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CHAPTER 1

Evidentiality as stance

Event types and speaker roles

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This chapter argues for a view of evidentials as a type of shifter and outlines a theory of reference for evidentials that separates the configuration of the ground from the relational axis, and the alignment between ground and figure. The chapter also evaluates a proposal by Kockelman (2004) that draws on Jakobson's notion of "event type" and Goffman's "speaker roles" to suggest an existing analogy between "commitment events" for modals and "source events" for evidentials. The scope properties of 'factual' forms in both systems notably constitute a formal difference between (epistemic) modality and evidentiality that cannot be accounted for solely by the referential properties of evidentials.

Keywords: epistemic modality, figure, ground, alignment, Jakobson, modals, shifters

1. Introduction

While much research on evidentiality has focused on how the notion of 'information source' defines individual forms as well as evidentiality as a category (Aikhenvald 2004; Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003, 2013), it is clear that there are other concerns in the analysis of evidentiality, especially from the point of view of language use. The conceptualization of evidentiality as a form of stance (cf. Mushin 2001) has yet to be formulated in a way that clearly separates evidentiality from other forms of stance-taking. More specifically, two problems stand out in attempts to define and delimit evidentiality from related, but distinct categories, such as epistemic modality. Firstly, there is the issue of whether the source of information (e.g. visual, reported) is accompanied by an encoded degree of certainty/uncertainty, or if this level of certainty is implied as a consequence of whether the source of information is "direct" or "indirect" (see Willet 1988). Secondly, how may we account for pragmatically dependent variation in meaning that results from e.g. changes in subject

person and sentence-type? If the meaning of an evidential marker changes along with changes in subject person, how do we incorporate this and related pragmatically conditioned alterations into a theory of evidentiality? In addressing these separate concerns, we explore the indexical properties of evidentials as a type of shifter, which feature distinct dimensions of meaning made visible in a model of indexical reference (Hanks 2012). Additionally, it is possible to outline differences between evidentiality and related categories (i.e. epistemic modality) by drawing on Jakobson's (1957/1990) notion of 'event type'. Indeed, the indexical properties of evidentials (in some languages) predict properties of the analysis of these in terms of how "source events" map onto "speech events" and how this mapping corresponds to a proposal for how "commitment events" relate to speech events in modals ("status", see Kockelman 2004, 2010). Important aspects of this approach concern the scope-properties of forms and how these relate to the suggested analogy between strength of evidence and assertiveness.

2. A relational theory of indexical reference

This section details a theory of reference that supports the exploration of evidentials as a type of shifter. The basic postulate of traditional theories of deixis is that the 'origo', or 'ground', (*i*) is separated from the 'object', or 'figure' (*x*) by a distance (*d*) (cf. Lyons 1977). The distance is prototypically conceived of as a binary contrast between 'proximate' vs. 'distal', i.e. "close to the speaker" or "removed from the speaker". This is illustrated in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Traditional model of deixis

More recent accounts of linguistic deixis argue that other components play a role in determining the relation between the ground and the figure as part of the meaning of demonstrative forms (e.g. Hanks 1990; Himmelmann 1996). According to these, the spatial separation between ground and figure is insufficient to explain the meaning and use of deictic forms. Hanks (2009) proposes a relational account of deictics that allows for other measures than spatial ones to define the positions of the ground and the figure, such as "perceptual access" and socially conditioned rights to the figure/object. Additionally, the definition of the ground must allow for the presence of a speaker and an addressee in order to reflect more accurately *how* acts of reference are carried out and what motivates them from the point of view of language use. The relation between the ground and the figure is thus separate

from the configuration of the ground itself; a conceptual distinction that allows for a differentiation of forms that may be indistinguishable with respect to salient parameters such as spatial or temporal distance alone. Figure 2 illustrates this relational model of reference:




Figure 2. A relational model of deictic reference (after Hanks 2009)

The accommodation of a secondary perspective (i.e. the addressee's) as part of the ground is supported by numerous accounts of demonstrative forms that encode 'proximity' or 'distance' with respect to the speaker, the addressee, or both (see Anderson and Keenan 1985; Diessel 1999 for typological overviews). Even languages that lack such encoded meaning in demonstrative forms, may display distributional patterns that signal (implicit) attention to the perspective/position of the addressee in acts of reference using demonstrative forms.

2.1 Referential properties of evidentials

Evidentials are used to refer to events from the point of view of the speaker, making a comparison to proper deictics possible. In evidentials, the relation between the ground and the figure may be defined in terms of "direct" and "indirect access" (see Willett 1988). Direct evidentials are ones that encode 'visual', 'auditory', or otherwise 'sensory' access, whereas indirect evidentials emphasize other cognitive means to access events, such as 'deductive', 'inferential', and 'reportive' access. Aside from these notions (and variants of these), other modes of access have been suggested, such as 'factual-participatory' evidentials (see below; San Roque and Loughnane 2012, cf. Brosig, this volume). These terms denote the factuality of, and/or the speaker's participation in an event, respectively. Whether these notions constitute "proper" evidential contrasts (i.e. signaling 'information source'), is like many other aspects of evidentiality debatable, but for the purposes of the present investigation, they are taken to be evidentials in the strict sense both on analytical and paradigmatic grounds.¹ An outline of how evidentials map onto the basic structure for deictic reference is in Figure 3:

1. Although paradigmaticity may be regarded as a weak argument in discussing evidentials given their sometimes scattered distribution in the grammar of a language in the form of clitics, inflections, or even semi-lexical elements, there is little reason to doubt the status of participatory




