

Abstract

The paper offers three illustrations of how the process of “intersubjectification” (Traugott & Dasher 2002) can be observed in the development of time deictics, person markers and sentence-type markers to encode aspects of the speaker’s assumptions concerning the addressee’s epistemic access to an event. First-hand data from Lakandon Maya (Yukatekan, Mexico), Kogi, and Ika (Arwako-Chibchan, Colombia) is discussed in order to offer a potentially more nuanced view of intersubjectification in language. While suggested in previous accounts of intersubjectification, the paper argues that this process of language change only involves categories and expressions defineable as “shifters” (Jespersen 1922), i.e. expressions that at the same time refer to aspects of the speech situation and the proposition.

Intersubjectification revisited: a cross-categorical perspective

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Introduction

Some forms of epistemic marking signal knowledge (a)symmetries between the speech participants (Bergqvist 2011, 2012, 2016, in press). Such markers encode the speaker’s assumptions about the addressee’s epistemic access to some event. These may be viewed as markers of (epistemic) intersubjectivity and constitute distinct sub-systems in some languages, parallel to other forms of epistemic marking, such as evidentiality and epistemic modality (e.g. Bergqvist 2016, Landaburu 2007; cf. Evans 2005). Evans et al. (forthcoming) follows Landaburu (2007) and calls this categorical expression “engagement”. Example (1) from Kogi (Arwako-Chibchan, Colombia) illustrates the semantic contrast between shared and exclusive access to an event:

- (1) a. uba na-kwĩ **ni**-Ø-gua-t’äw
 eye 1O-have.PRTC SPKR.SYM-3S-do-PROG
 ‘I’m getting tired.’ (Context: said yawning, late at night; BUN_090822)
- b. uba na-kwĩ **na**-Ø-gua-t’äw
 eye 1O-have.PRTC SPKR.ASYM-3S-do-PROG
 ‘I’m getting tired.’ (Context: said as a reason for wanting to go to bed; BUN_090822)

In (1), the 'symmetrical' *ni-* and the asymmetrical *na-* encode a contrast between the speaker's assumption that the addressee is aware of the speaker's tiredness (1a) and the speaker's assumption that the addressee has failed to notice, or alternatively has no reason to think, that the speaker is tired (1b). In both forms, the speaker's commitment is entailed and the forms only contrast in terms of whether the addressee's assumed commitment overlaps with the speaker's, or not. If this form of epistemic marking may indeed be regarded as distinct from more familiar forms of epistemic marking, such as epistemic modality and evidentiality, it raises the question of how such systems develop.

Intersubjectification is a grammaticalization process where forms that include the point of view of the addressee (intersubjective) develop from subjective forms that focus on the perspective of the speaker (subjective; see Traugott & Dasher 2002). This process is potentially applicable to constructions from various semantic domains. The present paper specifically discusses such developments using first hand data from Lakandon Maya (Yukatekan, Mexico), Ika, and Kogi (Arwako-Chibchan, Colombia). In these languages, intersubjectification involves time deictics (Lakandon), sentence-type markers, and person markers (Ika and Kogi). The common denominator for these categorical expressions is their status as "shifters" (Jespersen 1922), elements in language that at the same time signal aspects of the speech situation and the proposition (cf. *speech event* and *narrated event*; Jakobson 1990 [1957]).

In Lakandon Maya, a time deictic, *uúch*, has developed from marking a "distant past event" to marking an event as exclusively accessible to the speaker, and as such, unknown to the addressee. While the temporal meaning dimension in *uúch* is still present, the primary use of the marker is to distinguish (past) events that the speaker assumes that the addressee does not know about from those that are assumed to be familiar to the addressee (Bergqvist 2008, submitted).

Ika has developed a version of egophoric marking, also called conjunct/disjunct (see Bickel & Nichols 2007; Hale 1980). The egophoric marker *-w*, is cognate to the first person subject marker *-ku* in Kogi and the closely related language Damana. It interacts predictably with a set of epistemic suffixes, *-in*, *-e*, and *-o*, which developed from sentence-type markers to encode different (a)symmetry configurations between the speech participants in terms of 'epistemic authority' (see Bergqvist 2012). The egophoric *-w* occurs in contexts where the speaker claims epistemic authority of a publically observable event that involves (at least) one of the speech participants. The speaker's epistemic authority can either be exclusive to the speaker (*-in*) or shared with the addressee (*-e*) (Bergqvist 2012, forthcoming).

In Kogi, the declarative sentence-type marker *-in/ni* has come to signal 'knowledge symmetry' between the speaker and the addressee, marking events that are equally accessible to both speech participants in an epistemic sense. It is paradigmatically contrasted with the marker *na-*, which signals knowledge asymmetry (from the speaker's perspective) and arguably originates with the first person object marker *na-* (see above; Bergqvist 2016).

The intersubjectification of time deictics, person, and sentence-type markers to include the perspective of the addressee as epistemic markers is an underexplored development that partly may be attributed to the amorphous nature of shifters in language (see Section 2, below). Intersubjectification as a general process of language change may be favourably applied to account for such changes.

1. On intersubjectivity

While the term intersubjectivity purportedly originates with Husserl (1931), it has since acquired technical uses that are only weakly connected to Husserl's initial formulation. For Husserl, intersubjectivity solved the problem of how the 'self' can relate to the 'other', as an alternative to "solipsism", where nothing exists outside the consciousness of the subject. In this context, intersubjectivity is conceived of in terms of empathy (empathic intentionality) and regarded as a requisite for human consciousness; possible to equate with 'experience', as such. As pointed out by readers of Husserl (e.g. Crossley 1996), this formulation of intersubjectivity fails to account for phenomena like 'community' and language, which were explicit concerns for some of Husserl's followers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the sociologist Alfred Schutz. Part of the critique against Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity is that it begins and ends with "the constitutive operations of a solitary consciousness" (Crossley 1996: 7) and that the 'other' is created by means of ego's imagination. Husserl's subject "observes" the world and does not engage or interact with it, thus ignoring the role of language and communication in human consciousness (ibid: 8). Failure to consider language and communication as meaning-producing, makes an account of 'community' very difficult. Schutz argues that the notion of 'self' automatically produces the 'other' and that these are relational terms, where one is meaningless without the other. Self-knowledge entails knowledge of the other, thus making the notion of a 'monadic psyche', obsolete. (ibid: 10) Schutz also criticizes the (asymmetric) perception of self and other from the inside-out and outside-in point of view in terms of analogical apperception and pairing – these are not the same. Perception is something that we cannot experience in itself.

