MALMÖ UNIVERSITY

#Laïcité on Twitter

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Hashtag #Laïcité and Its Use in Discourses on Islam in the French Republic

Anne-Laurence Hamer

Media and Communication Studies: Culture, Collaborative Media, and Creative Industries
Master's Thesis
Word count: 15 234
15 Credits
May 2023
Supervisor: Berndt Clavier
Examiner: Malin Mc Glinn

Abstract

This thesis explores the Twitter discourse surrounding French secularism, referred to as *laïcité*, and its interplay with Islam in France. The research aims to provide an in-depth synchronic analysis of patterns and Twitter users' language and rhetoric when discussing the principle. Moreover, it attempts to examine the variations of these discussions based on their contextual relevance and Twitter's algorithm. To achieve this, I conducted a Critical Discourse Analysis on three data sets containing the hashtag #laïcité and pertaining to discussions on France and Islam: The first set is a compilation of tweets from the 26th of March to the 1st of April 2023; the second set is a compilation of tweets following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, from the 8th of January to the 14th of January 2015; and the third set is a compilation of "Top Tweets" initiated by Twitter's algorithm retrieved on the 4th of May 2023. The findings show a frequent instrumentalisation of laïcité to place the principle in elite and ideological discourses, discriminating against French Muslims. I identify two common discourses on #laïcité. First, laïcité is often associated with conservative France and is employed as a justification for propagating hate speech towards Islam and Muslims, especially on Twitter, where the platform's features and algorithm amplify this negative rhetoric. Second, laïcité is viewed as a critical aspect of French identity that frames the assimilation of French Muslims as the only way to comply with this principle.

Keywords: Laïcité, Twitter, Critical Discourse Analysis, Hashtag, Twitterisation, Islamophobia, Secularism, France

Table of content

Abstract 2
List of Figures and Tables 4
1. Introduction 5
2. Background Information 8
2.1 The Principle of Laïcité 8
2.2 Media Coverage of Laïcité in France 10
2.3 Twitter 11
3. Literature Review 12
3.1 Twitter and Societal Issues 12
3.1.1 Twitter research 12
3.1.2 The Internet and controversies 13
3.1.3 Twitter's features 14
3.1.4 Public conversations on Twitter 16
3.1.5 Network-oriented use of Twitter 18
3.2 Mediatisation of Secularism and Religion 18
3.2.1 Media and beliefs 18
3.2.2 Media framing and representation of Muslims 20
4. Theoretical Framework 22
4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 22
4.1.1 CDA in the context of hegemony 23
4.1.2 Multi-modal discourse analysis 24
4.2 Twitterisation of Laïcité 25
5. Methodology 25
5.1 Research Approach and Paradigm 25
5.2 Method 26
5.3 Sample 27
6.1 Ethical concerns 28
6.2 Positioning 29
6.3 Limitations 29
7. Findings 30
7.1 Initial Qualitative Findings 30
7.2 Micro Level of Analysis 33
7.2.1 Social or political group of the tweet writers 33
7.2.2 Verbs 36

7.2.3 Claims and conclusions 37
7.2.5 Twitter idioms 38
7.2.6 Figurative language 39
7.3 Meso-Level of Analysis 41
7.3.1 Comparisons 41
7.3.2 Laïcité 43
7.3.3 Us versus Them and essentialism 45
7.3.4 Hate speech and incitement to hatred 47
7.3.5 Islamophobia in the name of laïcité 48
8. Concluding Discussions 49
8.1 Twitterisation of #Laïcité, and Its Synchronic Sentiments Towards Islam 49
References 53
1 Appendix 58
1. 1. Selection of Tweets written between the 26th of March and the 1st of April 2023. 58
2. 2. Selection of Top Tweets gathered on the 4th of May 2023. 65
3. 3. Selection of Tweets written between the 8th and the 14th of January 2015, after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. 70

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Proportion of tweets within the three data sets. 100% refers to the total amount of tweet of each category. 31
Figure 2: Share of mentions, links, and visuals in %. 100% refers to the total amount of tweet of each category. 32
Figure 3: Word cloud of #laïcité regarding Islam in France, all tweets combined, translated to English. 33
Figure 4: Profile pictures of the writers of tweets 2, 8, and 18. 36
Figure 5: Profile pictures depicting Eric Zemmour, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Elon Musk. 36
Figure 6: Caricature attached to Tweet 2. On the cannon is written “Law of 1905” (Law on Laïcité), and the character says “We destroyed fanaticism and obscurantism!” 42

1. Introduction

Laïcité is a fundamental principle enshrined in the French Constitution that delineates the separation of religion and state. While similar to Anglo-Saxon secularism, the latter does not fully capture the intricacies of French laïcité (Kelly, 2020). This concept has its roots in the 14th century when the French monarchy sought to ensure the separation of religion from political matters (Colosimo, 2017). In 1905, the French law on the Separation of the Churches and the State went further by abolishing the rights of religion in state affairs and then incorporating laïcité into the Constitution in 1946. The primary aim of this law was to reinforce freedom of religion while ensuring public order and equality for all French citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, or social status (ibid).

From a traditional constitutional principle, laïcité has garnered significant media coverage in recent times, particularly in discussions surrounding the display of religious beliefs in public, with a specific emphasis on Islam (Mikulis, 2020). The traditional boundaries of laïcité being blurry and primarily designed for early-1900 Christianity, left- and right-wing ideologies instrumentalise it to apply their interpretation of laïcité to the public discourse about French Muslims, ultimately defining and restricting their role within society (ibid).

In contemporary society, social media has emerged as a prominent arena for discussing the concept of laïcité. Among the various digital platforms, Twitter has gained significant traction as a space for political and social discourse (Bruns, 2012; Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014). A diverse range of individuals with varying political affiliations (or none) utilise Twitter to engage in debates surrounding social controversies and negotiate the boundaries of laïcité. The discourse on laïcité is closely intertwined with the broader discussion on the status of Islam in France (Mikulis, 2020) and the "need to adapt" for Muslims to the concept of freedom of and from religion. Extensive research on laïcité and on the relationship between religion and the media has already been conducted (Charaudeau, 2015; Taira, 2022). However, the correlation between laïcité or secularism and digital media has not been adequately explored and remains an understudied topic (Taira, 2022).

The subject at hand remains relevant as it is an ongoing topic of discussion in France. The concept of laïcité is often debated during national elections and in response to specific incidents. For example, it has been a tool to validate far-right ideologies in the last decade, following different terrorist attacks in France (Kelly, 2020). The common association of religion with extremism challenges the place of French Muslims in the State (ibid). This issue is fuelled by exaggerated digital media representations of Islam and its perceived incompatibility with laïcité (Mikulis, 2020). In the digital era, Twitter has emerged as a platform that challenges the hegemony of political elites, allowing for a more diverse range of voices to be heard (Bouvier & Machin, 2018). However, studies suggest that Twitter's algorithms lack objectivity and neutrality, often amplifying extremist ideologies. (Huszár et al., 2022). Twitter serves as a platform for different opinions to be expressed and enables the mapping of an evolving and subjective conversation on laïcité through the use of hashtags.

The aim of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the Twitter conversations surrounding the concept of laïcité in relation to Islam and Muslims in France. The study looks into how Twitter intensifies this prevalent discussion. This research synchronically examines the Twitter discourse of laïcité and Islam in France in three different contexts. Firstly, tweets in March and April 2023, when this thesis started, in an ordinary context following no ephemeral event. Secondly, tweets of the "Top Tweets" section of Twitter as of the 4th of May 2023, which will be further explained in the methodology. Thirdly, tweets following a significant event related to laïcité, in this case, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015. These shootings occurred on the 7th of January 2015, and murdered members of the Charlie Hebdo newspaper after the journal published caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (Smyrnaios & Ratinaud, 2017). These caricatures, as well as any other kind of satire of religion, are allowed in French law alongside the right to blasphemy. For this reason, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings were not only an attack towards France and its people. It also was an attack on laïcité and the freedom of expression it entails. As such, it bears significant implications in relation to the principle of laïcité.

To this extent, I propose the two following research questions:

- What is the discourse on Twitter's hashtag #laïcité with regard to Islam in France, and how does it differ synchronically according to the news?

- How is laïcité "twitterised", and to what extent do Twitter's features amplify hate discourse toward French Muslims in the name of laïcité?

Despite the extensive research on secularism, there is a lack of literature on how it relates to digital media (Taira, 2022). Taira (2022) justifies this gap by the recentness of digital media research and the fact that secularism is often overlooked in studies on digital religion. This omission results in an incomplete understanding of the relationship between digital media and religion since secularism, atheism, and religion are intertwined (ibid).

Charaudeau (2015) asserts that when it comes to porous topics such as laïcité, discourse often takes the form of controversy, as the blurry definition of laïcité keeps being debated. Moreover, as the following part on background information will reveal, public opinion and discourse have already influenced legal proceedings in French history, notably discriminating against French Muslims. Charaudeau's research (2015) on discourse on laïcité focuses on traditional media. But, newer studies, such as Bouvier's (2020), examine the particularities of Twitter discourse. The author points out the abundance of hate speech encountered on the platform, linked with the anonymous and ephemeral natures of Twitter. Given the influence of the media on public opinion (Hodkinson, 2017c), such discourse is problematic. Moreover, to a more considerable extent, Twitter has been criticised multiple times for the hate speech found on the platform and the lack of content moderation (Bouvier, 2020). Interestingly, if hate speech is often condemned in societies, the online space appears to respond to different rules. However, in light of this social issue, France passed a law in 2020 obliging Twitter "to remove hateful comments – based on race, religion, sexual orientation, gender or disability, as well as sexual harassment – within 24 hours after they are flagged by users" (Gold, 2020). Therefore, it is interesting to observe the effect of this law and to map certain discourses and their synchronic alteration according to the news.

Extracting Twitter data related to a hashtag is an emerging method in media and communication studies, yet, it is seldomly done with a porous term such as laïcité, which brings about a strong capacity for adaptation and reinterpretation. Therefore, I hope this thesis can propose a new layer to the existing literature by connecting critical discourse analysis, Twitter, and laïcité.

2. Background Information

2.1 The Principle of Laïcité

Until the 1980s-1990s, the concept of laïcité was commonly understood as the separation of State and Church. However, debates arose during this time regarding second-generation French Muslims of North African descent, whose families had migrated to France during the post-Algerian-war migration wave of the 1960s (Hamel, 2002; Kelly, 2020). The issue at hand was the use of religious symbols in public institutions, particularly the headscarves worn by Muslim students in schools. The notion of laïcité and its indistinct definition came back onto the table as a legal framework for the judicialisation of the hijab.

According to the 1958 Preamble of the Constitution, laïcité enables freedom of any religion in France "provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law". In 1989, following the polemic when three pupils wearing headscarves were suspended from their school – referred to as the schoolgirls incident – the French Council of State soon validated religious symbols (such as hijabs) as suitable with laïcité, as the principle had to be embraced by institutions and not individuals (Colosimo, 2017; Fernando, 2014). The choice of accepting students with religious symbols was then given to the class teachers. The very notion of "disturbance of the public" order was brought up in this context, as it was rendered subjective.

The boundaries of laïcité were discussed and readjusted by every political party, exceeding the traditional left and right dualism (Kelly, 2020). Laïcité was "weaponised" (Jamal, 2021, p. 1), with the implication that bills discriminating against French Muslims were adopted in the name of laïcité, and the principle was framed to fit ideologies and political discourse. In parallel to the discussions taking place in the political sphere, the mediatisation, media coverage and framing of these events, Islam and the revival of laïcité, gained a significant role (Charaudeau, 2015; Fernando, 2014). The concept of mediatisation and its implications are still a debated topic today (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Hepp et al., 2015). Following the stance of Hepp et al. (2015), mediatisation is an interplay between the media and the organisations of our societies, with the media detaining a power of influence on the audience. With the traditional mass media being

controlled essentially by the so-called "elites" (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 4)– that is, the dominant group in a society detaining power –, the cultural hegemonic group of France (i.e., of non-Muslim belief) (Gramsci et al., 1971) led the discourse on laïcité (Fernando, 2014). To some extent, laïcité was judicialised, as the concept became part of the French legal framework and paved the way for the bill on the ban of religious symbols in public institutions to ensure neutrality in government-operated areas (Hamel, 2002; Jamal, 2021).

Interestingly, an elementary law on freedom of religion became somewhat discriminatory. On the one hand, the French Council of State considered this ban harmful to the civil freedom and identity of certain religious groups – especially the French Muslims (Hamel, 2002). On the other hand, politicians such as François Bayrou proclaimed that any ostensible religious signs in public institutions were associated with separatism and proselytism (ibid) – therefore, in contradiction with laïcité. Naturally, a constitutional principle of the early 1900s can't remain unchanged, substantially with the heterogenisation of religions in France. To this extent, the last decades have witnessed a series of new bills passed in the name of laïcité. However, the line between defending the principle and using it as a disguise for xenophobic resentment is thin (Hamel, 2002).

Today, the growing use of Twitter gives a new political arena to the debate on laïcité. Instead of just being presented in news reports, daily events are openly discussed in a way that allows individuals to share their own opinions and interpretations while adhering to their own definition of laïcité (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014). This discussion not only takes place within France but also on a global scale, where the strictness of French laïcité is compared to the more flexible secularism of Anglo-Saxon countries (Colosimo, 2017). Therefore, intercultural debates occur with a mutual misinterpretation of secularism: While common secularism grants individual religious rights, laïcité aims to foster mutual solidarity and equality among all French citizens. However, the digital debate on laïcité is today essentially concentrated on Islam and the place of Muslims in France (Jamal, 2021).

2.2 Media Coverage of Laïcité in France

Laïcité has witnessed different phases of media coverage. The principle started to be mediatised first in 1989, following the schoolgirls incident. For a decade, laïcité was mostly allocated to discussions between religious experts (Lochard & Soulages, 2015). However, the beginning of the 21st century marked a turn in media coverage due to the rise of the far-right in France and the September 11 attacks. The debate started to focus on what Fernando (2014) refers to as *nouvelle laïcité* ("new laïcité"), which represents the new turns taken by the principle since 1989, and its appropriation by extreme groups to define the place of French Muslims (ibid; Lochard & Soulages, 2015). Since then, laïcité has been brought into the media discourse after each event implicating Islam, alongside stereotyped representations and framed narratives (ibid). Among them, Mikulis (2020) addresses the recurring portrayal of Islam as the religion whose believers infringe laïcité the most. It can be argued that conversely, it is the very principle of laïcité that was developed in discord with the multiculturalism of contemporary France, setting laïcité as a standard framework which allows allegations and intolerance (Marchand & Marty, 2015). That is, corroborating hate speech and discrimination in the name of laïcité. The process of debating laïcité spread alongside the expansion and variegation of media platforms, in ways amplifying "the polarisation of positions, the dramatisation and the spectacularisation" (Guilbert, 2015, p. 151, translated by me).

Following this media logic, the early 2010s introduced the current phase of the debate, directed towards the reassessment of laïcité on traditional and digital media. Marchand and Marty (2015) argue that if the very notion of laïcité is similarly understood by different parties, there is a strong variation in its interpretation and coverage within the media scene in France, giving space to the negotiation and problematisation of the principle. News media commonly offer opinion columns on laïcité to rediscuss its borders and add different layers to the media discourse or sound out their readers about the topic. This gives it a controversial stance (Becqueret, 2015; Charaudeau, 2015; Fernandez, 2015): this problematisation implies that there is a necessity for a renewed and collective understanding and implementation of laïcité to be established, as it bears relevance to day-to-day issues (e.g., the place of Islam in France). On the side of digital media, the hashtag #laïcité on Twitter exceeds a dozen of daily tweets on its platform and demonstrates a strong engagement (Hamer, 2023). Indeed, a high amount of posts link to

external traditional media articles, feeding and debating the controversy (ibid). The notable evolution in the different cycles of media coverage and discourse on laïcité since the last century is the nature of the debate. Due to the substantial diversification and growth of digital media, the discussion isn't allocated to religious experts anymore, and anyone can add their interpretation to the media negotiation of laïcité. As Bowen (2007) puts it, the 21st century defined laïcité as one of the debated principles "that provide resources for arguments, not starting point of agreement" (p. 2)

2.3 Twitter

Twitter is the 2nd most popular social media, following Facebook. However, its structure differs widely. Unlike Facebook, Twitter doesn't function on the principle of "friends" and the privacy settings aren't as developed. Twitter has a flat structure: the only networking options are to follow and unfollow a user, and accounts can be public or private. The platform is a micro-blogging platform; therefore, the main function is for users to publish posts, called *tweets*. If an account is private, only those following it can see the posts. Alternatively, public accounts, which are of most interest to researchers, are "globally public by default" (Bruns, 2012, p. 1324), which is part of Twitter's branding. This indicates that the tweets of any public account are accessible for viewing by anyone, irrespective of their usage of Twitter, and regardless of whether they follow the account or not. Instead of focusing on a network, this platform focuses on popular topics that spark public debates. These very topics are usually gathered through the use of hashtags, *retweets*, and mentions. These features enable the establishment of the platform's structure and the organisation of information in a decentralised manner, without any central focus. They function as follows:

- Hashtags are thematic words following the symbol "#" (e.g., #laïcité). They are often tools in Twitter research to create a database (Bruns & Burgess, 2011; Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014). They are usually used for (1) wide reach, for news (e.g., #JeSuisCharlie) or to create a community (e.g., "MeToo"), to (2) add information on certain (political) topics (e.g., #laïcité), as (3) elements of discourse (e.g., #memes), or within narrower communities (e.g., #AcademicTwitter) (Bruns & Burgess, 2011; Hamer, 2023).
- Retweets are when users share others' (or their own) original tweets on their accounts. They may also choose to incorporate additional text or media in order

to express their own perspectives. Retweets often advocate for the original post, demonstrating a supportive standpoint (Indiana University Bloomington, 2018). They usually occur within communities and don't aim for polarised debate (ibid).

