

Contestation in transition

Value-conflicts and the organization of markets

- the cases of alcohol, gambling and coal

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Abstract

In this paper an historical comparative approach is applied to analyze how value conflict discourse and organization have evolved from the 1800s onward in three contested commodity markets – the alcohol, gambling and coal market. Situated mainly in the Swedish context, the three case studies demonstrate that the values at stake as well as the organizational arrangements brought forth in response to underlying value conflicts have changed significantly over time in all three markets. The commodities have stayed contested but for more or different reasons. Analyzing a dozen transformative moments in total we conclude that it matters to the organization of a market *if* there is an underlying value conflict and *how* this value conflict is configured. The comparative analysis sheds light on four processes in which value-conflict underpinnings of contested commodity markets may be shaped and altered: *value addition*, *value expansion*, *value accumulation* and *value relocation*.

Introduction

”Swedish regulation and public policy has for numerous decades been directed to general restrictive measures- high levels of alcohol taxation, low degree of accessibility and limited room for private profit seeking- thereby keeping down the consumption of alcohol, and consequently its harms.”
SOU 2005:25, s. 37.

“The particular character of games implies that gambling may be subjected to criminality. Gambling may cause economical and social problems for individuals as well as for society at large. Furthermore, gambling may cause health problems” SOU 2008:124

“The human impact on the climate by emission of so called greenhouse gases [primarily CO₂] is one of the most severe environmental threats. There is high risk of vast drought in some geographical areas and flood in others. Hundreds of millions in number of people might be forced to move, the ecosystem might be destroyed and severe diseases might be spread across large geographical areas, according to the expert group IPCC.” (Prop. 1990/91:90, s.20)

Some commodities are more contested than others. But contested commodities are not contested in any ‘essential’ or objectively given sense. Rather, contestation is an outcome of negotiation and power struggle amongst a wide range of market organizers. The classification of a commodity is often the subject of conflict. Objects or relationships may move back and forth across boundaries in response to technological change, the mobilization of interested groups, or the efforts of moral entrepreneurs (Fourcade and Healy 2007:22). In this paper an historical comparative approach is applied to analyze how value conflict discourse and organization have evolved over time from the 1800s onward in three contested commodity markets – the alcohol, gambling and coal market.

Looking back historically at the value-laden market discourses, we note that these commodities have sustained their status as contested for centuries. Even to the point

where today, their contestation is often taken as a given starting point for analysis of these markets and their organization. Hong and Kacpercyk (2009) for instance use the category label “The Triumverate of Sin” to denote the markets for alcohol and gambling. Pollution - from combustion of coal or otherwise - is the typical school book example in university readings on market failure and market regulation (e g Katz and Rosen 1991/1994; Steiner & Steiner (2008).

This comparative empirical paper sets out to explore attempts to influence the value set-up of markets. Following Graeber (2005), we use the term value according to the sociological/philosophical tradition as in “*what is important, meaningful, desirable or worthwhile*” for market actors to pursue. Our main rationale for studying value conflicts and their reconfigurations and relocations in a market setting is that such processes often feed into and in some respects may condition the organization of the market. Thus, in order to fully understand the dynamics of market organization we need to understand how value conflicts are shaped.

By way of our three historical case studies we aim to illustrate empirically that it matters to the organization of a market *if* there is an ongoing value conflict, *how* this conflict is configured and *where*, more specifically the conflict is located –i e what market elements (for example the price, the product, the sellers or the buyers) that are being targeted by market organizers. Specifically, we describe four processes in which value-conflict underpinnings may be shaped and altered over time: *value addition, value expansion, value accumulation* and *value relocation*. In short, we are interested in how the organization of value conflicts influences the organization of contested markets.

Research design: comparing transformative moments

A study of the dynamics of value conflicts in contested markets encourages an historical account of the discourse and organization of a commodity that both has existed and been contested for a long time. Alcohol and gambling are obvious examples of commodities with such long trajectories of contestation. Coal, on the other hand, may at first seem to be a more unconventional choice. However, we have chosen coal for its long history of contestation. In fact, coal has a much longer history of contestation than do some other possible cases of comparison such as narcotics and tobacco. Secondly, the seemingly odd choice of coal adds the potential for a generalization of the results beyond the traditional categorization of cases which may need to be challenged from time to time.

Aware of the complex sources and logics of institutional and organizational change, we have opted for a comparative design with a primary focus on *post hoc* identified transformative moments. Transformative moments are here defined as critical junctures, more turbulent times characterized by open contestation, vivid engagement and attempts to frame views on and values related to the contested commodity. We have chosen to focus primarily on transformative moments that have resulted not only in a reevaluation and reconfiguration of the value-conflict at hand but also in a change in the organization of the market (f ex a market regulation reform). In Rothstein's words (1992 p 17-18) transformative moments are periods marked by attempts "not only to play the political game, but also change the rules of the game".

Previous research has demonstrated that the task of determining transformative moments or 'critical events' must be performed *post hoc* since not all events that are defined as critical *ad hoc* become equally influential. Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) for instance show that in order for events to become triggers of institutional industry transformation they require sustained levels of public attention and contestation between insiders and outsiders over the enactment of the event (*ibid* p 431). The authors (*ibid* p 432) also highlight the role of value-conflicts when they state that "competing interests engaging in contestation forms the foundation by which institutional shifts may occur in an industry".

In their article on path generation in open systems Djelic and Quack (2007) likewise suggest that the likelihood of institutional change (path generation) increases when institutional systems or subsystems are "attacked" through what the authors define as a "pincer movement" – "pressure from both inside and outside, and foreign as well as domestic actors are able to mobilize various resources in favor of a common or at least compatible project" (*ibid* p 181). Djelic and Quack also stress that identifying transformative moments may not be enough in order to determine and explain how value conflicts emerge and change. This is because change processes may often be slow, gradual and emergent, rather than dramatic and disruptive. The authors compare critical junctures to "small clearings in a jungle" and stress that "for a path to emerge from the clearing, critical junctures have to generate a number of incremental and cumulative steps that can extend over long stretches of time" (p 168). Djelic and Quack remark that the institutional outcome of such influences typically is one of "recombination", for example a "layering" of logics or a "revival of a dormant logic" (see also Crouch 2005a, Schneiberg 2007, Sorge 2005, Streeck and Thelen 2005).

Determining what is a transformative moment and not, even post hoc, is a matter of judgment (see our tentative table on page 85-86). Previous research on transformative moments as well as historical research and our own recent empirical studies on the market development have guided us in this work. For reasons of delimitation we have chosen to focus on market development from the 1800s onwards. Between the identified transformative moments are longer periods of relative stability, periods of “dormant value conflict”, which for reasons of delimitations will not be discussed in any detail in this paper. The three market studies are situated mainly but not exclusively in the Swedish market settings - some international glimpses are included. We have derived our empirical material from a mix of sources; secondary historical accounts of the earlier shifts and richer empirical data in the form of own interviews and observations of the latest transformative moments.

The empirical comparisons of the alcohol, gambling and coal case offer insights as to how and why some markets remain contested for extended periods of time. In the analytical section following the three empirical case descriptions, we propose that in order for a market to remain contested for extended periods of time its underlying value conflict must be reconfigured continuously. We then go on to illustrate and discuss four types processes by which such reconfiguration takes place: adding values to the conflict, expanding the scope of a certain value discourse, accumulating values and relocating the target of contestation.

Contestation in transition: Alcohol

As a commodity alcohol is associated with both happiness and tragedy. Many are the dinners and parties that have been embellished by a glass or two. The feeling of joy and pleasure is undoubtedly an effect that gives people a break from everyday life. In a collective setting, facilitating and warming up relations between strangers at social conventions is another of its pleasant effects. Simultaneously, alcohol is claimed to be the *bête noire* behind numerous adverse effects, both at the individual and the collective level (Room 1997:1). Individually the short-term effects can often be experienced as a hangover or an injury, while over time a person can develop an addiction along with various health problems like cancer and liver cirrhosis. Drinking alcohol can also bring harm to others (Room 1997:1). Accidents, assaults and battery, wife-beating, financial problems are all known effects that might harm families, organizations and societies.

Value conflict configurations prior to The Aquavit Reform 1855

It was not until the formation of the bureaucratic state in the late 18th-century that alcohol got into the limelight of state attention (Nycander 1996:15). In this section we will discuss the underlying value conflicts prior to the Swedish Aquavit reform in 1855 and show how the value conflict came to shape the market for alcohol in the 19th century. The period is characterized by several different values surfacing and being brought into conflict. Economical profit, character and discipline became fundamental for the alcohol discourse of the time, as did justice and liberty. Also the value of health was added during this time, although the focus on health was far from being in the center of attention. The value conflict thus configured in a process in which more and more values were added over time, beginning with Christian morals, as the state increased its interests in the Aquavit issue. The main actors representing values in this transformative moment of alcohol policy history were the state, the temperance movement and the farmers.

Nycander claims that there were no alcohol regulations before 1855. However, the fact that seven different state committees were appointed between 1774-1877 reveals that alcohol, or to be correct aquavit, obviously was on the agenda (Båtefalk 2000:82). At the end of the 18th-century, the Swedish government tried to initiate a number of regulations in order to control the distillation of aquavit. Båtefalk has been able to trace three different types of regulations, namely prohibition laws, economical laws and decency regulations (Båtefalk 2000:84ff). While the prohibition legislation was directed towards the home distillation, the economical legislation was intended to regulate the aquavit industry based on the economical and political interest of the state. The decency regulations had the purpose of suppressing drunkenness and intoxication. Clearly, as noted by Båtefalk, at this time the state was beginning to form an interest in the economical and financial aspects of the aquavit (ibid). Although these regulations existed already in the 18th century, it wasn't until the reform of 1855 that state regulation made a serious impact on the market.

From 1809 household distilling had been more or less free for everyone to carry on with, but the reform in 1855 put an end to that. The reform in 1855 has been analyzed as generated from temperance politics as well as stemming from a legislative act based on state conceptions of scarcity. We will begin to describe the first stance, as it has been the most common in Swedish historical writings (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:13).

The regulation of the drinking habits is usually connected to religion and specifically to the Protestant church, where alcohol since the 15th-century has been seen as a root to sin and vice. With the spread of Christian morals and manners one can say that drinking was constructed as a social problem. But it wasn't only in this sense alcohol was perceived as a problem. In the 17th-century more and more complaints were raised against people disturbing the peace both inside and outside churches. The clergy made complaints about pubs drawing attention from the church services – the “pub community” was regarded as a threat among the priests, and later also by state authorities and the police (Båtefalk 2000:178). The alcohol problem was also often framed as a work related issue – being drunk and working in a mine for example, is maybe not the best of combinations (Knoblock 1995:46). Consequently, the moral panic and fear of the dissolution of society, as it had come to be framed by conservatives and churches, was mainly considered as a problem among the working-class of Swedish citizens (Båtefalk 2000:205, Sulkunen et al. 2000:12, also see Ambjörnsson 1998).

In the 18th century, the age of liberty in Swedish history, a different view on the social problems connected to alcohol surfaced sporadically, however more permanently established around 1830. New medical findings were a starting point for new arguments against the use of alcohol – drinking could ruin the health, in particular among the youth. Examples of early medical findings and warnings can be assigned to the Swedish Queen Kristina's physician Andreas Sparman and Urban Hiärne. Also Carl von Linnæus contributed with insights on the subject (Båtefalk 2000:146, ref. 13). Beside these medical arguments one can find secular criticism on bad behavior and other unpleasant effects of drinking. Even economical arguments were gradually considered, especially regarding families as family members were dependent on the husband not wasting money on alcohol. From a state point of view, the question of drinking was occasionally observed as a problem at the end of the 18th-century, but around 1830 it had made an impact on the state agenda, partly because of the impulses mentioned above (Båtefalk 2000:204). However, there were differences between the conservative representing religious and moral values, and the liberal views regarding the role of the state in reference to the Aquavit question. For conservatives, drunkenness was considered a moral crime against society, but for the liberals the issue of alcoholic consumption was something the individual had to deal with himself (Ibid. p.207). Even if there was a clash between conservatives and liberals regarding the role of the state in society, the political possibilities to regulate the supply of Aquavit was in fact seen as non-existent. One way

of dealing with the Aquavit problem was instead to discipline the people through defining the individual criminal act of drunkenness more clearly in the legislation to ensure order and stability in society (Ibid. p.205).

From around 1830 organized temperance had become more and more popular among the Swedish people, and around 1840-1841 the temperance movement made a major breakthrough in the Swedish Riksdag (parliament). Modeling international “associations” or “societies” the temperance movement tried to solve the Aquavit problem using new and independent organizational forms for reforming society. This organizational development was of course also observable on other social arenas, as for example the fight against poverty or the education of the lower classes. (Ibid. p.20). A majority of these organizations had a religious value structure, often with close ties to the increasingly popular free churches at this time (Johansson 2008:226). To give an example of the more notable organizations one must mention The Swedish Temperance Society (Svenska Nykterhetssällskapet) which was founded in 1837. Later, its prominent position was taken over by organizations such as International Order of Good Templars (IOGT), International Federation of the Blue Cross (Svenska Blåbandsrörelsen) or Verdandi (Ibid. p.23).

In the beginning, the movement was looked upon with skepticism by the state and the political elites. Soon, however, a more positive view proliferated and the movement was perceived as a solution to the Aquavit problem among the elites, which also began to support the movement (Ibid. p.207). From a state point of view the temperance organizations could enter areas and act where the state of different reasons couldn't access (Ibid. p.194). Thus, the development of the temperance movement can be seen as a civic activist attempt, though partly supported by the state, to shape the question of the Aquavit by value organizing. But, according to Nycander (1996) the temperance movement was politically vague – it had goals of course, but these goals were in a much higher degree directed towards the individual and his drinking habits. However, the temperance movement strongly proclaimed to outlaw household distilling, an intention shared with the state at this time (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:14). The main reason for these claims was rooted in the belief that household distilling was causing a growing drunkenness of the people. The claims were questionable, but the household distillery was constructed as a symbol for the excessive drinking at the time being (Johansson 2008:20). The venture was met by strong resistance from farmers.

The farmers' strong resistance has been criticized for being reactionary, in the sense that the farmers wanting to safeguard their own economical interests consciously ignored the Aquavit problem in society (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:17, Knobblock 1995:43). Later research has shown that their reasons were only in part economical, that many farmers actually were in favor of a total ban. According to Bergman (1918), the farmers knew that it wasn't only temperance behind the will to ban household distillery because a ban would be very lucrative for the large industrial distilleries and the bourgeoisie (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:17). Their resistance can instead be understood as an act of justice and class interest as well as an act against a hypocrite reform, which would transfer profit to the bourgeoisie without eliminating the adverse effects of the Aquavit (Ibid.). In this respect, economic interests were likely a major motive behind the reform in 1855 that prohibited home distilleries. As Nycander puts it "The reform motives were highly economical. [The state] wanted to end grain and potato squandering [...] and concentrate the manufacturing to a few rationally driven distilleries" (Nycander 1996:16).

