Men in Politics
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Revisiting Patterns of Gendered Parliamentary Representation in Thailand and Beyond

Elin Bjarnegård
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**Abstract**

Male parliamentary dominance, rather than the corresponding female parliamentary underrepresentation, is the object of study in this thesis. This shift in focus implies a gendered analysis centered on men and men’s practices. The thesis contributes to our understanding of how male dominance is maintained and reinvented by empirically studying male parliamentary dominance in clientelist settings. Worldwide trends of parliamentary representation are analyzed statistically and constitute the starting-point for a case study of male political networks in Thailand.

Clientelism is a strategy used by political actors to increase predictability in politically unpredictable settings. The thesis shows that clientelism is an informal political practice that requires the building and maintenance of large and localized networks to help distribute services, goods and/or money in exchange for political support. Where political parties also use candidate selection procedures that are informal, exclusive and localized, there are ample openings for clientelist practices to translate into political power and ultimately parliamentary seats.

This study also coins and develops a new concept: homosocial capital. It shows that clientelist networks are and continue to be male dominated because homosocial capital, a political capital accessible only to men, is needed for electoral success. Homosocial capital has two main components: a perceived pragmatic necessity to build linkages to those with access to important resources in society and a more psychological desire to cooperate with individuals whose behavior can be understood, predicted and trusted.

*Keywords*: clientelism; political parties; representation; candidate selection; Thailand; gender; masculinities; democratization; social capital; homosociality; homosocial capital

Elin Bjarnegård, Department of Government, Box 514, Uppsala University, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Centre for Gender Research, Box 634, Uppsala University, SE-751 26 Uppsala, Sweden

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Abbreviations and glossary

ANFREL Asian Network for Free Elections
ECT Election Commission Thailand
FH Freedom House
GDI Gender Development Index
GEM Gender Empowerment Measure
HDI Human Development Index
HDR Human Development Report
ICRG International Country Risk Guide
IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union
MMD Multi Member District
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PAO Provincial Administration Organization
PR Proportional Election System
SMD Single Member District
TAO Tambon Administration Organization
TI Transparency International
TRT Thai Rak Thai (former Thai party)
UNDP United Nations Development Program
WB The World Bank
Baht The Thai currency
Hua khanaen Canvasser (in Thai)
Jao pho/mae Godfather/mother (in Thai)
Kamnan Sub-district head (in Thai)
Nakleng Tough, rural politician (in Thai)
Phak puak Peer group, clique (in Thai)
Tambon Sub-district (in Thai)
Chapter 1: Upholding Male Parliamentary Dominance

One of the most striking patterns of unequal power distribution is that men are politically overrepresented everywhere in the world. This male parliamentary dominance ranges from extreme cases like Saudi Arabia or Qatar where there are only male members of parliament, to countries where parity has been achieved, such as Rwanda with 44 percent men in parliament and Sweden with 53 percent men in parliament.\(^1\) However, in all but one country in the world, there are more men than women in parliament.\(^2\) In total, over 81 percent of the world’s parliamentary seats are occupied by men.\(^3\) The male political dominance, rather than the corresponding female political subordination, that these representation figures illustrate is the focus of this dissertation. The dissertation addresses theoretical and methodological questions about how to gender men and male-dominated political institutions and makes several contributions to existing explanations of the variations in parliamentary gender composition.

Historically, the public and political spheres have been almost totally dominated by men. The research on and study of that which has been considered political has therefore been the research on and study of male power. The very entrance of women actors onto this highly public arena spurred research within the field of gender and politics, now an established sub-field within political science. In this dissertation I argue that, in order to understand why men are overrepresented and women underrepresented as political actors in democracies and autocracies alike, we must take seriously the fact that a gendered analysis is as much about men and masculinity as it is about women and femininity. Women may be relative newcomers to the political stage, but the fact that all societies are politically dominated by men can no longer remain an unproblematized phenomenon. By a simple rephrasing of the question, new answers are made possible. Thus, although this dissertation treats a subject – political gender equality – that has been the focus of an array of studies, it does so from a new angle. Studying men and masculinities in mainstream political institutions brings about important theoretical

\(^1\) Data from Inter-Parliamentary Union, www.ipu.org as of September 2009.

\(^2\) Rwanda is the first and only country in the world to have more women than men in parliament.

\(^3\) Also data from Inter-Parliamentary Union, www.ipu.org as of September 2009.
and methodological consequences, which, in turn, have generated new explanations and answers. These new insights, presented here, build on, add to, and complement the large body of literature on the representation of women.

The most fundamental and influential of the many consequences of studying male dominance instead of female underrepresentation is the shift of focus from the enabling agents to the constraining factors that it brings about. Many studies have aimed at explaining variations in representation of women in parliamentary bodies. By focusing on explaining increases in women’s representation, research has looked predominantly at success stories and compared them to countries in which women have not been as politically successful. Thus, factors that have been interpreted as favorable for the political participation of women have been widely documented. These factors have often included the political strategies and activities of women’s movements and the struggle for women’s human rights more broadly. Comparisons have also shown that electoral designs matter and that women tend to reach higher parliamentary representative levels in countries with proportional election systems as well as in countries that introduce electoral gender quotas. The importance of other seemingly auspicious societal factors, including for example democracy, is more disputed but has, nevertheless, received a great deal of attention. Women have often gained the right to vote and to stand for election as a part of a broader democratization process and the two - political gender equality and democracy – have thus often been linked. A great deal of hope has been invested in democracy as an enabling factor for gender equality. Empirically, however, it seems as if formal democratization of political institutions does not necessarily provide more power to marginalized social groups.

What largely remains to be explained or even analyzed, however, is the parliamentary dominance of men. In other words, the persistent constraints on political representation that women face everywhere in the world have not been sufficiently addressed. Despite large democratization trends seemingly suggesting the opposite, men have generally been fairly successful in holding on to their positions of power. We thus need to refocus and zoom in on those aspects of polities that might have remained the same - throughout democratization waves, despite the activities of women’s movements, in the midst of feminist debates and across different electoral systems - and that might thus continue to serve as constraining factors for women’s increased representation. It is the argument of this thesis that certain political practices cement and reproduce male dominance in the political sphere, and that these practices need to be brought into the light and problematized. One such constraining factor is the importance that clientelism plays inside many political parties. Clientelism is an example of a political practice that in several different ways serves to maintain and reinvent male dominance. Therefore, in this dissertation, clientelism and certain related corrupt practices are regarded as constraining factors for political gender equality - factors that this
field of research is in dire need of including if we are to complete the picture.

This study thus focuses on men and political power and should be seen as an addition and complement to the important body of research that focuses on the increased political power of women. Here, the issue is merely seen from a different angle: the problem is posited as having to do with the persistence of male political power and not just with female powerlessness. Potential women politicians do not operate in a vacuum and the political environment and its ensuing power structures, through which they are to navigate, must be better understood. We should also keep in mind that the increased parliamentary representation of women always implies a loss of political power for men. The desire to be in power is one of the maxims of political life. Male reluctance to give up power is thus rational and partly understandable, given that practices that conserve and reproduce male dominance are institutionalized and taken for granted in all spheres of society. Instead of demonizing these male practices by viewing them as patriarchal conspiracies, I argue that they are better understood as social structures that are, in large part, yet to be unveiled and fully comprehended. Far from all men benefit in the same way from these social structures, but there are certainly political ideals, or hegemonic masculinities, that politicians, in order to be successful, should aim at imitating. Some of these role models are simply not attainable for women. There is thus, in a sense, a political capital that can be used to gain and maintain power but that is only, or predominantly, reserved for men and to which only certain men have access. This study seeks to reveal what this political capital consists of, by which political practices it is generated and in which settings it gains currency and rises in value.

Revisiting Patterns of Gendered Representation

Analyzing or trying to understand patterns of gendered parliamentary representation is nothing new in research. Yet this dissertation argues that there is a need to revisit these well-known patterns of female underrepresentation in order to analyze them from a new perspective: from the perspective of male dominance. The overarching aim of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of how male political power is maintained despite societal currents working in the opposite direction.

True enough, the past century has presented great challenges to the formerly taken-for-granted equation between maleness and political power, and power relations have been reshaped in an unprecedented way. Nevertheless, given the strength of these challenges, the continued male political dominance is surprisingly strong. Still, after a century that has seen formidable challenges to male political dominance such as democratization waves, vociferous women’s movements, the introduction of women-friendly policies,
feminist scholarly debates, international resolutions on women’s rights, and the introduction of political gender quotas in many countries, politics remains a largely male bastion. This apparent paradox is addressed here by bringing together various strands of research that benefit from engaging in scholarly discussion with each other, but seldom do so.

First of all, this study builds on the argument emanating from gender studies, and more specifically from the field of the study of men and masculinities, that men should be seen, understood and analyzed as being gendered beings to the same degree as women are. Second, although this study recognizes that a democratization process has the potential to be a far-reaching reform of the political sphere that enhances opportunities of inclusion for everyone, it also argues that democratization as a phenomenon should be problematized and its possible impact put in relation to other political practices that may persist despite currents of political liberalization. Third, political science has often been reminded of the importance of informal institutions for understanding political development. Thus, informal political institutions and practices such as clientelism can maintain or even gain ground also during a political process of liberalization and can thus continue blocking the paths of inclusiveness.

This dissertation suggests a relationship between clientelist practices and male parliamentary dominance and unveils the causal mechanisms between the two. Male dominance, it is argued, is more easily sustained in political settings where electoral success is facilitated by the accumulation of homosocial capital. The concept of homosocial capital is introduced in this dissertation, and fills a theoretical and empirical void. Although references have earlier been made to old boys’ networks and although it has sometimes been pointed out that male politicians tend to work with other male politicians, the mechanisms behind these homosocial preferences – why they are seen as necessary and valuable in politics and thus can be understood as a rational behavior – have not been elaborated on. Far from demonizing or suggesting a male conspiracy, this thesis instead attempts to understand, rationalize and demystify male homosociality by describing homosocial capital as an invaluable political asset in many political contexts. Such an understanding is crucial if we are to better assess the strategies employed by politically active women and to get a more complete picture of the reasons for the uneven political representation patterns we see across the world. Thus, while nurturing a strong belief in the importance of scholarly cumulativity and building and relying on the important research efforts of others, this dissertation presents several new ideas and findings. The completeness of the picture is also enhanced by the methodological approach of this study. The advantages of combining different research methods in one and the same study in order to illuminate different sides of the same research problem are taken advantage of here. The study combines a quantitative analysis of elections around the world - which shows large trends, enables explanations and generalizations
and, in this book, serves as a back-drop and point of departure - with a qualitative case study of Thai politics, which explores new hypotheses, develops theories and demonstrates the mechanisms underlying how the proposed relationships actually work.

From representation of women to representation of men

Studies of gender and politics have, of course, been interested in the issue of political representation ever since the debates on female suffrage at the beginning of the 20th century. Gendered political analyses have generated and continue to produce immensely valuable insights into inherent injustices in political systems around the world and can sometimes suggest ways to overcome the political subordination and underrepresentation of women. Most of the time, however, gender – both in terms of persons and policies - has been and still is synonymous with “women”.

In attempting to identify successful remedies to the underrepresentation of women, studies have tended to focus on success stories – countries where women’s numerical representation is consistently high (see e.g. Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Freidenvall 2005, 2006) or has increased sharply (see e.g. Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Htun 2003b; Jaquette 1997; Powley 2005), strategies by women’s organizations (see e.g. Fick et al. 2002; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Jaquette 2001), or individual women who have managed to enter the political sphere against all odds (see e.g. Richter 1991; Thompson 2002). These success stories are all very welcome contributions to the field, especially considering the previous silence regarding women as politicians and the view of maleness as the political norm. However, if these remedies to female underrepresentation are to be properly assessed, a more thorough problem description is also needed.

Several of these studies have acknowledged and suggested that the study of women’s movements in isolation is not enough and that more emphasis needs to be put on the mainstream political system (notably Jaquette 2001: 117; Waylen 2007: 91). Political parties, for instance, are important in this context, because they serve as the gatekeepers for representation by selecting candidates to stand for election. The study of the political party is, of course, quite common in political science, due to its central position in most political regimes. However, studies of political parties are, for the most part, still mainstream and gender blind, despite the seemingly obvious fact that political parties are disproportionally dominated by men. Studies that do problematize gender in the political sphere at large generally do so by focusing on the long needed perspective of women as potential political actors. The consequence, however, is that many studies, probably inadvertently, thus also focus on the agency of rather marginalized groups of women activists. The mechanisms of the political party still too rarely fall within the scope of gendered political science.
In order to understand issues of representation, we should direct our attention to political parties. Arguably, the representation of men and women in a given country says more about the political parties than it does about the voters. Studies have shown that being selected as a candidate by the party, rather than being elected by voters once already a candidate, constitutes the main threshold for women. In other words, the greatest obstacle for women is that they do not become candidates in the first place. Once women manage to become selected as candidates, their electoral chances are roughly equal to those of their male counterparts (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Welch and Studlar 1986; Rule 1987; Darcy et al. 1994; Htun 2005). Several important studies of political recruitment have thus named political parties the main gatekeeper for the political representation of marginalized groups, and there is a fairly strong scholarly consensus that candidate selection in political parties is key to our understanding of representation in all or most electoral contexts (Dahlerup 2007; Matland 2005; Caul 1999; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Baer 1993; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). This study thus moves the focus from women activists to political parties with the aim of conducting a gendered analysis of those very organizations that matter most for representation patterns.

From democracy to clientelism

Political parties and politicians selecting candidates for elections do not operate in a vacuum, and they are likely to be deeply affected by the political context. Democratization has often been understood as an enabling political factor for women’s inclusion, and democratic liberalization has been hailed as a road to political success for women, although lately this perspective has increasingly given way to growing disillusionment. As a matter of fact, the existence of democratic institutions and the holding of elections per se have proven to be rather poor predictors of the parliamentary representation of women. Taken together, the large body of literature on representation shows that while democracy might hold new opportunities for women, it is far from a sufficient guarantee for political inclusion (see e.g. Jaquette 2001; Jaquette and Wolchik 1999; Waylen 2003, 2007; Htun 2003a, b; Friedman 2000; Ballington 2002; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Matland and Montgomery 2003). It can thus be concluded that democracy does not have a straightforward and simple impact on political gender inequality. Instead of abandoning democracy as an important factor, its workings need to be problematized, nuanced and put into context. The field of democratization studies has highlighted a number of issues that need to be taken into account: theoretical and methodological issues such as how democracy is defined and measured as well as empirical observations pointing out that formal democratic institutions coexist and interact with a number of other critically important political institutions, often informal, that need to be included in the analysis. Hybrid forms
Chapter 1 – Upholding Male Parliamentary Dominance

of democracy and different types of political regimes, all carry with them different baggage that is of importance to political actors competing in elections. I am thus reluctant to let go of democracy in the analysis, but I do not attribute to it the central role it has sometimes been said to play when it comes to gender and representation. Instead, democracy is seen as an underlying factor that needs to be taken into account because of the great impact it has on the system at large, but that cannot be studied in isolation. In particular, the level of democracy is seen as having an impact on the strength and predictability of formal political institutions. The issue of political unpredictability, and the constant struggle to maximize predictability, hovers over the entire analysis in this book, thus necessitating the analysis of democracy from a slightly new point of view.

One important informal institution coexisting with democracy is clientelism. Whereas democracy has often been viewed as enabling participation, clientelism is here seen as constraining genuine political participation for the majority of people. The theoretical definition of clientelism in this study is a conventional one: “the exchange of personal favors for political support” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Piattoni 2001; Scott 1969; Tripp 2001). Clientelism is thus by necessity a political practice, as it is intimately linked to votes, elections, and electoral support (Piattoni 2001). I understand clientelism as the manner in which votes are sought to be secured by political actors. I also see clientelism as a dimension ranging from the ideal typical “clientelist” to the similarly ideal typical “ideological”. All attempts at winning votes in any country of the world and by any political actor will be situated somewhere in between these two ideal types. There is thus no such thing as a pure clientelist political action and nor is there any political entity entirely free from clientelist influences. Clientelist particularist services can sometimes, for instance, target entire communities instead of individuals, something that is often referred to as “constituency service” (Piattoni 2001) or pork-barrel spending (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). This type of distribution may be further away from the clientelist ideal type than, for instance, outright individual vote buying, but it is nevertheless a more clientelist approach to gaining votes than debating about the implementation of a policy. Clientelism exists everywhere, and should thus be seen as a difference of degree rather than of type. This is important to remember, as clientelism is sometimes criticized as a postcolonial concept, primarily used to describe the “otherness” of politics in developing countries. Clientelism has, however, fairly recently been used to describe politics in countries as diverse as Italy and Spain (see e.g. Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2001), Korea and Japan (see e.g. Hee Park 2006) as well as in Latin American (see e.g. Levitsky 2007) and African (see e.g. van de Walle 2007) political contexts.

Clientelism is a good breeding ground for various forms of electoral corruption, the most evident form being direct vote buying. Electoral corruption
is not a new phenomenon in the world of politics and parties, and clientelistic networks, legitimacy building on patronage structures, and money politics have been thoroughly studied in different parts of the world (a few prominent examples include Scott 1969; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Piattoni 2001; and Stokes 2005). Corruption and representation of women have also been linked, but more often with corruption as the dependent variable instead of, as here, part of the explanation. In the common struggle to find remedies for corruption, a new and recently oft-cited solution has entered academic and development-oriented discussions: namely to increase the level of women represented in parliament. Women, it is claimed, are less corrupt than men are, and thus levels of corruption can, more or less directly, be attributed and linked to the proportion of women in parliament\(^4\) in a given country (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). In policy-related documents, such as “Engendering Development” which was produced by the World Bank in 2001, this causal direction is also hinted at with the support of the above two studies, and it is argued that more women in politics is thus desirable as a means to promote good governance (World Bank 2001: 96).

This statement is problematic in several ways. Because of women’s perceived incorruptibility they are pointed out as a solution to a problem occurring in a male-dominated sector. Men are seen as the implicit norm in this research. This does not only mean that male-dominated parliaments are the empirical norm in the world today, but also that when gender is introduced in the corruption debate, it is with a male norm and female exceptional characteristics in focus. The gendered male characteristics that are seen as the cause of corruption and bad governance in the first place are not problematized from a gender perspective.

A few studies, notably by Sung, Tripp and Goetz, have embarked on this important route. They all analyze, from different angles, the political systems in which corrupt activities thrive, and men’s political activities within these systems (Goetz 2007; Sung 2003; Tripp 2001). Sung argues that the relationship between gender equality and corruption is in fact spurious and can be explained by the political context. Functioning liberal democracies, he argues, have both achieved good governance in political institutions and relative gender equality as compared to other countries (Sung 2003). Tripp and Goetz, on the other hand, acknowledge that there may be a relationship between gender and corruption, but question the causal direction proposed by Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. Drawing on examples from Africa, Tripp specifically argues that women have a different relationship to state patronage than men do, because of “gendered divisions of labour, gendered organizational modes, and the general exclusion of women from political arenas”\(^4\) Dollar et al. use only women in parliament as their dependent variable, Swamy et al. do a number of different analyses, where women in parliament is the dependent variable in one.
Goetz in her article skillfully points out how opportunities for corruption are shaped by gender in male-dominated institutions such as the political parties and the bureaucracy, and uses field study data assembled in South Asia to support her argument (Goetz 2007). This book follows in the footsteps of these three studies, and takes the analysis a step further by explicitly problematizing the corrupt practices that are allowed to prevail in male-dominated political spheres. It also argues that these corrupt practices need to be analyzed in the context in which they take place, in this case the focus is on the clientelist context and the practice of vote buying and the purpose is to find out if and why clientelism and related practices tend to cement male parliamentary dominance.

There is a small but growing body of literature focusing specifically on gender and governance (see e.g. Waylen 2008; Rai and Waylen 2008). Governance, it is argued, is multifaceted and does not only take place within state institutions. The fractured nature of formal institutions, informal rules of the game and a wide variety of networks and actors are all seen to form part of the concept of governance. Although feminist scholars have spoken to some of these aspects, they have generally been reluctant to speak in terms of governance (Waylen 2008). In this sense, the present project contributes to the body of research concerning gender and governance. It shows how the variety and fragmentation of actors and institutions need to be taken into account if we are to understand gendered political outcomes. An isolated focus on women’s movements is not enough, nor is a traditional and unproblematic focus solely on formal political institutions. Instead, we need to use the knowledge generated by gendered studies of, often marginalized, women’s movements and female political actors, and apply this manner of gendering to male-dominated political bodies, both formal and informal.

The argument of the book: how clientelism translates into representation of men

In order to investigate how clientelism contributes to male parliamentary dominance, we first need to bring into light two questions about clientelism. First, how and why does clientelism favor men? And second, how and why does clientelist practices translate into parliamentary seats? In other words, we need to recognize that the dependent variable investigated in this book, male parliamentary dominance, is composed of two aspects, both of which are related to clientelism: one concerning representation and the other concerning male dominance. That political parties and their internal workings, candidate selection included, are affected by clientelism is not an entirely new idea in the field (Öhman 2004; Randall 2007). Why and how clientelism favors male candidates has, to my knowledge, not been studied before.
The manner in which political parties select candidates is partly affected by electoral laws creating different types of incentives, such as the election system in place. Despite the consensus that candidate selection procedures matter for gendered representation, suggestions as to how they matter are rather few and inconclusive. This book suggests that candidate selection should not be studied by itself to understand these issues, instead, the role of political parties and the specific characteristics of candidate selection procedures should be viewed as a form of institutional filter, creating institutional constraints on certain practices while enabling others. The task of this analysis is thus to specify the electoral enablers for clientelist influence. Earlier studies have suggested that clientelism does play a part in the recruitment procedures of political parties (Öhman 2004:144). A study of candidate selection in Ghana, for instance, showed that the most important characteristic in a candidate seemed to be the possibility to significantly contribute to the election campaign, and this was paramount to, for instance, a display of party loyalty (Öhman 2004:239).

The analysis of the clientelist networks and how their form and function eventually translates into parliamentary seats primarily for male politicians requires borrowing theoretical tools from related research fields. These research tools are then combined and elaborated on and specified in a new concept, homosocial capital, which can be used to analyze these types of political male-dominated contexts. The two theoretical tools used as a starting point are the widely used concepts of bonding social capital (Granovetter 1973; Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993, 2000) and homosociality (Kanter 1977; Holgersson 2003; Collinson and Hearn 2005). I argue that the clientelist context specifically carries with it incentives for individuals to accumulate homosocial capital. Clientelism per se can be understood as a form of uncertainty reduction in an otherwise unpredictable political environment, and homosocial capital is the currency needed to buy clientelist predictability. This capital is then invested in practices needed to win the election, and it is only accessible to a select few people who almost always turn out to be men. This book will introduce, develop and exemplify the use of this brand-new concept in order to manifest its utility.

Towards theoretical and methodological combinations

The thesis builds on suggestions and findings from a variety of scholarly fields and discussions, and also makes contributions to these fields. The main field to which it contributes is probably comparative politics with a focus on gender and representation. While reaching far down into theoretical depth of one field can certainly be useful, I believe it can be equally fruitful to combine views and research results from various fields, indeed, I believe it is necessary to do so in order to cope with the complexities of today’s world. While the downside is not having one evident discussion partner, the
advantages of having dozens of possible discussion partners more than compensate for this. Thus, although I do not deny that focus is paramount and that expertise within one area is needed and important, I also think that the scholarly community would do well to downplay the importance of field labels, and venture more broadly, recognizing the important work being done in other fields of research that are of relevance to the topic under study.

Instead of conducting either an extensive large-scale statistical study of representation patterns or an intensive smaller-scale case study of party candidate selection, this study does both. Earlier studies have tended to do either or, making comparisons between the two types of studies difficult. It is not always easy to see how larger-scale studies relate to smaller-scale case studies or whether and how the variables analyzed can be compared across studies. Yet it is useful to be able to assess the value of a theory both in terms of larger worldwide trends across time and in terms of mechanisms at the lowest societal micro level. Combining several methodological approaches within one study is not without its troubles, but the gains it brings about for the overall understanding of an issue are important. By going back and forth between statistical analyses and field study work, the two also enrich each other. Hypotheses that arose during fieldwork can be tested statistically and indications of statistical relationships that are difficult to interpret can be made understandable through further in-depth case study scrutiny.

The statistical analyses conducted in this thesis focus on the main variables and look at relationships between democracy, political stability and clientelism, on the one hand, and male parliamentary dominance, on the other. Potentially important control variables can be included in these analyses, and specific interaction effects can be specified or curvilinearity induced where it is theoretically appropriate. Trends across time and countries can be assessed, giving more weight and generalizability to the main argument.

The lion’s share of the empirical analyses in this thesis focuses on Thailand as the main case. I have mapped clientelist networks in the Thai political context and analyzed how they function and what part they play in candidate selection. An extensive interview material sheds more empirical light on the theoretical concept of homosocial capital. As will be argued later on, Thailand is a close to perfect case for exploring these new ideas. Its turbulent political landscape has rendered formal democratic institutions unreliable, which has led political actors to invest their resources in other, informal, networks. The clientelist networks needed to win votes in the countryside are one good example of this. There is a strong male dominance in the clientelist networks as well as in the Thai parliament.

One aim of the thesis is to clearly demonstrate how a combination of theoretical, methodological and thematic approaches is, in fact, necessary to explore some contemporary phenomena. For example, although quantitative methods are not the most commonly used in the field of gender and politics, they are invaluable when it comes to establishing large trends, spanning over
a wide range of countries. In particular when combined with consistent theorizing leading up to the statistical models as well as sound and systematic case studies taking their starting-point in quantitative results, the inclusion of more statistical models into the field can contribute many useful insights regarding the scope and strength of proposed relationships. Likewise, fields looking at issues of corruption and democratization often ignore issues of gender and also tend to base research on large, statistical datasets. Recognizing that gender is at the center of their analysis and that it is only a matter of making it visible, even when in the form of male dominance, brings about a whole new dimension of power analysis in this field. Complementing statistical results with both hypothesis generating case studies as well as mechanism-searching or explorative follow-up studies would also strengthen the results emanating from this body of research and would probably lead to a much needed emphasis on the mechanisms needed for change, which I believe, in turn, would enhance the general understanding of research results.

Structure of the book

The entire thesis will focus on male parliamentary dominance and the political practices we need to scrutinize in order to enhance our understanding of this standstill. This perspective thus permeates all analyses and chapters of this book and will, in addition, be elaborated on at the beginning of Chapter 2. More specifically, Chapter 2 also develops the theoretical framework that was briefly outlined in this introductory chapter. It summarizes the main theoretical starting points and explains how they are utilized in this thesis. The theories that have contributed to the concept of homosocial capital will be briefly outlined, as will the main characteristics of this new concept. These characteristics are important to keep in mind throughout the book, although the full utility of homosocial capital will not be exemplified until towards the end of the book. Chapter 2 also makes arguments about why homosocial capital is particularly useful in clientelist settings, and elaborates on the preconditions for clientelism. It also goes into detail concerning how clientelism may affect political parties, candidate selection and thus, ultimately, political representation and male dominance. Chapter 3 points to the usefulness of a methodological approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analyses and shows what these, somewhat different, approaches each contribute to the overall picture. It also discusses issues related specifically to the statistical analyses (although these are discussed more at length in Chapter 4) and deals at some length with methodological choices related to field study work in Thailand. Chapter 4 reports the results of quantitative tests including the main variables to be investigated and shows that there is, indeed, statistical support for the proposition that clientelism leads to more male dominance, even when a time series analysis including a large number
of elections all over the world is conducted. It also suggests that clientelism cements or accentuates male dominance in parliaments where male incumbency is already high, and reinforces and strengthens male dominance where male incumbency is not already at high levels. Chapter 5 deals with the same variables that have been dealt with theoretically in Chapter 2 and statistically in Chapter 4, but contextualizes them and situates the case of Thailand in relation to these variables. Specifically, we get more information on the political and social situation of women in Thailand, on the democratic and political history and present day political turbulence, on political parties in Thailand, and on the informal influence exerted by the military and by clientelist practices. This is done by referring to literature, but also by reporting empirical work on the specific clientelist networks scrutinized in this thesis. Chapter 6 zooms in even closer on Thailand and on the parliamentary election of 2005. With the help of interview data, it looks at the party strategies of two political parties during the candidate selection that took place before this election. It also analyzes and disaggregates the ensuing election results and draws some conclusions regarding the design of candidate selection for the influence of clientelism. Chapter 7 delves even deeper into the political campaigns in Thailand and shows how and why politics remains predominantly male. It uses extensive interview material to deal with the concept of homosocial capital within the clientelist networks. It elaborates on how homosocial capital has come to matter for political actors. It explains how homosocial capital contributes to theory development and an increased understanding of the mechanisms underlying male parliamentary dominance. Chapter 8 briefly summarizes and concludes the thesis and discusses the wider implications of the research conducted.

The figure below is a simplified illustration of the proposed relationships in this thesis and also shows which empirical chapters deal primarily with which relationship. As mentioned, the main relationship to be investigated is that between clientelism, the main independent variable, and the representation of men, the dependent variable. This relationship at large will be dealt with in different ways in the first two empirical chapters, chapters 4 and 5. The mechanisms that cause clientelism to translate into representation (institutional enablers) are dealt with in Chapter 6 and the specific mechanisms causing clientelism to be male dominated (homosocial capital) are treated more in detail in Chapter 7. Political unpredictability, which is related to the level of democracy, is an underlying variable or, if you wish, hovers over and permeates the entire analysis.
Figure 1. Proposed relationships and the empirical chapters in which they are treated.
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Starting Points

This chapter provides the book’s deeper theoretical argument as outlined in the introductory chapter. The most important theoretical starting points will be elaborated on, and the implications of the contributions of this study for a variety of areas of research will be highlighted. To start with, the point of departure for the thesis - that men are also gendered beings and need to be studied as such – and its consequences for the study will be discussed. Following this, the chapter will, in a sense, backtrack the central argument and go through its components one by one. It will start with homosocial capital, which is a brand-new concept, and discuss its theoretical foundations, how it has been constructed and what it can be used for. The main characteristics of homosocial capital will be described, so as to facilitate the reader’s understanding of the rest of the main theoretical argument, but the exemplification and demonstration of the usefulness of this concept will not come until later on in the book. Clientelism as a predictability maximizer, and the contexts in which it is likely to arise will be elaborated on next, and this causes us to revisit the arguments about the impact of democracy. The proposed links between clientelism and male dominance relating to homosocial capital will then be discussed, followed by the importance of institutional enablers if clientelist behavior is also to translate into parliamentary seats.

Studying men and masculinities in politics

Parliaments around the world are male dominated. Tackling this simple statement implies tackling at least two issues: that of male dominance and that of parliamentary representation. In this way, the object of research in this thesis – male parliamentary dominance - is twofold.

Despite the obvious evidence of political male dominance, the research tools we are presented with are often designed to analyze differences in gendered representation patterns rather than this unrelenting and continued male dominance per se. Part of the reason for this is that we are simply so used to male dominance that we see it as the norm, and we are thus far more likely to notice and be interested in small changes in the social standing and political representation of women than to problematize the still overwhelming dominance itself. Thus, the political position of women has been a much larger issue for academic discussion and scrutiny than the political position
of men. Yet the two are, of course, dependent on each other and cannot be discussed in isolation from one another. It is really as simple as Carrigan, Connell and Lee put it that “the change in one term of a relationship signals change in the other” (Carrigan et al. 1987: 64).

Simple as it may seem, the specific and critical study of men and male power is nevertheless still uncommon, especially outside the field of gender studies. The field of critical studies of men and masculinities has provided several useful starting points, which can be used for a research endeavor that wishes to embark on problematizing male dominance. First of all, a critical study of men must distinguish itself from a mainstream study of men. Most research in political science as well as in other scholarly fields is still undertaken with the male sex being the implicit norm. The critical study of men is something different. It is closely connected to feminist studies and was born in the women’s liberalization movement (Hanmer 1990). Carrigan, Connell and Lee, in their seminal article, argue that the sex role research of the 1950’s and 60’s did start to problematize the male gender, but that it did not put enough emphasis on the issue of power. In the men’s movement of the 1970’s, it was even commonly argued that men in general would gain from women’s liberation (Carrigan et al. 1987; see also Hearn 2004).

This notion is naive at best, and at worst dishonest. The liberation of women must mean a loss of power for most men; and given the structuring of personality by power, also a great deal of personal pain (Carrigan et al. 1987: 80).

Masculinity studies have sometimes simply been placed alongside studies of femininity, something that Hanmer criticizes. The study of men, she argues, must be seen in a relationship to the feminist pursuit of improving the conditions of women. If not, studies of femininity and masculinity alike are reduced to mere identity politics when they should go beyond individual experiences and focus on social structures and relations between and within the two sexes (Hanmer 1990). Hanmer summarizes the differences between women’s studies and the study of men:

[W]omen’s studies involves the recognition of social powerlessness, not just victimization, but survival, under difficult and unequal conditions. [...] The study of men involves the recognition of the use and misuse of social power that accrues to the male gender, of recognizing benefits even when none are personally desired (Hanmer 1990: 29).

Thus, the “understanding of how men gain, maintain, and use power to subordinate women” (Hanmer 1990: 37) is certainly an important contribution if we want to fully understand the barriers women face when attempting to enter traditionally male arenas. Of course, as Hanmer goes on to say, all women and all men do not have identical experiences of this social power-
lessness or privileges. Gendered patterns of expected behavior are both historically and culturally specific (Hanmer 1990). The study of intersectionality has also brought to our attention the many other factors that simultaneously interact to affect the identity and the power position of any individual, factors such as ethnicity, religion, age, sexuality or class (see e.g. Lykke 2003, 2005; McCall 2005; Weldon 2006). Nevertheless, biological sex and social gender continue to be important axes around which personal experience is mediated and social power is distributed. However, a focus on power also needs to acknowledge the fact that there are important differences to be found among men and women. The concept of *hegemonic masculinities*\(^5\) refers to the idea that there are multiple masculinities and that they are hierarchically organized in any given society. *Hegemonic* masculinity, then, is the culturally dominant ideal of masculinity towards which men are encouraged to strive. The hegemonic masculinity ideal is not to be seen as the most common or likely display of masculinity among men in a given society, but it is the most socially endorsed. Men need to position themselves in relation to the hegemonic masculinity ideal, while the ideal legitimizes the continued subordination of women to men. The concept of hegemony is seen as particularly useful because it does not necessarily imply the use of violence or force (although it can), but rather dominance achieved with the help of compliant men and women through traditions, culture and institutions (Connell 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832).

This research endeavor connects male dominance directly to parliamentary representation: in a sense a very formal and crude measure of political power. Parliamentary representation implies very different things in terms of positions of power depending on whether one is an elected representative of a full-fledged democracy or a figurehead in a practically powerless parliament in an autocratic state. But if one part of the aim is to make an international comparison of intricate political power relationships, some measure of pragmatism is appropriate. Data accessibility makes a comparison of the proportion of parliamentary seats that men or women hold in different countries completely feasible. The proportions with regards to gender are comparable, unlike proportions of, for instance, ethnic or religious group representation, as men and women make up about half of the population in every country of the world. However, studying representation of men and women is of course not merely pragmatic – it also says something of great theoretical importance: it says something about the strength of the political domination of men even outside the parliament and regardless of the power allotted to the legislature. The percentage of men in parliament is here seen as an

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\(^5\) The similar concept *hegemony of men* is proposed by Hearn, who argues that it is more appropriate because it better emphasizes that “men are both a social category formed by the gender system and dominant collective and individual agents of social practices” (Hearn 2004).
indicator of men’s political power also in other political bodies and organizations, most notably the political parties.

Here, when studying representation, the focus will thus be on the political parties as the, arguably, most important mainstream actors. As already mentioned, the political party is the lens through which we must start looking if we wish to understand any issue of representation. Parties, by being the organizations that select candidates for elections, are widely held as constituting the main barrier to women’s political representation (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Welch and Studlar 1986; Rule 1987; Darcy et al. 1994; Htun 2005) – and thus they also constitute the main enabler of continued male power. Gendering political parties implies attempting to understand how parties, as predominantly male organizations, control recruitment and form the political culture and how this, directly or indirectly, affects the gendered composition of parliament. In the same way that political science feminist scholarship has traditionally focused on female structures and agency, scholarship focusing on men and masculinities has also, until recently, been more concerned with viewing men in new, less conventional roles, associated with the private and traditionally feminine sphere rather than with the public male-dominated sphere. However, as Collinson and Hearn point out, even though the long-ignored study of men in new spheres is important, the major molding grounds shaping men, masculinities and men’s power continue to be situated in the public sphere – at work, in organizational cultures and in politics (Collinson and Hearn 2005). Political parties have been at the center of study in political science for a long time, but the fact that they are often male dominated has seldom been problematized. This is, perhaps, not surprising, but nevertheless an important reason to examine them as the gendered organizations they are.

The categories of men and masculinity are frequently central to analyses, yet they remain taken for granted, hidden and unexamined. Men are both talked about and ignored, rendered simultaneously explicit and implicit. They are frequently at the center of discourse but they are rarely the focus of interrogation (Collinson and Hearn 2001: 144)

Thus, political parties are therefore also effective sites for the reproduction of patriarchy and, as such, crucial to the study of male parliamentary dominance. Drawing from theories of representation, it seems that by focusing on the masculine bodies that political parties are today we can, at the same time,
study the center of power and problematize this very center from a gendered perspective.

Clientelism and male parliamentary dominance

In line with the above argument about male parliamentary dominance carrying with it a twofold focus – that on male dominance and that on representation – any political practice hypothesized to have the propensity to affect male parliamentary dominance should also be hypothesized to affect both these aspects. The past decades have seen a substantial scholarly discussion on clientelism and its conceptual relatives – for instance machine politics, neopatrimonialism, patronage, pork-barrel politics – but there is no need to go into detail on these debates here (for some prominent contributions to this debate see e.g. Scott 1969; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Shefter 1977; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Piattoni 2001; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b; Schaffer 2007). Instead, we will focus specifically on those aspects of clientelism that render it a likely site for the translation of clientelistic practices into parliamentary seats and that show us why and how clientelism may favor men.

The very definition of clientelism as the “exchange of personal favors for political support” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Piattoni 2001; Scott 1969; Tripp 2001) implies that winning political elections is central to this practice. As already mentioned, clientelism is seen here as an ideal typical dimension ranging from “clientelist” to “ideological”. The clientelist ideal type, then, encompasses the notion that political support is guided by favors and services, rather than by ideological considerations, and that favors are particularistic and personal in character, rather than universal. Scott, for instance, describes the clientelist machine party as a “non-ideological organization, interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it” and thus as being distinctly different from “the disciplined, ideological party held together by class ties and common programs” (Scott 1969: 1143-1144). Bratton and van de Walle describe the importance and the legitimacy of the person, rather than the party, in neopatrimonial or clientelist political systems. They argue that personal networks commonly override formal bureaucratic structures and that loyalty to the person often takes precedence over loyalty to democratic institutions and political parties (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Personal rule, rather than rule of law, is seen to be maintained through clientelism (Tripp 2001). Thus, clientelism is broadly understood here as a political practice that puts emphasis on the personal, rather than on the political party, and on distributing services, rather than on enacting policies. The distribution of services and the focus on the person can, of course, be analyzed as campaign strategies to attract votes. The common feature of vote buying is an appropriate illustra-
tion of how clientelism is directly connected to the allocation of parliamentary seats: the political support offered from the candidate can take the form of a direct vote for a particular candidate. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that clientelist political practices can have an impact on the composition of parliament. Here, however, the aim is to specify more exactly the institutional enablers that need to be in place for clientelism to have this effect. As we know that political parties and candidate selection procedures are the main gatekeepers for representation, the aim should be to specify the particular characteristics of candidate selection procedures and election systems that allow clientelist interests to trickle through the partisan filters.

We know much less about why and how clientelism would favor male dominance. What we can say with some confidence is that, in general, political practices were not designed with the outspoken aim of excluding women. Instead the systematic exclusion of women and other social groups is the consequence of practices primarily intended to protect other groups. The protection of one group often leads to the exclusion of another. Here, we are particularly interested in instances in which the mechanisms ensuring this protection and exclusion lead to systematically gendered consequences. There is a lack of theoretical instruments with which to study such gendered consequences and their logical underpinnings. This dissertation provides such an instrument: homosocial capital. The remainder of this chapter will elaborate on the mechanisms that enable clientelism to influence the parliamentary representation of men. It will start by elaborating on the concept of homosocial capital and move on to explain why and how homosocial capital is particularly valuable in a clientelist setting. Following this, the institutional enablers of clientelism’s translation into representation will be outlined.

**Constructing homosocial capital**

I have made use of two theoretical concepts in the theoretical construction of homosocial capital: *homosociality* and *bonding social capital*. I have combined these two theoretical tools and elaborated on them in order to capture what I have decided to call *homosocial capital*. The concept of *homosocial capital* will be employed, assessed and developed throughout the remainder of this book.

**Homosociality**

Studies on management and organizational cultures have mapped out the alliances and networks being formed between managers in order to maintain their power. Collinson and Hearn, among others, point out that many of these studies miss the important fact that being a man often constitutes a
prerequisite for being part of these networks. Even though the outspoken intention of such alliances is not to keep women out, but rather to protect one’s own organization, the result is highly gendered (Collinson and Hearn 2005). The concept of homosociality has arisen to define such behavior as is associated with seeking, enjoying and preferring the company of the same sex. It is clearly distinguished from the homosexual by not necessarily involving sexual interaction between individuals of the same sex (Lipman-Blumen 1976: 16). It is considered a homosocial behavior whenever men seek to socialize exclusively with men or when women prefer the company of other women to the company of men. In the literature on homosociality, however, the focus is on male homosocial behavior. There are probably (at least) two reasons for this. First, when it comes to issues of power in organizations it is, from the onset, most often male dominated. It is thus the reproduction of corporate male dominance that has been the object of most studies. Second, it is often argued that men have more to gain from homosocial behavior than do women, an idea that will be discussed more in detail later on. For women, rational behavior instead often turns out to be heterosocial.

Recruitment to closed corporate networks has often served the purpose of protecting the network by ensuring that no outsiders are let in. A study of recruitment to Swedish company boards conducted by Holgersson shows that in order to maintain control of these networks, positions are seldom advertised, personal initiatives from people who want to become engaged are met with skepticism, and new members are instead primarily found through informal discussions and in the immediate vicinity (Holgersson 2003). Recruitment is thus kept informal with few regulations, and this opens up for the possibility that abstract feelings, rather than formal merits, will guide who is perceived as a suitable person to include in the network. Senior male managers are likely to perceive men who display the masculine personality they themselves aim at displaying as more competent and reliable than individuals who display characteristics that they have rather formed themselves in opposition to. Thus, men select men, and male dominance in the networks is maintained and reproduced (Collinson and Hearn 2005).

These studies also emphasize static hierarchies between men. Kvande and Rasmussen describe homosocial networks in organizations as traditional patriarchal structures in which men are “keeping one another in place”, and older men are (generally) above younger men in the hierarchy. Older men are also in a position to decide who among the younger men will be allowed to compete for available positions. This disciplines the younger men and encourages them to play according to the rules of the game instead of changing them. There is a paternalistic spirit among the older men, and a competition for fatherly attention among the subordinate “sons” (Kvande and Rasmussen 1994). There is, of course, often a similar need to protect organizations and their smaller networks also outside of the corporate world, and
there is nothing to say that this would not encourage homosocial preferences in other contexts as well.

**Bonding social capital**

Social capital is created in relationships between different persons. It cannot be harbored in one single individual, nor can it exist without people being involved. Although relational, Coleman refers to social capital as a form of capital precisely because

> [l]ike other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence (Coleman 1990: 302).

Social capital is to be found within social structures, and it can thus facilitate some of the actions of people who are to be found within that structure. Nevertheless, while certain forms of social capital can facilitate actions that are extremely beneficial for some, the very same actions may be completely useless or harmful for others (Coleman 1990).

The level or type of social capital is often used to explain collective outcomes of different kinds (see e.g. Putnam 1993, 2000). The manner in which individuals interact with other individuals is thus likely to have a much larger societal impact.

> [T]he personal experience of individuals is closely bound up with larger-scale aspects of social structure, well beyond the purview of particular individuals (Granovetter 1973: 1377).

An important distinction between different types of social capital has been that of whether it is of a bonding or bridging nature (Putnam 2000), i.e. creating particularized in-group trust or generalized trust that includes people belonging to other groups. We bond with friends and others who are like ourselves, whereas we need to build bridges to people who we perceive to be different from ourselves. The central idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust, or bridging from bonding, is the inclusiveness (Uslaner 2004: 3-4). Early on, Granovetter proposed that a society with a large number of weak ties (bridges) and low density networks between acquaintances is more likely to promote individual opportunities and integration, whereas stronger ties (bonds) and densely knit networks consisting of close friends breed small and tight, but isolated, communities (Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1983). As Widmalm (2007) points out, bonding social capital has been treated almost solely as something that produces unwanted outcomes such as ethnic conflict or low political engagement. He argues that bonding social capital, by making cooperation easier, is also necessary for
any successful political movement, that it makes the movement run less of a risk of being diluted, and that it protects the group in question from exploitation by other groups (Widmalm 2007). Thus, on the part of the people within a bonding network, it is certainly rational to maintain the practices that protect the network and that simplify coordination and cooperation among its members. A standstill can be useful for and desired by one group, often the ingroup, while ineffective for and unwanted by another group, often the groups that are not members of the network. The very existence of a network implies being able to separate those who are members from those who are not. Coleman has also emphasized the importance of closure in networks if strong common norms and high levels of trust are to develop. In particular, he points out corporate actors as being in need of closed networks full of bonding social capital (Coleman 1990: 318-321). For collective norms and information-sharing purposes, a certain degree of closure is needed. Ogilvie points out that gender is one clearly visible category on which it is possible to base a restriction on the membership of networks (Ogilvie 2003). The reverse of the social capital medal is that some networks are so intimately linked to political positions that exclusion from them renders it difficult or even impossible to reach political office.

Men, women and homosocial capital in political networks

The discussions about homosociality and bonding social capital are relevant theoretical tools to bring with us when we enter into the world of politics, parties, and representation. In order to unveil and define the type of capital that maintains and reproduces male dominance in politics, it is necessary to understand how in-group power, in general, can be protected by building tight and closely knit networks and how the mechanisms of exclusion from these networks function. Complex power relations within a political system cannot be analyzed by looking only at individuals. The societal position of these individuals as well as their relations to other individuals must be taken into account. Political individuals may come and go, but power configurations in political networks often remain constant (Knoke 1990). I have constructed *homosocial capital* as a concept that highlights both the fact that an interpersonal capital needs to be built up before an individual is included in a political network, and the fact that there are gendered aspects to this interpersonal capital: it is predominantly accessible for other men as well as more valuable when built between men. In the sphere of politics, this capital is needed for investment in the ultimate political goal: to make sure that elections are won.

Unpredictability in the surrounding environment is problematic in politics as well as in the corporate world, and minimizing this unpredictability is necessary for political as well as corporate success. Kanter has highlighted the fact that the conditions for uncertainty in organizations create a strong
need for homogeneous groups of decision-makers. Homogeneity is seen as guaranteeing at least a certain level of similar outlook and mutual understanding (Kanter 1977).

If conditions of uncertainty mean that people have to be relied on, then people fall back on social bases for trust. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the pressures for those who have to trust each other to form a homogeneous group. At different times in an organization’s history, and at different places in its structure, a higher degree of uncertainty brings with it more drive for social similarity (Kanter 1993: 49).

Particularly in the early stages of an organization, uncertainty reaches high levels. The same can be applied to a polity – early stages of new political regimes are likely to be fraught with a higher level of uncertainty and unpredictability than consolidated political systems are. Likewise, certain countries experience higher political instability and unpredictability than others do. Political actors in such countries probably put a greater emphasis on interpersonal trust and predictability in other political actors. Political networks engaging in activities that, for some reason, should not be known to outsiders are also more likely to value trustable and predictable behavior more than, for instance, a diversity of social backgrounds and experiences. The accumulation of homosocial capital can be interpreted as an investment in predictability. As the level of unpredictability is likely to vary greatly between different societal contexts, so is the need to maximize predictability. The need to make use of homosocial capital in so doing is likely to vary accordingly.

Two slightly different explanations are suggested concerning why cooperation aimed at maximizing predictability seems to benefit men. The first version posits that at present men are simply found in more appropriate societal positions, whereas the second version argues that there are important gendered ideas that go far beyond such structural arrangements. Kanter has argued that the differences between the two sexes that are found and reproduced in organizational cultures can be attributed mainly to present differences in opportunities, power, and numbers within these very organizations (Kanter 1977). Her critics, on the other hand, have argued that it is impossible to separate issues of gender from issues of power in this way, and that gender per se is about power. Power structures within organizations cannot be analyzed in isolation, but must be seen as part of the larger power structures in society (Holgersson 2003; Cockburn 1990). I believe there is a need and room for both of these explanations, that they are in no way contradictory, and that they should, in fact, be combined in order to more fully understand the workings of homosocial capital.

Homosocial capital can be accumulated in a relationship between two or more people who believe (rightly or not) that they understand each other and
thus can predict each other’s behavior. A person’s behavior, in turn, is perceived to be restricted and guided both by his or her position in society and by supposed characteristics. Thus, similarity in terms of position as well as in terms of perceived, often stereotypical, characteristics is seen to ensure predictable behavior (and, in the long run, generate trust). It is only by taking both of these aspects into account that we can understand why homosocial capital today pertains more to men than to women.

Because of the power structures in today’s society, women benefit more from heterosocial behavior than from homosocial behavior, whereas the opposite is true for men. Women today are dependent on male networks for access to relevant resources and because of difficulties of building and maintaining their own networks. Men and women alike are thus more likely to be interested in cooperating with men than with women. Kanter argued that the position, rather than the person holding the position, determines the level of power. A position with open channels to information, resources, and support gives power, whereas positions in which these channels are closed are powerless (Kanter 1979). If a majority of women are found in low-key positions, with little access to information exchange and important resources, they will also not be considered crucial in informal political networks. Lipman-Blumen defined homosociality in terms of a pragmatic observation that men are the main controllers of resources in all spheres of society, and that this creates a situation in which men and women alike are dependent on men (Lipman-Blumen 1976). When the majority of political positions that give access to resources and information relevant for certain political actions are held by men, both men and women will have to turn to men in order to gain access to these important resources. People who are already in political positions that are very relevant to the network in question are also likely to be perceived as more predictable, as it is already in their interest to protect the network.

Let us continue, now, with perceived similar characteristics, in the pursuit of which we might expect homosocial behavior between women as well as between men. Persistent ideas of what is masculine and feminine still abound in all cultures, and political culture is by no means different. Most research in this area has focused on male-dominated arenas, and how masculine ideals of success are allowed to become the norm. For instance, while images of successful politicians may carry with them specifically masculine connotations, stereotypical views of women may implicitly impact assessment of merits among potential candidates. Organizational studies have shown how men create and maintain masculine identities that often come to be intimately connected with success, authority and privilege – and with being a man. In line with Connell (1995), who argues that there is more than one type of masculinity, Collinson and Hearn explore several different discourses and practices of masculinity connected to managerial styles. They describe, for instance, authoritarianism and paternalism as two distinct lead-
ership types associated with masculinity and that many men strive after (Collinson and Hearn 2001). Men recognize these characteristics in other men and interpret them as competence and likeness. One should, however, be careful not to carry such descriptions to different contexts. Masculinity can be described as the combination of signs that show that someone is a man (Collinson and Hearn 2005), and images of hegemonic masculinities and gendered expectations are likely to vary across settings and cultures (see e.g. Hibbings 2003). Sought after leadership types and their possible gendered connotations types thus need to be contextualized instead of simply exported from one context to another. Cockburn has studied how notions of men and women trickle through and affect possibilities for advancement even when equal opportunity measures are explicitly employed. Among men in charge of promotions within a company, for instance, it was often taken for granted that women were different from themselves – that they were simply not interested in promotion. For instance, it was often assumed that married women would be averse to being geographically mobile (Cockburn 1991: 55). Men and women alike are, of course, affected by gendered expectations and are likely to perceive members of the same sex as more similar to themselves. A number of studies have suggested that social homogeneity is perceived to facilitate communication, understanding, efficiency and to ensure predictability (Kanter 1977; Lincoln and Miller 1979; Brass 1985; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Ibarra 1992). Thus, both women and men would feel more comfortable about seeking social support and friendship in informal but work-related networks predominantly consisting of members of the same sex.

In summary, the above arguments imply that whereas the political success of women is dependent on including men in their political networks, men need not include women to maximize predictability. Men can find both the perceived similarities as well as the strategically positioned individuals among people of their own sex. Again, the only empirical support we can obtain for this type of behavior comes from organizational studies. They do show that even in contexts with approximately the same number of men and women, both men and women tended to build networks with a majority of members of their own sex, and men even more so than women (Brass 1985). In order to be successful, however, women need to have access to mixed networks, whereas all-male networks are sufficient for male success (Ibarra 1992; Brass 1985). Research also supports the view that women are seen as unpredictable outsiders by male managers, and that they have difficulty building their own mixed networks – they are not seen as legitimate members of predominantly male networks. Instead, in order to be successful, women need to borrow networks from a man who acts as their sponsor. The same applies to certain men, but the difference is that whereas men can, in time, become legitimate network members by rising in the hierarchy, women remain illegitimate members with the need for borrowed networks, even
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when they reach the highest positions (Burt 1998). With the help of the above theories, the concept of homosocial capital has been chiseled out. The figure below highlights the main characteristics of this important mechanism.

Table 1. Homosocial Capital

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Homosocial capital is thus a form of capital that, today, seems to be most accessible for men. For men, it is almost always considered advantageous to build networks with other men. Men are still more often found in important societal and political positions that are vital in gaining access to resources and information exchange. In addition, men often perceive other men to be more competent and reliable and more like themselves – and therefore more comfortable to cooperate with. Male networking is seen as maximizing network predictability. For women, homosocial capital is simply not a valid currency with which to attain political power. Women need access to the information and resources presently predominantly held by men. I thus wish to make clear from the start that homosocial capital is both about the pragmatic use of available resources and about more psychological considerations pertaining to the gendered roles of men and women in general. Homosocial capital contains both of these aspects – albeit for the same reason: the attractiveness of predictability in an unpredictable political environment.

Clientelism and unpredictability

We have already seen that the quest for accumulation of homosocial capital can be interpreted as a need for predictability. The importance of accumulation of homosocial capital is thus likely to be heightened in unstable and unpredictable political settings, and this section will show that the political practice of clientelism per se can be understood as a predictability maximizer. Clientelism is also an informal political practice that puts great emphasis on personal network building and that by nature demands a high level of predictability and reliability among its network members.

The focus on clientelism as a political practice highlights the interplay between formal and informal political institutions. Helmke and Levitsky force-
fully argue that the field of comparative politics needs to take informal institutions into account.

Many ‘rules of the game’ that structure political life are informal – created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 725).