In the field of linguistics, the notion of intersubjectivity was first discussed by Emile Benveniste (1971 [1958]) who considered the properties of shifters in language in an effort to illustrate the inherently (inter)subjective nature of language. Roman Jakobson's notion of "shifter" is almost simultaneous to Benveniste's formulation of subjectivity. It is indispensable for understanding categories in language where some only make reference to the event talked about (e.g. aspect) and others require explicit reference to the speech situation (e.g. tense). Benveniste discusses the categories of person (*I, you*), tense (present, as opposed to preterit and future), epistemic modality (in the form of complement taking predicates; *I think that, I suppose that*), as well as speech-acts (e.g. performatives; *I swear*) to illustrate how such constructions must be analyzed from the point of view of the speaker uttering them. The following quote elegantly formulates the inherent intersubjectivity of language as seen in the referential properties of shifters:

"Language is possible only because each speaker sets himself up as a *subject* by referring to himself as *I* in his discourse. Because of this, *I* posits another person, the one who, being, as he is, completely exterior to "me", becomes my echo to whom I say *you* and who says *you* to me. This polarity of persons is the fundamental condition in language of which the process of communication, in which we share, is only a mere pragmatic consequence. It is a polarity, moreover, very peculiar in itself, as it offers a type of opposition whose equivalent is encountered nowhere else outside of language. This polarity does not mean either equality or symmetry: "ego" always has a position of transcendence with regard to *you*. Nevertheless, neither of the terms can be conceived of without the other; they are complementary, although according to an "interior"/"exterior"

opposition, and, at the same time, they are reversible. If we seek a parallel to this, we will not find it. The condition of man in language is unique.”(Benveniste 1971 [1958]: 225)

It is worth noting Benveniste’s explicit claim that *I* holds a unique position against *you*, a position that he conceptualizes in terms of (in)equality and (a)symmetry. We will have reason to return to this original insight in our discussion of the language data in Sections 3 and 4. The notion of ‘knowledge (a)symmetry’ appears key to analyzing different intersubjective constructions that specify configurations of epistemic access between the speech participants (e.g. I know, but you don’t vs. we both know; Introduction, above; cf. Bergqvist 2012, in press, forthcoming).

On the level of grammatical categories, it has been long since noted that the subjective point of view of the speaker is present in well-known categories like tense, epistemic modality and evidentiality (Jakobson 1990 [1957]; see above). The layered meaning of such categories is reflected by their placement vis-à-vis each other where a category like tense is placed closer to the verbal stem than epistemic modality, which in turn is followed by evidentiality (e.g. Bybee et al. 1985; Cinque 1999). This hierarchical placement has also been argued to correspond to an increasing attention to the perspective of the addressee (Heine 2013; Section 2, below), i.e. categorical expressions featuring intersubjective meanings are commonly placed at the edge of the verbal complex. This placement aligns with the wide scope properties of such forms and their interaction with e.g. speech-act markers. We will have reason to return to this last point in our discussion of data from Lakandon, Ika, and Kogi in Sections 3 and 4.

2. Intersubjectivity and intersubjectification in language

Grammaticalization, according to Hopper & Traugott (2003: 1) “refers to that part of the study of language change that is concerned with such questions as how lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions or how grammatical items develop new grammatical functions.” It has been proposed as a cyclical, unidirectional, and semantically driven process where different stages of grammaticalization are achieved. The development of *will*/*’ll* (‘future’) in Modern English exemplifies this process. Historically, *will* was a verb of volition (OE *willan* ‘want’, ‘wish’), still discernible in the somewhat archaic phrase, *do what you will*. It then acquired the status of an auxiliary with modal semantics (‘intention’) overlapping with tense meaning (‘future’). In a still later stage of development, *will* has been reduced to the clitic *’ll* encoding future tense.

The stages of change outlined by the development of *will* are conditioned by sub-processes such as “semantic bleaching”, “morphological reduction”, “obligatorification”, and “phonetic erosion”. Semantic bleaching involves the loss of “concrete”, lexical content in a morpheme that is becoming grammaticalized; morphological reduction and obligatorification, respectively accounts for the shortening and changed grammatical status of a morpheme, and phonetic erosion can be seen in how a morpheme loses the possibility of taking stress. These stages of grammaticalization are not realized at every stage of the grammaticalization process, nor with every morpheme subject to it (see Hopper and Traugott 2003).

The notion of semantic bleaching is accompanied by the acquisition of a new function, which may be semantically less concrete than its previous lexical meaning, but often predictably related to the original meaning of the form (e.g. volition to (future) intention). Cross-linguistic tendencies have been observed for the development of members of categories such as tense, aspect, mood/modality, and evidentiality. A common origin for these is with verbs, e.g. *say* may become grammaticalized to signal 'reported speech' and *finish* express the function of 'perfect'.

A particular grammaticalization process is discussed in Traugott and Dasher (2002), namely the "intersubjectification" of modal adverbs and forms of social deixis (e.g. Fr. *tu/vous*). This process details how a 'subjective' expression that encodes some aspect of the speaker's point-of-view becomes 'intersubjective' by including the addressee's point-of-view in that of the speaker: "[i]ntersubjectivity crucially involves SP/W's attention to AD/R as a participant in the speech event, not in the world talked about", it is "the explicit, coded expression of SP/W's [speaker/writer] attention to the image or "self" of AD/R [addressee/reader] in a social or an epistemic sense" (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 22). This development is specifically discussed with respect to how epistemic adverbs (*well, let's*) acquire intersubjective discourse functions and develop into discourse markers. The intersubjective meaning attributed to such forms is thus contingent on their function to relate aspects of the speech situation and the perspectives of the speech participants in discourse.

The process of intersubjectification is a subspecies of the well-known process of cross-categorical reanalysis of forms where e.g. an aspect marker like the 'perfect' may become a past tense marker or an inferential evidential (e.g. Aksu & Slobin 1986 for Turkish *miş*). Aspects of this categorical transfer may be attributed to the fuzziness of categories in an analytical sense, but there are cross-linguistic tendencies with regard to the way markers may acquire characteristics outside of their category membership resulting from the "conventionalization of implicatures" (Levinson 2000; cf. "invited inferences", Traugott & Dasher 2002). Implied meaning thus becomes encoded in forms from conventional patterns of use, depending on language specific circumstances. The cross-categorical transfer of meaning and more specifically the intersubjectification of expressions of subjectivity are central to the proposal forwarded here. In Sections 3 and 4, below, we will detail how intersubjectification occurs with different kinds of shifters (Jakobson 1957; see Section 1, above).

3. Time deictics in Lakandon Maya

In Lakandon Maya, the time deictic *uúch*, ('previously', 'long ago') has grammaticalized from a one-place predicate to an adverbial. The accompanying change in meaning that has occurred in *uúch* is from subjective 'time' to intersubjective 'knowledge'. This process was aided by a grammatical mapping onto the forms *kuúch/ka'ch* ('previously', 'a while ago'; see below), which are cognate to forms found in Colonial and Modern Yukatek. More precisely, the semantic contrast between *uúch* and *kuúch/ka'ch* is between events that are exclusively known to the speaker (*uúch*) and those that are assumed to be shared with the addressee (*kuúch/ka'ch*).