The costs for importing grain had begun to rise and in 1850 a fear of a food shortage unfolded. On the other hand, some observers point to the fact that the main incentive for the state to intervene was to generate incomes in times of need (Båtefalk 2000:95). Behind the reform stood both moral and economic stakeholders – various temperance organizations from different social strata, state authorities, municipalities and private interests.

Eventually the reform ended household distilling, which also contributed to the establishment of industrial distilleries as the dominant form of manufacturing alcohol (Nycander 1996:17, Båtefalk 2000:122). Post reform, the production and sale of alcohol were separated, a construction welcomed by both the producers, i.e. private corporations, and the state (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:22). Municipality stakeholders could now benefit financially from sales, a novel condition which promoted a growth of local companies. However, the profits made had to benefit the municipality or philanthropic purposes.

The politics regarding the Aquavit reflected the underlying core values of society at the time. The transformative moment we have analyzed indicate that an addition of values can be observed; economic profit, discipline and character, justice and liberty as well as health are all values added to the debate on Aquavit during the period. Perhaps it is also possible to say that the values of discipline and character expanded the underlying Christian moral of the debate. These values were all in tension, resulting in a reform often presented as a gain for the temperance movement. On the other hand, a market for alcohol

was established under industrial conditions that would be the focus of attention in the near future.

Evolving value conflicts and the Ratio Book System

The core values of the conflict identified in the period before 1855 recur with much more intensity and strength when we look at the next transformative moment in the modern history of alcohol policy in Sweden.

During this period both the state and the temperance movement advanced their positions in the Aquavit question. The state's stance was quite bipolar, since it attempted to eliminate the value of private economic profit and at the same time direct the market profits back to the state. The capitalistic logic was thus overruled, which can be seen as a compromise with the temperance movement and its strong emphasis on prohibition. Additionally, the value conflict between the state and the temperance movement was managed by the state partly through cooptation of strategic temperance organizations. What we see is also a relocation of the value conflict from being set around alcohol as an inherently evil product to bad drinking habits as a social and health problem. Thus, health stands out as an increasingly influential value in the contemporary debate on alcohol. As a consequence, a system of individual control of Aquavit consumption has been designed and organized in the alcohol market.

The reform of 1855 created extensive profits for the state, as the income from Aquavit sales was almost tenfold (Nycander 1996:17). Another effect of the reform was that the rights to sell alcohol could be transferred to companies, and via separate municipality companies the City Council took control over the retail market. In turn, the consumption of Aquavit among the citizens was surveilled. This new kind of care and concern could not quite conceal the financial interests the municipality had in the alcohol business, and many groups in society were skeptical (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:30).

The man who took the fight against the monopoly of the municipality companies was another monopolist, though a private one, L.O. Smith – “The Aquavit King” (Ibid.). L.O. Smith demanded the abolishment of the municipality monopolies which surprisingly were supported by the temperance movement. Needless to say, L.O. Smith had a great private economical interest in abolishing the municipality monopolies, but he was also utmost skillful in hiding these motives in the debate (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:35, Johansson 2008:91). One of his arguments for abolishing the monopolies was that the Aquavit he was selling was significantly purer and cleaner than the aquavit the

municipality monopolies were selling. Thus, he was trying to add the value of quality to prevail in the conflict. This conflict over the resources the alcohol generated between Smith and the municipality monopolies was to be significant for the Aquavit issue until the end of the 19th-century, when the debate changed direction. At this point the temperance movement had grown and the demands for absolutism and prohibition echoed in the corridors of power. Despite a massive propaganda in the media and a diligent writing of propositions to the parliament, L.O. Smith had lost the fight.

This was a time when the general discourse was heavily moralizing and disciplinary, particularly directed towards the working class (Johansson 2008:188). Traditionally, the higher classes had tried to restrict the drunkenness of the working class for several reasons, one being efficiency, which gave rise to a class-based conflict. In the beginning of the 20th century the problem was called “the intoxicant misery“ (rusdryckseländet) and was constructed by both the temperance movement and the state taking different stances – against or for free sales of alcohol.

In 1909 a doctor named Ivan Bratt published a series of articles in one of Sweden's major newspapers, Dagens Nyheter. These articles paved the way for an internationally unique solution to the alcohol dilemma. Bratt was against prohibition. Instead he argued for a system built on individual control and the elimination of private profit motives from the alcohol market (Sulkunen et al. 2000:22). During this time a shift took place in the general perception of the alcohol question, when a “medicalization” and a growing scientific awareness became increasingly noticeable (Johansson 2008:347). Being a doctor gave Bratt legitimacy when emphasizing health as an essential value in the debate on alcohol. Bratt also maintained the idea that alcohol itself wasn't a problem, only its abuse (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:52). Also, by being backed up by his personal friend and editor in chief at Dagens Nyheter, Otto von Zweigberk, he earned political support among the temperance-friendly members of the Stockholm City Council, support much needed to put Bratt's ideas into practice (Johansson 2008:134, Nycander 1996:52, Bruun & Frånberg 1985:58).

The main idea of Bratt's system was inspired by war-time rationing when he launched the so called *Motboken*, a ration book system, which was first introduced in his newly established firm *AB Stockholmsystemet* in 1914 (Knoblock 1995:64). This was preceded by a City Council decision in 1913 to convey the rights to sell alcohol to Bratt and his company (Nycander 1996:50). The individual control system implied that individual consumers could apply for a ration book (though, single women and vagrants

were exceptions) and the logic was based on a principle of individual necessity. When selling alcohol to their customers the Company had to take into account nine (9) different factors, for example gender, age, lifestyle and a number of class-related indicators (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:97). To organize this system the companies had to develop and rely on a detailed register of all people carrying the ration book. Not surprisingly, the ration book system was directed to men and particularly men from the working class (Knoblock 1995:88). When accepted as a ration book holder, a certain monthly amount of alcohol could be bought from the Company.

Nevertheless, Bratt's ideas weren't all about rationing. In the beginning the system was only operative in his company, since other firms could sell alcohol as well. Albeit, the alcohol sold in these other stores were wine, beer or more exclusive variants of liquor, like cognac, a selection regarded as class-based. Since Bratt also aspired to eliminate all private interests on the market, "[he] anticipated legislation and consequently purchased all companies owned by private enterprise. At the same time, Bratt also concentrated the wholesale trade, creating a second company, *Vin & Spritcentralen*, in 1917" (Sulkunen et al. 2000:23). In 1919 the Bratt system was sanctioned by a decision in the Swedish *Riksdag* which made the municipality companies' legitimate monopolists as well as sole assessors of the amount each individual could buy (Rothstein 1992:151). Soon also the restaurants, bars and cafés were subject to Bratt's ideas – his goal was to balance the restaurant's purchase price for alcoholic beverages with the price customers paid (Koskikallio 1985:123). Yet, this objective was never realized, but the selling of alcohol at restaurants was to become highly regulated.

The temperance movement had an ambivalent attitude towards the ration book system (Rothstein 1992:158, Johansson 2008:138). Since there was a need for legitimacy in the early stages of the system, the state wanted to neutralize the resistance against the system as well as the demands for prohibition. At the same time the state needed the temperance movement to carry out an information campaign on the harmful effects of alcohol; there was a calculated risk that the movement would use the campaign to propagate for prohibition (Ibid. s. 138). The solution to the dilemma was, in 1919, to incorporate and transform the temperance movement organ, Temperance Education Federation (CFN), into a state authority (Ibid. s. 139). This construction offered both rewards – e.g. more resources from the state – and punishment – as the state wanted to interfere in the decision making on the content of the propaganda. This state interference brought about an emphasis on medical harms rather than the social effects of drinking.

This transformation followed a trend in the general Social Democratic agenda, which can be observed also in the population reforms at this time. Even if the state co-opted the CFN the question of power over the system remains. Seemingly there were no teetotalers in the boards of the municipality companies, but on the contrary they had a say in the County Temperance Committees that were responsible for allocation and suspension of individual rights of purchase, which the municipality companies had to deal with on a daily basis (Rothstein 1992:157). The organized teetotalers in the committees are said to have obstructed the system, some through assigning full ration to all customers, while others were extremely restrictive (Ibid.). In 1920, and despite the Bratt system, a temperance committee presented a proposal for prohibition. At this time the Aquavit question had become a fundamental and dominant political issue. To detect if a prohibition was legitimate among the people the Swedish Riksdag initiated a public referendum before making a parliamentary decision in the question. The battle stood between those who wanted to attack the abuse of alcohol and those who wanted to work against the use of alcohol in all its forms (Johansson 2008:138). Of course opponents of these two stances were also present, but their ideas were quite suppressed in the debate. Organized resistance based on industrial private interests set aside, there was an “ordinary people” criticism with mainly anti-bureaucratic and anti-patronizing (drinking alcohol was a private matter) emphasis. When the referendum was held in 1922, temperance opponents won a slight majority despite strong support for prohibition (Sulkunen 2000:23, Knoblock 1995). This resulted in the permanent establishment of the Bratt ration book system and an era of individual control.

It is apparent that several significant values were in clash during this period. Certainly a range of different medical, health and social values were in the limelight of the conflict between prohibitionists and its opponents. On the other hand we can observe that the general political trend was leaning towards temperance in some form. Another obvious issue where stakeholders were in conflict was the possibilities for profit, where both the state and private corporations had interests. Less attention has been paid to the controversy between the value of individual control, put forward by Bratt and his enthusiasts, and the temperance movement's wish to make the use of alcohol illegitimate. The reason for individual control as a temperance action was to suppress abusive behavior, not ordinary drinking habits, a standpoint in strong contradiction to the more radical temperance movement's ideas (Bruun & Frånberg 1985:87). However, none of these values were crucial when the system collapsed in 1955.

Since the beginning, the system had been criticized for being a class-based system, giving privileges to the higher classes, as well as an arbitrary and irrational authority where people were getting random treatments in different regions of Sweden. The values of universality and fairness were central when claims were raised at abolishing the system in the beginning of the 1950's (Rothstein 1992:154, cf. SOU 1952/53:34).

Abolishing the Ration Book in Consensus – From Individual Control to Liberal Democratic Values

Few signs of the earlier harsh value conflicts were seen during the time when the ration book system was abolished. Though, two parallel tendencies can be observed in our description below. First, we have identified a movement towards an expansion of the alcohol policy from being mainly directed against the working class to a more general and inclusive policy, tightly connected to the values of complete citizenship. Secondly, interlaced in the inclusive policy are the added values of universality, fairness and liberty. The reconfiguration of the conflict between prohibition or acceptance of alcohol was then possible because of the massive critique against the system's arbitrary functioning. Thus, the extensively criticized downside of the ration book system was also a unifying trigger for constructing consensus between former antagonists. Despite the introducing of democratic values after the ration book system, there is evident that control remained an important value throughout the century.

At the end of the 1940's the critique against the ration book system had escalated. For example, already in 1927 some of the antagonists founded an organization named "The Ration Book Holders of Sweden" with the purpose to work against the system. The system had failed, partly because the idea of total control was impossible to implement – in whose throat the aquavit ended up couldn't be controlled (Rothstein 1992:155). In people's minds, the system also had the effect that the right to buy the full amount of alcohol was tied to ideas of complete citizenship (Ibid.).

When the Temperance committee convened in 1948 only two delegates were pro-ration book. Two years later one of them, Åkerberg, died and the other one, Bergvall (the head manager of the Stockholm municipality company), went into politics as a mayor. This might have paved the way for reforms along with the fact that many members of the temperance movement had allied themselves with the liberals, who also opposed the ration book system, but for other reasons (Nycander 1996:91-93).

After nine years of evaluations and debates the decision to finally end the ration book system was taken by the parliament on October 1st 1954. The decision was characterized by a rarely seen unanimity regarding the underlying values of the abolition, which is shown by the high rate of support among the policy reviewing instances (Johansson 2008:327). One crucial outcome was that all municipal companies selling alcohol were merged into a new, state-owned, company – *Systemaktiebolaget* (Lundqvist 2002:9). In this way, the market for alcohol was divided between two state owned companies, *Systemaktiebolaget* and *Vin & Sprit AB*. Each of these companies controlled one function of the market. *Systembolaget* controlled the selling of alcohol to the consumers, while *Vin & Sprit* was responsible for the distribution. Thus, this centralized construction resulted in two different state monopolies with the purpose to make the “market” more uniform.

Five values were part of this construction – civilization, liberalization, universality and fairness, and simultaneously the state wished to maintain a high degree of control. In the new welfare state that had developed since the end of WWII, there was clear perception among the ration book critics that the welfare state would erase class inequalities and social problems – with a general welfare model, there was no need for individual control since the citizens now were able to be rational, well-behaving and moderate consumers of alcohol regardless of class, gender or race (Johansson 2008:344ff). Thus, the fundamental and civilizing doctrines of individual freedom, universal citizenship and equality before the law were established (Sulkunen 2000:75, Rothstein 1992:154). However, to achieve the latter, control, *Systemaktiebolaget* made an effort to draw clear boundaries between the consumers and the products - socially, spatially and temporally (Castillo 2009:136).

Premonitions of a sales increase made the state willing to reduce the desire to buy alcohol in every possible way. Expectations showed to be quite correct, since the consumption increased with 25 per cent the first year. Not being able to trust the system of individual control any longer, the state acted as a moral authority and resorted to fierce propaganda campaigns aiming at enlightening individuals (Rothstein 1992:144). This strategy was based on a liberal perception of individual responsibility as a factor of social progress (Nycander 1996:108, Lundqvist 2002:16). To illustrate, one of the early campaigns was entitled “Responsibility and Temperance” and another one promoted wine instead of drinking aquavit (Ibid. p. 111). Despite the propaganda, decisions were made a couple of years after the reform to drastically raise taxes, introduce registers for

undesirable customers and insist on identification upon buying (Lundqvist 2002:16, Systembolaget website). During this time, advertising was banned as well (Lundqvist 2002:16).

The register soon became exceptionally large with over 20 000 blacklisted customers, which made the register practically unusable (Sulkunen 2000:74). Also, it was problematic to ensure the general doctrine of fairness and equality when controlling customers. One way to reduce the criticism against the use of a register for undesirable customers, a system as well as before identified and discriminated people based on sometimes vague information, was to introduce simple technology. The system made use of a Red Lamp situated at every pay desk in the Systembolaget stores. The Red lamp was lit randomly indicating when customers were requested to show identification – the employee at the desk then could control the customer against the blacklist (Sulkunen 2000:98). Using this system the control was supposed to be more legitimate since it explicitly didn't discriminate individual customers. Implicitly though, the red lamp could be controlled manually in secrecy when the employee might suspect a customer for being in the register (Systembolaget website, Johansson 2008:389). Thus, the state solved the dilemma of controlling undesirable customers purchases and at the same time appearing as an organization maintaining the ideals of the modern democratic welfare state with an act of hypocrisy. Hypocrisy as a strategy is often used by organizations to control the environment and to achieve legitimacy at the same time as other more internal goals are attained (Brunsson 2002). Systembolaget could, in other words, manage different and opposite demands at the same time.