Informal institutions, according to Helmke and Levitsky, range from bureaucratic norms to clientelism and play very important roles when they coexist or interact with formal political institutions. They provide a typology of the influence of informal institutions and claim that when formal institutions are ineffective, informal institutions can play the part of either being substitutive (if their outcome largely converges with the formal institution’s) or competing (if they are incompatible with existing formal rules) (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 2006).

Clientelism per se can be understood as an attempt to maximize predictability in an unpredictable environment. Part of the evidence for this is that clientelist political practices are more prevalent in unpredictable political and institutional settings. Although there is little consensus on the causes and consequences of clientelism, we tend to find more accentuated clientelist behavior in poorer countries and areas and in areas with great inequalities. Stokes claims that although clientelism “is not an exclusive feature of the developing world, one is much more likely to encounter it there than in the advanced democracies” (Stokes 2007b). For clientelism to be an effective electoral strategy, there needs to be a demand from the voters for something that the existing formal political system cannot offer and there also needs to be a demand from politicians for a different campaigning system than the one offered within the formal political framework of their political party. Where formal political institutions are weak, and where there are still poor voters to be targeted, these demands are likely to be at hand.

Persistent poverty underpins clientelist structures by emphasizing direct personal services rather than indirect party policies. Clientelism and vote buying thus become electoral strategies for mobilizing the poor. Clientelism is particularly effective as an electoral strategy in settings where defunct democratic institutions cannot provide basic welfare for the poor. Instead, poor voters have to rely on influential local notables when it comes to loans, work opportunities or payments (Brusco et al. 2004: 84). Poor people are more likely to be in need of a direct handout than wealthier people are, but they are also more likely to be risk averse and unwilling to wait for uncertain universal policy-related benefits that may or may not come their way after the election (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007a). On the part of the client, then, clientelism is a way of reducing the unreliability of the formal political institutions by instead investing in more direct benefits from informal networks.
On the part of the political actors, the patrons, clientelism is also likely to be seen as a more reliable system in which to invest their loyalty and resources if and when the formal political institutions are unstable. In a clientelist system, personal relationships are given far more concern than the party or elected office. Bratton and van de Walle argue that so much legitimacy is given to the clientelist networks that they often override formal bureaucratic structures and that loyalty to and dependence on them take precedence over the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Tripp also talks about how personal rule as opposed to rule of law is maintained through clientelism (Tripp 2001). Thus, personal and informal networks can be seen as more reliable political investments in contexts where political parties are weak as organizations, where they come and go, or where the government is unstable and ever-changing.

Revisiting democracy

Informal institutions of different kinds exist everywhere and in all societies, but certain types of informal institutions benefit from a weak formal institutional framework (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Stechina 2008). Clientelism is considered to be such an institution. In this book, clientelism is acknowledged as an informal institution among many, but one that is rendered important and given the opportunity to flourish by ineffective formal political institutions. Thus, when a political actor invests in informal clientelist networks, this investment can, in part, be understood as a response to a weak or ever-changing formal institutional framework. When looking at this interplay between formal and informal political institutions, we must revisit the importance of democracy. Formerly, when democracy has been analyzed in relation to the representation of women, it has been seen as having the potential to directly impact representation levels. The expectation that democracy will contribute to a more just and equal society has often been grand and it has sometimes been expected that societies moving towards a more democratic system will experience an uncomplicated and linear development that includes more equal political opportunities and a parliament with representatives from a wider variety of social groups.

From a purely theoretical point of view, some of these expectations are understandable, as there is much in any definition of democracy to suggest greater inclusion and more equality. Indeed, the equality of all citizens is one of the main principles of most definitions of democracy (Beetham 1993: 55). Feminist political scientists such as Phillips, however, have emphasized that the very concept of democracy is built on a male norm and that it is impossible to attain democratic equality in a society that is already unequal (Phillips 1991: 1-8). The feminist argument is that social inequalities matter for political equality. Equal formal rights are not enough to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens. Pateman argues that while the past century has seen
most societies extend political rights to include women, the division between public and private arenas remains. The private life is, according to liberal principles, not considered political and public, but it remains highly significant to the different opportunities men and women have to shape their own lives (Pateman 1989: 210 ff). The contradictory results emanating from a large body of empirical research regarding the importance of democracy for the increased representation of women can thus be said to support the view that formal rights are not enough to ensure gender equality. Inglehart et al. claim that support for gender equality comes about as a consequence of democracy (Inglehart et al. 2002) and they also claim that an increased level of democracy is likely to promote women’s political participation (Inglehart and Norris 2003). They do note, however, that democratic institutions per se are no guarantors of gender equality. Instead, they see both gender equality and democracy as parts of a broader postmodernization trend (Inglehart et al. 2002). Paxton hypothesizes that “democratic systems are more likely to promote the interests of those not in power, including women”, but does not find support for this hypothesis (Paxton 1997: 445). The body of more qualitative research dealing with gender relations in democratizing countries is, as a whole, also inconclusive with regards to the impact of democracy on gendered parliamentary representation (see for example Jaquette 2001; Jaquette and Wolchik 1999; Waylen 2003, 2007; Friedman 2000). Women’s active part in the opposition movement before and during democratic transition has been a very unreliable determinant of whether or not they will be given a place in formal representative politics in the subsequent established democratic regime (Waylen 2007: 91). Women formed part of the opposition movements in Latin America, Eastern Europe and many African countries, but it is really only in some African countries, such as South Africa, that this democratic struggle for equality was transformed into real political equality (Ballington 2002; Goetz and Hassim 2003). In Latin America, women continued to mobilize as autonomous groups following democratization, but this largely took place outside the formal political sphere (Jaquette 2001; Jaquette and Wolchik 1999). In Eastern Europe, feminists have rather witnessed a backlash, both in the private and the public sphere (Jaquette and Wolchik 1999; Matland and Montgomery 2003). Democracy per se simply does not seem to be the answer. Neither cross-country research nor qualitative case studies provide much evidence that democracy per se gives women more seats in parliament. Despite the fact that the importance of a “male norm” in politics has often been highlighted, this male norm has seldom been a part of the research agenda of this field.

There is thus a need for a new assessment of the role democracy may play in gendered political power struggles. I argue that democracy probably does play a role, but that it is far from straightforward and simple. The interplay between defunct and unreliable formal political institutions and the rise of
functioning and stable informal political institutions, such as clientelism, shows us how this may work.

Formal and informal institutions
We can thus view the expected interplay between democracy and clientelism as one between formal and informal political institutions. The difference between formal and informal institutions is that while formal institutions are created, communicated and enforced through official channels and more or less known to all, the origin of informal institutions is often unknown and actors are often unwilling to admit to enforcing them. There are several different incentives to create informal institutions, but one commonly mentioned in relation to clientelism is that formal political institutions are already weak and that informal institutions are needed to accomplish that which formal institutions are not able to do. In this sense, clientelism is seen as a substitutive informal institution the outcome of which is not necessarily adverse to that of formal institutions. Another incentive may be that political actors simply do not respect the formal institutions that do exist and wish to engage in an activity that the formal institutional framework, however weak, cannot allow. In this case, informal institutions are seen as competing with formal institutions. In other words, formal institutions can be either unreliable or disrespected – or both. Clientelism can usually be interpreted as both substituting and competing with formal institutions. In a sense, it substitutes for the welfare that state institutions do not distribute and it ensures that local interests are taken up politically. But it also directly violates democratic procedures and corrupts elections (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Taylor-Robinson 2006). When there is a low level of respect for or belief in the continuity of formal political institutions, informal institutions take precedence. Schedler has described a common two-level electoral game in countries where not only elections are manipulated through, for instance, vote buying, but where the formal institutional rules themselves are seen as mere tools to be changed at will or even fiddled with in order to gain electoral advantages (Schedler 2002). Political parties in polities that are not fully democratic are generally quite weak organizations. Instead of relying on formal institutions, they rely on informal arrangements for their survival and in the competition for votes. Formal institutions are rather seen as bricks in a play about power, to be used to further one’s own purposes and to attain the ultimate goal – a seat in the parliament.

Several studies of the relationship between democracy and corruption raise issues of relevance for this study and illustrate how informal institutions not compatible with formal democratic institutions are more common at certain democracy levels. Although it is difficult to specify the causal direction between democratic level and the prevalence of corrupt activities, many of these studies argue that there is, indeed, a relationship, but that it is
not simple and straightforward. Formal institutional strength and informal institutions like corruption are thus related and all contribute to shedding light on different aspects of the concept of clientelism. Stechina, in a dissertation that compares high-level corruption in Argentina and Chile, also argues that the formal institutional context is important for understanding the opportunities arising for corruption (Stechina 2008). Where formal institutions are ineffective, weak and unreliable, informal networks will more easily develop into substitutive and permanent clientelist bodies that are more likely to engage in corrupt activities such as electoral fraud.

One thing that is emphasized in some of these studies is the importance of formal institutional instability for the appearance of informal corrupt activities. It takes a long-term stable democratic climate to bring about the institutions needed to curb corruption efficiently (Blake and Martin 2006; Treisman 2000). Studies also highlight the importance of not always assuming linear relationships. Montinola and Jackman find a curvilinear relationship between democracy and corruption, in other words, some authoritarian regimes have lower corruption than semi-democracies do (Montinola and Jackman 2002). Sung even finds that a cubic function fits the relationship even better than a quadratic, curvilinear one. Although democracy decreases corruption, there are temporary backlashes during the process of liberalization before sufficiently high levels of democracy are reached (Sung 2004). Bäck and Hadenius widen the concept beyond corruption and find a J-shaped relationship between democratization and administrative capacity (Bäck and Hadenius 2008).

**Unpredictable semi-democracies**

The questions that should be posed are: which political contexts are most likely to be unpredictable? And is unpredictability in any way related to level of democracy? I argue that it is probable that the strength of formal political institutions varies depending on the level of democracy and that the strength of informal political institutions, especially clientelism and related corrupt activities such as vote buying, varies accordingly, depending on the level of political stability. Importantly, where formal institutions are ineffective, ample opportunities arise that tend to create stronger informal institutions, such as corruption and clientelism (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 728).

It has been argued that formal political institutions are stronger in autocracies and democracies than they are in regimes found between the two in terms of democracy level or in new and unstable regimes (Keefer 2007; Bäck and Hadenius 2008). Research on democratization, however, is not oblivious to the special characteristics found in many states in the middle of the democracy continuum. States that are neither advanced democracies nor autocracies are called by many names, and there is quite a large body of literature on different varieties of such states. They are sometimes called
democracies with adjectives (Collier and Levitsky 1997): “delegative democracies” (O'Donnell 1994), “hybrid regimes” (Diamond 2002), “competitive or electoral authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006) or simply referred to as not being consolidated democracies (Schedler 1998, 2001). When I refer to semi-democratic states here, I refer to all such states that are, in some way, found between democracy and autocracy without alluding to any differences there might be between the different types. Keefer also argues that politicians in younger democracies are not only more corrupt, but that they also tend to rely on patron-client networks and to oversupply particularized goods rather than universal policies (Keefer 2007). The reason for this is that politicians in new and unreliable polities are not seen as credible providers of public goods, and that this credibility instead lies in patron-client relationships (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). States that have just embarked on their democratization processes lack many of the institutional practices of an older and more consolidated democracy. During relative liberalization, institutions are questioned and often in constant flux as the political sphere is opened up for new actors. Without consolidated institutional practices it is difficult to maintain a functioning bureaucracy, to uphold law and order or to combat corrupt practices in the political sphere. This also means, for instance, that it is difficult to organize elections that are free and fair and to limit vote buying as an electoral practice. Thus, the circumstances in which clientelism becomes both useful and possible are there.

The level of democracy tends to go hand in hand with political stability. Many semi-democratic states are said to experience political instability precisely because of their obscure democratic status. Levitsky and Way argue that the very coexistence, or mix, of democratic rules and the more autocratic methods that are often used by incumbents to try to stay in power that distinguish many of these states create an inherent instability (Levitsky and Way 2002; 2005). The concept of consolidation, according to Diamond, has a great deal to do with political actors following the formal rules as they are laid out by constitutions and laws (Diamond 1999). Schedler has argued that the concept of democratic consolidation is and should be about the expectations of democratic regime survival. Thus, once a country has achieved democratic elections, democratic consolidation - in the sense of relevant actors feeling confident that democracy will endure in the future - is needed for democracy to reach higher levels and be consolidated (Schedler 1998). He further argues that antidemocratic behavior in semi-democratic countries includes the rejection of elections by, for example, trying to control electoral outcomes and that this is a sign that actors are not following the written rules of the democratic game (Schedler 2001).

If our assumption is that clientelism thrives where formal institutions are weak and unstable, and that formal institutions tend to be weaker in semi-democracies – then this also has implications for how we view democracy,
in dichotomous or continuous terms. Most people tend to view democracy as both a dichotomy and a continuum, depending on the situation.

In common parlance we use the word “democracy” in both ways: sometimes to make the discrete claim that some countries are “democracies” whereas others are not, and sometimes to make the graded statement that some countries are more “democratic” than others (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b: 91).

Hadenius and Teorell continue by noting that this does not imply that either view is equally justifiable in every case, and they argue that when dealing with democracy as a main variable in a research enterprise, the view of democracy as a continuum provides the least loss of information (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b: 91). If we wish to be open to the possibility that the strength of political institutions differs at different stages of democracy, we should treat democracy not as an “either-or” but as a question of stages. Earlier qualitative research on democratization and gendered patterns of representation has not always been explicit as to at what stage of liberalization a country is analyzed, thus possibly contributing to the invisibility of a possible curvilinear relationship as well as to contradictory results. Likewise, quantitative studies have rarely included a curvilinear function of the democracy variable, thus inducing linearity on a relationship that might, in fact, be curvilinear. If democracy is not seen as a linear and direct road to equal representation, but instead as a curve, we may find that the top of the curve provides the weakest and most unpredictable formal institutions and thus the strongest incentives for strong informal institutions, such as clientelism. We also know that institutions created to maximize predictability are likely to perceive homosocial capital as a valuable currency.

Clientelism as a likely producer of homosocial capital

Certain political practices reproduce and reinvent male dominance more effectively than others, and the argument goes that these political practices are also more likely than others to make use of homosocial capital to preserve male parliamentary power. There are many different conceivable arenas in which the accumulation of homosocial capital could be seen as a useful strategy, but in order to specify this concept, it must be contextualized within a particular political practice. In order to explore a phenomenon that we know rather little about, it is useful to situate it within a political practice where it is highly likely to be relevant and manifest. Homosocial capital is likely to be a highly valued asset in a clientelist setting for a number of reasons that will be elaborated on in this section.
Informal distribution networks are central to clientelism

Networks have been central in earlier analyses of homosocial behavior, as a way to explain not just how individual preferences matter, but how they also serve to reproduce male dominance on a larger scale. Networks are also central to clientelist political practices, and the manner in which they are built and maintained, and who they include, are crucial aspects of whether they can serve their goal of being reliable channels for the distribution of goods and trustworthy sources of information and control regarding the political support given in exchange. Access to these networks is crucial in order to reap the benefits as a client, or to act as a patron. Despite the importance of functioning and stable network building in clientelist systems, there is fairly little research on the conditions of access to these networks, and even less on possible gendered conditions (see however Tripp 2001; Beck 2003; Goetz 2007). Tripp has emphasized that women, due to their subordinate position in society and politics at large, also have a different relationship to clientelism (Tripp 2001). Goetz specifies that gender shapes the opportunities people are given to partake in the clientelist exchange (Goetz 2007), while Beck points out that clientelist networks reproduce already existing social inequalities (Beck 2003). However, we still lack a specification of what societal positions and which characteristics are perceived to be assets in the clientelist network.

Despite sometimes being described as a dyadic relationship, clientelism does not only concern exchange between two people. Instead, it involves large networks of people bound together in hierarchical patron-client formations at different levels, including formal political and organizational institutions. Clientelist systems rely on networks that link patrons from the highest level with clients in rural areas (Lemarchand and Legg 1972). The networks need to be extensive, so that they can reach a large number of voters. As a patron, you thus need to work with a campaign manager of some kind, who has an extensive local knowledge of each area. You also need a well-functioning organization of brokers, each of whom, in turn, have access to a number of voters. Because networks are informal and personal, these brokers are commonly found through personal connections (Wang and Kurzman 2007). Sometimes, preexisting, dense social networks can be employed (Stokes 2005).

Despite being informal, clientelist networks are often hierarchically organized and, in addition, fairly static hierarchies. If clientelist networks are static hierarchies, then they are also, as Tripp suggests, unlikely arenas for social change (Tripp 2001). Clientelism per se implies both asymmetric and stable relationships between patrons and clients in a network. Clientelist networks are hierarchies because they are contingent on an asymmetric relationship between patron and client. Discrepancies in status, power, and influence at once segregate and unite patrons and clients. Control over the
resources that the patron has on the one hand and the obligations the client has to fulfill in order to access these resources, on the other, are differential (Lemarchand and Legg 1972). The asymmetry in the networks is part of the reason why clientelism works better in areas with high levels of poverty and inequality. This also means that it is easy to maintain a status quo in a clientelist system, as it continually serves those already in power, i.e. people who are able to serve as patrons and maintain a good relationship with their clients (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). The emphasis on stability explains why clientelism is often more prevalent in rural areas and in areas where mobility is limited. When mobility increases, the delivery of clientelist goods becomes unreliable (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007a). In urban areas, the anonymity is greater and it is also more difficult to maintain a network that reaches down to virtually every household.

Although informal, clientelist networks are very strategically built and maintained so as to include the crucial people with the best access to resources as important network nodes. The networks serve a specific purpose: distribution of goods and money, and the people included in the networks need to be well positioned to contribute to this purpose. They should also be able to contribute to the chain of clientelist exchanges.

The secretive nature of the clientelist exchange

Clientelism as a political practice has as its base an exchange – that between a patron and a client. The obligations between the two are mutually beneficial and obligating and concern an exchange of resources of some kind. Resources to be distributed can be in the form of land, work, or money, and they can be distributed locally or from the center, and directly or indirectly by coordinating contacts. The main idea is that political support (sometimes in the direct form of votes) from the client is given in exchange for material services provided by the patron. The volume of transactions is contextual – depending on the needs of the client and the influence of the patron (Lemarchand and Legg 1972). Tripp talks about constituency services being as varied as construction of schools, clinics, infrastructure or distribution of work, help or licenses in exchange for political allegiance (Tripp 2001). Vote buying can also be seen as an example of a clientelist exchange. It is narrower than clientelism, as it exchanges money or goods for a direct individual vote. Clientelism encompasses political and electoral support in a broader sense (Stokes 2007b). Vote buying is, however, a common feature of the clientelist exchange and is usually seen as a corrupt activity. Corruption, in turn, is often defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Warren 2004). Warren argues that corruption
breaks the link between collective decision making and people’s powers to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy (Warren 2004: 328).

Clientelism does not necessarily involve vote buying and is not necessarily corrupt. Corruption, in turn, does not necessarily involve political support as part of the exchange. Clientelism and corruption should thus not be equated, but clientelism is seen as a good breeding-ground for certain corrupt activities, such as vote buying. Stokes argues that vote buying is also an undemocratic activity because it prevents voters from making their interests known and interpreted and from being autonomous. She thus concludes that it is “imperative to search for ways to reduce vote buying in today’s developing democracies” (Stokes 2007a). Vote buying is illegal in most countries, and although it is often accepted in practice, to conduct vote buying in any form is to commit electoral fraud. Buying votes thus often encompasses ignoring or consciously breaking the law. However, politicians seem to find ways to get around such laws. Stokes points out that the laws seem to be malleable in the hands of politicians, and Wang and Kurzman argue that there are specific and discreet ways in which to run the logistics of vote buying without being found out (Stokes 2007b; Wang and Kurzman 2007).

Because of the illegal character of many clientelist activities, vote buying being the most obvious, there is a strong need for the networks to be informal and discreet and there is a strong emphasis on trust and social control within the networks. A study of vote buying in Taiwan concludes:

Vote buying campaigns, in short, may not be so different from other criminal enterprises: they make up for their legal vulnerabilities by ensconcing themselves in local networks of protection, and they administer resources to motivate these networks to protect them (Wang and Kurzman 2007: 77).

Arguably, trust and local knowledge are always important assets in election campaigns. When vote buying or other illegal activities are involved, however, their importance is even further emphasized. Every person included in the network represents a risk that the illegal activities will be discovered. Valuable goods and money will also be in circulation, and it is imperative that they end up in the hands of the right people – those who are willing to sell their vote in exchange for them - instead of in the pockets of the brokers. This is why the personal connections at every level become so important: to make sure that being disloyal to the network means being disloyal to a friend, relative, or business associate (Wang and Kurzman 2007).

Clientelism and male dominance

Here and in the remainder of this book, it is argued that clientelism is a strategy used to combat unpredictability and that it brings about the combined
need to build up efficient distribution networks and to protect secretive activities such as vote buying. This very combination fosters the accumulation of homosocial capital in clientelist networks and thus shuts out women. Yet it should be noted that earlier accounts of corrupt activities and gender have tended to view the relationship the other way: they have come to the conclusion that women are less corrupt than men, and that this is why corruption is higher where women are less well represented (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). Even though Swamy et al. specifically state that they are aware that the gender differences they find may be attributed to, for instance, differences in access to corruption networks rather than to biological differences between women and men (Swamy et al. 2001: 26-27), they choose not to take a position on the question and thus fail to acknowledge that the position taken has important consequences for how to methodologically approach a study of the relationship between gender and corruption. Conceptually separating biological sex and social gender implies distinguishing between inherent, unchangeable traits and socially constructed characteristics, which are contingent on contextual structures and thus potentially changeable. Gender understood in this sense is more about what we do than what we are. Doing gender is a continuously ongoing process that everyone participates in, but where the rules of the game often look different depending on the individual’s biological. This also implies that any generalized behavioral differences may be due to present differences in situations, opportunities and experiences. Thus, in line with Goetz’s argument, we must not overlook that gender shapes the opportunities for corruption (Goetz 2007). In other words, when conceptually making a distinction between sex and gender, there is nothing to say that women, once being given the same opportunities and advantages as men, would not become just as corrupt. Considering, instead, the possibility that corruption and vote buying, or the larger issue of clientelism, impede women from entering politics moves away from assuming intrinsic female attributes and instead takes stock of the social consequences that the discourse on gender has for women. In this way, it better separates the concept of gender from the concept of sex. It rather argues that in clientelist systems, opportunities for electoral corruption are gendered in that only those with access to networks, those with connections within the local or national elite, those with resources to finance corrupt behavior, and those who are already influential in society are in positions to be considered assets in clientelist networks and are the only ones who will be trusted with the sensitive nature of the exchange. With the gendered roles attributed to men and women alike, these persons are probably more likely to be men than women. Such a claim also takes one step away from seeing male, traditional political behavior as the norm, and female traditional behavior as an exception and solution to the problem. Instead, it reverses the gaze and problematizes masculinity, men’s practices, and the male gender, which are usually invisible or taken for granted in politics.
The other objection that may be raised against the above line of argument is that it is not clear how the proposed causal relationship functions. The proportion of women in parliament is small almost everywhere in the world. About half of the countries have less than 15 percent women parliamentarians. Only 22 countries out of 187 have more than 30 percent women in parliament and only two, Sweden and Rwanda, have more than 45 percent women in parliament. It is not made clear how the few women individuals that these low proportions of women signify would have managed to curb national corruption levels. It is true that to some extent the sheer number of women present in parliament does seem to matter. Although research on the policy impact of representation on women now focuses on critical acts as much as on a critical mass (Dahlerup 1988), most research indicates that “long-term significant change will only be realized when there is a substantial number of women in parliament” (Karam and Lovenduski 2005: 189; see also Grey 2002). It is often difficult for women parliamentarians to make a policy impact because they feel marginalized in the male-dominated environment they are to operate in (see e.g. Kathlene 1994). Thus, it seems highly unlikely that the few women working in male-dominated parliaments around the world would have found both the cure for combating corruption and the power to implement it. In any case, if this is indeed the substance of the argument of women parliamentarians curbing corruption, it is essential that this mechanism now be given much more attention in the literature. Simplistic suggestions, such as merely adding more women to parliament in order to overcome problems of corruption, do not sufficiently take into account issues highlighted by the more comprehensive governance literature, including how institutions and bureaucracies must function in order to promote governance, how multifaceted the road to good governance is or how a complex pattern of formal and informal institutions ultimately influences any political outcome. The reversal of the causal direction that this book proposes can make a rather strong case regarding causal mechanisms. If corruption is thought to influence representation, we have to investigate more closely what representation is, how political representatives come to be representatives, and how this selection process could be influenced by clientelism and associated corrupt behavior.

Institutional enablers of clientelism

Because the present aim is to understand and explain persistent male parliamentary dominance, we cannot only focus on understanding the theoretical underpinnings of one part of the relationship – how clientelism might be associated with homosocial capital and male dominance – but must also move on to get a better picture of how clientelist political practices might translate into parliamentary seats and matter for the gendered composition of
parliament. Clientelist support is translated into parliamentary seats through elections. Political parties, the manner with which they select candidates, and the incentives created by different types of election systems cannot be studied in isolation. Instead, political parties should be seen as filters through which political practices must pass before they translate into parliamentary seats. The institutional framework of political parties will allow for certain aspects of a political practice to matter for representation, whereas other aspects will not filter through. In most places, political norms need to pass through the workings of a political party before they materialize as concrete political candidates in a parliamentary election. Different types of election systems also affect the incentives of political parties when they select candidates.

Political parties and strategies to attract votes

Political parties have come to be the hub around which representative politics, or at least the appearance of representative politics, revolves in most countries of the world. Whether a country is democratic or not, elections of some sort are usually staged in order to enhance the legitimacy of the regime, and in such elections one or more parties participate. Although multipartyism has come to be associated with democratization, there are numerous examples of more authoritarian regimes in which political parties still play an important part (for a classification of different types of regimes as well as for numerous empirical examples, see e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 2005a, 2007).

Sartori has defined the political party as “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for higher office” (Sartori 1976: 64). This is an inclusive definition that enables a number of additional sub-classifications of different types of parties and party organizations (for some prominent examples, see e.g. Panebianco 1988; Sartori 1976; Epstein 1967; Duverger 1954). Some characteristics are, however, said to be common to all parties. One maxim of political science is that the overarching goal of all parties is to win elections. Downs claims that the desire to gain office is stronger than the desire to realize ideological convictions or to promote “a better or an ideal society” and that the appearance of coherent ideologies should be seen as a mere strategic weapon in the struggle for office (Downs 1957: 96 ff). Regardless of what degree of idealism we ascribe to political parties7, the overarching goal of political parties to reach office should, in the study of these organizations, be seen as a given.

7 Gallagher and Marsh do differentiate, however, between political parties that are after winning elections more than defining policy, so-called rational-efficient parties, and parties, so called party democracies, that put a greater emphasis on ideology and policy and see electoral success as the means to an end – the implementation of this policy (Gallagher and Marsh 1988).
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Starting-Points

The desire of all political parties to reach office and the use of clientelism as a political and electoral strategy are thus closely linked. Shefter argues that political parties can choose to employ one of two basic strategies in order to attract votes: distribution of divisible benefits or distribution of collective benefits. The divisible benefits imply patronage of various kinds, but only to the individuals supporting the party. The conditions under which a party decides to pursue either strategy simply depend on whether the party calculates that it will gain more than it will lose. The party must take into account with which techniques it has won the support of its voters and with which strategies it is most likely to maintain that support (Shefter 1977; on the origins of political parties see also Duverger 1954: 412-420; Huntington 1968: 415). An emphasis on collective benefits also generally brings about an emphasis on the party as a collective, whereas an emphasis on patronage implies a focus on the party candidate as an individual. Here we see a close link to the service-ideology and the person-party distinction used to identify clientelism in this study. If a party perceives that it wins votes based on clientelism, it is likely to select as candidates people who have access to resources and the possibility to effectively distribute them.

Other parties perceive that they win elections due to their ideological stance. In such parties, the desired candidate becomes someone who is in ideological agreement with the party, and someone from within the party ranks (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). If a political party perceives that it attracts its voters by virtue of its strong ideological stance, selecting candidates that in some way mirror this ideology is also likely to be perceived as a good strategy. For instance, leftist parties that emphasize egalitarian values would mirror this general ideological emphasis by including candidates that represent marginalized groups (Caul Kittilson 2006: 28-29).

The selection of the candidates that are perceived as being able to help the political parties achieve the goal of winning elections is thus a crucial activity of the political party, and one activity in which many of the political preferences surface and become visible. Through studying representation and the preceding candidate selection in combination, the means by which a political party tries to win the election, and the limits and incentives that the political system presents, are in focus. Political parties need to be included in the analysis as they are, in most contexts, the filter through which all individuals must pass before becoming political representatives. This does not necessarily mean, however, that it is enough to look within political parties for the answers. In a system where clientelism is a prominent feature of the political system and a successful strategy for attracting votes, we must also look outside the political parties to understand what goes on when parties select candidates. If informal clientelist networks are non-partisan but still influence partisan candidate selection, the analysis of such networks needs to be included in the study design. This study thus contends that party research has been correct in pointing out that political parties are the main filter through
which politicians must pass in order to become candidates and representatives. It also suggests, however, that the candidate selection procedures of political parties should not be studied in isolation, but need to be brought together with the political practices in place. Different political practices need different institutional apertures in order to influence representation. Thus, if a party attracts votes by divisible, clientelist strategies, the candidate selection procedures in question need to be designed in a manner that allows for these strategies to influence candidate selection. For instance, due to the informal nature of clientelist networks, we would expect that the candidate selection process allows for nonpartisan influences. As this study will show, where parties as organizations are weak, we need to look outside the party organization to fully understand what goes on inside the political party.

Election system and district magnitude

The electoral-institutional framework in place further shapes the preferences of political actors when political interests are to become manifest as political candidates. The desired traits in candidates differ across political systems and parties. Several different aspects affect whom the party sees as an appropriate candidate, and whether this prioritization of one type of candidate has a gendered impact. Marsh and Gallagher divide these desired traits into either the ascriptive-objective sort (e.g. age, family, sex, ethnicity) or the achievement oriented-subjective sort (expertise in organizing, record of party service, ideological orthodoxy) (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). To some extent, the electoral system determines what sort of desired traits the parties are likely to look for.

One crucial externally given factor that influences the preferences of political parties is the type of election system. Electoral systems are important because they affect party candidate selection strategies by presenting different sets of incentives. Election systems have also been said to influence the level of political and electoral corruption, thus opening or closing possible apertures for clientelist influence. The main distinguishing characteristics between different election systems are between ballot structure, district structure and the electoral formula employed. Briefly, the ballot structure specifies how votes are cast and counted, the district structure refers to the organization of electoral districts, whereas the electoral formula dictates how votes are translated into seats (Teorell and Lindstedt forthcoming).

Considering the ballot structure, one important distinction between different election systems is whether voters cast one or several ballots and whether ballots are open or closed – in other words, whether voters have the power to change the order of names on the ballot or whether this is determined by the political parties. Another distinguishing feature is whether voting districts are single-member districts (SMDs) or multi-member districts (MMDs). In a SMD, only one legislator per constituency is elected, whereas several Mem-
bers of Parliament represent the same constituency in a MMD. District magnitude thus refers to the number of seats per district. With a higher district magnitude, a party’s chances of winning several seats in a district increase and the party will be more likely to present a balanced ticket. Parties will have the opportunity to use different candidates to appeal to different groups of voters – and it will thus be in the party’s interest to present candidates that represent different interests. With a district magnitude as low as one, as in single-member districts, the party can only field one candidate. The party thus has to pick the one candidate they believe stands the greatest chance of winning, the most “secure” candidate, the candidate who can appeal to the greatest number of voters (Matland 2005). In a system that favors one candidate with the greatest chance of winning, incumbents are at an advantage. This distinction also corresponds fairly well to the distinction between majoritarian and proportional election systems, which concerns how votes are translated into parliamentary seats. Majoritarian systems are typically “the winner takes it all” systems, where the candidate with the most votes wins the entire district. Proportional systems, on the other hand, translate votes into a corresponding proportion of seats in the legislature, and thus distribute several seats per district (Matland 2005). Most accounts seem to agree that election system influences are dependent on a combination of characteristics, and that it is difficult to single out one thing that seems to matter. However, two different views regarding the impact of corruption and clientelism can be roughly distinguished in the literature.

The first view suggests that countries with proportional systems where voters cast their votes for party lists, rather than for individuals, tend to have higher levels of corruption. This would have to do with the fact that it is easier to conceal corrupt activities where the electoral focus is not on one individual (Persson et al. 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). The other view rather suggests that certain electoral systems provide stronger incentives for politicians to cultivate their personal vote, and that this is more likely to foster corrupt behavior than if party reputation is in focus (Carey and Shugart 1995; Golden and Chang 2001). Some sources also argue that governments in candidate-centered electoral systems are more corrupt and less bureaucratically efficient and that they tend to oversupply particularistic goods (Hicken 2007; Golden and Chang 2001). Importantly, proponents of the latter view argue that if voter control of politicians is to be a successful weapon against political corruption, the public needs to be averse to the corrupt behavior and willing to end it (Geddes and Neto 1992: 657). In literature on the personal vote, the focus often lies on the type of constituency services, patronage or even direct vote buying that individual politicians have to provide in order to be individually recognized (Golden and Chang 2001), whereas these types of “pork-barrel politics” are, in fact, excluded from the study by Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman precisely because they create support among constituents. They are only interested in kick-backs
and bribes that, if they were to be revealed, would be likely to decrease constituent support (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005).

Let us look a bit more closely, then, at the characteristics of electoral systems that would foster incentives to cultivate a personal vote, rather than a vote based on party reputation. If votes are pooled between candidates within the same party, the incentives to foster a party vote is stronger than if candidates are elected solely on individual votes independent of co-partisans. Likewise, if voters cast a single vote for one party, the incentives to foster a party vote are stronger than if voters cast several votes or votes for a candidate (Carey and Shugart 1995). Where party lists exist, it also matters whether these lists are open or closed. In an open list, voters can affect the order on the list by marking certain candidates, whereas in a closed list, the order set by the party is unchangeable. A closed list creates many fewer incentives to cultivate a personal reputation than does an open list (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Thus, a lower district magnitude and a majoritarian election system seem to create incentives for candidates to foster a personal reputation.

There are thus different arguments as to how election systems might affect the incentives to engage in electoral corruption. Naturally, fostering a personal reputation does not have to be connected to corrupt or clientelist behavior, but I argue that the likelihood of clientelism probably increases where such incentives are at play. What we do know is that there is generally a much higher representation of women in proportional multi-member districts than in majoritarian or single member districts, something that has been confirmed in a number of studies (see e.g. Matland 2005; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Paxton 1997; Rule 1987). The reason for this has been said to be that the balanced tickets that a higher district magnitude tends to produce often include candidates of both sexes, whereas the one “secure” candidate turns out to be a man most of the time. This is not least because incumbents are often the most attractive candidates, and most incumbents are male. Clientelist systems benefit incumbents to an even greater extent than other systems do, as incumbents have better access to public resources to be used for clientelist purposes. This quickly becomes a vicious circle for women:

Since women are still represented in most legislatures in substantially lower numbers than men, women candidates are less likely to be incumbents and thus are less likely to have access to the pork and patronage resources that are often important for winning elections in those systems (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008).

It is also the case, however, that if majoritarian systems with a low district magnitude tend to favor not only the fostering of a personal vote, but also clientelist activities such as constituency services and vote buying, the nature
of these activities may be another reason why women are kept outside of the political system under majoritarian election systems.

It is, however, also important to remember that election systems are nothing but incentive shapers and that the vote winning strategy, as perceived by the political parties, is paramount. If political parties really believe that voters prefer a female candidate, then a single member district with a majoritarian system should not present a problem for women. Especially in political contexts where there is a relatively low regard for institutional arrangements and where actors foresee that they are going to change in the near future, they are unlikely to make great efforts to adapt their organization or their long-term political activities to new electoral rules. Instead, they are likely to find ways to use the electoral rules in place for their own political purposes. Election system rules can thus be shaped in the hands of politicians and may not have the intended effect.

Clientelism translating into parliamentary seats

For clientelism to translate into parliamentary seats, it first needs to be filtered through political parties and their specific candidate selection procedures. The candidate selection of political parties is, in turn, partly shaped by the election system in place. Questions about representation and about the candidate selection of political parties cannot be separated, as both provide important information about the other and none gives full information by itself. The candidate selection of political parties is the main factor affecting parliamentary representation, but it is also the case that when it is difficult to get information about internal party procedures, statistics on formal representation are rather easy to come by. By combining the two, we thus get a better view of the power struggles taking place within the political parties.

All studies about representation of women have probably aimed at ultimately getting to the deeper questions of political gender inequality. This study is no exception. Looking at the percentage of men in parliament is certainly a crude and, some would argue, insufficient way of analyzing more intricate and important questions of gender and power in the state. It is true that the number of male and female representatives says little or nothing about whether parliament is actually effective, or whether representation is mere tokenism. The percentage of men in parliament will here be used as an indicator of the male dominance in internal procedures of important political institutions, notably political parties and clientelist networks. Because it is impossible to make a large-scale international comparison of the influence of different informal male networks, the proportion of men in parliament can serve as a useful proxy. By carrying out yet another study of gendered representation, but from the opposite angle – male overrepresentation instead of female underrepresentation – this dissertation will focus on political parties as male-dominated organizations. Thus, the interest in the proportion of men
and women in parliament here does not, first and foremost, signal a desire to
determine what roles men and women play in decision-making bodies and to
what extent substantive representation is achieved. Instead, looking at the
proportion of men is a way to study political parties and candidate selection
indirectly.

Moving on

The overarching question that this thesis aims at answering thus concerns *if
and how clientelism translates into male parliamentary dominance*. Answer-
ing this question implies establishing a covariance between clientelism and
male parliamentary dominance, in the first place, but also providing a rea-
sonable causal argument and empirical evidence of how and why the two are
related. The theoretical framework presented in this chapter can be seen as a
kind of roadmap that highlights the important contributions of earlier work
as well as the gaps that need to be filled in order to answer this question in a
satisfactory manner.

Clientelism can be seen as the main independent variable, whereas male
parliamentary dominance is the dependent variable, i.e. that which is to be
explained. As this chapter has made clear, however, there are a number of
other societal factors that affect this relationship in a number of ways and
that need to be taken into account in the analysis. First of all, we have the
issue of underlying variables, variables that are setting the stage but that do
not take center stage or play leading parts in this particular drama. The most
important of these underlying variables here is probably democracy and the
context of political uncertainty that different democracy levels are thought to
entail. Political uncertainty and instability per se are seen as the main moti-
vating factors underlying the establishment of clientelist networks. The new
hypothesis here is that democracy, from this perspective, should be seen as
having a curvilinear effect on clientelism and male parliamentary domi-
nance, rather than the linear effects that have previously been attributed to
democratic influence.

Second, there is a need to specify how clientelism might translate into
male parliamentary dominance by highlighting the mechanisms linking the
independent and the dependent variable. This theoretical overview suggests
that we need to understand both how clientelism affects representation levels
and why clientelism as a political practice is male dominated in the first
place.

The first mechanism concerns bringing into the light the institutional en-
ablers and constraints for clientelist influences on representation levels. In
particular, political party incentives for selecting candidates need to be scru-
tinized. These include larger issues, such as how the political parties per-
ceive that they gain support, as well as specific issues created by the candi-
date selection procedures employed by the parties and by the election system in place. I argue that these issues need to be linked to a political practice, in this case clientelism, in order for their relationship to political representation to be fully understood. The impacts of different characteristics of the election system and of the candidate selection procedure are contingent on specific political practices and are malleable in the hands of politicians, especially when formal institutions are weak. Specifying the type of candidate selection procedure that benefits clientelist concerns sometimes implies looking outside the political parties for important influences. Even election system rules can, arguably, be bent in favor of the informal influences political parties prefer to go by.

The second mechanism concerns why clientelism is male-dominated in the first place. Here, an entirely new hypothesis, concerning a need to accumulate a so-called homosocial capital in order to gain votes through a clientelist logic, is suggested. This homosocial capital is particularly needed in clientelist settings because of their strong emphasis on building and maintaining networks with a large level of trust. For incumbent male politicians, the accumulation of homosocial capital is usually not a problem – it implies forming alliances both with people who have the necessary resources as well as with people they perceive to be like themselves and whose behavior they can predict: usually other men. For prospective women politicians, however, the people with access to relevant resources are less likely to be women – thus, the accumulation of homosocial capital is something which only pertains to men, and which can explain why clientelist networks are male-dominated. The manner in which these ideas and hypotheses will be researched in this dissertation – in other words, methodological issues - will be elaborated on in the following chapter.
Chapter 3 – Methodological Considerations and Research Design

The theoretical framework elaborated on in the previous chapter carries with it certain methodological consequences that need to be elaborated on. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to elaborate on the type of research design and empirical material that are desirable in order to answer the posed research questions. There are advantages and disadvantages to all methodological approaches, yet certain methods are usually more appropriate for answering a particular question than others are. Pragmatic issues relating to data accessibility have been contemplated, as have more validity oriented considerations, relating to the required level of analysis. In this case, I argue that a combination of statistical analysis as an introduction followed by an in-depth case study is the most appropriate way forward. The issue here lies both in determining whether there is a discernable relationship between clientelism and male parliamentary dominance and in exploring why this is so and how it might come about. The manner in which these questions are posed as well as more pragmatic issues of data accessibility indicate that a mixed methodology study is the best way to proceed. What is more, to my knowledge, the particular issues addressed in this thesis have never been addressed using different methodological tools in one and the same study.

This chapter will start by discussing the advantages and some of the disadvantages of combining methodological approaches and the consequences it has for the research process. It will then briefly discuss the quantitative approach, followed by a more detailed discussion of the qualitative methodology. The quantitative approach is only discussed briefly in this chapter, because it will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, where the statistical analyses are presented. Not only is it established practice to discuss quantitative methodology in direct adjunction to the analyses, but the often technical and detailed nature of the discussions render it more appropriate for discussion in immediate proximity to the analyses it refers to. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, is represented in three different empirical chapters of this dissertation and the overall methodological questions are thus dealt with, more in detail, in this chapter.
Combining methods and research process

In order to get a full and holistic picture of a relatively new research area, different parts of the research task require different methods. George and Bennett argue that there is an increasing need for the complementarity of different research methods. The methodological dialogue, they argue, would be considerably revitalized with a clear understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of different research methods, and visible methodological measures taken as a consequence. In their view, case studies\(^8\) are particularly valuable for theory development but are also needed when testing hypotheses (George and Bennett 2005).

Case studies are apt at achieving conceptual validity, especially concerning variables that are notoriously difficult to measure and around whose definitions there is relatively little consensus (George and Bennett 2005: 19-20). The need for thickening thin concepts has also been highlighted elsewhere, and the solution is often said to be precisely to combine large-n studies with smaller-n studies. Quantitative analysis, Coppedge argues, is simply the best method available for testing generalizations or distinguishing broad trends. However, concepts and theories are, by necessity, “thinner” and more simplistic in a quantitative analysis than they are in a qualitative study. Combining the two can thus help achieve the desired generalization while adding more complexity and multidimensionality, which is particularly useful when attempting to measure “thick” concepts (Coppedge 1999). Examples of such variables in this research project are clientelism, corruption and democracy. Only contextual comparison and conceptual refinements can grant greater validity where these issues are treated. Thus, here these issues are not only treated in the statistical study, but great effort is also made to contextualize them to show what they might entail in a given context.

Case studies are also seen as being better apt at deriving new hypotheses (George and Bennett 2005: 20-21) by conducting fieldwork where it is necessary to be more open to new suggestions and ideas than it is when constructing a statistical model. At the beginning of this research project such a hypothesis-generating case study was conducted, from which both the subsequent statistical analyses and the continued fieldwork benefitted greatly. Although not always visible in the structure of the final research product (as in this case, no particular section or chapter is devoted to reporting the results from that initial study), time set aside for allowing new ideas to enter the research area is almost always time well spent.

In addition, in order to fulfill the criteria needed for a satisfactory causal explanation, extensive studies should be complemented with intensive studies, as they both have their advantages and disadvantages when it comes to

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\(^8\) Case studies are here seen to include both the analysis of a single case and comparisons of a small number of cases.
making a causal argument. Teorell and Svensson outline four causal criteria that need to be fulfilled before making causal inferences: counterfactual difference, time order, isolation, and mechanisms. Counterfactual difference implies that one should be able to make a strong argument that without the hypothesized cause, the outcome would have been different. Time order simply posits that one should be able to show that the hypothesized cause did, in fact, occur before the outcome. Isolating for other possible causes is important so that the effect of one independent variable is not really the effect of another variable. Causal mechanisms give us the answer to the questions of why and how the hypothesized variable causes the outcome (Teorell and Svensson 2007). Statistical methods can make better arguments about counterfactual differences by systematically studying many cases and producing a measure of covariance that is based also on the counterfactual situation in which independent variables are absent. Coefficients in regression equations are thus useful as estimates of effects that cannot be accomplished in the study of only a few cases. Likewise, with the inclusion of several control variables, statistical methods can systematically isolate the effect of one variable from the effect of others in a more efficient manner than case studies can. In particular, several control variables can be included in a regression equation, but in order to include a number of control variables in a case study design, the number of cases studied quickly needs to be increased. When it comes to time order, however, case studies are generally preferable. Although there are useful ways of conducting time series statistical analysis thus estimating time order, the time order established is highly sensitive to assumptions made by the researcher (Bäck 2003: 24-28). In case studies, however, the time order of events can be better established by carefully linking one event to another, thus establishing a time ordered causal chain of mechanisms. As we know, correlation does not imply causation, and a plausible causal chain needs to be presented in order to fruitfully make a causal argument. Once a covariation has been established in a statistical study, it is therefore also useful to turn to case study evidence to explore time order and causal mechanisms. The establishment of the causal chain is often described as the method of process tracing. This method links cause and outcome by closely following a series or chain of events, carefully linking each step along the way to the previous and next step (George and Bennett 2005: 21).

The combination of dataset observations and causal-process observations in one single project is thus often preferable and, increasingly, there is accessible advice on how to design such a study of “nested inference”. Some of this advice includes: letting statistical analyses guide case selection, provide the basis for more focused case studies, or be used to test hypotheses generated from case studies. Case studies, in turn, can be used to assess the plausibility of statistical relationships by demonstrating a reasonable causal chain of social mechanisms, to analyze statistically typical or outlier cases and thus develop theory, and to refine the definition and measurement of concepts.
All these combinations, Lieberman argues, allow each method to do exactly what it is best at doing, while compensating for the shortcomings of the other (Lieberman 2005).

It should be remembered, however, that although the use of just one method often does not fully satisfy the requirements for drawing well-based conclusions, combining methods implies considerably more time invested in methodological considerations on the part of the researcher. Each method must, of course, meet the standards set up for inference on its own, while relying on the other method for a full causal inference (Brady et al. 2006; King et al. 1994). While the combination of two methods provides, in a sense, the best of two worlds, it is also the most time-consuming choice, and it is up to the individual researcher to determine whether the investment in two methodological approaches is, indeed, time well spent. Or, would time be better spent by collecting more quantitative data or perhaps by conducting more thorough field studies? There are always trade-offs in each research enterprise, and combining methods is not an escape from these trade-offs, rather a way of forcing oneself to grapple with them (Brady and Collier 2004).

In this particular research enterprise, I have decided to use a combination of methods for several reasons. Some of the issues at the center of this analysis (democracy, quality of governance, corruption, representation of men in parliament) are more or less well suited to a statistical analysis, whereas others (clientelism, candidate selection methods, informal male networks) are both more difficult to get at with crude statistical indicators and suffer from a lack of comparative data. What is more, phenomena such as clientelism, democratization and corruption are both large societal systems, more or less affecting all countries of the world, and highly complex processes that take place at the individual and psychological level. Their impact should thus be estimated at both these levels, if possible. When questions are asked in a new way, a certain amount of exploration is often called for. Thus, when I combine a large-n analysis of general trends with a case study, I am convinced that I gain in scope what I lose in depth. You can only go so far in depth, when investigating a new question – but broadening the scope of the investigation will provide a broader understanding and more possible starting-points for future research. In my case, the two parts are clearly theoretically linked and have been integrated into the research project from the start. They are thus closely related and interactive, but yet by necessity kept separate since the questions they aim to answer are at different levels of abstraction and their study objects are at different societal levels. It has been a strong concern that they fit within the same framework, and I have reasoned in terms of macro and micro relationships and how they relate to each other (Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 21-22). The qualitative and quantitative work have been conducted in parallel, thus mixing fieldwork with statistical analyses throughout the course of the research project. I believe that both
parts have benefitted and developed from that exercise. Apart from gaining insights from reading, initial exploratory fieldwork generated hypotheses that could later be tested statistically. The causal mechanisms underlying the statistical findings were investigated in more thorough fieldwork and later statistical analyses were refined based on the fieldwork findings. Finally, a short period of fieldwork was undertaken to clarify issues and fill empirical gaps. One clear example, which is presently at the center of this analysis, is the role that electoral fraud and corruption plays in maintaining male dominance. Although I had earlier seen this as a part of a larger political problem in many hybrid regimes, I did not realize the central role of such political practices until I had conducted my first short field trip. I thus decided to specifically measure clientelism and corruption statistically, and found quantitative support for the hypotheses generated by my initial field studies. Another example is a theoretically unexpected result relating to the impact of different election systems in the descriptive election study. This result could not be explained by the analysis itself, nor could existing theory contribute to my understanding of the result. After having discussed it with several politicians, however, it was not only rendered understandable in terms of the Thai context, but also in terms of a larger, politico-institutional context – that which relates to the interplay between formal and informal institutions.

The extensive, macro level, part of the analysis studies worldwide time series data and the statistical associations between clientelism and its impact on male parliamentary dominance. In the intensive, micro level, part I have worked with two main objectives – the first, crucial for the integration of the two parts, has been to qualify the statistical findings by empirically investigating whether they are underpinned by reasonable causal chains. The second uses these causal chains and elaborates on them in a rather exploratory manner in order to develop theory and come up with new explanations for an old phenomenon: the overrepresentation of men in parliament.

Using both qualitative and quantitative methods to measure the same phenomenon is sometimes referred to as methodological triangulation (Jick 1979). In methodological triangulation the contributions from the two different methodological approaches can be either sequential and separate or carried out in a parallel fashion. The two contributions can either be given equal status or one of them can be the dominant contribution (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). In my case, they have been carried out in a circular fashion, going back and forth between quantitative data analysis and qualitative case studies. They are, however, presented in a sequential manner, with the quantitative study coming first and the qualitative contributions second. Likewise, in time spent, this research project can be divided into fairly equal parts spent doing statistical work and time spent doing and analyzing fieldwork. In pages written, however, the analysis of the case study demands more space, in terms of text, and is thus represented in three chapters, whereas the quanti-
Quantitative analysis is given a great deal of room in one chapter and only some space in another.

The quantitative approach

There is a large on-going discussion on the use of quantitative methods in feminist research. Sometimes, the two have been seen as being essentially non-compatible due to different underlying epistemologies and understandings of science (see e.g. Gorelick 1991; Cancian 1992, 1993; Wolf 1996; Tickner 1997, 2005), whereas others have claimed that the method chosen is nothing more (or less) than a tool needed to answer the research questions posed (see e.g. Keohane 1998; Ackerley 2009; Caprioli 2009; Apodaca 2009). I see feminist research as being more about the questions posed, and how they are posed, than about the methods used to answer them. This is certainly not to say, however, that feminist research has not contributed a number of useful methodological approaches that should and will be acknowledged. This includes striving to reveal that which has been ignored, suppressed or made invisible, and reflecting on and trying to minimize hierarchies of power in research relations by, for instance, dealing with questions of reflexivity (DeVault 1996). The questions posed in this thesis concern broad, political trends that affect women and men differently. These broad, political trends can be made visible, at least partly, through the compilation and analysis of quantitative data.

The quantitative methods in this study are mainly concentrated to Chapter 4, consisting of the first empirical analyses of the argument and the underlying theories. Some quantitative evidence in the form of election data is also used in Chapter 6. Because of the relative concentration of the quantitative material in this thesis and due to the technical nature of the issues that need to be dealt with in relation to the statistical analyses, most of the methodological discussions will take place in the next chapter. Some general remarks will be made here, however.

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9 This is in accordance with, for instance, Apodaca who recently elaborated on this theme (page 419): “[f]eminist research is motivated by and concerned with social justice, equality, and the empowerment of women and other marginalized groups. The method I have chosen to further my feminist-inspired research is merely an analytical tool. Feminist principles apply to the act of research, the questions asked, and the data to be collected. Thus, the intersection of feminism and quantitative analysis offers a new method of knowledge production for the study of international relations. Yet my research design is traditional: Based on theory, testable hypotheses are formulated, data gathered, and findings reported. The purpose of this feminist-oriented quantitative research is to produce a body of knowledge that can explain, predict, or help elucidate empirical phenomena relevant to women’s lives and issues” (Apodaca 2009).

10 These will be discussed in the section below, in relation to the qualitative contributions of this thesis.
In Chapter 4, the aim is to investigate and statistically test the relationship between clientelism and male parliamentary dominance while controlling for other possibly underlying or intervening variables, such as democratic level, political stability and election system. In terms of the structure of the book, the qualitative material provides a holistic view of large trends and the results emanating from this exercise can be seen as an introduction, a springboard, to the more in-depth qualitative analyses that will follow. Thus, only contextual variables at a certain level of abstraction are included in this quantitative analysis. Variables concerning political parties, campaigns, network building and candidate selection more directly will be dealt with qualitatively later on, and when they are, it is important to know a bit more about the relationships guiding the context in which they are at play. These macro variables set the stage for the workings of political parties and their selection procedures. The statistical analysis also enables us to generalize the main findings of the thesis.

It is important to remember that my aim in the quantitative analysis is not to explain all male dominance in parliament, merely to test the explanatory power of variables such as clientelism and democratic level. Many studies have already studied the impact of a variety of variables on the gendered composition of parliaments, and this is not yet another study striving for the highest explained variance possible. Thus, some variables commonly included when attempting to explain female parliamentary representation will be left out of this analysis, if they are not seen as affecting the relationship that is in focus: that between clientelism, on the one hand, and male parliamentary dominance, on the other.

The method used is OLS regression techniques and the main model uses data covering 459 elections in 123 different countries during a period of twenty years between 1985 and 2005. The data employed will be presented in more depth in the following chapter, in direct adjunction to the quantitative study itself, but they have been collected from reliable and well-used sources such as the Interparliamentary Union (male dominance in parliament), Polity IV (democracy) and International Country Risk Guide (quality of governance and corruption). I have also taken care to use data sources that provide comprehensive data from a large number of countries and for a relatively long period of time in order to maximize generalizability in the quantitative study. Results from robustness tests in which other measures have been included will also be presented in the chapter in question, or in the appendix. Because data are accessible over time, it is preferable to do a time series analysis in order to estimate dynamic changes. Such an estimation is relatively demanding, but the statistical tests conducted have been rather hard, for instance including the lagged dependent variable in the models. Results that survive such hard tests are thus rather reliable. However, I have also started the quantitative analysis with descriptive cross-sectional data, showing the differences between countries at a snapshot moment in time.
With such data, I cannot control for as many other variables, but they pro-
vide a good overview of the situation in today’s world, and they constitute a
good basis on which to build when moving on to more complicated statisti-
cal analyses. I have tried, above all, to strike a balance between statistical
rigor and comprehensibility by always providing substantial interpretation of
the results.