In Yukatek, *uúch* is an intransitive verb meaning 'to happen', but also a temporal-modal (TM) marker with the grammatical status of an auxiliary that is placed directly before the inflected verb. The TM-marker *uúch* is restricted to combine with the dependent status and cannot be inflected by proper verb morphology (see Bohmeyer 1998; Vapnarsky 1999). These differences are illustrated in the examples below where (2) features the intransitive verb and (3) contains the TM-marker:

(2) bfin wa uúch-uk-Ø tuka'ten-é
 FUT HYP happen-DEP.IV-3S.B again-TOP
 '(One day) maybe it will happen again.' (Vapnarsky 1999, p. 113 [my translation and glossing/orthographic adjustments])

(3) le' iglèesya yàan te' Sàanta Krùus-o', uúch
 DET church exist LOC PN-TD.DIST REM
 men-t-ak-Ø
 build-TR-DEP-3S.B
 'The church in Santa Cruz, was built long ago.' (Vapnarsky 1999, p. 143 [my translation and glossing/orthographic adjustments])

In example (2), *uúch* is a fully inflected verb, whereas in (3) it modifies the verb *me(e)n* 'to build'. A further development of *uúch* in Yukatek is as an adverbial that is not restricted to occur before the verbal core.

(4) Aa le'l-o k-in-ts'oon uúch-e' pixàan!
 EXCL DEM-TD.DIST INC-1S-shoot before-TD.ANA soul
 'Oh yes, I was shooting (at it) then, my soul! (Vapnarsky 1999, p. 5 [tome 2; my translation and glossing/orthographic adjustments])

In Lakandon, a cognate to the Yukatek *uúch* is no longer present in the form of an intransitive verb. Given that *uúch* in the form of an intransitive verb is found in all other Yukatekan languages, this must be regarded as a special development in Lakandon. Only the TM-marker and the adverbial *uúch* are attested. Example (5) shows the TM-marker *uúch* and (6) features the adverbial:

(5) uúch-ik saj-ak ma' mahk k-u-na'k-ar
 REM-ADV.FOC scare-DEP.IV NEG₁ person INC-3S.A-go.up-PLN.IV
 ich uy-atooch ik-nuukir-o'
 LOC 3S.A-house 1PL.A-ancestors-TD.DIST
 'Long ago, they were afraid, no one entered the house of the ancestors'
 (HBo40922_1EChK_4)

(6) uúch-ik k-u-tzikh'a-t-ik-Ø in-miim
 before.EXCL-ADV.FOC INC-3S.A-tell-TR-PLN-3S.B 1S.A-grandmother
 'My grandmother used to tell (me)' (HBo40922_1EChK_4)

While the placement and the actual form of *uúch* (with the adverbial focus marker *-ik*) is identical in (5) and (6), a differentiation can be made from the status marking that *uúch* combines with. In (5) the dependent status marker *-Vk* prompts an analysis of *uúch* as a TM-marker, while in (6), the plain status marker *-ik* motivates an analysis of *uúch* as an adverbial along with the fact that a Lakandon verb only permits one tense/aspect/mood-marker at a time (cf. Vapnarsky 1999: 142, for Yukatek).

The change in grammatical status from (full) predicate to adverbial corresponds to an increasing abstraction of meaning, where ‘to happen’ becomes ‘long ago’ and ultimately (in Lakandon) a ‘past event (assumed to be) unknown to the addressee’ (i.e. ‘knowledge asymmetry’). This development is sketched in Figure 1:




Figure 1. The grammaticalization of *uúch* (after Bergqvist submitted)

Clues to the proposed analysis of *uúch* as marker of a past event that is (assumed to be) unknown to the addressee, come from the distribution and frequency of *uúch* in various forms of speech. In Lakandon, *uúch* is frequently attested in some speech genres, such as personal narratives. In comparable Yukatek personal narratives, the adverbial *uúch* occurs with much lower frequency. A quick comparison between Lakandon and Yukatek reveals that *uúch* is present in 82 per cent of the lines (73) in one Lakandon narrative, whereas it is found in only 3 per cent of the lines of a Yukatek personal narrative (139 lines; cf. Author 2008, p. 331-332). While this comparison admittedly is impressionistic, statistically, it aligns well with other observations regarding differences in grammatical status of *uúch* in the two languages.

Evidence for the proposed analysis relies partly on manipulating the context of an utterance to see how contextual changes affects the congruent use of *uúch*, but also on speaker judgements that emphasizes an unknowing addressee as a requirement for the appropriate use of *uúch*. More importantly, the semantic change from temporal operator to a marker of knowledge asymmetry becomes visible from a paradigmatic perspective by comparison to the semantically contrastive particles *ka'ch* and *kuúch* (‘recently’, ‘a while ago’).

kuúch has cognates in all Yukatekan languages, whereas *ka'ch* is only found in Yukatek and Northern Lakandon. *kuúch* and *ka'ch* are hypothesized to be two variants with one function in Lakandon; *kuúch* in the Southern dialect and *ka'ch* in the Northern one. According to McQuown (1967) the meaning of cognate forms in Colonial Yukatek turn on relative temporal proximity, i.e. *kachi*, refers to “a time earlier today” and *kuchi* refers to a time “before today” (McQuown 1967: 243).

In Lakandon, *kuúch/ka'ch* do not encode a temporal separation between the speech event and the narrated event in terms of proximity (see Jakobson 1990 [1957]), i.e. *kuúch/ka'ch* cannot be used to answer a when-question about a past event (Author 2008: 260-261). Instead, the speaker’s assumption about the addressee’s knowledge of a past event constitutes the encoded semantics of the forms. As an illustration, compare (7), to (8), both of which refer to past states/events that happened more than 20 years ago.

(7) aw-eer mana' ch'upraj uúch
 2S.A-know NEG.EXIST woman before.EXCL
 'You know, there were no women before' (HB040917_1EChK_12)¹

(8) in-yuhm cheen b'in u-ka' ich este chiwahwa kuúch
 1S.A-FB only go 3S.A-do LOC this(Sp.) PLN before.INCL
 'Only my uncle was going to go to Chihuahua (as you already know)'
 (HB050328_1KYYM_1)

Example (7) was uttered in the context of telling a story about the history of the Lakandon. In this story there are many instances of *uúch*, one of these marking a commentary on the shortage of potential wives for Lakandon males in the first half of the 20th Century, as seen in (7). The events it recounts were not experienced first-hand by the speaker although this piece of community history is told as the speaker's personal knowledge (although not his personal history).

Example (8), on the other hand, was uttered when the speaker re-told the story of his uncle's going to Chihuahua to the researcher who had failed to get the recorder to capture the story the first time. *kuúch/ka'ch* is not restricted to appear in repeated utterances, but is often found with them. *uúch* was used during the first telling of the story for the same reasons that are stated above for example (7).

