms on their users that are challenging to learn for engineers who are used to modern high-level programming languages such as JavaScript and Python. To show how the adoption of agent-oriented programming by the software engineering mainstream can be facilitated, we provide a lean JavaScript library prototype for implementing reasoning-loop agents. The library focuses on core agent programming concepts and refrains from imposing further restrictions on the programming approach. To illustrate its usefulness, we show how the library can be applied to multi-agent systems simulations on the web, deployed to cloud-hosted function-as-a-service environments, and embedded in Python-based data science tools.

Abstract argumentation has emerged as a method for non-monotonic reasoning that has gained popularity in the symbolic artificial intelligence community. In the literature, the different approaches to abstract argumentation that were refined over the years are typically evaluated from a formal logics perspective; an analysis that is based on models of economically rational decision-making does not exist. In this paper, we work towards addressing this issue by analysing abstract argumentation from the perspective of the rational man paradigm in microeconomic theory. To assess under which conditions abstract argumentation-based decision-making can be considered economically rational, we derive reference independence as a non-monotonic inference property from a formal model of economic rationality and create a new argumentation principle that ensures compliance with this property. We then compare the reference independence principle with other reasoning principles, in particular with cautious monotony and rational monotony. We show that the argumentation semantics as proposed in Dung’s seminal paper, as well as other semantics we evaluate, with the exception of naive semantics and the SCC-recursive CF2 semantics, violate the reference independence principle. Consequently, we investigate how structural properties of argumentation frameworks impact the reference independence principle and identify cyclic expansions (both even and odd cycles) as the root of the problem. Finally, we put reference independence into the context of preference-based argumentation and show that for this argumentation variant, which explicitly models preferences, reference independence cannot be ensured in a straight-forward manner.

Typically, humans do not act purely rationally in the sense of classic economic theory. Different patterns of human actions have been identified that are not aligned with the traditional view of human actors as rational agents that act to maximize their own utility function. For instance, humans often act sympathetically -- i.e., they choose actions that serve others in disregard of their egoistic preferences. Even if there is no immediate benefit resulting from a sympathetic action, it can be beneficial for the executing individual in the long run. This paper builds upon the premise that it can be beneficial to design autonomous agents that employ sympathetic actions in a similar manner as humans do. We create a taxonomy of sympathetic actions, that reflects different goal types an agent can have to act sympathetically. To ensure that the sympathetic actions are recognized as such, we propose different explanation approaches autonomous agents may use. In this context, we focus on human-agent interaction scenarios. As a first step towards an empirical evaluation, we conduct a preliminary human-robot interaction study that investigates the effect of explanations of (somewhat) sympathetic robot actions on the human participants of human-robot ultimatum games. While the study does not provide statistically significant findings (but notable differences), it can inform future in-depth empirical evaluations.