Regardless of the desire to overcome both the problems related to alcohol consumption itself and the harsh critique against the ration book system, the state still had to deal with a cardinal contradiction. At the same time as the state and Systembolaget encouraged people to drink less and more responsibly, Systembolaget and Vin & Sprit generated large revenues for the state, being monopolies (Castillo 2009:138ff). This contradiction surely was provoking among different groups in society, but according to an interviewed official at Systembolaget the political debate has been absent at least since the beginning of the 20th century. The contradicting practice wasn't to be solved until the early 2000s, and then only to some extent.

A Diluted Alcohol Policy - Marketization and Individual Responsibility

The neoliberal impulses of the 1980s and 1990s with general claims for state deregulation and privatization certainly had an impact on the Swedish alcohol policy at that time. The period before the neoliberal agenda had a real impact, that is between 1955 and 1990 in the rough, we regard as a quite stable period and will not consider further. During this time, in 1995, Sweden also was about to enter the European Union, which called for several changes in the Swedish alcohol policy. The focus in this section is on value reconfigurations taking place around 1995. At this time, there were few signs of resistance to Alcohol sales, most likely because of the general trend of a less powerful and fading temperance movement and its sleeping values of morality, discipline and character.

More specifically we observe a relocation of the value configuration at the level of responsibility, that is from state responsibility by regulations, distinctive organization strategies and taxes to individual responsibility leaning on information campaigns and self-control of drinking. Furthermore, and in close connection to the rise of the individual responsibility agenda, another important observation is that the value of health returns with renewed strength. This development should be regarded as a continuation of the health argument developed during much earlier transformative moments in the history of Swedish alcohol policy, and not as a new value entering the Swedish alcohol policy. Although this time the health value had a significant impact on the alcohol policy, transforming it into a more general public health policy. In this process a medicalization of the alcohol problem can be traced, where professionals as doctors and researchers are gaining an increasing importance. Overall the values of alcohol restriction seems to be somewhat diluted in relation to values as liberalization, market mechanisms and individual responsibility, which we will show in more detail below.

In January 1994 the government proposed some quite fundamental changes in the alcohol policy. The circumstances leading to the handing over of a bill to the parliament was, according to the government, “vast changes in the world affecting the possibilities to pursue the present alcohol policy” (Proposition 1994/95:89, p. 49). At this time Sweden was preparing for its integration in the European Union, and the first step had been taken when the EES agreement was signed in 1992. A month after the bill was handed over to the parliament there was a public referendum on the Swedish membership in the EU. The membership negotiations had proved that state monopolies was not in line with EC law, which implied that Sweden, according to the Commission, had to suspend the state

monopolies (Castillo 2009:147). Due to the EU membership a suppliers' market was constructed the 1st of January 1995, which increased the amount of supply companies from 1 to approximately 200. State-owned Vin & Sprit was no longer the sole supplier of alcoholic beverages to Systembolaget and the restaurant business. Competition was in focus. However, the retail monopoly of Systembolaget was not subject to deregulation as long as the Systembolaget did not favor one market actor over another – for these reasons Systembolaget launched a policy to ensure neutrality in managing the new market actors, the private wholesale companies. In this market configuration the value of neutrality was essential for the monopoly to survive the reform linked to the Swedish EU membership process.

However, the EU membership process was not the only factor in the transformation of Swedish alcohol policy. According to Tigerstedt (2000) and Nycander (1996) there is evidence that ideals of deregulation was introduced long before 1994. As Johansson puts it; “a value shift in the liberal concept as such has led to the State's nurturing policy having [...] lost its power and credibility” (Johansson 2008:467). In the beginning of the 1990's a commission was appointed by the right-wing government, with a former financial minister as chairman, to formulate a strategy to decrease the total consumption of alcohol in the country as a reaction to some extraordinary cases of violence with intoxicated youth. The strategy also included another part, which was to evaluate if it was possible to simplify and abolish some of the regulations regarding alcohol (Nycander 1996:240). As Tigerstedt puts it, there has been “[a] decades-long transformation, consisting of a mixture of piecemeal shifts and substantial turns on both the micro-level and macro-level” (Tigerstedt 2000:111).

Nevertheless, the deregulation of the supplier-market was a major change in the current state of affairs. The former state intention to keep private interests away from the alcohol “market” was now transformed into controlling the market actors via a system of authorizations, supervision and sanctions (Proposition 1994/95:89, p. 52). In 1995, The National Alcohol Board (Alkoholinspektionen) took over the responsibility for the supervision from The National Board of Health and Welfare in 1995. (Socialstyrelsen) (Lundqvist 2002:25). In practice, the operation of the National Alcohol Board was terminated in 1999 (Interview with Systembolaget official). Turning to the operation of V&S, it is evident that the company expanded both nationally and internationally after the deregulation of the suppliers-market, (Lundqvist 2000:19). But the state's involvement in the lucrative business was not going to last for long. In 2006 the newly elected right-wing

government suggested a privatization of the company (Prop. 2006/07:57). In 2008 the company V&S was sold to the international business group Pernod Ricard S.A., an action that somewhat diminished the value conflict between state responsibility and revenues from the alcohol business.

In addition to these shifts at the macro-level it is possible to observe changes in both alcohol taxation and advertising legislation. Or perhaps, regarding taxation, it is the absence of changes that is of interest. The tax on alcohol was incremental until the 1995 reform, but has since then been reduced, especially if it is compared to the Swedish Consumer Price Index (Interview with Systembolaget official). As for advertising legislation, advertising was allowed in 2003.

On the consumer level, the changes were more visible. In 1991 the Systembolaget stores experimented with a more consumer friendly supermarket model for selling alcohol, an experiment that turned out well (Tigerstedt & Sutton 2000). This experience resulted in an expansion of both the concept of supermarkets and the number of stores all over Sweden. Further, the expansion was also followed by a larger product range (Lundqvist 2002:17). At the end of the century, 1999, Systembolaget also introduced a new system for managing the product range. The primary principles governing this new system were factors closely related to market practices – demand, profitability and efficiency (Castillo 2009:156). Changing perspective from Systembolaget to the government restaurant policy, there is also some interesting changes. Between 1967 and 1999 there has been a strong growth in the amount of approved alcohol serving permits – from 2 088 to 11 049 (Lundqvist 2002:19, c.f. Alkoholstatistik). One explanation for this growth can be found in the 1994 decentralization of the decision-making process concerning permits from regional to the municipality level (Nycander 1996:241, Alkohollagen 1994:1738). Thus, the decentralization moved responsibility concerning alcohol and its consequences from the state to the local level, leaving only the general control to the state. On the local level the municipalities were more generous with approving permit applications as the values of entertainment and the existence of a vivid city life with restaurants, bars and discotheques were important interests at the local level. At the same time, the development is hard to understand without the existence of strong private profit motives in the restaurant business.

Another obvious change is the rules for admission of alcohol into Sweden from other EU-countries. Until 1 July 2000 there were strong restrictions stating that only a smaller amount of alcohol could be brought to Sweden. Gradually the amount allowed increased

after several negotiations with the Commission, and from 2004 the same rules apply for all EU citizens, which means that the restrictions are very liberal in a Swedish sense (EU-upplysningen). The liberalization of the import quotas was however heavily criticized. Several critics turned against the Swedish government, as they thought the government gave up an important part of the logic of the national alcohol policy too easy (Johansson 2008:431). The debate was also present in the media, especially when a popular television program put the question in the limelight in 2005.

If we return to the role of supervising authorities, the National Alcohol Board responsibility only concerned the market actors. For other issues connected to alcohol policy health was, and still is, of major concern. Previous to the reform in 1995, actually in 1992, the Swedish National Institute of Public Health (Folkhälsoinstitutet) was established as the authority in charge of promoting health and preventing ill health (FHI website). If we dwell on the promoting of health and preventing of ill health, it is evident that these values are key ideals in the policy that began to develop in the 1980's. What's interesting about them is that they are palpable redefinitions of the alcohol problem if compared to earlier periods. The universal methods of the 1940's and 1950's which emphasized social and moral order and discipline, price control and restrictions on availability, transformed into policies pinpointing individual and public health *risks* (Tigerstedt 2000:93). This marks a shift from alcohol policy to public health policy (Lundqvist 2002:25). On the macro-level these risks are often seen as something close to negative externalities in markets, and is regularly dealt with by letting "scientists and experts produce valid assessments about threats encountered in everyday life" (Tigerstedt 2000:94). On the individual level, Tigerstedt argues that risks are seen as consequences of individual choices, which call for measures that strengthen self-control, empowerment and competence of the individual consumers – often referred to as responsabilization or subjectivisation (Ibid. p.95). It seems that freedom of choice is the overarching and omnipresent value on this level.

The health policy introduced since 1990's is a preventive kind of policy (Lundqvist 2002:25). This policy emphasizes the shaping of the minds of the consumer, partly through, for example, self-tests and partly through information campaign in collaboration with nonprofit organizations (cf. IQ-initiativet, Lundqvist 2002:30). The value of collaboration is very much in line with a neoliberal agenda, often found in the New Public Management approach (du Gay 2000). In the former paternalistic model of alcohol policy, there was a close connection between cure, care and control, which nowadays

seems to be split up (Tigerstedt 2000:107). One reason for the separation is that the impact of the temperance movement, which pursued integration of control and care/cure, on Swedish alcohol policy has declined since 1955. In the 1970's the Temperance Education Federation (CFN) became increasingly professionalized as the organization's management came to be populated by alcohol researchers, replacing people with a traditional background in the temperance movement (Rothstein 1992:150, cf. Elmér 1983). Furthermore, professionalization was not only affecting the Temperance movement, also the alcohol treatment was professionalized by medical expertise. This strengthened the development of an independent treatment sector (Tigerstedt 2000:107).

To sum up, the elimination of private interests on the market for alcohol has since the 1990's been less central to Swedish alcohol policy. Instead neoliberalist values in reforms of deregulation and privatization have been introduced, partly as an effect of the EU membership. At the same time the values of the Temperance movement have gone fallow as well as their capability to influence the organization of the new market for alcohol. The former instruments of state control concerning alcohol has disappeared, or been weakened. As a consequence, the state has handed over the responsibility for the alcohol issue primarily to individuals but also to municipalities, nonprofit organizations and corporations. Being associated with social and moral problems, alcohol has become more of a leisure activity and an ordinary commodity, though related to certain potential health issues. The role of the state regarding these health issues is that of The Enlightener.

Contestation in transition – gambling

Gambling is a contested activity and commodity, and has been for centuries (Reith 1999; de Goede 2005, Ihrfors 2007, Hong and Kacpercyk 2009). Looking back at the history of gambling, the exchange of gambling products - whether prohibited or legalized - have always been a sensitive political arena where value-laden conflicts of interests, debates, negotiations and attempted reforms have succeeded one another. Despite the simple idea and design of a lottery ticket, like all gambling products it has a Janus-faced double nature which has been sustained during centuries (Reith 1999, de Geer 2011).

Today, on the one hand games are associated with dreams and hopes of a better life, winnings, excitement and social interaction. Gambling may be a welcome time out in times of trouble. It may be part of one's identity, a weekly routine, an entertainment among friends – or for a few professionals – and the gambling operators, a main source of

income (Ihrfors 2007, Binde 2005, Svenska Spel 2004). On the other hand, gambling and games are equally associated with unpleasant consequences representing negative values. A metaphor used in the popular gambling discourse is that of the ‘dirty’ market backyard behind the shining casino façade. In current debates and market representations this ‘dirty backyard’ holds monetary losses, but also feelings of guilt, shame and anxiety, social risks of broken relationships, criminality, unemployment and health problems affecting not only gaming consumers themselves but their family, friends and other relations, and in the end, as most social problems, society at large (Edström 1995, Rönnerberg et al 1999, Nilsson 2002).

In ancient times, Aristotle compared gaming operators to thieves or pimps (de Geer 2011). In the Middle Ages gambling was condemned as an unproductive activity which attracted interest and meant less time was spent on more important issues such as breadwinning and family rearing (ibid). The Protestant church had a more strict gambling policy than did the Catholic church which did not consider games as such as sinful. After the Reformation, the Protestant church however denounced gambling on moral grounds – gambling was sinful and unproductive. Secularization was then a lengthy process during which the church gradually loosened the grip over the senses that it enjoyed during the High Middle Ages. But gambling remained contested. During the Enlightenment when influential minds pointed to the human reason as a driving force in society, gambling was thought to represent unreason - the contrary to the desired elevated human character (ibid). The scientific revolution in the 1600s and 1700s brought about a breakthrough of quantified empirical and statistical reasoning which laid the ground for the development of probability theory. The belief in God was thus supplemented, and eventually more or less replaced, by faith in human reason that helped reinforce the social stigma of gambling.

In retrospect it is clear that the attitude towards gambling, the configuration of values at stake and the measures taken to handle them have changed dramatically over time. As Fekjaer (2002:26) put it: “The attitude towards gambling rolls like a wave”. The limit society sets up for what is regarded as acceptable gambling is “a boundary that moves with changing societal needs” (Ihrfors 2007 p. 83). After prohibition comes liberalization and after formative shifts comes longer periods, typically many decades of relative stability before another transition takes place. In the coming sections we are to describe the values at stake in three formative moments in the organization of the Swedish gambling market since the 1800s: *Immoral gambling - From the King’s Lottery to*

prohibition that was enforced the 1840s, *Re-moralizing gambling - From prohibition to state monopoly* and the legalization of gambling in the 1930s and *Entering Health – The preventive turn and responsabilization of consumers* - the latest discernible shift which had its transformative peak in the late 1900s (a forth transformative moment *Towards a gambling gene?* will also be briefly mentioned).

Immoral gambling - From the King's Lottery to prohibition in the 1840s

The first Swedish lotteries date back to the early 1700s. They were organized as a means to raise funds to the Treasury post war. In 1771, The Swedish Royal Number Lottery was established in Stockholm and began its successful operations two years later. Once a month, there was a popular public drawing of the winner tickets from a large raffle and eventually the operations of the King's Lottery were protected from foreign competition by a decree in 1784 that prohibited foreign lotteries (de Geer 2011).

Just like alcohol, games have historically had a class character. When the aristocracy found its way to the cards and roulette tables in the health resorts of the 1700s and 1800s it was generally not with hopes of a strengthened financial position, rather, for them gambling was a pastime, it has a leisure value (de Geer 2011). The working class however played for profits but also for the psychological value of a chance at an exit from an often dull and predetermined financial and social situation – as a compensation and mental escape from the poor living conditions at the time (ibid). If the middle class played at all they played less and more cautiously, for ideological or religious reasons (Norberg 2004).