In Lakandon, the meaning encoded in *kuúch/ka'ch*, a "past event known to the addressee" (shared knowledge) is in paradigmatic contrast with the meaning encoded in *uúch*, which is to signal a 'past event unknown to the addressee'. As stated above, a change from temporal operator to a marker that specifies the speech participant's respective access to knowledge aligns with the notion of intersubjectification in which the subjective stance of the speaker is extended to include assumptions about the addressee's perspective. Comparable changes have taken place in English time adverbs (e.g. now, then; see Schiffrin 1987), but in contrast to such discourse markers, the change in *uúch* stems from its relationship to a contrastive 'past time' deictic, namely *ka'ch/kuúch*, which originally was contrasted to *uúch* in terms temporal distance. A temporal contrast between 'long ago' (*uúch*) and 'recently' (*ka'ch/kuúch*) has developed into a differentiation between what is assumed to be unknown to the addressee and known to the addressee, respectively. This development is outlined in Figure 2, below:

<i>kuúch/ka'ch:</i>	<i>temporal proximity</i> → <i>knowledge symmetry</i>
<i>uúch:</i>	<i>temporal distance</i> → <i>knowledge asymmetry</i>

Figure 2. Semantic changes in *uúch* and *kuúch/ka'ch* (after Bergqvist submitted)

¹ The opening phrase *aweer* ('you know') does not mean that the speaker thinks the addressee knows about the contents of the ensuing proposition, but is used as an informative opener, which is what I have tried to convey in the English translation of the example. An analogous construction in English would be: *You know, most of the Vikings came from Norway and not from Sweden, as you might think.*

Interestingly, the proposed analysis for *uúch* and *kuúch/ka'ch* in Lakandon has no synchronic correspondence in Yukatek. According to Vapnarsky (2000), using *-o'* together with *uúch* denotes a distance away from the interlocutors as well as 'shared information' (Fr. *savoir partagé*; Vapnarsky 2000: 202). This semantic analysis is however dependent on the presence of the terminal deictic *-o'* which allows (past) events to be referred to using *uúch*, but where reference to the speech participants' knowledge states is made by attaching one of the available terminal deictics, *-a'*, *-o'*, *-e'*, or *-i'*. The semantics attributed to these terminal deictics in non-temporal acts of reference, as reported by Hanks (1990), is also appropriate in the analysis of time words in Yukatek (p.c., Vapnarsky 2000: 200 pp). In Lakandon, there is no semantic contrast in terms of knowledge (a)symmetry between attaching *-a'* or *-o'* to *uúch*. The function of these terminal deictics is to serve as devices for event tracking (see Bergqvist 2008: 226) and does not indicate the speaker's expectation with regard to the addressee's knowledge of an event.

Also according to Vapnarsky, the semantic value of *ka'ch* in Yukatek refers to a state which is no longer true, or which could have been true but did not occur (see Vapnarsky 1999: 206-209). While a hypothetical function of *ka'ch* is also attested for Lakandon, the contrastive function of *ka'ch* in Yukatek to signal a past event/state that no longer holds may also be found in the use of *uúch* in the case of Lakandon. These semanto-pragmatic differences in cognate forms from two closely related languages serve to illustrate the nebulous nature of shifters more generally.

The synchronic variation found with *uúch* in Yukatek must be understood in terms of contextualized token-usage, whereas these conveyed meanings have crystallized in Lakandon to become encoded in forms. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the exact functional motivation behind these changes, the semantic path is clear from a comparison between *uúch* and *ka'ch/kuúch* in Lakandon to the synchronic (and diachronic) status of cognate forms in Yukatek.²

4. Sentence-type and person in Ika and Kogi

Ika and Kogi are two closely related Arwako-Chibchan languages spoken in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta region of northern Colombia. Ika has a variant of the egophoric marking pattern (see Section 4.1; Bergqvist 2012; Bergqvist forthcoming) whereas in Kogi, there is a form of epistemic marking that encodes knowledge (a)symmetries between the speech participants, tentatively named "complex epistemic perspective" (Section 4.2; see Bergqvist 2016). The function of these (purportedly) unusual, grammatical sub-systems in two closely related languages begs comparison and a first stab at this is in Bergqvist (2011). Since then, a more nuanced analysis of both systems has been formulated and the following account (Section 4.3) thus differs in some respects from the one proposed in Bergqvist (2011).

² The process of grammaticalization can clearly be seen with other pre-clitic aspect-modal markers in both Yukatek and Lakandon, which tend to be subject to phonological reduction and a possible future status as prefixes.

4.1 Egophoric marking in Ika

Egophoric marking (a.k.a. *conjunct/disjunct*) is a form of epistemic marking that draws on both ‘person’ and ‘evidentiality’ for its definition. Broadly speaking, the egophoric marker targets the involvement of the speech participants in some event, and is as such restricted to occur in contexts where the speaker or the addressee are salient participants.³ The prototypical egophoric pattern is as follows: the egophoric marker occurs with first person subjects in declaratives and second person subjects in interrogatives. The non-egophoric marker is reserved for all other combinations of subject person and the declarative/interrogative sentence-types. Egophoric marking must therefore be accounted for in both declarative and interrogative contexts. This pattern is demonstrated by data from the first description of such as system, namely the Tibeto-Burman language Kathmandu Newar (Hale 1980):

- (9)a. Ji ana wanā
 1S there go.EGO
 ‘I went there.’
- b. Cha ana wanā lā
 2S there go.EGO INTERR
 ‘Did you go there?’
- c. Cha ana wana
 2S there go.NON.EGO
 ‘You went there.’
- d. Wa ana wana
 3S there go.NON.EGO
 ‘He went there.’

(Hale 1980: 95)

In (9), the egophoric *ā* is restricted to occur with first and second person subjects in accordance with the stated alternation of sentence-type. However, this prototypical pattern is not without noted exceptions, which stem from the relationship between sentence-type and subject person (see Bergqvist forthcoming). Firstly, it is possible for

³ In line with the Western philosophical tradition to focus on the speaking subject and not on his/her interlocutor(s), the term egophoric marking appears shares this focus by form. However, as should be clear from the discussion, the *ego* also houses the *tu*, in Benveniste’s terms (from the point of view of the *ego*), allowing for a dialogical exchange of epistemic authority.

interrogative sentences with first person subjects to feature the egophoric marker, despite the fact that such combinations of subject person and sentence-type should be marked as non-egophoric. This atypical combination often results in a rhetorical reading as in (10):

- (10) Ji ana wanā lā
 iS there go.EGO INTERR
 ‘Did I go there? (I most certainly did not!’), Hale 1980: 100)

Aside from this exception to the prototypical pattern, it is also possible to signal a difference in terms of ‘volition’ by alternating the egophoric and non-egophoric marker in a context where a first or a second subject person would require the egophoric marker:

- (11) a. Ji danā
 iS go.EGO
 ‘I got up (voluntarily)’ (conjunct)
- b. Ji dana
 iS go.NON.EGO
 ‘I got up (involuntarily)’ (disjunct)

(Hale 1980: 99)

In Kathmandu Newar, as in other languages with egophoric marking (e.g. Akhvakh, Creissels 2008) there is a restriction on the distribution of egophoric markers that depend on predicate type, where only predicates that signal the volition/control of the speaker can take egophoric marking (see Creissels 2009 for a discussion). While non-prototypical uses of egophoric forms, such as the ones described above, may produce pragmatic changes in meaning, these are not attested in all languages that feature egophoric marking (e.g. Bergqvist 2012; Curnow 2002).