Figure 3. The relational axis of evidentials

As in Figure 2, it is important to keep the relational axis (mode of access) conceptually separate from the ground (*i*). Analogous to demonstratives in some languages, there are evidential forms that contrast only in terms of their different ground properties, although these have received relatively scant attention in the literature so far (but see Bergqvist 2017). Willett (1991) describes two reported evidence forms in Southeastern Tepehuan; one marker, *sap*, refers to reported evidence that is assumed by the speaker to be previously unknown to the hearer, and *sac* refers to reported evidence that is assumed to be previously known by the hearer. The meaning contrast between these two forms is clearly a property of the configuration of the ground given their identical referential properties with respect to the mode of access (reported speech). The two markers are exemplified in (1):

Southeastern Tepehuan

- (1) a. *Ma'n mu-pai' sap quio gu ma'ncam*
 one there-where REP.EXCL live ART person
 '(It is told that) there once lived a man in a certain place.' (164)
- b. *Añ mi'-ñi dyir jaç jim na sac jir Járax Cham*
 1s there-PRE from DIR come SUB REP.INCL EXS crab place
 'I'm coming from a place over there called "Crab Place"' (165)

Another common process that re-configures the ground in the use of evidentials is produced by a change of sentence-type from declarative to interrogative. In interrogatives, the identity of the perceiver shifts to the addressee, subject to the expectations of the speaker in terms of the addressee's information source in his/her response to the speaker's interrogative utterance. This is exemplified in (2):

evidentials in a language like Oksapmin (Loughnane 2010; San Roque and Loughnane 2012) as comparable to direct evidentials that focus on the speaker's perception of an event rather than his/her participation in it. The attested functional transfer of meaning in some direct evidentials from 'visual' in third person contexts to "volitional action performed by the speaker" in first person contexts is another argument for regarding 'participation' as a valid parameter in evidential systems.

- Duna
- (2) a. *no rakare-yarua*
 1.s cold-SNS.C
 ‘I am cold {I feel}?’
- b. *ko roro-yarua = pe*
 2.s hot-SNS.C = Q
 ‘You are hot {you feel}?’
- (San Roque 2008: 427 [my partial adjustments to glossing])

While possibly a common feature of evidentials cross-linguistically, not all languages permit a shift of perceiver identity according to a change of sentence-type. Some languages only allow for the speaker as perceiver even with interrogatives (Aikhenvald 2004: 242). Despite this observed variability between languages with evidentials, there is reason to make a distinction between the ground and the relational axis, as outlined in Figure 2, in the analysis of evidentials:




Figure 4. The referential properties of evidentials

Keeping the ground separate from the relational value of an evidential, allows for an analysis of evidentials that takes the dynamics between the speech participants in referential contexts at face value. Given that evidential forms and systems differ with respect to how they are affected by changes in sentence type, and whether they attend to the addressee’s perception of an event, the separation of the ground from the relational axis is indeed warranted to detail such differences.

2.2 Referential alignment in evidentials

A final component of the indexical properties of evidentials concerns how the ground *aligns* with the figure. This alignment is distinct from the relational value of the figure-ground relation, but may affect it in different ways. As noted in the literature, the meaning of an evidential may change depending on the relation between speech participant (as perceiver) and subject person, i.e. if the person of the figure-event (subject) is identical to the most salient participant of the ground (see Aikhenvald 2004: 219; Curnow 2002). In some evidential systems, this has consequences for how the relational value is determined. Notably, evidentially marked

utterances with first person subjects receive an interpretation that results from this speaker-to-first person subject alignment. In Tucano, the non-visual/visual contrast becomes one of non-volitionally vs. volitionally performed actions:

- Tucano
- (3) a. *bapá bope-ásə*
 plate break-REC.PST.N3.NVIS
 ‘I broke the plate {accidentally}.’
- b. *bapá bope-ápə*
 plate break- REC.PST.N3.VIS
 ‘I broke the plate {of my own will}.’
 (Ramirez 1997: 133, in Curnow 2003: 45 [my orthographic adjustment])

Curnow (2002) discusses what he calls “interpretation effects” and distributional differences that result from the use of evidentials with first person subjects, as opposed to third person referents. Some evidentials are rarely used in sentences with first person subjects (e.g. inferentials) and some languages seem to reserve evidential marking for sentences with non-first person subjects altogether (Aikhenvald 2004: 217). By contrast, some languages with evidential systems have certain evidential forms that only occur in sentences with first (and second) person subjects. Such forms target the speaker’s participation in an event in terms of ‘involvement’, ‘volition’, and ‘control’. In the literature, these forms are called “conjunct” or “egophoric” and they are usually contrasted to “disjunct” or “non-egophoric” markers that signal the speaker’s non-involvement, non-volition, or lack of control (see Hale 1980; Bickel and Nichols 2007). While it is not clear that egophoric marking should be analyzed as a form of evidential marking, there are certainly close parallels between the use of evidentials in sentences with first person subjects and egophoric markers. Hargreaves (2005) offers an (informal) characterization of egophoric (conjunct) marking in Kathmandu Newar that emphasizes the notion of alignment (see also Creissels 2008 and Bickel and Nichols 2007: 223): “[c]onjunct suffixes occur whenever the actor/subject is also the epistemic source for the action to which the utterance refers” (Hargreaves 2005: 5). Example (4) illustrates the conjunct/disjunct contrast in (declarative) statements where only sentences with first person subjects feature the conjunct/egophoric form (-*ā*):

- Kathmandu Newar
- (4) a. *ji wan-ā*
 1.ABS go-PFV.CJ
 ‘I went.’
- b. *cha wan-a*
 2.ABS go-PFV.DJ
 ‘You went.’