- Mentions are identifications of other existing user accounts within a tweet, following the symbol '@' (e.g., @account). Unlike retweets, mentions can create networks of dissimilar users from different communities and ideologies as they often identify polarised users (Indiana University Bloomington, 2018). Thus, they induce more debate on Twitter.

To this extent, hashtags and retweets are often used to show support for a particular viewpoint or to contribute to an ongoing discussion. Mentions, on the other hand, encourage more direct and argumentative communication, which is closer to the ideals of deliberative democracies. (Indiana University Bloomington, 2018; Smyrnaios & Ratinaud, 2017).

3. Literature Review

3.1 Twitter and Societal Issues

3.1.1 Twitter research

Twitter research has emerged since the launch of the social media in 2006 and can be divided into different sections. First, an increasing number of scientific works from various academic fields analyse the micro-blogging platform as an object of study for its characteristics and influence on "the real world". Posetti (2013), for example, examines the impact of Twitter on the field of journalism and the ways in which the ongoing digital media revolution is reshaping this industry.

Other research uses Twitter as a tool to retrieve data for the ease of access to, and the vast quantity of data and engagement on the platform (Bruns, 2012). To this extent, Twitter research may rather be considered as a cultural and social analysis through the lens of the Internet, which in turn "may be rethought as a source of data about society and culture" (Roger, 2009, p. 29, as cited in Bruns, 2012, p. 1329). Twitter to analyse society is popular

within media research. However, Bouvier (2020) recalls the fact that users might not act similarly on the platform and offline. If Twitter discourse easily inclines towards incivility, one may wonder if it hands out an unfaithful demonstration or, on the contrary, if this exacerbation draws a caricatural but true portrayal of society.

Simultaneously incorporating both abovementioned methodologies is a common standard of Twitter research. Yet, the sampling method and selection of filters to extract data from the micro-blogging platform are debated (Bruns, 2012), with some researchers filtering data by hashtags, keywords, shared languages, mentions or retweets. A reason for this dispute is the result obtained from these different filters. Undertaking discourse analysis with a hashtag on Twitter, such as #laïcité, enables one to map a discourse with a synchronic approach, namely, to understand discourse at a precise moment in time. But Bruns (2012) argues that incorporating the study of interactions (replies, retweets and mentions) adds another layer to the research, digging more deeply into network studies. Academia turns towards Twitter to examine the platform and uses it as a tool, yet the social network experiences a faster evolution than the different research fields (Bruns, 2012). Therefore, it is a timely area of study, but it can rapidly be outdated too (e.g., research studying the 140-character limit of Twitter, which changed to 280 in 2017 and in 2023, to 4,000 characters for subscribers in the US only).

3.1.2 The Internet and controversies

Controversies as "a polarised confrontation of standpoints" (Charaudeau, 2015, p. 15, as cited in Guilbert, 2015, p. 150) occupy a large space in the political arena of Twitter. This fact can be explained by the ease of producing outspread content linked with the anonymity provided by social networks (Bouvier, 2020). Twitter witnesses increased engagement in political news, which is widely shared and whose accessibility is heavily influenced by the algorithmic structure of the media (Maireder & Schwarzenegger, 2012). However, Anduiza et al. (2009, as cited in Maireder & Schwarzenegger, 2012) point out the slight agential role given to individuals as they still have to initiate this access to content. Interestingly, despite this increased political participation on the Internet, Western democracies witness today a drop in "offline" political participation, which questions the legitimacy of these online debates (Grönvall, 2015). Smyrnaios and

Ratinaud (2017) add that "political controversies that occur online and worldwide are far from presenting the characteristics of a normative public space" (p. 2)

Still, Twitter is nowadays actively used to discuss political and societal issues, and the social media is popular for its ability to initiate debates with actors from various stances (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014; Smyrnaios & Ratinaud, 2017). In particular, social controversies are largely debated on the platform, giving voice to conflicting parties (ibid). On the one hand, this shift in media power allows a "democratization" of social issues and "social justice" (Bouvier, 2020, p. 2), giving voice to minorities targeted by elitist ideologies and bypassing a traditional media authority. On the other hand, the actors spreading these very ideologies find their place on social media, too, alongside other groups using Twitter to spread harmful discourses and misinformation, which constitute serious threats to democracies (Bouvier, 2020; Ekström et al., 2020). These last months have particularly questioned Twitter's role in society with its structural revamp (e.g., being able to "buy" longer character limits; or geographical discrimination, which both affect freedom of speech).

3.1.3 Twitter's features

Twitter's communication model and agenda-setting presumably differ from that of the traditional media. First, access to information and the news doesn't follow the established two-step flow theory, advocating a transmission of content from mass media to receiver – or from the media to influential individuals, whom themselves filter and retransmit the content (Hodkinson, 2017b, p. 294). Instead, Twitter's communication model is based on discussions and personalisation of the news, with a filtration of content allowing users to retrieve only their own news of interest (Bouvier, 2020; Bruns & Burgess, 2011). Moreover, this model exclusively links users to channels that share their perspectives and beliefs. As a result, online communities with similar ideologies are formed, leading to news separatism. But it also confines individuals in a homogenous information landscape with sometimes too few challenging views. The risk of such a news ecology is to prevent a broader flow of information, leading to extreme discourse and harming democracies (Indiana University Bloomington, 2018).

The agenda-setting of Twitter is set by the news value scheme of the platform. The traditional 12 news values set by Galtung and Ruge (1965, as cited in Harcup & O'Neill, 2001) served as the framework for further research and included the following: "Frequency; Threshold; Unambiguity; Meaningfulness; Consonance; Unexpectedness; Continuity; Reference to elite nations; Reference to elite people; Reference to persons; Reference to something negative" (pp. 262-264). If these values were adapted to mass media communication flows, their present-day relevance is debated, notably by the recent study of Harcup and O'Neill (2017), who assert that expanded research on the impact of social media on news channels' values is required. Moreover, the authors show that news values have clearly evolved in the contemporary digital era, with their updated set of news values: "Exclusivity; Bad news; Conflict; Surprise; Audio-visuals; Shareability; Entertainment; Drama; Follow-up; The power elite; Relevance; Magnitude; Celebrity; Good news; News organisation's agenda" (Harcup & O'Neill, 2017, p. 1482). Maireder and Ausserhofer (2014) suggest that fastidious established topics are dedicated to mass media coverage but unpopular on Twitter – taking the example of the financial crisis. However, ephemeral issues (such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks of 2015) are highly discussed in both digital and traditional media. Then, some news is customised, namely, absent from mainstream media and discussed only within communities on Twitter.

In addition to these attributes of accessibility and agenda, Twitter is characterised by its algorithm – whose recommendation scheme was recently published open-sourced in March 2023. Twitter's algorithm, its secrecy and its impact on democracies and controversies is a long-studied matter (Huszár et al., 2022; Matamoros-Fernández, 2017; Weller et al., 2013). Algorithms define and rank content on a user's feed according to the logic of personalisation and recommendation. However, Huszár et al. (2022) found that algorithms also comply with news values proper to Twitter. In fact, their findings observe that the platform ranks societal contents according to their political groups, increasing the visibility of certain ideologies and thus influencing political discourse. Huszár et al. (2022, p. 3) demonstrated that out of the seven countries of their study – Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Spain, and the United States – only Germany didn't present a stronger amplification of right-wing and conservative content on Twitter, suggesting an algorithm in line with Twitter's culture. Beyond this algorithm, access to the news and, to a larger extent, public discourse is also defined by Twitter's terms and guidelines. Social networks have a say on the organisation and display of the content,

financial capitalisation, and guidelines of what can and can't be posted, which varies accordingly and depend on the societal values and culture of the platform while influencing discourses (Matamoros-Fernández, 2017).

Therefore, these arguments contradict the narrative of social media as a platform for freedom of speech and democratisation of the news. If their structure allows more debate and discussions than a two-fold communication model, the invisible structure of Twitter follows a similar concept of framing and selection of the news as traditional media.

3.1.4 Public conversations on Twitter

Online controversies present dissimilar characteristics to offline ones (Smyrnaios & Ratinaud, 2017). To this extent, there are multiple steps to the reporting of political news on Twitter:

- Political news is first selected, in a logic of agenda setting (Bruns & Burgess, 2011);
- The process of framing often intervenes soon after the selection, or is already employed with the use of "pre-framed media objects to integrate them into the current discourses" (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014, p. 6);
- Following the selection and framing of controversies, media contents' characteristics are discussed: their impact on society and culture, and their development (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014); their ability to be debated by polarised ideas – notably with the use of the same hashtags (Bruns, 2012); and, accordingly, discussions on the legitimacy of the targeted group or persons (Bouvier, 2020);
- The matters are then completed with opinions and interpretations of users (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014). This aspect varies much from the aimed objectivity of traditional media, with the personalisation and active social negotiation of the news and its meaning (e.g., the negotiation of the boundaries of laïcité);
- Finally, the handling of controversies on Twitter creates an interconnected network as the news contents are usually associated with other discourses, connecting elements to other narratives. On the one hand, Maireder and

> Ausserhofer (2014) assert that this connection to issues renders Twitter's political conversations wider and richer. However, one can argue that these associations favour the triggering of amalgams and speculations.

News reporting and controversies on social media present aspects of humanisation of the news, namely, inserting affect, standpoints, opinions and subjectivity to the news. This diverges from the aimed objectivity of traditional media. For example, on Twitter, news integrates emotions which bias content (Bouvier, 2020; Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014). This very humanisation is fed by discussions around social issues and initiates communities with common ideas. Information is also relayed through the use of humour (e.g., jokes, memes) (ibid). Besides the humanisation of the news, human interactions on Twitter contrast with the offline public sphere. Users present different behavioural aspects on the platform. In the realm of online debates, it is not uncommon for individuals to employ illogical reasoning and arguments on Twitter that would be deemed inappropriate in face-to-face public discussions (Bouvier, 2020). Ott (2017, as cited in Bouvier, 2020) implicates the "ephemeral nature of tweeting" (p. 2), returning to the former argument of facilitated and quickened access to information and publication on social networks – without any form of peer review or fact checking that newspaper usually benefit from. One can also associate the current 280-word limit with a lack of development of explanations. It is unfortunately a common occurrence to encounter disrespectful language and instances of hate speech on social media platforms, particularly on Twitter. This can be attributed to the platform's ephemeral and anonymous natures, which can often influence the behaviour of its users (Bouvier, 2020).

The use of Twitter by political-oriented individuals is a common, even growing practice in Western societies (Frame & Brachotte, 2015). The utilisation of Twitter varies depending on geographical location. In contrast with Anglo-Saxon countries, French politicians do not commonly utilise Twitter to share personal information (ibid). This is due to a more distinct separation between private and political affairs in French culture (ibid). On the other hand, due to the international amplification of right-wing ideologies on the platform (Huszár et al., 2022), Twitter is widely known for being used by far-right extremes as a bullhorn, notably to share xenophobic and intolerant discourses (Bouvier, 2020).

3.1.5 Network-oriented use of Twitter

Twitter overflows with features proper to its platform. Among them, hashtags are particularly appreciated in academia for the networks created by their common use, highly conducive to research (Bruns & Burgess, 2011; Giglietto & Lee, 2015). Tweets using a common hashtag are gathered, thus providing access and structure to discourses and shaping debates on the platform (Bruns, 2012; Maireder & Schwarzenegger, 2012). This flow of information can be alimented by any user, which creates respective conversations on controversies, and a multitude of perspectives on a matter. Therefore, following a hashtag doesn't prevent misinformation, but it can contradict the abovementioned argument of separatism within think-alike communities.

Hashtags can lead to long-established communities and discourses using the tool to converse (Bruns & Burgess, 2011). Yet, controversial and political discourses gathered in hashtags usually refer to mass media news and ongoing events, notably with the use of external sources (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014). Indeed Giglietto and Lee (2015) assert that if daily conversational posts are often original, urgent controversial posts usually include links connecting to news websites. Maireder (2011, as cited in Maireder & Schwarzenegger, 2012) and Matamoros-Fernández (2017) raise this network specificity by defining Twitter as a well-established point of departure serving as a database for external sources. Among these sources, a large share refers to news media websites, followed by other social networks (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014). Therefore, Twitter relies strongly on a "*produsage*" behaviour (produce and use, coined by Bruns, 2011, p. 121) to sustain such a media ecology.

3.2 Mediatisation of Secularism and Religion

3.2.1 Media and beliefs

Mediatisation is a core concept in the study of media and beliefs (Hjarvard, 2008, 2011). Hepp et al. (2015) define the term as the interplay between media and other societal fields and as the changes occurring at this intertwinement. Therefore, the media aren't the sole agents of social change as they are themselves influenced by society. However, it is this

joint process that provides broad changes in culture and social institutions (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Hepp et al., 2015). If the mediatisation of religion is widely studied, there is a lack of literature on media and secularism (Taira, 2022).

Taira (2022) mentions secularism in his work as a "belief system that is not religious in orientation" (p. 2), which can also be adopted by religious individuals provided they support the clear boundaries of politics and religions. The turn of the 21st century witnessed a growing coexistence of religious and secular media, which were sharply segregated before (Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003). This conjunction goes along with the expanding diversity of religions and secularisms within societies and digital spaces (Wessler et al., 2015). The mediatisation of belief systems gives place to digital environments dedicated to the practice of secularism and religion (ibid), which Stout and Buddenbaum (2003) consider as a shift from a physical to a mediated space.

Mansbridge et al. (2012, as cited in Wessler et al., 2015) regard digital media as the contemporary connection between individuals and the deliberative system of their society – that is, the process of creating knowledge on social issues and democratising decision-making. On the creation of knowledge, Taira (2022) adds that secularist digital spaces are a place for discussion which brings about awareness of this belief system – relating to the negotiation of the definition of, or production of knowledge on laïcité on Twitter mentioned earlier. On the other hand, de Charentenay (2006) contradicts the deliberative role of the media and asserts that mediatisation obstructs democratic debate because of the emotionalisation of public issues. Interestingly, the author mentions issues which were addressed about news on social media (chapter 3.1.4) – that is, that affect in mediatic affairs promotes extreme discourses and the ephemeral nature of Twitter leads to the production of contradictive arguments, following illogical reasonings. On laïcité, de Charentenay (2006) argues that "the media are upsetting the boundaries so laboriously established between private and public, between personal and collective, between religion and politics" (p. 438, translated by me). These very boundaries are subject to multiple studies. Mediatisation is viewed as a challenge for religious groups as the shift from the private to the public sphere implies public debates on confidential matters, renegotiation of religious authority, and a spread of external comments and judgements on one's private belief, contradictive with the presumed personal nature of faith (Hjarvard, 2011; Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003). Moreover, as "conflict" and "surprise" are among Harcup and

O'Neill's updated 15 news values (2017, p. 1482), mediatised religious matters are often controversial, thus provoking strong emotion (de Charentenay, 2006).

Hjarvard (2008) adopts a more neutral standpoint, claiming that the mediatisation of religion can erode belief systems, for example by providing unlimited secular sources sharing information about religions and promoting atheism (ibid; Taira, 2022). But on the contrary, it can also enhance religious authority with the use of symbols in different media types, or by creating an accessible, digital religious space. Regarding laïcité and secularism in general, which can be considered more abstract (de Charentenay, 2006; Taira, 2022), the interplay is narrow: as a free concept of multiple types, secularism is constantly redefined and reinterpreted on media platforms. Campbell (2013, p. 3, as cited in Taira, 2022) asserts that "digital culture negotiates our understandings of religious practice" which meets this argument of recurring negotiation of laïcité's borders.