In Ika, there are specific distributional restrictions with the egophoric marker and second person subjects that depend on the relationship between subject person and sentence-type, and which have consequences for the analysis of the system. In Bergqvist (forthcoming), it is argued that these exceptions are consistent with the functional motivations underlying egophoric marking more generally, although they may in detail be specific to the system found in Ika. *Prima facie*, the distribution of the egophoric *-w* and the non-egophoric *-Ø/-y* in Ika appears to conform to the prototypical pattern:

- (12) a. (ən=)bunsi-w-in
spin.yarn-EGO-DECL
'I am spinning yarn.'
- b. nən=bunsi-k-w-e
2S=spin.yarn-DIST-EGO-SUSP
'You are spinning yarn?'
- c. nən=bunsə-y-in
2S=spin.yarn-NON.EGO-DECL
'You are spinning yarn./You spin yarn.'
- d. bunsə-y-in
spin.yarn-NON.EGO-DECL
'He is spinning yarn.'

(Landaburu 1992: 9-10 [my translation and glossing])

In (12) the egophoric *-w* is reserved for the same combinations of subject person and sentence-type that we saw for Kathmandu Newar in (10). However, a closer look reveals that there are exceptions to the egophoric pattern in Ika that involve the role of sentence-type and predicate type in the system. Most importantly, the declarative-interrogative alternation is not binary, given that there are two markers (*-e* and *-o*) used to produce questions (in a speech-act sense) of which only one (*-e*) is ever available for egophoric marking. It turns out that *-e* fails to meet the requirements for an interrogative marker given that the speaker's ignorance only is implied and may disappear with a change of subject person. Compare (12b) to (13) below:

- (13) bunsi-k-w-e
spin.yarn-DIST-EGO-SUSP
'(When) I spun yarn/(that) I spun yarn.' (ELI_090823)

The translation of (13) suggests a subordinate clause, but egophoric marking only occurs in finite, main clauses. This form of "insubordination" has been attested for a number of languages where finite "modal" constructions have an origin in subordinate clauses (e.g. German *ob*-constructions; see Evans 2007 for a detailed discussion of 'insubordination'). Support for an analysis of clauses such as (13) with the egophoric marker and *-e* as finite is seen in example (14) where a rhetorical interpretation is also possible:

- (14) eya nuku-w-e
 this hear-EGO-SUSP
 ‘(Do) I understand this? (Of course!) (ELI_120507)

By contrast, the interrogative marker *-o* is not available for egophoric marking. Compare example (14) with (15) below:

- (15) bunsə-k-Ø-o
 spin.yarn-DIST-NON.EGO-INTERR
 ‘Do I (know how to) spin yarn?’ (i.e. in your opinion; Bergqvist 2012:174)

A rhetorical reading is not available for the sentence in (15) where the ignorance of the speaker is implied by asking for the addressee’s opinion/knowledge. A solution to the problem of accounting for *-e* in the framework of a traditional division into sentence-types is proposed in Bergqvist (2012) who draws on Landaburu (1994, 2000) and analyses *-in*, *-o*, and *-e* as markers of ‘epistemic authority’. Instead of signalling a separation between declarative and interrogative sentence-types, it is argued that these markers encode three distinct (a)symmetries in terms of epistemic authority, namely “speaker asymmetric” (*-in*); “addressee asymmetric” (*-o*); and “speaker-addressee symmetric” (*-e*). This tripartite division of epistemic authority has direct bearing on the analysis of egophoric marking since only utterances that encode the speaker’s authority, either as exclusive (*-in*, ‘speaker asymmetric’) or shared (*-e*, ‘speaker-addressee symmetric’) take egophoric marking. Instances where epistemic authority is in effect “handed over to the addressee” (*-o*) are non-egophoric regardless of subject person. This distribution is schematized in Table 1:

	<i>-in</i> , ‘speaker authority’	<i>-e</i> , ‘shared authority’	<i>-o</i> , ‘addressee authority’
1S	<i>EGO</i>	<i>EGO</i>	-
2S	-	<i>EGO</i>	-
3S	-	-	-

Table 1. Combinations of egophoric (EGO) and markers of epistemic authority.

The translation of (15) is also suggestive of another restriction found with egophoric marking in Ika, namely which predicates are available for egophoric marking. The already mentioned contrast in terms of ‘volition’ and/or ‘control’ is, however, not applicable to Ika. Both *re’kich* (‘jump’) and *wa’na* (‘fall’) take egophoric marking as in (16), below:

- (16) a. re'kich-ən nuk-w-in
 jump-IMPF be.loc-EGO-DECL
 'I am jumping.'
- b. ka'-se wa'na u-k-w-in
 floor-LOC fall.PERF do-DIST-EGO-DECL
 'I fell to the floor.'

(ELI_120508)

In Ika, only predicates that target socially and perceptually “observable” events and states can take egophoric marking, meaning that mental state predicates that concern the feelings, opinions, and wishes of the speaker (or the addressee) are not available for egophoric marking. This notion of observational access plays an important role in the Ika system, but is also underspecified with regard to how access to an event is acquired. ‘Access’, in this use distinguishes between events that are available to be experienced, and/or known, and those that are not. Inaccessible events (non-egophoric) include “public” events that do not directly involve the speaker or the addressee and the “private” inner states of the speaker and others (including the addressee). The notion of ‘involvement’ appears key, as any other form of perceptual access remains under-specified.

Egophoric marking in Ika is, because of the specific distributional constraints sketched above in terms of observability and access, hypothesized to encode the speaker’s epistemic authority of an event that involves (at least) one of the speech participants. With second person subjects, egophoric marking is only possible by including the perspective of the addressee in the epistemic assessment of the speaker, not by means of epistemic “flip” or reversal, as suggested in other accounts of egophoric marking (see Creissels 2008; Curnow 2002).

A final argument to support this hypothesis comes from restrictions on egophoric marking with second person subjects in certain temporal contexts. Although, tense marking in the strict sense has yet to be demonstrated for Ika, sentences with egophoric marking and second person subjects are always interpreted as “present”. A past context rules out egophoric marking with second person subjects, but not with first person subjects, which may combine with egophoric marking in both past and present contexts. This restriction is analyzed as a component of the egophoric system to only mark accessible events.