- c. *wa wan-a*
 3.ABS go-PFV.DJ
 ‘S/he went.’ (Hargreaves 2005: 12)

Conjunct/egophoric marking also occurs with second person subjects in interrogative contexts, a distributional pattern that has motivated researchers of such systems to argue that the egophoric marker encodes the involvement of the “informant” (Bickel and Nichols 2007: 223) or “assertor” (Creissels 2009: 11), two terms that allow for reference to both speech participants according to the stated changes in sentence-type.

The alignment between the speech participant in charge of an assertion and the (active) subject of a clause may be represented in a relational model for evidentials in terms of a binary contrast between A + (alignment) and A – (non-alignment).² A model that captures the relational value between ground and figure, the configuration of the ground and the alignment between the ground and the figure is illustrated in Figure 5, where the alignment between the ground (*i*) and the figure (*x*) is signaled by the +/- contrast:




Figure 5. A model of the indexical properties of evidentials

2.3 An illustration: epistemic marking in Ika

A form of epistemic marking that clearly illustrates the need for the identified indexical components of evidentials outlined in Figure 5 is found in Ika (Arwako-Chibchan; see Bergqvist 2012; Landaburu 1992, 2000).³ The system in

2. Curiously, for demonstratives this kind of alignment (i.e. A +) would entail “self-reference”, but aside from the referential properties of pronouns (e.g. ‘first person singular’), I know of no demonstrative system that reserves a form where the speaker targets him/herself in an act of e.g. ostensive reference (i.e. “this one for me”). Whether this is something that separates proper deictics from forms that possess deictic properties as part of their function, is unclear at this point.

3. ‘Epistemic marking’ is a term used here to denote forms that target the knowledge and belief of the speaker without specifying what relation these forms have to established notions such as evidentiality or (epistemic) modality.

Ika is analyzed as an instance of egophoric marking in Bergqvist (2012) where *-w* (egophoric) contrasts with *-Ø/-y* (non-egophoric). The egophoric *-w* encodes the shared or exclusive epistemic authority of the speaker with respect to an event that involves one of the speech participants, thus requiring attention to the configuration of the ground, as well as the issue of alignment between the ground and the figure for an appropriate analysis. The distribution of *-w* is restricted to occur with “observable”/ “public” events (see below) with first and second person subjects, and also co-varies with a set of epistemic suffixes with sentence-type-like properties. From a sentence-type perspective these markers may be glossed as ‘declarative’ (*-in*), ‘suspensive’ (*-e*), and ‘interrogative’ (*-o*; see Bergqvist 2012, 2017 for details), but when analyzed as epistemic suffixes, they specify “(a)symmetries with regard to the epistemic authority of the speech participants” (Bergqvist 2012: 152); *-in* encodes “speaker authority”; *-e* encodes “speaker-addressee authority” (i.e. shared authority), and *-o* encodes “addressee authority”. Only utterances that signal the speaker’s authority, either as exclusive (*-in*, gloss: SA) or shared (*-e*, gloss: SAA) feature the egophoric marker. The addressee-authority *-o* (gloss: AA) is non-egophoric. Ika egophoric marking therefore does not depend on a declarative-interrogative flip to account for the distribution of *-w* in utterances with first and second person subjects:

- Ika
- (5) a. *bunsi-w-in*
 spin.yarn-EGO-SA
 ‘I am spinning yarn.’
 (Landaburu 1992:9–10 [my translation and glossing])
- b. *nə = bunsi-k-w-e*
 2s = spin.yarn-DIST-EGO-SAA
 ‘You are spinning yarn(?)’ (you look like you are; ELI_090823)
- c. *nə = bunsi-k-Ø-o*
 2s = spin.yarn-DIST-NEGO-AA
 ‘Were you spinning yarn?’ (ELI_090823)
- d. *nə = bunsa-y-in*
 2s = spin.yarn-NEGO-SA
 ‘You are spinning yarn./You spin yarn!’
 (Landaburu 1992:9–10 [my translation and glossing])

The involvement of the speaker or the addressee is required for *-w* to occur and excludes third person referents. The notion of involvement should be analyzed as a product of the alignment between the ground and the figure, a feature that Ika egophoric marking has in common with other egophoric marking systems. The indexical ground, on the other hand, must be configured so as to ensure the ‘epistemic

authority' of the speaker, as either exclusive, or shared with the addressee according to the epistemic suffixes *-in* and *-e*. When the egophoric marker (*-w*) combines with a second person subject and *-e* (5b), the epistemic authority is shared, rather than handed over to the addressee by means of an “interrogative flip”. There is arguably no change in perceiver identity, only the inclusion of a second perspective, i.e. the addressee's. Support for this argument comes from how sentences with first person subjects and *-e* are translated:

- Ika
- (6) a. *bunsi-k-w-e*
 spin.yarn-DIST-EGO-SAA
 ‘I spun yarn (that time, you remember)’ (ELI_090823)
- b. *eya nuku-w-e*
 this hear-EGO-SAA
 ‘(Do) I understand this? (Of course!)’ (ELI_120507)
- c. *bunsa-k-Øo*
 spin.yarn-DIST-NEGO-AA
 ‘Do I (know how to) spin yarn?’
 (i.e. in your opinion; Bergqvist 2012: 174)

In (6), there is only one interrogative sentence that actually requests the addressee's opinion or evaluation of an event. This is found in (6c), which is non-egophoric. In (6a), the speaker implicitly refers back to a previously mentioned instance of yarn spinning and in (6b) the “question” is rhetorical, i.e. it has the function of a statement. This separates Ika from other languages with egophoric marking systems (see Bergqvist 2017; Floyd, Norcliffe and San Roque 2017).