At the beginning of the 1800s games were still legally sold in Sweden, however, as gambling was increasingly regarded as an immoral wasteful activity not to be encouraged - particularly not by governments which were expected to act as good examples. During the booming industrialization, gambling was seen as a waste of time rather than a pastime and a waste of money, rather than a chance at fortune, since time and money were crucial input in the new production system (de Geer 2011). The industrial revolution and its factories required a stronger control of the workforce. Standardized products and production processes required presence, precision and discipline. All threats to the working ethos and discipline – such as drunkenness or absence – were acted on since time and money could and should be better spent. Workers were surveilled but they were also disciplined by ideological means, not least according to the Protestant working ethic so prominent in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries (ibid). The protestant church likened gambling to stealing time from God and joined forces with the employers and the

emerging labor movement who all thought the idea of fast money terribly demoralizing to the workers (Ambjörnsson 1998). At this time there was thus consensus among a number of influential interest groups - the church, the workers movement and the employers, that gambling was unproductive and sinful.

The Swedish King's Number lottery lasted for 70 years. But the 1830s saw a growing criticism of the legalized exchange of games. There was a conservative political reaction after the Napoleonic period and during this time many European countries prohibited their lotteries. The Swedish parliament joined this European trend and abolished its' successful King's Number lottery in 1841 (de Geer 2011)¹. Three years later a national law was enforced that imposed a general ban on lotteries, and other games like the card games and roulette were banned one by one (ibid). These decisions meant that lotteries could now be permitted only in exceptional cases after requiring a special permit, a license. The accepted lotteries were typically small scale local lotteries held to raise funds for a charitable cause. One interesting exception from the general prohibition was horse betting - a game that had been successfully presented as a game not played by the (irresponsible) youth. Horse betting remained legal for another 50 years² (ibid).

During the prohibition era legalization proposals were up for debate on several occasions, but resistance was strong. Legalization of gambling exchange was up for debate on several occasions (Report 1910, Statement 1899:2 2aK TFU (no. 4) No. 2, referred to in Ihrfors 2007 p. 52) But resistance to prevent sin by sin was too strong to enforce a legalization.

The state was not to give in to temptation but rather was to nurture citizens to enjoy and take pride in abstinence, thrift, diligence and a virtuous living (Ihrfors 2007 p 51). The emergence of a modern middle class helped sustain this stance. If the player himself (or occasionally herself) was unable to take responsibility for his actions, it was considered the task of society, of the state, to aid and assist him to self control. An extract from a parliamentary debate anno 1885 illustrates this legalization resistance (ibid p 51): "All kinds of hazardous games are corrupting and should not be protected by law... The

¹ Although in some European countries; Denmark, Austria, Hungary and some Länder in Germany, gambling exchange remained legalized (de Geer 2011).

² Horse betting was eventually prohibited in Sweden between 1890 and 1923.

State does not lack opportunities of decent means of income.”³ Government funded gambling was as controversial then, in 1880s Sweden, as are proposals of a legalization of narcotics today.⁴ Gambling was primarily framed as an “immoral cancer” (Statement 1895:8 2K TFU (No. 3) No. 16, referred to in Ihrfors 2007 p. 49).

The idea of gambling as a morally reprehensible activity was well established in the public debate of the 1800s and early 1900s and was taken for granted. The appropriate way of addressing the immorality of gambling was for the Swedish state to protect and keep enforcing the prohibition. Also, gamblers were seen as morally weak victims in need of state guidance, education and protection from supposedly unscrupulous illegal gambling operators (Ihrfors 2007). Societal discourse must not signal an abandonment of the individual’s shortcomings (Statement 2aK 1906 p. 9), rather public education was thought needed to clarify to the public just how economically unwise it is to sacrifice your time and money at the lottery (Report 1910 p. 54, Husz 2004 p. 232-285). However, as indicated above, certain delimited exceptions were accepted during times of prohibition, such as betting on horses and the lottery which was set up in 1897 by the private firm Lotteriexpeditionen/the Lottery office to raise funds for the Stockholm Exhibition the same year. This was the first granted exception from the general lottery prohibition, an exception which opened up for several more to come (de Geer 2011).

Re-moralizing gambling - From prohibition to legalization in the 1930s

In the mature industrial and increasingly secularized society of the 1920s, there was suddenly room for leisure time, a new concept and practice enabled by the rapidly rising living conditions. At this time in the roaring 20s, the rigorous work ethic became challenged and supplemented by a more hedonistic “leisure ethic” (Husz 2004). As the basic needs were met, citizens started to demand products and services that could offer a meaningful leisure time. Contemporary debate was forward oriented and there was a general positive spirit and strive to modernize and come up with solutions rather than dwell on problems of the past. Although still prohibited, gambling was gradually re-

³ Original wordings in Swedish ”Alla slags hazardspel äro förderfliga och böra icke af lagarna skyddas. [...] Staten saknar ej tillfälle att på anständigare sätt än genom lotterispel vinna behöfliga inkomster” (ur Utlåtande 1885:8 2aK tfu (nr 3) nr 16).

⁴ See f ex newspaper articles in Dagens Nyheter 17 and 25 August 2011, the volume Cannabusiness (2011) by Johan Anderberg and Börje Olsson’s et al edited volume (2011) Narkotika – om problem och politik. Norstedts.

moralized and normalized during this time, as it became associated with the pleasure and joy of leisure times (ibid). And after World War I, gambling was further re-moralized as something modern, something American and future-oriented. This turn allowed some of the leftist critics to abandon their previous opposition toward gambling and embrace lotteries as part of the new, modern society.⁵ Despite its remaining illegal status, playing cards or the lottery become a pastime for everyone, not only for the aristocracy as in the 1700s and early 1800s. This development was made possible by the growth of organized sports and the positive associations between sports and gambling (Ihrfors 2007; de Geer 2011).

Right up to 1934, betting on any sport other than horse racing was illegal in Sweden. But many tipped anyway as the conditions for sports betting had improved immensely in a short period of time. Soccer was introduced in Sweden in the late 1800s, clubs were founded and systematic sports journalism was established about the time when the first national Swedish soccer league (Allsvenskan) was founded in 1924 (de Geer 2011). Games were organized everywhere and both major and minor sports clubs found tipping a good and increasingly accepted fundraising alternative to the traditional jumble sales and dances.

During the 20s, the up-side of the value conflict concerning gambling had been intensely strengthened as positive values linked to a leisure ethic were added to the point where gambling became increasingly normalized. The growing demand and supply of illegal yet licit gambling opportunities in the late 1920s however still highlighted a regulatory conflict– that between the current norms and behavior accepting gambling on the one hand and the illegal status of the market exchanges with reference to immorality arguments based on the protestant work ethic on the other hand. (c f Björklund-Larsen 2010 on the theme of illegal yet licit markets).

A first sentence for having arranged illegal tipping was faced in 1926 by a cigar dealer who had arranged illegal tipping in co-operation with the sports clubs Västerås IK and Västerås SK in 1926, but this sentence did not deter a stream of sport clubs and other types of voluntary associations from entering the illegal but publicly accepted, licit, industry (de Geer 2011). About 1930 there were nearly a hundred tipping operators in Gothenburg only (ibid). Bookmakers were fined but quickly reappeared with new

⁵ At the turn of the century, the lottery was perceived by leftist commentators as something old-fashioned, as a relic of the Gustavian autocracy so the radical left wing at this time opposed the idea of a state lottery.

principals. In Stockholm there were foreign agencies such as the Liverpool Vernon's as well which the authorities could not handle within the realms of the national Lotteries Act. It was however an unbearable burden to track down and prosecute all individuals, sport clubs and other associations and corporations that were enticed into this expanding and lucrative market. And fines were not heavy enough to act preventatively. The government instead sought new ways to organize the illegal yet licit market and opted for restricted legalization than a continued ban.

State investigator Gösta Engzell of the Ministry of Commerce investigated the matter during the first months of 1933. Engzell advocated legalization under state control as the best of two evils - the other being a sustained total ban. The suggested alternative involved a state-controlled gaming operator that could be run by a private owner but would supply a significant portion of the surplus to the Treasury. Respect for the rule of law had to be restored but the illegal gambling market had reached such proportions that there was no prospect of a continued enforcement of the ban. In the long run a total ban could be considered, but as a temporary pragmatic solution the market ought to be legalized proposed Engzell (de Geer 2011 p. 53).

The period when the illegal tipping flourished was rather short, about five years. It is clear in retrospect however that the illegal businesses were crucial in bringing forth the legalization that was decided on in early June of 1934 (ibid p. 50-53). During a cabinet meeting on September 24, the government decided to grant the concession to the private company Tipstjänst. The permit, which was limited to the first half of 1936 could be withdrawn at short notice, but in fact its operations was an immediate success and before long – much due to its great profits - the company passed into state hands as an state owned enterprise in the early 1940s (ibid).

From the turn of the century until World War II there was a shift in the public debate on gambling which saw more proponents and fewer adversaries of the idea of a restricted legalization under a state monopoly (Husz 2004). Gambling was also gradually re-moralized and de-stigmatized as the church was no longer as influential and as gambling proponents had been able to bring forth other values with positive leisure connotations. After nearly a century, the prohibited gambling products had clearly started the transition back to their previous status of legal yet contested commodities. The previously infected value conflict seemed temporarily neutralized - but not for long. For who was to benefit from a potential legalization of the profitable and expanding market?

In a short period of time market by depression, a window of opportunity was opened

for a redefinition of the downside of the gambling market, a window soon seized by the state. After the financial crisis of the early 1930s, the Swedish state was eager to retain control of the gambling market – and it did not have *laissez faire* legalization in mind – rather a strictly state controlled legalization or better yet, a state monopoly. But in order to justify such a control ambition, notions of a normalized market exchange like any other leisure product were not of much help. The value conflict had to be restored it seemed and as immorality claims were no longer politically vital a new value dimension entered the conflict: *criminallity*.

Reports of the flourishing illegal gambling market in Sweden and the sentences faced by some operators had not had any deterring effect on illegal operators and players. But reports of Swedes playing *abroad* – in Germany, England or Denmark and thus taking much needed Swedish money abroad (*ibid*) in times of economic crisis were used in attempts to revitalize the value conflict with respect to nationalism and protectionism. In line with the nationalist, protectionist frame “Privat geshäft” – private profits – were described by the state as something to be suspicious of and notions of the trustworthy state were used to promote the idea of a tight state control or even state monopoly shutting out supposedly untrustworthy private actors from the market place and thereby safeguarding the citizens from gambling-related crime (de Geer 2011) and keeping the gambling economy and its profits within Sweden.

Needless to say, the legalization and the eventual state ownership of both Tipstjänst and the Swedish lottery (Penninglotteriet) was a means to bring substantial amounts of capital to the Treasury (Ihrfors 2007). But the immoral connotations of games that still lingered with some citizens, were also addressed with reference to charity, as a share of the yearly profit from the gambling monopoly was handed over to finance youth activities such as sport clubs. This was another old that could be reintroduced to justify a state monopoly. In Sweden, state lotteries had earmarked funding for education and voluntary work since the 1700s, following the example of Austria and Italy (de Geer 2011 p. 31). The profits were demonstrated and distributed to the needy youth and sport organizations once a year, eventually in a ceremony broadcasted live on Swedish television. In the early 1930s the value conflict that had been neutralized in the 1920s had been intensified once more as foreign and private gambling operators were made into scapegoats – not because their operations were formally illegal. But because of the supposed risks of fraud and other criminal acts by these actors, and because they supposedly were less trustworthy than the state.

As we have seen in the historical back-drop, the value setup of the contested gambling market has been reconstructed several times. From the mid 1800s the contested games made a transition from being prohibited on immorality grounds to being legally sold following a discourse shift that first neutralized the value conflict and then re-vitalized it introducing safety (as in state protection from private fraud) and charity (as an alibi for state gambling profits). With this historic development in mind, we are now to have a closer look at the attempts and events shaping the last transitional neoliberalist-inspired shift starting in the mid 1990s and culminating around 2006, a shift during which the previous criminality framing featuring safety as a prime value was supplemented by a different commodity framing highlighting individual and public health and consumer responsabilization (Alexius 2011a).

Entering health - the Preventive turn and consumer responsabilization

In the post World War II decades, gaming has gradually evolved and been increasingly seen as part of the modern entertainment industry (Husz 2004, Ihrfors 2007). In fact, offering the citizens high quality entertainment is one of the current operating objectives of the State owned gambling operator, Svenska Spel/Swedish games (Alexius, 2010). As Reith (1999) points out, the more recent focus on problem gambling as a health risk has in some sense come to overshadow those who play for amusement and entertainment, although the normalization discourse remains well represented as well (Ihrfors 2007).

After decades of relative stability in the Swedish gambling monopoly market – de Geer refers to the period 1945-1980 as “the stable profit machine” (de Geer 2011 p. 122-208), in the late 1980s scattered research reports from abroad warned about an addictive disorder potentially linked to gambling (for an account of this early work see f ex Dickerson, 2003). Researchers wrote of gambling addiction and likened it to alcohol or drug abuse. These early reports described psychological unhealth potentially springing from harmful games. Neither morality nor safety was addressed in these studies, which focused entirely on gambling related health problems. Thus, the value of health (and the potential risks of illness related to gambling) now attempted to enter the debate.

However, it turned out that these early reports alone proved insufficient in altering the value set up of the Swedish gambling market. In fact, new gambling products were introduced regularly throughout the 1990s and early 2000s and gambling addiction was successfully ignored or dismissed as a “foreign phenomenon”, not present in the Swedish

context, for over a decade (Alexius, forthcoming). During this time of government and organizational dismissal, psychology professor Sten Rönnerberg attempted to raise public awareness and engagement around the “new” problematic of gambling addiction. A handful of individuals employed by the industry (the state owned operators or civil sector lotteries and bingo parlors) were also troubled enough to start advocating measures on their own. Seminars were arranged and an informal network of concerned individuals was formed, but there were no organizational measures, no state initiatives or other radical changes to the market practices in this respect until the Swedish gambling monopoly was struck by three major external shocks which in just a few years managed to firmly establish “responsible gaming” on top of the market actors agenda (ibid), and with it the value of health was definitely added to the market debate.

While the morality concerns (managing immorality) seemed to have faded from ‘market memory’ and practice, criminality concerns of safety (managing risks of fraud etc) were still engaging. However, during the course of a decade from the mid 1990s onward, the potential adverse effect of gambling addiction and various related social health concerns came to dominate the discourse (Helling 2003, Ortiz 2006). As an illustration, over 80 of the 200 questions and motions in the Swedish parliament concerning gambling between the years 2000 and 2007 focused on the subject of gambling (Ihrfors 2007 p 83). First, in 1995, Sweden became a member of the European Union and directly affected by the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that in several cases had stressed how crucial it was for monopoly operators to act responsibly and according to principles of care and moderation.