The development of egophoric marking in Ika is clearly an instance of the same process that gave rise to *uúch/kuúch/ka'ch* in Lakandon, namely the grammaticalization of one categorical expression into another. In the case of Ika, the egophoric *-w* is cognate to the first person marker *-ku* in the other two Arwako languages, Kogi and Damana. The meaning of the form has thus gone from indexing a participant (in a syntactic and speech-act sense) to signaling the involvement of a speech participant, subject to different configurations of epistemic authority. The role of the epistemic suffixes, *-in*, *-e*, and *-o* in Ika egophoric marking bridges this system to the Kogi “complex epistemic perspective” prefixes (below), which draw on some of the same semantic contrasts and involve cognates of these forms, but in the end results in a quite different system.

A summary of the features of egophoric marking in Ika, is as follows: 1) egophoric marking only occurs with declaratives featuring first or second person subjects; either ones that charge the speaker with exclusive epistemic authority (*-in*), or ones that share epistemic authority with the addressee (*-e*). Interrogatives that encode the speaker's ignorance and where the epistemic authority resides with the addressee (*-o*) are not available for egophoric marking, 2) the defining feature of 1) has the consequence of projecting a "present" interpretation on instances of egophoric marking with second person subjects. Actions/events that explicitly involve the addressee but which are inaccessible to the speaker's immediate experience/observation, are marked non-egophoric and receive a default "past" reading, 3) 'volition' or 'control' does not determine the availability of egophoric marking with certain predicates in Ika. Instead, epistemic/observational access imposes a division between actions/events and personal attributes that may take egophoric marking, and psychological/cognitive and bodily states that may not combine with egophoric marking

4.2 Complex epistemic perspective in Kogi

In Kogi, there is a paradigmatic set of epistemic markers whose primary function is to signal knowledge (a)symmetries between the speech participants with respect to an event (see Section 1, above). This (a)symmetry relation can be further divided into "speaker-perspective" and "addressee-perspective" forms. The set of epistemic markers consists of five prefixes: *na-/ni-/sha-/shi-/ska(n)-*, and are listed in Table 2:

Table 2. Epistemic marking prefixes in Kogi (after Bergqvist, 2016)

	Speaker-perspective	Addressee-perspective
Asymmetric	<i>na-</i>	<i>sha-</i>
Symmetric	<i>ni-</i>	<i>shi-</i>
Non-Speech Participant	<i>ska(n)-</i>	

The speaker-perspective forms, *na-/ni-*, target the epistemic perspective of the speaker. *na-* signals the speaker's exclusive knowledge of an event (speaker-asymmetry), whereas *ni-*, by contrast, signals shared knowledge between the speaker and the addressee (speaker-symmetry). The examples in (17) demonstrate this meaning contrast:

- (17) a. kwisa-té⁴ na-nuk-kú
 dance-IMPF SPKR.ASYM-be.loc-1S
 'I am/was dancing.' {informing}(JM_130613)

⁴ Acute accent (´) signals prosodic accentuation (see Bergqvist 2016).

- b. kwisa-té ni-nuk-kú
 dance-IMPF SPKR.SYM-be.loc-1S
 'I am/was dancing.' {confirming} (BUN_090824)

Example (17a) by default conveys a “past” action if no context specific circumstances are provided, even though the sentence does not feature any temporal operators. A “present” reading entails a situation where the speaker and the addressee e.g. are in separate rooms, given that the act of dancing is directly observable and thus does not permit being stated from the exclusive perspective of the speaker (see below).

Example (17b) is, by contrast, usually free from temporally tinged interpretations in that a statement regarding the speaker’s act of dancing is expressed as symmetrically accessible to the both speech-act participants.

The addressee-perspective forms, *sha-/shi-*, focus on the epistemic perspective of the addressee. *sha-* signals the addressee’s exclusive knowledge, while *shi-* signals shared knowledge between the addressee and the speaker. Consider the examples in (18):

- (18) a. nas hanchibé sha-kwísa=tuk-(k)u
 1s.IND good ADR.ASYM-dance=be.loc-1S
 'I am dancing well?' {in your opinion} (BUN_090824)
- b. kwisa-té shi-ba-lox
 dance-IMPF ADR.SYM-2S-be.loc
 'You are/were dancing?' {confirming} (BUN_090824)

Example (18a) targets the opinion of the addressee, which by social convention (not restricted to Kogi society) cannot be addressed without explicitly signalling the addressee’s authority with regard to his/her own opinions. Example (18b) exemplifies a common use of *shi-*, which is to mark utterances concerning observable actions performed by the addressee. Statements featuring *shi-* may function as questions, but with an explicitly expressed expectation from the perspective of the speaker that the talked about event/action holds.

Despite this functional overlap with interrogatives, there are reasons to consider *sha-* and *shi-* as declarative by form. This analysis is supported both grammatically and pragmatically. Firstly, interrogatives are possible to form without *sha-/shi-*:

- (19) a. sakí mi-k-zéi-shi⁵
 what 2O-DAT-feel-PTCP
 ‘How are you?’ (DAM_090819)
- b. néi ma-gu-ngu-é
 go 2S-do-PST-INT
 ‘Did you go?’ (DAM_090820)

Indeed, there is a complementary distribution between the polar interrogative marker *-e* (cognate to the ‘suspensive’ *-e* in Ika) and *sha-*, as illustrated in (20). It is not possible to combine the *sha-/shi-* prefixes with the interrogative *-e*. The semantic difference between *-e* and *sha-* is suggested by the translation in (20) where ‘thinking about something’ differs from ‘having an opinion about something’ (cf. example 18a, above). Given an otherwise identical construction, this difference in meaning must be attributed to the semantics of these forms.

- (20) a. sakí hangwa-ba-lóx-e
 what think-2S-PROG-INT
 ‘What are you thinking about?’ (BUN_090826)
- b. sakí sha-hangwa-ba-lóx
 what ADR.ASYM-think-2S-PROG
 ‘What do you think (about something)?’ (BUN_090826)

The presence of the speaker’s assertion in the addressee-perspective forms *shi-/sha-* is also apparent from the use of these forms in narratives. Depending on the specific setting for a narrative telling, an addressee-oriented stance may be adopted by marking monologic stretches of speech with *shi-/sha-* (see Bergqvist 2016, for details).

Pragmatic interpretation effects that cannot be attributed to the encoded meaning of the forms, but which may result from this in combination with certain contextual cues, include temporal displacement and attitudinal shades of meaning, such as ‘familiarity’ and ‘affection’ (see Bergqvist 2016, for details). Changes to the temporal interpretation of utterances that contain one of the prefixes are, as in the case of Ika, argued to be the result of the asymmetry notion. While *ni-/na-* do not specify a point in time, the combination of *na-* with a predicate denoting an observable act that is assumed to be available to both speech participants, may result in a ‘past’ interpretation if no other contextual cues are provided. This is why example (17a), repeated here, usually is translated ‘I was dancing’ instead of ‘I am dancing’.