The primary dimension of meaning in our model for indexical reference in evidentials is the relational axis (see Figure 5). In the case of Ika egophoric marking, this axis encodes the speaker's “epistemic access”, i.e. actions/events and personal features (permanent or temporary) that are possible to observe in an epistemic sense (“public acts” as opposed to “private” ones), are available for egophoric marking (*-w*). “Private states” as instantiated by bodily, psychological, and cognitive state predicates are non-egophoric (*-Ø/-y*). The epistemic access that is required for *-w* to mark a “public event” that involves the speaker or the addressee is under-specified in that it does not require perceptual access in the strict sense. The only requirement for epistemic access to be met is that the event is publically available in a social sense, which means that it can be commented on by the speaker and that it is assumed to be available equally to the addressee.

Analyzing evidentials and related forms of epistemic marking such as the ones in Ika requires a conceptual separation between the relational value of a form in terms of “mode of access” (i.e. visual, reportive) from the configuration of the

ground in terms of the targeted perceiver. A third consideration that has been noted, but largely overlooked in the literature, is the alignment between the perceiver (as part of the ground) and the subject (as part of the figure). In the analysis of individual forms, all three components should be considered to avoid a situation where the analysis of a form confuses semantically encoded features with pragmatically implied meaning. The amount of consideration given to either component will be different depending on language specific factors, but given the importance of pragmatic concerns in the analysis of shifters in other parts of grammar, there is good reason to keep the outlined separation of meaning in mind in attempts to analyze evidentials.

3. Modality as stance: Commitment events and the role of ‘principal’

While the referential properties of evidentials are important to define the encoded meaning of individual forms, it has less to say about how evidentiality differs as a form of stance-taking in comparison to other categories and means for conveying speaker-stance. To achieve this, we turn to a proposal that goes beyond the categorical conceptualization of meaning inherent to a form to explicate the event types and speaker roles that underlie the meaning and function of forms as signals of speaker-stance. Paul Kockelman (2004, 2010) proposes to operationalize (epistemic) stance in Q’eqchi’, a Mayan language spoken in highland Guatemala, by drawing on the insights of Roman Jakobson and Erving Goffman with regard to their respective formulations of “event types” and “speaker roles”.

3.1 Event-types and speaker-roles

Jakobson’s proposal to define categories associated with the verb in terms of different event types consists of a basic division into “narrated event” (E^n) and “speech event” (E^s). The narrated event has the subject as participant (P^n) and the speech event has the speaker as (speech)participant (P^s). The usefulness of Jakobson’s event types lies in distinguishing categories that refer to some aspect of the speech situation from those that do not. The categories ‘person’ (P^n/P^s) and ‘tense’ (E^n/E^s) make reference to the situation wherein the utterance was made, whereas ‘aspect’ (E^n) and ‘number’ (P^n) only refer to the contents of the utterance (i.e. the proposition). Jakobson calls an expression that refers to part of the context of the utterance, and consequently changes according to that context, a “shifter” (Jespersen 1922, in Jakobson 1990/1957: 388). As noted, evidentials are a specific type of shifter as evidenced by their reference to certain aspects of the speech situation. Jakobson

analyses “reported evidentials” as “narrated speech events”, i.e. a speech event contained within a narrated event (E^nE^{ns}/E^s ; see Jakobson 1990: 392). This analysis is too specific to be applied to evidentiality as a whole (as pointed out by Jacobsen 1986: 5) and a possible solution to this restriction is suggested by Kockelman (2004) and developed in Section 4.

Goffman (1981) proposes a division of the notion of “speaker” into different roles, namely “author” (the one who composes the words), “animator” (the one who speaks the words), and “principal” (the one who commits to what is being said). A prototypical speaker occupies all three roles, but these may also be separated, perhaps most saliently visible in the separation between the author and animator in (direct) reported speech. The utterance *John said, “I’ll be right over”* is spoken by the speaker, who is the animator, but the words of the quoted utterance (*I’ll be right over*) were composed by John (i.e. the author) and not the animator. Arguably, the principal of the quoted part of the utterance is also John, and not the speaker. The role of principal may, however, also be attributed to the animator for the utterance as a whole.

3.2 Adding commitment: Paul Kockelman’s proposal

By drawing on Goffman’s conceptualisation of speaker roles, Kockelman (2004) proposes an addition to Jakobson’s event types by adding “commitment event” to the two existing event types, i.e. “speech event” and “narrated event”. Kockelman takes Goffman’s tripartite division of ‘speaker’ into the participant roles principal, author, and animator and maps these onto the notion of event types. The added commitment event corresponds to the principal, the speech event to the animator, and the narrated event to the author. This is illustrated in Figure 6:

Event type		Speaker role
<i>Commitment event</i>	↔	<i>Principal</i>
<i>Speech event</i>	↔	<i>Animator</i>
<i>Narrated event</i>	↔	<i>Author</i>

Figure 6. Correspondence between Kockelman’s event types (based on Jakobson 1957/1990) and Goffman’s speaker roles

The reason for proposing a set of event types that correspond to speaker roles stems from the need to concretize the notion of *stance*, which although widely used to discuss both modals and evidentials, is so vaguely defined that it has become useless as an analytical concept (see Kockelman 2008: E106, for a discussion). The logic underlying Kockelman’s model for stance is as follows: if e.g. ‘tense’ can be

accounted for by specifying a relation between the narrated event (the event talked about) and the speech event (the utterance) in terms of temporal separation/overlap (as Jakobson argues), then epistemic modals may be defined in a similar way by specifying the relation between the speaker's commitment/belief as contained in the commitment event and the utterance found with the speech event.⁴ In the default case, the speech event completely overlaps with the narrated event, although these can be separated along other dimensions of meaning (e.g. time).