Three events taking place about the same time in the mid-late 1990s – the EU-membership, the Swedish prevalence study on gambling addiction and the internet boom – together put firm pressure on the market actors, not least the Swedish state and its monopolist state owned enterprise Svenska Spel to address the ‘new’ problematic of gambling addiction. The EU-membership of 1995 and the ECJ-rulings in the following few years challenged the previous physical nation state oriented market regulation. The market representations of the Swedish prevalence study challenged the idea of gambling addiction as a foreign phenomenon without bearing on the Swedish market actors. As put by psychologist Jakob Johnsson at Spelinstitutet in an interview: “Back in those days (before the Swedish prevalence study was reported in 1999 gambling addiction was a ‘non-problem’, so no one was responsible really.” (Alexius, forthcoming)

Second, in 1999, the first Swedish prevalence study led by Professor Rönnerberg and

colleagues concluded that problem gambling or even gambling addiction was not in fact a foreign phenomenon as they had found two percent of Swedish gambling consumers directly affected by gambling problems of an addicting nature (Rönnerberg et al 1999).

Last but not least, the internet boom. In the early 2000s the technological development and spread of internet in society enabled a rapid expansion of e-gaming. In a strict legal sense, the monopolies still existed but in practice the doors to the national monopoly markets were left wide open for new competitors and their products to enter. This radical development challenged not only traditional sales channels and gambling products but also the market regulation supporting the government monopolies. The technological advances, ineffective regulation and popularity amongst the consumers soon resulted in an increased availability of e-gambling opportunities. And with them, claims that problem gambling and addiction gambling too were on the rise, triggered by the fast e-games. The internet boom also opened up for fierce competition which challenged both the physical nation state oriented monopoly regulation and its possibilities of justification according to the channeling principle, using charity as an 'alibi value' to balance off the substantial state profits (Kingma 2008, Cisneros-Örnberg and Tammi forthcoming).

All in all, the three triggers from the three different market practices put gambling addiction firmly on the market agenda. The existing market organization was severely challenged and there was a window of opportunity for market organizers to influence future notions and practices of "responsible gaming" (Alexius 2011a, Alexius forthcoming). In this turmoil in the late 1990s the Swedish state and its state owned gambling operator Svenska Spel was expected to take action. But in these early days of neoliberalist influence (Harvey 2005) prohibiting games was no longer an option expected to be considered by the Swedish state. But what was it to do? How was Svenska Spel to balance and fulfill its value laden dual mission of "sustained economic performance by responsible means"? (Alexius 2011b)

Before long Svenska Spel had become the dominant national force in attempts to shape both the discourse of gambling addiction and the novel practices of responsible gambling that developed (Alexius, 2011a). There was not much resistance or critique at this point, rather there was cooperation and, in some cases even co-option of sorts as in the case of Spelberoendes riksförbund, the national association for gambling addicts, who went as far as to excluded state (and state monopoly) critical members from the association in order to enhance the low legitimacy of the association following internal

fraud (Alexius forthcoming). In the course of a few years, thanks to its powerful position, financial and personnel resources and proactive agenda, state operator Svenska Spel managed to unite all major national market actors: NGO:s, government authorities and private research consultancies who, influenced by the same experts and ideas soon started to work for a common goal - the construction (shaping, educating and equipping) of the responsible gambling consumer and the parallel crafting of *preventive* roles for the organizations involved (Blaszczynski et al 2004; Chan 2009). The dominant representations of harmful products connecting the state to the problem area of gambling addiction were successfully countered with new representations (research reports, ads etc, for details see Alexius, forthcoming) all suggesting that the *consumption* of games, rather than the games themselves, was the root to gambling related health problems.

Despite the fact that EU regulation and politics during the mid and late 1990s had stressed the utmost importance of state responsibility - were member states to keep the monopolies, a close look at practices of state market policy and CSR initiatives unfolds a rather different story (Alexius 2011b): the new emphasis on risky consumption shifted focus gradually from the products themselves and hence the retrospectively motivated responsibility of games producers and operators (and the state as owner) to the prospective – future and capacity oriented responsibility of consumers (for a discussion on the concept of responsibility, see f ex Cane 2002 and Bexell 2005).

In just a few years there was a shift from a legalistic, bureaucratic, centralized top-down configuration of authority to a reflexive, self-regulatory and horizontal ”market-like” configuration. And a view on responsibility as something that at least partly can be produced, distributed and actively realized through consumption (Shamir 2008). This development shows that even within a certain value framework - in this case concerning the problem of gambling addiction and the value of health - efforts to shape notions of the problem at stake becomes crucial for the distribution of responsibility amongst market actors. In this sense gambling addiction is very much a ‘moving target’ (Alexius, forthcoming).

In line with institutionalist views on change we may also note that the intensified focus on consumer responsabilization was in line with several influential movements and ideas of the time. Both the neo-liberal/governance agenda, the upcoming future oriented theory of cognitive behavioral therapy and self-regulation (Alexius 2011a) and the notion of a post modern risk-society with a culture of precaution (Richter et al 2006) and a tendency to risk-manage everything (Power, 2004). These three interrelated societal

trends helped lay the ideological/theoretical foundation for the preventive turn and its characteristic proliferation of self-control education and responsible gaming equipment aimed at realizing its ideal customer, the *Homo Ludens et auctor* – the responsible gambler.

A telling example of value management in the present era of the preventive turn is the public-private partnership Svenska Spel initiated with mathematics/artificial intelligence experts at ICU Intelligence and gambling addiction experts at Spelinstitutet, both private firms. Starting in the fall of 2006 and lasting over a year, the three partners conducted a project aiming at inventing a tool, an interactive device that were to help customers prevent gaming related health problems at an early stage. The result was the innovative responsible gaming device Spelkoll, Playscan. Playscan is a system that detects, predicts and prevents players that have a tendency to develop problem gambling.

With over 95 percent accuracy the system detects late stage problem gambling, i.e. gambling addiction, but also predicts risk behavior that indicates an escalating problem. The system was designed to keep customers from danger and when introduced was set into comparison with a safety belt. The purpose when developing the device was not to keep players from the games, but rather to ensure a responsible, balanced gaming behavior, according to the company strategy called ‘Green Growth’, which emanated from the dual mission. The ‘Green growth’ strategy was all about increasing sales and profits by encouraging low and medium risk players to play more.

The behavior was not only to benefit individual consumers but also the operator, Svenska Spel and its owner the Swedish state in their efforts to balance economical and social values in the market at large. “A healthy customer is a good customer” as Svenska Spel CEO Jesper Kärrbrink phrased it when Playscan had its world première at svenskaspel.se on June 29th 2007. By then (in April 2007) the company had launched the slogan ‘Spela lagom!’ which literally translates to ‘Play just enough!’ (not too much and not too little). The endorsed philosophy was that responsible gaming was most efficient when placed directly in the hands of the player. Therefore, at the outset, Playscan registration was voluntary. In time, however, Playscan was gradually integrated with Svenska Spel’s most criticized e-gaming product: its internet poker. When applying for permission to launch sensitive and somewhat controversial new games, Playscan was suggested as a basis for a modern self-regulation replacing the troubled government legislation, as a social innovation of importance in legitimating the gambling market, its actors and its products. Today, Playscan is also used as part of an overall branding

strategy communicating Svenska Spel as an operator specializing in responsible, safe games and gaming. On the 12th of March 2010, Svenska Spel acquired all rights to the Playscan technology from ICU and before long started exporting its invention. La Française des Jeux, the French monopoly operator was one of the first international customers.

During the course of a century, as a result of shifting ideals, disrupting market triggers and eager market organizers the value set up of the Swedish gambling market had been reconfigured several times and one of the organizational consequences of this reconfiguration was that responsibility for the downside of gambling had been profoundly reconstructed and redistributed (Alexius, forthcoming). Yet, as seen in the quote from the public report SOU 2008:124, p 87 (see the opening quotes) when public officials made an official representation of the contestation of the gambling markets in 2008 an extensive list of values were accounted for. See quote in the introduction: “The particular character of games implies that gambling may be subjected to criminality. Gambling may cause economical and social problems for individuals as well as for society at large. Furthermore, gambling may cause health problems”.

In closing we wish to draw attention to the very recent attempts made by researchers and actors such as the Swedish medical foundation Hjärnfonden/the Brain Fund to medicalize the downside of gambling.⁶ There has been a shift of emphasis in the pathology-oriented literature from external causes of problematic behavior and disease to more focus on internal, biological/chemical causes and clinical aspects of treatment. Recent DNA-inspired debate has even touched on the idea of finding and manipulating the “gaming gene” of affected individuals (de Geer 2011 p. 33). Such attempts at value expansion, expanding the scope of health, in a sense also involves a relocation of the conflict – from the consumption practices to the brains of customers. These ongoing attempts take us far from the moral stigma of the late 1800s, but likewise contribute to sustain the age-old contestation of gambling and its market exchange.

⁶ See for instance the Svenska Spel newspaper ad “Gambling research reveals: Your child is sadly no Einstein”, Dagens Nyheter, 22 October 2008.

Contestation in transition – coal

The conflict between supposed environmental harm and health hazards from coal combustion, and the short term wealth and profits of companies is an issue that has caught a lot of attention in recent years in Sweden (Johnson, 2007). This value conflict has become a subject of public debate, but it has also increasingly become subject of state involvement, of lawmaking. Sweden became one of the pioneer countries when introducing an instrument for control, a national carbon dioxide tax in 1991(SFS 1990:582). However, it did not take long until national measures were considered insufficient, when coal as a portrayed world problem of global warming was thought to require transnational solutions (Cline, 1991). One of the outcomes of this broader framing was a European market for trading with carbon dioxide allowances, launched on 1 January 2005, regulated by European and Swedish national legislation (2003/87/EG; 2004/156/EG; SFS, 2004:656; SFS, 2004:657; SFS 2004:1199; SFS 2004:1205). The two latest decades may be seen as a manifestation of a new formative moment, in which the downside of coal has become pictured in broader terms both in geography and scope, with more legislation as an outcome. Yet, as will be described in this section, this change did not come out of nothing, value aspects of coal has been under social construction for centuries.

Coal has been a contested commodity at least since the 18th century, over time passing through several formative moments. It has in periods been predominantly looked upon as harmless, in periods as unhealthy to humans directly exposed to it, in periods as a threat to the environment and health in a wider community and in recent years as a global problem attached to environmental, health and economical harm (Bongaarts, 1992; Cummins, 1927; Klotz, 1914; Neff, 1932; Ruth & Ibararan, 2009; Weart, 2003). As the coal market has evolved, its economical significance to society has increased. Today, coal is traded on a world market with actors such as brokers, suppliers, financial investors and end users (SOU 2004:62; World coal institute, 2005). As a natural resource it is still rather rich in supply, with relative moderate extraction and transportation costs (World coal institute, 2006). As a fuel it is more intensively used than ever especially in developing countries and coal is also still widely used in developed countries such as Sweden in energy production. The great demand has turned coal into an economical question as a valuable asset for society at large, frankly anyone that makes use of energy and heat. Given this broad coal dependence, the value conflict concerning coal may not only be

looked upon merely as a conflict between economical values on the upside and social values on the downside. It may also be seen as a broader conflict, a conflict between the lifestyle and the freedom of individuals to choose a lifestyle on one hand, and on the other hand social values that might even be difficult to measure in economical terms. Even though it has been suggested, they should be (SOU 2003:60).

What we can see is consequently that the values that speak against coal as a commodity have changed, matured and increased in strength throughout time. But coal had strong values that speak in favor of it attached. The strength of the claims in favor of coal has always been about wealth and the well being that can be obtained by industrial development and technological advances. These advantages have also expanded throughout history and during the 20th century been accompanied by the virtue of a modern individualistic and materialistic lifestyle. The conflict has reconfigured throughout history, evolving into the delicate situation we face today with significant advantages and devastating drawbacks. We will start our account way back in time, at the time when coal had not yet entered trains, boats or industrial production.

The emergence of a value conflict- the discovery of health hazards among coal miners

Today, carbon has a bad reputation as a commodity, particularly due to its emission of carbon dioxide in combustion. This harm has however not always been at the centre of attention. Neither has coal always been used as a fuel and a source of energy. The earliest signs of coal trading can be traced back to AD 200 in Great Britain. At that time, coal was used for the purpose of drying grains (Sallway, 2001). It is not until year 1213 that we can find more solid proof of the existence of industrial use in processes of combustion, the use of coal among blacksmiths and metal workers in Belgium. But it is commonly claimed that it was in Great Britain that the first traces of more organized trading of coal and wider industrial use emerged, during the industrial revolution. A drastic increase of the use of coal occurred in the early 19th century when it was increasingly acknowledged that combustion of coal was an efficient fuel in providing the high temperatures needed for steam engines used in industrial machinery (Neff, 1932). Trade became more organized as extended networks of railway tracks permitted efficient transporting. With the increased use, the mining industry grew and became international. During this time we can detect some of the early evidence of discovered health issues concerning coal.

The relation between the presence of carbonaceous material in lungs and pulmonary diseases was actually already discussed among researchers in 1717 (Ramazzini, 1717/2001) but it was not until the beginning of the 19th century that there were extensive studies on the effects of carbonaceous material in the lungs of coal miners, exposed to coal dust. This was a time of rapid progress, of industrialization and factory-like production.

The term “coal miner’s lung” was launched by physician George Pearson in 1813 (Meiklejohn, 1951). The existence of the phenomenon was later on supported by a report by Laennec in 1819, resulting in a wider attention to the fact that there seemed to be a relation between deposit of harmful carbonic substance in lungs and extensive inhalation of coal dust among workers in direct contact with coal. A health issue of coal had thus been discovered and coal ceased to be looked upon as a harmless commodity. Based on these pieces of work it was soon possible to determine specific harmful effects of coal when discovering that it had a tendency to change tissue structures within the organ (Gregory, 1931). Onwards, the coal miner’s lung was referred to as “the black lung” (Stratton, 1838). The concept of “the black lung” of coal miners continued to catch attention in increasingly more elaborate analysis (see for example Collins, 1915).

And as analysis of the “black lung” gradually became more sophisticated, the awareness increased resulting in somewhat improved working condition by for instance systems of ventilation (Cummins, 1927). Needless to say, there was a conflict between the struggle for profit in production and the sometimes costly improvement of working condition. But the conflict was not just there; it arose due to discoveries of harms that were taken up by a community of researchers. The conflict was constructed by these researchers displaying environmental harms, but also eventually by workers mobilizing to demand changed working condition making the issue not only a research matter but also a political matter that called for reform changes in form of a new legislation. At the point when a more unified research community and a more unified workers community had been established the issue became objectified and looked upon as urgent enough to require political measures (Simpson, 2009).

Expansion to a community issue - widening the scope of the health hazard

Working conditions were somewhat improved and this could perhaps have been the end of the history of coal as a contested commodity if it had not been for new research presenting coal as a danger to the local community when combusted. In for instance Klotz

(1915), emission from coal-combustion spread in the air was portrayed as a “community disease” and as an “urban disease”, shifting the focus from the individual coal worker to the health of the local community (See also Edgar, 1923). When the supply of oxygen is lower, combustion is said to be incomplete, and the result is the extremely poisonous carbon monoxide molecule. Carbon monoxide molecules are highly attracted to the oxygen carrying hemoglobin of the blood, creating compounds that block oxygen from being carried in the blood channels among people inhaling the emission.