3.2.2 Media framing and representation of Muslims

Media representations characterise the process of the portrayal of groups, individuals or events on different media platforms and news channels (Hodkinson, 2017d; Stamps, 2020). They define the construction of meaning (and to some extent, knowledge) with semiotics, language and visuals (Hall, 1997). Rather than creating a counterfeit reality, representations root in aspects of reality to produce subjective meaning. Because mass and digital media constitute an important window to the unknown for its viewers, representations will often be the only encounter of an audience with certain social groups – thus it defines the opinion of the public on given matters (Stamps, 2020). Hodkinson (2017d) mentions two types of problematic representations of minorities: under-representations, defining a small share of representation of minorities in media content but also in media management, and stereotypical representations. The latter induce depicting a narrow and prejudicial portrait of social groups, and academic research has demonstrated that it often targets minority groups, notably with the aim to define their place and worth in hegemonic societies (Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2019).

Within targeted minorities, stereotyped media representations create a hierarchisation between different communities, based on the portrayal of each group. This induces a social hierarchisation of communities, comparisons, competition between communities

and separatism (Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2019; Stamps, 2020). Intersectional hierarchisation also occurs within groups (Stamps, 2020), for example, Muslim women are particularly under-represented in the media, or they are hindered by strongly stereotyped representations (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017).

In the case of media representations of Muslims, the concepts of framing and association will be addressed first. Framing occurs when certain details in the news are emphasized or absent, which alters the interpretation of the audience (Hodkinson, 2017a). Islam has long experienced the framing of the hijab, very popular in the French political discourse, as an oppressive marker of submission and inferiority (Hamel, 2002). Moreover, the recurring association of Islam and hijabs renders the object a representative symbol of Islam in the media (ibid). Studies concentrating on mass media also found that the Muslim community is systematically associated with violence, extremism and terrorism (Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2019). Media representations employ contextual symbols according to the national aspect: for example in France, the discourse on Islam is often associated with the violation of laïcité, pejoratively linking both words in the public opinion (Mikulis, 2020).

The concept of essentialism is crucial in the media representations of French Muslims. That is, making narrow generalisations to tackle "Muslims" as one "homogenous group sharing the same beliefs and attitudes towards France" (Ait Abdeslam, 2019, p. 574) – in this case, an attitude inadequate to observe laïcité. This deprives individuals of their identity and gathers them within their faith, further described by Said (1997, as cited in Baker et al., 2013, p. 123) as an "unacceptable generalization of the most irresponsible sort, [which] could never be used for any other religious, cultural, or demographic group on earth". The research of Ait Abdeslam (2019) adds that among the main adjectives of the words "Islam" and "*Musulman"* (Muslim) in the news, are found respectively "radical" and "*responsable*" (responsible). First, this furthers the stereotypical associations mentioned above, but it also shows that the media consider Muslims as one uniform group represented by a few individuals.

The impacts of such representations are both societal and reciprocal. First, they define public opinion and emotions toward minorities and increase prejudicial attitudes towards them and discrimination (Hodkinson, 2017c; Parrott et al., 2019; Saleem &

Ramasubramanian, 2019). For example, Ahmed and Matthes (2017) linked pejorative media representation of Muslims in the United States in early the 2000s with a rising Islamophobia, which wasn't prominent in Europe at that time. But in the longer term, media representations and their variants – associations, framing etc. – induce discourses and public policies that hinder the rights of minorities (e.g., the bill on religious signs in France) (Hamel, 2002; Hodkinson, 2017c; Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2019). The reciprocal effects, that is, the effects of representations on the targeted community (Valkenburg et al., 2016), are more seldomly studied (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017). Stereotypical representations affect the social identity of individuals and their self-esteem, leading to a potential behavioural change to fit social norms (Hodkinson, 2017c; Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2019).

Representations of minorities define their place in society in a context of power, to preserve a hegemonic ideology (Stamps, 2020). As "white publics" (Stamps, 2020, p. 122; Van Dijk, 1995, p. 9) are dominant in Western mass media, the focus on representation is on these specific audiences, with coverage dedicated to their interest (ibid). Stereotyped representations lead to subordination, normalising roles depicted in the media (Hodkinson, 2017d).

4. Theoretical Framework

4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

The theory of Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is crucial in analysing the findings of my initial research question. CDA is an analytical practice that researches how social and political discourses conceal rhetoric of dominance, ideologies and hegemony (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). More than a sole method, it is a cross-discipline process which can be used in various contexts and research types – e.g., multimodal discourse analysis, linguistics, ethnography and more (Van Dijk, 2001). To this extent, although many types of CDA exist, the background aim stays very similar. Fairclough and Wodak (1997, as cited in Van Dijk, 2001) allot to CDA and discourse the following characteristics:

- "CDA addresses social problems,

- Power relations are discursive,
- Discourse constitutes society and culture,
- Discourse does ideological work,
- Discourse is historical,
- The link between text and society is mediated,
- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory,
- Discourse is a form of social action." (p.2)

These attributes are what constitute the relevance of CDA.

4.1.1 CDA in the context of hegemony

The CDA approach of Van Dijk (1986, 1995, 2001, 2006) will serve as the framework for this thesis. Indeed, the author analyses micro-, meso- and macro-levels of a discourse with a focus on ideologies (Van Dijk, 2006) and the prevalence of "elite discourse and the reproduction of racism" (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 1) through these layers. In the context of my thesis, this aspect will be adapted to the discourse of hegemonic groups in their intention to define the place of French Muslims with the argument of laïcité. Discourse on laïcité can induce a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, thus generating Islamophobia rather than racism (UN, 2023).

The CDA approaches of Van Dijk (1995, 2006) and first include a micro-level, or descriptive level, which is focused on the content's linguistic and textual context. It should place the author of the discourse within a social group carrying ideology. Textual analysis of elite discourse includes:

- Pronouns,
- Verbs: e.g., active/passive,
- Use of emojis or other typographical symbols,
- Figures of speech: e.g., comparisons and sarcasm to convey meaning,
- Structure: e.g., the format and the place of each piece of information within a text, which relies on the importance of the information,
- Argumentation: claim, conclusion and evidence
- And, when relevant, the social or political group of the writer, if given in their account description.

The second level, called socio-cognitive, interpretative and meso-level, occurs when an entity (in this case, Islam) challenges an elite cultural aspect (e.g., cultural beliefs) (Van Dijk, 1995). CDA should analyse:

- Semantics and lexicon: e.g., the use of certain terms rather than others or connotations linked to words and modifiers,
- Framing and generalisations: e.g., amalgams or using essentialism to speak about a group,
- Positioning: e.g., how hegemonic groups represent themselves and their role (often positively) and the "other" (often negatively),
- Recurring parallelism of "us" and "them", in multiple contexts
- Disclaimers: softening the argument with previous mentions, such as emphasising one group's tolerance, followed by a counterargument.

Finally, the sociocultural analysis or macro-level gives a clear view of the positioning and ideologies passed through discourse (Van Dijk, 1995). This level attempts to unravel the discourses surrounding laïcité in this context based on the findings of the first two levels.

4.1.2 Multi-modal discourse analysis

If these models of CDA are highly relevant to this research, it is crucial to incorporate multi-modal discourse analysis too. According to Van Dijk (1995), the media is easily accessible to those in power, which leads to a concentration on the opinions and perspectives of the elite. However, social media has overturned this notion, notably with the change in the communication model from a two-step flow theory (as above mentioned, in chapter 3.1.3) to an interactive model, thus requiring new methods of analysis (Bouvier & Machin, 2018). Van Dijk (1995) asserts that minorities are less quoted and under-represented in the media. Arguably, the amplification of conservative discourse on Twitter aligns with that of traditional media. Yet, one cannot rely solely on this algorithmic assumption. To this extent, I consider my research multi-modal, as I hope to analyse discourse in the context of its media (here, Twitter).

Moreover, in the digital era, consideration has to be given to visuals, as they are sometimes the main content of the data. To analyse visuals, I follow Collins' (2018)

guidelines on visuals for discourse analysis. That is, considering the following three levels: (1) image content and display, (2) their historical and political context, and (3) their aim and use in the short or long term.

4.2 Twitterisation of Laïcité

Critical discourse analysis on social media brings another dimension to traditional CDA as the content is distributed differently, with the democratisation of information (Bouvier, 2020). To this extent, a study on the medium aspect of Twitter is central to this research, hence my investigation on the mediatisation of laïcité on the platform.

Posetti (2013) employs the term "twitterisation" to define the changes engendered by the characteristics of Twitter (audience, participation and practices) in a field, in this case, journalism. In the context of my research, I use the scope of twitterisation similarly, as the platform's influence on the discourse on laïcité. Therefore, the features of Twitter studied in the literature review (see chapter 3.1.3) must be included in the analysis as follow:

- Algorithmic preferences (Top Tweets)
- Hashtags
- Mentions
- Selection and pre-framed media
- External links
- Interpretation and negotiation of knowledge

The framework of twitterisation guides the unravelling of the second research question of this thesis. Aligned with CDA, it aims to understand the patterns of Twitter-mediatisation of laïcité with a hegemonic purpose.

5. Methodology

5.1 Research Approach and Paradigm

This thesis is articulated around the following research questions:

- What is the discourse on Twitter's hashtag #laïcité with regard to Islam in France, and how does it differ synchronically according to the news?
- How is laïcité "twitterised", and to what extent do Twitter's features amplify hate discourse toward French Muslims in the name of laïcité?

I base my research on an epistemological framework that relates to how knowledge is produced and obtained (Blaikie & Priest, 2019). This study explores how people express laïcité and construct meaning around this principle. The first research question follows an interpretivism approach with a constructionist epistemology. The study uses inductive logic to create qualitative knowledge from general data. The focus is on how individuals construct meaning around a social issue, creating an internal social reality rather than a shared reality (Blaikie & Priest, 2019).

I am approaching my second research question using critical realism, specifically neo-realism (Blaikie & Priest, 2019), by considering the rhetorical structures and hegemonic context (Van Dijk, 1995), alongside the structures of Twitter as a medium.

5.2 Method

For my research on the discourse surrounding laïcité and Islam in France, I have opted to apply a multimodal discourse analysis approach within the interpretivism paradigm. Critical discourse analysis methodology seems particularly fitting for this study as it allows for the examination of various layers of content (Collins, 2018), including the use of symbols and discourse to represent French Muslims within the Republic. This approach also facilitates the exploration of knowledge production and the construction of meaning surrounding cultural values. The methodology of this thesis could be classified as a multimodal discourse analysis because beyond discourse analysis, I considered the characteristics of Twitter influencing my data and identified patterns across topics and themes in both quantitative and qualitative forms. Moreover, I included the visual methods of Collins (2018) to analyse the Tweet visuals. The data (tweets) was analysed following this analytical process:

- Micro-level (as mentioned in the Theoretical Framework, integrating visual description),
- Meso-level (as mentioned in the Theoretical Framework, integrating visual analysis)
- Macro-level (as mentioned in the Theoretical Framework) integrated in the Concluding Discussions of this thesis

Each level also included the analysis of the Twitterisation (as explained in the second chapter of the Theoretical Framework) of the discourse on laïcité.

5.3 Sample

The sample of this research is centred on an analysis of public Twitter posts that hold the hashtag #laïcité, focusing on France and Islam. I solely analysed the tweets that contained the designated hashtag, #laïcité. Replies to each tweet weren't examined unless they held the hashtag too. The original posts of each retweet were inspected for context but weren't added to the 131 data set. To explore the differences in the discourse on the hashtag #laïcité on Twitter with regard to Islam in France according to the news, I selected data synchronically:

- Debates surrounding sensitive topics tend to intensify in the aftermath of significant events, such as the tragic 2015 attacks in Paris. (Kelly, 2020). For this reason, I included a sample of tweets posted in the week following the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks (8th – 14th of January 2015).
- The principle of laïcité has been a subject of continual discussion in France, particularly among political factions. For my second dataset, I gathered tweets over a one-week period that were not related to any ephemeral events or specific news. The data set covers the period from the 26th of March to the 1st of April 2023. This time frame was determined based on the start of my research.
- Finally, the third dataset of this research was determined to tackle the Twitterisation aspect. I conducted an examination of the "Top Tweets" as of the 4th of May 2023 using the same filtering process as above. The Top Tweets are the tweets demonstrating the most engagement and algorithmic amplification, which are located in the "Top" section of Twitter.

All the tweets were retrieved manually and analysed with the help of the tool NVivo to encode them. Numerous daily posts related to laïcité are available, presenting ample data for a potential quantitative study. However, based on Layder's (2013) recommendation, I opted for a small-scale qualitative approach. By conducting a pilot study, I was able to identify a suitable sample size that aligned with the available resources and time constraints. This preliminary study enabled me to refine my research concepts and methods and ensure their suitability for the subsequent research endeavour (Collins, 2018).

To conduct this research, I initiated a Twitter search on the hashtag #laïcité on Twitter within the designated time frames. Initially, I planned to include the keyword "Islam" in the Twitter search bar to limit the search results. However, my preliminary investigation revealed that some tweets (mainly posted by intolerant groups) implicitly refer to French Muslims as "them" or "some" in a dominant rhetorical structure of elite discourse (Van Dijk, 1986). Therefore, I only used the hashtag #laïcité for my research and manually filtered the results to include posts related to France and Islam, as the context of my study. If any uncertainty about the context occurred (such as when French Muslims are referred to as "them"), I reviewed the entire Twitter thread.

6. Ethics

6.1 Ethical concerns

The data collected in this study is publicly available, as it originates from public accounts only. Upon the creation of a Twitter account, users are notified that any public posts they make on the platform are accessible to all audiences, regardless of whether or not they are registered with the service. Numerous academic studies have been conducted regarding the utilisation of anonymised Twitter accounts: Webb et al. (2017, p. 346) contend that if exposing one's Twitter handle could prove detrimental to the individual, anonymising the account would be inconsequential since users can search for posts utilising keywords and other relevant information. Additionally, anonymisation is considered a violation of Twitter's User Development policy. Therefore, it is imperative

to comply with the standard of citing handles, as outlined by Twitter's Terms of Service, that notify users of researchers' authorisations.

6.2 Positioning

I acknowledge that to guarantee impartiality in this research, as outlined by Collins (2018), the data should be presented without any personal bias. The analytical process of Van Dijk's critical discourse analysis employed can help to uphold the objectivity of the study. However, despite my aim to remain impartial, “a researcher cannot be neutral, or objective, or detached, from the knowledge and evidence they are generating. Instead, they should seek to understand their role in that process” (Mason, 2002, as cited in Blaikie & Priest, 2019, p. 61). In the past, I have observed that French Muslims have been subjected to hate speech on digital media, with some individuals using laïcité to corroborate such discourses. These individuals, often self-proclaimed "patriots" and nationalists, manipulate the principle to promote intolerant and elite discourses. My positioning vis-à-vis this issue is as follows. Laïcité, to me, denotes the division of religion and government and the liberty to practice any faith. It also signifies the autonomy to live and express oneself without any religious influence, as well as a stringent demarcation between politics and religion. This concept is of utmost importance in France, yet unfortunately, it is often used to discriminate against specific religions during political discourse. The law on laïcité is somewhat ambiguous, as it permits religious freedom as long as it does not disrupt public order. However, there is a lack of clear definition regarding what constitutes disturbance, which can result in instances of intolerance. I position this research as an aim to understand how laïcité is monopolised and what knowledge about it is constructed in certain Twitter conversations, with or without the context of significant events altering the discourse.

6.3 Limitations

Given the quantity and quality of data retrieved (e.g., not examining the replies of tweets that do not hold the hashtag #laïcité), the main limitation of this thesis is the lack of generalisation that can be made of this research. If it can attempt to find a discursive pattern, notably for the Top Tweets section and their algorithmic content, the analysis is limited to specific moments in time. Another limitation that can occur is the lack of clarity

in certain arguments, amplified by the ephemeral nature of tweeting, as addressed by Bouvier and Machin (2018). In these cases, the intended sentiment of the original tweet writer might be misunderstood. When such a situation occurred in retweets and replies, I examined the context of the original thread and considered any relevant media or links attached to it. Finally, each tweet is translated from French to English: Like every language, French has words and expressions that are very specific to its culture. Therefore, some terms are sometimes impossible to ultimately translate (e.g., laïcité), but in the data collected, their most appropriate translation are used.

7. Findings

7.1 Initial Qualitative Findings

The total data gathered constituting my findings, including the hashtag #laïcité and referring to Islam, attributes or persons affiliated with the religion in France, amounts to 131 tweets. Among these:

- 32 tweets were collected for the period 26 March – 1 April 2023,
- 72 tweets were collected for the period 8 – 14 January 2015,
- 25 tweets were collected on the 4th of May 2023 within the "Top Tweets" section.