Descriptive statistics are also employed in Chapter 6, where they are inte-
grated with interview material. Here, it concerns election data from the Thai
parliamentary election of 2005, collected from the Election Commission of
Thailand (ECT), and these data are used to illustrate some of the strategies
employed by Thai political parties in relation to candidate selection, election
systems and different voter demands in different geographical settings.

The qualitative approach

A large part of the empirical contributions of this thesis builds on fieldwork
conducted in Thailand between January and March 2005, January and
July 2006, and November 2008. Large parts of Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and
Chapter 7 are devoted to the analysis and interpretation of qualitative mate-
rial. Methodological issues of a more fieldwork-oriented character thus per-
tain to all these qualitative empirical contributions and will be dealt with
collectively and more at length here.

Case selection and fieldwork

Thailand is a highly appropriate case in which to study how clientelism af-
facts male parliamentary dominance, considering the consistently low repre-
sentation of women in parliament. In addition, as will be argued in Chap-
ter 5, this male dominance is persistent regardless of the type of political
regime in place and despite the fact that women’s status has been signifi-
cantly improved in other societal sectors. Clientelism is also a persistent
feature of Thai politics. In quantitative research, strong warnings are issued
against selection bias, arguing that cases should not be selected based on
their value on the dependent variable. In qualitative research, however, this
warning does not hold true (Collier et al. 2004). Instead, Thailand selected as
a case here precisely because it is appropriately situated on the main vari-
ables analyzed in the quantitative statistical analysis. The purpose of the
qualitative study of Thailand is thus not to test whether there is a relationship
between clientelism and male parliamentary dominance, but to see whether
the relationship found in the quantitative study is underpinned and supported
by a plausible causal chain of social mechanisms and to describe this causal
chain and use it to develop theory. The choice of Thailand does not, in itself,
validate the theory, as it is, in fact, chosen in relation to the theory (cf.
Skocpol and Somers 1980). In order to develop theory, or to generate new theory, it is useful to select a case in which one has reason to believe the manifestations of the theory will be highly visible and researchable. Once theory has been developed based on such “typical” or “evident” cases, it is possible to move on to distinguishing more subtle manifestations of said theory. As a large part of this research endeavor is highly explorative, however, the former path was chosen and Thailand thus picked as a relevant case.

All in all, about ten months were spent in the field. Conducting field research is often a time-consuming task, and not all ten months were spent directly collecting empirical material or doing interviews. Instead, I estimated that the planning of the field studies as well as general understanding of the Thai political context would be considerably facilitated and enhanced by me spending longer periods of time in Thailand. During the first field trip in 2005, which I call the pilot study, I thus first worked as an international election observer with ANFREL (Asian Network for Free Elections) before, during and after the parliamentary election. This gave me valuable insights into the workings of Thai elections and politics more generally. I established many useful contacts, received some elementary election education through arranged lectures and was given access to election data they were published. Following my duties as an election observer, I conducted several interviews with informants, i.e. centrally placed people who could teach me more about the general situation. These people were generally academics, journalists, NGO-representatives or bureaucrats. I also conducted a pilot study of an area where I had established some contacts. I worked together with an interpreter whom I got in touch with through ANFREL, and I had the chance to try out my questions, to investigate different ways of reaching respondents and mapping networks, and also to test some of my initial hypotheses and ideas on people on the ground. This pilot study was crucial for the project, partly because of the material I came back home with, but also because of the very fact that it was relatively short and that I had one year before the next field trip, during which I could seriously reflect on important issues of theories and hypotheses generated during the initial field trip, as well as on practical issues of research design that had arisen. My statistical studies also benefited from this field trip, as I could try out some new ideas and refine some of my earlier ideas about relationships that should be tested.

I came back to Thailand about a year later and started my longest visit, the main study, of about six months. The first month was spent in Bangkok, where I was affiliated with Chulalongkorn University and was given access to an office at the Faculty of Political Science. My affiliation also included some teaching and presentation of my own work. I also took Thai language classes throughout my stay, but particularly intensively during the first month. Although my Thai language skills are still very limited, at least I can carry on a very basic conversation and introduce myself to respondents. I
also understand quite a lot of what is said, something that was helpful during interviews with an interpreter. I also spent the first month renewing and improving my contacts with the ECT as well as with the two main parties I had decided to study, the Democrat party and the Thai Rak Thai party (in the pilot study, several political parties were included).

The Thai Rak Thai party had been able to form a single party government and the Democrat party was, at the time, the main opposition party. Not only were these two parties the main parties with regards to the number of parliamentary seats, but they are also interesting to compare for a number of other reasons. Whereas the Democrat party is one of the oldest parties in Asia, Thai Rak Thai was only a few years old and a new party. Most observers agree that the Democrat party is relatively institutionalized when it comes to having an organization of active party branches and established internal procedures, for instance. It has been claimed that the Thai Rak Thai was the first party that made policies a campaign issue in Thailand, but critics claim that the policies were populist, short-sighted and nothing but large-scale vote buying. As far as the internal organization goes, my informants gave me the initial impression (an impression that I would later come to nuance and partially modify, as my analyses will make clear) that the Thai Rak Thai was considerably more centered around the party leader Thaksin Shinawatra, who ran the party like one of his large companies. Including these two parties in the analysis would thus mean that I had a good range of the different types of parties prevalent in the Thai political context. In general, observers claim that Thai parties are rather far from being mass membership based, nor can they boast active and participating party branches. Parties, like other political institutions, are for the most part not permanent actors on the political arena, although individual politicians might be. The Democrat party, from this perspective, would thus be considered something of an exception, yet one of the few continuously influential actors on the Thai stage (McCargo 1997; Ockey 2003, 2004). I had a contact person in each of the parties, helping me with initial contacts for the constituency case studies. Although there is a plethora of registered political parties in Thailand, at the time, there were really no other parties that came into question for study. Two other parties held a few parliamentary seats – one of them (Chart Thai) is fairly regionally based and is thus difficult to cover in a country-wide study. The other party (Mahachon) was new but had experienced an electoral disappointment, was very small and its political influence declining. Most other former major political parties had merged with the Thai Rak Thai and now represented factions of this party. The choice of the Thai Rak Thai party and the Democrat party was thus not a very difficult one and I do not believe another choice would have made my study of Thai political parties any more representative of the Thai partisan world – rather the opposite.

I selected five constituencies for closer study, based on some descriptive information given to me by my contact person at the ECT. I wanted to en-
sure variation on some central parameters. The constituencies chosen are from different parts of the country\(^{11}\), both rural and urban. They are also different in terms of which political party is in power, how many election fraud allegations were filed during the parliamentary election, how close the race was between the two top candidates, etc. However, instead of primarily studying the variation between the sites, all the studied constituencies are regarded as one case illustrating one phenomenon. The advantages of moving horizontally between field sites is that dependence on specific persons is reduced, it is possible to cross-check information and to use what you have learnt in one place in another, and that a deeper understanding of a phenomenon can be achieved because different aspects can be studied within the same case study (Heimer 2005). Thus, the five constituencies will be analyzed together, as one case, to try to determine how clientelist networks are gendered. Such a comparison of somewhat different social systems, or comparison groups, in qualitative research is often referred to as triangulation. The purpose, more broadly, is to be able to verify hypotheses in diverse contexts where different combinations of factors are present (Glaser and Strauss 1965; Jick 1979). In my case, it implies being able to see whether clientelist networks are functioning in the same manner and are equally important in different Thai contexts. The five constituencies were thus chosen, not with the intention to establish causality, but rather with the aim to find a range of different political settings in which the mechanisms underlying the proposed relationship could be investigated. I do not have reason to believe that my findings would have been very different had I selected other constituencies than the five ones I presently study. They were selected to be, in somewhat different ways, representative of Thai politics.

This line of reasoning regarding the general logic of selection does not preclude me from sometimes using the variation that I do find to illustrate interesting issues and striking differences. For example, I do dwell on and discuss the differences found between urban and rural constituencies as well as make illustrative comparisons between the constituency with the highest number of women politicians and the other, more male-dominated, constituencies.

Broadly, each of the five remaining months was dedicated to one constituency each. The interviewing of people at the central level in Bangkok was also continuous and was done whenever it was possible to get an interview. There was severe political unrest in Thailand at the time and the parliament was dissolved and new elections were held. This slowed my work

\(^{11}\) It should be noted, however, that none of the five constituencies are from the southernmost provinces of Thailand. The political culture in this area is of a very different nature compared to the rest of the country and the political violence erupting in these areas has different causes than do many of the political conflicts in the rest of the country. I thus decided to exclude this particular political conflict from my case selection, so that I could concentrate on that which I perceive to be of more general relevance to all areas of Thailand.
considerably and sometimes made it difficult to conduct the field trips as planned. I rarely or never spent a full month in the constituency in question. I generally started out by contacting the two candidates representing the two political parties studied. Because the constituencies were, at the time, single-member districts, there was only one possible candidate per party once the constituency was selected. While parliament was in session, it was sometimes easier to schedule an appointment in Bangkok, but sometimes they preferred to meet me in their constituency. One of the first days in the constituency, I also visited the local Election Commission to establish contacts with them, to get contact information on the party offices and the main candidates, and to listen to their general assessment of the election climate in the area. The interviews with the candidates were the start of the “snowballing method”. Snowballing is commonly used as a network sampling method, particularly when networks are hard to reach or to identify. It implies actors in a set of sampled respondents reporting on other actors to whom they have ties of a specific kind (Goodman 1961; Wasserman and Faust 1994: 33 ff; Esaiasson et al. 2004: 212, 286). My first-order sample thus consisted of the Democrat and TRT candidates in each constituency, and I simply asked them to name a couple of people they worked closely with politically – both higher up in the hierarchy as well as lower down – and to give me contact information to these people. I then traced my way upward and downward in the political networks, focusing on vertical mapping rather than horizontal. The mapping of the networks downward in the hierarchy had to be done while in the constituencies, as they involved speaking to network members at the sub-district, district and village levels, while the mapping of the networks upward could sometimes be done later – depending on where the people mentioned worked and lived. If they lived in the province in question, we tried to travel to meet with them, but if they were active in Bangkok, we instead scheduled an appointment when next in the capital. Needless to say, considerable time was invested in travelling around the constituencies, locating respondents, conducting and typing out interviews and preparing for upcoming interviews. Whenever possible, I also participated in conferences and seminars and I continuously discussed my findings and new ideas with researchers.

The follow-up study was the shortest one, of only about a month. I always suspected there would be a need for such a study, as it is almost inevitable that the analysis of a large interview material will bring about new questions and make information gaps and issues that need to be clarified visible. In addition, however, Thai politics underwent far-reaching changes including a military coup and tense demonstrations and clashes between different political groups. I thus felt an additional need to increase my understanding of what was going on somewhat and to situate my findings relating to the election of 2005 to the present turbulence in Thai politics. Believing I had a clearer picture of my general findings, I also wanted to present and discuss
them with my informants and contact persons in Thailand. I thus met with my informants as well as with (formerly) centrally placed politicians and discussed my own findings as well as the recent political development in Thailand. Because there had been a change of governments since I was last there, I was able to meet with several previously central figures with whom I had not been able to schedule interviews while they were ministers in the government. I also conducted a couple follow-up interviews with constituency-based people I had not previously been able to reach.

All in all, the number of interviews amounted to just under 150. Although some of them are difficult to divide into a category, roughly two-thirds were with constituency respondents. Out of the remaining 50 interviews, about half are interviews with centrally placed politicians, whereas the remaining interviews are informant interviews and discussions. Out of the ten candidates of the five constituencies investigated, eight were interviewed.

Interview methods, ethical questions and reflexivity

Very broadly, three different interview groups can be identified in my material. There are no sharp dividing lines between the information I received from the different groups, but there are three discernibly different purposes with my interviews that partly required targeting different people. The most general and varied group consists of my informants, giving me general information and contributing to an overall understanding of the political sphere in Thailand. The people who were most likely to give me this kind of information were usually academics, journalists, NGO-workers and sometimes politicians and bureaucrats. From the second and, in contrast, the most homogeneous group, my aim was to obtain information about candidate selection and campaign strategies inside the political parties. The members of this group were thus almost without exception party politicians at different levels, ranging from party leaders and members of cabinet to constituency candidates and close aides to the candidates. The third and largest group consisted of members of the political networks. The main aim of the interviews conducted was to understand the personal strategies politicians use when building their political networks, and the motivation for networks members to be in the networks. The members of these groups could thus be whomever

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12 For more information about the interviews, see the list of interviews.
13 A couple of times I also got information by attending political meetings or from interviews with more than one person at a time – but this was an exception, and used only when it was impossible to schedule individual interviews.
14 In the case of the two remaining candidates, I interviewed several of their closest aides and managed to map their networks fairly well anyway. In one case, the father of the candidate was the previous candidate who had now moved up to the party list, and their local networks were considered identical.
the constituency candidates mentioned, and most of them ended up being politicians at some level of Thai politics (from party list representatives or senators to village heads), although some were without any formal affiliations (e.g. farmers agreeing to do services for a candidate, but not being a member of any political party or villagers witnessing a political campaign). I was interested in understanding the thoughts and the ideas the politicians themselves had on why their networks consisted of the particular set of people in them, as well as why people themselves decided to be in the networks, i.e. in specifying the preferences of network members at different levels. In other words, I was striving to understand the world through the eyes of the people I interviewed (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). I used semi-structured interviews to make sure that important questions were touched upon, but at the same time, I wanted to open the discussion to the ideas highlighted by the respondents. I did construct questionnaires with thematically organized questions, but very often did not have to make much use of the questionnaires. Initial questions were very open-ended and never abstract. I found it much easier to ask tangible questions about the respondent’s campaign and network and about the choices he or she had made, rather than asking hypothetical questions about more abstract principles and ideas. The greatest challenge, and the most rewarding strategy, turned out to be asking relevant follow-up questions during the interviews, as these follow-up questions were, inevitably, based on the respondents’ own reflections and experiences. My questions did not generally focus specifically on gender, instead interviews focused on issues such as why the respondent decided to become politically active, what a good politician is like, what campaign strategies are needed, who has been an asset in their political career and how, etc. If we had not already touched upon issues of clientelism and gender by discussing such matters, I made sure we did so towards the end of the interview.

When dealing with internal party politics in general, and perhaps with Thai party politics in particular, one deals with events that are normally not of a public character (Nelson 2005: 2). As a researcher one needs to be aware of asking people to openly discuss “political practices that some people would prefer remain undocumented” (Arghiros 2001: viii). Because the questions asked were, in many ways, sensitive and often concerned illegal practices such as vote buying and election fraud, the respondents’ anonymity has been ensured in most cases. High-level officials and public figures usually did not mind if they could be identified. When there is a need to name people for issues of clarity in the narrative of a constituency campaign, for instance, I have simply given the respondents false Thai names. Thus, all constituency respondents are anonymous, whereas informers and centrally placed politicians are represented with their names. Constituencies and their

15 See appendix for these questionnaires.
locality are also not revealed. When constituencies need to be named, they are referred to as Constituency Nung, Song, Saem, Sii, and Haa.16

Although the focus of the study is not on finding out and verifying all the details about vote buying, the electoral infrastructure as well as the practical issues that need to be dealt with in clientelist vote buying were certainly at the center of many interviews, as they were such a central part of local campaigning. In many instances, discussing vote buying was not as sensitive an issue as I would have thought. The higher position a politician had, the more politically correct would s/he generally be, and the less likely to openly admit to buying votes. All politicians, however, readily agreed that vote buying was an important feature of political campaigns in general, although perhaps not in their particular party or network. There were certain strategies, however, that worked particularly well for accessing information on clientelist election campaigns. To start with, clientelism is generally the preferred mode of politics for politicians as well as for members of their networks. Discussing clientelist services, protection of constituents, the importance of the personality of the candidate, etc., is thus far from a sensitive issue. Rather the opposite, highlighting these types of features and activities was equal to highlighting the strengths of a political campaign. Because networks are central also to these types of clientelist activities, it was usually not problematic to discuss the structure and nature of a politician’s personal, political networks. Unveiling more outright illegal activities, such as the cost of a vote in a particular area, or the distribution of vote-buying money etc., was more problematic.

Although this was not the absolute focus of the study, I wanted to gain at least some understanding of how the networks functioned when it came to the most secretive activities. It was often, although not always, very difficult to obtain any such information directly from national level politicians. I also found it more difficult in the first constituencies in which I did fieldwork. The more I learned, however, the more detailed, knowledgeable and tangible questions could I ask. Also, as I was often referred downward in the network, people further down in the hierarchies of the network knew their superiors had sent me to them. Often, I had been introduced to them with a phone call from the political candidate, or at least from someone in a clearly superior position, and they had been asked to provide me with the information I wanted. Thus, even if the candidate did not openly admit to buying votes, people lower down in the network probably did not perceive of it as being anything extraordinary and, in addition, saw their information-giving to me as sanctioned from above. Information given in such interviews could then be used in other interviews. Knowing, for instance, of unusually intense competition in one particular area of a constituency where the cost of the vote might have risen from the usual 100–200 bahts to 500 bahts and being able to ask directly how the network had coped

16 One, Two, Three, Four, and Five in Thai.
with this, was a strategy that almost inevitably provided me with a reflection on how to economize with vote-buying money and how to organize its distribution.

It is important to keep in mind that all interviews cannot be assessed in the same manner and that the quality of the interviews improved significantly as my understanding of the situation the respondents were in increased and as I became more skilled in posing questions in an appropriate manner. When conducting the fourth and the fifth constituency case studies, for instance, my level of information was already quite high. I could ask more relevant questions from the start, and I could be much more specific, thus getting much more specific answers. The first rounds of interviews are more general, but they were invaluable steps in getting to the higher level of information. However, there is a conscious and explicable bias towards the latter interviews in my analyses of the interview material. The awareness of this also made me save some of my most important interviews for later, when I was more informed and knew more exactly what I wanted information about. Scheduling your most important interviews is a balancing act, however, and sometimes waiting meant that I had to leave without the interview, as people were too busy or cancelled the meeting at the last minute (cf. Hertel et al. 2009). It is my interview material as a whole that has created the general picture of Thai politics conveyed in this thesis. Thus, it is sometimes difficult to cite the exact interviews contributing to a statement made in the text. The overall picture has slowly taken shape as one piece after another has fallen into place. The interviews cited should thus rather be seen as those interviews that best illustrate the present line of reasoning. In those cases where the views on a matter differ among the respondents or if the sentiment expressed was rare and only found among one or a few respondents, I will make this clear to the reader.

Most of the constituency-based interviews were conducted with the help of an interpreter. The interpreter was a young Thai woman with a good command of English, but was not a professional interpreter. Her interpretations are thus not word-by-word, but more focused on conveying the content and the central message of the answers. This, then, is also true of the quotes presented as part of the empirical material. In order to make the presentation more alive, they are written as if they were direct quotes, but they should be seen as illustrations of the argument of the individual rather than as direct quotes. There are of course important disadvantages to not being able to interview respondents directly, but these disadvantages were largely compensated for by the possibilities of developing long-term strategies when working closely together with the same person for such a long time. My interpreter became very familiar with my research project, and we could openly discuss the answers given as well as the problems of interview questions or social situations. She was an invaluable asset when it came to giving culturally specific advice, enhancing my understanding of social situations,
finding people in rural localities, driving me to the homes of networks members, asking for directions, identifying influential people during a social gathering, etc. I have recorded most interviews (whenever people agreed) and have thus been able to crosscheck the recordings with her whenever I was unsure of the message conveyed. Interestingly, I also found that the translation made note taking and posing relevant follow-up questions easier, as I had more time to reflect on what was said and what to ask next. I had a huge interview material to deal with analytically, and part of this was facilitated by the use of the computer program Atlas.ti, which helped me sort out the important parts of the interviews. I have, however, also read through the entire written interview material several times in order to maintain an overall picture.

There are a number of other ethical issues that are bound to come up when conducting field studies. Needless to say, as a fairly young, Western female scholar, I stand out in the Thai context and these different intersecting identities of mine are bound to affect the research process as well as the results emanating from it. As I see it, my identities have brought about both important advantages and disadvantages. Above all, the issue of reflexivity, and the insight that fieldwork abroad is often an intensely personal process where you constantly have to grapple with your own position in the world in relation to that of your respondents, should not be ignored (Ortbals and Rincker 2009b). Postcolonial feminist scholars have sometimes argued that Western women cannot accurately represent women in developing contexts, because they are bound to view them from a postcolonial perspective, and to interpret them as “the other” (see e.g. Mohanty 1988). This is an important perspective to bring along to the field and to constantly reflect on during the process. What is more, doing research in a country other than your own always implies a shortage of information and possible cultural misinterpretations, in particular when you do not fully master the language. There are, however, also important gains associated with having research done by “outsiders”. Questions that might not have been asked by insiders are asked, issues are analyzed in a comparative perspective, concepts that are often taken for granted need to be clarified and issues that usually do not need explaining are explained. Part of the problem is, of course, that such research is still usually conducted by Western scholars in the developing world, thus spurring a discussion about postcolonial scholarship, but there are, at least, an increasing number of good examples of scholars attempting to “reverse the gaze” in new and exciting directions or to compare previously seemingly incomparable contexts (notably Kabeer et al. 2008; but see also Arora-Jonsson 2005). In my case, the reversal of the gaze largely concerned being a woman interviewing men. Interestingly, most research on men and masculinities is still done by men, while other directions of feminist research are dominated by women scholars. Although I, for the most part, did not openly discuss the gender issues inherent in the project with my respondents, they
certainly did react to the fact that I was a woman in a male-dominated world. It might have prevented them from making more outright sexist comments about who they do and do not include in their networks, but I think it also made them seriously consider the fact that there were so few women and think about the reasons why, rather than joking about it. When the issue was raised, male respondents often tried to defend their choices, and sometimes these justifications are filled with strategic considerations taken. In a hierarchical society such as the Thai society, I also often felt that I could use the fact that I am a young woman to ask respondents to explain things to me in detail. These characteristics, in addition to the fact that I am non-Thai, often made people think that I needed a very clear explanation of how things work. I sometimes got the feeling that people thought I was a bit naïve, thinking that politics work the same way everywhere, and they thus had to explain the dirty ways of Thai politics and the strategies of vote buying to me extra carefully – possibly hoping to startle me a bit. It was easy for me to assert that I was a young eager learner, knowing little or nothing about Thai politics in comparison to the respondents, thus enticing people to act as my knowledgeable and experienced mentors (cf. Wax 1979; Ortbals and Rincker 2009b). Hearing that my husband travelled with me to Thailand because of my work, not his, also brought along countless chuckles and ensuing and enlightening explanations of gender relations in Thailand. Nor was I, for the most part, seen as a threat. I could rather easily make it clear that I have no self-interest in unveiling specific issues of electoral fraud or reporting back to the ECT. I think this impression was also enhanced by my combined identities as a non-Thai citizen and as a young woman – thus being clearly perceived as apolitical. During a majority of the interviews, we also travelled with my interpreter’s baby, bringing her along to all the interviews. Bringing a baby along was certainly more of a necessity than a methodological tactic, but it nevertheless had a strong impact on the interview situation. I perceive Thai society as being extremely child-friendly, and men and women alike, in all positions, wanted to hold and cuddle the baby and the atmosphere immediately became relaxed and unthreatening17(cf. the experiences of Ortbals and Rincker 2009a). It was, however, advantageous that during the interviews with more centrally placed politicians, I usually did not need an interpreter as they generally had a very good command of English. In such contexts, when meeting high-status personae in the parliament building, in an office or in a luxury hotel lobby instead of being seated with farmers or shopkeepers on the floor in a rural house, it might have been seen as unprofessional to bring along a baby to an interview. In these instances, I was actually more concerned with gaining credibility despite my gender and age.

17 In most cases, someone in the vicinity volunteered to take care of the baby during the actual interview, thus allowing us to concentrate on the discussion after the initial ice-breaking introduction.
thus presenting myself as a professional (cf. Ortblals and Rincker 2009a). Once aware of the position I have in other people’s eyes, I could thus tackle it more easily and sometimes even use it to my advantage. There were, of course, also extremely tangible advantages of being a western scholar in Thailand (cf. the similar experiences of e.g. Aldrich 2009). I sometimes got interviews with people that my Thai graduate student colleagues said they could only dream of meeting. This might have been partly due to my own insensitivity of hierarchical relationships and the inappropriateness of approaching people far above me in the social hierarchy, but also because I was perceived as being, if not highly ranked in the Thai hierarchy, at least outside of it. Many politicians expressed that they were flattered I wanted to talk to them and happy that I took an interest in Thai politics. They also often asked for my advice in political issues and hoped that my research would help move Thai politics forward. Many of the centrally placed politicians had studied abroad and wanted to compare their own views of international politics with mine. Meetings in Bangkok were often held in hotel lobbies rather than in offices. Part of this might have been for reasons of propriety, but most people I asked instead interpreted it as a sign that politicians wanted to be seen with a foreign researcher.

The methodological challenges and considerations outlined in this chapter should be kept in mind when we now move to the chapters in which they can really be assessed: the empirical contributions of this thesis that Chapter 4-7 constitute.
The consequences of problematizing men’s political practices and networks instead of analyzing women’s activity as a deviation from the male norm are manifold, yet often relatively simple. This chapter, as a first step in this direction, will deal with some of these consequences. It will analyze the persistent parliamentary dominance of men, rather than the variation of representation of women in parliaments around the world. It will also test the relationship between male dominance and the political practice seen as enabling it, while constraining the representation of women: clientelism. By doing this, previously asked research questions are turned around and the question of whether the opposite causal direction is not really theoretically and logically more appealing is posed and investigated. This new context also causes us to revisit the impact of democracy from a slightly new perspective. All these consequences emanate from the initial problematization of men’s political practices and will be clearly visible as this statistical test of the relationship between clientelism and male parliamentary dominance is carried out.

Previously asked research questions in political science have often had as their point of departure the difference of women. The political sphere as it stands at present, influenced by centuries of male dominance, has been seen as a given that women, as new actors, may or may not be able to change. But male dominance is nothing constant in that it never changes – rather it persistently finds ways to reproduce itself. The research question asked in this chapter thus concerns the political practices that men use in order to preserve or even strengthen their parliamentary power. Before considering whether women as political actors are different enough from men to be expected to permanently change the quality of government, the quality of government as it stands today will be in focus. Political practices around the world include not only formal arrangements, but also an array of informal agreements and networks. It is more difficult to scrutinize the ways in which informal political practices are gendered, simply because they are more difficult to get at. Research from a variety of areas, however, contends that informality is central to the preservation of arbitrarily accessed power (see e.g. Norris 1997; Collinson et al. 1990; Kanter 1977).

When research on governance claims that women parliamentarians are more apt than their male counterparts to promote good governance, the turn-
The immediate follow-up question is also what the gendered consequences of such a political system are. Can research be right in contending that women in general really are less prone to engage in corrupt behavior than men are? Or should we instead consider the possibilities that clientelist political systems both present strong incentives to engage in electoral fraud in order to gain a seat in parliament and that they also present different opportunities for male and female political candidates? Certainly, by considering the second proposition first, we do not completely exclude the first one. Rather, the two are likely to be connected to one another. A political system that has systematically excluded one category of people based on sex, ethnicity or religion is likely to experience change if and when these people are allowed to enter the political sphere in any substantial number. The main point here is that if this happens, it is more likely that some of these changes will come about simply because these people are newcomers to the political arena, not because they have a different sex, ethnicity or religion than the political in-group. As newcomers, they will not be accustomed to the established political practices, they will not be included in important networks or presented with the same opportunities as the in-group. In other words, it is almost impossible for a newcomer to act according to established principles in the beginning. This reversed perspective, unlike the first proposition, opens up for the possibility that political behavior is, in part, shaped by opportunities and thus subject to change. Taking change and long-term political development into account is thus crucial if we are to analyze this question correctly.

The two main studies of these issues, by Dollar et al. (2001) and by Swamy et al. (2001), focus instead on snapshot pictures of gender and corruption and are thus not fully able to assess the impact of political practices such as clientelism on gendered representation. They are right in that they capture a covariation between corrupt behavior, on the one hand, and the representation of women, on the other, but my hypothesis is that the studies by Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. actually tap into something larger than corruption, namely clientelism and change over time, and that they cannot adequately measure this with the tools they use. My suggestion is that when research compares the level of corruption of different countries and then links these levels to the composition of parliament, it is really tapping into issues of clientelism. As has been discussed in previous chapters, all aspects of clientelism are not corrupt, nor is all corruption part and parcel of a clientelist framework. However, clientelist practices do tend to foster corrupt behavior in the form of vote buying, favors-for-favors, patronage and nepotism. When studying corruption in isolation, this research may in fact be
tapping into one small part of a larger clientelist political system. The cor-
rupt practices they study are, indeed, more prevalent in clientelist societies,
but the fact that they are also working with certain institutional enablers to
create the most commonly tread road to parliament necessitates a turning of
the causal direction and an emphasis on dynamic changes, taking place over
time.

Capturing clientelism – measuring the immeasurable?

Clientelism is, as we have seen, an example of a political practice, common
around the world, which is distinctly connected to issues of parliamentary
representation, as part of the clientelist exchange concerns political support.
A clientelist system is likely to favor incumbents, i.e. members of the present
in-group, who have access to state resources. Because the large majority of
incumbents around the world are male, clientelism has the possibility of
cementing the existing male dominance in parliaments worldwide. Clientel-
ism is also prone to fostering politically corrupt behavior of different kinds.
Some activities, such as outright vote buying, are of a highly sensitive or
even illegal nature, and participants do not want to bring them out in the
open or risk working with people they do not trust. Closely-knit networks
with particularized trust and informal patterns of recruitment are thus main-
tained in order to protect these corrupt activities. Such networks are referred
to here as being equipped with homosocial capital. How these two argu-
ments translate into parliamentary seats for men, but generally not for
women, through partisan activities and candidate selection is the subject
matter in this as well as the following chapters.

Clientelism is thus an established albeit informal political practice that is
well suited to a deeper investigation when it comes to determining gendered
consequences and chiseling out the specific gendered mechanisms at play.
Clientelism is, arguably, less well suited to a quantitative analysis where
validity and finding appropriate methods of measurement are always a prob-
lem. Cross-national data are more readily available, and more comparable,
for formal political arrangements that more easily lend themselves to meas-
urements, numbers and categorizations. Nevertheless, this should not deter
researchers from including concepts that are difficult to capture in their
quantitative analyses. Rather, it should be seen as a challenge to refine avail-
able measurements and to bring the research agenda one step, however
small, forward. Important work has also been done previously, linking clien-
telism to a number of related political practices, on which there are available
data.

Thus, there is no available measurement that directly measures the preva-
lence of clientelism as such. Instead, we will have to make do with what we
do know about the institutional setting in which clientelism thrives and some

of the common consequences of a clientelist political sphere. Circling the concept like this will allow us to find appropriate measures with which we can capture clientelism with some accuracy. Research on formal and informal political institutions has suggested that informal institutions such as clientelism often go hand in hand with (because they either substitute or compete with) weak formal political institutions, such as bureaucracies or rule-of-law (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 2006) – in other words with low quality governance. Other pieces of research, in turn, suggest that such low quality governance and weak administrative capacity are more often found in semi-democratic settings than in either democracies or autocracies (Bäck and Hadenius 2008). Thus, by including the democratic setting in which clientelism is often found as well as some of the aspects of weak formal institutions and strong informal institutions that often go hand in hand with clientelist behavior –low bureaucratic quality, weak rule-of-law and high levels of corruption – we should be able to achieve a rather good indicator of the prevalence of clientelism – in the broad definition of the word that is employed here.

Disentangling clientelism and democracy

In order to more specifically capture the issue of clientelism statistically, we will need to disassemble the different component parts of the concept and then put them back together again in the statistical model. Although related, the different aspects used to measure clientelism need to be conceptually disentangled from each other so that we know which aspect of clientelism they are thought to shed light on, before they are once again put together in a statistical model in order to, together, capture clientelism as a whole. I want to avoid having several variables in the same model measuring the same aspects, regardless of what side of the equation these variables are on, because the results will be muddled. At the same time, we have to be pragmatic and use the measurements at hand. Thus, we must take care when operationalizing and specifying the variables to be included in the dataset to make sure that they do not overlap each other, while, at the same time, trying to ensure the highest possible validity.

The theory states that democracy and clientelism might be related, and we thus want to put them in the same statistical model in order to see how they affect each other. This means I have to be careful not to use a democracy measurement in which clientelism or corruption is already included. Because democracy is such a wide concept, used in a variety of different contexts and attributed a multitude of different meanings, there are several measurements of democracy that are rather too inclusive for my purposes. As an example, the Freedom House measure of democracy includes assessments of corruption in the government, undue electoral pressure as well as several aspects of gender equality. This renders this measurement unfit for including as a de-
mocracy control variable in a model where the impact of clientelism on male parliamentary dominance is to be measured.

For the purpose of capturing the aspect of institutional strength, it is more useful to employ a purely procedural definition of democracy as a political system that guarantees a number of fundamental electoral and associational rights that, in turn, ensure people’s participation in and influence over the political process. These rights are: elected decision-makers, free and fair elections, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, and associational freedom (Dahl 1989: 343). A political system fulfilling such basic criteria may or may not evolve into a system that, for instance, curbs corruption or better represents marginalized groups such as women. No matter how desirable different political outcomes are, it is theoretically and methodologically desirable to distinguish, to the greatest extent possible, between basic democratic criteria and qualitative democratic criteria (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b). Including qualitative criteria in the definition of democracy is, Hadenius and Teorell argue, problematic for several reasons. Whereas there is a relatively broad consensus on what constitutes basic democratic rights, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reach a consensus on what qualitative criteria are important. And even if such an agreement could be reached, the qualitative criteria can and should only function as a complement to the basic criteria. Thus, a country like Singapore does not become more of a democracy because it has managed to curb corruption in the public sector (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b: 90). By the same token, increased or relatively good political representation of various social groups, including women, should be assessed as a qualitative aspect of democracy, not as a part of the concept itself. If such qualitative criteria were included in the basic definition of democracy, it would be essentially impossible to map out the relationship between democracy, on the one hand, and political gender equality, on the other.  

18 So far so good. But as so often is the case, a couple of caveats are necessary, because separating basic criteria from quality criteria is sometimes easier said than done and cannot, in this particular instance, be fully accomplished. Almost all measurements of democracy include an assessment of whether or not elections are reasonably free and fair. Wherever we are analyzing electoral fraud or electoral manipulation, we are also analyzing the freedom and fair-

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18 This technical note goes against some of the more theoretical claims of feminist scholars who argue that no contemporary liberal democracies are, in fact, real democracies. “For feminists, democracy has never existed; women have never been and still are not admitted as full and equal members and citizens in any country known as a ‘democracy’” (Pateman 1989: 210). Making such high demands on fulfilling the equality principle at every societal level before a country can qualify as a democracy is of course a theoretically relevant and useful stance. However, it renders us unable to conduct further analysis on the empirical differences that do exist between different political systems of today and the representation patterns they produce. When incorporating gender equality into the very definition of democracy, the analysis is simple and quick: all existing societies are instantly considered undemocratic.
ness of elections. Electoral corruption is seen as being inherently unfair and undemocratic in that it excludes those who have a right to be included and involves an “unjustifiable disempowerment” of certain groups, while, equally unjustifiably, empowering others (Warren 2004: 329). And certainly, vote buying exists in countries that are called democracies, and at the same time vote buying is seen as both an undemocratic and corrupt activity (Stokes 2007a). Attempting to separate these two concepts or wanting to understand the relationship between them is a difficult and, to some extent, unsolvable issue. A somewhat more encompassing measurement of clientelism than one that only measures electoral corruption is thus desirable. The propensity of a political system to leave apertures for clientelist influences by determining whether there is a competent bureaucracy that can efficiently organize elections and sufficient rule of law to hold perpetrators of election fraud responsible should also be included in an approximation of a clientelist environment.

According to the theoretical model, the level of democracy and clientelism are connected. The exact manner in which we understand these two aspects, democracy and clientelism, to relate to each other is important if we are to specify them correctly in the statistical model. On the one hand, one might argue that clientelism can exist in all types of societies, and that democratic and strong formal institutions simply have the advantage of not letting clientelism and other informal activities have as large an impact on political activities, such as the selection of candidates in a political party. However, the literature on the subject, as we know, points in a somewhat different direction. It suggests that clientelist behavior is, in fact, more likely to be accentuated in semi-democracies than in democracies or autocracies. It seems as if certain types of states, especially long-standing full-fledged liberal democracies, are able to reduce the very opportunities for clientelism and the ensuing corrupt political behavior, whereas countries with a weaker formal institutional context continue to rely on informal arrangements such as patronage, nepotism and vote buying, partly out of sheer necessity (as substitutes for the lacking strong institutions) but also simply because they are given the opportunity to do so (contesting the formal institutions). This implies that democratic level, by approximating the strength of formal institutions, has a direct impact on the opportunities for corruption overall. Statistically, this suggests a simple control function in the statistical model. The former line of argument, that clientelism can be constant but its influence varied, would have prompted a statistical specification of interaction between the two variables.19

19 Such specifications have also been run and when evaluating the significance, the confidence intervals overlap.
The models, data and operationalizations

When measuring large, complex and often-contested phenomena like clientelism and democracy, the considerations regarding choice of measurements as well as regarding relevant control variables are important. Not only is a phenomenon like clientelism notoriously difficult to measure in itself, but there are also, as has been discussed in earlier chapters, different interpretations of what this concept entails. The main solution is to simply be as transparent as possible as to which measurements are selected and why. Of course, the variables included in a model also have to fit together so as to form a complete and sound model. In addition, I also want to achieve high reliability and good coverage in the measurements selected.

Three statistical analyses

Three different sets of statistical analyses will be undertaken in this chapter. All three investigate the same relationship, but in slightly different ways and with more and more advanced models, gradually adding complexity to the picture. In the introductory descriptive statistics analysis, I compare recent elections in different countries with one another in order to illustrate patterns of gendered parliamentary representation worldwide. Each country is thus only represented once. In particular, the analysis focuses on the prevalence of corruption and the proportion of men in parliament, just as earlier studies of these issues have done (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). Hitherto, most analyses of the composition of parliaments have focused on comparing levels across countries. Sometimes the results from cross-sectional analyses of the representation of women at different time periods have been compared (Caul 1999; Matland 1998; Paxton 1997; Rule 1987). It is, however, preferable to combine such an analysis with an analysis that better takes into account changes taking place also within countries in order to make a more convincing argument that the results we get are not due to other, omitted, variables.

We thus go on to conduct a time series OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors. Such an analysis has many advantages. The number of elections included in this analysis is considerably increased, as each country can be represented with more than one election. It allows us to estimate the effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable while holding other, potentially important, variables constant. One such variable that is held constant is the lagged effect of the dependent variable, the proportion of men in parliament. In other words, we can estimate the effect of explanatory variables while controlling for incumbency. Given the probable importance of incumbency when it comes to explaining parliamentary composition, it is inappropriate that each observation in this dataset be regarded as being independent of the other observations. Instead, we are fairly certain that the pro-
portion of men in parliament after one election will have a great impact on the proportion of men in parliament following the ensuing election. In particular, this type of analysis allows us to also take into account the changes taking place within countries, instead of just across countries. In this analysis we also move on to estimate the larger issue of clientelism instead of only measuring corruption levels. There are both theoretical and practical reasons for this. The theoretical reasons we have already elaborated on – clientelism is not the same thing as corruption and the institutional context as measured by bureaucratic strength and rule of law takes us a step closer to a more holistic view of clientelism. It is also the case, however, that the main differences in corruption levels as well as quality of government levels are to be found between countries, rather than as changes within countries over time. When moving on to a time series model, it is desirable that there is variation in the variables used not just across countries, but also within countries. Many of the differences in corruption levels that have driven earlier analyses (both my descriptive analysis and those done by others) have been due to large differences between countries rather than to changes taking place inside countries. Corruption levels seem to be rather static and slow changing, whereas there are additional changes taking place if you look at the more holistic concept of clientelism.20

The final analysis moves on to actually investigate the upholding of male dominance rather than variations in the representation of men by including an interaction effect between the lagged proportion of men in parliament and clientelism. It thus estimates whether the effect of clientelism on male parliamentary dominance is different depending on how male dominated the political sphere is to start with. Interpretations of the statistical results thus gradually become more complex and perhaps less straightforward, but the accuracy of the models in relation to theory is, arguably, simultaneously enhanced.

Units of analysis

When testing the proposition that the prevalence of clientelist political practices translates into male parliamentary dominance, the empirical focus should be on the political gatekeeper guarding the entrance to parliaments: i.e. on elections and on the partisan candidate selection processes taking place before them. This empirical focus brings with it the methodological consideration that substantial changes to the dependent variable, i.e. the composition of parliament, only can come about in a country during an elec-

20 As we will see, the particular indicator used here is an index (Quality of Government) partly made up of a corruption measure. This ensures that a change in corruption leads to change in the overall index, but also makes institutional changes affecting clientelism possible – even if corruption levels remain constant. It is thus entirely logical that there is more variation in the composite variable than in one of its component variables.
tion year. It is theoretically unlikely that large changes will occur in between election years, and such years are thus not of interest. In addition, this is regardless of whether or not the elections held are free and fair, as most countries of the world, no matter what their democratic record, first, usually have a parliament of some kind and, second, only ever change the composition of these parliaments by holding of an election of some kind. When it comes to determining the relevant units of analysis, the main consideration is thus whether or not there has been an election – not whether or not this election was sufficiently democratic to “count”. Thus, only election years have been included in the model. The dates of elections in different countries come from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU 2009). They document all election procedures as reported by parliaments themselves and thus include all elections, regardless of regime type and quality of the electoral procedure.

I have lagged all independent variables to the year before the election. Candidate selection procedures likely to influence the outcome of the election in terms of male dominance in parliament probably take place some time during the year before the election itself. The dependent variable men in parliament, on the other hand, is coded for the same year as the election, as the composition of parliament is a direct outcome of the election results. In accordance with the above argument, the lagged dependent variable is coded to include the value of the outcome of the previous election, as per the previous election year. Data were accessible over a time period of 20 years, from 1985 to 2005. Because I required the lagged variables from the year before the election, however, the dataset includes elections taking place between 1986 and 2005. The exact number of cases included in the models varies depending on the type of model and the variables included. The main models include 459 elections taking place in 123 countries.

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21 In order to determine whether the democraticness of the election matters for its outcome, democracy level will instead be included as a separate variable in the model.

22 The exact timing of candidate selection of course depends on when in the year the election takes place as well as on election laws regarding announcement of candidates and on internal party procedures. Because these things vary between different countries and because there are no data on the timing of these practices, there is no other way than to approximate the lag to one year before the election.

23 Regression Models 2 and 5 are seen as the main models. Descriptive variable data will also, by default, be from the variables included in these particular models. Descriptive statistics of control variables included only in one of the other models will be from the models where the control variables are represented.

24 The time series model including the largest N has 556 elections. The descriptive analyses include 125 recent elections taking place between 2000 and 2005 in different countries, whereas the time series analysis is based on 123 countries. This difference is due to data accessibility. Some elections are not included in the cross-sectional analysis because the countries did not hold any elections during this more recent time period (Angola, Czechoslovakia and East Germany) or because data on one of the main variables are missing from the latest election held (Iraq), but these countries are nevertheless included in time series analyses. On the other hand, some countries are included in the cross-sectional analysis but not in the time series analysis, because there are election data from recent elections, but data on significant
Explaining male parliamentary dominance

This dissertation and the particular statistical analyses presented in this chapter seek to add to existing explanations of continued male dominance in political parties and parliamentary bodies. The dependent variable employed is thus the proportion of men in parliament instead of the more commonly used proportion of women in parliament. This change is, of course, nothing more than an issue pertaining to presentation and interpretation, but still merits mentioning to avoid confusion. A negative b-coefficient thus implies weakened male dominance in parliament. The proportion of men in parliament in the dataset ranges from 54.7 percent to 100 percent with the mean at 86.7 percent and a standard deviation of 9.5 percentage units.

I have chosen to include the proportion of men in lower chambers only, even in countries with bicameral parliaments and where numbers exist for both chambers. The reason for this is that upper houses have disparate functions and mean very different things in different countries. Election procedures for upper houses also differ more than they do for lower houses. Upper houses are sometimes, for instance, non-partisan, which is problematic in a study where partisan candidate selection is in focus. I have determined that the comparability is better if only numbers from lower chambers or unicameral parliaments are included.

The proportion of men in parliament is calculated from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s data on election results and the number of men and women among the representatives (IPU 2009).

Clientelism and its institutional prerequisites

We have already discussed the challenges in capturing a clientelist environment in one quantitative measure at some length. Here, the clientelist environment will be measured in terms of the likelihood that informal institutions are weak, with a quality of government index, encompassing both corruption, the rule of law and the quality of the bureaucracy. The strength of formal institutions will also be assessed using measures of level of democracy as well as political instability. Together, these measurements can capture the broad characteristics of a clientelist environment.

lagged variables are missing (Bahrain, East Timor, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Somalia). Thus, 119 of the countries are the same ones, an additional four can be included in the time series analysis, but not in the cross-sectional analysis, and an additional six are present in the cross-sectional analysis but not in the time series analysis, thus adding up to slightly different numbers.

See appendix for a list of the elections and countries included.
Clientelism as quality of government and corruption

The selected measure of clientelism regards the quality of government and corruption. The measurements used come from the ICRG Quality of Government measure, which is a threefold index encompassing the quality of the bureaucracy, the rule of law and the prevalence of corruption (Teorell et al. 2009; ICRG 2009). As mentioned, in some of the analyses I investigate corruption separately in order to better address the studies that have previously focused on the relationship between corruption and the proportion of women in parliament. For the purposes of this study, however, I am more interested in employing the wider measure that encompasses more of that which is related to clientelist practices.

The ICRG data were selected instead of similar data sets such as Transparency International (TI 2009) or the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2009) for several reasons. First, unlike the Corruption Perceptions Index as measured by TI, the ICRG composite indicator of quality of government looks not only at corruption, but also takes into account law and order and the quality of the bureaucracy in a country. The law and order aspect looks both at the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as at whether there is wide observance of the law. Bureaucracy quality estimates whether the bureaucratic institutions are stable and relatively autonomous from political pressure. Thus, both these measures contribute to the clientelist picture by assessing to what extent formal institutions such as the state bureaucracy are weak or strong as well as whether the rule of law is upheld or whether it is likely that it allows for electoral fraud in different ways.

The ICRG corruption variable also looks specifically at corruption within the political system, whereas other measures of corruption do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption (and in some cases also looks at financial or corporate corruption outside of the public sector). The ICRG corruption measurement is most concerned with “actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favors-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business”. The ICRG measurements are originally constructed to measure investment risk for foreign companies, and thus political stability is, indirectly, included in the measurements as well, something that should be remembered in the analysis (Teorell et al. 2009: 50-51; ICRG 2009). In addition, the ICRG data cover a relatively long period of time compared to the other measurements, from 1984 onward, and it has wide country coverage. It is also the measure used in some previous studies by Swamy et al. (2001) as well as by Dollar et al.(2001), and it will thus be valid to compare my results to theirs.

The ICRG corruption index goes from 0 to 6, and I have reversed it so that higher numbers correspond to higher corruption. In the main model, the mean corruption score is 2.7 with a standard deviation of 1.4. My broader
measure of clientelism, the composite indicator of quality of government, presents the mean value of the three ICRG variables “corruption”, “law and order” and “bureaucracy quality” ranges from 0 to 1, and higher scores indicate higher quality of government. In my interpretation of the measure: the lower the score and the lower the quality of government, the more clientelism. The mean of the score in my sample of countries is 0.6.

**Clientelism, institutional strength and democracy**

It is also argued that the level of democracy as well as democratic stability can add to the overall understanding of clientelist environments. With the time series model in mind, we want the measure of level of democracy to cover a relatively long period of time, in order to measure democratic development, and not just democratic level. In addition, the measurement should, in accordance with the above discussion, be formal and electoral in order to achieve, as far as it is possible, a separation between basic democratic criteria and other related qualitative criteria, such as corruption or gender equality.

The choices of measurements that are continuous and cover a long time period are Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2009) and the Freedom House (FH 2009). The Freedom House is problematic in that its definition of democracy is very wide, capturing several of the aspects that I consider separate and wish to estimate using other independent variables (FH 2009). Polity IV, on the other hand, measures institutionalized democracy and autocracy and specifically states that issues such as rule of law and press freedom are seen as means to or manifestations of liberal democracy, and should thus not be included in the measurement itself (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). In an evaluation of democracy indices, Polity was criticized for lacking a sufficient number of questions on the “correctness of elections” (Hadenius and Teorell 2006: 18), something that might actually be seen as an advantage here, when it is to be combined with a measure of political corruption.

To account for the possibility that semi-democracies experience lower levels of quality of governance and thus are more prone to clientelist influences, we must introduce curvilinearity to the measure of democratic level. The theoretical expectations are that low levels of quality of government scores will be associated to middle levels of democracy, rather than linearly to high or low levels. Thus, a non-linear, squared function of the Policy democracy measurement will be introduced in the model.

The same evaluation of democracy measurements, as referred to above, also suggested that in comparison with Freedom House, Polity rates the majority of countries as either fairly democratic or fairly autocratic – with few in-betweens (Hadenius and Teorell 2006: 28). This is slightly problematic considering that we are specifically interested in the countries that are not to be found on either extreme of the democracy scale, so this should be kept in mind when making comparisons across the democracy scale. The conse-
quence for interpretation should be that also countries found rather high up or far down on the Polity scale would, according to other measurements, be seen as semi-democratic.

Originally, the Polity scale ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 is the most autocratic and 10 is the most democratic. In order to facilitate interpretation, I have recoded the scale into a 0-10 scale, where 0 is the most autocratic and 10 is fully democratic. The mean in the sample of countries is rather high, at 7.2 with a standard deviation at 3.2. The median value is 8.5, thus indicating that the majority of elections studied are, indeed, conducted in countries that are placed high up on the democracy scale.

I also control for political instability, as there is reason to believe that not just the strength of formal institutions, but also the stability of the polity matters. Theory suggests that unstable formal institutions pave the way for increased incentives to invest in informal arrangements. There are numerous ways to measure political instability as well\(^\text{26}\), and it is important to remember that indications of political stability often need to be contextualized in order to be understood. For instance, political demonstrations, frequent regime changes or amendments to constitutions can all be either indications of a vital political system undergoing reform or of a political crisis leading to long-term instability. Thus, I have chosen to use a measurement, also produced by Polity, concerning coup d’états (Marshall and Ramsey Marshall 2007). This measurement can, at the very least, be said to be unambiguous when it comes to being an indicator of political stability. When political actors use or try to use unsanctioned channels to gain power, the political system is probably much less stable for years ahead. I have coded this variable as a dummy, having an influence up until five years after a coup or an attempted coup (mere plots or rumors of coups are not included here, although there are Polity data accessible).\(^\text{27}\)

Control variables

A limited number of control variables are included in this study. Importantly, I only include variables that I think might reasonably be intervening variables that affect the relationship that the other independent variables have on the dependent variable. While of course aiming to avoid spuriousness, I still want a fairly simple statistical model, as my aim is not to increase the explained overall variance, but rather to assess the impact of clientelism and electoral fraud on male parliamentary dominance. There is thus no reason to include variables that are not seen as having an impact on clientelism in the

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\(^{26}\) For instance, Polity also produces a measurement of regime durability that looks at the number of years since the most recent regime change. Regime change is defined by a three-point change in the Polity democracy score over a period of three years or less (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

\(^{27}\) See appendix for list of coups and coup attempts.
model. With main variables that already run the risk of being close to each other and of measuring similar things, there are many advantages to a fairly simple statistical model, as long as it does not become too parsimonious. There are also certain methodological recommendations considering the number of control variables. Too many control variables, especially control variables that are not necessarily seen as having an impact on the effect any of the main independent variables are expected to have on the dependent variable, render results both difficult to interpret and unstable (Ray 2003, 2005; see however also Oneal and Russett 2005).

The relevant control variables used in earlier studies of the representation of women can roughly be divided into two different categories: socioeconomic variables and politico-institutional variables (see for example Matland 1998; Rule 1987; Paxton 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Hypotheses suggesting socioeconomic explanations have often been tested, and although they have sometimes been seen as relevant, for the most part quantitative work has supported the qualitative finding that the lack of women in decision-making is not, first and foremost, due to an inadequate supply of competent women. In general, political variables seem to matter more than women’s socio-economic position (see for instance Paxton 1997; Rule 1987).

Nevertheless, the general economic development of a country is often highlighted as something that brings about modernization, access to education, women’s entrance into the workforce, etc. In addition, general development is almost always discussed in relation to the main independent variables, clientelism and its institutional prerequisites as measured by democratic level and institutional strength, on the one hand, and quality of government and corruption, on the other. We want to be sure that the effect on male parliamentary dominance is due to clientelism and not to the fact that economically developed countries have educated and competent women as well as low levels of clientelism. For this reason, some socioeconomic variables are included in some of my models. Every year the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) releases a Human Development Report (HDR), which, in turn, produces and presents a Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2009). This index is inspired by discussions on the necessity of seeing development as something more than merely GDP/capita and encompasses three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living (UNDP 1990; Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000). More specifically, it measures life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate, the combined enrollment rate at primary, secondary and

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28 The concept of “cultural variables” has also been used (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Here, these variables are either categorized as social variables (women’s labor force participation, general level of development of a country) or seen as not having an impact on the specific relationship between clientelism and male dominance (egalitarian attitudes) (for a more thorough discussion see Bjarnegård 2008).
tertiary levels of education and GDP/capita in purchasing power parity in US$. In one combined measure, we thus get a fairly good index of the general development for a wide range of countries and for a long period of time (UNDP 2009). The number of years since women gained suffrage is also included as an indicator of women’s long-term general social and political standing (OECD 2009; Teorell et al. 2009: 155).

When turning to political variables, almost all studies of the representation of women have found that proportional representation is conducive to women’s representation. Matland’s study is one exception in finding that this was only true in advanced democracies (Matland 1998). It has also been claimed that the higher the district magnitude, the greater the percent of women in parliament. As the number of representatives per constituency increases, the percentage of the vote needed for being elected diminishes, something which could be seen as beneficial for women (Rule 1987). Theoretical discussions on the propensity of different election systems to generate opportunities for electoral corruption offer, as we saw in the theory chapter, different suggestions as to what impact the election system might have on the incentives for corruption. Whereas some argue that proportional representation makes personal accountability harder and thus corrupt behavior easier to get away with (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Persson et al. 2003) others claim that the incentives to foster a personal vote that is primarily prevalent in majoritarian systems is conducive to corrupt behavior (Carey and Shugart 1995; Golden and Chang 2001). Although without a consensus, the debate motivates the inclusion of election system in the model. I use a simple dummy variable for election systems in which a majority of the seats are distributed with proportionality and I include a measure of the mean district magnitude for the House elections (Beck et al. 2001: 81; DPI 2009; Teorell et al. 2009).