This meant that the harms were increasingly linked to the coal consumption, the emission of coal, rather than its production. Working conditions in mines were still a minor issue, but the new hot topic was how people in the neighborhood could be protected. The solution was obviously not to tell them not to breath. The conflict was thus brought vividly to life again by new health concerns that widened the scope of the conflict, expanding it on the same value grounds: the value of health.

What was often assumed in research at the time was its negative health effects to humans mainly caused by carbon monoxide - the result of incomplete combustion in absence of larger amounts of oxygen (Thomson, 2010). These arguments resulted in a debate, but in little actual policy change. The scientific arguments were not as specific and concrete as in the case of the workers, and furthermore there was no movement of workers to pay attention to. When it appeared as if these arguments were to have no impact, economists entered the scene.

Coal as a negative externality to society

In the early 20th century research within economics were initiated on what came to be known as a negative externality related to pollution. Pollution was portrayed as one of the ills of production resulting in costs to society that producers should pay as they were thought to be causing this harm. The externality concept brought on an increasing interest in estimating costs and an instrument of control was enforced to make polluting firms pay a price for exploitation (Mishan 1971; Baumol and Oates 1975; Serret & Johnson, 2005).

The externality research helped expand the argument about local community health hazards even further. Now, the issue was brought up to a level of societal costs that were easier for politicians to grasp. Furthermore it provided a valid justification for introducing measures to tackle the ills of coal within an economical realm – profits versus costs that is. Coal had been considered valuable for society and the economy, now the positive value and profits had to be weighed against the negative social costs incurred. All within

an economic value frame work. Also, from being treated as an issue of local communities, the question of the harm of coal became extended to a societal level. Consequently emission of carbon could now not only be expressed in terms of a health issues but in the terms of being a cost to the society in terms of health and environmental damage. In other words, tying the hazards of coal to the term negative externality meant the adding of an economical concern and an expansion of the health aspects without any new discoveries on the matter of health. Just by applying a new concept and its framing, values had been accumulated into an entity of stronger claims than any single value could provide. Also - the social downside of coal exchange was in a sense colonized by the externality concept – it was made calculable.

During the first half of the century, taxes where often proposed as an instrument appropriate for dealing with negative externalities (Pigou, 1912). This was exactly what happened in Sweden in 1950, when the tax on energy produced from fossil fuels as a consequence of this new line of thinking as it was motivated in such terms. In this change we see relatively little social movement involvement, rather it appeared to have been the result of a dialogue between politics and researchers that came to be much centered on economical issues (Ståhl, 1975).

As displayed above, it took quite some time between the launching of a tax system and the first appearance of theories on externalities. It is difficult to say exactly why, but as we already have explained there was little social pressure for change, and furthermore environmental harm was at large yet to be added to the conflict. As such, the theory on externalities provided the possibility to make companies pay both for health costs and environmental costs (Baumol and Oates 1975; Serret & Johnson, 2005).

But coal was yet not experienced as a greater environmental hazard, the relation between carbon dioxide and environmental consequences were still largely unknown. This appear to be much due to the fact that research within natural science until late 40s had a tendency to focus studies on local phenomena, and inertia around old theories and mathematical formula seem to have prevailed. But foremost, the difficulties with detecting environmental problems appear to have been due to limitations in technology, until the late 40s. There existed simply no means for measuring carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere on a larger scale before (Weart, 2003).

Environmental issues started to be added to the value conflict in the late 40s and a tax came in 1950, but this was only the beginning of the struggles to assemble the health issue, economical and political claims and environmental concerns in a mobilization that

called for action. Again, a lack of technology seem to be the chief cause to the fact that it was not until late 70ths until environmental research really started to see the magnitude of the environmental damage of coal.

Expansion of environmental values and the concept of global warming

During the 50s and early 60s it was increasingly common to do studies on the relation between increased temperature and coal combustion, the issue of carbon dioxide on top of the already known effects of carbon monoxide. The expression “global warming” started to be used in rather fuzzy terms in the early 70s but did not at the time mobilize a wider research community or the policy makers of society (se for example Park, 1970). The mid 80s and early 90s reconfigured the value conflict by the increased orientation to environmental issues, and these issues tended to be widely debated internationally in research that also came to influence Swedish strategies for dealing with the value conflict, even though most of the influential research on the matter was not of Swedish origin.

This epoch - the 80s and early 90s - can be looked upon as a time when environmental framing of coal gained ground and came to permeate the discourse. In research, if we are to generalize, the 80s was a time of controversy and debate that did put the issue on the research and policy agenda. The attention to the harm of coal, not only as local environmental or health problem, but as a world problem escalated during the 80s, but researchers tended to be divided in opinion. A fairly large bulk of researchers in the 80s believed that no such thing as global warming caused by coal combustion existed. Some attributed changes in temperature to natural random variation (MacDonald, 1980). Some researchers acknowledged a trend of increasing temperature but traced this development to the position of Earth's orbit and axis tilt (Rosenberg, 1988). Other skeptical researchers discerned a rather unfavorable change in world temperature, but downplayed the importance of coal as a cause, pointing at figures indicating that there existed no perfect correlation between increasing amounts of carbon dioxide and the rise in temperature (Houghton and Woodwell, 1989). The most extreme point of view at the time was perhaps the perspective of the green house effect to be something good, a blessing in an otherwise cold world that would stabilize as sun spot activities changed (see Seitz et al., 1989; 1990). During this time of division of opinion there were environmental organizations very convinced about the harms of coal combustion, but still states tended to remain passive, perhaps in lack of a more unified research image about the severity of coal combustion in environmental terms.

But as new ways of processing and extracting data developed and facilitated the task of analyzing environmental effects, methods of measuring changed due to new technology - for instance in the shape of rather advanced satellites. Then, the tide among researchers started to turn to a state of more consensus. New studies recognizing environmental harms started to have an impact on the political debate and older studies got recognition (See for example Bongaarts, 1992; Cline, 1991; Ramanathan & Raval, 1989; Cess et al., 1989, Schlesinger and Mitchell, 1987). The wider effects of global warming were increasingly paid attention to in studies, in which it was acknowledged to cause the so called “green house effect”, the rise in average temperature affecting affect grains, diminish animal species, imbalance the ecosystem contribute to extension of deserts, raising sea-levels (Cline, 1991; Houghton, 2005; Rosenberg, 1988; Weart, 2008) Importantly, this research caught the attention of actors outside the world of research - among governments, international bodies and NGOs. Environmentalists in different spheres of society did put on the pressure when reports came, indicating that there was no end to the environmental problems without actions, as the use of coal seemed to increase due to the struggle for material wealth (Benedick et al., 1991).

The gate keeper between research and policy appears to have been public national reports drawing upon recent research findings. Powerful actors in the US and the UN highlighted the questions and spread the words of research of the environmental harm of coal and the need to introduce instruments of control (EPA, 1990a; IPCC, 1991 a): IPCC, 1990a,b; NAS, 1991; EPA, 1990a,b). Another concern was the simple fact that coal is not an endless resource and therefore ought to be seen as a more scarce resource, especially if the use of fossil fuels such as coal continued to increase (Cline, 1991; Liaskas et al., 2000, Bongaarts, 1992). Governments in several European countries rapidly reacted to these findings and reports, but they tended to be back bound by being trapped between the findings of harm and the interest of powerful lobbyist of industries that would suffer from instruments of control (Benedick et al., 1991).

Sweden was all the same marked by more concrete policy ambitions on the issue at the time. We can see this in the introduction of the carbon dioxide tax in 1990, and in prop. 1992/93:179 and prop. 1996/97:84 urging for climate strategies in which Sweden would both take responsibility for externalities on the national level and take a leading role in shaping the climate policy of the EU. On the whole, the late 80s and early 1990s was a time when environmental issues were brought into the political agenda in Sweden starting with the formulation of the first carbon dioxide target in 1988 (DS 2005:55). By

the time, the value conflict did not only expand in geographical concern, but also in the scope of attention to a plurality of sources giving rise to carbon related emission.

Were these changes in policy and attitude only due to researchers and politicians in interaction? No, the rise of powerful environmental organizations was doubtlessly a significant factor. The 90s was the time when the discourse on the harms of coal became more unison and when politicians were urged by actors such as environmental organizations to settle for action. In essence, this was an era of environmental activism with the birth of organizations such as Greenpeace in 1983, bringing attention to environmental issues in whole different ways. 1990 was the year in which the document “Global warming: The Greenpeace report”, backing up unconventional methods with peaceful measures suggested by rather influential scientists (Legget, 1990). The sign of the time was that the discourse on Carbon dioxide changed from being looked upon as a local problem to being treated as a world problem. The term global warming became an umbrella term accumulating the harms of coal. Long time had passed since the time when miners’ health was looked upon as the sole crucial hazard of coal, but even this local concern was in a sense baked into the term global warming that came to manifest all the harms of coal in accumulation. Several events helped bring on this accumulation of values; environmental research, activism and technology. But it was also due to economical research once again being brought into the picture, urging for practical solutions at a transnational level. Economical aspects made the issue particularly relevant.

Towards a European emission allowance market

In Sweden the newly displayed environmental harms of coal started to have an impact on policy as the social movement pressed on and the problem reached the media. But it was yet hard to find agreements on how to tackle these issues transnationally. At this point we see the entrance of a new version of externality theory based on economic theory on the importance of property rights for an efficient society (Knight, 1924; Friedman, 1966; Coase, 1960). In the late 60s and early 70s property right research proved to be highly significant for research on negative externality as the idea of a new solution to the externality problems was presented. Studies started to mend the idea of negative externalities with theories about property rights and came up with the idea of a market for emission allowances (Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972). It was assumed in the theoretical framework that trade with emission allowances instead of imposing taxes would create a situation where the ownership and trade would stimulate decrease in

emission among companies that could reduce emission fairly cheaply, while other companies could maintain their levels of emission. In other words, a market mechanism was believed to enable economically efficient reduction of emission in comparison to other instruments for control.

The idea of a market solution was also inspired by an actual initiative to create such a market, namely the market for Sulphurdioxide allowances in the US (Smock, 1991). The American sulphurdioxide market was national and rather limited in its extent, but this did not stop it from being portrayed as a valid role model. The market ideal became a fuel for the European debate which transferred into actual policy in the Kyoto meeting in 1997. Its agreements on joint fulfillment and on flexible mechanisms for reducing coal appeared to be a significant step towards transnational strategies for dealing with emission. The Kyoto protocol became the catalyst to the emission market introduced in 2005 within the EU, a market solution that did draw upon the findings of economics in the 70ths about the efficiency of a system of defined property rights (2002/358/EC).

On 1 January 2005 the first international trading scheme concerning coal, was at the point of launching within the European Union. A market for emission permit trading was introduced within the EU in 2005 at a time when emission externalities were increasingly regarded as a highly prioritized fatal world problem (IPCC, Climate Change 2001. Synthesis Report). The market was introduced at a time when the faith in markets was prevalent, in a time when the market was a strong ideal. Reading reports from the time, it becomes clear that the market was not only introduced for the sake of provable efficiency, but also for the simple fact that it was a market.

The European emission allowance market rests upon the logic that every company is allowed to emit a certain amount of carbon dioxide corresponding to a specific number of allocated so called emission allowances. Emissions beyond this level requires purchases of allowances for a market price dependent on supply by companies willing and able to emit less than they are expected/allowed to (KOM, 2001: 581; KOM 2000: 87; EGT L 242; EGT L 242; EG/2002/358; EG/2003/87 2004/156/EG). This was regarded to be the special advantage of a market system; the reward from selling allowances when able to reduce emission to a low cost, resulting in economically efficient reduction (Bohm & Convery, 2004; Serret & Johnstone; 2005). The fact that each company was endowed with a certain specific number of permits implied that the system was not only a move towards a market order, but also a shift from the idea of tax uniformity to an individualized market setting where energy companies using coal in producing energy got

a specific responsibility to measure and report emission, with increasingly advanced equipment making it possible. The system was thus in a way treating companies (users) like individuals of own responsibilities according to different capabilities for reducing emission and for monitoring the actual emission. We have consequently to do with a very special way of dealing with an externality; a commodification process.

Coal seems to have been no longer looked upon as merely a matter of health or environmental problem, but as a larger question of the wellbeing of humans including all those aspects (SOU 2003:60). With the introduction of a market mechanism it may appear that the value conflict had been managed. This was not the case however. The market was decided on and launched, but the value conflict remained. Rather, events from the time of the first talk about a market in Kyoto until its was launched brought conflict, debate and disagreement to light. Public authorities, NGOs, environmental organizations, trade organizations and lobbyists were important actors in these debates (See N2002/4470/ESB; Proposition 2005/06:184). At no time in history of coal had so many stakeholders had an ambition to affect a decision concerning the condition of the market for coal.

The idea about an emission market was discussed in Sweden already in Prop. 2001/02:55 and dir.2001:56), but the detailed framework for such a market can be seen with its starting point in 2003, a significant starting point as most of the important decisions on such a market was to be decided on the national level. The levels of supply, the specific rules for applications to emit and the structures for monitoring the market where all at large national concerns. From 2003 and onwards we can spot a flood of SOUs, statements from stakeholders, reports from other public authorities judgments from Lagrådet, paving the way for a Swedish legislation (prop. 2003/04/132; prop. 2004/07/18; Statskontoret, 2002/265-5; SOU: 2003:60). Trade organizations such as Svensk Energi, populated by many companies of coal combustion, proved to become an important voice in affecting the shape of the market, as it seems also its allocation, as already mentioned trying to impose their will on the allocation conditions. Lobbying initiative turned from systems of control as such to the direction of trying to affect the conditions within the market to become more lenient (Interviews with company representatives). These attempts were somewhat successful but not to an extent of satisfaction (Interviews with company representatives).

Meanwhile, environmental protection interest organization such as Naturskyddsföreningen engaged also in the debate calling for an auctioning system rather

than an allocation system, an auctioning system with fewer emission permits handed to companies for free. These attempts were at large unsuccessful and here we again see the impact and influence of research, this time research in favor of an allocation system. We can once again see in the reports before the introduction of the market how researchers came to shape its formation as a body of experts. One group of research experts were the scholars of traditional academy, another group of experts were brought in from structures in the intersection between traditional research, the state and private companies, such as SP with the task of testing how emission from coal combustion could be measured technically (SOU 2005:10; SP 2004:30). A third body of experts were private consultants with some responsibility for processing information from different actors that expressed a voice about how the market should be designed. Expertise was at large an important factor in attempts to agree on and mobilize for practical solutions.