The first observable conclusion is that the period following the Charlie Hebdo attacks initiated a higher engagement. This corroborates the findings of Maireder and Ausserhofer (2014) and Kelly (2020) that ephemeral issues trigger substantial attention notably, when applicable, on targeted communities. The characteristics of the tweets also differ according to the period and algorithm. The tweets from January 2015 demonstrated many original tweets, whereas most data gathered in the 26 March – 1 April 2023 period were replies (see Figure 1). In terms of proportion, the Top Tweets section presents the largest share of retweets, as the tweets display more interaction. The two following reasons can explain the fact that tweets succeeding the Charlie Hebdo attacks were mainly original tweets. First, the retweet function in January 2015 consisted only of sharing a tweet on one's account. The feature of adding media or text to a retweet was launched in

April 2015, and I didn't gather data without the hashtag #laïcité incorporated into the tweet. Nevertheless, also, the findings show that most users used the circumstances to redefine their notion of laïcité, alongside showing their support and respect to the Charlie Hebdo team, rather than initiating debates on controversies such as the two other periods in March-April and May 2023. Therefore, within the 66 original tweets in January 2015, only 2 were quotes from other tweets.

***Figure 1**: Proportion of tweets within the three data sets. 100% refers to the total amount of tweet of each category.*



The components of the posts vary according to the posting period, namely, the mentions (@name of account), external links, and visuals (see Figure 2). Two distinct forms of visuals are noticeable: visual support of the news (e.g., extract of a news broadcast, infographics with statistics) and other media (e.g., memes). The latter proved to be rather unpopular in the context of #laïcité on Twitter, especially concerning the Charlie Hebdo attacks. However, visual supports of the news were highly used. They were notably present in 13 of the 25 Top Tweets selected in May 2024. The explanation might root in Twitter's algorithm, which amplifies (right-wing) political content (Huszár et al., 2022). The findings show that these publications are often initiated by politicians, who tend to share extracts of their television appearances or statistics to support their points. The findings of Giglietto and Lee (2015) stating that tweets following ephemeral events are prone to include more links to external sites are observable in this study, with 19 links within 72 tweets in the data of January 2015.

Figure 2: Share of mentions, links, and visuals in %. 100% refers to the total amount of tweet of each category.



The noticeable sentiments towards laïcité in the 131 tweets were generally similar. A slightly higher engagement about defining and "protecting" the principle was found after the Charlie Hebdo attacks (see part 7.2.2), whereas some tweets of 2023 criticised laïcité in the name of other religions, such as Christianity. Interestingly, the focus on Islam is more salient in 2023, whilst the 2015 tweets were essentially directed to laïcité. The word cloud in Figure 3 draws an idea of the sentiments on laïcité about Islam in all periods combined and an insight into the discourse analysis of the findings.

***Figure 3**: Word cloud of #laïcité regarding Islam in France, all tweets combined, translated to English.*

7.2 Micro Level of Analysis

7.2.1 Social or political group of the tweet writers

Interestingly, those who posted tweets in 2023, hereafter referred to as writers, had different and more public political affiliations than those who tweeted about laïcité in 2015.[1] In the Top Tweets section of May 2023, 40% are politically affiliated. Strikingly, but joining Huszár et al.'s (2022, p. 3) findings, 32% of Top Tweets writers are openly related to far-right and conservative groups: namely, French far-right political parties (*Reconquête, Rassemblement National*) and media (e.g., *CNews*, *Radio Courtoisie*). The remaining 8% belong to a government-owned account and the centre-left and social-democratic party *Parti Socialiste.* Furthermore, the contents of the tweets reflect the writers' affiliation ideologies. Far-right tweet writers share alarmist tweets denouncing a lack of harmony between laïcité and Islam (e.g., Tweet 37), whereas the centre-left tweet

[1] Are considered writers, the writers of each original tweet and of each tweet which was shared within a retweet

adopt a tolerate stance (Tweet 34**).** On the other hand, the government tweet is purely factual and does not take a stance.

Tweet 37[2]

#Islam #France #Laicite #immigration "Laïcité, ultimately, if you change the People, well, Laïcité collapses in front of you the next morning". 🎙 Mathieu Bock-Side analysis about Eid everywhere, students nowhere! Extract #FaceALinfo ⤵

Tweet 34

“Fighting discrimination against Muslims is not about questioning #laïcité […] or re-establishing a crime of blasphemy. It is an objective that stems from the laws of the Republic, the need to make society & the necessary harmony.”

Only 37,5% of writers are politically affiliated in the March – April 2023 selection. The period counts 25% of far-right affiliated groups (e.g., *Union des patriotes*, Reconquête, Sud Radio) and 3.1% of groups considered conspiratorial. The remaining 9.4% vary between moderate right-wing, left-wing and presidential-majority groups. Finally, the writers of tweets following the Charlie Hebdo attacks are generally not politically affiliated, with a substantial variation of parties or oriented media when they are.

Beyond the public affiliation of writers, their self-description is often given and is representative of the sentiments in their tweets. First, recurring textual references to national sentiments are found: “Corsair, Patriot. For France, the French and science.”; “patriot”; “Zionist 💯 & Union of Patriots 13 גולני #TeamOM #TeamPatriots”. Besides, self-descriptive emojis and symbols are employed, such as demonstrated in the following quote parts:

- “FR ✝” or “ن”.
- “CP 🌿”

[2] Each tweet was translated into English.

- “🧠 🧠 🧠 FR RU NL”

The letter ن is the nuun, an Arabic alphabet letter representing Eastern Christians. In 2014 it started to be added to social media accounts in solidarity with persecuted Christians in Iraq. However, the display of the letter ن on user profiles is today discussed because of its appropriation by far-right groups (Ayoub, 2022). This alludes to cultural Christian France. The olive branch is a French national emblem and the logo of far-right leader Eric Zemmour, from the party Reconquête (literally, reconquest, winning back). Finally, the brains represent knowledge. References to knowledge detention are often found in tweets redefining laïcité taking a form of evidentiality inducing that the tweet writers have a knowledge that “the others” don’t have (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 125).

Other self-representations use the lexicon of conflict and invasion, as expressed in the quotes as follows:

- “Whistle-blower, defence of values.”
- “Man of masculine gender worried about the "*bledisation*" of France. #Consumer”
- “I vomit Islamo-leftism and neo-feminism”

“Bledisation” refers to the word *bled*, which represents rural areas of North Africa. And regarding the last quote, offensive claims are often found in the context of digital media (Bouvier & Machin, 2018), alongside compartmentalising entities as such.

Finally, self-descriptions are also employed by users to make claims:

- “YES to the Europe of Nations! NO to EU enlargement! NO to wokism!”
- “Wanting to preserve French civilisation, its roots, its history and its way of life is neither racist nor xenophobic FR”
- “Islamophobia is not a crime.”

These claims can act as a justification for the somewhat offensive tweets initiated by users, validating discrimination in the name of values such as laïcité. Moreover, the abovementioned “way of life” and “civilisation” often refer to traditional, conservative ideologies rather than modern, progressist, and multicultural ones.

These claims and self-representations are sometimes accompanied by revealing profile pictures. First, the “Shush symbol”, depicting a finger in front of the mouth, is frequent in the March – April 2023 writers.

***Figure 4**: Profile pictures of the writers of tweets 2, 8, and 18.*

Second, some profile pictures of regular Twitter users depict well-known people, which can give indications about the writers' sentiments and political affiliations.

***Figure 5**: Profile pictures depicting Eric Zemmour, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Elon Musk.*

7.2.2 Verbs

In the selection of data gathered, the verbs used to discuss laïcité are linked to safeguarding (see Tweet 88 and Tweet 27, underlined). Using such verbs in this discourse indicates that there is something to protect as if a threat was hanging on laïcité. Another remark about this selection is the use of verbs to induce claims about actions to take as an incentive to take new measures, such as "we must", "we will need", and "resist". On the other hand, the verbs used to mention headscarves – and, to a broader extent, Islam – also refer to the vocabulary of safeguarding, but with another dimension: writers accuse people and entities of "serving" and "defending" the headscarf rather than laïcité.

Tweet 88

In Muslim countries, pers. are murdered for criticising Islam. From now on in France, a secular country, too #Resist #Laïcité

Tweet 27

"More and more religious people, not just Islamic fundamentalists, are undermining and contesting the principle of laïcité (...) it is absolutely necessary to defend it", declares @emmanuelmaurel. #Laïcité #CesIdées Cc @LePontdesidees

7.2.3 Claims and conclusions

As expected with digital media, opinions stated as claims, without proof or evidence, are prevalent. The tweets are often structured with a claim using verbs of certainty ("it is" instead of "would" or "I think"; "must" instead of "should"), followed by a conclusion to this claim (see Tweet 33, Tweet 43, and Tweet 26). This conclusion is used to state what must be done to address the claim, which as Marchand and Marty (2015) recall, is often formulated as a problematisation.

Tweet 33

Islam is a system of violent, liberticidal and sexist beliefs. It can and must be fought. Pushing back Islam is in the interest of all humanity, including those who have had the misfortune to be born Muslim. #Islam #laïcité

Tweet 43

Laïcité allows everyone to practice the religion they want. But what about those who do not practice it and do not want to be in constant contact with it. Only one solution, no more religious signs in the public space. #laïcité

Tweet 26

in many French public establishments, non-Muslim children are harassed because they eat pork or because they do not observe Ramadan. so yes it is very worrying

#francophobia #laïcité #proselytism

The problematisation of laïcité confirms the notion of threat evoked in section 7.2.2 towards laïcité and France ("Francophobia"). However, it is also noticeable that the hashtag #laïcité is often present in tweets bearing negative sentiments towards Islam unrelated to the principle, betraying a disguise for hate speech rather than a genuine concern. Other tweets display the exact structure of claim and conclusion; however, the writers make use of links or retweet features to validate their claims with a piece of evidence. This process gives writers the pervasive ability to insert pre-framed content, as seen above with Maireder and Ausserhofer (2014, p. 6), which validates the claim and adapts the pre-framed content to a discourse.

7.2.5 Twitter idioms

If claims and conclusions are part of Twitter's structural characteristics, other elements dictate the form of the platform's content. Some tweets have typographic mistakes (e.g., repeating words successively, forgetting letters, punctuation, or accents) resulting from ephemeral tweeting (Bouvier, 2020). To this can be added the limit of 280 characters, observable with the use of symbols such as "=" to join two ideas or instant messenger slang: e.g., the abbreviation "bcp" for *beaucoup* (many). This modified language and illogical, contradictive arguments lacking context (see Tweet 43 and Tweet 84) (Bouvier, 2020) can lead to misunderstanding.

Tweet 84

My philosophical view on #France: #Judaism = #Freedom; #Christianity = #Equality; #Islam = #Fraternity; #Buddhism = #Laïcité.

To transmit ideas and emotions, punctuation and upper case letters are widely used in the three analysed periods. Upper case letters emphasise keywords: e.g., "FUNDAMENTAL and CONSTITUTIONAL"; "#LAÏCITÉ"; "#laïcité, common well-being, social peace are DEAD". They add a dramatic substance to the tweet, which nourishes the abovementioned humanisation of the news. Sentiments are also conveyed through punctuation choices. First, interjections and exclamation marks (e.g., "Sad day!"; "Help!" amplify the problematisation of the tweet. Second, many rhetorical questions are found

in the tweets (see Tweet 31 and Tweet 57, underlined). Rhetorical questions are used to make a point rather than honestly inquire, and they "strategically 'index' the ideology of the speaker or writer" (Van Dijk, 2006, pp. 123-124). They bring sensationalisation to the news.

Tweet 31

How much and by whom was @EricPiolle corrupted to validate this ad campaign? Qatar? Morocco? Moral corruption is already real. #EELV #Laïcité

Media: Anti-discrimination ad of Grenoble: "I have half the chance of getting a job interview".

Tweet 57

They managed to find a bill for #religious #holidays... #laïcité @PapNdiaye and @education_gouv, do you sit on it? And so non-Christians go to school for #Easter too? #discrimination #GreatReplacement Thank you @valeurs

7.2.6 Figurative language

Figures of speech are an essential element of critical discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2001), and they often occurred in the findings in the context of digital controversies on the relationship between Islam and laïcité. The findings reveal the frequent use of circumlocution to refer to Islam and France (Tweet 1, Tweet 6 and Tweet 9, underlined). That is, periphrasing a word (e.g., Islam, France, practising Muslim) with an association of multiple words, which extends the sentence. The context can give clues on the absent word. In Tweet 1, figurative language is applied to both France and Islam. It is part of the sentence's rhetoric and is intended to highlight the writer's argument and transmitted ideology (Van Dijk, 2001). However, in Tweet 6 and Tweet 9, the writers use circumlocution to mention practising Muslims and Islam. On the contrary, they write "French", "France", "Catholicism and Judaism", etc. Not stating the name of the targeted group, especially when majority group members refer to a minority group, is a form of domination (Van Dijk, 1986). It compartmentalises different groups in a context of power, which will be further discussed in the meso-level of analysis.

Tweet 1

A culture where #Religion is omnipresent, in morals as well as in law, cannot peacefully coexist with a culture that experienced religious wars until the 17th century and only found social peace thanks to the #laïcité ("religions, at home")

Tweet 6

So, most French people are without religion, and only 15% practice religion regularly. And we are constantly pissed off with this 15%... Religion is in places of worship or at home, that's all! #laïcité

Context: This tweet is a retweet of statistics stating that regular religious practice is much more prominent in Islam than in Catholicism.

Tweet 9

#Laïcité will have overcome Catholicism and Judaism in a Judeo-Christian land, France is no longer the eldest daughter of the Church. Nature abhors a vacuum, another civilisation with its religion will get the better of #laïcité. The situation is serious!!

Context: This tweet is a retweet of statistics stating that "the number and proportion of French practising Muslims are increasing, now exceeding that of practising Catholics".

Other figures of speech are regularly found in the tweets: anaphora (notably in the selection of January 2015, see Tweet 72 and Tweet 17), epiphora (see Tweet 69), parallelism (see Tweet 17), and sarcasm prove to be popular. Figurative language is part of the rhetorical structure of a discourse (Van Dijk, 2001, 2006). Van Dijk (1995) outlines the substantial role of indirect and subtle discourse by elite groups (called elite discourse) in the reproduction of discrimination towards minorities, which has more influence than "grassroots racism" (p. 5) – here, Islamophobia. In Tweet 17, for example, parallelism contradicts different concepts: condemning Islamophobia as opposed to laïcité, ecology versus progress etc.

Extract of Tweet 72

"No Jews who can be afraid, no Muslims who can be ashamed in #France"

Tweet 69

Catholics ignored in the name of #laïcité. Muslims and Jews praised in the name of #diversity. #dhimmis or half citizens?

Extract of Tweet 17

By supporting the fight against so-called #Islamophobia, he betrayed #laïcité. By preferring #ecology, he betrayed progress. By supporting #wokism, he betrayed the universalism of the left".

Finally, messages are conveyed through French cultural references. The instrumentalisation of these national symbols emphasises French patriotism. For example, "*Aïd partout, élèves nulle part"* (Eid everywhere, pupils nowhere) refers to the famous 1851 sentence of Victor Hugo *"Police partout, justice nulle part"* (Police everywhere, justice nowhere). Another more recent reference is the Tweet 18 gif showing the famous French artist France Gall singing her popular single "*Résiste*" (Resist). The tweet is a reply to the Collective for Countering Islamophobia in Europe sharing the news of Berlin allowing teachers to wear headscarves, and it mocks French conservative groups.

Tweet 18

France seeing this tweet. #laïcité

7.3 Meso-Level of Analysis

7.3.1 Comparisons

Paradoxically, discourse on #laïcité with regard to Islam in France is filled with comparisons between religions in France – especially with Christianity. The discourse places laïcité as the culprit for the drop of Christian practice in France, and this phenomenon is then directly linked to the presumed rise of Islam practice (see Tweet 9

and Tweet 11). The historical links between France and Christianity prevail in the discourse as if their cultural mutual history would legitimate this religion over another one. The tweets betray the negative sentiment that laïcité robbed and "denied the Christian roots" of France, which is the "eldest daughter of the Church". Moreover, Christianity is called the "indigenous religion" of France.

Tweet 11

Law on #laïcité = Abolishment of Christianity. #Islamisation #GreatReplacement

The notion of injustice towards laïcité is also observable in the comparison of religions. Some tweet writers express the feeling that the law on laïcité imposes more constraint and damage on Christianity than on other religions (see Figure 6) – notably Islam; stating that it should "be asked an effort of #laïcité as were asked Catholics". Some scholars in the literature review of this thesis argue the contrary (Fernando, 2014; Hamel, 2002). Interestingly, in the context of comparison, resentment towards Islam is found mostly in the tweets of March – April 2023. However, numerous writers of the tweets from January 2015 take another stance in these comparisons, defending Muslim people against the hate acts they suffered after the Charlie Hebdo attack (e.g., see Tweet 95).

***Figure 6**: Caricature attached to Tweet 2. On the cannon is written "Law of 1905" (Law on Laïcité), and the character says "We destroyed fanaticism and obscurantism!"*

Tweet 95

We must react to attacks on #Muslim people with the same indignation as attacks on #Jewish people. #laïcité #fraternity

Finally, twice, parallel comparisons of #*Christianisme* (Christianity) and #*Catholicisme* (Catholicism) with #*Islamisme* (Islamism) appear in the tweets of March – April and May 2023. If the two first hashtags bear no political or ideological connotation, #Islamisme refers to a religious and political ideology in contradiction with laïcité, and the mirror term for the other words would have been Islam. One may wonder if this false parallelism is a genuine mistake, given the morphological similarity of the three words, or if it is a rhetorical approach.