In the discussion of Q'eqchi' epistemic modals, Kockelman argues that the commitment event is identical to the speech event when an assertive utterance is epistemically unmarked. In terms of speaker roles, this is equal to saying that the one who says something (animator) is also the one who is committed to what s/he says (principal). The 'factual' modal marker *pe'* in Q'eqchi', is the modal closest to this default case.

- Q'eqchi'
 (7) *x-Ø-hulak pe' chaq ewer*
 PFV-3.setA-arrive FACT hither yesterday
 'He *did* arrive yesterday.' (addressee-focused) or 'He arrived yesterday!' (speaker focused)
 (Kockelman 2004: 140 [my adjusted glossing])

From the point of view of language use, the instantiation of *pe'* implies either an opposing stance (e.g. negated) by another person (e.g. the addressee) or a previous, contradictory stance assumed by the speaker him/herself. The epistemic modal markers discussed by Kockelman along with their encoded semantics are listed in Table 1:

Table 1. Semantic meaning of modal clitics in Q'eqchi' (after Kockelman 2004)

	Gloss	Meaning
Ø	Unmarked	In a non-specified world, speaker is committed to the truth of <i>p</i>
<i>pe'</i>	Factive	In this world, speaker is committed to the truth of <i>p</i>
<i>tana</i>	Afactive	In a possible world, speaker is committed to the truth of <i>p</i>
<i>taxaq</i>	Optative	In a wish world, speaker is committed to the truth of <i>p</i>
<i>raj</i>	Counterfactive	In another world, speaker is committed to the truth of <i>p</i>
<i>moko...ta</i>	Nonfactive	In a non-specified world, speaker is committed to the truth of not <i>p</i>

4. This characterization of tense is incomplete if it is to be used as a theory of tense, which it is not. Although analogous to Reichenbach's (1947) notions of "point of event" and "point of speech" and later more developed and cross-linguistically informed schematizations (e.g. Comrie 1985; Klein 1994), the separation into narrated event and speech event is meant to distinguish aspect from tense by pointing to the fact that tense requires a relation between the speech event and the narrated event (E^p/E^s) in terms of temporality, whereas aspect (E^n) does not.

An important aspect of Kockelman's analysis of Q'eqchi' modals concerns the different scope properties of the individual markers. Kockelman draws attention to distributional and grammatical properties of these and arranges them along a cline where the 'factual' *pe'* has the widest scope and the 'non-factive' *moko...ta* has the most narrow scope.

The scope properties of Q'eqchi' modals warrants a separation into two groups where *pe'*, *tana*, and *taxaq* form one group and *raj* and *moko...ta* form a second group. The latter two forms have scope over core operators, such as tense and aspect, as well as focus constructions, but not over the illocutionary force of the utterance. The first group, featuring *pe'*, *tana*, and *taxaq* is more ambiguous when it comes to scope over the illocution, but otherwise share scope properties with *raj* and *moko...ta*. The shared properties of the forms constitute an argument for viewing the group of markers as a paradigmatic set. What supports making a separation between forms in terms of scope, is that e.g. *pe'* can have scope over any of the other forms, whereas the reverse is not possible.

The original contribution of Kockelman's proposal lies in the observation that a difference in the scope properties of epistemic modals (at least in Q'eqchi'), may be translated into "degree of separation" between the commitment event and the speech event. This analysis aligns with functional accounts of evidentials (e.g. Hengeveld and Dall'Aglio Hattner 2015) as well as individual descriptions of evidential systems (e.g. Faller 2002), where some evidential forms are located on the propositional level and others are analyzed as illocutionary modifiers. Below, we consider these correspondences in more detail.

4. Evidentiality as stance: Source events and the role of 'perceiver'

Kockelman suggests an analogy between the commitment event used for analyzing epistemic modals and what he calls "source event" for evidentials (Kockelman 2004: 143). A reason for proposing this analogy is the seeming correspondence between strength of evidence and level of certainty. If a speaker sees an event first-hand, then s/he may also possess a high degree of certainty of the actuality of that event. If, on the other hand, the speaker only heard about an event, then his/her certainty may well be conceived of as lower, given the indirect access to the event in question. This comparison appears sound, but the notion of source event and the proposed analogy to commitment events remains to be explored in detail and there are several issues that need to be addressed in this regard.

4.1 Evidential event-types and speaker-roles

First of all, it is necessary to formulate the components of the source event, namely what speaker role it corresponds to and what kind of evidentials may fall under this notion given the problematic nature of evidentiality as a category.⁵ The most obvious speaker role is “perceiver”, i.e. the one who has perceptual or cognitive access to an event.⁶ If the speech event corresponds to the speaker role of animator (i.e. the one who speaks) and the commitment event corresponds to the principal (i.e. the one who commits), then the source event corresponds to the one who perceives an event. As should be clear from the discussion below, the speaker role of perceiver to accompany the source event is problematic given the meaning inherent to some forms. It may be that ‘cognizer’ is a better option, since that would accommodate otherwise problematic notions such as ‘inference’, ‘participation’, and ‘factuality’.

