Since Russia's accession to the Council of Europe in 1996, its relationship with the organization's institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has not been easy, especially since the ECtHR started issuing judgments in politically salient cases. Despite more than 2,500 rulings of the ECtHR finding Russia in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and contrary to the expectations of the decision-makers at the time, the compliance gap between the requirements of the Convention and the domestic protection of human rights persists. This chapter concerns Russia's participation in the Convention system explored through the lens of its responses to the adverse judgments of the Strasbourg Court, which over the years have ranged from compliance, in some cases, to open defiance, in others. It is suggested that while Russia's approach in many ways is not unique, the existing mechanism to refuse the execution of a judgment is unprecedented.

In today’s Europe the protection of human rights is ensured by different legal instruments on the national, regional and international levels. Sometimes these human rights regimes clash with each other, not infrequently because of diverging understandings of rights by the judicial bodies responsible for their interpretation. On the one hand, states have a legal obligation to comply with their international commitments and, pursuant to Art. 46 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or the Convention), also with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) delivered against them. On the other hand, in the majority of countries international treaties (including international courts’ judgments) have a lower formal rank than national law and in particular the Constitution, which is regarded as the supreme source of law. This paper compares the case-law and approaches of the Constitutional Courts of Russia and Lithuania towards judgments of the Strasbourg Court, which potentially challenge national constitutional provisions. Neither the Constitutional Court of Russia nor the Constitutional Court of Lithuania was willing/able to reconcile the Convention and the Constitution, but whereas the former encouraged the State to respect its international obligations, the latter used its authority to justify non-compliance.

The ECHR system is often regarded as one of the world’s most effective human rights regimes, with unique mechanisms to ensure compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Despite this, there is a growing concern about judgment non-compliance, a trend that extends beyond non-democracies to established and young democracies alike. This article investigates ‘democratic non-compliance’ through a process-tracing analysis of six leading cases against Lithuania, monitored by the Committee of Ministers (CoM) under the enhanced supervision track. As a young democracy with strong institutions but only a moderate compliance record, Lithuania presents a compelling puzzle. The article argues that certain democratic features themselves - such as electoral competition and legislative veto players - can obstruct the execution of ECtHR judgments. While young democracies are often expected to comply to signal their commitment to international norms, the analysis reveals a more pragmatic and nuanced approach, with material and tangible costs playing a central role for the legislature and reputational concerns for the executive. Meanwhile, the supervision of the CoM, while reliable, is not an independent driver of compliance but a catalyst whose effectiveness is contingent upon favourable domestic conditions.