7.3.2 Laïcité

As the focal point of the data selection, the tweets widely discuss the definition of laïcité. In the continuation of the previous section, laïcité is defined as the end of Christianity (see Tweet 11) or as an "ephemeral period of transition from #Christianity to #Islamism". However, these claims provide religious feelings rather than a definition, and their sentiment towards laïcité is usually negative. The tweets gathered from January 2015 provide a large database on the definition of laïcité in the digital discourse of the findings (e.g., see Tweet 89, Tweet 117). This selection presents a generally positive sentiment towards laïcité, associated with togetherness and tolerance. Yet, in the data from 2023, definitions of laïcité are less straightforward. They almost exclusively remind the obligations fixed by laïcité (e.g., "religions at home", "religion should only occur in places of worship").

Tweet 89

#Laïcité is also the freedom of religious practice, in the greatest safety for Muslims, Jews, and the others

Tweet 117

#laïcité is an extreme form of secularism that has put #France at odds with its minorities.

The findings cover diverse modifiers of laïcité. Laïcité is strongly associated with the notion of the republic: "*République laïque"* (laic republic), *"Laïcité républicaine"* (republican laïcité), among many others. Because of this association, the tweets condemning the lack of harmony between Islam and laïcité oppose French Muslims, to a greater extent, to the French Republic too. The two tweets of the French government also use this modifier alongside the notion of values (see Tweet 51), which recurs in the findings ("values et principles (including #laïcité)"; "Republic and values #laïcité"). The three terms – laïcité, Republic, and values – are used as modifiers to or synonyms for one another.

Tweet 51

#Dialogue / #Laïcité / #Republic

Yesterday took place the territorial convention of Islam in France #ATIF at the prefecture of Reunion. A rich and respectful dialogue, in the values of the Republic.

References to blasphemy are numerous in the findings. More precisely, to the right to blasphemy granted by the law on laïcité. The scope of the tweets using this notion vary from simple claims, "I'm lucky to be able to blaspheme in my country: God, *je t'emmerde!*" ("screw you!"), to insulting tweets towards Muslims, using the right to profanity to give clearance to the content (see Tweet 35). It is relevant to mention that most of these insulting tweets (including tweet 35 and another tweet from the same writer, mentioning Muslims too) are found in the Top Tweet selection (May 2023). The problematic aspect of Tweet 35 is that it is not only insulting towards religion – which is allowed by the right to blasphemy – but also towards Muslims (e.g., "his" brain), which is condemned by law. The GIF attached was later hidden, as considered "sensitive" by digital content moderators, but the tweet remains on Twitter. Reminders of the right to profanity are often found in the three data sets ("#racism is a crime, criticising a #religion isn't"; "Islamophobia is not a crime"), acting as a form of disclaimer (Van Dijk, 2006). But, in contradiction, the findings also indicate a common display of disapproval of Islamophobia ("is it islamophobia or patriotism?"; "is not Islamophobic").

Tweet 35



An AI was able to reconstruct his brain. As we see, the upper part is entirely dedicated to sex... The lower part (not Visible here) is for terrorism...
#blasphemy #freedomexpression #laïcité #tolerance #atheism #expression #islam #coran #jesus #mohamed

Lastly, laïcité is frequently associated with indivisible France (see Tweet 60 and Tweet 77). If these claims are well-intentioned, in a logic of anti-discrimination, they imply a disapprobation towards cultural diversity and a need for assimilation in the name of laïcité. Van Dijk (2006) mentions the process of positively alluding to a minority while indicating obvious expectations on their behalf as part of the rhetoric of elite discourse.

Tweet 60

In a truly #laic #France, there are no individuals belonging to a #religion but only similar humans 2/2 #laïcité

Tweet 77

And if everyone only claimed their French citizenship rather than showing their religious affiliation... we would all win #Laïcité

7.3.3 Us versus Them and essentialism

As mentioned in the literature review, essentialism, or over-generalisation of a group, is commonly observed in the findings. To a broader extent, the writers compartmentalise Muslim people into one group, differentiated from the majority group (Us versus Them). Claims – usually lacking source and evidence – using the word "*Musulmans*" (Muslims) generalise approximately 10% of the French population to transmit ideas and stereotypes. For example, the claim "#muslims didn't understand what the principle of #laïcité was" makes a broad generalisation, but it also presents a form of evidentiality, that is, implying that "we have the truth" and "they are misguided" (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 125). The ability to produce essentialist misleading statements is emphasised by Twitter's characteristics: the platform doesn't fact-check its content, the anonymisation empowers users to produce

hate speech (Bouvier, 2020), and #hashtags create databases on words, for example, #Muslims, which are gold mines for over-generalised contents.

Two levels of opposition are dominant in the findings: the usual Us (French cultural majority) versus Them (Muslim people), found principally in the tweets of 2023, and Laïcité versus Islam, prevalent in the tweets of January 2015. To a certain extent, this can show the symbolic use of laïcité to refer to France in general. First, Muslims are referred to as "others": for example, in the abovementioned Tweet 9 "another civilisation with its religion will get the better of #laïcité". Then, social differentiations are also highlighted: "what happens in the *banlieues*[3] (suburbs)", which distinguishes French citizens according to their dwelling place in a context of superiority and condescension towards Muslims, frequent in elite discourses. To differentiate "us" and "them", the findings demonstrate the use of possessive pronouns to mention the cultural majority (see Tweet 98). In this example, the writer opposes "our values" and "our excessive tolerance" with "borderline citizens", which, in this context, is a condescending way of referring to a minority – similar to the previous example.

Tweet 98

Haven't we violated some of our values by our excessive tolerance for borderline citizens #laïcité #thequestionoftheday

The findings witness a deeper intersectional exclusion of Muslims: that is, the exclusion of Muslim women from the identity of French women. Obvious rejective comments such as "these are not our French women" referring to women wearing headscarves are observed. But subtler insinuations are also made: for example, in the abovementioned Tweet 31 on the anti-discrimination ad campaign, the writer rhetorically asks, "How much and by whom was @EricPiolle[4] corrupted to validate this ad campaign? Qatar? Morocco?". By doing so, the writer associates headscarves – which is the focus of the ad – with another nationality (Qatar and Morocco), insinuating that women wearing hijabs don't belong to the French identity construction.

[3] In France, the word *banlieue* (suburb) has a connotation of poverty and delinquency, and it is often associated to Muslim communities in far-right discourses.
[4] The mayor of Grenoble, who initiated this ad campaign.

The opposition of Islam versus Laïcité is recurring in the data of January 2015. The differences between the two notions are outlined. Some tweets present firm distinctions between the words, such as "#Laïcité put to the test by #Islam and Muslims". This kind of opposition integrates a discourse of incompatibility of Islam and laïcité. The abovementioned Tweet 1 illustrates this claim when the writer states that Islam "cannot peacefully coexist" with French culture, which itself "only found social peace thanks to #laïcité". The concept of impossible cohabitation comes up regularly to clarify that laïcité is "not the coexistence" of different religions. It is rather the assimilation of different identities in one indivisible France, as suggested in the abovementioned Tweet 43: "what about those who do not practice it [religion] and do not want to be in constant contact with it. Only one solution, no more religious signs in the public space". Tweet 3 recalls the article of Mikulis (2020), addressing the constant framing of laïcité being exclusively overlooked by Muslims. The writer confronts "Islam" and "Laïcité" and broadly generalises in the name of Islam.

Extract of Tweet 3

It is clear, and perhaps unfortunate, that it is ONLY TO #ISLAM that #LAÏCITÉ poses a real problem ⚫ … 🤔

7.3.4 Hate speech and incitement to hatred

As mentioned by Bouvier (2020), hate speech is easily delivered on Twitter. Among other aspects which will be addressed in further discussions, bearing pseudonyms (e.g., "@anonymegirl3030" in April 2023) accelerates the diffusion of such discourse. But also, likeminded tweets can be found under hashtags, for example, #laïcité, which can provide a feeling of validation of certain ideologies. To this extent, hate speech in the name of laïcité is found in the three data selections. The first prominent hate speech associated with Islam implies the lexicon of invasion (see Tweet 28, Tweet 9, and Tweet 33). Van Dijk (1995) attributes this lexicon to the elite reproduction of racism and argues that "differences such as those attributed to Muslims also tend to be characterized as problematic or threatening to us" (p. 8) and are therefore framed negatively. In addition to textual content, hate speech on invasion is signified through markers such as the hashtag #GreatReplacement. This concept roots in a white nationalist far-right conspiracy theory, first coined by Renaud Camus in 2002, who was then condemned numerous times

for incitement to hatred. The problem with such a hashtag is that it provides a database of hatred and misleading theories. It gathers individuals with like-minded views and can lead to further incitement to hatred. Bearing the hashtag #laïcité, Tweet 33 is an example of the subtle incitement to hatred: "it can and must be fought" implies taking action against Islam.

Extract of Tweet 28

Stop #racism and invasive #religions, source of Evil

Extract of Tweet 9

Nature abhors a vacuum, another civilisation with its religion will get the better of #laïcité. The situation is serious!!

Tweet 33

Islam is a system of violent, liberticidal and sexist beliefs. It can and must be fought. Pushing back Islam is in the interest of all humanity, including those who have had the misfortune to be born Muslim. #Islam #laïcité

7.3.5 Islamophobia in the name of laïcité

Hate speech and ideological discourse are often softened and legitimised with disclaimers (Van Dijk, 2006). Among those, the findings distinguish two kinds. The first is adding an argument in favour of the targeted minority before or after a pejorative argument to moderate the tone (see Tweet 126). In Tweet 126, the writer gives an opinion disguised as a claim while addressing Islam in essentialist terms. Paradoxically, the mention of "no amalgam", common in tweets following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, would imply that the writer does not mix different assumptions in broad generalisations. In Tweet 65, the writer starts the sentence with an inclusive argument towards Islam but pursues it with the attempt to define the place of French Muslims within the Republic with the connector "but".

Tweet 126

Even moderate, everyday Islam irritates with its outrageous proselytism and arrogance. But no amalgam... #JeSuisCharlie #laïcité

Tweet 65
#laïcité Islam must find its place in the republic but know how to stay there and not overflow into the public sphere #ONVPSM

The second form of disclaimer omnipresent in the findings is using laïcité to justify anti-tolerant discourses. As mentioned in this thesis, the keyword laïcité is used as a hashtag or as part of an argument to discriminate against or define the place of French Muslims (e.g., Tweet 65). It is also widely linked to discrediting Islamophobia. Tweets advocating for laïcité include hashtags such as *#IslamophobieImaginaire* (#ImaginaryIslamophobia), a hashtag filled with tweets on the "presupposed victimisation of French Muslims". Other modifiers of Islamophobia, such as "so-called" and "propaganda", are frequent, showing scepticism towards the existing discrimination against Muslims in France. Writers justify that their claims are not Islamophobic by stating that they are instead following the principle of laïcité. This sceptical discourse is dangerous for democracies and minorities because it empowers the cultural majority while sweeping away the awareness of intolerance towards French Muslims.

8. Concluding Discussions

8.1 Twitterisation of #Laïcité, and Its Synchronic Sentiments Towards Islam

The discourse on Twitter's hashtag #laïcité with regard to Islam variates synchronically between the periods of January 2015, March – April 2023, and the algorithmic selection of May 2023. In 2015, the tweets following the Charlie Hebdo attacks are certainly more numerous than in the other selections. However, the focus on laïcité is more prevalent than on Islam. The discourse on laïcité variates strongly, but some tweets call to end discrimination against French Muslims in the name of the principle. Moreover, there is a shift in the hate discourse towards "the other". If the selection of 2015 displays the opposition of Laïcité versus Islam, both 2023 data selections instead set forth an opposition of the French cultural majority versus French Muslims. The controversy on laïcité is personified, and hate speech shifts its focus from religion to humans while being amplified by Twitter in the following ways. The findings advocate for the arguments of Bouvier and Machin (2018), blaming anonymous and short-lived characteristics of Twitter, as well as the network of like-minded individuals created by common hashtags

(Indiana University Bloomington, 2018; Smyrnaios & Ratinaud, 2017). Hate discourses are acknowledged and amplified within communities (e.g., #GrandRemplacement and #IslamophobieImaginaire). But also, the findings show the use of the vocabulary of certainty to make unfounded claims with or without pre-framed sources, which can amplify stereotypes (e.g., "in many French public establishments, non-Muslim children are harassed because they eat pork or because they do not observe Ramadan"). The ephemeral aspect of Twitter contributes to groundless claims as users seem not to measure the extent of their words. Structural elements proper to social media to construct rhetoric and classify arguments are observable. For example, using upper case letters to highlight specific concepts or rhetorical structures like parallelism to convey unchecked misinformation (e.g., comparing Catholicism with Islamism). Then, humanisation of the news conduces stronger emotions – notably hate. As de Charentenay (2006) points out, the digital mediatisation of the private sphere, for example, religion, provokes negative emotions as it debates a core element of one's existence: this is observable in the numerous comparisons of Christianity with Islam vis-à-vis laïcité.

Several studies link the rise in hate speech to Twitter's recent takeover by Elon Musk (Frenkel & Conger, 2022). Indeed, the platform's freedom of expression and moderation policies have changed, resulting in a substantial increase in misinformation and hate speech (ibid). The new possibility to purchase a verified account can also impact discourse: politically extreme groups are legitimised with this status which, most importantly, amplifies the visibility of their interactions on Twitter. This comes alongside the findings on the numerous far-right politically affiliated writers of the Top Tweets. The so-called "freedom of speech" praised by Elon Musk recalls the findings showing the utilisation of freedom of blasphemy and freedom of speech, notably in hashtags, to spread hate discourse. One may partly associate the rise of intolerant discourse with the new culture of Twitter facilitating its spread.

8.2 The discourse on laïcité

The epistemic discourse on #laïcité in the periods selected concentrates on the creation and detention of knowledge on the principle. It is used as a keyword to convey the following ideologies and ideals with modifiers and disclaimers:

- Laïcité as the fourth word of the French motto, completing "*Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*" (Freedom, Equality, Fraternity) (e.g., "#Judaism = #Freedom; #Christianity = #Equality; #Islam = #Fraternity; #Buddhism = #Laïcité"): Laïcité is often associated with modifiers of French values and republic, notably by the presidential majority, and with "indivisible France", as mentioned in the law on laïcité. On the one hand, this notion of indivisibility advocates for the equality of all French before the law, regardless of their religion. On the other hand, its interpretation on Twitter calls for a need for assimilation from the French Muslims whose religious practice "cannot coexist" with laïcité. It sometimes betrays a negative sentiment towards cultural diversity while impregnating laïcité in an intolerant discourse about "the other".
- Laïcité as the symbol of conservative France: The discourse on #laïcité is associated with historical and traditional France and, sometimes, with its Christian roots. For example, allusions to change, to the 20th century, or to former president Charles de Gaulle are present in the findings. In this discourse, laïcité embodies these values and way of life as a call to re-establish them in the name of the principle. This stance is much adopted by far-right groups or individuals, who in return take Islam as a culprit for the loss of laïcité, as seen with the vocabulary of invasion and "safeguarding laïcité". Therefore, laïcité is waved as a means to define French Muslims as "the others", in disharmony with the values of the republic, and to minimise their place in the public sphere (e.g., "only one solution, no more religious signs in the public space"). This #laïcité discourse presents a contradiction: On the one hand, the principle of laïcité is employed to defend conservative values and justify intolerant speech. On the other hand, it is criticised by the same groups – sometimes even by the same tweet writers – for undermining Christianity in France.

8.3 Further research

Among the discourses mentioned above, the findings witness an opposing movement that defines and uses laïcité to promote social justice in an anti-discrimination discourse (e.g., "Fighting discrimination against Muslims is not about questioning #laïcité"). However, this thesis observes that these tweets are overshadowed by an influent intolerant discourse, notably in the Top Tweets. It questions the involvement of Twitter's algorithm

in the propagation of hate speech. Twitter evolves constantly and is filled with continual debates occurring in tweets, retweets, but also in replies, without the use of hashtags. Therefore, as addressed by Bruns (2012), a further network study considering the complete panel of interactions under #laïcité would not only gather more data, but would also allow a broader synchronic map of the controversy on laïcité.