29 In 1995 UNDP also started creating two gender indices, one called the GDI (Gender Development Index) and the other the GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure). Whereas the second comes too close to my dependent variable, the first one is, at first glance, interesting. When looking closer at this index, however, it is not to be used as a measure of gender equality – in fact, the UNDP thinks that it has often been misused as such a measure. Instead, it is simply the HDI all over again (exactly the same components) but with added penalties for gender inequalities. GDI in most countries is thus slightly lower than the HDI – but it says nothing about the relative gender inequality regardless of development level. Such a measure can be constructed by simply subtracting the GDI from the HDI. This measure is not used because it is not available for as many years or for as many countries as is the HDI.

30 If women have still not gained suffrage the year of the election, the number of years is set to zero.

31 Indeed, Matland found that all of the commonly cited explanations for women’s representation did not hold true when tested on developing countries (Matland 1998).
Table 2. *Variable description*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men in parliament</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>54.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>86.70</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year since women received the right to vote</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>49.88</td>
<td>18.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR system</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>14.33</td>
<td>27.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Clientelism and male parliamentary dominance**

The analysis will be conducted in three different steps. First, some descriptive statistics and graphs will be introduced, followed by a time series regression analysis looking at dynamic changes within countries. Finally, a model including interaction specifications will also be presented and analyzed. Together, they will provide a rather full picture of the worldwide systematic covariation found between clientelism and its institutional prerequisites, on the one hand, and male parliamentary dominance, on the other.

**Comparisons between countries**

Data from recent elections, taking place between 2000 and 2005 in 125 different countries, will serve as a descriptive introduction to the issues that have been discussed. It should be remembered that such a descriptive comparison focuses primarily on differences between countries and that country trajectories can thus not be evaluated in this first step. I will start by looking at the proposition that countries that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic have the weakest political institutions and thus the highest likelihood of clientelist influence. An illustrative graph showing the mean of the composite index of quality of government for different levels of democracy serves as a good starting point.
This graph clearly shows that the quality of government was perceived to be the highest in fully democratic countries. It is interesting to note, however, that the mean value for quality of government differs quite a lot between the fully democratic countries and those that are just slightly less democratic (for instance only one step down on the democracy scale). It seems, then, that the real threshold to achieving good quality of government and strong and reliable political institutions is high up on the democracy scale. We should remember the warning issued in an assessment of different democracy indices, that Polity tends to rank countries very high or very low (Hadenius and Teorell 2006). We would thus expect the real threshold to be rather high up on the democracy scale when using this particular democracy index.

What is more, there is a fairly evident curvilinearity here showing that, indeed, the lowest quality of government is not to be found at the lowest end of the democracy scale (as would be expected by a linear relationship) but in the middle. Thus, in this sample, countries that were autocratic were actually better at upholding law and order, curbing corruption and fostering strong bureaucracies than were semi-democracies. All these propositions are completely in line with my theoretical expectations. However, this is important for my purposes only if these issues also seem to matter for the parliamentary composition of the parliaments that were elected during the years represented in the figure. Corruption is, as we know, one of the indicators of the above quality of government index. It is also the one indicator that has most often been coupled with gendered representation patterns (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). For the time being, I will thus move on with this particular indicator to investigate its relationship to male parliamentary dominance a bit more carefully. A scatter plot will illustrate this relationship.
Figure 3. Scatter plot between corruption and male parliamentary dominance. (N=125)

The trend in this scatter plot is obvious, although not perfect. Countries with higher corruption levels also tend to have a higher male parliamentary dominance. This covariation, because it emanates from a cross-sectional dataset, does not specify time order and can tell us nothing about the causal direction of this relationship. A covariation such as the one illustrated in the scatter plot above can be used to argue either that more women in parliament seems to yield lower corruption levels or, as will be argued here, that corrupt practices seem to spur male parliamentary dominance. I will move on to investigate what the above scatter plot would entail when interpreted in terms of the second line of argument.

In particular it seems as if very low levels of corruption correspond to relatively low levels of male parliamentary dominance. Thus, the absence of corruption seems to be particularly conducive to more inclusive representation, whereas there is rather large variance in gendered representation among the more corrupt countries. In other words, the level and extent of corruption are, perhaps, not as important as the fact that corrupt behavior is a present feature of the political sphere at all.
Table 3. *Men in parliament by corruption level (N=125)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corruption level</th>
<th>Men in parliament (mean, %)</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low corruption (0-2)</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium corruption (2.5-4)</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High corruption (4.5-6)</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lion’s share of the countries in the sample is also found somewhere in the middle of the corruption scale. As the above table shows, this middle group has a significantly higher mean proportion of men in parliament than do countries with low levels of corruption. The important difference seems to be between countries with relatively low levels of corruption and countries with higher levels of corruption. These two upper categories are therefore collapsed in the table below, which compares the mean proportion of men in parliament by different democracy levels as well as by high and low levels of corruption. The different democracy levels are divided into approximately equal parts of the democracy scale, not in terms of number of countries in each category. When looking at the table below it should thus be remembered that democracy level 7 is a very low threshold, even slightly below the democracy mean of the entire sample.

Table 4. *Men in parliament by democracy level and corruption level (N=125)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men in parliament (mean, %)</th>
<th>Democratic (7-10)</th>
<th>Semi-democratic (3.5-6.5)</th>
<th>Autocratic (0-3)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% N</td>
<td>% N</td>
<td>% N</td>
<td>% N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low corruption (0-2)</td>
<td>73.5 (21)</td>
<td>88.2 (1)</td>
<td>91.5 (1)</td>
<td>74.9 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher corruption (2.5-6)</td>
<td>85.1 (61)</td>
<td>89.6 (18)</td>
<td>87.4 (23)</td>
<td>86.4 (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82.1 (82)</td>
<td>89.5 (19)</td>
<td>87.6 (24)</td>
<td>84.3 (125)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table illustrates that the mean value of a male dominance of 84.3 percent men in parliament does not hold true for all levels of democracy, nor for all levels of corruption. As predicted, the highest level of male dominance is found among semi-democracies at 89.5 percent compared to 82.1 percent for democracies and 87.6 percent for autocratic countries. Male
parliamentary dominance is also higher for countries with higher levels of corruption than among countries with lower levels of corruption at 86.4 percent compared to 74.9 percent. The table also tells us that semidemocratic and autocratic countries generally do have higher levels of corruption than do democratic countries, as there is only one country in each group that fits the “low corruption” category at all. Thus, it does not make much sense to compare countries with high and low corruption among semidemocratic and autocratic countries, whereas among democracies, we can see that countries with lower corruption levels do, indeed, have a lower male parliamentary dominance.

The category with democratic countries is rather large and as such deserves a closer look, particularly considering that Figure 2. Quality of government by democracy level, suggests that there is an effect that only sets in at high levels of democracy. The threshold for democracies is thus set very low in this table, at democracy level 7, which is, in fact, around the mean of the sample. This could thus be seen as a hard test: if there are visible differences even here, where we probably have included quite a few semidemocracies in the democracy group, it is very likely these differences would only be accentuated were we to draw the line a bit higher up. We should also remember that an evaluation of the Polity democracy scale showed that countries that are, according to other measurements, further down on the scale tend to cluster in the top of this scale. As the division above only splits the Polity scale into three equally large parts (in terms of steps on the scale, not in terms of number of countries), there may be several countries that are not necessarily to be seen as full-fledged democracies in the present democracy category.

Table 5. Democracies and levels of corruption (N=125)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full democracies (10)</th>
<th>Other democracies (7-9.5)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% N</td>
<td>% N</td>
<td>% N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low corruption (0-2)</td>
<td>71.0 (17)</td>
<td>83.9 (4)</td>
<td>73.5 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher corruption (2.5-6)</td>
<td>85.1 (15)</td>
<td>85.1 (46)</td>
<td>85.1 (61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77.6 (32)</td>
<td>84.9 (50)</td>
<td>82.1 (82)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This observation is confirmed in the above table. As many as 50 out of the 82 countries designated as democracies are not full democracies, and out of these 50 only four countries have low levels of corruption. It thus seems as if
very high levels of democracy are needed for countries to have a chance to curb corruption efficiently – alternatively that very low corruption levels need to be achieved before political institutions become sufficiently strong to support a full-fledged democracy. Countries with higher levels of corruption, regardless of democracy level, have considerably higher male dominance in parliament than do the countries with low corruption.

Based on descriptive analyses, we can establish that there is a systematic covariation between corruption and male parliamentary dominance. While illustrative, the downside of these analyses is at least threefold. First, the cut-off points between categories are always more or less arbitrarily set, leading to exactly the type of varied results we have just witnessed, depending on where the division between the groups is set. Second, it is difficult to control for the effects of other variables when only dealing with descriptive statistics. And third, we cannot claim causality by merely establishing covariation. In order to successfully claim that this discernible effect really is causal and that its direction primarily is due to the impact clientelism has on the gendered composition of parliament, however, we need additional analyses. Causality is best argued for in theoretical terms and supported by case studies. What we can do statistically, however, is to test whether our theoretical conceptions hold true for harder statistical tests before setting out to investigate causal mechanisms. When only looking at cross-sectional analyses, the established covariation we have seen can mistakenly be interpreted as a proof of a few women’s skillfulness in curbing national corruption. Here, the statistical testing will be of the opposite causal direction. The independent variable will be widened to include a fuller measure of clientelism than merely corruption, and the relationship will be tested in a dynamic time series analysis, where we cannot only control for intervening variables but also specify the time order of the main variables. Thus knowing a bit more about what the general covariations show, I will move on to a somewhat more advanced statistical analysis.

Dynamic effects – analyzing change

A more theoretically appealing but also harder test for any theory is to not only compare differences between countries at one snapshot point in time, but to also see whether the same explanations hold true for one and the same country over time. This can partly be accomplished wherever time series data are available. The theory that clientelism has a positive impact on male parliamentary dominance will therefore now be tested dynamically in a time series analysis. As mentioned earlier, I will here abandon the limited measure of corruption and move on to use the entire quality of government index, which also encompasses bureaucracy quality and law and order and therefore better captures a clientelist environment. The cross-section covariation between corruption and male parliamentary dominance has been captured by
several other studies, but interpreted in different ways. It is now time to investi-
gate, as best as we can, which of these different interpretations seems to hold the most truth. Have earlier studies assumed the wrong causal direction by thinking that women are less corrupt than men? Have they failed to see that in measuring corruption levels at one point in time, they actually largely capture clientelist political contexts? As has already been mentioned, corruption levels are relatively stable and rarely change much within one and the same country – thus it is difficult to estimate changes within a country over time based solely on corruption values. There are more visible changes in the composite index that also include changes in the quality of bureaucracy and law and order – something that might at least indicate that the environment affecting clientelist practices may slowly be changing in the long run.

It has already been noted that there are several sound theoretical reasons for a reversal of the causality between the quality of government and male parliamentary dominance. As was elaborated on in Chapter 2, the reversed causal direction implies first, that gender shapes the political opportunities we are given instead of claiming that women are inherently more incorruptible as human beings. It also argues that there are more theoretically sound explanations underpinning the reversed causal relationship. While it is not made clear, or explained, how a few politically active women would have managed to curb corruption, we do have quite a few suggestions as to why clientelist systems might be more open to those with access to important political resources, i.e. men. These suggestions, or causal mechanisms, will be elaborated on in the chapters to come. This chapter, however, deals with statistical results that can support the reversed causal direction. As has been mentioned earlier, time series analyses looking at dynamic changes with lagged independent variables are the best way of investigating causality.32

Table 6 shows the OLS regression results for the time series Models 1-4. In time series models it is important that all observations not be seen as independent of one another. This is particularly true in this case, as we know that incumbency is a strong explanatory factor in most if not all countries of the world. We can control for incumbency by introducing the lagged de-

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32 One way of testing causality, other than through theoretical reasoning and running full-scale regressions, is by conducting a Granger-type causality test. The reliability of the test is somewhat disputed, but if time-series data are available, this test can be conducted by each variable being predicted by its previous value as well as by the lagged value of the other variable (Finkel 1995). I have conducted a simple Granger test by lagging the variables one year and then running two separate trivariate regression analyses. The results can be seen in the appendix. They show that the effect of quality of government on the proportion of men in parliament is significantly negative (the higher the quality of government, the lower the male dominance in parliament), even when controlling for the lagged number of men in parliament the previous election. This is just as predicted. The effect of the proportion of men in parliament, however, does not have a significant effect on the quality of government when the lagged level of quality of government is controlled for. I thus find some methodological support for the argument outlined earlier on in this dissertation, and I feel confident to continue my investigation of the impact of clientelism on the proportion of men in parliament.
dependent variable in the model (see recommendations by e.g. Keele and Kelly 2006), thus minimizing the problem with autocorrelation and including changes taking place within a country, regardless of the previous level of male dominance, as well as differences between countries. In addition, panel corrected standard errors (PSCEs) are used (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). Model 1 estimates the institutional strength by democracy level, the curvilinear function of democracy and political instability. Clientelism, as measured by quality of government, is introduced in Model 2. Model 3 controls for socioeconomic variables, whereas Model 4 controls for political variables.

33 The Durbin-Watson statistic is often used to assess problems with autocorrelation. It determines whether or not the residuals of the model are correlated. The statistic can vary between 0 and 4, and the value of 2 means that the residuals are uncorrelated (Field 2000; Kennedy 2003). After introducing the lagged dependent variable in the main models, the Durbin-Watson statistic is almost exactly at 2, thus indicating no or very low problems with autocorrelation.
Table 6. *Time series OLS regression with PCSEs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: men in parliament (%)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-3.35</td>
<td>** -4.27</td>
<td>* -3.15</td>
<td>* -3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>(2.22)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional strength</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>† -0.04</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy sq.</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>* † -0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>1.15 ***</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social standing of women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since suffrage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>0.82 ***</td>
<td>0.83 ***</td>
<td>0.86 ***</td>
<td>0.91 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>15.30 ***</td>
<td>16.41 ***</td>
<td>12.27 *</td>
<td>10.10 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.72)</td>
<td>(5.36)</td>
<td>(6.42)</td>
<td>(3.69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.66  R²: 0.73  R²: 0.76  R²: 0.83

N= 556   N=459   N=366   N=360

*** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10; † jointly significant, p< 0.05
Model 1 shows that the variables measuring institutional strength are significant predictors of male dominance in parliament. Democracy level and the curvilinear function of democracy are jointly significant, thus indicating a weak curvilinear effect on parliamentary dominance for a country moving upward or downward on the democracy scale. Relatively higher values of male dominance can be expected when a country is at a semidemocratic level, compared to in a democracy or an autocracy. Importantly, a country experiencing political instability in the form of recent coups d’État or coup attempts is also likely to have a higher male dominance in parliament. Model 2 shows that all of these effects are rendered both weaker and insignificant when quality of government enters the model. Instead, the weak institutions that are primarily found in semidemocratic and unstable countries seem to coexist with low quality of government, and this, in turn, has a strong impact on male dominance. Thus, if the quality of government remains low in a country, the risk is that male dominance will remain high. Model 3 shows that this relationship holds true, although at a lower confidence level, when controlling for socioeconomic variables and Model 4 shows that the same applies to the election system variables.

We should be careful not to conclude that human development, long experiences of female suffrage and the choice of election system in terms of proportionality and district magnitude does not matter for gendered representation. The above model does not suggest that. It suggests that although socioeconomic variables as well as politico-institutional variables may be important for the political possibilities of women in general, they do not seem to matter much for the gendered possibilities created by clientelist political systems. In a political system where elections are filled with clientelist influ-

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34 Model 1 has also been run with a reduced number of cases to make sure that the results are not due to cases that are not present in the other models. When all cases where quality of government is missing were removed from this model (thus reducing the number of cases from 555 to 459 as in the main models) the joint significance of the two democracy variables was retained while political instability was rendered insignificant. We do know, however, that the variables measuring democratic level and political stability are closely related to each other. See results for this model in appendix.

35 Regression diagnostics trying to identity particularly influential cases that may affect the overall result has also been conducted. In particular, DFBeta measures have been used to pick out particularly influential observations. One observation stands out with regards to the influence of the quality of government on male parliamentary dominance: the election taking place in Romania in 1990. The model has thus been run without this particular case, rendering the variable somewhat less significant. This model can be studied in the appendix. However, as elaborated on in the appendix, the case in question is explicable in terms of the theory presented here, and should thus be included in the main model. A discussion on multicollinearity in the models can also be found in the appendix.

36 Model 2 has also been run with time period dummies as well as with regional dummies. The main results hold true, even though it is also discernible that time periods and some regions do have a significant impact in themselves. For instance, there is a trend of decreasing male dominance that causes later time periods to be significant as predictors of male dominance in comparison to earlier time periods. Even when controlling for these factors, however, quality of government remains significant. See results in appendix.
ences such as vote buying and electoral fraud because bureaucracies are too weak to organize free and fair elections and/or because the rule of law is not efficient enough to hold those who break election laws accountable, we are likely to see a higher proportion of men in parliament than in countries where elections are cleaner. This also seems to be true for one single country. If elections become cleaner and clientelist influence diminishes, all being equal, male dominance will decrease. Even when controlling for the previous level of male dominance, something which we know is one of the main determinants of the next level, the difference between the male dominance in parliament elected in a non-clientelist country and one elected in a clientelist country is estimated to be over three percentage points.

Analyzing the preservation of dominance

The previous analyses have investigated variations in the representation of men, between as well as within countries. This final analysis moves on to actually investigate the upholding of male dominance rather than focusing on variations in the representation of men. Theoretically, this is what we are most interested in – why and how men are able to uphold and maintain parliamentary dominance. Here, I thus include an interaction effect between the lagged proportion of men in parliament and clientelism. Interaction effects are introduced in order to account for the fact that the relationship between two variables might be moderated by the value of a third variable. In other words, the effect of clientelism on male dominance might differ depending on the previous level of male incumbency. The question is whether clientelism creates male dominance as well as preserves it?
### Table 7. Time series OLS regression with PCSEs and interaction effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: men in parliament (%)</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-49.67  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government * male dominance</td>
<td>0.53    ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutional strength**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy sq.</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged dependent var.</td>
<td>0.45    ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>49.78   ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.74

N= 459

| *** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10 |

A word of caution is called for before interpreting this table.³⁷ When interactions are introduced into a model, it becomes more difficult to determine statistical significance than in other, more simplistic, models. Simulation figures must be generated in order to see if and where confidence intervals overlap. The effect of the interaction variable in the above model is significant unless countries have a very high level of previous male dominance in

³⁷ Many of the same robustness tests have been run for this model as for the previous models, and can be seen in appendix. These results thus hold true even when excluding influential cases and when controlling for time series dummies and regional dummies. Even though certain regions, such as Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, do have significant effects on male parliamentary dominance, this fact does not render our main explanatory variables less significant.
parliament. In other words, the high male dominance is maintained in clientelistic surroundings, but at very high levels of male incumbency it does not necessarily become even higher simply because clientelism increases. There is, in a manner of speaking, a glass ceiling also for male parliamentary dominance, although it seems to be very, very high – at somewhere between 90 and 100 percent men in parliament. Male dominance simply cannot get much higher than that, no matter how clientelistic the environment becomes.38

The results in the above table show that even if male parliamentary dominance is less than the mean, a clientelist environment will kick in to reinforce it yet again. In other words, it is much more difficult for countries with a continued high clientelist influence to permanently diminish male parliamentary dominance than it is for a country with a higher quality of government. A clientelist-free, high-quality government environment does lead to reduced male parliamentary dominance, in particular in countries where the most accentuated male dominance has already been broken. Interaction effects usually require some substantive interpretations as well as the calculation of expected values if the meaning of the model predictions is to be made clear to the reader. In this case, we can first compare the values generated by the model for elections taking place within different clientelist settings but with the same level of previous male incumbency. An election taking place in a country with a previous male incumbency of, say 60 percent, is expected to generate an increase of 14 percentage units men in parliament in a very clientelist setting (0.1), an increase of 7 percentage units in a medium clientelist setting (0.5) but male dominance will remain at the same level if the setting is fairly non-clientelist (0.9). If male incumbency is, instead, more pronounced to begin with, but still well below the mean of 80 percent men in parliament, it will be even further pronounced with an increase of 4 percentage units in a very clientelist setting, an increase of 1 percentage unit in a medium clientelist setting and a slight decrease, of 1.5 percentage units, in a non-clientelist setting. In other words, the more clientelism the setting, the more pronounced and reinforced is male parliamentary dominance likely to be. The effect of clientelism in countries where male dominance is not already high is thus to strengthen male parliamentary dominance even further, whereas the effect of clientelism in already highly male-dominated environments is rather to maintain it.

I have also calculated the changes in male parliamentary dominance that the above model predicts for a country that holds four consecutive elections depending on whether the elections are held in a clientelist (0.1 in quality of government) or in a non-clientelist (1 in quality of government) setting and depending on whether the country starts out with a relatively low male incumbency, at 55 percent, or a higher male incumbency at 87 percent (which is actually the mean in the sample, so it is not high in relative terms). For

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38 Simulation figure can be found in the appendix.
each consecutive election, the new estimated male incumbency is taken into account. Table 8 summarizes the expected differences between male dominance after the fourth election has been held.

Table 8. Estimated male dominance after four consecutive elections

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clientelist setting (0.1)</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low male incumbency (55%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-clientelist setting (0.9)</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelist setting (0.1)</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average male incumbency (87%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-clientelist setting (0.9)</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows that all else being equal, male dominance is more likely to increase or be sustained in clientelist settings than in non-clientelist settings. At lower levels of male incumbency, a high clientelist influence in the political life leads to an increase in male parliamentary dominance, but when male incumbency is already pronounced, clientelism simply helps to maintain it. Where male dominance is not accentuated, a clientelist-free environment will allow for women to continue participating in political life. Where there is a higher male incumbency, a non-clientelist setting will help decrease it. Thus, as long as a country couples a high male incumbency with a fairly clientelist environment, male parliamentary dominance is likely to be stable. These results are also visualized in the graph below.
The above graph is simply another way of showing what this interaction implies in four imagined consecutive elections. The previous level of male incumbency has been calculated for each election and added to the equation to produce these expected values. For low levels of male incumbency, a highly clientelist environment will increase male dominance in parliament significantly. For higher levels of male incumbency a highly clientelist environment will instead cause male dominance to be maintained. A fairly equal parliament can be maintained in a non-clientelist environment, whereas a male-dominated parliament can at least move towards more equality in a non-clientelist setting. In other words, clientelism is central not only when we want to explain differences in male dominance between countries or different elections, but it is also central to our understanding of the preservation of this male dominance – which really is the topic of this dissertation.

Figure 4. Illustration of estimated changes in male dominance depending on clientelism and male incumbency

Results and implications of the quantitative study

This chapter has shown several things, the most important being that clientelism, as measured by quality of government or corruption, does have the systematic covariation with male parliamentary dominance that we would expect from the theory. I will thus go on to investigate the causal mechanisms behind these statistical results to try to determine whether clientelism really does help to explain male dominance in parliament. These findings certainly support this view, but the explanations are rather to be found in the coming, qualitative, chapters.
A related finding is the fact that low quality of government is most likely to be found in semidemocracies and that it is not until a country reaches very high levels of democracy that we can expect institutions to become strong and quality of government to significantly improve. During large parts of the political liberalization process, formal political institutions are weak, electoral competition and party recruitment are flawed and easily influenced by informal institutions such as clientelism.

As regards the relationship between quality of government and democracy, together, they measure the institutional setting where clientelism is most likely to thrive and where it is most likely to lead to flawed elections with, for instance, vote buying - and where candidate selection in the political parties reflects this. I see the two variables as connected and influencing each other, just as the above chapter has shown. It is disputed whether corruption is enabled by undemocratic and unreliable institutions or whether institutions are rendered undemocratic and unreliable because of the high incidence of corruption. Most likely, this is a vicious circle in which the two aspects reinforce each other. In the analyses conducted in this chapter, however, the introduction of corruption renders the democracy variables insignificant, thus indicating that at least part of the effect that could be found between democracy and male dominance is due to the higher incidence of clientelism in semi-democratic countries.
Chapter 5 - Situating the Thai Case

Thai politics is many things, but one thing it is not is inclusive and certainly not when it comes to gender. Women are still largely absent from the political arena in Thailand. Thailand will, in this chapter, be introduced as the case in which the main variables are contextualized, illustrated, and elaborated on. Thailand is also the case in which I study questions of candidate selection, clientelism and gender in more depth. I have shown statistical support for the argument that the level of democracy and political stability are associated with formal institutional strength, which, in turn, lays the groundwork for informal institutions such as clientelism. I have also shown that a lower quality of government and a higher level of clientelism are associated with the level of men in parliament in international comparisons. Such statistical comparisons are by necessity made with rather crude indicators of these complex societal phenomena. While informative as far as general trends go, they tell us less about how the relationships come about and function in the real world, i.e. the social mechanisms. This chapter thus introduces the country of Thailand as an apt case for a somewhat deeper investigation of the workings of political institutions and corruption on the representation of men. It will outline and reiterate, based on Chapter 3, what type of case Thailand is, how it will be used methodologically, and how it relates to the overall picture.

In order to make logical linkages between the macro study and this case study, the more abstract phenomena studied in the statistical study will be concretized and situated in the Thai context and the micro relationships between them elaborated on. Thus, the democratic development of Thailand, the presence of clientelist concerns and political practices, and the male political dominance will be in focus here. In particular, this elaboration will be situated within a theoretical framework of weak formal political institutions (such as rule of law and political parties) and strong and influential informal institutions (such as clientelism and vote buying networks). The control variables, such as women’s societal position, the general level of development and electoral systems can also be discussed more in detail when relating to a specific case.

The argument is thus that formal and informal institutions, in this particular case democracy and clientelism, are working together to create a political

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39 Parts of this chapter has earlier been published with ABC-CLIO (Bjarnegård 2009b).
landscape in which the ways that political parties select their candidates are conditioned by clientelist concerns rather than by internal party regulations. The result of this is the Thai “gender paradox” – the often acknowledged fact that it is difficult for Thai women to reach political prominence despite the fact that they fare relatively well socially and economically (see e.g. Iwanaga 2008).

The temporal anchor point of the description of the Thai case will be around 2005. The empirical work centers on the political campaign and the candidate selection that took place before the parliamentary election of 2005. However, a brief historical background is appropriate in order to increase the understanding of the context in which these elections took place. Likewise, the more general subsequent political development – including political turmoil, the military coup of 2006, the banning of major political parties, the large demonstrations by different supporters leading to the closing down of international airports in 2008 and to the dissolution of an international summit in 2009 - following these elections and continuing until the publication of this thesis in 2010 cannot be ignored and, in retrospect, also add to our understanding of the Thai context.

This chapter thus demonstrates how a careful case selection can contribute to an overall understanding of a phenomenon. When case studies are employed for this purpose, it is imperative that the case in question be selected to ensure the presence of the main variables.

The Thai gender paradox

Gender relations in Thailand have often been described as paradoxical, spanning over a large spectrum of possible gender roles and representations (see for instance Vichit Vadakan 2008; Bjarnegård 2009b; Hanks and Hanks 1963). The contrast between women’s relative success in social and economic spheres, on the one hand, and the male dominance in the political landscape, on the other, makes the simile with the concept “gender paradox” fitting. The concept “gender paradox” has been used by Erwër (2003) when describing the Indian state of Kerala. It refers to the fact that the attainment of a high quality of life does not automatically translate into empowerment for women. This relationship has often been assumed, and indicators of human development of some sort are almost always included in analyses of women’s political power (as it was in the analysis in the previous chapter). True enough, there is a clear tendency: in countries where women fare well socioeconomically, they are better placed to also be empowered. What the gender paradox does is to point out that this is not necessarily true, it does not happen automatically, and it has not happened everywhere. A quick way of checking whether there is an apparent gender paradox at hand is to compare measurements of gender development with measures of gender empow-
Government, as produced by UNDP. Whereas the Gender Development Index (GDI) measures human development (life expectancy, educational attainment and income) while adjusting downwards for gender inequalities in any of these sectors, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is instead described as a measure of agency and looks at women’s political and economic power and to what extent they partake in decision-making (UNDP 2009). Most countries have a GEM that is lower than its GDI, but in Thailand the difference is accentuated with a GDI at 0.779 and a GEM at only 0.472 in 2005.

For the purposes of this study, the concept of the gender paradox is important because it shows that the shortage of women in politics cannot only be attributed to the low status of women in general. Thailand is thus a case in which the long needed complementary focus on men and masculinity to understand representation patterns is certainly warranted. In the same way that the general state of gender inequality is controlled for in the statistical study, some general knowledge of the gendered societal context in Thailand is necessary in order to situate the dependent variable, the male dominance in the Thai political sphere. Choosing to study Thailand as a country where the gender paradox is evident also, in a manner of speaking, controls for socioeconomic variables and speaks for a focus on political variables.

While the gender paradox is certainly a fitting illustration of some of the most pertinent irregularities in the Thai gender pattern, the reality is, of course, even more complex. True, the economic sector is, at least in terms of numbers, certainly more gender equal than the political sector. But there are contradictory gender patterns in every sphere of Thai society. The next sections will attempt to not only show the general patterns illustrating the paradox, but also give a more nuanced view of gender equality in Thailand.

Positive developments in the economic sphere...

Women in Thailand participate in the labor market to a large extent. The rate of female economic activity is 65 percent versus 81 percent for Thai men. When disaggregated on different sectors, the proportion of women and men is also fairly equal in industry, agriculture, and service (ILO 2006). Women’s share of professional positions is also relatively high, at 53 percent. The ratio of estimated female to male earned income, however, is only 0.59 (UNDP 2006a).

Women are highly visible in the economic sector in Thailand and have been throughout history. The importance of women’s economic roles can be traced back several hundred years. Men and women have traditionally shared agricultural work, and often women have even taken the main responsibility for the family farm and the economic activity surrounding it, as men were required to do military service or to work for the royal court. In this way, men sought status through activity in politics. Economic roles, on the other
hand, traditionally represented worldly attachment and as such posed a threat to men in their accumulation of merits (Siengthai and Leelakulthanit 1993: 89; Phananiramai 1996: 275). Thus, especially in the lower classes women’s roles have been less restrained compared to the distinct roles of man and woman in the West. The traditional Thai family left more room for the fluidity of sex roles, and different tasks and household chores have not been clearly associated with femininity or masculinity (Hanks 1962: 1250, 1256).

With the emergence of contemporary public administration and private enterprises, however, modern business management was established, requiring employees with literacy and education. Traditionally, education was given by the Buddhist monasteries, to which men had primary access as they could be ordained as monks (as most Thai men still are at some point in their life). As women cannot be ordained as monks, men have greater opportunities to accumulate merit directly, to achieve education and to advance socially. (Vichit Vadakan 1994: 522; Hanks 1962: 1250, 1256). Men, who received an education from the monasteries, were thus better equipped to make the occupational shift. Women, who had not received a monastic education, were left in small businesses, whereas men entered modern business organizations and built up wealth and networks (Siengthai and Leelakulthanit 1993, 89). Even though men thus certainly became more active in the economic sphere with modernization, there is still no social stigma for women working outside the home, as can be detected in other countries in the region. For instance, Thai female labor force participation does not drop

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40 Among other things, there was a matrifocal kinship system where lineage evolved around women. The groom in a newly married couple would often move to the bride’s home, for instance, rather than the other way around (Vichit Vadakan 1994: 516). There was an equal inheritance practice early on, where siblings of different sex had the same right to inherit land. This matrilocality has been more or less pronounced and flexible in different parts of Thailand (Potter 1976: 51-56; Whyte and Whyte 1982: 109).

41 Theravada Buddhism has had (and still has) a large influence on how societal relations function at every level. Theravada Buddhism places a strong emphasis on harmony in Thai society at large, and this of course includes harmony between women and men. The focus on merit accumulation is particularly important. Merit accumulation means one’s position in life today is based on one’s behavior (sins and merits) in earlier lives. This system means Thai society is highly hierarchical, something that is still valid both at the individual and the state level, whereby it is imperative to accumulate merit to advance in this life as well as the next. This hierarchy is by no means fixed, and it is completely possible to move up and down social hierarchical levels depending on one’s merit accumulation. There are, however, factors constraining this mobility. To start with, one is born to a certain societal position entailing certain opportunities while restraining others. This societal position is not to be questioned, because it is based on one’s action in earlier lives. Age and sex are strong status determinants, and it is the task of men to advance the family. Because it is the responsibility of each individual to accumulate merit, this system legitimizes the existing inequalities, hierarchies, and governing system. Some would even claim that the aspect of Buddhism called “self denial” encourages people to accept the existing power system (Hanks and Hanks 1963).

42 Women can still not be fully ordained as monks, and the female Bhikkuni order has been and still is clearly subordinate to the male monk order (Lindberg Falk 2002: 1-11)
below 60 percent at any social strata, whereas Indian women’s participation in the labor force, in comparison, never exceeds 60 percent (Mammen and Paxson 2000).

Most management positions are still held by men, however. Yet some observers have noted visible improvements in this regard. A report on the impact of the financial crisis on gender relations in the private sector shows that the number of women-led enterprises not connected to the family has risen significantly in the past four or five decades. A sample of selected industries in Thailand shows that 19 percent of top managers are women, although there are few women chief executive officers or presidents, and many companies have no women on their board of directors. In the sample analyzed in the report, women constitute 30-45 percent of board members in the entertainment and financial sector (Chonchanok and Vejjajiva 2004), which is, in international comparisons, regarded as a fairly high figure. It can be compared to the proportion of women board members of Swedish companies listed on the stock exchange, which was reported to be 16 percent in 2006 (Jämsides 2006). The report concludes that women reach executive positions when they are related to finance, perhaps because historically women have managed the money in Thai households. Women also stand a better chance of becoming executives in small or international companies. The authors attribute this to a different and more women-friendly corporate culture (Chonchanok and Vejjajiva 2004: 75-82).

Thailand was one of the Southeast Asian tiger economies, but economic growth, while strong, has been uneven and unbalanced, further widening the gap between the urban rich and the rural poor (Bunbongkarn 1999: 175). The economic sector has undergone far-reaching changes during the past decades, bringing with it new demographic situations, new possibilities, and new problems. Female employment has gradually shifted from agriculture to manufacturing and services, and from personal account work to formal employment. This shift has affected women to a greater extent than men because of the rapid growth in sectors with a high demand for women (Phananiramai 1996: 277, 282). With industrialization, migration from rural to urban areas has increased significantly. There is a visible increase in the number of young, unmarried women migrating from rural villages in poorer areas such as Isan (in the northeastern part of Thailand) to Bangkok. These women are motivated by the rising demand for young women in the workforce. Young unmarried women are considered easily controlled and inexpensive, and as they have no immediate family to support, they are more willing to work in insecure positions and to work for long hours below mini-

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43 The specific issue of prostitution will be elaborated on below.
mum wage. They are also given jobs in which they do not have access to labor unions (Mills 1997: 37-38, 45).

In general, women need to rely on formal merits more than do men, who have better access to traditionally male networks to secure jobs and managerial positions. The growing importance of education as a status symbol is perhaps improving women’s abilities to compete on a more equal basis, especially considering the closing gender gap in the education system in Thailand (Siengthai and Leelakulthanit 1993: 98). The gross enrollment rate is somewhat higher for boys than for girls in primary school. However, girls enroll to a greater extent in secondary and tertiary education than do boys. This shift came about during the 1980s and 1990s (WB 2006). Education for girls and women was introduced by King Vajiravudh at the beginning of the 20th century as part of a conscious strategy to portray Thailand as a modernizing country in order to avoid colonization (Vella 1978: 151-160). Although implemented more out of necessity than out of conviction, and though initially of more symbolic than practical value, these changes did open up new opportunities for elite women (Bjarnegård 2009b).

…but relative standstill in politics

Thai women gained the right to vote and to stand for election simultaneously with the transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy in 1932. Yet it took 17 years and 14 elections until the first woman was elected to Parliament. And still, women tend to be less politically active than men are (Wongchaisuwan and Tamronglak 2008: 211-213). One cannot discuss Thai politics without alluding to the 18 coups d’états since 1932 that have marked modern Thai political history. It is extremely difficult to say anything definitive about the present political situation in Thailand, as the only thing constant seems to be change itself – something that will be elaborated on in sections and chapters to come. The important point to make here, however, is that whether members of Parliament have been appointed under military rule or elected by the people under democratic rule, women have never made up more than approximately 10 percent of the lower house in the Thai Parliament. This shortage of women is, in fact, even more obvious in cabinets, in the senate, and even in provincial and local politics, something that we will soon have reason to elaborate on further. The table below, however, shows

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44 The insecure working situation of many young women was made obvious during the economic crisis in the 1990’s when many women were laid off. It is, however, not a good idea to measure unemployment rates in such a situation. As Phongpaichit and Baker stress, when no formal welfare is available, it is simply not an option not to earn an income of some sort. Rather than being unemployed, people are likely to go into small businesses, take low-paid work, or work as unpaid family labor (Phongpaichit and Baker 2000: 82-86, 248), thus moving back to the situation they were in before industrialization.
the trend of male parliamentary representation that, while declining, is still somewhere around 90 percent.

![Graph showing % men in parliament from 1986 to 2005](image)

**Figure 5.** Men in parliament in Thailand 1985-2005

A comparison between two fairly recent years - 2005, when relatively democratic elections were held, and 2006, when there was a military coup – shows that regime type does not have a great or immediate impact on the participation of women in politics. The parliamentary representation of women after the 2005 election was 10.4 percent. Of the 500 persons elected, 53 were women. The Parliament appointed after the 2006 military coup had 8.7 percent women. Of the 242 members of Parliament, 21 were women.

Though a small retreat percentage-wise, there were no marked differences in male dominance between the two regimes. The same has been true for Thai modern history at large. Regardless of regime and size of parliament, the Thai limit seems to be somewhere around 10 percent women, and male members of parliament seem to rather comfortably be able to continue controlling their 90 percent of the parliamentary seats.

The United Nations (UN) Report *Women’s Right to a Political Voice in Thailand* outlines many commonly mentioned barriers to women’s political participation, such as general social attitudes, the attitudes of political parties, and practical difficulties. General social attitudes, it says, are still that men make better leaders than women. Because of this, potential women politicians are held back by their families and are affected by such attitudes (UNDP 2006b: 27-28). No active measures have been taken to change the election law or candidate selection processes in favor of women, as has been the case in countries that have passed laws establishing candidate quotas. Voluntary party quotas, also common in political parties around the world (Dahlerup 2006: 3-4, 21), have not been employed in Thai political parties.
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thus far. In addition, the report states that women are bound by household responsibilities, and they do not have access to the same important networks that men do (UNDP 2006b: 28). These difficulties are known by women politicians in many countries of the world. In the literature, the networks supporting political candidacy have received less attention than they merit. In Thailand, as in many other countries, access to and control over such networks are crucial for political participation.

Studies of gender-disaggregated citizen participation in Thai politics are scarce, but a few somewhat contradictory results should be mentioned. A study of voter turnout in 1992 shows that all over Thailand, eligible rural citizens vote to a greater extent than do people residing in the capital. Women and men vote to almost the same extent (59.5 percent of eligible women turned out to vote, compared to 59.0 percent of eligible men) apart from in Bangkok, where slightly more men vote (43.4 percent of eligible men compared to 41.8 percent of eligible women). In total, about 300,000 more women than men turned up to actually vote, constituting 50.8 percent of all voters. With the Constitution of 1997, voting became compulsory in Thailand. Failure to vote resulted in a loss of political rights the following years (Thomson 1995).

An exit poll in the election of 1992 concluded that women were more knowledgeable in politics than men, based on the fact that women could better than men predict which female candidates representing which political party would be elected (Thomson 1995: 8-9). Whether this, in fact, represents general political knowledge or knowledge of female politicians seems questionable. Most other research findings, summarized by Wongchaisuwan and Tamronglak, tend to come to the opposite conclusion. Thai women in general seem to be less interested in politics and less knowledgeable about politics than Thai men are. Men are also more likely to be members of a political party than are women. In addition, one study has suggested that women tend to make their electoral choices at a later stage than men, and that personality, rather than political conviction, plays a greater part in determining whom they will vote for (Wongchaisuwan and Tamronglak 2008: 217-218). By the same logic, however, it can be questioned whether this really reflects less political interest among Thai women or the mere fact that Thai politics are male dominated and women feel excluded from that sphere. Wongchaisuwan and Tamlongrak also construct a political participation index containing a variety of forms of political participation, such as political discussions, attendance at a political campaign, participation in demonstrations, party membership, and voter turnout. Not surprisingly, they find that participation among Thai middle-class women increases with age, higher education levels, and frequent exposure to news. Salary, marital

45 The Democrat party did, for a while, set a target (never reached) of 30 percent female candidates, see www.quotaproject.org.
status, and association membership did not have an impact on the political participation of these women (Wongchaisuwan and Tamronglak 2008: 220-227). These findings are partly in accordance with international findings, indicating that more highly educated women who have entered the workforce are as psychologically involved in political matters as are men. Although the gender gap with regards to participation also decreases as women receive an education and work outside of the home, they are still less likely to be politically active than men are. This thus suggests that women are prevented from participating politically and that this has little to do with a lack of psychological involvement or interest (Verba et al. 1978: 263-268).

The women’s movement in Thailand has, with some exceptions, not been a very strong political force. In an international perspective, women’s activism has started rather late. In many other countries, women’s struggles started alongside struggles for national independence and as a part of a larger intellectual educational boom. As Thailand has never been colonized, this has not been a motivator either for women’s movements or for Thai civil society at large, something that some observers claim is a reason why Thai civil society is more pragmatically oriented rather than critical and analytical (Pandey 2003). Early examples of women’s organizations were led by wives of or women related to military personnel or government officers. These groups were primarily elite oriented and saw women’s primary tasks as preserving national culture and family values.

With modernization and women’s movement into the formal labor force, however, the calls for organization among lower-class women became more frequent. Starting from the 1970s, many women’s organizations were created as a response to the increasing impact of international donor agencies in the region and to the increasing importance of the UN. In 1980, the Thai women’s movement became involved in a regional protest against sex tourism and was primarily concerned with issues such as domestic violence, rape and trafficking (Tantiwiramanond and Pandey 1996: 9-10). These women’s organizations also sided with the student movement against the military. Although the student movement was leftist inspired, the women’s movement got its inspiration from Western feminism. The entire movement, however, was mainly confined to intellectuals in Bangkok and did not reach out to larger groups of people (Pandey 2003). International donors started moving in as a preparation for the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing that was held in 1995 and organizations changed from being the charitable organizations they were in the beginning of the movement to working for structural and political changes (Doneys 2002: 170-171). After the Beijing conference, however, there was a decline in the activism of women in Thai civil society. Funds had run out, and donors left Thailand considering it developed. At the same time new kinds of problems emerged that were connected to the new economy, such as human trafficking and mass layoffs of factory workers, where women were especially vulnerable.
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(Pandey 2003: 13). It has since been difficult for Thai civil society in general to solidify and become a consolidated channel for influencing the state, because of the frequent regime changes and the political instability in Thailand. Joint actions by grassroots movements and NGOs have sometimes led to state action, but they are not yet legitimate enough to serve as a natural channel through which people’s wishes are incorporated into state policy. Grassroots movements and NGOs also tend to focus on particular cases of victimization, rather than on building bridges and changing the discourse in broader segments of society (Banpasirichote 2004: 238-239).

According to Banpasirichote, the political culture in Thailand is rigid and paternalistic, thus limiting the potential impact of civil society. Because of the persistence of patron-client relationships in almost all areas of Thai society, direct political participation is commonly viewed with distrust. Although civil society has, in some cases, managed to build vertical linkages to decision makers, it has not managed to establish any broad-based public support nor has it accomplished long term political changes (Banpasirichote 2004: 242-244, 250). Instead of consolidating its influence, Thai civil society influences political outcomes through temporary demonstrations, aimed at upsetting the political order rather than working its way through it. There are, however, exceptions. For instance, women’s organizations, despite all these general problems, managed to make a concerted, coordinated, and in many ways successful effort to influence the drafting process of the 1997 Constitution (see e.g. Doneys 2002; Bjarnegård 2009b).

To gain a better understanding of this political standstill, the political system in Thailand will be discussed, in particular in terms of how democratic level and political stability affects the strength and influence of informal institutions, such as clientelism. Whether Thai politics are, indeed, clientelist, will also be discussed and analyzed.

Democratic instability in Thailand

The political history of Thailand following the end of absolute monarchy since 1932 is one of the most diverse imaginable, and the past decade has proven to be no different. Although it seemed that a democratic reform process and even consolidation were well under way during the 1990’s, this proved to be wrong when the military yet again staged a coup – the 18th since 1932 – and thus showed that the democratic system in Thailand still did not enjoy enough legitimacy for political actors to trust it would be able to cope with domestic problems. Thus, it is impossible to pinpoint one formal institutional setting that would set the stage for political actors in contemporary Thailand. Rather, the only thing constant in the Thai world of politics seems to be sudden change itself. As McCargo has rightly noted:
“what appear to be robust processes of political liberalization can rapidly give way to crises of democratic confidence” (McCargo 2002a: 112).

Figure 6. Democracy level since the end of absolute monarchy in Thailand

There is thus variation as regards the democratic level and also considerable and frequent political instability. Political actors remaining on the stage throughout regime changes often have plenty of leeway to decide to which extent they will adapt to the new regime, and which particular strategies to employ. While Thai parties often have to court democratic and military leaders and ideals at the same time, the greater institutional context they are most likely to foresee is that of an ever-changing political arena, where it is better to invest one’s power in something more consistent than a particular regime or formal institutional setting. Thai political parties, being the rational and pragmatic actors that they are, are likely to want to continue business in much the same way as usual, while making minor adaptations to conform to new formal rules. The actual practices and preferences of the parties thus certainly have an impact on how generous the openings for women are - in other words, how inclusive democracy becomes. In order to understand this stalemate in the overrepresentation of men in Thai politics, we have to understand the organizational context in which political actors are situated when operating within the political parties, and we have to understand the social and cultural expectations in the political sphere in Thailand. Although women are underrepresented in all legislative bodies of the world today, there are different localized and cultural reasons for this underrepresentation. Specific political institutions - formal and informal - help shape localized interpretations of gender roles and thus generate a demand for different types of politicians. The low numerical representation of women in Thailand thus signifies an institutional context that has been favoring male political involvement over female political involvement.
Institutions in flux

Although regime changes often come about amidst calls for far-reaching societal and political changes, and despite the fact that they are commonly loaded with an array of expectations, the type of regime in power per se has proven to be a poor predictor of male parliamentary dominance. Thailand is a perfect case in point, having, in a very short time, undergone various regime changes while political equality, in terms of greater parliamentary inclusion of women, has remained unchanged. Within the span of only a decade, Thailand has experienced regime change, democratic reform, political unrest, a military coup and a substantial reshuffling of the political boards.

The political reform process in Thailand in the wake of the economic crisis during the 1990’s received considerable scholarly attention (Phongpaichit and Baker 2000; McCargo 2002b; Laothamatas 1997; Hewison 1997). That a country that had known long-term economic growth finally democratized seemed to many a proof that modernization and industrialization eventually lead to democracy. During the first election under the new constitution, a new party, Thai Rak Thai 46 won a landslide victory and the businessman gone politician Thaksin Shinawatra became Prime Minister. In the midst of severe criticism and allegations from media, academics and activists concerning corruption, personalist rule, populist policies, the merging of business and politics, and a disregard for Human Rights, especially in the Muslim-dominated and violence-ridden areas of southern Thailand (McCargo 2002a; McCargo and Pathmanand 2005; Ockey 2005; Phongpaichit and Baker 2004), Thai Rak Thai managed to gain even more popularity among Thai voters. The election in 2005 turned out to be a tremendous success for Thai Rak Thai and a downright catastrophe for many other parties, new and old. With Thai Rak Thai gaining 377 seats out of 500, Thailand received its first ever single party government, and the power of Thaksin and his party seemed to be further confirmed while the opposition was considerably weakened (Ockey 2005: 133). Several observers pointed out that this would consolidate Thaksin’s hegemonic position as leader and that it might pose a threat to Thai democracy (Croissant and Polar 2005). The main opposition party, the Democrat party, was severely weakened everywhere but in its traditional southern strongholds and initiated an internal reform process that included the change of party leader from Banyat Bantadtan to Abhisit Vejjajiva.

A time of political unrest soon followed, sparked by the selling of a telecom company owned by the Shinawatra family to a foreign investor. Although the selling was legal, the law regarding foreign investments was amended shortly before and it was considered unethical to sell out a Thai company. In addition, people were upset that the capital gains the already

46 Thais love Thais
wealthy Shinawatra family made were exempt from tax. Neither public protests and demonstrations on the streets of Bangkok nor the dissolution of parliament and the subsequent snap election boycotted by all the major opposition parties were able to resolve the situation in a democratic manner. There was a political stalemate as the country slowly prepared for new elections. This was when the military stepped in once again, after fifteen years of decreasing military influence in politics (Ockey 2007).

In September 2006 Thailand experienced yet another military coup. This was the 18th military coup since 1932 but the first one since 1991. The coup makers, headed by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, and the subsequent government appointed by them, headed by Prime Minister and retired General Surayud Chulanont, expressed from the very beginning their conviction that the military should not be involved in politics and that they would turn the power over to the people as soon as possible (Ockey 2007). The Thai Rak Thai party and over 100 of its leading members were subsequently banned from politics in 2007. A new constitution was drafted and passed in a referendum, and another round of democratic elections was planned for (The Nation August 20, 2007), while politicians were yet again busy realigning and regrouping strategically. Most of the Thai Rak Thai politicians who were not banned from politics decided to stand for the same party, the People’s Power Party, in the first elections following the military coup – and they won once again. Protests followed, arguing that the new government was a mere puppet of Thaksin’s. Protesters in the group PAD – People’s Alliance for Democracy – in November 2008 occupied the major international airports in Bangkok, leading to a standstill in all international flights for several days. The governing party was yet again banned and the Democrat party could form a government with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva – without having actually won an election. Supporters of Thaksin and of the new parties constantly popping up after the banning of an old one called themselves UDD – United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship – dressed in red and in the spring of 2009 managed to suspend an international ASEAN summit and gain international media attention before the military dispersed the protesters.

Informal Influence

Through all these large-scale changes and high-stakes strategic games, there were several influential actors on the stage who did not act through a formally sanctioned channel, but still exerted considerable influence. Many of these informal institutions are gendered in different ways and at different societal levels. The gendering of these institutions often has to do with historical baggage or is an unintended consequence of strategic reasoning. Many arenas in Thailand are still considered to be exclusively male, and it is
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difficult for women to become accepted or to enter these arenas. This is true for the economic sector as well as for politics. The importance of informal institutions, and the necessity of the political actions they are responsible for, is usually accepted in Thai society, although these actions might not be admired. Instead, voters and politicians alike will often refer to informal institutions as a necessary evil, depicting them as something they know is not quite *comme il faut* but still, under the circumstances, unavoidable.

The importance of informal arenas and networking in business and other contexts has sometimes been highlighted internationally (see e.g. Uzzi 1999) and it has sometimes also been argued that such informal networking often takes place in arenas from which women are excluded as business partners. Morgan and Martin distinguish between heterosocial informal settings, in which women and men alike are subject to gendered societal norms, and homosocial informal settings, from which women are de facto excluded (Morgan and Martin 2006). Academic informal networking and information exchange, for instance, sometimes take place in pubs. Pubs are still, in some contexts, highly male-dominated arenas (Morgan 1981). Other examples of informal settings that are common in the business world and from which women are excluded, or where their presence is at least highly unusual, would be men-only golf courses or, more evident still, strip clubs. The fact that such informal arenas have gendered effects on the business opportunities of men and women has recently been highlighted in the literature (Morgan and Martin 2006; Jeffreys 2008).

One infamous aspect of Thai culture is prostitution, and the institution of prostitution can, in fact, be used as an illuminating example of the overall attitude of many Thais to informal influence. Because prostitution is, after all, an illegal business, it is notoriously difficult to estimate the numbers of sex workers in Thailand, but some fairly recent accounts suggest numbers between half a million and one million (Bales 2002: 214). Some surveys indicate that women who work as prostitutes actually earn rather good money, and that this is one of the reasons the sex industry draws so many women (Keyes 1984: 235-236). Another is the high demand, from foreign tourists as well as from Thai men. The royal harem was disbanded in 1910, but it is still considered a mark of high social standing for men to have a mistress. In a hierarchical society like Thailand the booming economic development in the 1990s led to an increased consumption of commercial sex. Buying sex is not an embarrassing thing that Thai men sneak away to do where no one can see; rather, it is part of a social event that takes place publicly in pubs, massage parlors, coffee shops, and karaoke bars, places that Thai men frequent with groups of male friends. Most Thais find it natural that men will want several sex partners, something that leads most men and many women to find this behavior, if not laudable, at least explicable and understandable (Bales 2002: 215-216). Meeting at so-called karaoke bars is thus an entirely accepted part of business – for men. This is perhaps an ex-
treme but nevertheless common example of an informal arena in which im-
portant discussions are held and crucial decisions informally taken - but that
is open only to men. In addition, the general attitude towards men meeting in
these kinds of arenas is that it is certainly unfortunate, but also explicable
and necessary – the very same arguments used about the political influence
of other types of informal institutions. There is very little research done on
the importance of these kinds of political informal arenas. Here, we will look
more closely at two other such male arenas that are important in Thai poli-
tics: the military and clientelist networks.

The military and political influence

The military as an institution is not informal as such, but the influence they
have had in Thai politics has often gone far beyond the political power that
this institution has been formally given. There are also many informal group-
ings within the military, sometimes with access to other influential power
centers, such as the Royal Palace and the Privy Council (the president of
which is a retired military general). The fact that politics has been male
dominated in Thailand is perhaps not as surprising regarding the military
ruled regimes as it is regarding the more democratic periods. In most cul-
tures, there are few things that are so intimately connected to masculinity,
and so consistently exclusive of femininity, as the military. This has also
been recognized in some literature within this field (Higate and Hopton
2005; Higate 2003). Hearn, for instance, notes that it is “an understatement
to say that men, militarism, and the military are historically, profoundly, and
blatantly interconnected” (Hearn 2003: xi). In Thailand this has been literally
the case, since women were not accepted as cadets to the Chulachomklao
Royal Military Academy until the 1990s (GDRI 1996: 15). Thus, women
have not had direct access to the Thai army - this political power center that
has been the direct cause of most of the coups d’état the country has experi-
enced. The greeting on the academy’s website states:

Not only are Army commissioned officers produced at Chulachomklao Royal
Military Academy, many leaders of the country are also born here.47

This is certainly true, as many of Thailand’s past Prime Ministers are Chula-
chomklao alumni, including Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsonggram, Prime
Minister and military dictator of Thailand from 1938 to 1944 and 1948 to
1957; General Prem Tinsulanonda, who was Prime Minister from 1980 to
1988 and later became president of the Privy Council; and the more recent

47 Website of Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, http://www.crma.ac.th/English/. Last
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who graduated in 1969 and led the military coup in 2006.

