Andelen svenskar med muslimsk kulturbakgrund ökar och i det offentliga samtalet kan vi skönja allt mer polariserade positioner i fråga om de utmaningar som en större muslimsk närvaro i Sverige kan förväntas medföra. I dessa diskussioner, liksom i den allmänna mediabilden av muslimer, ligger fokus oftast på personer för vilka religionen utgör en viktig del av identiteten. I ett sekulariserat samhälle – där det lutherska kristna arvet för många upplevs som något som tillhör det förflutna – uppstår en situation i vilken människor med muslimsk familjebakgrund betraktas som mer religiösa än de med en kristen.

Men hur är det egentligen med detta? Är svenskar av muslimsk börd mer religiösa än andra i Sverige idag? Med utgångspunkt i den forskning som Erika Willander och David Thurfjell genomfört inom ramen för projektet The Muslim mainstream presenteras i denna rapport resultat i fråga om i vilken utsträckning och på vilka sätt svenskar med muslimsk familjebakgrund är sekulära. 

The demographical changes during the last decades have created a sit­uation where Sweden has become one of the most secular and one of the most multireligious countries at the same time. This situation stands in stark contrast to the country's modern history in which its population have been largely homogeneous, and its religious landscape almost completely dominated by state-church Lutheranism. The growth of Sweden's Muslim population is what has caused most debate. According to calculations made by the Pew Research Center, one fifth of the country's total population is likely to be Muslim by 2050. This change also has consequences for the former state church, which now finds that also Muslims take part in its activities. In this article we present and analyze a novel survey-investigation on Muslims who self-identify as members of the Church of Sweden. In our analysis we differentiate between Muslims and what we call post-Muslims. While the former of these categories refers to those who self-identify as Muslims, the latter refers to people who do not refer to themselves as Muslims but who come from a Muslim family. These categories are mirrored by the Christians and post-Christians, who are selected by equivalent criteria. We conclude that most Muslims and post-Muslims have no affiliation to organized religious communities in Sweden and that among those who do, Christian churches are as important as the Muslim congregations. Among the churches, the Church of Sweden is the one in which most Muslims and post-Muslims are members. The Muslim and post-Muslim members of this church, we find, differ from each other. The Muslims are mostly Swedish-born 50–65-year-old women. They do not take part in any religious activities, and they celebrate Christian, but not Muslim, holidays. In terms of beliefs, they believe in a life after death, but mostly not in God or hell. The post-Muslims are mostly 30–49-year-old men who have come relatively recently to Sweden from the Middle East. They take part in congregational activities and celebrate both Muslim and Christian holidays. They also largely believe in God, a life after death, and hell. In terms of representation, they feel represented, primarily, by Muslim communities.

Inherited or acquired secularity? Secular identity among post-Muslims and post -Christians in Sweden Sweden is both secularised and multi-religious. This article analyses the secularity of Swedes with Muslim and Christian family backgrounds. Survey data were collected from people living in Sweden with a family background in Iraq, Iran, Yugoslavia, or Turkey, as well as from a control group of Swedish origin. We first present the extent to which respondents agree with the statement "I see myself as secular (non-religious)". This is followed by an exploratory regression analysis of what is associated with self-identification as secular. Country of origin and secularity in the immediate family were the variables that correlate most clearly with a secular self-image. Length of residence in Sweden, exposure to majority Swedish culture and socio-economic factors also have some influence. We conclude that secularity is mainly something that Swedes with a Muslim family background bring with them from their countries of origin, rather than something that they acquire in Sweden. The article concludes with a discussion that opens up the results for further theorising in the field of secularisation studies.

Sverige är samtidigt sekulariserat och mångreligiöst. Föreliggande studie bidrar till förståelsen av denna situation genom att diskutera sekularitet bland svenskar med muslimsk respektive kristen familjebakgrund. Materialet i undersökningen kommer från en enkät som skickades till i Sverige bosatta personer födda i, eller med föräldrar som föddes i, Irak, Iran, Jugoslavien eller Turkiet, samt till en kontrollgrupp (personer med familjebakgrund i Sverige). Inledningsvis presenteras i vilken utsträckning de svarande instämmer i påståendet ”jag ser på mig själv som sekulär (icke-religiös)”. Därefter följer en explorativ regressionsanalys av vad som sammanfaller med att beskriva sig som sekulär. Analysen visar att ursprungsland och graden av sekularitet i den närmsta familjen är det som tydligast samvarierar med en sekulär självbild. Viss betydelse har också vistelsetid i landet, exponering för svensk majoritetskultur och socioekonomiska faktorer. Vår slutsats är att sekularitet bland svenskar med muslimsk familjebakgrund huvudsakligen är något de har med sig från sina anknytningsländer och inte något de förvärvar i Sverige. Detsamma gäller svenskättade svarspersoner utan migrationsbakgrund. Artikeln avslutas med en diskussion som öppnar för vidare teoretisering inom sekulariseringsfältet.

The demographical changes during the last decades have created a sit­uation where Sweden has become one of the most secular and one of the most multireligious countries at the same time. This situation stands in stark contrast to the country's modern history in which its population have been largely homogeneous, and its religious landscape almost completely dominated by state-church Lutheranism. The growth of Sweden's Muslim population is what has caused most debate. According to calculations made by the Pew Research Center, one fifth of the country's total population is likely to be Muslim by 2050. This change also has consequences for the former state church, which now finds that also Muslims take part in its activities. In this article we present and analyze a novel survey-investigation on Muslims who self-identify as members of the Church of Sweden. In our analysis we differentiate between Muslims and what we call post-Muslims. While the former of these categories refers to those who self-identify as Muslims, the latter refers to people who do not refer to themselves as Muslims but who come from a Muslim family. These categories are mirrored by the Christians and post-Christians, who are selected by equivalent criteria. We conclude that most Muslims and post-Muslims have no affiliation to organized religious communities in Sweden and that among those who do, Christian churches are as important as the Muslim congregations. Among the churches, the Church of Sweden is the one in which most Muslims and post-Muslims are members. The Muslim and post-Muslim members of this church, we find, differ from each other. The Muslims are mostly Swedish-born 50–65-year-old women. They do not take part in any religious activities, and they celebrate Christian, but not Muslim, holidays. In terms of beliefs, they believe in a life after death, but mostly not in God or hell. The post-Muslims are mostly 30–49-year-old men who have come relatively recently to Sweden from the Middle East. They take part in congregational activities and celebrate both Muslim and Christian holidays. They also largely believe in God, a life after death, and hell. In terms of representation, they feel represented, primarily, by Muslim communities.

This article empirically explores the interplay between the secular, post-Lutheran majority culture and Muslim immigrants in Sweden. It presents the ambiguous role of religion in the country's mainstream discourse, the othering of religion that is characteristic to this, and the expectations of Muslims to be strongly religious that follows as its consequence. Four results of a web-panel survey with Swedes of Muslim and Christian family background are then presented: (1) Both groups largely distance themselves from their own religious heritage - the Muslims do this in a more definite way; (2) the Muslim respondents have more secular values and identities than the Christians; (3) contrary expectations, Christian respondents show more affinity to their religious heritage than the Muslims do to theirs; and (4) the fusion between the groups is prominent. The article concludes that equating religious family heritage with religious identity is precipitous in the case of Swedish Muslims.