⁵ The participial suffix *-shi* has not been demonstrated to be cognate to the prefix (*shi-*) under discussion.

- (17) a. kwisə-té na-nu(k)-kú
 dance-IMPF SPKR.ASYM-be.loc-1S
 ‘I was dancing.’ (not at the moment; JM_130613)

Alternatives to this translation are possible if access to the event is reduced, e.g. if the act of dancing takes place in a dark room where the addressee cannot see the speaker. In that case, a present reading of the phrase is accepted. This means that temporality parameters are implied and not entailed. A sentence that does encode ‘past’ time must feature *-gu(a)*, as in (21):

- (21) kwisa-té ni-nu(k)-gu-kú
 dance-IMPF SPKR.SYM-be.loc-PST-1S
 ‘I was dancing.’ (BUN_090822)

The pragmatic restrictions sketched above arise from the primary function of complex epistemic marking in Kogi to signal knowledge access as either exclusive, or shared between the speaker and the addressee. This (assumed) (a)symmetric access can further be viewed from the speaker’s (*ni-/na-*) or the addressee’s (*shi-/sha-*) perspective.

4.3 Comparing Ika egophoric marking and Kogi epistemic marking

From the above descriptions of Ika egophoric marking and Kogi complex epistemic marking, we may conclude that cognates of the sentence marker *-in/ni* and the first person markers *-ku* (subject) and *na-* (object) play a role in comparing the two systems. In Ika, a cognate of the first person subject marker *-ku*, has developed into a marker of ‘speaker involvement’ (*-w*), which may be accounted for by comparison to available accounts of egophoric marking. The distribution of the egophoric *-w* is conditioned by a set of markers, of which *-in/ni* constitutes one, that turns on the notion of “epistemic authority”, which encodes an exclusive vs. shared contrast regarding who is charged with authority of an event in an epistemic sense.

In Kogi, a cognate of *-in/ni* encodes ‘knowledge symmetry’ as part of a system that also features a cognate of the first person object marker *na-*, which has grammaticalized to encode ‘knowledge asymmetry’. The system in Kogi harbors additional complexity in the markers *shi-/sha-* which encode a corresponding (a)symmetry contrast from the perspective of the addressee. A plausible development of these forms consists of a combination of the *ni-/na-* contrast with the indefinite/interrogative *s-/sh-*.

The grammaticalization of sentence-type and person marking in Ika and Kogi are illustrated in Figure 3:

<p>Ika:</p> <p>‘declarative’ (-<i>in/ni</i>) → ‘speaker authority’</p> <p>‘1S.NOM’ (-<i>ku</i>) → ‘egophoric’ (-<i>w</i>)</p> <p>Kogi:</p> <p>‘declarative’ (-<i>in/ni</i>) → ‘speaker authority’</p> <p>‘1S.ACC’ (<i>na-</i>) → ‘speaker asymmetric perspective’</p>

Figure 3. Grammaticalization of sentence-type and person markers in Ika and Kogi.

The present comparison between the two systems focuses on *-in/ni*, which encodes ‘the speaker’s claim to epistemic authority’ in Ika, and ‘shared knowledge/attention’ from the perspective of the speaker in Kogi. While these constitute opposed semantic contrasts in terms of authority and knowledge, such developments are not contradictory given their common origin as a marker of the declarative sentence-type. The marking of epistemic authority in Ika, retains some characteristics of sentence-type marking, and the once declarative *-in/ni* still features aspects of the speaker’s prototypical role as provider of (novel) referential content (cf. Givón 1990: 288-291). In Kogi, *ni-* also encodes the speaker’s privileged perspective, but as shared with the addressee in terms of knowledge/attention. The form in Kogi that most obviously corresponds to the shared epistemic authority, *-e*, in Ika, is the addressee-perspective *shi-*. Both forms possess a “quasi-interrogative” function in the separate systems, clearly signalling attention to the perspective of the addressee.

The egophoric *-w* developed from a cognate of the first person subject marker *-ku* in the other two Arwako languages Kogi and Damana (see Trillos Amaya 1999). A separate development occurred in Kogi where the first person object marker *na-* became part of a distinct system for marking knowledge (a)symmetry. While the distribution of the egophoric *-w* in Ika co-varies with markers of epistemic authority and with properties of the predicate of the clause in terms of socially acceptable observability (i.e. public vs. private events), the distribution of *na-* in Kogi is not restricted by any comparable grammatical parameters in terms of subject person and/or a notion such as ‘involvement’. Restrictions in the use of *na-* are only found on the level of the speech-event, where grounds for making assumptions about the knowledge and attention of the addressee are assessed by the speaker. The only grammatical restriction relevant to the Kogi system is found with sentence-type, since it is argued that complex epistemic marking only occurs in declarative contexts. In Ika, on the other hand, the markers of epistemic authority (*-in*, *-e*, and *-o*) arguably have retained a function as signalling sentence-type.

In sum, although the notions of ‘epistemic authority’ and ‘knowledge (a)symmetry’ are distinct in targeting slightly different aspects of epistemic perspective-taking, they are very much comparable given the shared function of the markers that are analyzed using these terms. These differences are reflected by grammatical features and distributional restrictions associated with the discussed markers. While epistemic marking in Ika consists of two inter-related systems, i.e. egophoric marking and the marking of epistemic authority, the Kogi system is formally less complicated, but conceptually richer in allowing the speaker to adopt a speaker-centered, or an addressee-centered epistemic perspective. It appears likely that similar functional

pressures have given rise to distinct grammatical expressions that developed from cognate forms that index 'person' and 'sentence-type', as signaling a certain speech-act.

5. Your view in mine: implications for research on epistemicity

The very reason that prompts a speaker to signal his/her subjective point of view with regard to some event also underlies the development of intersubjectively grounded forms of epistemic marking, such as the ones detailed above. The speaker's need to situate events with respect to other comparable and contrasting events includes a requirement to situate these to the speech participants and to related aspects of the speech situation. While the traditional conception of epistemicity in language focuses on notions such as 'necessity', 'possibility', and 'commitment', these are intimately tied to other aspects of the speaker's evaluation of events in terms of affect, attitude, and expectations. It is obvious that these notions must be kept separate, but it is also important to acknowledge their role in accounting for cross-linguistic variation in systems for epistemic marking. It is, in fact, reasonable to assume that most cross-linguistic research on epistemic marking systems is heavily biased in focusing on notions associated with modality and to a lesser degree on evidentiality, largely due to the frequent presence of these expressions in the languages of Europe. Even though there has been an awareness of intersubjectivity as a prerequisite for language ever since Benveniste's formulation of subjectivity (see Section 1, above), it is only recently that this awareness has started to shape descriptive and comparative work on epistemic marking in lesser described languages. Viewing language as a tool for representing (potentially) objective knowledge about the world has been a fruitful perspective for linguistic research in many areas, but it has become increasingly clear that there are some severe limitations in this approach once linguists' interest in language-use came on the agenda. When taking into account how language is used in order to analyze linguistic structures and demarcate language from competing and complementary forms of communication, an increasing emphasis on the embodied, intersubjective nature of language appears crucial. Understanding how pragmatics becomes grammar is key in accounting for forms of epistemic marking such as the ones outlined in Sections 3 and 4, where "objective knowledge" is a less relevant parameter than intersubjectively positioned knowledge from the inherently subjective perspective of the speaker.