This has probably impeded women not only when military juntas have been in charge of the country, but also when military installed governments have been put in place in periods of transition, as well as during more democratic time periods. As argued by McCargo and Pathmanand, important and close-knit networks are formed within the Thai military, often dating back to the class at the military academy. They also mean that even during periods of relative democratic stability, it has been essential for any national politician to have linkages to and good friends within the upper echelons of the armed forces, and to make very strategic appointments with the maintenance of the military’s continued benevolence in mind (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005: 121-165). Important connections have also been made in the other direction, as some of the military structures have been slow to reform themselves and army officers have often striven to ally themselves to powerful politicians in order to remain politically influential. As the military’s role has gradually become more complex, it has been more important for its officers to become part of patron–client networks and to thereby solidify their power both locally and nationally (Samudavanija 1997: 54-57).

Following the military coup of 2006 the junta leading the coup as well as the junta-appointed Prime Minister Surayud repeatedly referred to themselves as reluctant coup makers. They were all in agreement that military coups are not laudable or desirable and that the ideal state of things is that the military does not become involved in politics. Yet, the coup was seen as an unfortunate necessity to save the country and they pleaded to the public to consider the special circumstances. Military influence in politics has thus remained a perceivable possibility throughout political reform periods in Thailand, and any person wishing to distinguish him- or herself politically would thus be wise to carefully cultivate his or her relationship to the army.

The role of the military is more accentuated at the central political level in Thailand, and it has often changed the route of national politics. It does, however, not play a decisive part in local election campaigns, and connections to the military are not necessarily conducive to electoral support. At the local constituency level there are thus other types of informal networks – often stretching all the way up to the central level and merging with the informal groups within the military – but still distinctly separate in terms of how they work and function. A researcher of the Thai military and its involvement in politics says:

> In high and low national politics, there are different systems at play. The military support is essential for higher levels, but for choosing the constituency candidates, vote buying needs to be employed.48

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48 Interview no. 9. Ukrist Pathmanand, Chulalongkorn University. February 16, 2005.
Political parties, institutionalization and clientelism

While the formal political framework has been ever-changing in the Thai political context, political actors have striven to achieve some kind of stability that will last beyond constitutional changes and regime alterations. Patron-client relationships and the electoral networks that often follow with them have been central to Thai politics for a long time (Vichit Vadakan 2008), even more so, many would argue, than the political parties. When discussing formal and informal institutions and their respective relationships to political party organizations, it is difficult to escape the larger discussion on institutionalization. Institutionalization can refer to the entire party system, to individual party organizations or to particular party procedures (Randall and Svåsand 2002). For an entire party system to be institutionalized, actors should share the belief that the system as such will endure. Such an expectation will, according to Mainwaring, shape attitudes as well as behavior in the political sphere (1998). In an institutionalized party system, there is stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave. Change, while not completely precluded, is limited (Mainwaring 1998: 69). Huntington has called it “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (Huntington 1968: 12). For instance, a system in which even major parties regularly appear and disappear is considered to be weakly institutionalized. Likewise, a system in which politicians regularly change parties is not considered institutionalized (Mainwaring 1998: 69-70). Several researchers emphasize the particularly weak institutionalization of party systems in new democracies (Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Randall and Svåsand 2002).

The Thai party system would probably not qualify as an institutionalized party system were these criteria to be applied. As we have seen, political actors are more likely to foresee change than stability in the political system. Parties, like other political institutions, are for the most part not permanent actors on the political arena, although individual politicians might be. The one exception would be the Democrat party that was founded over 60 years ago. The now defunct Thai Rak Thai was founded in 1998 but many of its senior executives and candidates moved over from other political parties and were thus no newcomers to politics. The founder Thaksin Shinawatra himself came from Chart Pattana. Thai Rak Thai is also typical of most Thai political parties in that it was relatively short-lived as an organization. Despite its huge influence on Thai politics, it did not even last a decade. When Thai Rak Thai was disbanded in 2006, it reappeared under the name of People’s Power Party. This was a small, already existing party without parliamentary representation that simply took on most of Thai Rak Thai’s former Members of Parliament. Again, in 2008, People’s Power Party was disbanded, but as this was foreseen, they already had an organization in place.
for a swift rebirth under the name of Puea Thai, also an existing minor party without previous parliamentary seats.

When it comes to the institutionalization of individual parties, there is disagreement as to exactly what it entails. It has been argued that party institutionalization has to do with aptitude for ideological and rule flexibility (Caul Kittilson 2006), with internal procedures and with reification of the party in people’s minds (Randall and Svåsand 2002), with the differentiation from the surrounding environment or with the complexity in organizational structure (Polsby 1968). The one factor on which there seems to be rather strong agreement is that institutionalization, at any rate, has to do with whether the rules of the party organization are implemented and followed (Polsby 1968: 144-145; Panebianco 1988: 58-60). Freidenberg and Levitsky usefully qualify this picture. Using this simple conceptualization, they argue, all procedures diverging from written rules would be deemed noninstitutionalized, something with which they do not agree. They argue that informal organizational activity with partisan functions but carried out by networks that are not officially sanctioned (thus departing from formal rules) might nevertheless be institutionalized in the sense that the functions are widely known, accepted and enforced (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006: 180). In this vein, there is a need to distinguish between three distinct party types:

(1) **formally institutionalized** parties, in which rules and organizational structures are institutionalized in line with party statutes; (2) **informally institutionalized** parties, in which formal structures are weak but informal structures are well established; and (3) **weakly institutionalized** parties, in which neither formal nor informal structures are well established (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006: 180-181).

In the second category Freidenberg and Levitsky would place patronage-oriented machine parties or clientelist parties, whereas personalistic or charismatic parties would fit in the third category. Both types depart from formal rules, but in the former category the procedures are still enacted in a manner that is predicted by all those involved (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006). Such a party organization is weak in terms of its formal structure but strong in terms of its informal clientelist structures. Moreover, such parties often, but do not necessarily, work in electoral contexts where large parts of the entire party system, or even political system, are unstable and in flux, which is why the institutionalization of the clientelist logic presents a rare possibility for stability and status quo.

As McCargo has argued, Thai parties cannot be easily situated along Western ideological lines or measured with Western political systems as the model. Instead, he suggests, research should be designed to look at how Thai political parties really function (McCargo 1997). The above characterization, however, does, not focus on the ideological orientation of political parties,
but on the formal and informal influence on the internal party organization. As such it encompasses the study of non-Western parties. Considering the volatility of all past election laws in Thailand, it may not come as a surprise that few, if any, researchers of Thai political parties have come to the conclusion that Thai political parties are, in general, formally institutionalized in the sense that they stick to the electoral law and, in the long run, seek to adapt their internal organization and regulations accordingly. Instead, researchers agree that parties as organizations are weak in Thailand. In fact, most political parties in Thailand are really made up of political factions, or cliques of individuals, and politics has commonly been centered around these factions and around certain individuals rather than around parties and party policies (Ockey 2003: 670-671, 2004: 22-27).

The similarities between the different Thai parties are more pronounced than the differences. McCargo describes the now banned party Thai Rak Thai as a party that was “at heart a collection of self-interested cliques unburdened by any program or ideology and united by little more than shared opportunism – in short, a traditional Thai political party” (McCargo 2002a: 116). Thai parties are generally seen as being rather far from mass membership parties, nor can they boast active and participating party branches (McCargo 1997; Ockey 2003, 2004). The Democrat party would, again, be the one possible exception here as it, to some extent, has a widespread organization of active party branches throughout the country. Thai Rak Thai did not have many branches in its formal organization, but its informal networks were nevertheless institutionalized, often well-organized and reached into almost every village. Whereas the Democrat party draw their support largely from elite circles and have their strongest vote base in the South and in Bangkok, Thai Rak Thai was extremely successful in the poor countryside, particularly in the northeastern parts of Thailand. The Democrat party usually describes themselves as a royalist party that looks out for the long-term good of the Thai people, while it has been argued that Thai Rak Thai was the first party that made concrete policies a campaign issue. Critics, however, claim that their policies were populist, short-sighted and nothing but large-scale vote buying – thus the old style politics all over again, albeit skillfully wrapped in a new package.

The drafting of new election laws and whole constitutions have become wrapped up in the strategic games of the political parties and are increasingly seen as mere power crafting tools of the party presently in power. Thailand in modern times has had a large number of constitutions – almost as many as military coups – and neither constitutions nor laws are seen as living documents that are supposed to apply in the long run. Presently, the disbanding of a political party comes with an ensuing political ban on its senior politicians - a recent election law designed to make it more difficult for political actors to simply switch parties when their party is banned. Usually, when a party is disbanded, the members of its executive board are
banned from politics for five years, and even stripped of their basic political rights, such as the right to vote. According to some political actors, this just further weakens the rule of law and the respect for formal institutions and instead makes formal partisan arrangements mere showcases. One former senior member of Thai Rak Thai, now banned from politics but influential behind the scenes in Puea Thai and with good connections to Thaksin, thinks that in the future, few parties are likely to put their most influential politicians on the executive boards. Instead, he thinks parties will realize it is more strategic to let important individuals primarily act informally, behind the scenes, whereas the people on the boards, constantly risking the political ban, will be put there as mere figureheads, without any real political influence.\(^49\) This is a perfect example of how institutional instability and weak rule of law render informal arrangements the only strategic way to do business. The weak institutional framework can be illustrated by the declining slope of quality of government, as measured by ICRG, which has consistently gone down since the economic crisis in the mid-nineties.

\[\text{Figure 7. Quality of government (ICRG) in Thailand 1985-2005}\]

In the absence of parties as strong political abodes and constitutions and election laws as respected rules of the game, informal institutions and connections have gained prevalence in the Thai political sphere. These informal concerns are often filtered through formal arrangements within the political parties. This is typically the case with clientelism. Voters expect direct and personal help in the form of more or less clientelistic transactions. Being a successful patron is in many ways equal to being a successful politician (Ockey 2004: 6-9). Most observers thus argue that it is very difficult to es-

\(^{49}\) Interview no. 50. Pongthep Thepkanchana, former Thai Rak Thai Party Executive. November 12, 2008.
cape the clientelist logic in Thai rural politics. The key lies in being able to build, maintain, and use electoral networks efficiently, and it is here that the gendered aspects of clientelism come in. The clientelist networks of politicians and canvassers, called hua khanaen networks, often build on connections between national-level politicians and local-level politicians (Ockey 2004: 27-33). Clientelist networks usually extend all the way from the party candidate down to the lowest village level. One reason these networks have become so stabilized is, according to Ockey, that Thai national politics has seldom been concerned with issues of interest to local communities and poor people (Ockey 2003: 27). Instead, people have had to rely on local notables for help in their daily lives. This has brought about a patron-client system that is still in place today. Constituency politicians are obliged to establish themselves as patrons who can offer the welfare that the larger political system can not (Brusco et al. 2004: 84). Moreover, women are, in practice, not present in these large, influential networks – neither as patrons nor as clients or canvassers, a topic we will have ample reason to return to.

These networks, so central to the political world of Thailand, are also of an informal character. The best example of Thai bonding social networks is the phak puaks, peer groups or circles of close friends, that are of immense importance in politics, as well as in business or in the military – or in almost any Thai person’s personal and professional life. It has been described as the only relationship in Thailand that can rival family relationships in terms of the demand for a Thai person’s loyalty (Welty 2004). These phak puaks play a significant role in Thai politics, as they fill the empty space left by the weak political party organization in the provinces (Nelson 2005: 7). A significant feature of these groups is that the local politicians, officeholders and supporters who are members of them feel they share an identity and that they can easily identify people who do not belong to their phak puak. Belonging to the same phak puak facilitates cooperation (Nelson 2005: 9). Yet, phak puaks are of an informal character to the extent that people are often unable to explain or describe the ties that bind them to a particular phak puak. Nelson explains that

Citizens who are interested to participate in provincial politics cannot ask for a form to apply for membership; cliques do not have branch offices or regular meetings to discuss policies, nor would one find newsletters published to advertise a clique’s political achievements and to broaden its membership base (Nelson 2001: 317).

He further emphasizes their informality by claiming that

instead of formal political party structures or citizen-directed political activities, we find informal – meaning essentially private and exclusive, mostly invisible – local politician groups or cliques, called phak puak” (Nelson 2005: 9).
Many accounts demonstrate that Thai politicians are, first and foremost, interested in providing general services to their constituencies, hoping that these services will be interpreted as a favor from the individual politician, rather than from the party (Ockey 2004: 44). Direct vote buying is one important and recurring detail in this larger pattern. In order to administer vote buying, in particular, the large networks are essential (Arghiros 2000; Callahan 2005; Callahan and McCargo 1996; Nelson 2005). Linked to this, we can also note that general corruption levels have been consistent and rather high in Thailand in the past years. On the ICRG scale used in the quantitative analysis, corruption has long been a prominent feature of the Thai political landscape, but it has recently been even more accentuated, which is illustrated by rising figures in the table below. Corruption in Thailand is thus rife both high and low and in business as well as politics.

![Figure 8. Corruption (ICRG) in Thailand 1985-2005](image)

Being a politician active at the local level in Thailand is certainly gendered in itself. Just as with the military, women have been formally excluded from this arena for a long time. It was only after 1982 that women were even legally allowed to become village heads or heads of subdistricts (Doneys 2002: 167; Funston 2001: 337). More than 20 years later, the traditional institutions like village heads and sub-district heads are particularly male dominated with 96.7 and 97.6 percent men among elected officials, respectively. It looks only slightly better at the provincial level, where 4.8 percent of the provincial council members and 6.6 percent of the municipality council members are women (UNDP 2006b: 26-27). General claims that it is easier for women to participate politically at local levels are thus proved wrong in the case of Thailand, and there are important consequences of this at the national level.
There are also indications that the construction of local politicians in Thailand is still strongly associated with maleness. As was argued in the theory chapter, male hegemonic role models for politicians probably exist everywhere, but they cannot be readily exported from one context to another. Instead, they need to be culturally specific and contextualized. Thus, in the Thai context, the word nakleng, for instance, was formerly used to connote a tough charismatic youth who was always loyal to his phak puak. Nakleng was and is closely associated with manliness and power (Ockey 2004: 7,10). His basic motive used to be to protect the village, owing to the local administration’s inefficiency in maintaining law and order (Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1994). Now the nakleng is often used to refer to a provincial politician who is unable to have face-to-face patron-client ties but who exhibits manliness, power and, above all, generosity in terms of vote buying, roads, and constituency contributions. His loyalty and generosity is nowadays extended to encompass the entire constituency (Ockey 2004: 16-17). According to Pasuk, the term jao pho, or godfather, occupies some of the same cultural space as does the nakleng (Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1994) – with one important difference: the role of the jao pho is open also to women, although it is not common. The female version is called jao mae, and can simply be translated as godmother. The difference between nakleng and jao pho is that jao pho are of a more financial and businesslike character. Women have always been active as entrepreneurs in the economic sphere in Thailand, so that could explain why there are jao maes but no female naklengs. Jao phos are often engaged in criminal activity, and their influence is sometimes province-wide (Ockey 2004: 102).

Assessing the clientelist political logic

Despite the consensus that clientelism is a strong feature in Thai politics, it is of course not self-evident that all political networks in Thailand can be labeled clientelist. But in order for me to analyze how clientelist networks are gendered, I need first to determine whether I can confidently label the networks studied as clientelist. I need, in other words, to situate not only the case of Thailand at large, but also the studied networks, my study objects, in relation to the larger variables.

My starting-point when selecting the networks was fairly neutral: the political party candidates in the chosen constituency and the people who work politically for them (administratively or with campaign work). Through central party contacts, I established contact with the candidate for each party in the constituency. If that was not possible, I went to the local Election Commission Office for more information. I simply asked the candidate to direct me to people who had either helped him or her in his/her political career or who instead helped him or her with campaign work. Simply based on this
starting point, it could well be that I ended up studying networks that were very far from being clientelist.

I mapped the candidate’s network as far as possible and talked to as many members of it as possible. My focus was on the vertical depth, rather than the horizontal width, of the network, because I wanted to determine how the networks were organized hierarchically. Each candidate needs networks covering the entire constituency, so I needed to focus on the vertical extension of the networks in some localities. Interview questions regarding clientelism focused on practical details of the campaign organization, on how they perceive a good politician, how they happened to become politically active and how they recruit new members (at whichever level they are). The purpose was to assess whether the resources with which political party candidates compete in Thailand are predominantly clientelist or ideological. Thus, in order to determine whether the perceptions of the participants in the researched political networks in Thailand match a clientelistic logic, I employ the two-dimensional ideal type with clientelism, on the one hand, and ideology, on the other, that has been used throughout the book to define clientelism. Each dimension has two indicators drawn from the previous theoretical discussion. By comparing the political logic of the local network members and politicians partaking in this study, as expressed by themselves, to these two theoretical dimensions, the analysis below will determine whether they view politics in general as predominantly clientelist or ideological. As in all analyses with ideal types, there is no clear-cut division between the two dimensions employed, nor should there be. People are not expected to express perceptions of reality that are in perfect accordance with either of these ideal typical dimensions. Likewise, they can express political logic in accordance with both at the same time or none at all. Most political networks anywhere in the world probably display elements of both dimensions and it is thus not a matter of “either-or”, but rather a matter of determining which of the two extremes the networks investigated are closest to. Most political networks anywhere in the world probably display elements of both dimensions and it is thus not a matter of “either-or”, but rather a matter of determining which of the two extremes the networks investigated are closest to.

The main point is that it is possible to discern tendencies inform me as to whether the networks studied are, in fact, fruitful networks to look at in an investigation of clientelism.

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50 See questionnaires in appendix.
51 It is also theoretically possible to mix the two categories. For instance, it is possible to have a personalistic party headed by a charismatic leader who campaigns with policy promises rather than direct services. Combinations of the two categories are, however, not of primary interest here.
Table 9. *Indicators of political logic, clientelism vs. ideology*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A: Clientelism</th>
<th>B: Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a – SERVICE-ORIENTED VIEW</strong></td>
<td><strong>b – POLICY-ORIENTED VIEW</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on particularistic services, personal favors, pork-barrel politics, material benefits, financial support or vote buying.</td>
<td>Focus on ideological stance, universal policies, systemic changes, policy clearness, country-wide legal reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a – EMPHASIS ON PERSON</strong></td>
<td><strong>b – EMPHASIS ON PARTY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on person, personal acts, personal resources, personal characteristics, kinship, friendship and affection, reforms in constituency attributed to a person, personal networks, campaign for a person, personal office</td>
<td>Focus on party, party program, public party resources, party organization, common policy goals, ideological agreement, party membership, reforms in constituency attributed to party, party networks, campaign for party, party office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Service- or policy-oriented view?**

People in the leadership of both the Democrat party and Thai Rak Thai acknowledged that vote buying and patron-client relationships exist and emphasized the problems they create for the party organization. Although both parties had quite large memberships, one may call into question what membership in a Thai party entails, as the secretary-general of the Democrat party pointed out one area in northeastern Thailand where the party had only received 2,000 votes despite having 16,000 members listed.\(^{52}\) Membership cards are generally seen as a shortcut to privileges. Even though party regulations state that party membership fees should be collected, this is very seldom enforced, because it is in conflict with the logic of a patron-client relationship where the supporters, being the clients, are expected to receive, not to give.\(^{53}\) The then Thai Rak Thai party executive Pongthep claimed that if they attempted to collect membership fees, they would simply have no members.\(^{54}\)

The privileges that could be collected by party members were also emphasized by constituency candidates and members of the local networks. The


\(^{54}\) Interview no. 35. Pongthep Thepkanjana, Party Executive for the Thai Rak Thai party. January 24, 2006.
benefits that could be enjoyed by the holder of a party card seemed varied. One canvasser explained:

If you show someone the party card because you have no money, if you are lost or something, you will receive help and money. It is the same for all parties. Parties take very good care of their members. Thai Rak Thai takes good care of its members, and gives them something.55

When asked about their own personal political standing, or about what the important campaign issues were, common responses among members of the local networks concerned getting help with whatever you need, getting budgets for local development projects to the village or area, or receiving personal advice or favors. Direct vote buying was one, but far from the only ingredient of this support system. One candidate said that the support system still permeates the political system in Thailand, but that, as a result of new election laws, it has become increasingly directed towards entire communities instead of towards individual persons.56 This view seemed to be widespread. An assistant of a Democrat party branch chairman in an urban area described the work at the office:

If there are inconveniences like drainage, roads, electricity, trouble – they come here, and I coordinate to the organization that takes care of that. […] To build up this area and make it stronger, we are looking for people’s needs. We help people get what they ask for. […] Some children can not go to a school because it is full, but whenever the Democrats ask, they can go to school.57

Certainly, politicians in every country are likely to engage in constituency service in the sense that they want to develop the particular area they represent, and this is likely to be a campaign issue in most political campaigns. The difference is that many of the projects described above were not part of any budget planning or specified in a long-term policy that would benefit the constituents universally – rather they were implemented as particularized services to the people who had supported the candidate in the election. Particularly in the poorer areas of northeastern Thailand, this kind of provision of resources and services in exchange for political support retains its most direct form: vote buying. Here, vote buying was still rampant and accepted as a common way of campaigning. Most people interviewed in this area confessed to buying votes or having been offered vote-buying money, and it

55 Interview no. 74. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006.
56 Interview no. 128. Female Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Haa, March 2006.
was seen as necessary albeit perhaps not a sufficient means to achieving electoral success. In other areas, as well, people talked about vote buying as the common way of doing political business, as being almost “automatic” and very “systematic”, and not directly involving the important people in the political parties, but brokers, closer to the people. The money is put in envelopes and delivered to households by the canvassers.\(^58\) One party broker illustrates how he is, at the same time, the link between the higher party echelons and the canvassers, but without really knowing where the money comes from or where it is going:

As far as I know, we spend about five or six million baht on buying votes in this area. That is what I estimate. But I do not know how much is from the party and how much is directly from the candidate. I get the money, but I do not ask where it comes from. About one million is transferred through the bank accounts, the rest is cash money. […] We keep a registry of all canvassers, but it is the power of the tambon person to work with people in the villages. […] This is already a Democrat area, so we don’t need to pay more than 100 baht per vote.\(^59\)

As in the general public’s attitude toward prostitution or as in the military generals’ own attempts to justify military influence in politics, vote buying is generally described as unfortunate but necessary and explicable. In some of the constituencies where there was a close struggle between the different parties, paying just a little bit more per household, and just a little bit closer to the election than the rival party were strategies definitely thought to increase the chances of winning.\(^60\) The problem with vote buying is, according to the director of a provincial election commission, that people as well as political candidates are so used to it that they expect it to happen. If the election law becomes harsher, vote buying does not disappear, it only changes. He claims that whereas before the money was distributed the night before the election, now the relationships have become even more long term, and payments are made before or after the election law is in effect.\(^61\) Canvassers in the same area, however, claim that timing is still crucial and that the declining support for the Democrat party in the area is partly due to the fact that they have to pay for votes a full week before the election, whereas Thai

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\(^{59}\) Interview no. 72. Male Canvassers with financial responsibilities for a branch of the Democrat party, Constituency Nung. May 2006.

\(^{60}\) Interview no. 72. Two Male Canvassers with financial responsibilities for a branch of the Democrat party, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 73. TRT Canvasser and Kamnan, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 86. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party in neighboring constituency to Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no.

\(^{61}\) Interview no. 65. Director of Provincial Election Commission, Constituency Nung. May 2006.
Rak Thai can do it on the day before. Because villages are full of govern-
ment-run military and police the day before the election, they claim that only
canvassers from the ruling party can be active and that, at least in some
cases, villagers tend to remember who they got money from last. One can-
didate directly connects his electoral success to vote buying:

I lost because I did not pay for votes. You look like a young tree, but you
have to get fertilizer. Next election I did not pay for votes again, and lost
again. The third time I bought votes, and won. I followed the suggestions of
the people.63

The policy dimension is, however, also present and manifest in the interview
material, but there is a marked difference between how much it was empha-
sized by the central leaders of both parties, and how little it was emphasized
by constituency candidates and local networks. Here, there was also a dis-
cernable difference between the two parties. Whereas Thai Rak Thai repre-
sentatives and members mentioned several concrete policies, such as the
30 baht for health care reform, the one million baht per village fund, and the
suspension of debt program, Democrat officials and supporters were gener-
ally much more vague in their policy discussions, talking more about achiev-
ing real democracy for the country, about the history of the party, and about
the dangers they saw in one party having parliamentary majority.64

Thus, just like many political observers and researchers have noted, Thai
Rak Thai did succeed in transferring the grassroots voters’ demand for tan-
gible benefits into country-wide policies, thus creating a political logic
probably situated somewhere in between the two dimensions. The services
traditionally generated by the old support system were translated into univer-
sal policies by Thai Rak Thai. The success of Thai Rak Thai was commonly
attributed to its clear and practical policies for grassroots people.65 A candi-
date that, on the other hand, switched parties from Thai Rak Thai to the De-
mocrats was more ambiguous:

62 Interview no. 72. Two Male Democrat Canvassers with financial responsibilities for the
63 Interview no. 80. Male Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party in neighboring
64 E.g. interview no. 38. Suthep Thaugsuban, secretary-general of the Democrat party. January
31, 2006; Interview no. 47. Varathep Ratanakorn, Thai Rak Thai Party List Candidate and
65 E.g. Interview no. 4. Kavi Chongkittavorn, Senior Editor of the Nation (lecture and discus-
sion). January 31, 2005; Interview no. 47. Varathep Ratanakorn, Thai Rak Thai Party List
I still like the TRT policy. They are concrete policies that happen fast. In the long run, though, it is not good, people don’t know how to do things by themselves.\textsuperscript{66}

This is more in accordance with the general economic standpoint of the Democrat party. In terms of economical issues, their campaign focused on promoting the Thai King’s economic theory – the self-sufficiency theory – the essence of which is to not consume more than you actually need.\textsuperscript{67}

Thus, despite somewhat mixed messages (as was expected from an analysis using ideal typical comparisons), what can be concluded is that a service-type of political logic was still very much present in the Thai political system, particularly in rural areas, and among the politicians and voters who are active there. The populist policies of Thai Rak Thai did bring about a more policy-oriented election campaign to some extent, but they far from excluded vote buying or constituency services.

**Emphasis on party or person?**

Regarding the emphasis on person or party, the result of the analysis partly depends on who is asked. Leading party officials naturally hoped that their constituency candidates would work for the party, but they also expected them to already have or to establish their own personal networks in order to win in their constituency. The party leader of the Democrats also said that the party preferred if the candidate could finance his/her own campaign, and that they often made deals with these candidates that they would not get any financial support from the party.\textsuperscript{68} The election system in place at the time gave each voter two votes, one for a proportional party list, and one for a majoritarian system constituency candidate in a single member district\textsuperscript{69}. This system contributed to a split focus on the party, on the one hand, and the person, on the other. Comments like: “people vote for the person and for the party list”\textsuperscript{70} were rather common, and imply that the partisan consideration on the part of the voter was reserved for the party list vote, whereas his or her preferences for a person could be expressed in the constituency votes. It was, however, not possible for a candidate to stand for election independently, so each constituency candidate was fielded by a political party and

\textsuperscript{66} Interview no. 86. Male Democrat Constituency Candidate in neighboring constituency to Constituency Nung. May 2006.

\textsuperscript{67} Interview no. 37. Suthep Thaugsuban, Secretary General for the Democrat party. January 27, 2006.

\textsuperscript{68} Interview no. 30. Abhisit Vejjajiva. Democrat Deputy Party Leader (shortly to be selected Party Leader). February 25, 2005.

\textsuperscript{69} This election system subsequently changed following the military coup and the new constitution, and is thus no longer in place.

\textsuperscript{70} Interview no. 125. Male Assistant to Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party in a neighboring constituency to Constituency Haa. March 2006.
thus had the perceived responsibility of running not one, but two parallel election campaigns. One candidate says:

I have to have both a party campaign and a personal campaign. I have one poster for the party and one personal poster.71

Even if most candidates attributed their chances of winning the election to a combination of their party and their personality72 there was another type of connection that was often given prominence when the success of candidates was discussed: kinship. Candidates from both parties emphasized their family connections, prominent ancestors and their relatives’ general standing in the area as important for their success. Personal networks were often inherited from parents and new candidates attributed at least part of their success to the community’s respect and gratitude for what their fathers had accomplished.73 One former governor described how he campaigned for his nephew:

I say that he is a good boy, and that his father and grandfather are good men. His great-great-grandfather was a governor […]. They are an old and respectable family in the area.74

However, managing, maintaining and controlling such networks is no small endeavor, even if they are inherited. All candidates interviewed described the burden of the everlasting duty of not only having to deliver the services asked for, but also showing villagers that you care about them and remain close to them by, for instance, participating in local ceremonies and parties, and giving personal advice in difficult situations. Politicians thus hardly saw themselves as someone who delivers and implements the party policy in the area and were much closer to picturing themselves as someone with a per-

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72 E.g. interview no. 64. Male Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party, Pilot study area, March 2005; Interview no. 98. Male village level canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Saem. June 2006; Interview no. 116. Male canvasser for the Democrat party, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
73 Interview no. 80. Male Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party in neighboring constituency to Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 86. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party in neighboring constituency to Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 87. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Song. April 2006; Interview no. 101. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Saem; June 2006; Interview no. 118. Female Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Sii. February 2006; Interview no. 128. Female Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Haa. March 2006; Interview no. 143. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Haa. March 2006.
74 Interview no. 102. Former governor and uncle of Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Saem. June 2006.
sonal responsibility for and involvement in the lives of the constituents. One candidate who had won nine times said:

Since I became the representative, I have looked after and cared for the people. [...] I join any events, and I get invitation cards all the time. I never leave the people and they never leave me. Today, I just got back from a wedding, and yesterday I went to a funeral.  

Candidates also say that whenever they do something for their constituents, like construct a new road or build a bridge, they make sure it is named after the candidate (not after the party) so that constituents will remember who it is from. The candidate’s own sense of duty in this particular area was almost perfectly mirrored in the views of the local networks when they talked either about why a particular person was a good or bad politician, or about what a good or bad politician should do in general. They should clearly be easy-going, they should be willing to sit down on the floor and talk with people and attend as many community events as possible. In addition, a really good politician also has the power and authority to solve personal problems:

He has built up credit for a long time. When someone kills someone they ask him for advice and get help to go away happily. [...] He is an example of a politician who supports people. With him, people dare not deny him. If he gives 10,000 baht for 100 votes, he gets 80 or 90. Another person might get 20 or 30 for the same amount. He is sharp and authoritarian, and what he says, he gets it, right on the spot. [...] If he says it, it is right.

Partisanship also gave some credit, however. The Democrat party was perceived as having the strength that comes from being an old party with loyal followers. One candidate, whose grandfather was one of the founders of the party, said that the Democrat party is like his family. The Democrat party also has over 100 local branch offices, where people elected to the branch committee often remained committed to the party and claimed they would support the candidate of the party whoever it might be. One former candidate explains the relationship between supporters and the party:

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75 Interview no. 96. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Saem. June 2006.
76 Interview no. 96. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Saem. June 2006; Interview no. 128. Female Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Haa. March 2006.
77 Interview no. 106. Male Canvasser, Assistant to Constituency Candidate and relative of local strongman, Constituency Saem. June 2006.
78 Interview no. 143. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Haa. March 2006.
79 E.g. interview no. 72. Two male canvassers for the Democrat party, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 88. Male canvasser and office worker for the Democrat party, Constituency Song. April 2006; Interview no. 126. Male canvasser for the Democrat party, Con-
People who support the Democrat party are faithful and really love the party. Once they become supporters, they really love the party.\textsuperscript{80} Thai Rak Thai, on the other hand, also had its advantages as a party with its recent landslide victories, a charismatic Prime Minister, and policies popular among the grassroots to lean against. In some areas, the popularity of Thai Rak Thai was so overwhelming that jokes went around saying that a lamp-post would win the election, as long as it was fielded as a Thai Rak Thai candidate.\textsuperscript{81} Some Thai Rak Thai supporters thought it was obvious that the party had done a good job and attributed the fact that the area had become more developed and that people seemed to lead better lives to Prime Minister Thaksin.\textsuperscript{82} The name of Thaksin was seen as crucial to the Thai Rak Thai success, and choosing his campaign trail and the exact places where he was to rally were thus decisions of great electoral importance. The appearance of Thaksin had an enormous impact on the local support for Thai Rak Thai. There was thus still a strong emphasis on the person, but on someone not directly connected to the constituency, and who was, on the other hand, almost synonymous with his own party. One member of the party says:

\begin{quote}
I joined Thai Rak Thai especially because of the leader of the party. I have been interested in politics since I was very young, but none of the parties satisfied me. No one had an international outlook like Thaksin has. He can negotiate with people abroad.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

One good way to compare what emphasis is put on person versus party is to study constituencies in which the candidate changed party affiliation, and to look at how the network surrounding this candidate reacted – by staying in the party or by changing parties along with the candidate. As mentioned before, switching parties is quite common in Thailand – among candidates as well as among supporters. Part of Thai Rak Thai’s initial success can be attributed more or less directly to their recruitment of already popular politicians. Several of the candidates interviewed had switched parties, motivating the switch by saying that their local networks had urged them to do so. Commonly mentioned reasons were also that it would be easier to get budgets for local development if you were a candidate for the government side and that

\textsuperscript{80} Interview no. 99. Male former Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Saem. June 2006.
\textsuperscript{81} Interview no. 63. Female Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Pilot study area. March 2005.
\textsuperscript{82} Interview no. 74. Male canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 134. Male canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and former village head, Constituency Haa. March 2006.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview no. 98. Male village level canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Saem. June 2006.
polls showed that the other party would win, so the best chance of becoming an MP was to change parties.\textsuperscript{84}

It used to be more about the person, and people still care for the person. But nowadays it has changed, and people also care about the party. So we thought it was a good combination with me working for Thai Rak Thai. [...] I have moved from several parties. [...] I am not an idealist person – I can be in politics with whichever party that makes me win. It does not matter what the ideology of the party is.\textsuperscript{85}

Local networks often split when a candidate changed parties\textsuperscript{86}, but the lion’s share of the inner network that were actively working as canvassers had often worked with the candidate for a long time and moved with the person.\textsuperscript{87} In one area, the expected votes for the party and for the person could be calculated after a candidate had switched parties to a smaller and rather insignificant party and thus reduced his votes from 26,000 to 18,000 in the area. It was thus estimated that about 8,000 votes of the original 26,000 came from voters who primarily voted for the party, whereas the majority of voters stayed with the person.\textsuperscript{88} In most cases, there are several intertwined hierarchies in the constituencies, and if a single candidate changes parties, but the strongman of the region stays put, the chances are that fewer supporters will join. Thus, in Constituency Sii, the constituency candidate changed parties when her party list patron decided to do so, and won the seat. In constituency Nung, on the other hand, a constituency candidate changed parties without the knowledge and support of the local strongman:

When Klahan tried to bring the real supporters with him, he could not, only the newer ones. Most supporters belong to Virote, and Klahan could not take them. He only took very few of those. Ninety percent of the canvassers were always with Virote, no matter what. Ten percent depends. We were not really checking, because Klahan had his separate team even when he was a candi-

\textsuperscript{84} Interview no. 96. Male constituency candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Saem. June 2006; Interview no. 118. Female constituency candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Sii. February 2006.

\textsuperscript{85} Interview no. 96. Male constituency candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Saem. June 2006.

\textsuperscript{86} Interview no. 69. Male Democrat party branch manager, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 98. Male village level canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Saem. June 2006.

\textsuperscript{87} Interview no. 74. Male canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 77. Male canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 97. Male canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Saem. June 2006; Interview no. 112. Male canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and village head, Constituency Sii. February 2006.

\textsuperscript{88} Interview no. 72. Two Male Democrat Canvassers with financial responsibilities for the Democrat branch.
date. They were the people who used to work for his Dad. He came with a big group, but when he left, he had less.89

One useful indicator is to take a look at the party office in each constituency and where it is situated in the five different constituencies. In all but one constituency, an urban constituency, party offices were, in reality, personal offices that were either directly connected to the candidate’s house, or housed in the same building as the candidate’s other businesses. In one of the offices, old stickers from the candidate’s former party were still on display. That canvassers consider their personal attachment is also evident when they describe their campaigning. In order not to upset any member of another party who also asked them for help, some canvassers decided to help several parties. They also draw on their personal relationship to voters, sometimes asking people who were reluctant to vote for their party if they would not consider giving one or two of the household votes to the party in question, as a personal favor.90 One canvasser for the Democrat party even shared his own household votes with other parties in order to maintain a good relationship to important politicians in the area:

In my house, I told two of my children to vote for Thai Rak Thai. It is about sharing votes. Niran was the Thai Rak Thai candidate, and we knew each other. You have to help, and since he himself came to ask me I felt I needed to give him something.91

To sum up, individual politicians remain crucial in Thai politics, due to their close connections to the communities and to members of their networks. Parties also have loyal followers, and do have some legitimacy of their own, but the perception among politicians seemed to be that parties in their own right were assessed by their voters on the party list ballot and that the constituency ballot was reserved for a vote for a particular person. The challenge for most canvassers and politicians alike seemed to be to convince voters that the particular combination of party and candidate that they represented was a particularly desirable one.

Are networks clientelist?
The above analysis has shown that the members of the political networks studied in Thailand understood and described the political landscape in which they functioned as a predominantly clientelist one. Although parties

91 Interview no. 79. Male district level canvasser for the Democrat party and former tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006.
and policies did have an impact on Thai politics in many ways, clientelism, as operationalized by “a service-oriented view on politics” and “an emphasis on the person” was still considered to be a highly significant feature of the Thai political landscape in general, and of the five constituencies in my study in particular. As such, it is also likely to be acted upon by the members of the political networks, and it is thus possible for me to conclude that I am, indeed, dealing with networks that have, at the very least, significant elements of that which I am attempting to analyze.

The Thai case: clientelism and male dominance

This chapter has aimed at situating the Thai case in relation to the main variables investigated in this thesis. Although this chapter has brought considerable nuances and paradoxical developments into the open, this is nothing more than what is expected when moving from a quantitative to a qualitative approach. Thailand should still be seen as a highly typical case of that which I wish to study: the relationship between clientelism and male dominance. In other words, Thailand can be found right on the regression line in the statistical model. When employing the interaction model, Model 5, to calculate expected values and inserting the real values of the independent variables for Thailand in 2005, the model predicts the real male parliamentary dominance at 89.2 percent men in parliament almost exactly.

As we have seen, the Thai political landscape is highly unstable both in terms of democratic level and in terms of frequent interruptions. Thai democracy scores seldom or never reach the high levels that the quantitative analysis suggests it must if democracy is to be consolidated and formal political institutions stabilized and strengthened. There are also frequent regime changes, causing political actors to invest their loyalty in informal and more permanent institutions, such as clientelism, rather than in political parties. Political parties in Thailand are generally rather weak as formal political institutions and they are also, just like their environment, highly volatile and seldom permanent actors on the political stage. The permanence is instead represented here by clientelist networks. The analysis of Thailand in general as well as of the networks specifically studied in this dissertation shows that clientelism is a prominent feature of Thai politics.

As regards the dependent variable, we can also conclude that Thai politics are highly male dominated, and this despite the fact that we can control for a number of factors concerning women’s socioeconomic advances. Although women certainly face persistent gender inequalities in businesses in Thailand, just as elsewhere in the world, women fare better in the Thai economic sector than they do in the political sphere, in which they are severely under-represented at all levels – from the parliament down to local politics. It should also be noted from the outset that even the networks studied were
highly male dominated. Thus, the male dominance indicated by the formal numbers of elected representatives at different political levels in Thailand is confirmed and reinforced by the more informal political networks at the local level. I did not specifically ask to talk to male canvassers, instead I simply asked the candidates, whether male or female, to direct me to some of the people they had worked with in their political career and when campaigning. I made the same request at each level of the network. Not once was I directed to a female canvasser. When I asked about this, I was sometimes told that there were some female canvassers, but that they were mostly to be found at the village level, representing the housewife group in the community. On my own initiative, I also interviewed some female office workers in the local party offices.

What is it, then, that links the clientelist features outlined here to this pronounced male dominance in formal political representation as well as in informal political networks? What are the causal mechanisms that can help us understand why male parliamentary dominance is more persistent the more clientelist the environment? In order to gain a deeper understanding of this relationship, the next two chapters will focus on the recruitment strategies of Thai political parties as well as on the specifically gendered nature of clientelism. Institutional enablers for clientelism to affect representation as well as the high value of homosocial capital in clientelist networks are the two mechanisms that will be scrutinized further.

For the sake of simplicity and comprehension, the two mechanisms will, to start with, be analyzed separately. In other words, how clientelism develops into parliamentary seats is one part of the explanation, whereas the other part of the explanation concerns why clientelism is male dominated in the first place. Thus disengaging the two mechanisms from each other presupposes that if institutional enablers for clientelism were to be changed or removed, the male dominance of clientelism would not be able to trickle through to affect parliamentary representation. It also implies that if clientelism would, somehow and in some contexts, become more gender equal, making heterosocial capital (or maybe just social capital) as valuable as homosocial capital, the institutional enablers for clientelism might still remain unchanged – but the parliamentary dominance of men would, nevertheless decline. This is, perhaps, too simplified a picture, and it is likely that there are relationships and interactions to be found and investigated also between the two mechanisms. Such possible connections between the two mechanisms – for instance how a certain type of candidate selection might also affect homosocial capital – will be briefly discussed on later on. Now, for the sake of conceptual and argumentative clarity, the mechanisms will be analyzed separately.

The next chapter will show that the candidate selection of political parties in Thailand de facto works to allow for clientelist candidates by being largely informal, exclusive and localized. The subsequent chapter moves the
focus to explaining how clientelist characteristics carry with them gendered attributes when it comes to building up clientelist networks and maximizing the homosocial capital in these networks.
The political world is regulated partly by formal institutions, such as electoral laws and internal party rules, and partly by informal institutions, such as clientelist networks. Both types of institutions need to be taken into account if we wish to gain a holistic understanding of politics. This is certainly also true when uncovering the gendered nature of Thai politics. When the interest lies in understanding parliamentary composition and representation patterns, it is necessary to study political parties and the manner in which they select candidates to stand for parliamentary election. The aim of this chapter and the next is to answer the question of how and why clientelism is gendered and how it filters through the candidate selection procedures of political parties and comes to matter for representation patterns. In other words, we now move from studying the larger independent variables that have been the subject of the past two chapters, to focusing on the causal mechanisms that translate clientelist practices into male parliamentary dominance. The two necessary pieces of the causal chain between the two concern candidate selection and homosocial capital.

Candidate selection within political parties has been labeled “the secret garden of politics” because of the great importance it plays within representative politics, on the one hand, and the secrecy that surrounds the methods by which political parties actually select their candidates, on the other (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Research on women’s representation has long emphasized the importance of candidate selection procedures for understanding gendered representation patterns. Despite this, most accounts are inconclusive as to what it is that really matters and how it matters. We are thus faced with a practice – candidate selection – that is widely believed to be important but where there are also few accepted truths to start with and that is, in addition, often secretive and thus difficult to research.

I argue, in accordance with Hazan (2001; 2002) that candidate selection cannot be understood in isolation from the electoral context and the specific political party in which it takes place. This is why there is a great need to visibly incorporate into the study of candidate selection the Thai clientelist

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92 Some of the electoral analyses presented in this chapter have previously been published with NIAS Press (Bjarnegård 2009a).
setting in which I study these practices. The question cannot and should not only concern which specific candidate selection characteristics are favorable for women’s representation in general. Attempts at answering that question have produced inconclusive results. Instead, I focus on a more specific gendered political practice - clientelism – in order to determine whether or not a particular candidate selection procedure allows for clientelist influences or not. We will also go beyond the sphere of partisan candidate selection and see whether studies of recruitment in other types of organizations can give us any important clues that can bring this field forward.

Candidate selection will be studied from a number of angles – theoretical as well as empirical. Empirically, the analysis consists of a combination of election data and interview material regarding the actual process of candidate selection. The election data presented come from the Thai Election Commission (ECT), but I have disaggregated and analyzed them. The interview material used in this chapter is primarily based on interviews with the centrally placed politicians and bureaucrats as well as with the national level constituency candidates. The focus is on the selection procedures preceding the parliamentary election of 2005 under the election rules stipulated by the Constitution of 1997 and in two different political parties – the Thai Rak Thai and the Democrat party.

The importance of candidate selection

Party candidate selection is often seen as the most crucial step in the legislative recruitment process, which refers to the process by which an individual moves from merely being eligible to stand for election to actually winning a seat in parliament. The literature has identified three crucial steps in this process: first, an individual must select him- or herself, i.e. must be willing to stand for election; second, this individual must be selected as a candidate by a political party; and, third, the individual needs to be elected by the voters in an election (Norris 1997; Matland 2005). For women, as well as for other candidates, the most crucial step is the second one - being selected as a candidate by the party. To be sure, studies have shown that women as a group exhibit less personal ambition, resources and practical opportunities to stand for election and thus may be less likely to self-select themselves than men are in the first step. On the other hand, as Matland argues, parties commonly take an active part in recruiting aspiring candidates and the pool of female aspirants is certainly almost always sufficiently large that political parties have the power to compensate for the skewed nature of the pool of

93 As in the quantitative study, the percentages presented represent the proportion of men rather than, as customary, the proportion of women. This is a simple way of illustrating that the object of the study is the continued male dominance in Thai politics.
aspirants at large (Matland 2005). As for the last step, most research sug-
gests that there is not a large systematic bias against women in elections (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Welch and Studlar 1986).

The candidacy factor

The so-called candidacy factor is of relevance to the very motivation for studying political parties in order to understand unequal representation. Ac-
cording to the literature, we would expect political parties, rather than the electorate, to discriminate against women candidates. We also expect that political parties themselves actively recruit candidates to a large extent and that the pool of eligible female aspirants is at least large enough for political parties to recruit women candidates, were they willing to do so. If political parties, rather than electorates, are responsible for the male dominance in the Thai parliament, this has important consequences for the study. Instead of analyzing the elected representatives, all the candidates presented by the party will need be scrutinized and taken into account in the analysis.

In addition, we need to know whether there are important partisan differ-
ences that should be taken into account. Who is elected is, to some extent, determined by the voters and the general election results. Whom the voters have to choose between, however, is determined by the political parties. A large number of women among the candidates is likely to give a large num-er of women representatives, but this is by no means certain. If there are, for instance, important discrepancies between how many women candidates each party fields, the party that wins the election is going to have more influ-
ence on the number of women representatives. Also, there are several strate-
gies that political parties can use to field a large number of candidates in not very electable places. Examples of this would be when women candidates are placed at the end of the party list or in constituencies where the party predicts with some certainty that it does not stand a good chance of winning. My main interest really does not lie in which party wins the election, but rather in how the party selects their candidates. I will start by showing election data comparing all candidates fielded and those subsequently elected in the Thai parliamentary election of 2005.
The above table confirms the suggestion that the largest threshold for women to become politicians in constituencies in Thailand lies with being selected as candidates, and that our focus on political parties is thus an accurate one. Male dominance is almost equally high in the pool of candidates as it is among the elected representatives, with 87.8 percent men among candidates as compared to 89.4 percent men among elected representatives. The proportion of male and female candidates being elected is also roughly the same with women only standing a slightly smaller chance of being elected than their male counterparts. Nineteen percent, or 53 out of 276, of the women candidates were elected, as compared to 22.5 percent of male candidates. Thus the fact that there are only 53 female parliamentary representatives is, in the first step, best explained by the fact that there are only 276 women candidates while there are more than seven times as many men standing for election.

Though it is much harder to become a candidate as a woman, it seems as though, once you are there, you stand an equally good chance of being elected as your male counterparts. It does not seem as if voters systematically shun parties with woman candidates or that the male dominance in parliament is strongly linked to the electoral success or failure of one particular party. Nor is there strong evidence that parties put women candidates in non-electable positions, although, as we will see, different election systems within the Thai context can spur different types of strategies in this respect and this finding will come to be nuanced. Male dominance is strong in both parties when looking at candidates as well as elected representatives. Thai Rak Thai, the landslide winner of the election, also leads with regards to the proportion of elected women. However, the difference is hardly great
enough to conclude that Thai Rak Thai was less male dominated than the other parties.

The supply-side factor
Male dominance could also be attributed to the fact that the supply of aspiring female candidates is too low and that the political parties simply cannot find enough candidates. In this case, the problem could be constructed as being a problem with Thai women or with structures in Thai society. As there are no numbers to go back to, this largely becomes an issue of how the party officials in charge of recruitment interpret the situation. Often, the previous candidate is simply reselected, but sometimes there is a need to find new candidates. Such candidates can either approach the party they are interested in themselves or be identified and invited by someone in the party.

In the interviews with candidates and party officials, it was evident that the first step of the candidate selection process can be better described as proactive recruitment than as identifying a pool of aspirants. In many cases it seems to be a matter of pride not to put oneself out for candidature before it is certain that one is wanted. A Democrat candidate says:

> In 2005 I decided to enter politics. Coming into a political party is not like going to Siam Square or Siam Paragon\(^{94}\). If the door is not open to you, it is too difficult. It does not suit my personality to stand and holler to the party. Instead, I was invited to the party. They came to me. [...] The previous candidate of the constituency called and asked me and gave me three days to think about it. He suggested me.\(^{95}\)

While party executives from both parties claimed that their parties pick both candidates who approach the party themselves as well as candidates who are handpicked\(^{96}\), the latter route is by far the dominant one in the personal narratives of the politicians interviewed. This discrepancy between the official picture and the way things really happen is particularly relevant when it comes to the shortage of women candidates. A woman candidate for Thai

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\(^{94}\) Siam Square is a shopping area in central Bangkok and Siam Paragon is a shopping mall in this area.

\(^{95}\) Interview no. 87. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Song. April 2006.

Rak Thai who, herself, was personally invited to become a candidate by Yaowapa, the sister of Thaksin, because she knew the Shinawatra family well, still talks in very different terms about her own political career and about political recruitment in general:

It is not a strategy of the party to put women there. [...] I was in the women’s wing of Thai Rak Thai and I talked to Thaksin about this. If more qualified women apply, they are welcome. People push the party in order to become candidates, and then we do polls in the area. We prefer this rather than the party pushing people. There is a committee making the decision, and people know this. The procedure is very formal.97

Thus, there is a general perception, or at least an official picture, that women need only apply to become candidates. In a way, this legitimizes the complete lack of conscious strategies to decrease the male dominance among party candidates. It is, of course, also difficult to devise a strategy when there is no formal recruitment procedure to target. Because political parties are not mass based in Thailand, rather few politicians have “worked their way up” in the party hierarchy. Forging important personal relationships with senior politicians is certainly rewarded more highly in terms of candidature than is long-term party loyalty at the grassroots level. There is thus no clear and standardized party route to candidature that an interested person can follow in order to become a candidate. Thus, because party candidature in practice is by invitation only, we can still attribute the lion’s share of the male dominance to the fact that political parties, for reasons yet to be discussed, simply are more likely to invite a man than a woman when a parliamentary seat is left open.

The incumbency factor

Male incumbency is also often pointed to as one of the greatest obstacles to women to run for office, and is also an issue that could, to a certain extent, move the explanation away from the candidate selection procedures of political parties. As long as there is a successful incumbent running for the party, and as long as most incumbents are male, the opportunity structure for women to come forward as new candidates is limited (Welch and Studlar 1996). As parties are acting with the goal of winning the election in mind, candidates who have already managed to win an election are seen as secure investments.

Analyzing incumbency in Thailand very soon becomes a complex endeavor. The theory of incumbency assumes that an incumbent representative will be more likely to be selected as a candidate in the same party for which

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97 Interview no. 63. Female Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Pilot study area. March 2005.
he or she won a parliamentary seat. However, in Thailand we cannot expect incumbency to work only within one party. Because of the pragmatism among political parties, and due to the fact that few candidates feel bound by party loyalty or ideology, party-switching is common in Thailand. For individual candidates with strong local networks, there are gains to be made by switching parties, and even greater gains for faction leaders who might be able to command the switching of an entire faction from one party to another (McCargo 2002a; Nelson 2001). There are different incentives for party switching in different elections. The 2001 election, when Thai Rak Thai was a newcomer on the political stage, has become famous for the large number of representatives who were encouraged by Thaksin to change parties (McCargo 2002a: 116). In 2005, on the other hand, many incumbent candidates for other parties wanted to switch to Thai Rak Thai in order to boost their re-election chances by benefiting from the enormous popularity of the party.98

Unfortunately, there are no data available on incumbency at the candidate level, but some information can be found on which of the winning constituency representatives were already members of parliament when they stood for election. The conclusions about how incumbency matters for candidacy should thus be taken with a pinch of salt, as we can only say something about how incumbency matters for the chances of winning. Because we have already ascertained that the representation numbers match nomination numbers rather well, however, the analysis is nevertheless worth undertaking.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 11. Incumbency in the Thai parliamentary election (constituencies)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the 400 constituency representatives elected in 2005, over 70 percent (290 people) were incumbents in the sense that they were already members of parliament when they stood for election. As the above table shows,

98 E.g. interview no. 35 with Phongthep Thepkanjana, Thai Rak Thai Executive. January 24, 2006; Interview no. 96. Male Thai Rak Thai Member of Parliament, Constituency Saem. June 2006; Interview no. 122. Female Thai Rak Thai Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
87 percent of these incumbents were male. This suggests that incumbency is, indeed, important for nomination and election, but also that incumbency is male dominated. It is perhaps even more interesting to take note of how parties act in cases when there is no incumbent available or when they decide, for whatever reason, to select a new candidate. Interestingly, male dominance is even more accentuated among the new representatives than it is among incumbents, at 93 percent, suggesting that although incumbency is both a common and male-dominated route to parliament, the preference for male candidates is constantly reproduced instead of being compensated for when new candidates are selected.

Sixty-six of the 400 constituency representatives (16.5 percent or 23 percent of incumbent MPs) in the 2005 parliament stood for different parties in 2005 than they did in 2001, but all but one of these party switchers were incumbent MPs (and the remaining one switching representative had the same last name as the incumbent MP). Thus, incumbents are attractive as candidates also for parties other than the ones they have once won for.

The rules of the game

Although there is quite a large body of research on the institutional settings affecting women’s parliamentary representation as well as on the different important characteristics of candidate selection, i.e. how decisions are made and by whom they are made, there is not always a strong scholarly consensus about what really matters. There is rather good agreement on the notion that election systems matter for representative patterns, and as regards the candidate selection process itself, the level of formalization and institutionalization have often been mentioned as important factors. Because of the relative inconclusiveness of this body of research, however, a somewhat wider take on the issue will be employed here. It is argued that recruitment processes of political parties need first to be contextualized and put in relation to a specific political practice and second that they can fruitfully be compared to studies of recruitment to other types of organizations, especially as regards homosocial aspects of recruitment patterns.