Apart from terminological issues, important concerns in applying Kockelman’s model of stance to evidentials are unmarked scenarios and how different source events overlap with the speech event. It is not clear in the case of evidentials what counts as an “unmarked” utterance, i.e. where the source event is identical, or completely overlapping with the speech event. As in the case of epistemic modals, some states-of-affairs do not require evidential marking even in languages that have developed evidential systems. A statement like “the sky is blue” may not require a specification of the source of information that justifies making the utterance. It is simply generic, factual knowledge. By contrast, prime candidates for utterances that must be marked evidentially are instantiated activities and events that are subject to the evaluation of the speech participants. We may postulate that a proposition/utterance that is above challenge in terms of how the proposition is justified constitutes a complete overlap between source event and speech event.⁷

Next to an unmarked scenario lacking explicit evidential marking, the candidates for displaying the closest overlap between saying something and providing the source for what is being said are ‘participatory’, or ‘performative’ evidentials (e.g. Oswald 1986; Rule 1977; San Roque and Loughnane 2012). These target the speaker’s participation in, and performance of an event, and constitute the highest

5. The problem of defining evidentiality concerns both the conceptualization of evidentiality in a “narrow” and a “broad” sense, but also the heterogeneous view of what counts as an evidential. We discuss the evidential notion of ‘participation’ with respect to the latter problem.

6. Kockelman uses the speaker-role of “author” to discuss the separation between source event and speech event (animator). This fits with a discussion of evidentials in terms of reported speech, but seems less well suited for other evidential forms that do not involve an author, as such.

7. Some languages with obligatory evidential inflections, such as Tariana (Arawak, see Aikhenvald 2004: 2) may be exempted from this assumption, however.

form of direct evidential, outranking forms that target the visual/auditory/sensory perception of the speaker.⁸ Semantically, these evidentials encode the speaker in the role of actor even though they may also appear with other subject persons. (8) is an example of a participatory evidential in Oksapmin, signaling the participation of the speaker in an event:

- Oksapmin
 (8) *nuxut gəl ml di-pa*
 I.DUAL cut do eat.PFV-PCR.FP.PL
 ‘We cut it up and ate it {I did it}.’ (San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 122)

In languages like Kashaya (Oswalt 1986), Oksapmin (Loughnane 2010), and Foe (Rule 1977) factual and participatory forms are identical, a fact that supports the argument that these markers signal the closest overlap between source event and speech event. Murray Rule states the following in regard to participatory-factual evidentials in Foe: “The speaker is either participating actively and consciously in the action, or is making a statement of known fact without regard to the way the knowledge has been gained” (Rule 1977: 71).

As stated in Section 2.2, visual evidentials are sometimes recruited to signal volitional acts by the speaker. This suggests a conceptual closeness between first-hand evidentials in terms of having performed/participated in an event and having witnessed it, where the performative/participatory evidentials arguably outrank the visual ones.

The analogy between commitment event and source event that Kockelman suggests should extend to include the scope properties of evidentials as corresponding to a gradual overlap/separation between the source event and the speech event. Scope has played an important role in analyzing evidentials and may be connected to the postulated origins of evidentials as complement-taking predicates, as also pointed out by Kockelman (2004: 142). An interesting result of comparing the scope properties of evidentials to those of epistemic modals in Q’eqchi’ is that modals go from wide scope with the ‘factual’ (i.e. almost complete overlap between the commitment event and the speech event) to narrow with the ‘non-factual’ (i.e. negated, 140–141; see Figure 7). Evidentials, on the other hand go from narrow scope with direct evidentials (visual, auditory) to wide scope with reportives

8. The logic behind placing evidentials in a hierarchy is that if one participated in, or performed an event, it would be strange to mark an utterance describing this event with a visual evidential in the case that there is a participatory evidential available. This hierarchy also extends to the division between direct and indirect evidentials (see San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 116, for a discussion of evidential hierarchies).

(see Hengeveld and Dall'Aglio Hattner 2015; San Roque and Loughnane 2012). Consider Example (9), again from Oksapmin:




Figure 7. Scope properties of Q'eqchi' modals in terms of event relations (after Kockelman 2010: 125)

- Oksapmin
- (9) *sup ux ang t-x-t us jox = o*
 mother.3.POSS 3S.F find MID-make-SIM go.PRS.SG top = EMPH
sjap bap tit = o pt-n-gop = li = o
 cassowary small INDEF = EMPH stay-PFV-VIS/SNS.FPS = REP = EMPH
 'When the mother went searching around, there was a cassowary chick {she saw, I was told}.'
 (San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 118 [my orthographic adjustments])

In (9), the visual evidential (*gop*) is attributed to the sensory access of the subject of the sentence, whereas the reportive (*li*) is linked to the speaker, clearly displaying a difference in scope both semantically and grammatically with regard to inflectional placement (inflectional *gop* precedes cliticized *li* and is closer to the verb stem). This contradicts the analogy between direct evidentials and modals in terms of level of certainty. Indirect evidentials such as the reportive have the scope properties of modals with factual and strongly assertive meanings despite the assumed difference in terms of degree of certainty. Is this a significant discrepancy, and could the opposing scope-properties of modals and evidentials be a diagnostic of the two as separate categories? In order to answer this, we must first consider how the mode of access (information source) corresponds to level of certainty.

