This study examines whether the initial phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War confirms or challenges the classical air power assumption that air superiority is a necessary precondition for operational success. Using a composite theoretical framework based on Giulio Douhet, John A. Warden III, and Robert A. Pape, the thesis analyses the relationship between control of the air and operational effect in a modern high-intensity interstate war. The study is conducted as a qualitative theory-testing case study using congruence analysis and is based on five analytical reports on the opening phase of the war in 2022.

The findings show that neither Russia nor Ukraine achieved stable and lasting air superiority. Although Russia gained some temporary and local advantages, it failed to suppress Ukrainian air defences sufficiently to sustain a coherent air campaign. This limited Russian operational freedom of action and reduced the operational effect of Russian air power.

The study concludes that the Ukrainian case challenges the classical assumption in its strongest form, since some operational activity and limited success occurred without full air superiority. At the same time, it also supports the theory in a weaker sense: the absence of air superiority clearly constrained the ability to generate decisive operational effect. Air superiority therefore remains important, but in modern warfare it appears more contested, local, and temporary than classical air power theory tends to assume.