Election system

The design of the election system is commonly pointed out as an important key to further explain the choices made by political parties in candidate selection processes. Proportional election systems, as opposed to majoritarian ones, are generally more conducive to women’s representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Matland 1998; Paxton 1997), because of their focus on the party as a whole rather than on an individual candidate. In majoritarian, first-past-the-post systems, on the other hand, the emphasis is on putting
Chapter 6 – Candidate Selection in Thai Political Parties

forward one, strong candidate who can attract as many voters as possible. Simply put, proportional systems tend to encourage political parties to include different social groups to attract as many voters as possible, whereas majoritarian systems encourage parties to go for the one candidate they perceive to be most likely to win the election. By shaping the logic by which a political party selects its candidates, the election system thus brings forward otherwise hidden views on male and female candidates. District magnitude often goes hand in hand with this. District magnitude refers to the number of representatives per constituency, and it has often been argued that the greater the district magnitude, the more women representatives (see e.g. Rule 1987).

Thailand in 2005 provided an extremely interesting opportunity to compare the impact of different electoral systems on the representation of women in a non-Western context. The election system at the time was of a mixed character, where 400 out of 500 seats were constituency based in single-member districts whereas the remaining 100 seats were elected on a proportional list ballot, where all of Thailand served as one constituency. The majoritarian system thus had a low district magnitude of 1 whereas the proportional system had a high district magnitude of 100 – which clearly suggests that the proportional system with a greater district magnitude would generate more women representatives than the majoritarian first-past-the-post system. Proportional lists were closed, which means that voters could not affect the order in which the political parties had placed the candidates. The election results of the proportional system can thus be directly compared with the majoritarian system – in the same political setting.

When looking at elected representatives by election system, however, we find an unexpected pattern in Thailand. The highest male dominance found is, surprisingly, the 94 percent male representatives (6.0 percent women) produced by the proportional system, where Thailand is considered one giant constituency. This is to be compared to the 88.3 percent male dominance among constituency-based representatives. Thailand thus seems to refute one of the commonly accepted “truths” regarding women’s representation in the West, namely that proportional election systems with high district magnitude produce more women representatives than do single-member constituency-based systems with low district magnitude. The comparison between the outcomes of two electoral systems, made explicit, is shown in the table below.

99 This election system was, however, abandoned after the military coup in 2006, and the constitution is, yet again, subject to reform.
Table 12. Sex of representatives by party and election system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Party list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ECT

This anomaly holds true for both parties in this election. Among the representatives of all parties, the male dominance is even stronger in the proportional system than in the constituency-based system. Looking more closely at the differences between candidates fielded and representatives elected in the different election systems, there are some important things to note. When comparing the sex of the constituency candidates with the sex of those elected as constituency MPs, we find support for the assumption that women’s largest threshold is becoming a candidate.

Table 13. Seats won by party and by gender in constituency system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ECT
Male dominance is still equally high in the pool of candidates as it is among the elected representatives, with 89.3 percent male among candidates as compared to 88.3 percent men among elected representatives. The proportion of male and female candidates being elected is roughly the same in the constituencies, and even slightly higher among women as 26 percent, or 47 out of 180, of the women candidates were elected, as compared to 23.5 percent, 353 out of 1503, of male candidates. There does thus not seem to be an evident strategy at play whereby political parties field women “just for show”, but put them in constituencies where they are unable to win. Thus, the main problem still is not how and where women are placed when they are selected, but why women are not selected to become constituency candidates in the first place.

When looking at the party list system candidates, we do, however, see a distinct strategy at work suggesting that the number of female candidates fielded by the parties does not correspond to the number of women elected. Thus, although women, in fact, stand a better chance of becoming a party list candidate than a constituency candidate, they still stand a smaller chance of actually becoming elected as party list candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ECT

100 Analyses have been conducted comparing the male dominance in constituencies that can be considered "safe seats" (where the winning candidate won with 75 percent of the votes or more) and "close races" (where the winning candidate won with 25 percent of the votes or less). The male dominance in the close race constituencies was not very different from the overall male dominance among candidates (although Bangkok is an exception here, something which we will return to shortly), whereas male dominance was a little less pronounced in the 72 safe seat constituencies, where it was as low as 83 percent of candidates fielded. Thus, in constituencies where a party could probably foresee that they were likely to win with a large margin, they were a little more willing to abandon the traditional male candidate and field a woman.
Even though there were 83.5 percent men among the party list candidates, 94 percent of the elected representatives from the party list were men. In proportions of female candidates, this means that out of the 16.5 percent female candidates on the party list (compared to 11 percent of the constituency candidates) only 6 percent of those elected were women (compared to 11 percent of the constituency candidates). This indicates that even though the number of women constituency candidates is very low, at least they are put in electable positions, and that this is not equally true for women candidates in the party list system. The fact that 16.5 percent women among party list candidates is reduced to only 6 percent elected candidates clearly shows that if women are put on the list at all, they are normally placed so far down that it is unlikely they will be elected. The male dominance in the electable slots can be attributed to the political parties, especially considering the fact that party lists in Thailand were closed, i.e. voters did not have an opportunity to affect the order of candidates set by the political parties.

Why, then, do Thai political parties not use the opportunity used by parties elsewhere to balance their party lists in this huge constituency with such a high district magnitude in order to appeal to more groups of voters? Although formal electoral rules do shape the behavior of political parties, they do not always do so in predictable ways. Rules are malleable in the hands of politicians, and this is particularly true in contexts where there is a rather low regard for formal political institutions and new regulations in the first place. In this case, informal internal party practices that have become institutionalized within both political parties prevent the proportional method from having this kind of balance effect. These informal internal practices concern intricate reward systems within the political parties.

The party list has, in practice, become a seniority list for potential candidates for cabinet positions. Part of this is for practical reasons – a person appointed minister gives up his or her parliamentary seat, and it is easier to fill an empty parliamentary slot following an already ordered list than it is to hold a by-election in a constituency. The proportional list is thus considered a very prestigious list, and it is more attractive to become a party list candidate than a constituency candidate. In effect, only senior male politicians end up in electable places on the party list, often as a reward for support given to the party in some way. Even if there are small chances of the party forming a cabinet, the party list is considered more prestigious and it also brings about less hard work in the constituencies and with less direct concerns about electoral fraud and the investigations brought about by the Election Commission. Very few of the senior politicians in Thailand are women, and, in effect, this became a system for men high up in the party hierarchy to reward other men
high up in the party hierarchy but slightly below their own position.\textsuperscript{101} Democrat party leader Abhisit confirms this view.

There are a number of reasons why people would prefer to be on the party list system. First because there’s less of a burden in terms of constituency work and because constituency politics have become more competitive too, given that there are now single member constituencies. Secondly, the process and the complications with the Election Commission have become very tiresome. You see how the party list members have a much easier time after the elections, not having to go through these processes of complaints, of allegations, of investigations and so on. And thirdly, it has now become an almost accepted rule, that should the party become part of the government, ministers will be picked from the party list.\textsuperscript{102}

Thus, the comparison between election systems provides yet another example in which an informal practice, in the party leaders own words an “almost accepted rule”, trumps formal, written rules in the Thai partisan context.

The level of institutionalization of candidate selection processes

The task of analyzing the level of institutionalization of the party candidate selection process is clearly more limited than that of determining whether an entire party organization or even a party system is institutionalized. The discussion regarding whether the process is institutionalized or not has usually revolved around determining whether it is predominantly bureaucratized (sometimes called institutionalized) or predominantly patronage oriented (sometimes called informal). A bureaucratized process is thus, in line with the Weberian notion of bureaucracy, “detailed, explicit, standardized, implemented by party officials, and authorized in party documents” (Norris 1996: 202).

In our terminology, this aspect thus mainly refers to the formalization of the process – whether it is predominantly formal or rather informal. For a process to be formal, there should be written regulations specifying issues such as who selects the candidates, when in the candidate selection process this occurs, and according to which criteria. The steps in a formalized candidate selection process are also transparent, as compared to the informal candidate selection process. Norris claims that an informal process is, instead, “relatively closed, gatekeepers have considerable discretion, the steps in the


\textsuperscript{102} Interview no. 30. Abhisit Vejjajiva, Male Democrat Deputy Party Leader (was shortly to be selected Democrat Party Leader at the time of the interview). February 25, 2005.
application process are familiar to participants but rarely made explicit, and procedures may vary from one selection to another” (Norris 1996: 203).

Even if formal rules do exist, they are not necessarily adhered to. It is thus always important to keep in mind that it is not enough to study de jure selection of candidates – the de facto selection is often even more important. Party regulations often simply do not have any de facto influence over the actions of party officials and the process is rather steered by the personal patronage of power brokers at different levels (Norris 1996: 203). In this context, we should remember Freidenberg and Levitsky’s notion that even informal practices can be institutionalized. Institutionalization, from their perspective, is more about whether a practice is widely known, accepted and enforced, than about whether it is in line with formal party regulations (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006: 180). The candidate selection procedure may not vary from one selection to another but may instead follow clear and established, albeit informal, practices within a network of people.

It can, however, be difficult to identify established but informal practices. Gallagher and Marsh’s reminder - that important decisions regarding candidate selection are often made early in the process by informal groups of influential people but then ratified more formally by party channels - is important. As it is difficult to determine what goes on behind the scenes and to really understand the workings of a candidate selection process, they also suggest there is a need to delve deeply into the process, preferably by conducting in-depth interviews with most of those involved (Gallagher and Marsh 1988).

Established but informal practices, or in Freidenberg and Levitsky’s words, informally institutionalized practices, are particularly important as they link research on clientelism with research on political recruitment. Literature on the representation of women has also often emphasized the importance of a formally institutionalized process, but without really specifying the mechanisms at play. What has been said is basically that with a clear framework of rules and a transparent application process, it is easier for all kinds of outsiders know what is required to enter politics (Czudnowski 1975). Also, party leaders in a formalized system have less leeway to arbitrarily bend the rules in favor of particular candidates (Caul Kittilson 2006). I argue that there is more gender to formal institutionalization than that. Or, rather, that there is more gender to informal rules than that. Guadagnini is closer to my line of argument when arguing that weakly institutionalized parties tend to bias candidate nomination in favor of those who have accumulated a “personal political capital” based on personal status or external group support (Guadagnini 1993). Informal rules are more flexible than formal rules and can thus be bent in whichever way. In certain contexts they may favor women just as they are seen as favoring men in this particular political context. The key to understanding why and how informality matters from a gendered perspective is to study it together with a political practice,
such as clientelism. Clientelism, it has already been argued, can be understood as a predictability maximizer in contemporary Thailand. The clientelist campaign is the road to electoral success, and clientelism as a political strategy thus has to be preserved and protected. If clientelist candidates are the winning party strategy, it is in the interest of the party that the manner in which they select candidates is favorable for clientelist candidates.

Just as Freidenberg and Levitsky suggest, even an informal recruitment procedure often follows certain patterns and unwritten rules anticipated and known by those involved in the process. Such a procedure is, although informal, nevertheless institutionalized. Clientelist systems are by nature informal, but very often institutionalized in the sense that people rely on them and both parties in the relationship know exactly what to expect from the other party. Informal political organization, such as clientelism, stands different chances of influencing candidate selection in different types of recruitment procedures and, vice versa, different types of recruitment procedures are more likely than others to spur the continued recruitment of candidates supporting the clientelist way of doing politics. The manner in which different recruitment practices interact with clientelist concerns will now be elaborated on.

As in many other places, Thai formal party regulations regarding the selection of candidates for election are rather brief and leave ample room for flexibility. According to the Organic Act on Political Parties from 1998, Section 11, all political parties are required to have regulations that, at least to some degree, specify “the rules and procedure for the selection of candidates for the election of members of the House of Representatives on a party-list basis and a constituency basis”. The regulations of both the Thai Rak Thai party and the Democrat party include such specifications and both dedicate a chapter of their respective statutes to the selection of candidates. Both descriptions are very brief.103 Both party regulations give the formal power of candidate selection for all elections to the Party Executive Committee. The criteria by which candidates are selected and the procedures that are used are also at the discretion of the Executive Committee according to the statutes. Although the Executive Committee may consult branches or regional committees, or in the case of Thai Rak Thai even appoint a separate “Committee on Election Management” to nominate persons for consideration by the Executive Committee, the Executive Committee has the final say in these matters. The two parties do not differ very much in the formal statutes laid down to guide candidate selection. There are virtually no guidelines regarding the characteristics of the candidates selected other than that they should be party members. The Democrat party regulations state that the party list should be comprised of candidates from various geographical re-

103 In the case of Thai Rak Thai, only two sections deal specifically with candidate selection and in the Democrat party there are four sections.
gions. Thus, the party regulations themselves are not very detailed or explicit nor do they contribute to a deeper understanding of the selection procedures to an outside observer, as Norris claims that internal party rules in highly institutionalized parties should (Norris 1996: 202-203).

It is not surprising, then, that none of the candidates interviewed had followed the exact same process in order to become a candidate. Most of the people interviewed had been informally approached by a senior party official or a local party strongman and only a small minority had, themselves, established a contact with the party they were interested in. In the cases where this happened, they did not fill out a pre-existing form or go through any established procedure, but they rather got in touch with “someone who knew someone” who could introduce them to the right people in the party. Interestingly, although there was no formally specified process, most candidates interviewed seemed to have known exactly what to do in order to increase their chances of becoming a candidate. Indeed, they were already part of the local political system when they were invited.

For instance, it is often up to the incumbent to find someone deemed appropriate for the constituency in question and this often happened when the incumbent was moved up to the party list by the party. If the incumbent did not select a son or another close relative, it was bound to be someone with whom he or she had been in close cooperation for a long time. In other cases a local strongman had the party authority to select new candidates from his area. Candidate selection can often take the form of informal negotiations as different strongmen within the party want to promote their particular favored candidate. In one rural area, the selected candidate had a history of working for a candidate of the no longer existing New Aspiration party before he entered politics for the same party himself. He did not win the election for New Aspiration and was thus not automatically attractive as

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105 E.g. Interview no. 54. Male Constituency Candidate for the Chart Thai party. Pilot Study Area. March 2005; and, to some extent Interview no. 96. Male Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Saem. June 2006.

an incumbent candidate when New Aspiration merged with the Thai Rak Thai party prior to the 2005 election. Nevertheless, he became the new candidate for Thai Rak Thai, as his former employer and patron insisted that the two were linked to the extent that Thai Rak Thai could possibly pick one of them without also picking the other.¹⁰⁷ In another example, a prominent woman Democrat candidate was pressured both by her constituents as well as by Thaksin himself to switch parties to the Thai Rak Thai. She was offered a party list seat with Thai Rak Thai and decided to change parties. She had supported a junior candidate and wanted to secure a Thai Rak Thai candidature for her as well. There was already an incumbent candidate who was the first choice of the Thai Rak Thai, but the prominent party list candidate refused to stand for election if the party did not also pick her candidate for the constituency in question. Thaksin felt he could not afford to lose the party list woman but was also not sure the junior candidate could win her seat, yet he finally decided to sacrifice that one constituency¹⁰⁸.

The use of polls – an informally institutionalized procedure exemplified

Some studies have suggested that women fare better in parties that put more emphasis on the party ideology, particularly when that ideology comprises strong equality statements, than in parties that are more pragmatic, entrepreneurial or clientelistic (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008; Saiavelis and Morgenstern 2008). When asked what the preferred characteristics in a prospective representative are, the answer among Thai politicians is often of a very pragmatic character: a constituency candidate needs to be able to win the election and a party list candidate is rewarded for his or her service to the party and also represents a certain faction of the party. Six senior politicians (three from each party) were asked to rank from one to four the extent to what a number of factors affect positively the chances of a person to be selected as a candidate by the party. It is highly remarkable that all six ranked “commitment to the campaign” as a “one”, i.e. “not at all important”.

Although there were no formal requirements as to what an aspiring candidate needed to do in order to be selected by the party, most people witnessed about the hard and steady work they had been required to do in the constituency before even standing a chance of becoming candidates. This type of constituency work has probably always been important in order to convince the party that you have the electoral support needed to become a candidate, but the Thai Rak Thai in a way institutionalized these informal, clientelist activities and incorporated them into the candidate selection process by measuring their success in a pre-electoral poll. The polling strategy later

¹⁰⁷ Interview no. 68. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Nung. May 2006.
¹⁰⁸ Which, in the end, the junior candidate secured and won in the election.
spread to other parties as well. The main architect behind the polling strategy was Poomtham, one of the co-founders and senior people of the Thai Rak Thai party. He explains that when Thai Rak Thai was a new party they had to look for all of their candidates and in order to accomplish any of their goals, they needed candidates who could win – and such candidates are not always easy for a new party to find. Thai Rak Thai wanted a mix of newcomers and old generation and decided to use polls to compare the popularity of prospective candidates, irrespective of their present party affiliation. The overarching aim was to get candidates who would win them a seat in Parliament. Sometimes this meant convincing a candidate for another party to wear the Thai Rak Thai party shirt in the next election.109

The poll was introduced by the central team, but the regional committee had to check which names should be included. The old politicians from other parties were put first. Then community leaders, police officers, kamnans, teachers, and businessmen. By doing these polls, we used scientific methodology, not just reputation. We considered scientific data before making the final decision. We had a database with all levels of elections. We also polled the popularity of the parties, so that we could weigh that in. This method was beneficial in many ways.110

The informal invitation outlined above sometimes did not come until after the poll was conducted, but there were also cases in which a potential candidate was approached and screened regarding his/her interest before a poll was conducted. Often, being a former Member of Parliament or having a close connection to a former Member of Parliament would be enough to secure a seat in Parliament, but as a new party does not have those advantages, the Thai Rak Thai needed to devise a new winning strategy – by simply recruiting the winning candidates.

A winning candidate, in a clientelist setting, is the person who best manages to distribute the material and personal services that the constituents expect. It usually takes a long time to build up networks expansive enough to distribute goods and money to most parts of the constituency and to make sure that constituents associate the benefits with the candidate in question. Setting up a poll that lists already influential clientelist politicians and then simply selecting the one that stands the greatest chance of winning the election certainly institutionalizes and cements the clientelist way of doing politics.

Although the recruitment of winning candidates can be seen as an informally institutionalized practice, the actual recruitment was certainly informal and fringed with ambiguous offers and off-the-record negotiations. It is of

109 Interview no. 52. Poomtham Vechayachai, former Party Deputy Secretary General for the Thai Rak Thai party. November 21, 2008.
110 Interview no. 52. Poomtham Vechayachai, former Party Deputy Secretary General for the Thai Rak Thai party. November 21, 2008.
course not easy to determine what was at stake in the negotiations during the first election in which Thai Rak Thai stood in 2001, as the winning candidates who accepted the offers are unlikely to specify what they consisted of whereas those who did not accept did not even know the exact content of the offer. One local strongman, clientelist patron and a certain winner for the Democrat party in Constituency Saem says that before the election of 2001, he was approached by a high-ranking member of the Thai Rak Thai and asked to be their candidate. Thai Rak Thai did not offer him anything directly but said that once he showed his interest, they would bring him to people higher up in the party hierarchy and rewards would be discussed. He says he certainly got the impression that there was something there for him, although he declined the offer and thus does not know for sure what it might have been. It is clear that it was much easier for Thai Rak Thai to get candidates in 2005, when they were already the government with good chances of winning a second term. Many candidates who did not switch to the new party in 2001 instead did so before the election of 2005. Often the promise of being a Member of Parliament for the governing party was enough to entice a candidate from another party over to Thai Rak Thai, as it is perceived to be easier to get access to government budgets for developing the constituency if you are not only an elected representative, but also a representative for the governing party. In the same constituency, Constituency Saem, the same Democrat strongman in 2001 invited a candidate who had won nine consecutive elections for five different parties to move to the Democrat party. The candidate switched parties once more, this time to the Democrats, on the condition that he could pick which constituency to run in. Because of his excellent winning track record, the same candidate was also approached by Thai Rak Thai and Thaksin in 2001. It was, however, not until 2004 that he decided to move to the Thai Rak Thai. Because he was already a Member of Parliament (for the Democrats), a friend who was a military general and who had close connections to several people in the Executive Board in Thai Rak Thai approached him in the Parliament building and asked him to reconsider switching parties for the next election. His local supporters in his home constituency had also begun to like the generous loan policies of the Thai Rak Thai and thought he would be able to access better benefits for them if he worked for the government. His own view was also that there is less worry if you are on the government side, and he attributes the present juridical problems of his former Democrat colleague, the strongman, not to the fact that he has done anything criminal, but to the fact that he did not switch parties when he had the chance. While the candidate thought about the offer, Thai Rak Thai took the opportunity to conduct several polls in the area and when it was

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clear that he stood the best chance of winning, he was offered the seat once again and retired from the Democrat party in time to become a member of the Thai Rak Thai for the required 90 days before the election. Based on his experience from five different Thai parties he says:

Choosing candidates is the same in all parties: they want a person who can win the election. That is why they asked me.\footnote{Interview no. 96. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Saem. June 2006.}

Other candidates say that there is a clear advantage to being connected to the governing party, as you can go directly to the ministers and ask for budgets for your constituency, both before and after you are actually elected.\footnote{Interview nb 128. Female Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Haa. March 2006; Interview no. 144. Male Democrat Constituency Candidate, Constituency Haa. November 2008.} This is why the aim of recruiting candidates who could win was even easier to attain in 2005. This outspoken preference for winning candidates, especially in the early days of the Thai Rak Thai, was echoed by the Thai Rak Thai party executive Phongthep:

If you want to turn the country around, you need enough Members of Parliament to do so. We contacted several leaders of factions and important people. We also recruited sitting Members of Parliament from other parties, mostly Democrat Members of Parliament. We looked at the likelihood that someone would be elected and gave priority to former Members of Parliament, except if there was a very strong reason to do otherwise. Many other Members of Parliament decided to join us because they saw potential in Thai Rak Thai. But there were also many new faces – about half of the candidates. The new faces in the South were not elected, but they were in the Northeast. We competed against the giants and won.\footnote{Interview no. 35. Phongthep Thepkanjana, Male Party List Candidate, Member of Parliament and party official of the Thai Rak Thai party. January 24, 2006.}

The Thai Rak Thai also employed a rather elaborate ranking system, by which candidates and their constituencies were graded from A+ to C. Many of the candidates refer to this system, as it was a way of determining the amount of party support they would get during the campaign. A+ meant invincible, A meant that there was some competition, but that the Thai Rak Thai candidate was likely to win, B+ that the two competitors were fairly similar, B that the competitor is ahead, but that a fight is still possible, and C meant a lost seat, a seat that was impossible to win but where a candidate still was needed. For instance in 2004 and 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin prioritized the B+ constituencies for his speeches and went to very few A+-
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In some areas, the party preference is so strong that the grade can be assigned before the candidate is selected. This can then influence the effort that is put into selecting candidates, and this also influences what type of candidates the party looks for in a particular constituency. A Thai Rak Thai spokesman said that safe seats were used to pick someone who works well and hard for the party, and who cooperates with other party members. In competitive seats, on the other hand, the emphasis on winning is paramount and this is where the polls are most important and where they go for someone who is already well-known, who can be promoted in the short run and who goes down well with the press. As an example he mentions an urban constituency where they fielded a famous movie star, and where the Democrat candidate subsequently moved to the party list, supposedly out of fear of losing. The Democrat party, which does not assign exact grades, still reasons in a similar manner. The party leader Abhisit says that in safe seats they try to pick someone who they know can contribute to the work of the party, whereas in already lost seats, they pick young candidates who need the experience.

A strict adherence to poll results does, of course, render a sort of standardized and predictable selection procedure. However, in a popularity poll the reason for a person’s popularity is not taken into consideration, thus making ideological cohesiveness or group representation a very difficult task to achieve for a party in a clientelist setting. In addition, the party leadership combined these quantitative results with their own qualitative assessments and discussed the issues with regionally appointed representatives, thus not making the decision-making entirely transparent. The system with polls can also become a vicious circle for those excluded from the political arena and who are not wrapped up in clientelist networks or made part of any political support systems locally. As one politician points out, you need to work and be well known in advance in order to stand a chance to win the poll – or in order to even be included in the poll in the first place. Party support is not distributed until you are a confirmed candidate. Newcomers to politics thus need to invest a great deal of time and money to prove that they can win the election and that they should be mentioned in the poll in the first place. Poll-

115 Interview no. 47. Varathep Ratanakorn, Party List Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party and Deputy Minister of Finance. July 7, 2006; Interview no. 68. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Nang. May 2006.
116 Interview no. 31. Pimuk Simaroj, Male Constituency Candidate, Member of Parliament and Deputy Spokesperson for the Thai Rak Thai party. January 17, 2006.
118 Interview no. 52. Poomtham Vechayachai, former Deputy Secretary General of the Thai Rak Thai party. November 21, 2008.
119 Interview no. 31. Pimuk Simaroj, Male Constituency Candidate, Member of Parliament and Deputy Spokesperson of the Thai Rak Thai party. January 17, 2006.
ing winning candidates is thus a way of allowing for already long established clientelist practices to influence candidate selection.

Who decides?

Research on candidate selection has not only focused on how rule-bound the candidate selection is, but also on its level of inclusiveness (if the selectorate is large or small), whether or not it is territorially centralized (if decisions are taken centrally or locally) and on whether the party itself controls the decisions. As argued by Zetterberg, the three latter points have often been lumped together in the concept “centralization”, and it has been unclear whether the interest lies in determining the size of the selectorate or in the territorial location of the actual decision-making (Zetterberg 2009). I will therefore take care to distinguish between them, especially because it seems likely that their relationship to clientelism differs slightly.

Territorial decentralization implies that local party selectorates (party branches, members in an electoral district, local party strongmen) are in charge of nominating candidates. Another aspect often separated from centralization in the literature concerns horizontal centralization, i.e. the inclusiveness or size of the selectorate, regardless of vertical level. This focuses on the number of people involved in the process and can range from one to the entire constituency. Functional decentralization also moves the selection away from the national central committee, but to bodies that ensure functional representation for different groups (women, minorities, trade unions etc.). Such a decentralization implies that, for instance, women’s wings, ethnic groupings or other sectarian groups are tasked with selecting candidates. Establishing quotas for women can be an example of functional, or corporate, decentralization (Hazan 2002; Zetterberg 2009). This type of decentralization formally or informally moves the selection away from the partisan body. All three types of decentralization should thus be included and distinguished from each other in any analysis of candidate nomination in order to clarify which one, if any, is of importance when it comes to decreasing male dominance and which one, if any, has an impact on the influence of clientelism.

Territorial decentralization

Most of the literature on candidate selection seems to be concerned with territorial decentralization. Theoretical as well as empirical accounts remain inconclusive as to the impact of the degree of vertical centralization on the representation of women. Vertically decentralized party organizations have been said to be more likely to be influenced from the grassroots and thus more open to change. On the other hand, Caul Kittilson shows that in con-
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temporary Western European parties, vertically centralized party organizations are generally conducive to more women candidates – but only in political parties that already boast a higher number of women in the party leadership (Caul Kittilson 2006).

It is important to note, however, that the impact of the centralization of the party organization at large does not necessarily go hand in hand with the findings regarding the centralization of the candidate selection procedure per se. Caul Kittilson finds some, but rather weak, support for the argument that vertically decentralized candidate selection procedures are beneficial for women. She argues that in centralized party organizations with many women in the leadership, gender-friendly guidelines regarding candidate selection can trickle down to the local bodies nominating candidates (Caul Kittilson 2006: 126-127). In favor of decentralization, it has also been argued that localized concerns engage more women (Lovenduski and Norris 1993: 12) and that a selection process taking place closer to ordinary party members might more easily identify and attract previously excluded groups (Norris 1997: 220). It has also been argued, however, that a centralization of the candidate selection procedure is beneficial to increased inclusion of women because the central leadership is more likely to be well educated and liberal in their attitudes towards women (Randall 1987: 141). Equally inconclusive, some empirical accounts lean towards the notion that localized selection procedures are beneficial to women’s representation, at least under certain circumstances (Norris 1996: 212-213; Caul Kittilson 2006: 126), while other accounts seem to imply that centralized selection procedures are better (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008: 360). Field and Siavelis claim that candidate selection procedures generally tend to be more vertically centralized in transitional political environments due to a lower level of party organization. Where there is not an organized party base, the bargaining power of local actors to make candidate selection procedures more inclusive is rather weak (Field and Siavelis 2008).

Related to these inconclusive accounts is probably a fact that has been highlighted before – that candidate selection processes are complex and informal decisions are often hidden behind formal sanctions. Different actors are crucial at different stages of the process and sometimes no one controls selection entirely but it can only be described as a complex set of interactions (Norris 1996: 220; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Thus, if looking at all stages at once or only at formal regulations, the answer is likely to be perplexing, inconclusive or even misleading. It is also very important to be aware of the mechanisms through which decentralization is expected to matter. In our case, clientelism is known to be a localized activity although its network often reaches all the way from the village level to the central state level. It seems reasonable to assume that localized, clientelist concerns, however, stand more of a chance of influencing candidate selection when it is, at least to some extent, territorially decentralized.
No major partisan differences have been distinguished in the electoral analyses so far. Also, candidate selection seems to be conducted in the same fashion in both parties – there are few formal rules but many informally institutionalized practices that seem to favor clientelist candidates. If the candidate selection process is somewhat territorially decentralized, it is possible that we will find regional differences, depending on the context in which the election takes place. Clientelism may be an electoral ingredient in most of Thailand, but its influence is not constant and certain regions, such as the northeast, are much more likely to be impacted by clientelist concerns than would an urban region such as Bangkok. These suggestions will be investigated in the table below.
Table 15. *Seats won by region, gender and party*

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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>% men</td>
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Source: ECT
As far as the regional differences go, the data have only been disaggregated for the five major regions of Thailand. However, despite this rather crude division, one region clearly stands out. In the Bangkok region, the male dominance is as low as three quarters of the representatives (75.7 percent male representatives, 24.3 percent female). Women candidates from all parties were actually more successful in Bangkok than in other regions, and thus, the proportion of women among the representatives is higher for each party than the proportion of candidates. The same is true, although not as evident, for the Central region and for both parties. The three remaining regions display rather the opposite pattern. Not only have parties fielded fewer female candidates in the South, North and the Northeast, but the female candidates that are fielded are also not put in as electable positions as in the other regions. The proportion of women elected in these areas is the same or lower than the proportion of female candidates. What we see then is probably a rural-urban division reflecting the fact that different demands and expectations are put on constituency candidates in Bangkok than in more rural areas of the country. Apart from city areas having a more highly educated population with generally more liberal values, it is probably also true that electoral networks and vote buying are less extensive in urban areas than they are in rural areas, in other words, that the clientelist influence is weaker in urban areas than it is in the poorer rural areas.

Interestingly, despite the fact that the party regulations of the two parties are very similar, they are often described in very different ways. Thai Rak Thai was, by many, described as a very centralized party, due to the huge influence of charismatic party leader Thaksin Shinawatra and the weak organization of its branches. Some observers point out that Thai Rak Thai had a very strong top in the party leader and a massive base among its supporters, but no institutions in between. The Democrat party, on the other hand, is described as being more hierarchically organized with plenty of well-institutionalized branches, although they might be more conservative than proactive in many cases. The fact that the Democrat party is reputed to be more formally decentralized has not had a large impact on the number of women selected, but in most practical terms, the de facto candidate selection looks the same in both parties. Regional committees headed by one person are appointed by the party leadership and are put in charge of collecting suggestions from local strongmen or branch offices. These regional committees are not formal and local politicians usually only know the name of the person representing their area on the committee. When people higher up in the

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party hierarchy are asked, however, they all know who heads which committee, even though there are few formal documents to support this. If there are no particular circumstances pointing in another direction, the regional committees often follow the suggestions coming from incumbents or local strongmen in the constituencies. Local strongmen have large leeway not only in looking for but also in nominating candidates for national elections (and the nominated candidates are often selected in the next stage). Local branches can, however, be added in the case of the Democrat party. Democrat branches were, in many instances, actually functioning organizations that also contributed names of potential candidates of the constituencies. The branches could send one or several names, while being aware that the party leadership could add names and that they made the final decision.122 This was not so in the Thai Rak Thai. Branches were much fewer, played no such formal role and were often hardly functioning. The offices of the candidates were where all the political activity seemed to be going on (and often branches and candidate offices were one and the same and if there was a new candidate, the branch office was moved). In Thai Rak Thai, potential candidates were advised to go either directly to the Executive Committee or to the head of a faction.123

Despite the informal decentralization, the party leadership does exert a great deal of power in the very final stage: when nominees are actually becoming candidates. This power, however, is not always used and can, at least in terms of the constituency candidates, be likened to having the right to veto a decision taken elsewhere. During the process, central people within the party have given strategic advice and organized polls, but at this final stage they often decide to go with the suggested name. Sometimes, however, if there is a sensitive decision to be made between different candidates, the leadership will make the final decision. Here, as elsewhere when discussing the Thai polity, it is crucial to distinguish between formal and informal centralization and alliance-building. Field and Siavelis are correct in pointing out that the central leadership often reserves a good deal of autonomy as regards the final decision as well as more sensitive cases of candidate selection, such as party list composition. When conflicting interests need to be weighed against each other in a particular constituency, there is also an important element of leadership autonomy. In one case, one brand-new constituency candidate was recommended by an incumbent candidate from another party who had accepted a place on the Thai Rak Thai party list. There was already an incumbent constituency candidate and there were thus conflicting interests and strategic decisions to be taken as to whether it was more

important to keep a winning constituency candidate than to use a new and promising party list candidate from another party. The two potential constituency candidates – the incumbent and the newcomer - both waited at the Thai Rak Thai headquarter on the same day that the candidates would be formally selected, nervously waiting for the decision of the party leader.\(^{124}\)

> I was the last one in the whole country that he signed for. It was the very last day. I was sitting at the bottom of the Thai Rak Thai building in Bangkok waiting for the decision. So was Rewat.\(^{125}\)

In the end, however, the brand-new candidate was selected, so the suggestion from the influential person at the local level did trump the party leader’s doubts.

The size of the selectorate

The size of the selectorate concerns the concentration of power in the candidate selection process. In the literature it is sometimes also referred to as centralization (confounded or lumped together with vertical centralization) or to the inclusiveness of the candidate selection process (Rahat and Hazan 2001; Rahat 2009). The scholarly consensus as to what should matter for women is not much greater here than in the previous case. In fact, because the effect of horizontal centralization as such has not been distinguished from that of vertical centralization, and most accounts have tended to focus on the former, we are even less certain about what matters here (see summary of literature in, for example, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2009).

The empirical accounts that do exist tend to conclude that women fare better in candidate selection processes where a small elite is in favor of selecting candidates (see e.g. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008). Because many of these parties also tend to be territorially centralized and bureaucratized, however, it is difficult to know what to ascribe to the inclusiveness of the selectorate. An argument that more women candidates would be selected by small elite selectorates might be supported by the claim that introducing new candidates often implies kicking out older ones, and such a decision is likely to be sensitive and difficult negotiations are often more easily conducted in smaller groups. Field and Siavelis claim that transitional political systems generally exhibit greater political uncertainty, problems of coordination and party fluidity. Where the political world is not predictable, the decisions become strategically complex with high stakes involved. Thus, in such polities, elites are more likely to control important decisions (Field

\(^{124}\) Interview no. 118. Female Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak party, Constituency Sii. February 2006.

\(^{125}\) Interview no. 118. Female Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak party, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
and Siavelis 2008; see also O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 4). That such a selection would favor women, however, hinges on the fact that party elites are at all interested in increasing the number of female candidates. If this is not the case, or if their interest is more along the lines of protecting the elite groups already in power, a small selectorate could be said to facilitate any decision-making. When looking at recruitment more broadly, a study of the recruitment of company leaders in Sweden rather suggests that shortlists of potential managers are generally put together in a much smaller group than the one assigned with the formal responsibility in order to facilitate the informal selection of candidates from their own networks (Holgersson 2003).

When it comes to allowing for clientelist influences to matter, it is probably often easiest not to let too many people partake in the decision-making, at least not when it concerns the direct, and ethically ambiguous, exchange and controlling of votes through vote buying. Thus, only looking at the formal regulations of the political parties, we might be surprised to find that the power of selection lies with the rather large Executive Committees of the parties. In the case of Thai Rak Thai, it was specified that the Executive Committee should not exceed 120 members whereas in the case of the Democrat party the number was set to 46. Formally, the decision-making power over the selection procedures of both parties is thus rather inclusive with large selectorates. In practice, however, the people actively participating in selecting candidates are much fewer in number.

As regards the constituency seats, people in the vicinity and with ample knowledge about the area are given the informal mandate to identify potential candidates. Here, too, the selectorate is very small, often only consisting of one person or a small regional group. Most of the time one person was assigned the responsibility for a larger region, and then this person delegated responsibility for different sub-regions to other influentials with strong local ties. However, institutionalizing polling is, as has been mentioned, one way of allowing for clientelism to matter without going into the details of the clientelist exchange. It also involves a huge number of people in an important stage of the selection process by allowing voters in an area to have a say regarding whom they would prefer to see as a candidate. This could be compared to a primary election – the difference being that the polls are not conducted according to any formal guidelines and that the names on the lists are arbitrarily selected.

The size of the selectorate is more decisively small when it comes to the selection of party level candidates. The decision-making regarding the party list is de facto done by a small selectorate in both parties and for all types of positions, despite the more democratic decision-making alluded to in the party regulations.
Sometimes, the Executive Committee did not even have to convene to make a decision on the candidates, instead, this decision was taken by the party leader himself after consultation with the regional committees.\textsuperscript{126}

Selection for party lists is also highly centralized. Party list candidates are usually invited by someone in a top position, usually with a seat in the cabinet, the shadow cabinet or, at any rate, in the Executive Committee of the party, and often directly by the party leader. Party leaders tend to retain control over this process, thus strengthening both horizontal and territorial centralization tendencies. It is often a delicate matter to distribute the electable slots on the party list between factions and influential individuals in a fair manner and it is of utmost importance to tread carefully in discussions and negotiations preceding the final decision. Only a prospective Prime Minister and a party leader can give promises about cabinet positions, and there is always the risk of factions forming alliances outside the party or even deciding to defect and join another party should they feel they are not justly treated.\textsuperscript{127} One new Democrat candidate who was given an electable place on the party list testifies as to the autonomy of the leadership in the midst of internal critique:

> The party leader and one deputy are the ones that decide the party list order. It is probably just the two of them. [...] No party branches are very strong in this decision-making. [...] Some old ministers were probably highly critical of my high rank on the list, but they never told me so up front. I wanted to be able to answer them easily and the party leaders could testify of the influence and substance that I give. There are many veterans after me on the list. The place that I got was the best they could give to a newcomer without causing internal problems and making people cross.\textsuperscript{128}

Usually only one person directly invites a candidate to stand for election on the party list, and although this decision has been discussed with others, they seem to take place between very few people. One Democrat constituency candidate in Bangkok says that he started to help one of the deputy party leaders in different ways. When election time approached, the party leader, who had heard about his services to the party from the deputy party leader, invited the candidate to move up to the party list so that he could concentrate his work on administration and managing for the party.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126} Interview no. 35. Phonghtep Thepkanjana, Male Party List Candidate, Member of Parliament and party official for the Thai Rak Thai party. January 24, 2006.

\textsuperscript{127} Interview no. 52. Poomtham Vechayachai, former Party Deputy Secretary General of the Thai Rak Thai party. November 21, 2008.

\textsuperscript{128} Interview no. 28. Kriengsak Charoenwongsak, Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Democrat party. February 17, 2005.

\textsuperscript{129} Interview no. 89. Male Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament, former constituency candidate of Constituency Song. May 2006.
Non-partisan influence

Functional decentralization implies that the selection process is moved away from partisan channels to other, related, bodies. Hazan calls gender quotas an example of functional representation, but it might also be the case that a political party requests that trade unions or women’s wings select some of their candidates (Hazan 2002). In line with Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006) a reminder is issued that also decisions taken outside formally sanctioned party channels might be institutionalized. Thus, even if there are no party regulations stipulating that small oligarchies of influentials are to have any power over candidate selection, this may very well be the established de facto route to candidacy. As with the other candidate selection characteristics, it is impossible to determine whether functional decentralization, in itself, is conducive to women’s candidacy or whether it tends to cement male dominance. This, of course, depends entirely on the organization or group to which the decision-making power is moved. Even gender quotas, a formalized functional decentralization designed to increase the numerical representation of women, does not always do so (see e.g. Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2006; Zetterberg 2009).

Informal functional decentralization may imply that local notables or informal factions de facto have a strong say in who becomes a party candidate. It is impossible to determine that factions in general are interested in recruiting women, but their influence is not necessarily bad for the participation of women in the long run. Caul Kittilson argues that highly factionalized parties get used to taking outside interests into account (Caul Kittilson 2006), and along the same line, Panebianco’s view is that parties that experience a high degree of internal conflict have to learn how to absorb new demands (Panebianco 1988). This does not seem to be the case in Thailand, however. Rather, bargaining with the factions takes up so much time that there simply is no room for other interests to play a part. The case as argued by Field and Siavelis seems to contain more truth: that the forming of strategic alliances and the sharing of legislative seats are crucial to the survival of the party to the extent that inclusiveness based on other factors than faction affiliation are simply not an issue (Field and Siavelis 2008). Also, where factions are built upon existing support systems and form part of clientelist networks, they are less likely to be conducive to women’s participation and more likely to promote the male candidates partaking in their networks. In one manner of speaking, candidate selection procedures in clientelist settings are probably highly likely to be informally functionally decentralized to clientelist groups or factions, as clientelism largely builds on electoral networks that are very seldom strictly partisan, but more linked to influential individuals.

The impact of factions on candidate selection procedures can thus serve as yet another example of an informally institutionalized practice underpinning clientelism. Factions are influential, albeit informal, loose organizations
acting within the party but without any formal attachment to the party. Nevertheless, they exercise a great deal of power over all forms of decision-making. Within a faction there are several smaller “cliques” or phak puaks – groups of people who feel connected to each other and express a great deal of loyalty towards each other.¹³⁰ Often, but not always, do the factions also have a territorial base. Sometimes, they originate in former parties that merged with another party and the former party leader keeps some power and still exerts control by being the faction leader. This was the case with many of the influential factions in Thai Rak Thai, as many smaller parties merged with Thai Rak Thai. The power of the factions over the candidate selection procedure is, in practice, similar to that of a strong labor union movement, women’s wing or youth organization demanding good treatment and a certain number of electable slots on the party list. The power of the faction is, however, owing to its informal nature, elusive and depends on the present personal relationship between the faction leader and the party leadership. Although newspaper articles and politicians constantly refer to the different factions, there are no formal accounts of Thai factions.

Summarizing Thai candidate selection

Political institutions in Thailand have been and are seen as largely ineffective, and they are certainly weak when it comes to steering political behavior. Rather, political behavior often seems to steer the development of the political institutions in an ad hoc manner. Instead, informal institutions have developed to become the one persistent characteristic of Thai politics. The formal political structure for elections and for party candidate selection may change – and has often been subject to change in the past years – but in essence, the logic by which candidates are selected remains the same. Thus, candidate selection procedures in both Thai political parties are clearly informally institutionalized. Formal rules may not always be ignored, but they are remodeled and used for other than their intended purposes. The party list, for instance, was introduced in the constitution of 1997 as an attempt to strengthen the political parties by enticing them to conduct a party campaign besides the personal campaigns taking place in the constituencies. The intention was that the party would pick party loyal candidates with good policy records from a variety of backgrounds – an intention that tallies well with how proportional representation functions in many countries and that has been successful in achieving a higher representation of women. The result, however, was one in which the party list became a reward for long and faith-

¹³⁰ Interview no. 11. Tulsathit Taptim, Managing Editor of The Nation. February 18, 2005; Interview no. 27. Juree Vichit-Vadakan, Professor at the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA). November 19, 2008.
ful service in the constituencies and party leaders quickly started using the party lists as a way to field their cabinets, should they win the election.131

An informal and exclusive process with local bias

The constituency candidate selection processes in the two Thai political parties analyzed here can be described as an interaction between different territorial levels, where strategic directions (guided by poll results) are issued from the central level, coordination exercised at the regional level, the groundwork, the negotiations and the real decision dealt with at the local level, and the formal decision being finalized at the central level. In other words, the three levels cooperate when it comes to identifying aspirants, the local level is often responsible for (informally) nominating names, and the central level is in charge of the only real formal step in this procedure: signing the paper that makes one of the nominees the candidate of the party. Gallagher and Marsh’s observation that candidates can be de facto selected locally but vetoed by the national executive and that the involvement behind the scenes is important, but difficult to measure, also fits nicely together with the Thai picture (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Important decisions are made informally but ratified formally. We can thus conclude that Norris is right in emphasizing that different actors are important at different stages of the candidate selection process, and that it is difficult to determine which part of the process is more important (Norris 1996). When asked about the process for selecting constituency candidates, the party leader of the Democrats talks about this joint candidate assessment:

Any constituency that is finished and ready goes up to the deputy leader. It is a good process of assessment. There is no voting within the constituencies to select a candidate.132

Informality is the dominating feature of these processes, although they do have formal elements – such as the final party leader signature confirming candidature. Former Democrat Party Leader Banyat, who was in charge of the candidate selection leading up to the election of 2005, made a distinction between the formality of the very final decision taken by the Executive Committee, and the necessary informality of personally approaching potential candidates in the earlier stages of the process.133 The national party administration thus formally selects the candidates, but base their selection on

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131 Constituency candidates would have to be replaced in their constituency were they to be given a cabinet position. Thus, by appointing party list candidates to the cabinet, costly re-elections and new campaigns can be avoided.
suggestions coming from the local level. This a common way of selecting candidates, according to Gallagher and Marsh (1988), although the local suggestions they studied were more formal and were issued by party bodies – which is generally not the case in Thailand. When it comes to formally selecting the candidates, both parties are rather centralized, but the earlier stages of the recruitment process are much more de facto decentralized. It is difficult to reach a conclusion as to who controls nomination, as it involves a complex set of interactions. The fact that the center of the party plays a key role does not mean that its role is decisive in most of the individual selections the party makes. What does seem to be the case, however, is that the central party has more influence over the party list than over the constituency candidates, something that is echoed by the findings of Gallagher and Marsh (1988).

In the Democrat party, the de facto decentralization relies on institutionalized branches to a greater extent than in the Thai Rak Thai, where the local influence is entirely informal. As we know, there are no important differences in the number of women candidates that the two parties produce. Thus, the more formalized decentralization of the Democrat party does not seem to matter in this regard. In essence, when it comes to which apertures are open for clientelist influences, both parties exhibit informally institutionalized practices that do just that. There is no evidence that the leadership of either party is more liberal in its attitudes towards women candidates – at any rate, this attitude is not emphasized in the candidate selection process. Nor is there evidence that the part of the selection process that does take place on the ground engages women or that it is easier for local party officials to identify women. All actors involved in the process seem to have very different concerns when it comes to candidate selection.

Both parties are, however, rather horizontally centralized and selectorates at all levels are rather small, often only consisting of one or a few people. Where decisions are made informally and where they are not based on any formal criteria, this is the easiest way to select candidates. It also, however, contributes to the continuation of arbitrary and personal selection standards favoring male candidates.

Thai candidate selection procedures can be described as predominantly informal, de facto territorially decentralized with a great deal of local and non-partisan influence. They are also exclusive in that the selectorates are small selectorates and pragmatic in that their main concern is to go for the candidate that stands the best chance of winning. These are characteristics that make it possible for clientelism to play a part in selection procedures. Such an influence would not be as possible in a bureaucratized, territorially centralized process where large selectorates vote for candidates based on party loyalty and policy commitment. Clientelism is, in itself, an informally institutionalized practice that builds on an agreement and an exchange between patron and client. This agreement is upheld in entire networks but
exercised at the local level, in a direct and more or less personal exchange between patron and client. A local anchorage, or some kind of territorial decentralization, in the candidate selection process is thus necessary for these clientelist influences to play a role. The decisions regarding candidatures are often of a sensitive nature and can, for instance, involve enticing the candidate who controls the most votes through vote buying to switch parties. Candidate selection has always been seen as the secret garden of politics, but when it is, in addition, conditioned by an often secretive and exclusive practice like clientelism, the negotiations are even more likely to be limited to including only a select few. Factional influence is also common in clientelist settings, as parties are often weak as organizations while internal factions, often themselves part of clientelist networks, are stronger.

Gender and candidate selection

As we have seen, the scholarly discussions about which candidate selection characteristics are favorable for women have generally been rather inconclusive. It is easier to gain a good understanding of what matters when the winning strategies of political parties, in this case clientelism, are coupled with candidate selection characteristics as above. We will soon move on to investigate how and why clientelism is, also, male dominated. A few words may already be appropriate, however, in order to link the manner with which parties select candidates not only to clientelism but also to the gendered features of clientelism. We know that clientelism can be interpreted as a predictability maximizer in the unpredictable Thai political landscape, and that it is seen as the winning campaign strategy for political candidates. Whether parties are selecting candidates to stand for election or whether candidates are handpicking people for their personal clientelist networks, the recruitment strategies they employ are probably likely to be perceived as the ones that are most likely to protect the clientelist way of doing political business. Although it may be an individual selection partly based on assumptions, prejudice and gendered stereotypes, it is nevertheless often rationalized as a strategic decision and seldom considered outright discrimination, although there are discriminating consequences for women and certain men.

Studies of managerial recruitment can contribute to our understanding of why and how informality matters. Such research has generally shown that women are disadvantaged in informal systems and that men tend to favor men where there are no binding rules that prevent them from doing so (Kanter 1993; Holgersson 2003; Collinson et al. 1990; Cockburn 1991; Collinson and Hearn 1996, 2001). For instance, a study of recruitment practices in American organizations showed that organizations with managerial recruitment through informal channels had higher managerial male dominance than organizations that practiced more open recruitment. The same study also suggested that as recruitment procedures are formalized, male manage-
rial dominance weakens (Reskin and McBrier 2000). Even when there are formal and bureaucratic rules, norms and criteria that exclude certain groups are often unconsciously applied in the selection process (Salaman and Thompson 1978; Holgersson 2003). A study of the recruitment of Swedish managers showed that the de facto responsibility of recruitment was often with a small group of people although it was formally ascribed to the company board. Shortlists were generated from the informal networks of the recruiters rather than through applications submitted by individual candidates. Many leaders viewed the identification of future leaders as an important part of their leadership responsibility, whereas it was seen as preferable that potential candidates themselves were relatively passive (Holgersson 2003). Thus, just as in the political sphere, formal or bureaucratic rules may not be adhered to, and even when they are, they constitute an incomplete picture of power, as there is always informal interaction that needs to be taken into account. Thus, formalized recruitment is, from a gender perspective, simply the most effective way to circumvent or puncture those informal networks and procedures that, in most contexts, tend to favor male power over equal power.
Chapter 7 – Clientelist Networks and Homosocial Capital

There is still one crucial aspect left to deal with: to specify exactly wherein the gendered nature of clientelism lies, and to determine how it is reproduced and maintained. To do this, an analysis of political parties and their candidate selection procedures is not enough. Political parties and the manner in which they select candidates are rather to be seen as gatekeepers to parliament, gatekeepers that determine the openings left for clientelism to play a part. But why is clientelism male dominated in the first place? And why does it continue to be male dominated? This chapter argues that political networks play a decisive part in the upholding of clientelism, and that the key to understanding the gendered nature of clientelism is to be found in these networks.

How informal party practices, such as clientelism, work in gendered ways needs to be contextualized. In Thailand, the exclusive and unofficial predominantly male political networks thus need to be investigated. The very fact that party organization is weak means that candidates cannot rely on the party to build electoral support or to help in the campaign, instead they have to build and maintain their own, personal networks. These networks are thus built so that a candidate or party faction can distribute benefits widely: the most secure way to achieve being selected as a candidate and being elected. Such benefits might take the form of constituency services, personal favors, and direct vote buying administered by the local canvassing networks. Looking at what has been written about these networks before, they seem to have many characteristics of a homosocial network. Politics in Thailand remains a male bastion partly because candidate selection in the political parties builds on the cooperation between several informally sanctioned groups and leaves a large opening for local influences. The consequences of this will be investigated in this chapter. The concept of homosocial capital, and the role it plays in these networks, will be further explained, employed, and elaborated on.

Earlier chapters have shown that parliaments will continue to be male dominated to a greater extent in countries where clientelism is an important feature of politics. It is even the case that significant improvements in female representation should not be expected even in democratizing countries if the new democratic system coexists with and develops alongside persistent cli-
entelist practices. If, on the other hand, clientelism is weakened simultaneously with democratic reforms and democracy climbs to very high levels and is consolidated, then the representation of women will, in time, be relatively higher. We also know that the selection procedures of the two Thai political parties analyzed here, the Democrat party and the Thai Rak Thai party, are of an informal character and that decisions are usually taken by a select few at the local level – thus leaving ample room for clientelism to affect parliamentary representation. The criteria by which parties assess candidates are also often very pragmatic: they simply go for the candidate who stands the best chance of winning the election. Where a clientelist logic coexists with formal democratic procedures such as elections and candidate selection, it is not far-fetched to propose that clientelist practices will play a large part in determining who is to become a candidate.

This chapter mainly builds on my own interview material, but I also compare my empirical results to previous research about clientelism in Thailand. In addition, this chapter has a theory-developing approach, and I thus reason around the meanings and implications of homosocial capital. In order to theorize my empirical findings, I revisit previous accounts of homosociality and social capital. When citing interviews, I have chosen the quotes that best illustrate the general picture I am trying to convey. I have chosen to refer to and quote those interviews that I think best represent the line of reasoning most prevalent among my respondents, rather than always listing all the interviews that could be interpreted in the same manner.134

The role and function of clientelist networks

The task of this analysis is to identify the mechanisms that open the doors for certain men, while closing them for others, and to assess their gendered consequences. In order to find these mechanisms, the rationale underlying the network-building in a clientelist system first needs to be scrutinized. Then we can determine how this rationale affects the way that networks are built and maintained and how the building and maintenance of clientelist networks favor the political participation and recruitment of certain people while discriminating against others. Interview material from interviews with

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134 As was mentioned in the theory chapter, the later interviews were of a better quality in the sense that I knew more, could ask better questions, and thus got more informative answers. With the knowledge gained from these interviews, I could also look back on my earlier interviews and see them in a new light. I better understood what my respondents had been trying to say, and this second reading of my early interview material greatly contributed to the overall picture taking shape. However, for the most part, these early interviews are not directly cited here.
constituency candidates and members of their local networks, all in all about 100 interviews, is primarily used in the analysis.

Clientelist networks and their link to representative patterns

There is a direct link between the clientelist networks and parliamentary representation patterns in Thailand. The networks are thus central to our understanding of the continued male dominance at the national level. We already know that potential candidates seldom step forward themselves to announce their interest in running for election under a certain party banner. Instead, candidature is by invitation only, and it is thus the privilege of local influentials with connections to the party, often the incumbent, to find and recruit candidates. This does not mean, however, that people cannot improve their chances of launching a national political career. Only certain people are likely to be considered appropriate as candidates, and this is where the clientelist networks play a crucial role.