4.2 Scope properties of evidentials and modals

While there is a cross-linguistic tendency for direct evidentials to have narrow scope properties when compared to indirect ones, it is not self-evident that direct evidentials are the best candidates for displaying the closest overlap between the source event and the speech event in comparison to the factual modal *pe* in Q'eqchi', despite the suggested analogy between certainty and the quality of evidence in terms of directness. An indirect evidential such as 'reportive' comes in different forms, e.g. "second-hand", "third-hand", and "folk lore" (see Willett 1988). Some of these encode "traditional knowledge", or "general knowledge" that is regarded as generally accepted and true (e.g. Du Bois 1986: 325; Oswalt 1986). Traditional knowledge and folk lore represent a kind of reported knowledge that lack a specific source for the report, but at the same time is regarded as a highly reliable source of information akin to factual status, i.e. with a similar status in terms of factuality and incontestability. A marker of 'general knowledge' that overlaps conceptually with reportives is found in Mamaindê. According to Eberhard (2009: 463), this marker is used to mark information that any adult member of the community would know and is therefore beyond questioning:

- Mamaindê
- (10) *ta-tukwinʔni-tu ʔaik-tu tau-Ø-nta-wa*
 POSS1-father.in.law-FNS field-FNS chop-s.3-GKN-DECL
 'My father-in-law is clearing a field (everyone knows this because he's been doing this every day now for a month).' (Eberhard 2009: 463)

Certain uses of reported speech markers that go counter to the notion of "reduced certainty" is discussed in Curnow (2002). He cites Bendix (1992) where the 'quotative' in Kathmandu Newar is used in first person contexts to counter doubt expressed by the addressee with respect to an earlier proposition (e.g. 'I went'):⁹

- Kathmandu Newar
- (11) *ji won-a hō*
 S.1 go-EGO QUOT
 'I say I went! I went, I tell you!'
 (Bendix 1992: 238, in Curnow 2002 [my adjusted glossing])

9. The status of quotatives as a form of evidential is disputed, but it is clear that they should not be mistaken for a kind of reportive (cf. Boye 2012). The exact status of the quotative in Kathmandu Newar is not clear to the author, but it is worth noting "atypical" uses of forms (strong assertiveness) that commonly are associated with a contrastive meaning (reduced certainty).

While there are reportives and quotatives (and specific uses of these) that make the general assumption that reportives encode or convey a reduced level of certainty on behalf of the speaker, problematic, it is also evident that reportives do not represent the strongest form of evidence in evidential systems. Participatory-factual evidentials may (arguably) be the best candidates for the function of signaling a high degree of overlap between the source event and the speech event, and in a language like Foe, it appears that these markers have similar scope properties to visual evidentials given their placement with regard to the verb stem (Rule 1977:74–75).¹⁰ This may also be the case for Central Pomo, which has a paradigmatic set of evidential clitics that includes a “personal agency”-marker that appears to align with the grammatical properties of the other evidentials:

- Central Pomo
 (12) *da-ché-w = la*
 pulling-seize-PFV = PERSONAL.AGENCY
 ‘I caught it (I know because I did it).’ (Mithun 1999: 181)

As Curnow (2002) observes, the “personal agency”-markers entail a first person subject even if a sentence does not explicitly mark the subject, thus emphasizing the above stated overlap between participatory/performative evidentials and egophoric marking systems (Section 2).

The use of ‘factual’ as a notion to denote both a modal (*per* Kockelman 2004) and an evidential contrast may be clarified by considering the different functions of the ‘factual’ marker in both systems. The factual meaning of *pe* in Q’eqchi’ serves to assert an event in the face of a contradictory stance whereas in an evidential system like Foe, a factual marker justifies an event by connecting it to the speaker and his/her knowledge of an event as a fact, or as something the speaker knows because s/he initiated and participated in the event. These represent two different functions that may go some way in explaining the different scope properties of these distinct ‘factual’ forms; modal ‘factuals’ have wide scope and evidential ‘factuals’ have narrow scope.

When we compare the scope properties of the Q’eqchi’ modals in Figure 7 to the scope properties of evidentials as outlined above and, we see that the cline from wide to narrow scope in Figure 7 becomes reversed when applied to the discussed evidential notions. This reversal is illustrated in Figure 8:

10. Rule (1977:71) calls this grammatical category “aspect” (possibly following Boas), but it is clear from the treatment of the forms that they are evidential in the narrow sense.




Figure 8. Scope properties of evidentials and the relation between source and speech event

What does the reversal of scope properties from narrow to wide in evidentials, as opposed to wide to narrow in (Q'eqchi') modals, say about the difference between modals and evidentials as categorical notions? One aspect of this question concerns the different grammaticalization paths associated with both categories. The diachronic development of modal auxiliaries and affixes from main verbs in English is well known, but as Traugott (2006: 107) notes, the origin of modal adverbial and particles is more heterogeneous than in the case of modal auxiliaries and affixes. The origins of the Q'eqchi' modal clitics is not accounted for by Kockelman except for a brief comment regarding the 'counter-factual' *raj*, which according to Kockelman probably originates in a nominalization of the verb *ajok* 'want' (Kockelman 2004: 128). Short of a clear view of the diachronic development of the Q'eqchi' modal clitics, one may speculate that the scope properties of these clitics are centered on the notions of 'factuality' vs. 'non-factuality' (reminiscent of a realis/irrealis distinction) and that other notions such as 'possibility', 'optionality', and 'counter-factuality' simply gravitate towards the factual or non-factual forms, as two ends of a continuum. Evidentials are, by contrast, well known to originate with predicates for perception/cognition/speech, and are thus subject to a path of grammaticalization that seemingly produces a tendency for direct evidentials to have a more narrow scope than indirect ones (Kockelman 2004: 143). While the significance of "scope-reversal" in modals and evidentials will have to remain unanswered for the moment, it is an interesting topic for future study; is this a generally applicable tendency, cross-linguistically, or is it a local phenomenon that is more closely linked to the properties of Mayan clitics?