Finally, as raised in the concluding discussions, the findings demonstrate a rise in hate speech in the 2023 tweets. But above this, they are in slight contradiction with the theories of several researchers of this literature review, such as Giglietto and Lee (2015), who address a rise in hate speech towards French Muslims after terror attacks. The findings of the 2015 tweets show a fairly more diverse panel of sentiments (grief, compassion, protection, fervour towards defending laïcité, calls for assimilation etc.) than both sets of 2023 tweets, more frequently framing Islam as a threat to laïcité. An example of a noticeable change is the specific targeting of hate speech towards French Muslims in 2023, as opposed to the general targeting towards Islam in 2015. This thesis did not strive to compare the three sets of data and cannot make generalisations on this matter, nor certify that these differences are due to the 8-year gap between 2015 and 2023. However, it can call for further research to synchronically compare discourses on laïcité, after different events challenging or not the notion of laïcité.

References

Ahmed, S., & Matthes, J. (2017). Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis. *International Communication Gazette*, *79*(3), 219-244. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516656305

Ait Abdeslam, A. (2019). The Representation of Islam and Muslims in French Print Media Discourse: Le Monde and Le Figaro as Case Studies. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *39*(4), 569-581. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2019.1688514

Ayoub, J. (2022, 3 October). How the European far right coopted an Arabic letter. *Al Jazeera*. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/3/how-the-european-far-right-coopted-an-arabic-letter

Baker, P., Gabrielatos, C., & McEnery, T. (2013). *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511920103

Becqueret, N. (2015). In P. Charaudeau (Ed.), *La laïcité dans l'arène médiatique. Cartographie d'une controverse sociale.* INA.

Blaikie, N., & Priest, J. (2019). *Designing Social Research : The Logic of Anticipation*. Polity Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/malmo/detail.action?docID=5638724

Bloomington, I. U. (2018). *Visualizing the Political Discourse on Twitter*. Indiana University Bloomington. https://cnets.indiana.edu/groups/nan/truthy/visualizing-the-political-discourse-on-twitter/

Bouvier, G. (2020). Racist call-outs and cancel culture on Twitter: The limitations of the platform's ability to define issues of social justice. *Discourse, Context & Media*, *38*, 100431. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcm.2020.100431

Bouvier, G., & Machin, D. (2018). Critical Discourse Analysis and the challenges and opportunities of social media. *Review of Communication*, *18*(3), 178-192. https://doi.org/10.1080/15358593.2018.1479881

Bowen, J. R. (2007). *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*
Islam, the State, and Public Space (STU - Student edition ed.). Princeton University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rrd5

Bruns, A. (2011). Gatekeeping, gatewatching, real-time feedback: new challenges for Journalism. *Brazilian Journalism Research*, *7*(2), 117–136. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.25200/BJR.v7n2.2011.355

Bruns, A. (2012). HOW LONG IS A TWEET? MAPPING DYNAMIC CONVERSATION NETWORKS ON TWITTER USING GAWK AND GEPHI. *Information, Communication & Society*, *15*(9), 1323-1351. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2011.635214

Bruns, A., & Burgess, J. (2011). The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of Ad Hoc Publics.

Charaudeau, P. (2015). *La laïcité dans l'arène médiatique. Cartographie d'une controverse sociale.* INA.

Collins, H. (2018). *Creative Research : The Theory and Practice of Research for the Creative Industries* (Vol. Second edition) [Book]. Bloomsbury Visual Arts. https://proxy.mau.se/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct

=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,url,shib&db=nlebk&AN=2910876&site=eds-live&scope=site
Colosimo, A. (2017, 11 December). Laïcité: Why French Secularism is So Hard to Grasp. *Institut Montaigne*. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/laicite-why-french-secularism-so-hard-grasp
Couldry, N., & Hepp, A. (2013). Conceptualizing Mediatization: Contexts, Traditions, Arguments. *Communication Theory*, *23*(3), 191-202. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12019
de Charentenay, P. (2006). Religions, laïcité, médias. *Études*, *405*(11), 437-440. https://doi.org/10.3917/etu.055.0437
Deacon, D., & Stanyer, J. (2014). Mediatization: key concept or conceptual bandwagon? *Media, Culture & Society*, *36*(7), 1032-1044. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443714542218
Ekström, M., Lewis, S. C., & Westlund, O. (2020). Epistemologies of digital journalism and the study of misinformation. *New Media & Society*, *22*(2), 205-212. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819856914
Fernandez, M. (2015). In P. Charaudeau (Ed.), *La laïcité dans l'arène médiatique. Cartographie d'une controverse sociale.* INA.
Fernando, M. L. (2014). *The republic unsettled : Muslim French and the contradictions of secularism*. Durham : Duke University Press, 2014. https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-republic-unsettled
Frame, A., & Brachotte, G. (2015). Le tweet stratégique: Use of Twitter as a PR tool by French politicians. *Public Relations Review*, *41*(2), 278-287. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.11.005
Frenkel, S., & Conger, K. (2022, 2 December). Hate Speech's Rise on Twitter Is Unprecedented, Researchers Find. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/technology/twitter-hate-speech.html
Giglietto, F., & Lee, Y. (2015). To Be or Not to Be Charlie: Twitter hashtags as a discourse and counter-discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting in France. Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Making Sense of Microposts co-located with the 24th International World Wide Web Conference,
Gold, H. W., Ya Chun; Berteau Benjamin. (2020, 14 May). French parliament passes law requiring social media companies delete certain content within an hour. *CNN Business*. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/13/tech/french-hate-speech-social-media-law/index.html
Gramsci, A., Hoare, Q., & Smith, G. (1971). *Selections from the Prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. Lawrence & Wishart.
Grönvall, J. (2015). De-coupling of journalism and democracy: Empirical insights from discussions with leading Nordic media executives. *Journalism*, *16*(8), 1027-1044. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884914554174
Guilbert, T. (2015). Patrick CHARAUDEAU (éd.) La laïcité dans l'arène médiatique Cartographie d'une controverse sociale 2015, Bry-sur-Marne, Ina éditions, collection « médias essais », 176 p. *Langage et société*, *154*(4), 149-153. https://doi.org/10.3917/ls.154.0149
Hall, S. (1997). Chapter 1: The work of representation. In S. Hall (Ed.), *Representation : cultural representations and signifying practices* (pp. 15-64). Sage Publications.

Hamel, C. E. (2002). Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe: The Islamic Headscarf (Hijab), the Media and Muslims' Integration in France. *Citizenship Studies*, *6*(3), 293-308. https://doi.org/10.1080/1362102022000011621

Hamer, A.-L. (2023). *Research methodology: Final Exam paper*. Unpublished manuscript, Malmö University.

Harcup, T., & O'Neill, D. (2001). What Is News? Galtung and Ruge Revisited. *Journalism Studies - JOURNAL STUD*, *2*, 261-280. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700118449

Harcup, T., & O'Neill, D. (2017). What is News? *Journalism Studies*, *18*(12), 1470-1488. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1150193

Hepp, A., Hjarvard, S., & Lundby, K. (2015). Mediatization: theorizing the interplay between media, culture and society. *Media, Culture & Society*, *37*(2), 314-324. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443715573835

Hjarvard, S. (2008). The mediatization of religion: A theory of the media as agents of religious change. *Northern Lights: Film & Media Studies Yearbook*, *6*(1), 9-26. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1386/nl.6.1.9_1

Hjarvard, S. (2011). The mediatisation of religion: Theorising religion, media and social change. *Culture and Religion*, *12*(2), 119-135. https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2011.579719

Hodkinson, P. (2017a). The Construction of News. In P. Hodkinson (Ed.), *Media culture and society: an introduction* (pp. 119-137). SAGE.

Hodkinson, P. (2017b). *Media culture and society: an introduction*. SAGE.

Hodkinson, P. (2017c). Media users. In P. Hodkinson (Ed.), *Media culture and society: an introduction* (pp. 77-94). SAGE.

Hodkinson, P. (2017d). Media, race and ethnicity. In P. Hodkinson (Ed.), *Media culture and society: an introduction* (pp. 221-240). SAGE.

Huszár, F., Ktena, S. I., O'Brien, C., Belli, L., Schlaikjer, A., & Hardt, M. (2022). Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *119*(1), e2025334119. https://doi.org/doi:10.1073/pnas.2025334119

Jamal, T. (2021). The Weaponization of Laïcité Against Muslims: Pushing More Towards Extremism. *Euro Crisis in the Press: The politics of public discourse in Europe*. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/06/15/weaponization-of-laicite/

Kelly, M. (2020, 20 November 2020). France's laïcité: why the rest of the world struggles to understand it. *The Conversation*. https://theconversation.com/frances-la-cite-why-the-rest-of-the-world-struggles-to-understand-it-149943

Layder, D. (2013). *Doing Excellent Small-Scale Research* https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473913936

Lochard, G., & Soulages, J.-C. (2015). Comment la télévision traite la laïcité. In P. Charaudeau (Ed.), *La laïcité dans l'arène médiatique. Cartographie d'une controverse sociale.* INA.

Maireder, A., & Ausserhofer, J. (2014). Political discourses on Twitter: Networking topics, objects, and people. *Twitter and society*, *89*, 305-318.

Maireder, A., & Schwarzenegger, C. (2012). A MOVEMENT OF CONNECTED INDIVIDUALS. *Information, Communication & Society*, *15*(2), 171-195. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2011.589908

Marchand, P., & Marty, E. (2015). In P. Charaudeau (Ed.), *La laïcité dans l'arène médiatique. Cartographie d'une controverse sociale.* INA.

Matamoros-Fernández, A. (2017). Platformed racism: the mediation and circulation of an Australian race-based controversy on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube [Article]. *Information Communication and Society*, *20*(6), 930-946. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1293130

Mikulis, T. (2020, 30 October). The challenges and consequences of covering laïcité. *European Academy on Religion and Society*. https://europeanacademyofreligionandsociety.com/news/the-challenges-and-consequences-of-covering-laicite/

Parrott, S., Hoewe, J., Fan, M., & Huffman, K. (2019). Portrayals of Immigrants and Refugees in U.S. News Media: Visual Framing and its Effect on Emotions and Attitudes. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *63*(4), 677-697. https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2019.1681860

Posetti, J. N. (2013). The 'twitterisation'of investigative journalism.

Saleem, M., & Ramasubramanian, S. (2019). Muslim Americans' Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination. *Media Psychology*, *22*(3), 373-393. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2017.1302345

Smyrnaios, N., & Ratinaud, P. (2017). The Charlie Hebdo Attacks on Twitter: A Comparative Analysis of a Political Controversy in English and French. *Social Media + Society*, *3*(1), 2056305117693647. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117693647

Stamps, D. (2020). Race and Media: A Critical Essay Acknowledging the Current State of Race-Related Media Effects Research and Directions for Future Exploration. *Howard Journal of Communications*, *31*(2), 121-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/10646175.2020.1714513

Stout, D. A., & Buddenbaum, J. M. (2003). Media, Religion, and "Framing". *Journal of Media and Religion*, *2*(1), 1-3. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328415JMR0201_1

Taira, T. (2022). Secularism, Atheism, and Digital Media. In H. A. Campbell & P. H. Cheong (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Digital Religion* (pp. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197549803.013.7

UN. (2023). *International Day to Combat Islamophobia*. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/observances/anti-islamophobia-day

Valkenburg, P., Peter, J., & Walther, J. (2016). Media Effects: Theory and Research. *Annual review of psychology*, *67*, 315-338. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033608

Van Dijk, T. A. (1986). When Majorities Talk About Minorities. *Annals of the International Communication Association*, *9*(1), 57-82. https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.1986.11678603

Van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Elite discourse and the reproduction of racism. In D. Slayden & R. K. Whillock (Eds.), *Hate Speech* (pp. 1-28). Newbury Park: Sage. https://discourses.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Teun-A.-van-Dijk-1995-Elite-discourse-and-the-reproduction-of-racism.pdf

Van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical Discourse analysis. In D. T. Schiffrin, Deborah; and Hamilton, Heidi E. (Ed.), *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (pp. 352-371). Blackwell Publishers Ltd. https://doi.org/0–631–20595–0

Van Dijk, T. A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, *11*(2), 115-140. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310600687908

Weller, K., Bruns, A., Burgess, J., Mahrt, M., & Puschmann, C. (2013). *Twitter and Society*. Peter Lang AG International Academic Publishers. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/helsinki-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1632466

Wessler, H., Rinke, E., & Löb, C. (2015). Should We Be Charlie ? A Deliberative Take on Religion and Secularism in Mediated Public Spheres. *Accepted for publication in Journal of Communication*, *66*. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12213

1 Appendix

1. 1. Selection of Tweets written between the 26th of March and the 1st of April 2023.

Data 1: 32 tweets

Tweet #	1
Writer	@AnneArmorika22
Date	Apr 1
Tweet	Une culture où la #Religion est omniprésente, dans les moeurs comme dans le droit, ne peut pas coexister pacifiquement avec une culture qui a connu les guerres de religions jusqu'au XVIIe siècle, et n'a retrouvé la paix sociale que grâce à la #laïcité ("religions, à la maison")

Tweet #	2
Writer	@ChristianRadis
Date	Apr 1
Tweet	Tout simplement parce que au nom de la #laïcité on a détruit la Religion autochtone de ce pays. Il faut donc l'appliquer sans faiblir pour qu'il n'y en ait plus dans l'espace public ou remettre le Christianisme comme religion d'état. Sinon c'est trois poids trois mesures.
Reply to	@mohamedbouhafsi

Tweet #	3
Writer	@Ribambelle_Cie
Date	Apr 1
Tweet	1/2 (…) Exigences, je le relève, toujours insidieusement avancées par les acoquinés et activistes des #Frères_Musulmans, et eux seuls… Force est de constater, et peut-être de se se désoler, qu'il n'y a QU'À l'#ISLAM que la #LAÏCITÉ pose véritablement problème ⚫ … 😕
Reply to	@Ribambelle_Cie; @kamilabderrahmn

Tweet #	4
Writer	@DELAGEPIERRE5
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Négatif !La religion c'est chez soi. Pas dans le sport Pas a l'école Pas dans les lieux publics Pas au travail Pas dans des lieux privés non religieux recevant du public. #laicite
Reply to	@ActuFoot_

Tweet #	5
Writer	@WatermolenJona2
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Ce musulman ne doit pas pratiquer le même islam que ses compatriotes qui veulent s'assimiler. Les sportifs ont l'autorisation de rompre le jeûne du #Ramadan.

	Ce n'est pas à la #laïcité de se plier à l'islam intégriste.
Retweet	@F_Desouche Ramadan : après avoir reçu un mail de la FFF, un arbitre officiel s'étonne que la laïcité doive être respectée sous peine de sanction https://fdesouche.com/2023/03/31/ramadan-un-arbitre-officiel-de-la-fff-setonne-que-la-laicite-doive-etre-respectee-sous-peine-de-sanction/

Tweet #	6
Writer	@AnthonyComedien
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Donc la majorité des français sont sans religion, Seulement 15% ont une pratique régulière de la religion. Et on nous fait chier en permanence avec ces 15% ... La religion c'est dans les lieux de culte ou à la maison c'est tout ! #laicité
Retweet	@VLautard INSEE : en France 51% des personnes se déclarent sans religion, 29% catholiques, 10% musulmanes… La pratique de la religion est beaucoup plus importante chez les musulmans que chez les catholiques. La transmission religieuse est forte dans les familles musulmanes et juives. 

Tweet #	7
Writer	@Hadass118
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Insupportable et haineux #KarimZeribi,quipour défendre le #voile,aunom de la fameuse #laïcité nie lesracines #chrétiennes de la #France!etbien sûr cite les #juifs,puisque s'y compare sanscesse, depuis quand les #juifs ne lesreconnaissent et respectent pas?oùest leur prosélytisme?