In order to be seen as a potential candidate, someone the recruiters even keep their eyes on, you need to be a member of a clientelist network. Networks and cliques are important arenas for political recruitment for higher political office. When someone needs to be recruited for a new candidate position, incumbents or other partisan influentials look for suitable people who have proven themselves in their immediate vicinity. Although incumbents and prominent politicians are at considerable liberty to select their successor or to suggest names for an empty seat, it is very common for them to select someone who is already a part of their network and who has proven him- or herself as a local politician. Nelson also claims that national constituency candidates often originate from these very networks (Nelson 2001: 318). Most of the time, the people they recruit have had important positions as nodes in their own networks. Thus, the people who already have a position in a clientelist network will be more likely to become constituency representatives in the parliament.

To get one step further, and also improve the chances of being selected as the constituency candidate, a person needs to convince those in charge of candidate selection that he or she controls a certain number of votes - preferably a large enough number to win the election. The only way this can be successfully claimed is by not only being a member of a network, but by visibly contributing to the maintenance of one. An extensive network in the potential candidate’s hands facilitates the approximation of the expected number of votes. The increasing use of polls conducted by parties to gauge the popularity of different candidates against each other is also a way to measure the impact of the already existing clientelist networks these potential candidates control. Thai rural voters are used to the clientelist way of politics and for the most part see the clientelist exchange as a legitimate one. Thus, they are likely to base their vote, both in pre-polls as well as in real
elections, on the clientelist support they have already received and perceive they are most likely to continue receiving. In order to be even considered as a candidate, you thus need to have an efficient clientelist network up and running. The people who can most successfully claim to have an extensive and efficient clientelist network will be more likely to become constituency representatives in the parliament.

All members of a clientelist network, from national leaders to village folk, need to maintain and entertain their networks both upward and downward. A constituency candidate usually needs to be associated with a faction and with reliable patrons closer to the power centers. Downward, the candidate is often at liberty to build and maintain his or her own political network – or burdened with the need to do so, depending on how you see it. The question thus is: who are these people? Who becomes a member of these networks? And who can build and maintain an extensive and efficient network? These questions, and why the answer to them is gendered, are the subject of this analysis.

Clientelist networks as predictability maximizers

The clientelist networks are the one relatively stable feature of Thai political life. The highly unpredictable national political environment renders it unwise for political candidates to invest resources in building a local partisan organization, considering that partisan association is highly volatile. Informal and personal networks are a better and more secure political investment. Some members of this network might invest their primary loyalty in a provincial strongman, but for the most part, the candidate is responsible for amassing the network support needed. The network investment is a crucial one for political success. Networks do not only need to be far-reaching; with a large number of supporters, they also need to consist of a certain type of supporters. The clientelist networks can, if they are built and maintained in the right way, constitute the stable political abodes always to be counted on that are otherwise lacking in Thai politics. In order to serve this purpose, however, the networks need to consist of the right people – people who can be counted on, people whose behavior can be understood and predicted.

In much the same way as Kanter (1977) described the world of corporations as inherently unpredictable, so is the world of Thai politics unpredictable. And, following Kanter’s line of argument, the unpredictability of the surrounding environment further strengthens the need of a corporate manager to maximize predictability among close co-workers. The Thai clientelist networks can be understood in the same way. No Thai politician can expect to steer or foresee the next move in national politics. It is thus extremely difficult to make strategic career moves by relying on any national, official or formal political bodies. As I show in Chapter 5, however, clientelist networks have remained fairly stable amidst national political turbulence.
Clientelist networks also have another specific feature that increases the need of predictability and trust within the network: they are often engaged in secretive and sometimes downright illegal activities. The distribution of goods and services and the planning and administration of vote buying are activities that cannot be entirely conducted in the open. Nor can they be entrusted to anyone. The fact that clientelist networks are, at least partly, employed for secretive and often shady activities further increases the emphasis on the networks as closed entities charged with trust.

Building personal networks with local notables at different levels is an old Thai practice. The canvassers are called *hua khanaen*, and *hua khanaen* networks can extend all the way from the candidate down to the village level (Ockey 2003). This is sometimes referred to as creating “electoral infrastructure” (Argihiros 2001; Nelson 2005). Political candidates in a constituency need to reach out to the grassroots people to secure support. It is impossible for one person to distribute services everywhere or to maintain a personal relationship with villagers throughout a constituency, thus some sort of middleman is needed, whether it is for distributing money for votes, for implementing constituency services, or for campaigning. The party organization would seem like the most obvious choice for this, but considering that it is rather weak in most places, candidates have to look for local support elsewhere and build and maintain networks for these purposes themselves.

In order to ensure that the personal networks over which the candidate presides will remain stable and can administer their duties and distribution of services, it is imperative that they be perceived as predictable, and thus filled with people whose behavior the candidate can foresee and understand. Perceived predictability is achieved by working with people who are in the right position in society to have the incentives to uphold the existing system and to have access to the needed resources. This is, in a sense, the calculated pragmatism of the choice. But feelings are also involved. Perceived predictability and in-group trust is also achieved by working with people with whom you feel comfortable, with whom you can easily communicate and whose behavior is perceived to be similar to your own.

The obvious choice for candidates is to base their personal network on local politicians. Some local politicians are supposed to be non-partisan (e.g. village heads and kamnans, who are seen as government officials), but they have the distinct advantage of being spread out at different levels all over the constituency (Ockey 2004: 29-30), and there are also real and important benefits in store for them if they support a national candidate and especially if they manage to deliver the votes necessary for electoral success in their district.

The people in local politics are the heads of hua khanaen. [...] There are many supporters that are village heads and kamnans. You can never expect them to be neutral, they are secretly supporting someone. They do not walk
from door to door, their campaigning is secret. The village head is powerful, so he tells some of his men to vote for a particular candidate. These men will tell others.\footnote{Interview no. 80. Male Constituency Candidate for the TRT party, Constituency Nung. May 2006.}

All constituency candidates interviewed mention local politicians as their most important \textit{hua khanaen}.\footnote{Although some candidates and members of the networks preferred not to use the specific word \textit{hua khanaen}, which in some areas is seen as derogatory. Thai Rak Thai members, in particular, preferred to talk about their political “teams” instead. E.g. in interviews no. 68; 80; 96; 99; 101; 115; 118; 128; 143 candidates also discussed their cooperation with local politicians.} The sub-district level is probably the most crucial and important level. A constituency is made up of several sub-districts, or \textit{tambons}. Sub-districts also have several political institutions that can be targeted: the Tambon Administration Organization (TAO) as well as the traditionally powerful \textit{kamnan}, the sub-district head who is the leader of all the village heads in the sub-district. The TAO is a decentralized political body, where members often have partisan ties, whereas the \textit{kamnan} is, formally, a government official. The \textit{tambon} level is usually the hub of the clientelist network, and local politicians, who are either members of the TAO, or \textit{kamnans}, are central as middlemen between the candidate and villagers. All candidates interviewed cooperated with local politicians at this level.

I have many hundred close co-operators. In each tambon, I cooperate with the \textit{kamnan}, village head, and the chairman of the TAO. I work on the relationship with these people. All or at least most of them are local politicians. They are people in the area, working with local people and I build up my own vote with them.\footnote{Interview no. 101. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Saem. June 2006.}

Generally, the candidates’ face-to-face contact with the network members extended as far as the \textit{tambon}, and when it came to building village teams, it was up to the \textit{tambon hua khanaen} to select suitable people in each of the villages of the \textit{tambon}. 
In the figure above, the arrows show who has the power to select canvassers for what level. The lines without arrows show less formalized links between people and formal and information institutions.

The clientelist exchange is considered particularly apt at enhancing predictability in election results. When asked about what a successful election campaign entails, direct and continuous services and distribution of money are two components that are almost always mentioned. Clientelism, and vote buying in particular, thus also facilitates candidate selection on the part of the political parties. Whereas outsiders often tend to see vote buying as an inherently uncertain way of ensuring future votes – why don’t people just take the money and then go vote for whomever they like? – this is not a concern shared by most people in the clientelist networks. Rather the opposite, buying votes is seen as the most secure way of achieving a predictable election result.\footnote{The figure is partly inspired by a figure in a working paper on provincial political structures (Nelson 2005).}

\footnote{Interview no. 88. Male canvasser for the Democrat party, Constituency Song. April 2006; other interviews with a similar line of reasoning include no. 62; 68; 74; 77; 84; 88; 96; 101; 128.}
Establishing a stable and predictable personal network is the best investment for a future political career that a Thai politician can make. But in order to make an investment, some kind of capital is needed. The capital with the strongest currency in the clientelist setting is, I argue, homosocial capital. The more homosocial capital there is in a network, the higher the perceived predictability of the network will be.

Network maintenance and homosocial capital

Maintenance of a clientelist network requires building up a mutual and sustainable relationship between central nodes of the network. People higher up in the hierarchy can not simply pick a person, there has to be a mutual understanding.

I do not select my team directly, they select me as well. It is mutual, normally we are very close in the team anyway.\footnote{Interview no.98. Male village level canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Saem. June 2006.}

Such a relationship is more likely the more accumulation of homosocial capital there is between the people in question. Two important aspects of the concept of homosocial capital become visible when we look a bit more closely at how networks are maintained. First, a person’s position in society affects his/her possibility to accumulate homosocial capital. Societal positions usually follow gendered patterns but they are, nevertheless, primarily used pragmatically in this instance. Second, however, a person’s sex per se also contributes to his/her accumulation of homosocial capital. Although far from all men are perceived as contributing to homosocial capital, even fewer women will be seen as contributors in this sense. To understand the rationale behind clientelist network building and the underlying logic of homosocial capital, we need to discuss how both position and characteristics contribute to homosocial capital in slightly different ways, and how they also affect men and women in different ways.

The importance of societal position for accumulation of homosocial capital

Who, then, is perceived to be in a position to contribute to the clientelist exchange? This is the first aspect of homosocial capital that needs to be dealt with. In a clientelist system, the national candidate, as mentioned above, needs help to reach out to villagers in a number of ways in order to both strengthen his or her position as a person and to distribute the particularized
services that are part and parcel of the clientelist exchange. The local politicians thus become *hua khanaens*, or canvassers, who run the localized campaign before national elections. Although campaigning and vote buying in particular, intensifies before an election, the connections between the national candidate and the localities need to be continuously upheld. Thus, the association of local politicians to national candidates is far from temporary. Campaign organization can be more or less elaborate. In some areas it was described as a continuous activity, that concerned making sure that local politicians gave the candidate credit for implemented development projects by, for instance, naming roads after the candidate or putting up thank you notes\(^\text{141}\), distributing money for projects when the candidate was unable to do so\(^\text{142}\), or taking every opportunity to explain how good the candidate was\(^\text{143}\). In other areas, campaign organization was elaborate, and *hua khanaens* were supposed to control a specific number of votes for themselves, and indirectly for the candidate. One tambon level *hua khanaen*, who is also a chairman of the TAO, explains in detail how he goes about securing votes for the network:

I am the leader of this tambon, which is nine villages. There are 15 *hua khanaens* in each village. This means there are 135 *hua khanaens* under me. I am also in charge of controlling the votes in the tambon. There are 2000 votes in total. 1800 votes I have to get. 1500 is the minimum. To work… I don’t know how to explain the process. You have to make sure that for one *hua khanaen*, there are 10 families and cousins and relatives. I have to make sure that the whole team together can get 1,500 votes. I have to know this, since they don’t count the votes in the village anymore. For the whole constituency there are 40,000 voters but maybe 10,000 never come to vote. Among 30,000 votes, we need to get 10,500, at least. All tambons have to work the same way that I do in order to really know. In order to check back, I sit in the local TAO. There are local elections, and someone in every team competes in every TAO election. So at each polling station you see how many people vote for that person. In these smaller counting stations you see how people vote. These votes refer to the bigger scale, and they show how many votes you control.\(^\text{144}\)

This man, himself a local politician, is thus clearly in a position in which he has the resources to deliver the votes for the national candidate. Although an election law had been passed to the effect that all the votes are counted centrally in the constituency to avoid knowing how the votes were distributed in each local-

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\(^{141}\) Interview no. 128. Female Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency *Haa*. March 2006.

\(^{142}\) Interview no. 96. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency *Saem*. June 2006.

\(^{143}\) Interview no. 127. Male Canvasser for the Democrat party, Constituency *Haa*. March 2006.

\(^{144}\) Interview no. 74. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency *Nung*. May 2006. E.g. interviews no. 74; 93; 101 have similar accounts.
ity, there are apparently ways around this new law. This canvasser uses his own position as an elected local politician to calculate how many votes he controls on the part of the constituency candidate. His important role in the network is of course partly due to the fact that he, himself, has an extensive network reaching down to every village. He claimed to achieve all these votes by having teams whose 15 members were well known and respected in the village, and who were from 15 different families. Although it was often difficult to directly make the village head part of the team, as they are supposed to be neutral, he made sure that at least one person was closely related to the village head. He also kept continuous contact with villagers even when there were no elections. For instance he helped them with their harvests. According to him, it was rather obvious that the candidate could not have this detailed local knowledge or implement all the projects by himself, but that he was dependant on the local politicians.\textsuperscript{145} Equally important, however, is the very formality of this person being an elected local politician, likely to stand for election again. Because votes are counted centrally in national elections, local elections alone make social control possible. How local politicians fare in local elections is used as a proxy to determine how many votes they are likely to control in national elections.

Apart from organizing the campaign, the local politicians were also expected to act as the personal representatives of the candidate – to attend ceremonies and events\textsuperscript{146} and give advice in the place of the representative. With the multitude of events that candidates are invited to, they have to have a number of close people who can represent them in their place. This is a very common task of \textit{hua khan-aens}.\textsuperscript{147} If the candidate cannot honor a local event with his or her presence, it is customary to send someone else, along with an envelope with money from the candidate.\textsuperscript{148} There are incentives for local politicians to show themselves at these types of events, and to associate themselves with the national candidate, as this is likely to improve their own visibility and spur their own political campaign. A canvasser who does not have anything to gain from showing him- or herself at these events cannot be depended upon in the same way. Thus, local politicians also have the distinct advantage of being able to make a personal gain from the clientelist exchange. As such, they are more predictable in their support for the candidate as well as in their support for the maintenance of the clientelist

\textsuperscript{145} Interview no. 74. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency \textit{Nung}. May 2006.
\textsuperscript{146} Interview no. 97. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency \textit{Saem}. June 2006.
\textsuperscript{147} Interview no. 28. Kriengsak Charoenwongsak, Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Democrat party. February 17, 2005; Interview no. 97. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency \textit{Saem}. June 2006; Interview no. 74. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency \textit{Nung}. May 2006; Interview no. 91. Female Office Worker at the Thai Rak Thai office, Constituency \textit{Song}. June 2006.
\textsuperscript{148} Interview no. 127. Male Canvasser for the Democrat party, Constituency \textit{Haa}. March 2006.
logic at large. Apart from the abstract benefits they might reap from associating themselves with a national candidate, there are also more concrete benefits that are specifically geared towards their campaigns. In exchange for the services the local politicians perform as *hua khanaens*, they receive support for their own election campaigns, or, once they are elected, budgets for local development projects — something that benefits the local politician as well as the national candidate. Voters as well as local politicians know that close connections to a national candidate are desirable, especially if it is an elected Member of Parliament, who has access to government budgets.149 One TAO-committee member who works closely with the national candidate by, for instance, going to events for him when he is unable to, has also received direct help from him.

He helped me coordinate projects in the villages - road projects, construction and electricity – and he provided a budget for development.150

Others offer their support even before the members of their network are elected, simply to make sure that the people they like cooperating with will be elected. Campaign support can be everything from the national candidate giving the local politician advice151, walking from door to door helping in the campaign152, posing in the same election poster, or financing the campaign. One candidate contributes to the campaign of many local politicians. He gives 5,000 baht to people who stand for TAO election and 100,000 baht for people who stand for PAO election. For village headman elections he gives around 2,000 baht, or simply brings some whiskey or slaughters a cow. He supports *kamnan* elections once in a while.153 In this way, candidates can influence who becomes a local politician and, consequently, who they will want to have in their network, as a link to the voters.

People think that the national level politicians help the local level politician. Actually, local level politicians have helped national level politicians more than the other way around, because the local level politicians are closer to the people.154

149 Interview no. 80. Male Constituency Candidate in neighboring constituency to Constituency Nung. May 2006. A large number of respondents emphasize this cooperation between local and national level politicians including also interviews no. 68; 69; 72; 74; 77; 79; 84; 86; 88; 90; 91; 92; 93; 96; 97; 98; 99; 101; 102; 104; 105; 106; 112; 113; 114; 115; 116; 118; 119; 120; 121; 125; 126; 128; 129; 130; 131; 136; 143.


153 Interview no. 68. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of the Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Nung. May 2006.

154 Interview no. 84. Male Canvasser for the Democrat party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006.
Local politicians are thus almost synonymous with members of clientelist networks in this Thai context. Most of the candidates interviewed had a background in local politics if they were not the son or close relative of a previous candidate. This view is echoed in other studies of political networks in Thailand. Nelson, for instance, claims that constituency politicians very often originate from these very networks, having, perhaps, made a political career at the district or provincial level before taking the step to the national level, promoted by influential people in the clique or faction and with an already established electoral network at hand (Nelson 2001: 318). The person perceived to be in a position to contribute to the clientelist exchange is thus, with few exceptions, a local politician. Thus, membership in clientelist networks and potential accumulation of homosocial capital is certainly not something that is open to all men in a society – but it is open to even fewer women. As was shown in the political background of Thailand, local politics in Thailand is even more male dominated than national politics. The local network members that I interviewed fit this overall picture well, as almost all were men. Women were not completely excluded from the networks, but I was never once directed to a female hua khanaen.155 When I asked directly about them, the female hua khanaens were almost always part of the village team at the lowest hierarchical level, where being a local politician is not that common, and these women were usually representatives for the women’s group in the village.156

Thus, as Thai society stands today, women simply do not have access to the societal positions and the desirable resources needed to be viewed as attractive members of clientelist networks. People who do not occupy these crucial positions or possess these vital resources are not perceived as predictable. They are not necessarily in a position where it is in their own interest to protect the clientelist system as a whole. Nor are they necessarily interested in the rather elaborate exchange that creates a win-win situation for the national candidate and the local politician.

155 The exception being the one constituency where I specifically sought out and studied a female canvassing network. My method of mapping the other networks was, as described in the methodology chapter, a snowballing method in which I could not control who I was directed to. Instead, I simply asked to meet people with whom the respondent worked closely politically. Thus, had respondents worked closely with women, I see no reason why I would not have been directed to network women.
The importance of presumed characteristics for accumulation of homosocial capital

Because a large amount of dedication is needed in these networks, and considering that activities dealt with are often of a sensitive and semi-illegal nature: buying votes, discriminating project budget allocation in favor of supporters, partaking in national politics when you are supposed to be neutral etc., the clientelist networks are of a very tight and closed nature. There is thus a less tangible aspect of homosocial capital related to who is perceived as being the more trustworthy member. A national candidate is likely to strive to work primarily with people whom he or she perceives can be trusted. This is why family members, relatives or childhood friends are appreciated close co-operators and members of networks. One candidate says that the most dangerous thing a politician can do is to share information with people in the area. Thus, even though an extensive network is needed to reach all the way down to the village level, candidates usually only really trust a few close co-operators, often local politicians at the provincial or sub-district level. Local politicians, in turn, exercise the same type of cautiousness when selecting whom to work with at the village level.

One candidate explains how he selects with whom he will work with regard to the specific, and secret, distribution of vote-buying money:

I have two people that I trust and that I have worked with for a long time. They are the ones who help me with the accounts during election time. There are large flows of money that is completely outside of the party finances,


158 Interview no. 143. Male Constituency Candidate for the Democrat party, Constituency Haa. March 2006.

159 Interview no. 74. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 77. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview nb, 84. Male Canvasser for the Democrat party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006; Interview no. 106. Male Canvasser for the Democrat party, assistant to the Constituency Candidate and relative to the local strongman, Constituency Saem. June 2006.
completely unofficial. These people are middle-men, between me and the villagers, so if I just trust them the money can’t be connected to me. This is vote buying.160

Lower down in the hierarchy, the tambon level, in the same constituency a local politician explained:

> When I choose hua khanaens, firstly it is important that this person has many relatives and that the relationship between me and this person is good. He has to be trustable. If I ask something of this person I need to know that he will do it.161

Trust is thus closely associated with predictability. When a secretive activity is undertaken, you need to be able to foresee how the people you cooperate with will react, if they were to be confronted. When something is communicated to another member of the network, you need to be sure that the meaning of what you have communicated is understood correctly and that services and activities are carried out as intended.

> I am the leader of the village team. My team consists of people who have been my own canvassers in local elections. […] There were more people who wanted to support me, but I had to look at the honesty. I don’t turn away the rest of the people who are just there to learn secrets. I just give them some other task and don’t make them part of my team.162

Trust and loyalty within the clientelist network are two highly esteemed qualities163 and networks are often referred to as phak puak.164 One candidate claims that friendships are more important than formal relationships in politics and that, in his case, his hua khanaens are the same thing as his phak puak. Just like you don’t change friends all the time, local networks and phak puaks have often worked together for a very long time in order to become a close group.165 Others make a distinction between phak puaks, who are a select few people with whom you already have established relationships, and networks of hua khanaens, which can be set up more instrumen-
Part of this has to do with social control and the possibility for verification of the number of votes controlled at each level of the network and in each part of the constituency. Most village level canvassers do not at all see the secrecy of the ballot as a complicating factor when it comes to determining whether you actually got the votes you expected and paid for. They claim that they are so close to the villagers that they simply need to look them in the eye, or talk to them for a couple of minutes to know who they voted for. This is also often an issue of open bargaining and not something that is kept a secret. This same feeling of trust is emphasized all the way up in the networks. Deep respect for other members in the network is also often expressed:

I respect Kamnan Som as a role model. First I admired him from a distance, because he did not know me. [...] I was introduced by a relative of Kamnan Som. We are phak puak ever since we got to know each other. In a phak puak you stand up for each other. I don’t mind working for him, he is the most respectable person in the area. It was a dream for me to work with him. 

Recruitment to these networks is often by invitation only, and especially when it comes to the group working closest to the candidate, the group of tambon level representatives, it is imperative that they are people who can be trusted not to spread sensitive information. One person contacts another person, and networks are extended one by one.

It usually starts with a friend of a friend. The person who already knows the candidate introduces them to each other. This established friendship can then get closer and closer.

Selection is also hierarchically based, people higher up in the network structure approach the people they want to work with lower in the structure. Of-

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169 E.g. interview no. 128. Female Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Haa. March 2006; Interview no 97. Male Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Saem. June 2006.
ten candidates, by supporting certain people to run for local office, can also control who will advance in the network.

In order to succeed in local politics in Thailand, you thus need to be able to build a durable and strong network yourself, but you also need to be selected as a part of a more influential person’s network. Clientelist networks build on asymmetrical exchanges, and thus tend to cement status relations (Lemarchand and Legg 1972: 154). Influential people ally themselves with people who already have power, and there are few inroads for new people to the networks or to the political sphere at large. Stereotypes about the inherent characteristics of women and men exist in all societies, and the Thai society is no different. Regardless of whether or not there is a grain of truth in these stereotypes, and regardless of whether they are inherent characteristics or due to opportunities or social structure, the conception that there is a difference guides people’s behavior towards men and women. In the Thai context, it is evident that women are perceived to be different from men, and unlike the men who are already in the network. It is also clear that certain characteristics perceived to be male are desirable in the networks, whereas certain female characteristics are not.

Some people claim that women can be used for groundwork in the villages because they are more reliable than men, but I was never introduced to such female members of the networks. Others claim that women are offered preparatory work but that they are completely excluded from the canvassing networks simply because the work is considered to be too hard and “too complex and complicated to be ladylike”. Being seen as profoundly different, women are not seen as similar to the recruiters higher up in the hierarchy, nor are they perceived to be a good long-term investment. A researcher who has focused on politically active women claims that female politicians often are victims of sexual assault and allegations. Despite the fact that women move about rather freely in the public sphere in Thailand, the freedom associated with canvassing is thought to interfere with personal propriety. There are other standards for women politicians than for male politicians. One woman member of the TAO says that women politicians at the tambon level always have their eyes on them.

You have to be very careful with drinking, gambling and having affairs, for instance. Much more careful than men, since women will be immediately

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173 Interview no. 27. Juree Vichit-Vadakan, Professor at the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA). November 19, 2008.
174 Interview no. 27. Juree Vichit-Vadakan, Professor at the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA). November 19, 2008.
discredited if they do any of this. Women are watched much more carefully and always have to behave nicely.\(^{175}\)

Being a rare bird with everybody’s eyes on you is not necessarily a positive thing in a clientelist network where it is preferable that many of the activities be undertaken secretly. Thus, even when women have managed to attain important positions as local politicians, they cannot necessarily make use of these positions quite as easily as men can. Related to this, some respondents argue that with women in the network, the possibility of love affairs becomes a reality, and this is perceived as something that is difficult to deal with. This is also clearly constructed as a problem that has to do with the woman, rather than with the man. Thus, the local political careers of women are not likely to be supported.

Regarding women, it is always something wrong the second time they are going to stand. The first time it is OK. Last time the person who was a member of the PAO married with another member of the PAO and there were problems. There are no women in my network.\(^{176}\)

Given a heteronormative view of society, there is thus an inherent instability in letting women enter a male network. The possibility of romantic, heterosexual relationships between members of the network introduces new dimensions of loyalties and thus diminishes the predictability of the network members at large.

In stark contrast to the perceived problems of having people who are in a romantic relationship in the same network is the glorification of including or even basing entire networks on people with intimate father-son relationships. The possibility of being father-like seems to be central to many of the respondents, either directly or indirectly.\(^{177}\) It is not uncommon for sons to directly take over their father’s position in the network. This was the case in constituency \textit{Haa}, where the father of the present candidate had built up such a great amount of trust among the members of the clientelist network, that it could only be maintained if he was succeeded by his son. Canvassers expected the son of the candidate to be the same as the father, and thus they could trust him, and look up to him.\(^{178}\) Father figures, or \textit{jao phos}, are also central figures in the networks. In constituency \textit{Saem}, many members of the

\(^{175}\) Interview no. 110. Female member of a women’s local politics group, Constituency \textit{Sii}. February 2006.

\(^{176}\) Interview no. 68. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency \textit{Nung}. May 2006.

\(^{177}\) Political success of an individual was attributed partly to an older male relative in interviews no. 46; 72; 85; 88; 93; 99; 101; 105; 106; 118; 119; 120; 123; 126; 143.

Democrat network refer to a local strongman by calling him “father”.\textsuperscript{179} Whereas close romantic relationships between a man and a woman in the clientelist networks are seen as endangering the predictability and stability of the network as well as introducing distrust and new types of problems, the inclusion of a father and son is highly encouraged and this type of relationship is even simulated where no biological relationship exists. A father-son relationship is rather seen as increasing stability and predictability, as a son is perceived to be similar to his father, or even the same as his father, and is also seen as an insurance against future unpredictability.

The old local institutions in Thai politics, \textit{kamnan} and village headman, are closely associated with maleness, and not just any maleness - there is a certain type of masculinity that is sought for, to use Connell’s words: a hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). It is considered difficult for men who do not possess certain qualities to become village headman or \textit{kamnan}, but it is considered almost impossible for women. Descriptions of a \textit{kamnan} often come very close to that of a \textit{nakleng}, which implies that it is necessary to be rough and tough to do the job. Some of the most infamous gangsters and mafia leaders in Thailand still use the prefix \textit{kamnan} in front of their name, probably contributing to this image. Kamnan Poh, the godfather of Chon Buri, is probably the most famous example. Kamnan Poh has been accused of several crimes, from conducting corrupt business deals to hiring hit men to assassinate his business rival. He is also, however, known to protect a large number of people and has, himself, spoken of the importance of rewarding loyalty (Chantornvong 2000). Being a \textit{kamnan} is considered a dangerous job and thus not suitable for women.\textsuperscript{180} One woman in the network said that it was much more difficult for a woman to become a \textit{kamnan} or a village head than a TAO member:

\begin{quote}
This is because you have to deal with robberies and things like that: and what can you do if you are a woman? Women can not do anything. It is easier with the MP level, and the municipality council or TAO. TAO is more brainwork and not so much strength so they can choose a woman as a TAO member.\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

Because \textit{kammans} and village heads are crucial allies in the networks, it is of course an additional difficulty for women that these posts are so intimately associated with being a man.

There are thus psychological issues at hand, and many people find it difficult to talk about once asked. The question of whom you decide to trust and support and why is not something that most people can readily come up with

\textsuperscript{179} Interview no. 105. Male Canvasser for the Democrat party and tambon level politician, Constituency \textit{Saem}. June 2006.

\textsuperscript{180} Interview no. 80. Male Constituency Candidate for the Thai Rak Thai, neighboring constituency to Constituency \textit{Nung}. May 2006.

\textsuperscript{181} Interview no. 110. A female member of a women’s local politics group, Constituency \textit{Sii}. February 2006.
a rational answer to. Thus, analysis of the responses given thus has to build on an analysis of the type of personalities politicians claim to trust or distrust, rather than on their direct comments on these issues. For instance, many of the respondents did not at all acknowledge a problem with gender bias in Thai politics when they were asked about it in general terms. In relative terms, a great number of people mentioned that Thailand is more advanced than many other Asian countries and corrected me by emphasizing that Thailand is a gender equal country. In some of the cases I confronted them with the fact that none or very few of the people they worked with and claimed to trust were women. One male candidate insisted that he did not care if politicians were male or female, but still tried to explain why his networks looked the way they did:

Women think with a mentality that men can help them. They can talk and tell men what needs to be done, and the men will do more than the women. If you have a good friend who is a man, you will feel better than if you have a woman friend. You are more comfortable when you work with other men.

Stereotypes indicating that women are less corruptible than men also, ironically, seem to hinder women from partaking in the clientelist networks. One female candidate thinks that women are not included in political networks partly because the political sphere is considered corrupt and dirty whereas women are considered incorruptible and clean.

There is nothing in the law, but people think it is not suitable for women with politics. People view the political career as a dirty job.

Because of these prevailing perceptions, women are denied opportunities to engage in the corrupt deals that men often present to other men. Some male respondents also expressed generalized trust in women, indicating that they might let women take care of the clean party finances and book-keeping, because they are more reliable and sincere than men are. According to an expert on gender and politics in Thailand, women are also often relied on to organize meetings and provide catering at political rallies. Women have traditionally assumed economic responsibility in farm households in Thai-

186 Interview no. 27. Juree Vichit-Vadakan, Professor at the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA). November 19, 2008.
land, so this is, in a sense, nothing new. The interesting aspect is that because women are perceived as being generally trustable they are also exempt from the particularized trust of the clientelist networks. Because they are seen as being different and less corrupt, they cannot be trusted and their actions, were they to be let in, could not be predicted. This is particularly important in the highly unpredictable and public political world. Because women are perceived as being scrupulous they can make inroads in the business world, but not in politics.187

Society is harder on women in politics. They say that women are emotional and can not keep secrets.188

The fact that women are not invited in the first place is, however, rarely constructed as a problem. Despite the fact that all other members of the networks have been invited, the most commonly mentioned reason for there being so few women in the clientelist networks is that women in general are averse to the hard work it entails and that they, themselves, do not want to partake in the corrupt political sphere. The problem is thus constructed as being women’s lack of will to participate.189 The fact that the male members of the networks do not invite women to participate is not mentioned. This problem construction is true for outside observers as well as for male and female politicians.

Women do not want to be in politics. It is because women do not want to there are so few women in the parties. Neither do the ethnic people want to be in politics.190

Someone can be a politician because they did good work, and then they can go into politics. Politics is a lot of work. When we have a strong lady who is willing to work 24 hours a day, she is welcome. Perhaps women just want a stable life and some money.191

My friends say that politics is so dirty and ask me why I am in there. And it is more difficult for women, you need confidence to stand against what people

189 Interview no. 74. Male canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai party and tambon level politician, Constituency Nung. May 2006.
190 Interview no. 11. Tulsathit Taptim, Managing Editor of the Nation. February 18, 2005.
191 Interview no. 144. Male Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament, Constituency Haa. November 2008.
might think about you. [...] People will challenge you so much. In parties it is not our world.192

One woman party list candidate acknowledged the importance of recruitment and partisan initiative and also claimed that the party leader had tried to recruit women. But, she said, “how do you do it if they do not drink cognac and play golf?” 193

Holgersson, in a study of homosocial recruitment to the seemingly very different world of Swedish companies, commented on the fact that while the shortcomings of men were generally constructed as something pertaining to the individual, something that would change or that could, at any rate, be compensated for by other men, the shortcomings of women were generally seen as something pertaining to all women, something inherent and unchangeable (Holgersson 2003). Undoubtedly, this seems to be very much the case in the Thai political context as well.

Theorizing homosocial capital

There are thus two important aspects in the accumulation of homosocial capital and both are crucial ingredients in clientelist networks. National candidates are likely to require both aspects as they are complementary. Interestingly, the two aspects affect men and women somewhat differently, leading to homosocial capital as something that is, in today’s society, specifically male. One aspect of homosocial capital concerns the position of a person. This aspect can also be referred to as the instrumental resources. The other aspect concerns the perceived characteristics of a person, and can be referred to as the expressive resources (for earlier references to these types of resources, see Ibarra 1997, 1992). The ultimate goal of both of these aspects is to maximize predictability in the clientelist networks by selecting people who have the incentives to continue the clientelist exchange and who can be trusted with sensitive activities and information.

Position as an instrumental resource

In order to be perceived as having the incentives to protect and uphold a clientelist system, a person needs to be in a specific societal position with access to specific resources. It is also simply the case that in a society where gender inequality still persists, women and men have different positions and possibilities to partake in political life. A political system that builds on hier-

192 Interview no. 29. Pussadee Tamthai, Female Democrat Party List Candidate. February 24, 2005.
archies and benefits those who are already in the system, or close to someone who is in the system, is less likely to experience change. This is true of many contexts also outside Thailand. Epstein argues that

Women do not ordinarily have access to large sums for campaigning, even if they are from wealthy families…nor do they have the contacts to tap outside financial resources, lacking access to the “oldboy” networks that donate a great deal of primary campaign money (Epstein 1981).

Pennings and Hazan (2001) point out that politicians (regardless of political level) are likely to show the greatest amount of loyalty to the person who is considered to have the greatest influence over their re-election. In the Thai context, the local politicians are, at the same time, important when it comes to getting the national candidate (re-)elected and they also need help from the national candidate to be (re-)elected themselves. There are thus plenty of incentives for maintaining loyalty between the different levels of the clientelist network. The local politicians need help in their own political campaigns, and they also have the networks and political resources needed to reach out to voters at lower political levels. Cooperation with local politicians is thus a very pragmatic and strategic choice, and the fact that women are not members of clientelist networks can partly be explained by the fact that they are not, in Thai society, likely local politicians. Resources and positions of power are unequally distributed among men and women in all societies. People who build networks need to be instrumental in doing so, reaching out to those who have access to the resources they need. The effect of this is that whereas men build their own networks with other men, women, in order to get access to the instrumental resources, commonly need to borrow men’s networks. Male and female national candidates alike are thus more likely to select male members to their networks, and this is likely to be the case as long as men are in better and more instrumental societal positions than women are. In present day Thai society, women cannot make a political career for themselves without access to certain resources, and the majority of these resources are possessed by men. Women, in this respect, thus behave heterosocially instead of homosocially.

Perceived similar characteristics as an expressive resource
The second aspect of homosocial capital concerns perceived similarity. The sex of a person is a very strong predictor of how this person will be perceived. Although sex-specific stereotypical characteristics have changed historically and look different in different parts of the world and in different contexts, they nevertheless function as an important guide for most people and they give rise to expectations concerning individual behavior. Though far from sufficient for trust, belonging to the same sex is likely to be per-
ceived as enabling and facilitating communication and understanding, whereas belonging to different sexes is often perceived as being problematic because of anticipated gender differences, difficulties in communicating easily and because romantic relationships might complicate cooperation. From the point of view of men, women are not perceived as being socially similar and thus their behavior in the clientelist exchange is not seen as ensuring predictability – rather the opposite. The effect of this is that, everything else being equal, men and women alike often feel more comfortable and more trusting in the company of same-sex individuals. In contexts where the efficiency and secrecy of communication are paramount, such an expressive resource – perceiving that you are understood – is a crucial one. Thus, for most men, the two important resources – the instrumental and the expressive - are more seldom in opposition to each other, as it is almost always possible to cooperate with people in superior societal positions that are also of the same sex as themselves. For women, however, the two are more often in opposition. While dependent on the resources and positions that can only be accessed through reliance on male networks, women are also more likely to want to facilitate cooperation and boost trust in their groups of close cooperators. Women in today’s society are thus not in a position to accumulate homosocial capital by only selecting other women. Even if the incumbency of women increased at the parliamentary level, women would be more likely to act heterosocially than men are. In today’s society, the accumulation of homosocial capital is thus reserved for men only. While it is not enough to be a man to be included in a network or trusted by a candidate, it is certainly an advantage to be both in the right societal position and to be a man. Thus, we would expect male politicians to have almost exclusively male networks whereas women would have networks consisting of both men and women. Clientelism is thus not just about reproducing the same persons, regardless of who they are. The perspective of homosocial capital also takes into account the subordinate position of women in society, relative to men, and the ensuing stereotypes this gives rise to.

Why homosocial capital is essential in clientelist systems

Because women are neither in the societal position needed to be perceived as assets in the clientelist exchange nor likely to enter into those positions as long as stereotypical views of male and female characteristics abound, the status quo is likely to be maintained and male dominance reproduced. Clientelist systems thus preserve the status quo by tapping the resources - instrumental as well as expressive - to which men presently have the best access. Clientelist systems also reproduce male dominance because of the strong emphasis they place on predictable behavior, loyalty and trust. Politics is full of issues that are of a very sensitive nature and of activities that all agree are not laudable, but at least explicable and sometimes necessary. Such activities
can only be undertaken together with people with the same perspective and who agree on which issues are at stake. If a person does not benefit from an activity – what guarantee is there that he or she will protect it? Thus, a person with no interest in prostitution might not readily engage in informal discussions at a brothel. A person with no important connections within the military might not readily see a military coup as a good solution. And a person who has nothing to gain from a clientelist exchange might not protect the continuation of such an exchange. If we add to this view that sex differences are thought to induce communication difficulties not to mention different interests all together, we can come closer to understanding why men tend to select male cooperators rather than female ones. In a different political system that does not put this enormous emphasis on the resources and services to be distributed or that does not value predictability and high level of trust within the network quite as highly, gender differences might be perceived as an asset rather than as a problem.

Homosocial capital is accumulated between network members at all different levels of the network. Voters might not be more averse to voting for a female constituency candidate than for a male candidate, but male voters probably feel more comfortable receiving vote-buying money from a male canvasser than from a female one. Where female hua khanaens operate, their function is commonly to reach out to the all female housewife groups at the village level. More often, however, canvassers recount how they bargain with the head of the household about how the family votes are to be distributed between different parties, and that they thus reach female and younger voters by communicating with their husband or father. It does not seem to matter whether the constituency candidate higher up in the hierarchy is a woman or a man, and voters do not seem to care whether networks are borrowed or personally maintained – but in everyday clientelist deals and exchanges, homosocial capital seems to be an asset at all levels.

The gendered consequences of clientelist competition

We know that political parties in Thailand select candidates informally, often personally and based on local concerns and almost always pragmatically. Polls or rumors will determine who is most likely to win the election. As long as the person upholding the largest clientelist networks is also the person that most people will vote for, people hoping for a quick change in terms of the gendered standstill in Thai politics are likely to be disappointed. Clientelist networks are exclusive in nature, and as such they have evident gendered consequences. To maintain a clientelist network the constituency candidate has to develop links to local politicians who can implement local de-

development projects, campaign, and act as a representative in the place of the candidate at various events. In return, local politicians are given campaign support, or budgets for projects once they are elected. The local politician thus has a partly instrumental position, but also an emotional position, as the personal representative of the candidate. My findings here are in accordance with earlier accounts of clientelist networks in Thailand, as they also show how political candidates gave economic benefits to local politicians, in return for campaign work - what has sometimes been referred to as creating “electoral infrastructure” (Arghiros 2001; Nelson 2005). Thus, the main guideline for these networks is not that they should be as diverse as possible, on the contrary, they are made up of people who are very much alike, who have very similar experiences, and who are perceived as suitable canvassers.

Today, Thai local politicians are almost exclusively male. Considering that the details of the exchange consist of sensitive information, clientelist networks are built on high levels of in-group trust, and recruitment is decided on hierarchically and is by invitation only. It is imperative that people in the same clique or electoral network can trust each other, especially considering that activities are often sensitive and secretive and sometimes outright illegal - such as the distribution of vote-buying money (Callahan 2005). In addition, women often do not fit the construction of what a local politician is supposed to be like. Women are thus caught in a vicious circle, as they are unlikely to be considered suitable local politicians, and as such be recruited to the network. This also implies that they do not have easy access to valuable network resources. Chiseling out what the concept of homosocial capital entails helps us in conceptually understanding and explaining this seemingly invisible discrimination. We have been able to look at how male networks function, but by looking a bit more closely at the few women candidates that are part of the empirical material, we can begin to chisel out some of the differences in how they employ their networks.

The exceptions to the rule – women in politics in Thailand
There are women in politics in Thailand. Some of them were interviewed for this thesis. This study was not and could not be designed to compare the networks of male and female candidates simply because of its exploratory nature at the onset. There was not enough knowledge about the clientelist networks to construct any analytical tools with which to select different types of networks. At this stage, however, it is nevertheless useful to attempt to chisel out some of the possible differences between the networks of the female candidates and the male ones. This is, however, not the place for a more thorough and systematic study.

What are the expectations, given the theory on homosocial capital as the tie that binds clientelist networks together? First of all, at the country-wide level, we would expect areas with less clientelist influence to have weaker
male dominance. At the individual level, we would expect women candidates to make use of borrowed networks to a larger extent than male candidates do. Networks of female candidates are also expected to be heterosocial, i.e. composed of both sexes, to a larger extent than the all-male networks of male political candidates.

We did see a rather large difference between male dominance among Bangkok candidates and candidates elsewhere in the country. Male dominance was strongest in the south of Thailand as well as in the northeastern parts. Many also claim that clientelism is considerably weaker in urban areas, and that urban voters base their choice on different issues than do rural voters. The support system is not as strong in urban constituencies, and fame and merits are more attractive than a personal relationship.

Voters in general still believe in a patron-client relationship society. They depend on influential persons and look for people who can give protection, and school assistance, who can help them when they are caught by the police and then they are looking for a job. Voters are more independent in Bangkok than in the rural areas. They can help themselves, and with the life in the city they don’t have to depend on anyone else.195

There are differences between provincial candidates and Bangkok candidates. They are different types of candidates. In Bangkok they might not even come from the area, they might not be local people but they have certain qualifications. […] Actors have an advantage in Bangkok, because they have a reputation. They have the charisma of entertainers that people here like.196

The first, nationwide, expectation thus seems to hold true. Clientelist support systems and networks are less of a winning strategy in Bangkok – and we also see less male dominance in parliamentary representation from the constituencies in the capital.

Although quite a few female politicians were interviewed during the course of this project, only three women candidates will be discussed here. These are the three candidates that were found in the five constituencies studied, and for which I have a somewhat larger contextual knowledge that can be used to understand their situation. Two of these women competed in the same constituency, Constituency Sii. The Thai Rak Thai candidate was the winner in that constituency. The third woman was also a Thai Rak Thai candidate, but in constituency Haa, a traditional Democrat stronghold. She did not win the election. A closer look at these women’s routes to candidacy and at their network-building gives us a good initial picture that can be fruitfully compared to the accounts of the male networking and the accumulation of homosocial capital.

196 Interview no. 35. Phongthep Thepkanjana, party executive for the Thai Rak Thai party. January 24, 2006.
Constituency Sii, with two women candidates running for the two major parties was, indeed, an exceptional constituency with regards to the general position of women. This area had a particular problem with prostitution, which prompted the rise of a senior female politician. She has worked against trafficking and prostitution in the area and has received a great deal of respect both locally and nation-wide. One of the consequences of her work has been to start a province-wide women’s network in cooperation with some of the local NGOs. The network covers a large number of activities, but one of them is to empower women politically by offering training on how to become a candidate and on how to work once you are elected. Part of the curriculum of this training involves how to build a canvassing network, to think carefully about who they trust to work with and how to become involved with parties and money. Many women have passed this training and it has led to very visible results in the number of female local politicians at the TAO level.\(^{197}\)

In this constituency, women are stronger than elsewhere. Not in themselves, but because they have a network that supports them. When more women come together they become stronger.\(^{198}\)

The female Thai Rak Thai candidate, Rattana, in this constituency had consequently, as her male counterparts elsewhere, the privilege of having had a career as a local politician. She had an existing network of women to rely on. She also had the support and active backing of the powerful senior female politician from higher up in the network hierarchy. As far as the similarity effect goes, Rattana seemed to be sufficiently surrounded by other people, predominantly women, whom she trusted and relied on and perceived to be similar to herself. When asked about the relationship between herself and the candidate, one of the female tambon team leaders says:

Rattana and I call each other all the time. There is a connection between us. Rattana asked me to be on her team.\(^{199}\)

The senior female politician also avows that it is possible to work with a different agenda than the traditional clientelist one, and that this is the kind of politics she stands for.

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\(^{197}\) Interview no. 117. Director of local NGO supporting women’s political activism, Constituency Sii. February 2006.

\(^{198}\) Interview no. 110. Female member of a women’s local politics group, Constituency Sii. February 2006.

\(^{199}\) Interview no. 113. Female Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai and local politician during a team member meeting, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
I am living proof that women can work alongside men in politics. I want to start a new breed of politicians and show that anyone can become a politician.200

This may be true for her, working as a party list politician with the party at the central level. Rattana, however, being a constituency candidate, had to employ two tactics at once. She could not completely bypass the old power structures and the clientelist ways of politics. Rattana’s sister, who works as an organizer at the party office, says that the women’s group is Rattana’s base but that she also had to have a different kind of network. Luckily, she did have access to a network of local politicians, partly because of her own career as a provincial politician, but mainly because her father used to be a kamnan and a successful businessman. Her sister acknowledges that it certainly helped Rattana that their father knows a lot of people and that he already had built up a large network of people in the area. The people in his network vote for Rattana.201 Rattana herself is also thankful for the existing network of her father. She felt it was difficult to work with these people because she was a young woman, but her father has many friends who love them and support them.202 A village head willingly admits that he supports Rattana because of her father’s time as a kamnan.203 Despite her own career as a local politician, Rattana thus had to borrow her father’s clientelist networks in order to reach out to people in crucial societal positions. Rattana’s network strategy is thus clearly more heterosocial than the strategies of her male counterparts. She does prefer to work with people whom she perceives to be similar to her, but she also acknowledges the need to tap into the resources of the existing male networks. Her competitor, the Democrat candidate Amporn, is an even clearer example of borrowed networks. Amporn does not even have a dual strategy at play, she sees herself, and is seen by others, as nothing but a stand-in for her husband, who was banned from politics when he was found guilty of election fraud.204 They decided to merely field her in his place. He kept his network of canvassers and supporters and made it clear to them that she was just a figurehead and that it would be business as usual – with him. One of his canvassers says:

I do not mind that Amporn is the candidate instead. Husband and wife always agree. If Amporn wins the election, I can still pass on information to Othong

200 Interview no. 122. Female Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
201 Interview no. 120. Female Office Worker at the Thai Rak Thai office, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
202 Interview no. 118. Female Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament for the Thai Rak Thai, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
203 Interview no. 119. Canvasser for the Thai Rak Thai and village head, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
204 Interview no. 115. Female Constituency Candidate for the Democrat Party, Constituency Sii. February 2006.
that he can give to his wife. In the Thai and Chinese culture the wife always says yes to the husband, so they are practically the same. This is different from the West where people act and think individually even though they are husband and wife.\(^\text{205}\)

Constituency *Haa* is more ambiguous. The rise of young female candidate Ung could partly be attributed to the fact that Constituency *Haa* is a Democrat stronghold, where founders of the Democrat party have been ruling for decades. Thai Rak Thai might have considered the chances of winning slim, thus seeing no danger in selecting a young, female candidate. She herself says that she never received any party support at all. Ung did work extremely hard, however, and has managed to build up an impressive network of canvassers. She did gather enough support to become a candidate, but not enough to win the election.

Before the party decided, TRT did a poll in the area. The Democrats have their last name, but it still showed that I might stand a chance against the Democrats. You have to work very hard in advance to win the poll […] First I decided I wanted to become a candidate, then I had to work hard to get canvassers. The poll was six months before the election. I resigned from my job before I got nominated, because I worked so hard. I opened myself and worked hard. This first time I started to work with community leaders, village heads, kamnans and respectable people. In Thailand, there is a support system. I already have relatives and networks in villages, but no teams. Before the announcement of me as a candidate, there was no formal team, but a large network. When I became the candidate I had at least 10 people in each village. There was one leader for each sub-district (tambon). At the tambon level, I chose the kamnan or formal leader or the village head of some village or a person that someone selected for me. Then they are responsible for selecting village people.\(^\text{206}\)

Ung was encouraged to run for election by a senior male member of the Thai Rak Thai party for whom she had earlier worked as a secretary. She thus had the necessary support from higher levels in the hierarchy. She has had to work her way downward, however. In a meeting with her *hua khanaens* that we attended, Ung was the only woman. All of her canvassers (apart from one) were male. She emphasized that it is important to be humble in her relationships with the voters. Ung did not say many words during the political meeting. Instead, she left all the talking to the provincial male politicians who seconded her. She did, however, distribute vote-buying money herself at the end of the meeting.\(^\text{207}\) Interestingly, the two provincial politicians who


\(^{206}\) Interview no. 128. Female Constituency Candidate for Thai Rak Thai, Constituency *Haa*. March 2006.

\(^{207}\) Interview no. 129. Observation of a canvasser meeting for the Thai Rak Thai party, Constituency *Haa*. March 2006.
had chaired the meeting immediately came up to us afterwards, emphasizing that they did not see themselves as working under Ung, but that they worked as a group.\textsuperscript{208} Despite the fact that Ung did try to build her own relationships with voters, she borrowed the networks of the provincial politicians. She did not, as far as she told me, do any networking with other women.\textsuperscript{209}

The suggestion that women have to work heterosocially in order to build networks thus seems to be a valid one. Two of the women managed to reach candidature based on entirely male networks, whereas one woman gained a parliamentary seat based on her mixed network. There were no examples of candidates with all-female networks. The resource effect is still important enough to ensure that women are dependent on men, while the opposite is far from true.

The added value of homosocial capital
What does the concept of homosocial capital add that the concepts of homosociality or social capital have not already contributed, separately or together? I argue that homosocial capital is, indeed, more than the sum of the two, and that there is added value to using the concept.

Unlike the concept of social capital, here gender is an integral part of the concept itself. And unlike the concept of homosociality, homosocial capital highlights the fact that this is to be seen and understood as important political capital, available only to those who can amass the relevant resources, and with which elections can be won. Homosocial capital is relational and exists between people in a network. It is based on two types of resources needed in the clientelist exchange and in other unpredictable contexts: instrumental resources and expressive resources. Making clear that the accumulation of homosocial capital is both about the pragmatic use of available resources as well as about more psychological considerations pertaining to the gendered roles of men and women in general, also takes into account the existing discussion on whether discrimination is only pragmatic and understandable and a matter of who is, in present day society, more suitable, based on formal merits, or whether there is also an element of more outspoken gender preference to it – whether more shady acceptability criteria are usually applied during recruitment procedures. Homosocial capital contains both of these aspects – albeit for the same reason: the attractiveness of predictability in an unpredictable political environment.

\textsuperscript{208} Interviews no. 130 and 131. Male Provincial Canvassers for the Thai Rak Thai party and provincial politicians, Constituency Haa. March 2006.
\textsuperscript{209} Interview no. 128. Female Constituency Candidate for Thai Rak Thai, Constituency Haa. March 2006.
Homosocial capital is not reserved only for clientelist settings – but as the study of Thailand has shown, clientelist settings are excellent breeding grounds for homosocial capital and thus suitable for chiseling out how homosocial capital functions. The Thai political setting has a kind of persistent unpredictability that causes politicians to look outside formal political arenas for political stability. They commonly find that the stable political organizations they need to affirm and build up their political support can be found in informal clientelist networks. In order to be eligible to partake in these networks, however, you need to be able to contribute two types of resources, both of which are of a mutual character. First, you need the instrumental resources that only cooperation between people who are in the appropriate societal positions can generate. People need to know, for the sake of predictability, that cooperation is a win-win situation and that a continued relationship will be in the interest of both. Local politicians in Thailand are in a position to help national candidates while furthering their own political careers. But you also need expressive resources. You need to feel, also for the sake of predictability, that what you say will not be misunderstood or misinterpreted. You need to feel comfortable and secure in order to smooth out cooperation. If you can easily have access to both these types of resources, and if they can even be located in the same place and person, they transform into homosocial capital – a strong currency with a reputation to install predictability and trust that is particularly valuable when political parties select candidates.

A potential candidate in Thailand needs to be able to convince the political people in charge of candidate selection that he or she is in control of an efficient clientelist network – efficient in the sense that it is stable and predictable as well as both appropriate and trustworthy in terms of gaining electoral support. It needs to have trustworthy people in the right positions. Although women can also strive to gain access to both instrumental resources and expressive ones, they are less likely to find they are present in the same relationship. Because homosocial capital is relational and between two or more individuals, both its resource components need to be in place before homosocial capital can be accumulated. Women’s networks are either borrowed or tend to be more diverse – the instrumental resources and the expressive ones are found in different parts of the networks. The two types of resources are also interrelated. Expressive resources are important partly because they serve to protect the instrumental resources. Having the different resources in different localities and different persons thus diminishes their value.

Thus, women are often not perceived as being eligible to partake in vote-buying activities, for instance. Clientelism is not only about vote buying, but also about favors-for-favors, nepotism and legally questionable deals and understandings. For such understandings and favors to be met and undertaken, the negotiating people need to be in positions to strike the deal but
they also need to feel comfortable and at ease with the people with whom they negotiate. If you are a person in need of campaign support for your own political campaign and if you have already developed close links to the people, then you are more likely to be considered for such a deal. If, in addition, you are perceived as possessing the possibility of engaging in dishonest or morally questionable activities while being perfectly honest and trustworthy around your close cooperators, that is an additional asset that is likely to ensure you will gain some power in the network in question. Far from all men are perceived as being eligible. Some are excluded because of their affiliations. Government workers, for instance, are sometimes seen as not having the correct position in society. Women may have relatively good access to financial capital in Thailand, but they most certainly do not have access to the important homosocial capital they would need to make political careers and to gain electoral power.