An important issue that was discussed in Section 2 is how implied meaning becomes encoded in forms. This semantic development is at the heart of the grammaticalization process and the reason why it is regarded as semantically driven (see Traugott & Dasher 2002). This analytical aspect of intersubjectivized expressions of epistemicity is also important for understanding their place in grammar vis-à-vis other forms of epistemic marking such as modality and evidentiality. Functional pressures, shared by all languages, to provide the speaker with the means to position him/herself epistemically with regard to events may produce very different resources for doing so. Cross-linguistic observations concerning the correspondence between syntagmatic positioning, scope properties, and meaning content, allows us to postulate a potential placement of intersubjective forms near the edge of the clause, corresponding to the gradual shift from subjective to intersubjective meaning as accounted for by the process of intersubjectification. Pragmatically conditioned meaning is likely more often found with forms such as second position enclitics and particles than with inflectional forms that occur close to the verb stem. The development of temporal adverbial clitics/particles in Lakandon and sentence-type markers in Ika and Kogi into resources for specifying the intersubjective distribution of knowledge and commitment

between the speech participants aligns with such expectations. While intersubjective aspects of meaning are implied in some subjective forms expressing temporality and epistemology as part of the verbal template, this implied meaning may become encoded along with an increased displacement of forms towards the periphery of the clause.

Semantically, the (a)symmetry notion appears central in accounting for the distinct sub-systems outlined in the present paper. Originally adopted from Hanks (1990), the wide applicability of this notion connects to the basic concept of “intersubjective alignment” (and non-alignment) in stance-taking, as detailed by Du Bois (2007). While the notion of ‘knowledge (a)symmetry’ as discussed in this paper represents a specialized, technical use of the notion of (a)symmetry, the fundamental recognition that what the speaker knows may either overlap with someone else’s knowledge, or be distinct from it, must be considered the basis for this notion. The use of ‘(a)symmetry’ in the languages discussed in Sections 3 and 4 matches perfectly Benveniste’s formulation of subjectivity in language (see Section 2, above): the speaker’s perspective holds sway over the addressee’s even in forms that are defined as symmetric, i.e. encoding shared epistemic access/authority. In this sense, shared knowledge, or epistemic authority, is not the same as “equal” access/authority. The addressee can always disagree, or question, the speaker’s evaluation of information as shared, i.e. the speaker’s assumption does not equal “fact” in this regard. This seemingly trivial observation has consequences for the analysis of forms where the secondary perspective of the addressee must be regarded as subordinate to the speaker’s primary point of view. Forms that harbor two simultaneous perspectives in an epistemic sense arguably has one of these perspective embedded in the other, making the embedded perspective a “second order” commitment (cf. Kockelman 2004) that stands in relation to the speaker’s first order commitment to the event in question.⁶ This mode of analysis also resonates with Schutz observation that the proprioception of ‘self’ and the external perception of ‘other’ differ (see Section 1, above). The only commitment that the speaker has direct access to is his/her own. All other commitments must be assumed.

6. Conclusion

As this paper has shown, intersubjectification is not restricted to involve the development of modal adverbs into discourse markers, nor person forms that develop politeness distinctions (see Traugott & Dasher, Ch 4, 6). The development of person markers and sentence-type markers in Ika and Kogi, and time deictics in Lakandon Maya, to express (a)symmetric access to events in an epistemic sense, may also be accounted for by the process of intersubjectification. Given this observed diversity, we may ask if any grammatical form may acquire intersubjective aspects of meaning. The answer is both yes and no. An observation that follows from the semantic changes accounted for in this paper as well as those reported by Traugott & Dasher, point to the requirement that a grammatical expression must have the properties of a shifter (*per* Jakobson 1990 [1957]), such as tense, epistemic modality, evidentiality, sentence-type, and person. Aspectual forms, such as the ‘progressive’ are unlikely to be available for this kind of development unless they first acquire the meaning-function of a shifter,

⁶ Kockelman’s analysis builds in equal parts on Jakobson’s notion of event types (speech event/narrated event [Es/En]; cf. Jakobson 1957) and Goffman’s notion of participant-roles (Goffman 1981), resulting in a proposal that allows for a separation between different forms of epistemic marking, as well as, the embedding of these to produce stances about stances, either reflexively or with respect to someone else’s viewpoint (see Kockelman 2004)

like the 'perfect' has in some European languages (see Lindstedt 2000 for a discussion of the 'perfect' in a number of European languages). Although suggested by the data discussed in this paper, this proposal remains a hypothesis until confirmed by more research on processes of intersubjectification in language.

The applicability of the (a)symmetry notion to define epistemic-intersubjective forms stands out, but is also expected from cross-linguistic research on modality such as Heine (2013) and comparable research by Hengeveld & D'all Aglio Hatthner (2015) on evidentials where a shift in the grammatical status of a form toward the periphery of the clause corresponds to a shift in the semantics of that form to target the level of the speech-act and an increasing attention to the perspective of the addressee. If we wish to know more about markers of the kind discussed in this paper, this is an area of grammar where we should start looking.

List of abbreviations

1, first person; 2, second person; 3, third person; A, ergative agreement marker; ADR, addressee perspective; ADV, adverbial; ALL, allative; ANA, anaphoric; ASYM, asymmetric; B, absolutive agreement marker; CP, completive; DAT, dative; DEP, dependent; DEM, demonstrative; DET, determiner; DIM, diminutive; DIST, distal; DUB, dubitative; DUR, durative; EXCL, exclusive; EXIST, existential; FB, father's brother; FOC, focus; FUT, future; HAB, habitual; HYP, hypothetical; IMP, imperative; IMPF, imperfect; INC, incompletive aspect; INCL, inclusive; IND, independent; IV, intransitive verb; LOC, locative; O, object; NEG, negative; NSP, non-speech participant; PERF, perfect; PL, (generic) plural; PLN, plain status; PN, person/place name; POS, possessive; POT, potential; PROG, progressive; PRTC, participial; PST, past; PURP, purposive, REM, remote; REV, reverential; S, subject; SG, singular; SOC, socialis; SPKR, speaker-perspective; SYM, symmetric; TD, terminal deictic; TOP, topic; TR, transitivizer

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