Launching the reform implementation

At the brink of launching the market an order was in place, with the different organizing tasks defined by Swedish regulation and directives. Naturvårdsverket became the general responsible authority, the author of directives and responsible for allocation of emission allowances. Länsstyrelsen was handed the task to make companies individually responsible by giving every company a certain permission that stated how the company was to act for taking their responsibility, in particular the technology and methods used in measuring emission. Energimyndigheten stood as the administrative authority of emission accounts heavily relying on new advanced computer systems for reporting between authorities and foremost the reporting of trade and measured emission among the emitting companies of the market. A very central role of the market was played by accredited controllers - private companies that acted as the third party link between the emitting companies and the state authorities. The task of the controllers was to monitor and assess how the companies of the market fulfilled their responsibility in terms of measuring emission, the use of equipment (SFS, 2004:656; SFS, 2004:657; SFS 2004:1199; SFS 2004:1205; SFS 2006:643, SFS 2006:645 and SFS 2006:1109). This role of the controllers meant that a group of experts stepped into the task of shaping the market and they also served as a sign of that a question of a “real” market, where private actors were involved in the organization of trade mechanisms, not primarily the state.

Yet, despite a rather sophisticated state designed plan for the organizing of a market solution for dealing with ills of fossil fuels, all the aspects of the value conflict proved to

be far from settled or solved. Disagreement among experts and other stakeholders about how trade mechanisms should be designed remained, different views were largely dependent on what were seen as important values to protect. One debated question was whether emission allowances were to be auctioned or to remain allocated for free. Trade organizations with an interest in coal economy were naturally in favor of free allocation. Meanwhile, they promoted the view that the market was only one aspect of solving emission problems and that many problems did not lay in coal combustion by companies, but instead incurred by private consumption of goods in general. Environmental interest organizations were in favor of auctioning, provided that the social cost would be valued in economical terms. Researchers tended to be of different opinions on the matter.

In the end a mechanism for allocation was introduced, but the extensive debate that continued indicated that this solution did not solve the value conflict of coal. Voices that wanted to protect the environment rather than support the industry kept a high media profile in denouncing the first period allocation using the argument that it had caused a too low emission allowance price. Naturskyddsföreningen was particularly successful in highlighting this question, strengthened by research and reports claiming that emission was not only an ordinary environmental concern, but in the end a threat to the wealth and well being of humans. In the meantime state authorities spoke of the initial phase of the market as a testing period where an oversupply could be justified. This was a viewpoint that did not really make it to a common debate. Instead, the shortcomings of the market came to be focused in the media.

But many companies, especially within the energy sector and their trade organizations were of a totally different opinion. Their claim was that the allocation was a serious constrain that would raise the prices of electricity and heat dramatically. And this was also a claim that reached a general public due to extensive media coverage. Consequently, the debate about emission continued in discussions on how different actors viewed the values of the market.

On the matter of trading and the market price, we are not to forget the significance of the private consumer in shaping the ongoing market practices, both being the end user of commodities producing emission and a possible owner of emission allowances. Emission allowances can be bought by private persons and this means that the market has not only become a matter of individual company responsibility but also the responsibility of private individuals. Environmental interest organization such as Naturskyddsföreningen in Sweden, utilized this opportunity as a means for intervening in the market promoting

the possibility of purchasing allowances from them and letting them take care of the bureaucracy of trading, with the purpose of lowering the supply accessible for companies. The emission allowance was even launched as the Christmas gift of the year in 2006. This had in the end little impact on market prices, but due to large media attention it became a well spread portrayal of the harms of fossil fuels such as coal. It is however possible that this initiative did have a counter effect as attention was turned from market exchange actors to the responsibility of individuals, thereby in part resolving the value conflict responsibilities from the main actors of the market.

The value conflict of coal still remains but the emission allowance market has survived on a seemingly solid foundation in its organizational structures, in power of being a market in times of markets, in the power of being an individualizing solution at a time of individual responsibility. Also, in the power of being surrounded by advanced technical equipment at a time when the faith in such equipment is extensive. Furthermore, with the help of new and old kinds of experts who were standing as a guarantee for solutions dealing with coal externalities within a legal framework. But given the history of coal there is no reason to believe that this is a solution that will settle the issue permanently.

From the coal case we have learnt that it is possible to achieve reconfigurations of values by attempts to mobilize actors in times when a window of opportunity opens - even if it is a difficult and often lengthy process. We have seen values being added to the conflict and we have seen processes expanding the scope of a single value, such as health. Most striking is perhaps the accumulation of values depicted in the case. The power balance and the possibilities to make value claims may be significantly changed when values can be entangled and assembled into a single concept such as global warming that makes the sum of the accumulated values something more and different from each of the values standing alone.

Findings and concluding discussion

By way of three historical case studies of transformative moments in the classical contested commodities markets of alcohol, gambling and coal we have aimed to illustrate that it matters to the organization of a market *if* there is a value conflict embedded in a commodity and *how* this conflict is configured. In the following section we discuss and

compare our findings. For instance, we conclude that we have not seen any attempts at deliberately removing values from a value conflict discourse. Value discourses in markets rather seem to be ‘layered’ in a path dependent manner, indicating that changes are most likely to occur either when new values are added or existing values are expanded or accumulated. We also discuss the possibility of relocating value conflicts and suggest that such relocations seem likely to influence the choice of market element/s to ‘target’ when organizing in response to the conflict.

Reconfiguring values at stake

As stated in the introduction, the three markets were selected for comparison on the basis of their presumed long history of value conflicts and their shared categorization of contested commodities markets. And indeed, our empirical case descriptions have demonstrated beyond doubt that conflicting values have indeed been a constant concern in these markets. We have also demonstrated that a plethora of market organizers have been involved in efforts to reconfigure or relocate the value conflict at hand and the notions of contestation.

Alcohol has been the focus of a number of different, although at times intertwined conflict configurations. The primary value conflict configuration we have found is the conflict between *liberalism vs solidarity*, which is a conflict over consumer access to an assumed harmful commodity and whether or not consumption should be restricted or unlimited. Other dimensions of value conflicts observed are *fairness vs unfairness*, a conflict over producer rights to entry between farmers and industry capitalists; *individual control vs universality*, a conflict over the arbitrariness of state control of alcohol sales, and lastly, *state responsibility vs individual responsibility*; a conflict over the the role of the state regarding the question of alcohol.

From the long dominant focus on *immorality* – claims of gambling as a sinful and wasteful, unproductive activity, the value conflict of the gambling market was gradually first neutralized with reference to profits and not least leisure values of entertainment and sports. Then, in the early 1930s, the value conflict was reactivated and expanded to include values of *safety* – claims of foreign and private operators as potentially criminal, as well as the alibi value of state *charity*. And eventually, in the 1990s the value of *health* – and a discourse on gambling addiction came to dominate the downside of this layered value conflict.

Coal has transformed from having been predominantly looked upon as harmless, to being viewed as *unhealthy* to humans directly exposed to it during early 18th century. The conflict was then gradually expanded making coal an issue of *environmental and health* hazards of a broader community and in recent years, a global problem attached to *environmental, health and economical* values. The upsides of coal has likewise evolved in pace with industrial and technological development, turning from an issue of local economical interests, to grander economical interests and in the end also other values which are associated with a modern lifestyle such as *material wealth and freedom of individuals*.

Actors involved

Scrutinizing the transformative moments of our three markets we find that many actors of very different agendas, motives, position and resources are involved in handling the delicate issue of a contested commodity. As expected, the Swedish state has placed an active part both in the reconfigurations and in the market organization following them. When restrictions and bans were placed on the contested commodity these have been mainly issued by the state. Being in possession of the power of lawmaking and in the extreme, the power of closing down a contested commodities market, makes states powerful market organizers.

But the state may also and at times simultaneously take on a number of other roles and intervene in markets a number of different ways, for example as producer/operator and regulator at the same time. The most striking example is perhaps the latest transformative change in the coal case when the state actually created a new market in order to deal with the harms of the coal, an emission rights market in which the supply is handed out by the state. A parallel case has been seen in the gambling market where the state and its state owned gaming operator Svenska Spel has been the driving force in setting up a niche service market for responsible gaming education and tools (Alexius 2011a).

Our cases also indicate that the state may take active part in value conflict configurations as a means to protect the status quo of the market organization, for example the interest of creating or protecting a state monopoly may explain why the state has attempted to influence value conflicts in the alcohol market of the 1950s and the gambling market in the 1930s and 1990s.

Another type of prominent market organizer is the social movement. As an example, the Temperance movement was highly involved in the conflict reconfigurations and construction of a Swedish ration book system in the beginning of the 20th century. The same coherent impact can also be seen in the coal market when environmental organizations established their view on carbon dioxide harm as a global problem in late 80s and early 1990s. Another actor that might perhaps be looked upon as a social movement in some respect is the protestant church and its influence on how alcohol and gambling became seriously contested commodities in the 15th century with the diffusion of Protestant morality which defined alcohol and gambling as roots to sin and vice. In later formative movement in all our cases we cannot see the church playing any major role, implying that this is an example of a social movement that have lost its momentum and much of its power to influence the value conflict configuration of these markets. Likewise, the Temperance movement had a momentum in the late 19th and early 20th century that it has not been able to sustain. Hence, it is not surprising that morality and temperance concerns have been much less prominent, if at all present, in the debate. When proponents leave the scene, the values they promoted become dormant or even forgotten.

Researchers make up another influential actor category. In all our three cases, research and science is a main source of arguments to reframe both the conflict and the discussion of appropriate ways to deal with the conflict - for example solutions directed to individual responsibility in the latest shift. To some extent researchers have replaced the declining church as central legitimacy makers in Swedish society, besides the state that is. Also, which is apparent in the alcohol case especially after 1955, researchers of mainly the medical profession came to replace people with a traditional background in the Temperance Education Federation (CFN). Further, it is for instance highly unlikely that the gambling responsibility system would have looked the same if it were not based on reports of considered scientific reliability (Dunne, 1985). The same goes for the coal case where the market would hardly have its design without the externality concept proposed by studies in economics. A general conclusion is thus that the impact of research, sometimes to the point of performativity of research concepts and theories (Callon, 1998) may be expected.

In the gambling case we also see that the value conflict may very well be altered by actors not directly involved in market exchange of gaming products. In the 1920s the growing 'leisure market' of sports events such as soccer matches, helped open up for a

normalization of gambling. Both in the 1920-1930s and in the 1990-2000s we also find that illegal yet licit gambling operators, both within Sweden and abroad, were influential in opening up a wider range of legalized, yet restricted products such as the Svenska Spel poker which comes integrated with the responsible gaming tool Playscan (Alexius 2011a).

As pointed out by Djelic (2011:6), the notion of institutional entrepreneurship is a risky one, because from an institutional perspective, agency is always embedded. Using the notion of institutional entrepreneurship may thus make us overstate the possibility and importance of individual agency. Some earlier historical accounts of market development may suffer from such an “heroic individuals bias”, but even judging from our own empirical studies of the present times we find it hard to neglect the influence exerted by certain “wise guys” individuals (Furusten and Garsten, forthcoming). In the alcohol case doctor Ivan Bratt managed to have his Motboken system enforced. In the gambling case, psychologist and private consultant Thomas Nilsson has managed to spread the gospel of a cognitive behavioral approach to the adverse effects of gambling and entrepreneurial CEO of Svenska Spel Jesper Kärrbrink introduced market solutions in a, for the time still unorthodox manner (Alexius 2011b). It is generally difficult to point out individuals as agents of change as they typically belong to an organization and are embedded in a context. However at times certain individuals manage to raise issues more swiftly. The fact that individuals may attempt to intervene in value conflict configuration and organization does however in no way guarantee their success. In our cases we followed the struggle of gambling addiction researcher Sten Rönnerberg who struggled for a decade to add the value of health to the agenda (for an account of a similar development in the US 1970-1980s see Dunne, 1985). And in the alcohol case, the “Aquavit King” L O Smith struggled in vain against the municipal monopoly, attempting for instance to add the value of pureness (as in a higher product quality) to the upside of the reconfiguration then taking shape. In these cases success or failure seems to correlate with whether the individuals shared state interests or not.

In the following section we pay attention to the potential impact of both exogenous events and strategies chosen and put forth a number of tentative suggestions as to why and how value conflicts have been reconfigured and why and how some attempts seem to have influenced the organization of the market.

Exogenous events as triggers?

As noted by Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) not all events are attended equally: not all critical events become triggers for change. Our cases indicate coherently that events become influential and achieve a mobilization *if* they can be linked up with motives of powerful actors.

In the alcohol case, a couple of events in the 1850s made it possible for the state to gain a certain amount of discretion to be able to initiate a reform. One important event was the rising costs of imported grain in 1850 and the fear of a food shortage, which functioned as a legitimate reason for the state to propagate to end grain squandering. At the same time the rise of the temperance movement, though quite vague, demanded actions to be taken against home distillation. Taken together the arguments of the moral and economic stakeholders, the temperance movement, private corporations and the state reconfigured the conflict and made it possible to formulate demands for a reform in 1855. Later in the 1920s when strong demands on prohibition surfaced, various liberal stakeholders mobilized to form a rationing system as a way to suppress these demands. The consideration of a rationing system was most likely influenced by circumstances of the war-time rationing of several commodities during the WWI. Not to forget was the general agenda where the state transformed itself from a military state to a social state, where the responsibility for social problems came to be a state concern, a circumstance that made a state solution to the Aquavit problem possible. Further, the shift in 1995 involves perhaps the most distinct exogenous trigger in the alcohol case, namely the demands set out by the European Union in the Swedish membership process. These demands, coupled with the international neo-liberal trend of state deregulation, surely reconfigured the value conflict regarding alcohol.

As suggested in the gambling case, disrupting crises such as the financial depression of the early 1930s may open up a window of opportunity for actors to influence the value conflict and its organization. In this case the Swedish state could seize this window of opportunity and after decades of debate managed to legalize gambling as a means to raise funds, to 'channel' gaming income away from illegal or foreign actors to the Treasury and to charitable causes, the latter value added to justifying state involvement. This reconfiguration reinforced the economical upside of gambling and helped tip the scale in favor of the restricted legalization. Comparing this development to the one in the late 1980s we see many similarities. When the psychology professor Sten Rönnerberg attempted to raise public awareness about the first foreign research reports on gambling addiction

his efforts were simply ignored by most actors in and around the market for over a decade. Just as in the previous shift a “clearing in the jungle” was insufficient to create a new path (Djelic and Quack 2007). Rönnerberg alone did not have the leverage nor the resources to make an impact. Keeping on the path and its existing focus on safety as in protection from fraud seemed to absorb change pressures and make it possible for the government to ignore Rönnerberg’s attempt for such a long time until a chain of events were linked up to support his initiative.

It took three additional more or less critical events until eventually the value configuration was altered– Sweden entering the EU in 1995 and having to abide by ECJ Rulings which advocated responsible gaming – protecting citizens from gambling related harm – as the primary *raison d’être* for state gambling monopoly operators; the completion and dissemination of the first Swedish prevalence report on compulsive gambling (written, by the way by Rönnerberg and colleagues) in 1999 and the dramatically increased internet competition around the year 2000. In this second case, a number of events and actors from a number of practices helped bring a new value to the conflict configuration.