The accumulation of homosocial capital in the Thai clientelist context should thus be understood as a political strategy with a clear goal: political success through predictability. The accumulation of homosocial capital has clear gendered consequences, but these consequences are not the intended outcome of the strategy. Certainly, politicians may not mind excluding women from their networks, but for the most part gender equality and the inclusion of women are simply not issues that they spend much time thinking about. In this way, homosocial capital, although relational, can be analyzed as an almost material capital that is needed for political investment. The accumulation of this capital is thus necessary for political success, even if the capital is unequally distributed or if access to its component resources are not equally available to all. It certainly does not vindicate or justify the male parliamentary dominance it brings about, but it takes us a step away from demonizing it and a step closer to understanding it. And understanding, I argue, is key to any prospect of future change.
Chapter 8 – Concluding Remarks

The concluding remarks of this thesis will take up and revisit the central claims of the introductory chapter in order to summarize and assess the collected findings and contributions. The overarching rationale of this research endeavor has been to contribute to our understanding of how male political dominance is maintained and reinvented and to explore the ways in which men and masculinities can be researched. This study has focused on male parliamentary dominance in clientelist settings and has analyzed general worldwide trends as well as political networks in the Thai context in order to answer the questions of how and why clientelism favors men and how and why clientelist practices translate into parliamentary seats. It is now time to evaluate the comprehensive picture provided by this dissertation to see whether posing questions in a new way also has generated new answers.

The chapter will start with a summary of the main findings of this thesis followed by an elaboration of the main contributions – theoretical, methodological and empirical. Last, there will be a discussion of the possible broader scholarly and policy-related implications of this research as well as possible ways forward in this field of research.

A summary of the findings

Male parliamentary dominance worldwide, rather than the corresponding female parliamentary underrepresentation, has been the object of study in this thesis. This continued male dominance is seen as a particularly interesting phenomenon given its persistence in the midst of strong currents moving in the opposite direction. These currents are the political trends of our time, such as democratization processes, stronger and more vibrant and vociferous women’s movements, international resolutions on political gender equality and the introduction of electoral gender quotas in over 100 countries around the world. Although women have made important inroads into previously entirely male spheres during the past decade, the pace with which these conquests have been made is slow, backlashes are frequent, and male dominance in political institutions is still surprisingly permanent and tenacious, although no longer absolute. Yet finding the possible explanations for this remarkable grip on power has seldom been the outspoken focus of research. This is, however, exactly what the present research set out to explain.
The main implication of turning this question around and investigating male dominance instead of female subordination is the focus on the constraining rather than enabling factors that this brings about. It implies studying political practices that restrict women’s representation rather than focusing on seemingly facilitating trends, such as democratization, gender quotas and international agreements. Certainly, the political practices restricting women’s representation cannot be analyzed in a vacuum and they need to be situated within the context of these trends and should sometimes be seen as tools of resistance and opposition to these trends.

The political practice that has been in focus here is clientelism. Clientelism has been situated within a larger institutional approach and framework in order to unveil the motivations behind clientelist investments. I approached the task equipped with a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods, and with inspiration from a number of scientific fields besides political science, such as gender studies, sociology and development studies. The specific questions I set out to answer concerned how and why clientelism favors men and how and why clientelist practices also translate into parliamentary seats.

The large societal trends that serve as a point of departure were unveiled by studying election results from over 400 elections in all or most countries of the world during the past quarter of a century in Chapter 4. Where formal political structures are weak, as they tend to be in semi-democratic settings, informal political institutions, such as clientelism, take precedence when it comes to influencing political outcomes. Finding appropriate ways to measure the strength and weakness of formal and informal institutions required some creativity. In the quantitative study, democratic level was used to indicate the strength of the formal institutions, whereas quality of government was used as an indicator of to what extent informal institutions and clientelism can influence the candidate selection procedures of political parties and consequently representation levels. The statistical results show that the more clientelist influences there are in a political system during an election year, the stronger is the male dominance in the parliament that is an outcome of that particular election. This holds true even when the level of male dominance in the previous parliament is controlled for, i.e. even when the strong factor of incumbency is held constant. In addition, the results indicate that male parliamentary dominance per se is important. In a clientelist environment with fairly low male incumbency, male dominance is likely to increase and where male incumbency is already high, it is likely to be maintained. This is reason enough to attempt to turn the argument that more women in parliament would help combat corruption around. Instead, this dissertation argues that there is ample reason to consider the opposite causal direction and that this even provides more plausible an explanation.

Thailand is a both a useful and appropriate case in which to study the workings underpinning male parliamentary dominance. As Chapter 5 shows,
the political climate of Thailand is ever-changing and as a result, formal political institutions are rendered unstable and weak. Despite the fact that women have reached a relatively high social standing in many areas in Thailand, politics still remains a male bastion. This has proven to be true for different types of regimes, during military dictatorships as well as during more democratic periods. The reasons for this male dominance can be found in the political actors’ strategies for coping with the ever-changing political environment. In order to ascertain the survival of their own political careers, Thai politicians generally see a need to invest in their own, personal networks rather than in formal political institutions that may be gone tomorrow. Although it is acknowledged that many of these informal networks and political practices are far from laudable, they are nevertheless seen as being explainable and understandable. The chapter also demonstrates the presence of a clientelist logic in Thai politics. A clientelist logic is perceived to consist of a focus on the person, rather than on the party, and on services, rather than on policies. It is thus not an either-or matter, rather politics everywhere contain elements of clientelism as well as of more ideological orientation, but they can also be situated more or less close to either end of this continuum. My interview material with members of political networks in five constituencies in different parts of Thailand is used to determine the existence of clear and important elements of clientelism in Thai political networks. Having thus situated the case of Thailand in relation to the main variables, the analysis can be taken a step further.

The findings of earlier research suggest that the representation of different social groups is determined not by the voter casting her or his ballot, but by the political parties selecting their candidates to stand for election (see e.g. Rule 1987; Darcy et al. 1994; Htun 2005), and this claim is confirmed in the election analyses in Chapter 6. Election data from the Thai parliamentary election 2005 are compared and analyzed together with my own interview material on the preceding candidate selection in two Thai political parties. The election data confirm that the greatest threshold for women in Thailand is not being elected, but rather being selected as a candidate by the political parties. Once women have become candidates, their chances of becoming elected are equal to that of their male counterparts. We also see some interesting geographical differences indicating that male partisan dominance is more accentuated in rural areas than it is in urban areas. Another result worth noting is that, contrary to expectations, there is a higher male dominance among the 100 parliamentary seats distributed with a proportional election system than there is among the 400 seats distributed on a majoritarian constituency-based system. This further corroborates the view put forward in this thesis: in unstable political contexts, formal institutions are often bypassed or ignored and laws are malleable in the hands of politicians aiming to serve their own purposes, primarily their own electoral success. In this case, the proportional list came to be used as a form of internal and informal
reward system for senior politicians, thus favoring incumbent men rather than new women. The analysis also shows that the inner workings of the political parties follow the same logic as Thai politics at large: formal procedures are bypassed in favor of informal arrangements. Candidate selection procedures leave large openings for clientelist influences by being of a predominantly informal character. There are few regulations as to how candidates are selected, yet there are informally established routes to becoming a candidate – routes that presuppose a clientelist influence. Like clientelism itself, candidate selection is largely territorially decentralized, even though the central level maintains a right to veto a decision, to choose between rivaling candidates and to formalize the informal decisions. In order to be selected as a candidate, a person has to control a large clientelistic network and a large number of votes. This vote control is often ascertained by conducting a poll in the constituency, but the power to select whose name is included in the polling is reserved for a select few. This chapter shows that political practices like clientelism can and do translate into parliamentary seats and that candidate selection procedures should be analyzed together with important or dominant political practices, rather than in isolation, if their full impact is to be understood.

Why clientelist practices are male dominated is the subject of the final empirical chapter, Chapter 7. This is, in a sense, also the core contribution of the thesis, as it elaborates on and employs a new concept in relation to which political practices and their gendered impact can be assessed: homosocial capital. Homosocial capital is defined as a kind of social capital that can be used as a currency to achieve electoral success, but that is also reserved for men. Whether or not political practices encourage the accumulation of homosocial capital is one major clue to whether or not male dominance will be pronounced. Homosocial capital is, I argue, a very strong currency in the Thai clientelist setting. Politicians operating in an unstable environment need to establish links to people in strategic network positions as well as to people whom they trust and perceive to be like themselves. In so doing, they tap into the two resources that, together, can be translated into homosocial capital: instrumental resources and expressive resources. The strategic positions as well as the perceived likeness are seen as contributing to the sought-after predictability. For men, this implies maximizing homosocial capital in the networks. In today’s society, people with access to resources and in strategic positions of incumbency are, more often than not, men. Members of the same sex also seem to consider each other as more alike and more predictable. Many of the arguments that male politicians in the Thai political networks use to explain how they build and maintain their political position show that as they strive to maximize predictability, they also, not necessarily consciously, strive to maximize homosocial capital as an insurance against the unpredictable formal political sphere. Homosocial capital is thus to be seen as a mechanism whereby certain political practices translate into par-
liamenter seats, or, put in another manner: the currency with which parliamenter seats (through a party nomination) can be bought in certain political contexts. The gendered aspect of homosocial capital is that it can only be efficiently accumulated and invested by men. Women need to borrow male networks because men are currently incumbents and sitting on crucial political positions. Borrowed networks are not as protected and thus not perceived as being as efficient and as serving their primary purpose: stability. In addition, because borrowed networks are used primarily for access to instrumental resources, they need to be combined with women’s own networks, which is where they are most likely to find expressive resources. When instrumental and expressive resources are not found in the same network relations, however, their respective value decreases and they do not translate into the important political capital they do translate into in many male networks.

In retrospect, we can also give more credit to the statistical findings of Chapter 4, because we know that they have gained support and causal clarity in the qualitative sections building on these results. These qualitative sections have shown how informal political institutions help shape the opportunity structures for potential politicians, and how opportunities present themselves in different ways to men and women.

The contributions of the thesis

Does asking questions in a different manner bring about new answers? The onset of this research endeavor was really quite simple: it presumed that part of the answer to the question of why women are underrepresented in parliaments is to be found in the answer to why men are overrepresented. Although reversing the question in this sense is as simple as can be, it does have important consequences for the research design and it does make new answers possible. These new answers, as I see it, build on and complement previous accounts, rather than replace them.

In previous research on gendered representation, the constraining factors for women’s political presence have, of course, been mentioned and highlighted: but as a backdrop against which women’s activities are contextualized rather than as a focus of research. This thesis has done the exact opposite. The focus has been on political practices that constrain women’s representation, and these factors have been analyzed against the backdrop of factors that should be conducive to a more inclusive political sphere. The strong focus on political parties as male-dominated political organizations that we see here has thus come about as a consequence of this reverse perspective. The interplay between informal and formal institutions is used as an analytical framework, providing many useful insights. For instance, it causes us to acknowledge the wider political setting in which the parties operate and to take the possibility that certain societal currents can be undermined by actual
political practices into account. The importance of factors such as democracy, political parties and election systems that this line of research has earlier emphasized is retained in the analysis and confirmed by the results of this thesis, although it is argued that they need to be contextualized and coupled with certain political practices for their full importance to be estimated. This has been done in the present work, as here, all these aspects have been explicitly coupled with clientelism. Clientelism as a male-centered political practice and homosocial capital as a political currency are both the result of this new take on representation studies. This new take, the focus on men and masculinities, is inspired by masculinity studies, which usually have their academic home either in gender studies or in sociology. In this study, I show that the theories and suggestions this field has generated can be fruitfully applied to political contexts and that they can also develop through application to new settings. The research process as a whole generated the concept of homosocial capital, which I regard as the main contribution of the thesis. Leading up to the coining of this concept, however, there are a number of other contributions, or new answers to the question of gendered representation, that will be highlighted.

The study of Thai politics

This study also contributes a new analysis of Thai politics. Whereas the political turbulence, the numerous coups d’état, the reform process of the 1990’s, the Thaksin-era and the more recent demonstrations and power-reversals are under almost constant academic scrutiny, and while political practices such as clientelism, military influence in politics, and party-switching have often been treated by scholars, their gendered aspects are more rarely dealt with (see however Ockey 2004; Iwanaga 2008). The combination of these different analyses of Thai politics into a holistic picture and the very fact that the political turbulence and certain informal political practices have a role to play in the gendered standstill of Thai politics is a new proposition put forward here and, at that, central to the present argument. The view that Thai political actors are obliged to turn to informal institutions in their struggle to achieve predictability also contributes to a deeper understanding of the present political turmoil in Thailand.

The study of Thailand is useful not only as a study of an intriguing, complex and interesting culture, but also for many more universally applicable reasons. The constant change that has become a characteristic of the Thai political sphere makes Thailand a highly appropriate case in which to study the consequences of political instability more generally. When studying phenomena from a new angle or when exploring and developing theoretical concepts, it is always good to select a case in which that which you aim to study is clearly manifest. Thailand, in this sense, can be seen as a typical case of clientelism and homosocial capital accumulation leading to male
dominance. This does not mean that we should expect to find exactly the same aspects in other contexts. With a clear theory and understanding of what is going on in the Thai case, however, we are much better equipped to approach other cases in order to elaborate on or modify the theory proposed here. Thus, I hope that this study will reach beyond area studies and also speak to researchers interested in other empirical contexts.

It is difficult to prophesize about the future of Thai politics, and this study mainly contributes with a pessimistic view claiming that patterns of clientelism are adhesive in politically unpredictable settings. As long as the formal political sphere in Thailand continues to be disturbed by demonstrations, military coups and new political parties popping up, there is ample reason to believe that the informal influences in Thai politics will continue to be strong and relatively evident to the outside observer. The Thai army may seem officially to proclaim itself utterly unwilling to become involved in politics, and it is probably less inclined to do so than it has been during earlier periods of Thai history. Nevertheless, the military coup of 2006 was unexpected by many observers and shows that the inclination of the army to become involved in politics is completely dependent on their own, as well as their powerful allies’ assessment of the present political situation. Clientelist networks in the Thai countryside do adapt their strategies when the formal political framework is changed - but in substance they continue to function in pretty much the same ways as they always have. Political candidates offer direct support in the form of money or services to voters who, in turn, give them their political support and their vote. These relationships are encapsulated in large, intricate networks and cemented by a strong sense of loyalty towards other network members, necessitated by the fact that networks are the ultimate political protection.

Is there a reliable answer to the question of where Thailand is headed next? No, there is none that I am willing to offer without giving far too much scope to speculation. There are, of course, different discernible paths – some for the more pessimistically oriented and others for those who sincerely wish to bring about a more genuine and sustainable democratic development and wish to focus on the ways in which it can be brought about. The more pessimistic view argues that if we are at all interested in learning from history, we will conclude that political instability in Thailand will remain a characteristic feature. Perhaps not enough to permanently harm international tourism and investment – history also teaches us that Thailand always reverts to a more internationally acceptable political framework after undemocratic setbacks – but still enough to hinder any long-term political developments and improvements of formal political institutions. As long as Thai political actors do not have any choice but to invest their political capital in the informal institutions, the formal political institutions will remain weak and temporary. And as long as formal democratic institutions are weak and temporary, the only conceivable strategy will be to invest in the more permanent
informal institutions – and thus to strengthen the political influence of parts of the military or of clientelist networks. Local strongmen, individuals within the army and the palace will remain influential despite the fact that they lack formally sanctioned power. It will also be difficult for new political actors to enter the political sphere or to build their own political platforms based on anything but traditional informal institutions. This fact is illustrated in this dissertation by the very low political engagement of women in Thai politics, which is in contrast to their relatively strong socioeconomic position in other spheres of Thai society.

Even with an optimistic view, it is difficult to foresee anything but a long, political struggle to break free from this vicious circle. What has to be built up is the faith in formal and democratic political institutions themselves, and this is, of course, easier said than done. Political parties should be strengthened as organizations and constitutions and election laws be drafted to go beyond the vested interests of informal political groupings. It is far from impossible, and it has happened in a number of other places. But the political cleavages that now split the Thai people must simultaneously be overcome or at least rendered less politically significant. Even the losers must be willing to respect and abide by election results. And in order for election results to be more acceptable for all, the very premises for how to be a successful politician in Thailand need to be changed. On a more positive note, however, a deeper understanding of a perceived problem is always a first and necessary step in the direction of finding a sustainable solution. The proposition put forward by this thesis is that the struggle for predictability is, in fact, one of the driving forces of the vicious circle of constant change in Thai politics.

The importance of unpredictability

This study proposes that unpredictability as a contextual factor is key to understanding the behavior of many political actors in a number of political settings. All systems need to be predictable in order to function efficiently, and the more rapid the changes, the more unpredictable and inefficient will the formal system be. The aim of increased efficiency is thus also an aim to enhance predictability. Thus, when seeking political power, actors need to compensate for the level of unpredictability of the political sphere by making investments that will ensure predictability in the route leading to parliament. Clientelism can be understood as a compensation for unpredictability whereas homosocial capital is the investment that needs to be made in order to uphold clientelism as a feasible political practice.

Attributing this importance to the level of unpredictability also causes us to look with new eyes at, for instance, the level of democracy. The level of unpredictability varies between different political settings, and is more common in semi-democratic countries than in countries that are highly democratic or autocratic. Analyzing such countries not only as semi-
democracies, but also as unpredictable political settings, might bring about a new understanding of the many specificities often attributed to such polities. Where formal institutions are unpredictable they will be overridden and informal institutions will rise in importance. Only when we understand the motivation behind the formation of informal institutions can we analyze their workings more efficiently.

The implications of informal institutions are manifold and need to be attributed to the particular informal institution in question as well as to the research question posed. In this instance, studying clientelism gives us more information as to why research on gender and politics has often suggested that informality is detrimental to the political participation of women. This claim can be substantiated when coupled with a specific analysis of formal and informal institutions. The understanding of political parties as formal organizations and the influence of informal non-partisan networks are both important for our understanding of how political parties select candidates. Formal rules as well as informal practices such as vote buying matter for who becomes the candidate. Informality per se is not incompatible with gender equality, but it is non-transparent and conducive to arbitrariness. Opaqueness and arbitrariness can and often do lead to decisions based on feelings and prejudices rather than on formal merits. In today’s society, this means that women as a group are often at a disadvantage compared to men. As this study shows, however, we should not settle for the simple notion that informality is automatically detrimental to gender equality. We need to specify wherein the informality lies and how it creates openings for certain political practices to favor men. In this particular case, I have shown that informal, decentralized and exclusive party candidate selection processes enable a clientelist influence in determining who will become a candidate. Clientelism is informal albeit institutionalized, local albeit with links to the national level, and exclusive albeit with far-reaching networks. Even more importantly, clientelism is also male dominated.

This thesis does not suggest that governance would necessarily be improved in terms of getting rid of corruption, were women to be represented in parliaments in larger numbers. It does suggest, however, that a real reform of various institutions in the political sphere, including an increased emphasis on formal meritocracy in political recruitment, should, among other things, bring about both a diminished male dominance and better governance by enhancing the predictability of formal political institutions and diminishing the reliance on informal political institutions such as clientelism. From a broader perspective, it thus also suggests that a rethinking of simple political solutions to complex societal problems is often highly relevant. Instead of accepting common truths that women are less corrupt than men, we need to take on a greater task: to look at more complex patterns of political culture and trust. This study has only been able to highlight how a certain form of political practice, clientelism, often including aspects we would deem “bad
governance”, also reinforces men’s reliance on other men. The statistical study gives some support to the counter-factual argument that improved governance also improves the numerical representation of women. The case study suggests that this may have something to do with a formal institutionalization of political parties, which, in turn, would lead to more women being selected as candidates. As clientelism loses in significance and becomes a less certain road to political success, clientelist networks will also lose in significance and new manners of promoting political success – such as ensuring inclusiveness – will increase in importance. Limits can be put on men selecting only same-sex individuals by, for instance, institutionalizing an emphasis on diversity.\footnote{One way of institutionalizing the manner in which political parties select candidates could be to introduce a quota reform. Certain types of quotas could have the effect of posing a serious challenge to existing ways of selecting candidates, thus destroying the importance of previously influential political networks (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2009). Thus, somewhat paradoxically, gender quotas that are designed to increase the number of women in parliament could also bring about less clientelism and political corruption – but not because of the increase in women parliamentarians, but because of the reform of candidate selection processes they bring about. Exactly how this could come about, and what its short- and long-term consequences might be, however, are outside the scope of this particular study, but certainly questions in the wake of it, waiting to be investigated.}

Homosocial capital in this and other contexts

When dealing with issues of informal institutional influences and their gendered consequences, we also have to embark on a journey of specifying somewhat murky concepts of gender-specific trust within certain political practices. The concept of homosocial capital, situated within a clientelist setting, is one of the main contributions of this thesis. The notion of homosocial capital differs from more generalized claims about the importance of old boys’ networks in that it specifies the mechanisms that motivate and allow men to accumulate a political capital needed for electoral success but also not accessible for women. This capital is invested in the protection of informal political organizations necessary for the promotion of political careers and electoral success. The claim that homosocial capital consists of building relationships both to those with good access to resources and to those whose behavior you think you can predict concretizes some of the, often unconscious, considerations people make when expanding their political networks. In the present research, the concept has primarily been linked to electoral success, but it is possible that it can be exported and applied to other contexts as well. Although the wider implications of one piece of research should not be overestimated, it is useful to end by reflecting on the sources of inspiration of this book as well as on the inspiration for future research that I hope this work will generate.
Chapter 8 – Concluding Remarks

The development of the concept of homosocial capital has been integral to this research project and is thus very much a product of the specific contexts presented here. It does stem, however, from widely used social science theories on social capital and homosociality, and its usefulness may very well go beyond contributing to our understanding of male parliamentary dominance. Although the aim of the thesis has not been to elaborate on the usefulness of this concept for other contexts, rather to develop a theoretical concept that could help us understand the particular context in focus here, I would now, nevertheless, like to invite other researchers to explore its usefulness in other contexts. It does not seem unlikely that homosocial capital describes something that is at play in a wide variety of settings.

Homosocial capital should both be seen in close relation to and be kept distinct from its component parts: social capital and homosociality. From social capital it brings with it the view that soft social relationships can be used as hard currency in certain contexts. Social capital theory has described the different types of relationships and networks that tend to emerge in different kinds of societal settings, but it has not always been very specific about the types of settings that lead to homosocial or heterosocial behavior. Homosocial capital takes this gendered aspect into account. From homosociality it brings with it the core thought that there are gendered preferences in many social relationships. It thus takes a step away from general attitudes and prejudice and looks at what is marketable and seen as necessary, and where and how it can be invested. By showing exactly how homosocial capital is used as an investment in electoral campaigns, it is more specific than the theory of homosociality has been. Homosociality is, as I see it, more descriptive in nature, describing how men prefer the company of other men, but not always being specific as to when and why. Homosocial capital looks at the structural prerequisites for gendered preferences and describes homosocial behavior as rational and understandable.

Research looking at unpredictable environments where it would be useful to invest in informal predictability may, then, benefit from employing the concept of homosocial capital. In a sense, it materializes something that is often rather interpreted as fuzzy and intangible – and thus difficult to do research on. Yet social science research more and more acknowledges the importance of informal networks and institutions in a variety of settings and for a number of different purposes. Developing theoretical tools with which we can approach these networks and institutions has thus become an increasingly important task for social scientists. Having a large amount of homosocial capital can be interpreted as possessing the compulsory entrance fee to those informal networks that are seen to safeguard informal predictability. Having access to homosocial capital thus minimizes unpredictability while maximizing network access. Although this dissertation has elaborated on the specific use of homosocial capital in clientelist networks and in order to win elections, I believe that there may very well be other contexts in which the
prerequisites are similar and in which male dominance is the unforeseen consequence.

As we know, theories of homosociality as well as social capital theory have been employed in a number of different scholarly fields and empirical contexts. Organizational research has already started to move in this direction, showing that leaders of large organizations often show a preference for socially similar subordinates in order to ensure predictability. Social capital theory has shown that high levels of trust are often reserved for people who are perceived to be like oneself – in particular when it comes to morally questionable activities. Thus, the use of the concept homosocial capital should not be limited to either political contexts or to developing countries. Unpredictability is likely to be more or less prevalent in a lot of societal contexts, and where it is more prevalent, it is likely to be more compensated for by actors wishing to advance by predicting their next strategic career step. It would be very interesting to see how homosocial capital could travel to other contexts by identifying and analyzing the behavior of such actors in new settings. I think it is likely that the accumulation of homosocial capital is a relevant and widely practiced strategy on other unpredictable arenas, apart from the political one. Bird looked at informal male gatherings in an academic community in the United States and concluded that the men she interviewed had a very decided view about what was masculine behavior and not. They thus felt they could understand their male peers, whereas women were described as “the others” (Bird 1996). A study of homosociality in the male dominated organization Rotary shows that members are selected based on what they are perceived to be able to contribute – both in terms of professional favors and socially (Hamrén 2007). Göransson writes in an analysis of Swedish power elites from different fields that there are different ways of recruitment in different fields, but that they all create their own hierarchies, informal practices and cultural codes. Regardless of field, it is imperative to learn the rules of the game and to build up capital in the form of knowledge, merits, networks and reputation (Göransson 2006: 526). In the same volume, Djerf-Pierre describes network-building as imperative for reaching an elite position. Just like the networks described in this study, she sees that networks in Sweden are expanded through active recruitment by insiders. This implies, she argues, that the accumulation of social capital is important for the possibilities of being recruited and that social capital, by facilitating recruitment to top positions, is converted into other forms of capital. She also shows that male individuals in Swedish top positions mainly build male networks, whereas female individuals build networks including both sexes. In Sweden, however, politics is less male dominated than is the business world, and Swedish male politicians also include more women in their networks than do Swedish businessmen (Djerf-Pierre 2006). Thus, while her picture of the different strategies in network building between women and men correspond well to the Thai picture, the difference between the political and the
business world seem to be the opposite in Sweden as compared to Thailand. This is, however, explicable when taking the issue of unpredictability into account. In Thailand, the political world is the more unpredictable whereas Swedish politics are relatively stable and changes are slow. Swedish politicians thus probably perceive that their career is predictable to a greater extent than do Thai politicians. Swedish politicians are likely to compare their experiences to those of Swedish businessmen, where unpredictability is a much larger problem. Certainly, the Thai business world is also grappling with problems of unpredictability and the necessity of quick decision-making but their frame of reference is a different one: the enormous unpredictability of their political surroundings. Where unpredictability is perceived, in relative terms, as a problem, the rational strategy will be to build networks that are as perceived to be as predictable as possible – and these kinds of networks are what homosocial capital can buy.

There are many perceivable and exciting ways forward in this area of research, and many new questions waiting to be answered – not to mention all the old and commonly asked questions waiting to be posed in a slightly different manner. I hope that comparative politics will, to a greater extent, embrace that part of gender studies that has come to be called the study of men and masculinities. For instance, a great deal of work has been done on the importance of network building in politics and another growing body of work has dealt with men’s and women’s different strategies in organizational networking. This study contributes a closer understanding of the motivation behind male political network building in a clientelist context. It was necessary to reach such an understanding in order to chisel out, specify and elaborate on the concept of homosocial capital. Now, however, a more systematic comparison with female political network building would refine the theory of homosocial capital even further and could reveal the different opportunity structures available to men and women and the different strategies for political success these ultimately give rise to.
Appendices

Appendix A – Units of analyses
List of countries and elections, cross section analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2002</td>
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N = 125
## List of countries and elections, time series analyses

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2003 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2000, 2005 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2000, 2004 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1994, 1999, 2004 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1997, 2002 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Kinshasa</td>
<td>2003 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2000, 2003 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1991, 1996, 2001 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1998, 2002 (2)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1990, 1992 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2003 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1990, 1996, 2001 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1992, 2002 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, East</td>
<td>1986 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ghana  1996, 2000, 2004 (3)
Guinea  2002 (1)
Guinea-Bissau  1994, 1999, 2004 (3)
Iraq  1996, 2000 (2)
Israel  1992, 1999, 2003 (3)
Ivory Coast  1990, 1995, 2000 (3)
Kazakhstan  2004 (1)
Latvia  2002 (1)
Lithuania  2000, 2004 (2)
Moldova  2001, 2005 (2)
Morocco  1997, 2002 (2)
Mozambique  1994, 1999, 2004 (3)
Namibia  1994, 1999, 2004 (3)
Nicaragua  1996, 2001 (2)
Nigeria  1999, 2003 (2)
Panama  1994, 1999, 2004 (3)
Russia  1993, 1999, 2003 (3)
Sierra Leone  2002 (1)
Slovakia  1998, 2002 (2)
Slovenia  2000, 2004 (2)
Tanzania  1995, 2000, 2005 (3)
Uganda  1994, 1996, 2001 (3)
Ukraine  2002 (1)
Uruguay  1994, 1999, 2004 (3)
Yemen  1993, 1997, 2003 (3)
Zimbabwe  1995, 2000, 2005 (3)

N=123  N=459
Coups, coup attempts and their influence on election years

Albania 2001 (1)
Armenia 2003 (1)
Azerbaijan 2000 (1)
Bangladesh 1996, 2001 (2)
Bolivia 1989 (1)
Congo, Brazzaville 1998, 2002 (2)
Ecuador 2002 (1)
Guatemala 1990, 1994 (2)
Guinea-Bissau 1999, 2004 (2)
Honduras 2001 (1)
Iraq 1996 (1)
Ivory Coast 1995, 2000 (2)
Liberia 1997 (1)
Madagascar 1993 (1)
Niger 2004 (1)
Pakistan 2002 (1)
Panama 1994 (1)
Papua New Guinea 1992 (1)
Peru 1992, 1995 (2)
Philippines 1992, 1995 (2)
Sierra Leone 2002 (1)
Sudan 1989, 1992 (2)
Trinidad 1991, 1995 (2)
Tunisia 1989 (1)
UAE 1988, 1990 (2)
Venezuela 1993, 2005 (2)
Zambia 1991, 2001 (2)
Appendix B – Regression tables and statistics

Granger type causality test

Table 16. *Granger-type causality test 1.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: % men in parliament</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% men in parliament (lagged)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government (lagged)</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>16.01</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 459, R²: 0.72

Panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in parenthesis

*** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10

Table 17. *Granger-type causality test 2.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: quality of government</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% men in parliament (lagged)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government (lagged)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 459, R²: 0.96

Panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in parenthesis

*** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10
Reducing the number of observations (Model 1)

Table 18. *Model 1 with same observations as in Model 2 and 5*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: men in parliament (%)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional strength</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy sq.</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lagged DV</strong></td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>12.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.72
N= 459

*** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10; † jointly significant, p< 0.05
The influential case of Romania 1990 (Model 2 and 5)

There are several ways to identify particularly influential observations in a model in order to assess the influence of specific observations on the coefficient. I have focused on the important predictor quality of government as well as the interaction predictor where quality of government is combined with male parliamentary dominance. I have looked at DFBeta measures and it was fairly easy to single out one observation: the election taking place in Romania in 1990. Romania at the time had a very low lagged value for quality of government. The present value had increased considerably, but since values for quality of government are lagged to the year before, this does not yet come into play. Also, it had a very high male dominance. The previous communist government of Romania had also ensured a high (but arguably cosmetic) representation of women. This tradition of high representation of women, however, fell apart together with communism leading existing male informal networks to take over and almost completely dominate the parliament. The case is thus certainly in line with the theory, and would even be an interesting one for further exploration. It should remain included in the analysis as there is nothing “wrong” with it. However, the models below show that coefficients are weakened, but not rendered insignificant, even if the case is excluded from the analysis.

Table 19. Model 2 and 5, excluding Romania 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: men in parliament (%)</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-2.67</td>
<td>-39.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(12.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government * male dominance</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutional strength**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy sq.</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged dependent var.</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>13.72</td>
<td>40.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.44)</td>
<td>(12.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.75  N= 458
R²: 0.75  N= 458

*** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10
Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity is a problem that can arise in a multiple regression equation when the independent variables are highly correlated among each other (Knoke et al. 2002). There are many sophisticated ways to check for multicollinearity, but one of the simplest and most straightforward is to look at a table of correlations between the independent variables. Statistics books urges researchers not to include variables with a bivariate correlation of 0.7 or more and correlations around 0.8 or 0.9 are definitely cause for concern (Pallant 2001).

Table 20. *Bivariate correlations between independent variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clientelism</th>
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<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Political Stabil-</th>
<th>Political Stabil-</th>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.495</td>
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<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>0.321</td>
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<td>-0.126</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N= 459

None of the correlations in the table above are as high as 0.7. Since all models include the squared function of democracy, it needs to be noted that it is not strange that the squared function of a variable already included in the model is highly correlated to its component parts, thus also generating low tolerance statistics by computer programs. Yet, most accounts of curvilinear models recommend that both the linear function and the curvilinear function be included in the model. In general, high levels of collinearity between two such independent variables will generally not be problematic (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). I do not seem to have seriously violated the assumption of no multicollinearity.
Fixed effects - regional dummies

Table 21. Model 2 and 5 with regional dummy variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: men in parliament (%)</th>
<th>Model 2 with regional fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 5 with regional fixed effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-4.57** (1.85)</td>
<td>-55.04*** (12.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government * male dominance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.56*** (0.13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutional strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy level</th>
<th>0.24 (0.36)</th>
<th>0.41 (0.33)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy sq.</td>
<td>0.04 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.05* (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>0.42 (0.56)</td>
<td>1.11* (0.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional fixed effects (reference category “West”)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>0.80 (1.35)</th>
<th>-0.69 (1.11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-0.75 (0.68)</td>
<td>-2.10*** (0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1.31 (1.07)</td>
<td>0.76 (0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-1.48 (1.00)</td>
<td>-2.63*** (0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1.28 (1.04)</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific and Caribbean</td>
<td>2.04 (1.38)</td>
<td>-0.01 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>0.81*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.41*** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>18.74*** (4.90)</td>
<td>55.29*** (12.69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.74  R²: 0.75  N= 459  N=459

*** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10
# Fixed effects - time dummies

Table 22. Model 2 and 5 with time period dummy variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: men in parliament (%)</th>
<th>Model 2 with time period fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 5 with time period fixed effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government</td>
<td>-4.59 ***</td>
<td>-48.99 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(13.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of government * male dominance</td>
<td>0.51 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutional strength**

| Democracy level                          | 0.36                                    | 0.34                                   |
|                                         | (0.44)                                  | (0.42)                                 |
| Democracy sq.                            | -0.04                                   | -0.04                                  |
|                                         | (0.04)                                  | (0.04)                                 |
| Political instability                    | -0.28                                   | 0.34                                   |
|                                         | (0.63)                                  | (0.62)                                 |

**Time fixed effects (reference category 1985-1990)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>-1.56</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>-2.46</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>-4.61</td>
<td>-4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>0.80 ***</td>
<td>0.44 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>21.55 ***</td>
<td>53.43 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.58)</td>
<td>(13.88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R²:    | 0.75   | 0.77   |
| N=     | 459    | 459    |

*** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.10
Simulations of confidence intervals for interaction term

This figure presents the marginal effect of a tenth of a unit change in Quality of Government, from 0 to 0.1, across the full range of lagged male dominance. The y-axis is the marginal effect of male dominance. The dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence bands around the estimated effect. The x-axis is the level of lagged male dominance. This figure was produced using the simulation approach presented in Brambor et al (2006) and values from Model 5. The control variables democracy and democracy squared were set at their respective means and political instability was set at 0.

The figure shows that better quality of government significantly and substantially reduces male dominance in parliament if the lagged male incumbency is 88% or less. The effect becomes more pronounced the lower the lagged male dominance. The effect is not statistically different from zero when lagged male dominance is at its very highest values, i.e. higher than 88%.

Figure 10. Marginal Effect of Quality of Government (+0.1) as lagged male dominance changes
Appendix C – Interview Questionnaires

The questions below should only be seen as examples of questions that were raised during the interviews. Interviews were semi-structured and thus, to a large extent, had the form of informal discussions with follow-up questions. The more talking the person interviewed did, the less questions did I have to ask. Depending on the position of the person interviewed, different questions were asked in a different manner. The three categories below (informants, centrally placed politicians, and constituency respondents) are the widest and most inclusive categories possible, and are thus, as groups, rather heterogeneous.

Question guide for informants

Sites of power
What would you say are the major sites of power in Thailand?
- The palace/The parliament/The military/The temples/religion/The political parties/Business
- Do women have equal access to these sites? Why/why not? To which?

Gender equality in Thailand
There is a high number of women in the workforce in Thailand, and an equal number of men and women in higher education. Women are often claimed to have a relatively high socioeconomic status in Thailand. What are your views on this depiction of gender equality in Thailand?
- Is the workforce divided?
- Are women in one profession and men in another?
- Do women often become members of executive boards or reach managing positions?
- How about women in politics?
- Is there a women’s movement regarding these things? Why/why not?

Political parties in Thailand
How are the political parties organized externally and internally?
- Would you consider them strong or weak as organizations? Why?
- What are the differences between the major parties?
- How are political parties working and functioning locally? Are they mass-based with branches or elite led?
- Do you know anything about how they select their candidates? What issues are important?

What is the connection between parties and the rest of the political world?
- Why are there so few women in political parties in Thailand
- Are the political parties connected to the major sites of power? How?
• Are there connections within the political world that it is difficult for women to get access to?
• What is the role of factions in political parties? Which are the important factions?
• How does money politics and electoral corruption function in the political parties?
• What is the role of women in money politics?
• Would you say politics is clientelist or is it moving towards more ideologically oriented debates?
• Do you think that women need political representation in Thailand?
• What do you see as the biggest obstacle for women’s entrance into the political sphere in Thailand?

The political situation and democracy in Thailand
What are your views on the recent political development in Thailand?
• Why is Thai politics so unstable?
• Why so many military coups?
• Why so many constitutions?
• Do you think the movements and protests are good or bad for democracy?
• Is the most recent development good or bad for democracy in the long run?
• How has politics changed the past couple of years?
• What is the role and influence of the military now?

Did the reform processes during the 1990’s change women’s situation at all?
• Did the constitution of 1997 help?
• Did women’s access to the political sphere change after democratization?
Question guide for centrally placed politicians

**Personal background**

In your own words, please tell me a bit about your personal background and how you came to be in the position you are now?

- Your education?
- Family in politics?
- Professional career?

How long have you been actively involved in politics (at any level)?

- For which party or parties have you worked?
- Please tell me about how, when and why you decided to enter politics?
- Who or what influenced you to go into politics?
- When you decided that you wanted to – was it easy? How did you go about it? Who helped you?
- How did you decide which party you wanted to support?
- Did you already have connections in the party?
- Did you first approach the party, or did the party approach you? If the latter, who asked you to become a candidate?
- Did you know what was required of you in order to become a candidate?
- What is your factional belonging?

Do you have any political mentors or people who have helped you throughout your political career (inside the party, in another political party or outside the political world)?

- Who are they, can you name them?
- How have they helped you?

What is your present position in the party/parliament/government?

- Tell me a bit about the types of responsibilities this position brings about.
- Tell me a bit about your daily work.

**Candidate selection**

How is selection conducted centrally?

Who is involved in the candidate selection process and what is their position within the party?

- Is candidate selection delegated or decentralized in any way?
- Who makes the final decision regarding candidates?

What kind of candidates are you looking for in general? What characteristics are useful and what type of personality do you need?

- In what way do factions within the party influence candidate selection?
- In what way does a person’s local standing influence his or her possibilities to become a candidate?
- Do you make use of polls to monitor candidate popularity?
- How do you reason around campaign financing for candidates?
- Would you say that the candidate’s view of party policy or the candidate’s local popularity is the most important?

What are the main differences in candidate selection procedures for the constituencies and for the party list, according to you?
- Who is responsible for party list nomination?
- Do you know how the order on the list is determined (financial contributions, ministerial positions, seniority, faction belonging)?
- What is generally required for a candidate to move from a constituency to the party list?
- Which group prepares the list of potential candidates?
- Which group or person has the final say?

How is selection conducted in the part of the country where you come from/which you represent? Please, be as specific as possible and use examples!
- Who were the people who were involved in discussing candidate selection in this area and what is their position within the party?
- Where is the final decision regarding candidates in this area made?
- What are the important political issues in this area?
- How much and how do different local expectations on candidates play a part in the selection process?
- How are these local expectations monitored?
- How are the resources needed to win the candidacy estimated?
- How are party resources allocated?

Could you tell me as specifically as possible how the party reasoned around candidate X in constituency Y?
- Who were the people who were involved in discussing candidate selection in this area and what is their position within the party?
- Who makes the final decision regarding this constituency?
- What are the important political issues in this constituency?
- What were the issues that you took into consideration before selecting candidates in this constituency?
- Did you use polls as a tool to select candidates in this area? How did you go about? Which names were included in the poll and why?
- What kind of candidate did you look for in this particular area?
- What should a good candidate be like?
I will mention a few examples of types of constituencies. Please, try to reason as you think the party and you yourself would reason.

- Please, consider a constituency where there is an incumbent MP. Is the incumbency effect almost automatic, i.e. will the previous MP always get the chance to stand again?
- Please, consider a constituency where there is a previously unsuccessful candidate. Under which circumstances would he or she be given the chance to stand again?
- Please, consider a constituency where there is no evident candidate (let’s say the old candidate resigned): How do you go about to find a new candidate? Who is in charge of recruitment? What type of candidate does your party look for? Where and how do you look for new candidates?
- Please consider a member of the party who is very interested in the development of the party and in politics in general. What is required for this member to become a candidate? Are there established mechanisms for finding these people? Will they have to be approached by a senior figure? Is there a formal application or selection procedure that you know about?
- Consider a constituency that has several eligible potential and interested candidates. What happens if there are several people who express their interest to become candidates for one and the same constituency? What does a candidate have to do, say, show or prove to convince the party that s/he is ”the right one”? Would you say that the candidate’s view of party policy or the candidate’s local popularity matter the most?
- Is the strategy and logic of selection very different for close race constituencies and safe or lost seats? Explain in what way?

Political development and campaign strategies
Tell me what you think about the recent political development!

How do you, as a politician, personally cope with political changes?

What are your strategies for the next election/for the future?

Talk a bit about the biggest problems for Thai politics, as you see it?
- Electoral fraud and vote buying/Military coups/Gender inequality/Corruption/Poverty
Question guide for constituency respondents

**Personal background**
In your own words, please tell me a bit about your personal background and how you came to be in the position you are now?
- Your education?
- Family in politics?
- Professional career?

How long have you been actively involved in politics (at any level)?
- For which party or parties have you worked?

Please tell me about how, when and why you decided be active politically?
- Who or what influenced to go into politics?
- When you decided that you wanted to – was it easy? How did you go about? Who helped you?
- How did you decide which party or person you wanted to support?
- Did you already have connections in the party?
- Did you first approach the party, or did the party approach you?
- If the latter, who approached you?

**Present position**
What is your present position in the constituency (candidate, local politician, canvasser – at which level)?
- Tell me a bit about the types of responsibilities your position brings about.
- Tell me a bit about your daily work.
- What are your thoughts on the outcome of the last election?
- Tell me a bit about how you campaigned for the last election (rallies, posters, door-knocking, vote buying, weddings, funerals, temples…).
- Tell me about how you work with the constituents (projects implemented, representing them at different events, policies that are important for the area, helping and taking care of personal problems, national politics…).
- Tell me about how vote buying is administered and distributed.

Who do you work with closely in politics?
- Who are they, can you name them?
- How have they helped you?
- How do you help them?
- What is the relationship between local and national politicians in this area?
What do you think is important to think about when you decide who to work with politically?
- Social or political position in locality/that they are friends or family/that they can be trusted/that the people are from a variety of backgrounds (professions, sex, age, ethnicity etc.)/that they are spread out over the area/that they are faithful party politicians/that they have a good relationship with constituents/that they have plenty of money

**Candidate**

How did you become the candidate of this constituency?
- Who were the people who were involved in discussing candidate selection in this area and what is their position within the party?
- Who makes the final decision regarding this constituency?
- What are the important political issues in this constituency?
- Which people should you know in order to become a candidate in this constituency?
- How did you have to work in advance in order to become a candidate?
- Who did you have to convince and how?
- Did you receive help from the party before you were chosen as the official candidate?

How did you build support among your constituents?
- Did the party use polls as a tool to select candidates in this area?
- How did you get to be on the poll?
- Who were the others?
- What were the results?

Why do you think the party wanted you as their candidate here?
- What should a good candidate be like?
- What do constituents look for and want?
- How do you win an election?

**Political development and campaign strategies**

Tell me what you think about the recent political development!

Do you care a lot about national politics, or is local politics more important?
- How do the national political changes affect you?

What are your strategies for the next election/for the future?

Talk a bit about the biggest problems for Thai politics, as you see it?
- Electoral fraud and vote buying/Military coups/Gender inequality/Corruption/Poverty
Below is a complete list of the interviews, including spoken and direct information gathering, conducted during the course of this research project. The aim of the list is to be as complete as possible, thus including all types of information gathering meetings I participated in. This means that the posts in the list below represent meeting of varying length and sometimes of varying quality. Some of the interviews took the form of informal discussions following an informative lecture or seminar, a couple of them were group discussions or meeting attendances, and others were short discussions with constituents regarding their experiences of electoral campaigns. Most of the interviews listed below, however, were of a more formalized character, usually somewhere between 40 and 120 minutes in length and conducted one on one (excluding the interpreter). The perceived quality and the form of the interview have been taken into consideration in the analytic work with the interviews. The interviews have been divided into three different categories: Discussions or interviews with informants, interviews with centrally placed politicians or bureaucrats and interviews with constituency respondents. The indicated position of the person is the position in which s/he was interviewed and the position held at the time, unless otherwise indicated (sometimes the former or future position is of interest and is thus included as well). The spelling of Thai names is, as far as possible, in accordance with the person’s own preferences, often as indicated by their business cards. I apologize for the misspellings that are bound to remain. The anonymity of constituency respondents has always been ensured, and in a couple of instances the anonymity of informants or centrally placed politicians, who did not ask for anonymity, has been given so as to protect respondents who could otherwise be identified. I specify the sex only of politicians and constituency respondents.

**Informants**

1. Pokkrong Soontharasudth (lecture and discussion), Deputy secretary-general, Election Commission Thailand (ECT), January 31, 2005
2. Gothom Arya (lecture and discussion), former Election Commissioner, Election Commission Thailand (ECT) and secretary-general of Forum Asia, January 31, 2005
3. Sunai Phasuk (lecture and discussion), Thailand Human Rights Watch Commissioner, January 31, 2005
4. Kavi Chongkittavorn (lecture and discussion), Senior Editor of the Nation, January 31, 2005
5. Duncan McCargo (discussion and interview), Professor of Southeast Asian Politics, University of Leeds, February 8, 2005
6. Gothom Arya (interview), former Election Commissioner, Election Commission Thailand and secretary-general of Forum Asia, February 13, 2005
7. Chonchanok Viravan (interview), Business and Professional Women's Association, February 15, 2005
8. Thithinan Pongsudhirak (discussion and interview), Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Chulalongkorn University, February 16, 2005
9. Ukrist Pathmanand (discussion and interview), Assistant Director, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, February 16, 2005
10. Chamnong Watanagase (discussion and interview), Director of the Open Forum for Democracy Foundation, February 17, 2005
11. Tulsathit Taptim (interview), Managing Editor of the Nation, February 18, 2005
12. Chantana Banpasirichote-Wungaeo (discussion and interview), Associate Professor, Department of Government, Chulalongkorn University, February 18, 2005
13. Maytinee Bhongsvej (discussion and interview), Gender and Development Research Institute (GDRI), February 22, 2005
14. Niyom Rathamarit (interview) Associate Professor and Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadiphek's Institute, February 22, 2005
16. Amalin Sundaravej (discussion and interview), Program Officer, UNIFEM, February 22, 2005
17. Weerayut Chokchaimadon and Tanyaporn Kunakornpaiboonsiri (interview), reporters, the Nation, February 24, 2005
18. Bertil Lintner (interview), Foreign Correspondent, Svenska Dagbladet, March 10, 2005
19. Shashi Ranjan Pandey (interview and discussion), Women's Action & Resource Initiative (WARI), March 20, 2005
20. Suteera Vichitranonda (interview), Founder of Gender and Development Research Institute (GDRI), March 22, 2005
21. Pokkrong Soontharasudth (meeting and interview), Deputy Secretary General, Election Commission Thailand (ECT), January 16, 2006
22. Pasuk Phongpaichit (discussion and interview), Professor of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, January 18, 2006
Centrally placed politicians or bureaucrats

28. Kriengsak Charoenwongsak, male Democrat Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament, February 17, 2005
29. Pussadee Tamthai, female Democrat Party List Candidate, February 24, 2005
30. Abhisit Vejjajiva, male Democrat Party List Candidate and Democrat Deputy Party Leader (was shortly to be selected Democrat Party Leader and subsequently became Prime Minister), February 25, 2005
31. Pimuk Simaroj, male TRT Constituency Candidate, Member of Parliament and Party Deputy Spokesman, January 17, 2006
32. Abhisit Vejjajiva, male Democrat Party List Candidate, Member of Parliament and Party Leader (and later Prime Minister), January 19, 2006
33. Pussadee Tamthai, female Democrat Party List Candidate and Executive Director of the Democrat Party, January 19, 2006
34. Observation of TRT-party meeting at the TRT headquarters, January 20, 2006
35. Phongthep Thepkanjana, male TRT Party List Candidate, Member of Parliament and TRT party official, January 24, 2006
36. Vasana Puemlarp, Chairman of the Election Commission Thailand (ECT), January 25, 2006
37. Suthep Thaugsuban, male Party List Candidate, Member of Parliament, and secretary-general for the Democrat Party, January 27, 2006
38. Suthep Thaugsuban, male Party List Candidate, Member of Parliament, and secretary-general for the Democrat Party, January 31, 2006
40. Discussion with a group of demonstrators and activists March 22, 2006
41. “Pai”, male Organizer for People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), March 22, 2006
42. Suriyasai Katasila, male Coordinator of People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), March 27, 2006
43. Pimuk Simaroj, male TRT Constituency Candidate, Member of Parliament and Party Deputy Spokesperson, March 31, 2006
44. Prinya Nakchudtree, male Election Commissioner ECT, April 1, 2006
45. Sanguan Lewmanomont, male President of Election Commission of Bangkok, April 1, 2006
46. Warotai Kosolpisitkul, male Chief of Staff, Office of Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance, July 7, 2006
47. Varathep Ratanakorn, male TRT Party List candidate and Deputy Minister of Finance, July 7, 2006
48. Pimuk Simaroj, male businessman and former TRT constituency candidate and party deputy spokesperson, November 4, 2008
49. Pussadee Tamthai, female Democrat Party Deputy Leader and Boudin Tamthai, her husband, November 10, 2008
50. Pongthep Thepkanchana, male spokesperson for Ex Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and former Thai Rak Thai Party Executive, Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament, November 12, 2008
51. Kuthep Saikrachang, male Spokesperson of PPP, November 13, 2008
52. Poomtham Vechayachai, male former TRT party deputy secretary general, November 21, 2008

Constituency respondent interviews (anonymous)

**Pilot Study Area (March 2005)**

53. Local researcher focusing on women’s rights
54. Chart Thai Constituency Candidate (male)
55. Democrat Constituency Candidate (female)
56. Mahachon Constituency Candidate (male)
57. Director and Assistant Director of Provincial Election Commission
58. TRT Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament (male)
59. Representative for local NGO promoting democracy
60. TRT Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament (male)
61. Representative for local women’s NGO
62. Representative for development oriented NGO
63. TRT Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament (female)
64. TRT Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament (male)
Constituency Nung (May 2006)
65. Director of Provincial Election Commission
66. Retired Democrat Constituency Candidate (male)
67. Former Democrat constituency candidate (male)
68. TRT Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament (male)
69. Democrat Party Branch Manager (male)
70. Local Election Commission Official
71. Village head
72. Two Democrat canvassers with financial responsibilities for the Democrat branch (males)
73. TRT canvasser and kamnan (male)
74. TRT canvasser and tambon level politician (male)
75. Democrat Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament (male)
76. Observation of a meeting with Democrat constituency candidates about the candidate selection for the upcoming election (mixed)
77. TRT canvasser and tambon level politician (male)
78. TRT canvasser and tambon level politician (male)
79. Democrat district level canvasser and former tambon level politician (male)
80. TRT constituency candidate of neighboring constituency (male)
81. Discussion about campaign with villager
82. Discussion about campaign with pharmacy employee
83. Discussion about campaign with villager
84. Democrat canvasser and tambon level politician (male)
85. Village level Democrat canvasser and tambon level Election Commission representative (male)
86. Democrat Constituency Candidate in neighboring constituency (male)

Constituency Song (April – June 2006)
87. Democrat Constituency Candidate (male)
88. Democrat canvasser and office worker (male)
89. Democrat Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament (male)
90. Democrat Canvasser, local politician and Democrat office worker (male)
91. TRT Canvasser and office worker (female)
92. Assistant of Democrat Canvasser and Party Branch Chairman (male)
93. TRT canvasser and election planner (male)

Constituency Saem (June 2006)
94. Director of Local Election Commission
95. Director of Provincial Election Commission
96. TRT Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament (male)
References

97. TRT canvasser and tambon level politician (male)
98. TRT village level canvasser and tambon level politician (male)
99. Former Democrat Constituency Candidate (male)
100. TRT Office Worker (female)
101. Democrat Constituency Candidate (male)
102. Democrat Canvasser, provincial level, and former Governor and uncle of Democrat Constituency Candidate (male)
103. Two Democrat Office Workers (female)
104. Democrat Canvasser, local party committee member and tambon level politician (male)
105. Democrat Canvasser and tambon level politician (male)
106. Democrat Canvasser, assistant to constituency candidate and relative of local strongman (male)
107. Discussion about campaign with snacks vendor
108. Discussion about campaign with gas station employee
109. Discussion about campaign with noodle vendor

Constituency Sii (February 2006)

110. Members of a women’s local politics group (females)
111. Director of local Election Commission
112. TRT canvasser and village head (male)
113. Team of TRT canvassers (mixed)
114. TRT canvasser and kamnan (male)
115. Democrat Constituency Candidate (female)
116. Democrat Canvasser (male)
117. Director of local NGO supporting women’s political activism
118. TRT Constituency Candidate and Member of Parliament (female)
119. TRT canvasser and village head (male)
120. TRT office worker (female)
121. TRT office worker (female)
122. TRT Party List Candidate and Member of Parliament (female)

Constituency Haa (March 2006 and some follow-up in November 2008)

123. Director of Provincial Election Commission
124. Human Resource Officer at Provincial Interior Office
125. Assistant to TRT Constituency Candidate in neighboring constituency (male)
126. Democrat canvasser (male)
127. Democrat canvasser (male)
128. TRT Constituency Candidate (female)
129. Observation of TRT canvasser meeting (males)
130. TRT provincial canvasser and member of the Provincial Administration Organization (male)
131. TRT provincial canvasser and member of the Provincial Administration Organization (male)
132. Kamnan (male)
133. Two members of the local constituency Election Commission
134. TRT canvasser and former village head (male)
135. TRT canvasser and village team leader (male)
136. Democrat Office Worker (male)
137. Discussion about campaign with noodle shop vendor
138. Discussion about campaign with watermelon vendor
139. Discussion about campaign with watermelon vendor
140. Discussion about campaign with carpenter
141. Discussion about campaign with gas station employee
142. Discussion about campaign with whisky vendor
143. Democrat Constituency Candidate (male)
144. Democrat Constituency Candidate (male) (follow-up)
145. Democrat Party List Candidate and father of Constituency Candidate (male) (follow-up)
References


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Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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