4.3 Embedded source events

In addition to the scope properties of evidentials, which align with the relational value of an evidential form, a conceptualization of evidentiality in terms of event type relations would ideally also accommodate representations of the ground configuration and the alignment between perceiver and the subject. Given the strong association between event type and the participant belonging to a certain event type (i.e. actor of the narrated event, speaker of the speech event, and perceiver/cognizer of the source event) we propose the following: the alignment between the ground (*i*) and the figure (*x*) corresponds to a (complete) overlap between the source event and the narrated event. This means that the subject of the clause translates to the actor of the narrated event (P^n , in Jakobson's terms), which is identical to the perceiver/cognizer of the source event (for which there is no corresponding Jakobsonian representation). The configuration of the ground cannot be represented by manipulating the position of the discussed event types with respect to each other (Figure 8). In order to represent a form of epistemic marking, such as the one in Ika (see Section 2.3), where the epistemic authority can be either exclusive to the speaker or shared between the speaker and the addressee, we need to draw on what Kockelman calls "secondary stances", i.e. a "stance within a stance". Let us briefly consider Example (6b), repeated here as (13a), and contrast this to (13b):

- Ika
- (13) a. *beya nuku-w-e*
 this hear-EGO-SAA
 '(Do) I understand this? (Of course!)
- b. *eya nuku-w-in*
 this hear-EGO-SA
 'I understand this.' (ELI_120507)

The difference between (13a) and (13b) can only be conceived of in terms of how two source events overlap with respect to the narrated event; one source event belonging to the speaker as perceiver/cognizer and the other belonging to the addressee as (potential) perceiver/cognizer. The second source event is conceptualized as separate from the first in the case of *-w-in* (13b), and as overlapping in the case of *-w-e* (13a). Both the speaker's and the addressee's roles as perceiver/cognizer are embedded in the source event to produce secondary stances. This is illustrated by Figure 9:




Figure 9. Embedded source events signaling the configurational properties of the ground

There is no difference between (13a) and (13b) with respect to the relational axis (epistemic access), or in terms of ground-figure alignment (involvement). These referential properties may also be represented by event configurations, as in the overlap between source event (perceiver) and the narrative event (actor; see directly above), but are distinct from the embedding of events to produce a secondary stance that involves assumptions about the addressee's perceptual/cognitive access to an event. The source event thus instantiates the ground (*i*) in our model of the indexical properties of evidentials (as sketched in Section 2, Figure 5) and the overlap/separation between the source event and the speech event represents the relational axis.

Egophoric marking signals an overlap between the source event, the speech event and the narrated event. This means that the perceiver/cognizer is identical to the animator and the actor and that any separation between two events results in non-egophoric marking. Lastly, an egophoric system like the one in Ika may also signal an overlap between two embedded source events as a way to represent a secondary stance that includes the addressee's stance towards the speech event.

5. Summary

The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the need for a theory of reference to explicate the meaning properties of evidentials and to compare evidentiality to epistemic modality by analyzing both categories as devices for stance taking. While the referential model explored the indexical properties of evidentials by separating the ground from the relational axis and the alignment between the ground and the figure, the analysis of evidentials as stance explored the scope properties of evidentials and how the ground configuration could be conceptualized as a secondary stance that is embedded in the primary stance of the speaker. The original intuition of Kockelman (2004) to treat source events as analogous to commitment

events was only partly born out given the observed differences in scope between ‘factual’ evidentials and ‘factual’ modals in Q’eqchi’. Whether this difference turns out to be diagnostic for the two as separate categories remains to be determined by detailed investigation of the scope properties of both categories.

Abbreviations

1	first person	FP	far past
2	second person	FUT	future
3	third person	GKN	general knowledge evidential
AA	addressee authority	HAB	habitual
ABL	ablative	IMPF	imperfective
ABS	absolutive	INC	inclusive
ADR	addressee perspective	INCP	inceptive
ART	article	IND	independent
ASYM	asymmetric	INDEF	indefinite
C	current evidence	INF	infinitive
CJ	conjunct	IRR	irrealis
CM.1	clause marker 1	LINK	linker
CM.2	clause marker 2	LOC	locative
COND	conditional	MID	middle
DAT	dative	MP	modal particle
DECL	declarative	NEG	negative
DEM	demonstrative	NOM	nominalizer
DEP	dependent	N3	non-third person
DER	derived	NEGO	non-egophoric
DIM	diminutive	NSP	non-speech participant perspective
DIST	distal	NVIS	non-visual evidential
DIR	direction	O	object
DJ	disjunct	OBLIG	obligation
DUAL	dualis	OBS	observation
DUB	dubitative	OR	orientation prefix
DUR	durative	P	previous evidence
EGO	egophoric	PCP	participatory evidence
EMPH	emphatic	PFV	perfective
EXCL	exclusive	PL	(generic) plural
EXS	existential	PN	person name
F	feminine	POSS	possessive
FACT	factual	POT	potential
FNS	final nominal suffix	PRE	precision
FOC	focus	PROG	progressive

PRS	present	SAA	speaker-addressee authority
PRTC	participial	setA	absolute agreement marker
PST	past	SIM	simultaneous
Q	interrogative marker	SNS	sensory
QUOT	quotative	SOC	socialis
REC	recent	SPKR	speaker perspective
REDUP	reduplicative	SUB	subordinator
REV	reverential	SYM	symmetric
REP	reported speech evidential	TOP	topic
S	subject	VIS	visual evidential
SA	speaker authority		

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