Technological change as the final catalyst in a longer chain of events is also something that we find in the case of coal and its carbon dioxide emission. Here we see a similar trajectory where technological changes enables new ways of configuring the conflict and in turn new organizational solutions. New technology to process and extract data (such as advanced satellites) provided both the opportunity to redefine the adverse effects coal and to measure it (in this case analysis of environmental effects). National NGOs such as Naturskyddsföreningen and international such as Greenpeace then jumped into the bandwagon. Meanwhile, the Swedish state saw the possibility to return to economic ideas that had not been debated for decades in this market. Research, technology, social movement and a sense of political feasibility had gradually been mobilized and coupled and reinforced one another in a chain of conflict reconfiguration.

Just as in the case of gambling addiction, the new value (in the coal case it was the value of global environmentalism) was added to the conflict configuration when public attention was eventually reached. But it did not come easy. The benefits of coal representing values of prosperity, profits and competitiveness were welcomed by many in an age stressing the importance of materialistic individual wellbeing. Displaying the bads of coal enough to launch the EU emission market was an effort that had requested a

number of events, actors, technology and economical counter arguments. These all came together to close the conflict temporarily.

And just as with the prevalence report of in the gambling case or the Kyoto protocol in the coal case, representing additional problematic aspect of commodities and markets are vital, but most often insufficient in altering conflict configuration. In the coal case, the new research results developed using the new technology caught the attention of actors both inside and outside the research community – such as governments, international bodies and NGOs.

Our findings support Djelic and Quack (2007 p 168) and their findings of the importance of “pincer movements” and their remark that “for a path to emerge from the clearing, critical junctures have to generate a number of incremental and cumulative steps that can extend over long stretches of time”. The likelihood of succeeding to influence a value conflict configuration seems to increase with increasing public attention and mobilization from various actors and practices around the issue.

Value addition

Our cases indicate that actors aiming to influence a value conflict reconfiguration of a market often aim to *add* another value to the conflict. We have found values being added to both sides of the conflicts. In the gambling case leisure values were added to the upside of the conflict in the 1920s, not least by civil sector sports clubs. In a few years however, the state made great efforts to add values to reinforce the conflict once more, this time by reference to safety, criminality, nationalism and protectionism. Values may also be added to the upside of a conflict as an “alibi-strategy” by those in charge of market organization. In the cases of both alcohol and gambling, the Swedish state added charity to the conflict discourse in an attempt to balance the conflict and perhaps neutralize the purchases somewhat. In the alcohol case, after household distillery had been prohibited in 1855, the protected municipal producers’ profits had to benefit the municipality or philanthropic causes. The same strategy was applied in order to justify the restricted market legalization in the form of the state gambling monopoly in 1934.

Values may be added to a conflict to heat it up. Values may also be added in order to neutralize a conflict, as in the 1920s gambling market. Adding values to a conflict configuration may also open up for challenges and confusion amongst market organizers. Values may at times be added to a conflict in order to increase such confusion perhaps as a means to resist change and protect the status quo. Adding values may invite change, but

if further values claims then are brought into the conflict negotiation this might lead to confusion that prevents or delays change. The coal case is a good example of this as it has a history of much debate but less reorganization, possible because of actors constantly adding values to both sides of the conflict.

Value expansion

Values conflicts are not just reconfigured by processes of value addition. Existing values are also expanded. Expansion of values, i.e. adding of new dimensions to existing values is one of the most common reconfiguration of values, to judge from our cases. As time goes by, new lines of research has tended to emphasize new dimensions especially on the matter of health issues in all our cases. A good example is seen in the reconfigured value conflict of coal. First, coal was regarded as a health hazard to individuals directly exposed the miners. Secondly it became treated as a more general community health hazard, as a community disease. Third, the value discourse on health was expanded geographically to a *global* health concern. In the gambling case, the cognitive psychological framing of health is presently challenged by attempts to expand the health discourse to include a genetic/medical framing on gambling addiction.

Value expansion is different from value addition in the sense that expansion may be a less disruptive way of reconfiguring values as adding new dimensions of health in a path dependent fashion provides little confusion in comparison to the risk when bringing forward a new value, for example environmentalism which could become just a ‘clearing in the jungle’ (Djelic and Quack). This might be one reasons why we see expansions of old values occurring with relative ease in our cases.

Value expansions appear to happen in different ways for different reasons, but it is possible to see some general patterns. Research appears to be a common facilitator or actual cause of value expansions. In all our cases it is particularly evident of later shifts that such expansion has been much due to reports, investigations and works of scientific credibility. We also see from our cases that new research expanding the value conflict can be due to technological change that permits new ways of discovering harms. This phenomenon can perhaps be most coherently seen in the case of coal where the latest technology is used to represent and measure harm on an expanded geographical scale. In the alcohol case, values regarding the alcohol policy of the 1920-30s were expanded from being mainly directed towards the working class to encompass all citizens in the 1950s. Likewise, in the gambling case, the leisure values previously relating to aristocracy only,

was gradually expanded to the entire adult population. Value expansion can be a consequence of deliberate agendas or of events and actions with no intentions to obtain such changes.

Value accumulation

Value accumulation is different from the value addition and value expansion in the sense that this process does not change the value set up, but rather puts it in a new light by collecting values under an umbrella term or framework. When all the aspects are brought together and made visible as an entity it becomes more than the separate values alone. This is mainly a matter of language, about new ways of framing that can be exploited by actors that are eager to change views on existing values. The most coherent example of this is perhaps the latest transformative shift in the case of coal where the term "global warming" not only became an expression for environmental issues, but also a more general expression that represented all the bad of coal. The term as such gave strength to claims against coal by assembling environmental and health hazards, but also economical aspects.

Global warming embraced every level of the problem and provided a politically strong entity that could be exploited by for instance environmental organizations calling for new and urgent measures that for example would make it more expensive to use coal resulting in a reduced consumption of it.

Accumulation is a powerful form of value reconfiguration, but it is not easily attained. It appears to require a great deal of mobilizing to launch a concept that can credibly assemble several values under one umbrella. In the case of coal we see how environmental movements, research discoveries, new technology and political economical motives coincided in providing the ground for establishing of the term "global warming" in the common debate. The collection of factors needed for a powerful accumulation of values is perhaps the reason that we see it occurring pretty seldom.

Dormant values

The transitions we have depicted in this paper were not processes in which added values necessarily replaced existing ones. Rather, we have found attempts to add values to both sides of the conflict, but no obvious attempts to remove values. In line with the results of earlier studies we rather find "recombinations", or a "layering" of values (Djelic and

Quack 2011 *ibid* p 168, see also Crouch 2005a, Schneiberg 2007, Sorge 2005, Streeck and Thelen 2005).

In the gambling market, the recent government report (quoted before the introduction) indicates that neglected values may linger in market memory, but that they will fade eventually if there is no attention or mobilization concerning them. In this case the previous immorality concern – influential for centuries well into the 1900s is no longer present at the now extensive list of downside values: “criminality... economical and social problems for individuals as well as for society at large. Furthermore, gambling may cause health problems.” The same tendency is observed in both the alcohol and the coal case.

Is it the case generally that values may more easily be added than removed from a value conflict in a market setting? The findings from our three cases at least suggests that values *not* actively promoted, such as morality in the later stages of the alcohol and gambling market developments, seem to linger on for some time until they eventually ‘fade from market memory’ and practice, or at best become “dormant” (Djelic & Quack 2011 and references cited there).

Relocating contestation in the market

In all three cases there have also been several attempts to shift the *locus* of the contestation, to relocate the heart of the conflict, for example from the *commodities* themselves to the *consumption* of the products. In the gambling case market, actors have made competing attempts to change the locus of the contestation. While the Swedish state owned gambling operator Svenska Spel has attempted to shift locus from the games as such to the exchange situation, by reference to technologies such as the so called Gamgard matrix, the latest government report on the future of the gambling market (SOU 2008:124) countered with an attempt to put focus on the categorizing products as more or less harmful (Alexius, forthcoming).

In the alcohol case, when the Temperance movement singled out the household distillery as a prime locus for the market downside this decision influenced the 1855 reform. Later in the history of alcohol, Bratt and his supporters made a successful attempt to relocate the value conflict from the commodity itself to the actual drinking habits. In this case we may also trace a class based discourse where attempts were made to connect the downside, the adverse effects of the commodity, to a certain consumer segment (workers, who’s health and working moral must be protected by restricted access to the

commodity) while the upside of drinking, such as entertainment, was framed as part of (and dependent on) more elevated manners of the bourgeoisie culture.

The most apparent example of relocation in the coal example can be observed in the shift from a focus on the extraction of coal to the process of burning it, by the framing of coal as a community disease. This moved the locus of the conflict from the mine to sites of usage. Furthermore, it also moved the conflict somewhat away from coal as such to its byproducts, thus changing the nature of the conflict and the targets of market organization to remedy these harms.

Linking configurations and market reforms

To what degree may we propose that value conflict reconfigurations and relocations are causing reforms or at least making some reforms more likely, perhaps easier to justify and implement? Do value government shifts generally follow from reconfigurations or relocations of value conflicts? In our cases we find a number of reforms which we believe plausibly may be linked to previous attempts at value conflict reconfiguration or relocation:

In the coal case, when coal became portrayed as a world problem of global warming local or even national measures focusing ‘The Black lung’ were deemed insufficient as a global problem required a global, transnational solution. This also goes for the emergence of national reforms such as the carbon dioxide tax, where public reports addressing research findings on new harms of carbon dioxide paved the way for reform decisions. In the gambling case, attempts at consumer responsabilization and the production of various responsible gaming education and equipment were partly justified with reference to the relocation of the contestation of gambling, from games to gaming. As for the alcohol case, the relocation of the conflict to household distilling in the 1850s and drinking habits in the 1920s paved the way for the decision to prohibit household distilling as well as the Bratt system/Motboken-reform. Yet another more drastic example from the same market was the Swedish government co-opting the temperance movement organ CFN and transforming it into a state agency. By way of this co-option the state came to influence the propaganda in such a way that it focused on medical harms rather than adverse social effects. This relocation in turn may very well have helped hinder a full-blown resistance and prohibition movement. Note by the way that at this time gambling was still prohibited in Sweden (all through the period 1844-1934).

In all our cases, relocating the heart of the conflict from the production of a commodity to the *consumption* has implications for the organization of the conflicts. In the coal case for instance, coal producers do not pay the price of environmental damage. It is the coal consumers that pay for their emissions. To sum up, we propose that relocated value conflicts may influence the choice of *targets* for market organization, i.e. the ‘market elements’ that become organized (for example, the product, the buyer or the seller). In fact, we have not found any major reforms that seem to have come about in absence of a value conflict reconfiguration, but there is reason to be cautious about this tentative conclusion.

Drawing on institutional logics

Last but not least, it is not surprising to find that attempts to reconfigure value conflicts concerning contested commodities are likely to become more influential if they are in line with institutional demands and trends of the day. Actors aiming to influence a value conflict configuration might be successful if they are able to identify and connect to institutions such as individualism or democracy. We believe that the transformative moments in our case studies may be analyzed in terms of adjustment to institutional logics, not least dominant market ideals and popular strategies and solutions of the day. The allowance market reform of the coal market supports such an argument. The market was introduced because it was believed to be the most efficient solution although the concrete evidence for this was slim. Yet the allowance market was regarded as an appealing solution, a market solution fit for a world which puts great faith in markets. The institutional logics thesis also apply to the alcohol case, especially regarding the shifting role of the state. In the early 20th century the rise of the social democratic and “caring” state was apparent, which can be observed when we look at the solution to the value conflict during this time – the total individual control model of the Motboken-reform. In the late 20th century we can, on the other hand, observe a decline of the state as a responsible actor, which is representative for the period and in line with general neo-liberal agenda. The same reasoning goes for the niche market of responsible gaming education and equipment that has grown since the early 2000s and for responsabilization and the preventive turn which has been observed in the latest shifts of all three cases.

Contestation in transition

This paper is grounded in the assumption that value conflicts in markets not only bring about and justify calls for market organization, they also influence *how* the market is organized. We may expect that the more a commodity is perceived as contested, the greater the concern to organize it will be as a response to this contestation. But, as demonstrated in our cases, an altered value conflict configuration may also pave the way for deregulation, opening up of a closed market etc. This outcome, we propose, depends at least partly on how the values were reconfigured and where the conflict was relocated. In this paper, drawing on empirical data on some ten transformative moments having taken place since the 1800s in three market settings, we have found evidence of four processes aiming to organize values at stake. We have called them: *value addition*, *value expansion*, *value accumulation* and *value relocation*. It is our ambition to continue to scrutinize the dynamics of these processes and to study their implications for the organization of contested markets. In closing we would like to propose that the often taken for granted contestation of some commodities such as alcohol, gambling and coal may be better understood in terms of “contestation *in transition*”, the outcome of far-reaching processes involving a wide range of market organizers.

CONTESTATION IN TRANSITION

ALCOHOL

Transformative moment	Time (approx.)	Values at stake	Process	Main actors
The debate on Household distilling	1830-1855	Morality/Liberalism/ Solidarity/Fairness/ Unfairness	Addition	State, Farmers, Private Corporations, Temperance org.
Establishing of Motboken	1910	Discipline/Character/ Health Product/Habits	Addition Relocation	State, Medical expertise, Temperance org., (individuals)
Abolishing Motboken	1955-1995	Universalism/Fairness/Libera lization	Addition Expansion	State, Temperance org.
EU-membership	1995	Liberalization/State responsibility/Individual responsibility	Relocation	EU, State

COAL

Transformative moment	Time (approx.)	Values at stake	Process	Main actors
Discovery of health hazards	1800-1820	Worker health/Profit	Initiation	Medical researchers, coal miners
The entrance of economical aspects	1910-1930	Community health/Societal costs/Profit	Addition Expansion Relocation	Medical Researchers, Economists
Environmental harms brought into the picture	1950-1980	Environment/Health/ Societal costs/Profit/Individual rights and wealth	Addition Expansion	Environmental researchers, State, Corporations
Global mending of values calling for global solutions	Post 1980	Global dimension of mentioned values by discovery of “global warming”.	Expansion Accumulation	Researchers, State, International organs, Corporations, Social movements

GAMBLING

Transformative moment	Time (approx.)	Values at stake	Process	Main actors
Immoral gambling – from the King’s Lottery to prohibition in the 1840s	1770-1840	Protestant ethics, work ethics. Gambling an sinful, wasteful and unproductive	Addition	State
Re-moralizing gambling- from prohibition to state monopoly in the 1930s	1920-1930s	Leisure ethics, profits Safety/Protectionism/ Nationalism and Charity	Addition	Illegal and foreign operators, sports movement - sports organizations and media, State
Entering Health	1995-2000	Prevention/ responsibility/Health	Relocation	EU and ECJ, National prevalence inquiry, illegal and foreign operators, researchers and consultants, State and state owned operator Svenska Spel
Towards a gambling gene?	Post 2000	Health	Expansion, relocation	Researchers and institutes promoting brain research

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