Tweet #	8
Writer	@LsidLsid
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Non c'est une sage décision : aucune religion ne dictera les lois du sport #laïcité
Reply to	@mohamedbouhafsi

Tweet #	9
Writer	@WatermolenJona2
Date	Mar 31

Tweet	La #Laïcité aura eu raison du catholicisme et du judaïsme sur une Terre judéo-chrétienne, la France n'est plus la fille aînée de l'Église. La nature ayant horreur du vide, une autre civilisation avec sa religion aura raison de la #laïcité. L'heure est grave !!
Retweet	@ZemmourEric Quatre informations majeures viennent de tomber pendant que la France regarde ailleurs. 1. L'immigration en France représente aujourd'hui 19 millions de personnes. Pour un pays de 68 millions d'habitants : c'est COLOSSAL. 2. L'immigration augmente sans cesse et partout en France, en valeur absolue comme en proportion de la population et s'africanise de plus en plus. 3. Le nombre et la proportion de musulmans augmentent, avec une orthodoxie de plus en plus marquée. 🔴 Aujourd'hui, il y a 55 % de femmes voilées en plus qu'en 2013 ! 🔴Chez les musulmanes d'origine subsaharienne le port du voile a plus que doublé. 4. Point de bascule historique : l'islam devient la première religion pratiquée sur le sol de France (fréquentation d'un lieu de culte, fréquence des prières…) : le nombre de Français musulmans qui se disent pratiquants dépasse aujourd'hui celui des catholiques qui se disent pratiquants. Source : https://insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6793314?sommaire=6793391

Tweet #	10
Writer	@LamilheMimi
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Et on arrête de jouer le samedi pour la shabbat ? #Laïcité 💪💪
Reply to	@mohamedbouhafsi

Tweet #	11
Writer	@MaltaOM
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Loi sur la #laïcité = Abolissement du Christianisme. #Islamisation #GrandRemplacement

Tweet #	12
Writer	@lmorizot93
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	En être à devoir rappeler ce qui est normal dans une République laïque prouve qu'il y quand même un gros problème ... #laïcité
Reply to	@le_Parisien

Tweet #	13
Writer	@lesradicaux_
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Contrairement à l'Angleterre, la France FR n'autorisera pas la mise en place de pauses durant les rencontres pour permettre aux joueurs de rompre leur jeûne lorsque le soleil se couche pour le #Ramadan. La #Laïcité reste la règle pour la @FFF #Foot #Sport http://lefigaro.fr/flash-sport/fo…

Tweet #	14
Writer	@VSoccerGameShow
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	La #Laïcité ne les exclut pas, elle les contient...
Reply to	@captainspold1ng @ActuFoot_ and 6 others

Tweet #	15
Writer	@YvesDON
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	👁 République & valeurs #libérale mises à l'index. Contre vents & marées ⚡ La #Laïcité #Républicaine est bien l'1 des enjeux majeurs de la #Crise #Politique des #partis avec leurs fonds de commerce propagandistes #islamophobes #ExD & pro #islampolitique #LFI #Nupes #TousPerdants 🔥 

Tweet #	16
Writer	@AhmedLo84189125
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	Mais pourquoi la France fait-elle ça à chaque fois ? L'Angleterre met des stades à la disposition des fidèles musulmans , pour moi la #Laïcité c'est de especter la religion de ton prochain et non de passer par tout les moyens pour dénigrer la religion de ton prochain.
Retweet	@ActuFoot_ La FFF a envoyé un mail à tous les arbitres de France pour rappeler qu'il est interdit d'interrompre un match suite à la rupture du jeûne du ramadan. 📸 @mehdii_dz7

Tweet #	17
Writer	@SudRadio
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	🔴🎥 @Guillaume_Bigot : "#Mélenchon a trahi la gauche. En soutenant la lutte contre la soi-disant #islamophobie, il a trahi la #laïcité. En préférant l'#écologie, il a trahi le progrès. En soutenant le #wokisme, il a trahi l'universalisme de la gauche" http://youtu.be/JxOcxL28_Zo

Tweet #	18
Writer	@gabisback69190
Date	Mar 31
Tweet	@CCIEurope La France en voyant ce tweet. #laïcité
Reply to	@CCIEurope

Tweet #	19
Writer	@LaurentOpsomer
Date	Mar 30
Tweet	La religiosité, plus forte chez les immigrés et leurs descendants, selon l'Insee https://lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/03/30/la-religiosite-plus-forte-chez-les-immigres-et-leurs-descendants-selon-l-insee_6167624_3224.html… via @lemondefr #Religion #France #Laicite

Tweet #	20
Writer	@kabyle
Date	Mar 30
Tweet	Laïcité vs l'islamisme en débat #islamisme #laicite #kabyles #kabyle https://kabyle.com/evenement/laicite-vs-lislamisme-en-debat

Tweet #	21
Writer	@Super_Yoyo_fr
Date	Mar 30
Tweet	Merci de soutenir ce compte Le droit de dire ce que l'on veut, de parodier ou de critiquer n'importe quelle religion, est un droit FONDAMENTAL et CONSTITUTIONNEL Ceux qui ne sont pas d'accord peuvent aller vivre en Iran #Islam #Laicite #France #Libertedexpression

Tweet #	22
Writer	@TechAvecZemmour
Date	Mar 29
Tweet	Reste chez toi avec ta religion #Laicite
Reweet	@zeerTwt (Tweet erased)

Tweet #	23
Writer	@comitelaicite
Date	Mar 29

Tweet	#laicite N. Bestandji "La Ville de Grenoble instrumentalise une campagne antiraciste pour servir le voile" (Naëm Bestandji, 22 mars 23) https://ift.tt/OFwiDxs #CLR

Tweet #	24
Writer	@isgmcf1
Date	Mar 29
Tweet	#pécresse : ses positions sionistes et islamophobes ont tué la droite. Aujourd'hui, elle veut débaptiser un lycée Angela Davies pour défendre la "laïcité". #sionisme #islamophobie #laïcité #poupettekenza #soukainatwosisters #doussa

Tweet #	25
Writer	@Prefet11
Date	Mar 28
Tweet	🫶 La 4e édition des Assises Territoriales de l'Islam de France a été ouverte par @Prefet11 en présence des représentants des associations concernées du dep. Échanges sur les enjeux liés au culte musulman et déclinaison des 4 thématiques #FORIF #Dialogue #République #Laïcité

Tweet #	26
Writer	@phosophiahah
Date	Mar 28
Tweet	dans bcp d'établissements publics français, les enfants non musulmans se font harceler parce qu'ils mangent du porc ou parce qu'ils ne font pas le ramadan. donc oui c'est très préoccupant #francophobie #laicite #prosélytisme
Reply to	@PaulEmirJ and @r_chekkat

Tweet #	27
Writer	@LCP
Date	Mar 28
Tweet	"De plus en plus de religieux, pas seulement les fondamentalistes islamiques, mettent à mal et contestent le principe de la laïcité (...) il faut absolument la défendre", déclare @emmanuelmaurel #Laïcité #CesIdées Cc @LePontdesidees

Tweet #	28
Writer	@YvesDON
Date	Mar 27
Tweet	#Antisémitisme & #islamophobie d'#ExD rattrapent 1 #Système trop laxiste envers notre #Laïcité. #Libéralisme #islamisme font bon ménage & l'effet boomerang est au RDV. A tous les #démocrates #républicains de le comprendre. Stop au #racisme & aux #religions invasives source du Mal

	
Reply to	@YaelBRAUNPIVET @AssembleeNat and 4 others

Tweet #	29
Writer	@marika_bret
Date	Mar 27
Tweet	Les positions de Lallab contre nos valeurs et principes (dont la #laïcité) relevées par @FabriceDAndrea -merci à lui pour sa vigilance-, sont connues depuis longtemps. Le poison idéologique islam politique introduit à l'école avec caution Éducation Nationale ? Duplicité, danger.

Tweet #	30
Writer	@YvesDON
Date	Mar 27
Tweet	#Libéralisme & #Islamisme Les vérités qui percent d'une collaboration volontaire que la #Propagande du #Système #conservateur & #religieux avec le concours de la #Gôche #Nupes #LFI qui d'une lutte Vs l'#islamophobie d'#ExD en arrive à être pro #islamistes 👁FR⚡#Laïcité en danger
Reply to	@ MohamedLOUIZI @MathiasVicherat and 2 others

Tweet #	31
Writer	@RealSebColinNew
Date	Mar 26
Tweet	Combien et par qui @EricPiolle a été corrompu pour valider cette campagne de pub ? Le Qatar ? Le Maroc ? sous entendu qu'elles ne sont pas françaises, décrédibilise aussi la discrimination La corruption morale est déjà réelle elle. #EELV #Laicite
Retweet	@kkerima Je viens de découvrir cette campagne de pub, dites moi que c'est une blague. Sa ville est gangrenée par l'insécurité, le chômage et "@EricPiolle dépense l'argent du contribuable dans des pubs contre l'#IslamophobieImaginaire. Ces gens sont fous

Tweet #	32
Writer	@BenjaminBak1
Date	Mar 26
Tweet	"Si ça gêne que je parle politique, vous pouvez partir".

	L'imam Ismaïl dans une mosquée. Intro à 1 discours qui défie République et #laïcité. Loi de 1905, art. 26 : "Il est interdit de tenir des réunions politiques dans les locaux servant habituellement à l'exercice d'un culte."
Reply to	@AnasAbouMalik and @imam_ismail13

2. 2. Selection of Top Tweets gathered on the 4th of May 2023.

Data 2: 25 tweets

Tweet #	33
Writer	@DeQuoiJeMeMele3
Date	May 2
Tweet	L'islam est un système de croyances violentes, liberticides et sexistes. Il peut et doit être combattu. Faire reculer l'islam c'est dans l'intérêt de l'humanité entière, y compris de ceux qui ont eu la malchance de naître musulmans. #Islam #laïcité
Tweet #	34
Writer	@FadatCecile
Date	May 2
Tweet	« Lutter contre les discriminations envers les musulman(e)s ne relève pas de la remise en cause de la #laïcité […] ou de la réinstauration d'un délit de blasphème. C'est un objectif qui découle des lois de la République,du besoin de faire société & la nécessaire concorde. »
Tweet #	35
Writer	@Zoom_in_Zoom
Date	Apr 28
Tweet	Une IA a pu reconstituer son cerveau Comme on le voit, la partie supérieure est entièrement dédiée au sexe ... La partie inférieure (non Visible ici) est pour le terrorisme... #blasphème #libertéexpression #laïcité #tolérance #athéisme #expression #islam #coran #jesus #mohamed 
Tweet #	36
Writer	@Zoom_in_Zoom
Date	Apr 27

Tweet	La médecine Mohamediene... L'occident mécréant vous envie Ils savent que c'est bénéfique mais refusent de le dire publiquement 😂 #mohamed #coran #allah #islam #droitdeblasphème #libertédereligion #libertédexpression #tolérance #laïcité #censure #blasphème #religion #liberté
Tweet #	37
Writer	@giuseppebaggio
Date	Apr 25
Tweet	25/04/23 #Islam #France #Laicite #immigration "La laïcité, finalement si vous changez de Peuple, et bien, la Laïcité s'effondre devant vous le lendemain matin". 🎙 Analyse Mathieu Bock-Côté à propos de Aïd partout, élèves nulle part ! Extrait #FaceALinfo ⤵
Tweet #	38
Writer	@Lamechante64
Date	May 2
Tweet	Au secours! 😭😭😭 Ce n'est pas une religion c'est une secte! La religion c'est intime personnel on oblige rien à personne on peut partager mais rien imposer! #Laïcité #islam
Retweet	@scorpion8559 foutez moi ca en dehors de la France c'est pas ca nos Françaises https://twitter.com/DamienRieu/status/1653311810487943171
Tweet #	39
Writer	@Lookthisalgeri2
Date	Apr 28
Tweet	Voilà comme il n'y a pas de différence entre l'#islamisme et l'#islam , c'est le même livre avec les memes recommandations #laïcité #humain #fraternité
Tweet #	40
Writer	@kinux31
Date	May 2
Tweet	Dites-le plus fort pour les personnes en France 📣👀 Le port du voile ne devrait jamais être forcé ou interdit mais il doit s'adapter au Principe de #laïcité existant chez nous Et au passage, j'ai la chance de pouvoir blasphémer dans mon pays : Dieu, je t'emmerde !
Retweet	@AmnistieCA Dites-le plus fort pour les personnes à l'arrière 📣 👀 Le port du voile ne devrait jamais être forcé ou interdit ✊
Tweet #	41
Writer	@loupdmer
Date	Apr 26
Tweet	Le sociologue Hicham Benaissa déconstruit le processus réactionnaire qui a conduit à faire de la #laïcité une arme-notion anti islam, cela à partir du

	rapport de François Barouin.Le moins que l'on puisse dire, c'est que cela a bien marché. Qui connait la laïcité aujourd'hui ?
Retweet	@Ccesoir « République dans son abstraction, ça ne veut rien dire. Ce n'est pas possible d'opposer l'islam à la laïcité de manière abstraite » @hichbenaissa, sociologue La suite : ➡️https://bit.ly/LeJeuneImam 🎧en podcast https://audmns.com/kLiNvMO
Tweet #	42
Writer	@de_beaujeu
Date	Apr 30
Tweet	Elle a raison. Ce vêtement musulman n'a rien à faire dans l'enceinte d'une école française. #Laicite
Reply to	@CCIEurope
Tweet #	43
Writer	@BooyaOff
Date	Apr 25
Tweet	La laïcité permet à chacun de pratiquer la religion qu'il veut. Mais qu'en est il de ceux qui n'en pratiquent pas et ne veulent pas y être sans arrêt en contact. Une seule solution, plus de signes religieux dans l'espace public.
Reply to	@DefenderEurop
Tweet #	44
Writer	@anonymegirl3030
Date	Apr 24
Tweet	Le #racisme est un délit, critiquer une #religion non... Même l'apologie ne l'est pas réellement. Pourtant vu l'ampleur des revendications de certaines personnes, le sujet devrait être débattu.. La #Laicite quand ça arrange comme d'habitude
Retweet	@MaximeHaes Bonjour les racistes du @Le_Figaro : voici le calendrier de l'Education Nationale donnant droit à une absence. Sur les 13 événements religieux (les événements chrétiens font déjà partie du calendrier) seuls ceux musulmans vous posent problème. Ça s'appelle : le racisme. twitter.com/Le_Figaro/stat…
Tweet #	45
Writer	@IsabelleSurply
Date	Apr 26
Tweet	🎙️Retrouvez-moi demain matin sur @radiocourtoisie pour l'émission @Ligne__Droite Nous parlerons absentéisme dû à l'#Aïd, du phénomène de #laïcité dévoyée et des pièges de l'islamisation exponentielle de la France.
Tweet #	46

Writer	@ouassou1er
Date	Apr 27
Tweet	Victor Hugo ne retrouverait pas la gauche dans #Nupes! Celui qui a lutté contre l'Eglise ne comprendrait pas ce qui se passe dans les banlieues quand #Melenchon défile avec les frères musulmans! #Laïcité
Reply to	@tatiochka @pie_qui_chante and @salomesaque
Tweet #	47
Writer	@arkeoprof
Date	May 2
Tweet	#hg #prof #Laicite Yo Team Prof, une collègue me demande d'intervenir en tant que réf laïcité auprès d'une élève qui a rendu une capsule vidéo faite à la maison où elle apparaît voilée... Perso, c'est son espace privé, ça ne me choque pas... Temperature des twittos ?
Tweet #	48
Writer	@PREDIGAN
Date	Apr 27
Tweet	Et @PapNdiaye @education_gouv la soutiennent ? #école #laïcité #voile #CPE #Paris
Retweet	@roland56100 Paris : accusée d'islamophobie pour avoir demandé à une élève de retirer son voile, la CPE du lycée Charlemagne menacée de mort, elle porte plainte (MàJ : La délatrice est militante de l'UNEF) - Fdesouche https://fdesouche.com/2022/06/21/paris-accusee-dislamophobie-le-nom-dune-cpe-du-lycee-charlemagne-jete-en-pature-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux/
Tweet #	49
Writer	@loupdmer
Date	Apr 27
Tweet	Louons E Plenel pour sa constance à dénoncer les sous pensées de la mise en avant de la #laïcité. Car combien d'autres ont cru que la brandir comme une arme pour dénoncer les manquements à la laïcité des élèves. Ces notions n'existaient pas, elles viennent de l'extrême droite
Tweet #	50
Writer	@NaemBestandji
Date	Apr 26
Tweet	.#laïcité: liberté de conscience, libre exercice des cultes (encadré par la loi), séparation des Églises & de l'État. Ce n'est pas la "coexistence" ni 1 arme contre l'islam. Dire n'importe quoi ne sert qu'à attiser tensions, communautarisme, victimisation & favoriser l'islamisme.
Retweet	@AckermannEmile "Ils faut combattre les mauvaises conceptions de la laïcité, car elle est le cadre qui permet la coexistence et non pas une arme qu'on dirige contre des minorités qu'on voudrait émanciper de force." @AckermannEmile
Tweet #	51
Writer	@Prefet974
Date	May 3
Tweet	#Dialogue / #Laicite / #Republique Hier ont eu lieu les assises territoriales de l'islam de France #ATIF à la préfecture de La Réunion. Un

	dialogue riche et respectueux, dans les valeurs de la République."
Tweet #	52
Writer	@loupdmer
Date	May 4
Tweet	Céline Pina, ce naufrage intellectuel, promotrice d'une version réactionnaire et #islamophobe de la #laicité prétend s'en prendre à Edwy Plenel http://laicite-republique.org/celine-pina-quand-edwy-plenel-sur-mayotte-defend-une-conception-ethnique-de-la.html
Tweet #	53
Writer	@martine_live
Date	Apr 29
Tweet	📺Dire comme le gouvernement que le @RNational_off n'est pas dans « l'arc républicain » me fait doucement rire. Leur bilan en la matière est celui du renoncement ! #laïcité ⤵ https://fb.watch/kcNRyGfnVu/ via @FacebookWatch facebook.com
Tweet #	54
Writer	@loupdmer
Date	Apr 27
Tweet	Je suis tellement d'accord avec ce que tu dis dans cet article de blog Il y a eu une manipulation extrême venue de l'extrême droite, qui a produit des effets extrêmement néfastes, jusqu'à la déformation du sens du mot #laïcité qui désormais envisage des devoirs pour la population
Reply to	Replying to @girard_bd @LCP and @lofejoma
Tweet #	55
Writer	@TousAzimutsNant
Date	May 4
Tweet	Les limites du combat en carton de l'extrême droite pour la #laïcité et la #libertédexpression 🙂
Retweet	@NicolasBay_ À l'initiative d'une députée d'extrême-gauche, une exposition mettant en scène le Christ en militant LGBT racisé est installée au Parlement européen. Ceux qui injurient le christianisme n'oseraient évidemment pas faire de même contre l'islam. En attaquant notre civilisation, ils insultent tous les Européens.
Tweet #	56
Writer	@fernandez_dom
Date	Apr 26
Tweet	le #catholicisme aussi nous racontait cette fable de la méchante république...d'où la loi de 1905 sur la #laïcité! Il faudra sans doute une autre loi pour abstraire l'#islamisme du champ public et le cantonner à la maison....
Reply to	@Ccesoir and @hichbenaissa

Tweet #	57
Writer	@RobertSurcouf9
Date	Apr 26
Tweet	Ils ont réussis à trouver une circulaire pour les #fêtes #religieuses... La #laïcité @PapNdiaye et @education_gouv Et donc les non chrétiens vont à l'école pour #Pâques aussi ? #discrimination #GrandRemplacement Merci @Valeurs : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8O3UT07It8c&feature=youtu.be

3. 3. Selection of Tweets written between the 8th and the 14th of January 2015, after the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

Data 3: 72 tweets

Tweet #	58
Writer	@michaelcdeibert
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	@Niamatullah There are many problems w/#France, but it is secular & the wrong place to look to enforce theocratic laws. #laïcité
Reply to	@Niamatullah
Tweet #	59
Writer	@ybenderbal
Date	Jan 14, 2015
Tweet	La #laïcité, c'est très beau... Toi cache ta croix ! Toi retire ton foulard ! Toi ôte ta kippa ! Par contre toi, tu peux tous les heurter...
Tweet #	60
Writer	@theonlypym
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Dans une #France vraiment #laïque, il n'y a pas d'individus appartenant à une #religion mais seulement des Hommes semblables 2/2 #laïcité
Tweet #	61
Writer	@liberte_dex
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Ma France à moi #Laicite #DISCERNEMENT #IslamNonCoupable #nonalislamophobie#liberté
Tweet #	62
Writer	@trkloubilou_88
Date	Jan 13, 2015

Tweet	#ONVPSM Quand c'est des mosquée on s'enfout mais si on dis quoi que ce sous sur les juifs on est condamné #Laicité #C'estunegrosseblague 🔥
Tweet #	63
Writer	@MDJ_Libertad
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Se retrancher derrière la #Laïcité pour promouvoir l'#IslamRadical ou l'#Antisémitisme est une honte et doit être combattu. #ONVPSM
Tweet #	64
Writer	@ychaffaud
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	#laïcité l'islam de France doit voir le jour et être porté par de grands penseurs comme @malekchebel un islam éclaire et tolérant #ONVPSM
Tweet #	65
Writer	@ychaffaud
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	#laïcité l'islam doit trouver sa place dans la république mais savoir y rester et ne pas déborder dans la sphère publique #ONVPSM
Tweet #	66
Writer	@VAN_PEEBS
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	+ 650 000 vues #DontLaïk — Continuez de partager le clip de @Medinrecords — https://youtube.com/watch?v=E7B45h_lAEk — #Barbu #Laïcité #Hijab
Tweet #	67
Writer	@FBerdougo
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Et Philippe #Tesson, il est condamné quand pour incitation à la haine ? #musulmans #CharlieHebdo #laïcité #islam http://jeanmarcmorandini.com/article-331336-les-declarations-de-philippe-tesson-contre-les-musulmans-provoquent-une-vive-polemique-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux-ecoutez.html
Tweet #	68
Writer	@LucLeGarsmeur
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	La laïcité permet à chacun de pratiquer la religion qu'il veut. Mais qu'en est il de ceux qui n'en pratiquent pas et ne veulent pas y être sans arrêt en contact. Une Dans le dialogue "républicain" entre #laïcité et #islam, deux sécularismes et deux relativismes, l'indigène est "Monsieur de Trop".
Tweet #	69
Writer	@erybbbs
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	catholiques ignorés au nom de la #laïcité musulmans et juifs encencés au nom de la #diversité #dhimmis ou demi-citoyens ?
Tweet #	70
Writer	@Pecky
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Il est urgent de donner un cours de droit français ET une leçon de #laïcité à Abdallah #Zekri : http://lefigaro.fr/actualite-

	france/2015/01/13/01016-20150113ARTFIG00115-la-representation-de-mahomet-a-la-une-de-charlie-hebdo-divise-les-musulmans.php #crétin
Tweet #	71
Writer	@Kitty_Maggy
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Est-ce que le discours de #Valls qui se voulait "musclé" sous-entendait qu'on va VRAIMENT sanctionner le port de la #burqa? #laïcité (le hashtag pour faire passer ça au nom de la laicite)
Tweet #	72
Writer	@mschuler_
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	"Pas de juifs qui peuvent avoir peur, pas de musulmans qui peuvent avoir honte en #France" @manuelvalls #laicité #11janvier
Tweet #	73
Writer	@levoisindenbas
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Bravo à Malek Boutih qui n'a pas peur de dénoncer ce qui déconne #Laicite #islam #republique #liberté
Reply to	@LePoint
Tweet #	74
Writer	@mediadroite
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	#laicité ??? #Paris 1,3 M€ pour l'Institut des Cultures d'Islam | Observatoire des subventions http://observatoiredesgaspillages.com/2015/paris-1-300-000-euros-pour-linstitut-des-cultures-dislam/ via @ObsSubventions
Tweet #	75
Writer	@m_potier
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	@franceinfo qui cite le nom des 3 policiers morts, se sent obligé de rappeler "musulman" précisement pour le défunt Mérabet. #Laicite
Tweet #	76
Writer	@quelle_france
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Un lycéen tabassé par d'autres élèves musulmans pour avoir défendu la laïcité ! https://fr.news.yahoo.com/châteauroux-ly%A2teauroux-lyc%C3%A9en-bless%C3%A9-dautres-%C3%A9l%C3%A8ves-apr%C3%A8s-avoir-d%C3%A9fendu-174253736.html #Laicite #JeSuisCharlie
Tweet #	77
Writer	@c_ldrs
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Et si chacun revendiquait uniquement sa citoyenneté française plutôt qu'afficher son appartenance religieuse... on y gagnerait tous #Laïcité
Tweet #	78
Writer	@chris78310
Date	Jan 13, 2015

Tweet	@Luciole757828 @PierreParrillo La #laïcité, merveilleuse idée du "Vivre ensemble" mais porte ouverte au #sectarisme & au #prosélytisme.
Tweet #	79
Writer	@RutabagaForever
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	La #Laïcité est au programme d'HG en 1re pro. Chaque année, je travaille avec les élèves de culture musulmane qui sont toujours attentifs.
Tweet #	80
Writer	@RevueProjet
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	"L'Europe face à l'islam" @ValerieAmiraux #islam #Laicite #europe Article en accès libre #Charlie http://revue-projet.com/articles/2014-10-amiraux-l-europe-face-a-l-islam/
Tweet #	81
Writer	@Kitty_Maggy
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Un des premiers islamogauchistes coupable de trahison de la #laïcité: #Jospin! (Nommé au Conseil Constitutionnel) in http://marianne.net/Laicite-ne-plus-rien-ceder-_a243819.html
Tweet #	82
Writer	@Kitty_Maggy
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	@FrancoisFillon demande à l'islam un effort de #laïcité comme on l'a demandé aux catholiq. #neutralité_ds_l_espace_public
Tweet #	83
Writer	@supertroll_fr
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	@JJBourdin_RMC @Place_Beauvau @senateur61 Faut vraiment être tordu pour vouloir répondre à l'intégrisme religieux par moins de #Laïcité
Tweet #	84
Writer	@AlexisdeFrance
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Ma vision philosophique de la #France : #Judaïsme = #Liberté ; #Christianisme = #Egalité ; #Islam = #Fraternité ; #Bouddhisme = #Laïcité.
Tweet #	85
Writer	@rsistons
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	Curieuse #laïcité!Le #racisme anti Juifs (nom spécial,antisémitisme) est criminalisé;le racisme anti-Musulman pas criminalisé,mais encouragé
Tweet #	86
Writer	@saibfar
Date	Jan 13, 2015
Tweet	@Despeerad0s c'est bien dit ! Et pourtant je suis francaise musulmane et les caricatures me font rire!! #Laicite #CharlieHebdo ♡

Reply to	@Despeerad0s
Tweet #	87
Writer	@aubinjullian
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	#CharlieHebdo n'est pas islamophobe, une mise au point s'impose. #Laïcité http://youtube.com/watch?v=xzIBBUogmeA&sns=tw via @youtube
Tweet #	88
Writer	@T_Pigache
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	Dans les pays musulmans, des pers. sont assassinées pour avoir critiqué l'islam. Dorénavant en France, pays laïque, aussi #Résister #Laïcité
Tweet #	89
Writer	@solastalgie
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	La #Laïcité, c'est aussi le libre exercice des cultes, dans la sûreté la plus grande possible pour les Musulmans, les Juifs et les autres
Tweet #	90
Writer	@djemilaben
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	#JesuisCharlieHebdo : des combattants de la #laïcité cible privilégiée des islamo-gauchistes http://2.xfru.it/dXgsuz
Tweet #	91
Writer	@AlissonLange
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	Cazeneuve nomme un préfet coordinateur de la sécurité des sites de la communauté juive. #laïcité ? #unité ? #musulmans ? #chrétiens ?
Tweet #	92
Writer	@jlturbet
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	"Lettre ouverte au monde musulman", par Abdennour Bidar, philosophe. http://jlturbet.net/2015/01/lettre-ouverte-au-monde-musulman-par-abdennour-bidar-philosophe.html #Religions #Islam #Laïcité
Tweet #	93
Writer	@Cairninfo
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	"La #laïcité à l'épreuve de l'#islam et des musulmans : le cas de la France." http://bit.ly/1BSS72x
Tweet #	94
Writer	@hm_hakly
Date	Jan 12, 2015
Tweet	Pourquoi on associe toujours les musulmans au terrorisme ? La stigmatisation a-t-elle un but de nuire ? #laïcité
Tweet #	95
Writer	@LerougeMarc
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	catholiques ignorés au nom de la #laïcité musulmans et juifs encencés au nom de la #diversité #dhimmis ou demi-citoyens ?
Tweet #	96

Writer	@rsistons
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	Triste journée! La #laïcité,le bien vivre ensemble,la paix sociale sont MORTS. Nous allons assister à la silencieuse chasse aux #Musulmans !
Tweet #	97
Writer	@shontell_1
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	Mr @fhollande comptez-vous, vous rendre également dans une mosquée pr rendre hommage à la communauté musulmane et chrétienne ? #laïcité
Tweet #	98
Writer	@ChristleNICOLAS
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	N'avons nous pas bafoué certaines de nos valeurs par notre trop grande tolérance à l'égard de citoyens borderline #laicite #laquestiondujour "notre trop grande tolérance"
Tweet #	99
Writer	@alainforet
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	Ni musulman ni chrétien ni juif mais hyper favorable a ce projet #laicite. Un projet de nouvelle mosquée aux Sablons: http://ouest-france.fr/le-mans-un-projet-de-nouvelle-mosquee-aux-sablons-3103808
Tweet #	100
Writer	@EricSapinParis1
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	#JeSuisCharlie Pour que chacun-e connaisse mieux la #laicité (respect mutuel) comme la non-violence dans l'histoire et la culture musulmanes
Tweet #	101
Writer	@MazKaya
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	Ce sont les jours à venir qui font le plus peur #charlie #laicité #intégration #islamophobie #aquiprofitelecrime?
Tweet #	102
Writer	@comitelaicite
Date	Jan 11, 2015
Tweet	#laicite #CLR "La gauche radicale a eu tort d'attaquer la prétendue islamophobie de « Charlie »" (C. Ramaux, Le Mo... http://ow.ly/2TawgI
Reply to	
Tweet #	103
Writer	@MoralCourage
Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	Does secularism have a problem with Islam? http://bit.ly/1AwgzYo #Laicite #CharlieHebdo #JeSuisCharlie #JeSuisAhmed
Tweet #	104
Writer	@PorteTonEspoir
Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	demain je conseille de ne pas sortir en burqa meme si c'est 1 manif pr la liberté d'expression mais pas du culte #laicite #hypocrisie
Tweet #	105
Writer	@fautpaspousser

Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	#Fppdailynews: "Attentats: Unité de la France ,unité de l'#Islam et #civilisation ?" #Laïcité http://tmblr.co/ZxFsjn1aI-TQB
Tweet #	106
Writer	@teratogenese
Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	"L'Europe face à l'islam" @ValerieAmiraux #islam #Laicite #europe Article en accès libre #Charlie http://revue-projet.com/articles/2014-10-amiraux-l-europe-face-a-l-islam/
Tweet #	107
Writer	@galitee
Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	Dans ses #voeurx, #Valls dit le plus #laïcité et #valeurs. On peut facilement y voir #autoritarisme et #islamophobie
Tweet #	108
Writer	@Nichoax
Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	C'est marrant comme, pour beaucoup, le concept de #laïcité c'est très bien mais pour les musulmans seulement #Zemmour #Ménard #GnlMartinez
Tweet #	109
Writer	@desgrivesauxlou
Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	"@glagaulle: La #laïcité aura juste été cette éphémère période de transition du #christianisme vers l'#islamisme..."#autoritarisme et #islamophobie
Tweet #	110
Writer	@dnomyar67
Date	Jan 10, 2015
Tweet	#laicité #islamnoncoupable Islamophobie, peut-être, mais que les imams de France condamnent haut et fort les #JeSuisKouachi et le #djihad
Tweet #	111
Writer	@rennmaxx
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	@franceinfo : Olivier #Bobineau "Ce qui est frappant c'est que les #musulmans n'ont pas compris ce qu'était le principe de #laïcité"
Tweet #	112
Writer	@Camille_Andres
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	#Excellent Olivier Bobineau sur @franceinfo #islam #radicalisme #laicite #JeSuisCharlie
Tweet #	113
Writer	@VincentCespedes
Date	Jan 9, 2015

Tweet	Mon père, musulman pratiquant, a tjs laissé traîner une 20aine de Canards enchaînés entre les WC et le salon http://petitlien.fr/7rpv #laicité
Tweet #	114
Writer	@HenrietteDR
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	Toucher les lieux de cultes musulmans c'est ne rien comprendre à l'importance de l'unité nationale auj http://bit.ly/1A0ngN6 #laicité
Tweet #	115
Writer	@AlgeriaFaraDaSe
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	@SouamesFarah AfraidThatNotOnlyOne[#Assertion]CouldBeRight [J[#BouGhrab: CeuxQuiDéfendentLa[#Laïcité]SontAccusésD[#Islamophobie]] @SallyKphn
Reply to	@SouamesFarah
Tweet #	116
Writer	@didierglacon
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	Maintenant, il ne faut plus que ceux qui parlent de laïcité se fassent taxer de "racistes". Merci. #laicite #racisme
Tweet #	117
Writer	@mfmutawa
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	#laïcité is an extreme form of secularism that has put #France at odds with its minorities
Tweet #	118
Writer	@LydiaGuirous
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	Itw @atlantico_fr " Le problème de fond de l' islam en France est qu'il y a autant d'islams que d'imams." #Laïcité http://atlantico.fr/decryptage/suis-charlie-pourquoi-serait-bien-qu-on-soit-aussi-policiers-profs-ou-tous-ceux-que-notre-aveuglement-ou-notre-lachete-laissent-1945482.html#4pZyr5lFxQ8tCob2.99
Tweet #	119
Writer	@Kitty_Maggy
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	@Dupinceau On dévie du sujet. Il faut renforcer la #laïcité et interdire les signes religieux ostentatoires IDENTITAIRES ds l'espace public.
Tweet #	120
Writer	@mylivre
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	"@FN_Vannes #Laïcité #Guerre Laïcité forme de neutralité qui peut engendrer la guerre!? Respect Madame. "

Tweet #	121
Writer	@marcsoulhol
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	Pas d'amalgames #jesuischarlie #libertédexpression #laicité #égalité
Tweet #	122
Writer	@kingdomholysun
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	#JeSuisCharlie #jesuisahmed #charliehebdo #Laïcité
Tweet #	123
Writer	@kingdomholysun
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	#JeSuisCharlie #jesuisahmed #charliehebdo #Laïcité
Tweet #	124
Writer	@rsistons
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	Extra lucidité : Demain, Caroline #Fourest va être sur tous les plateaux pour plaider en faveur de la "#laïcité" islamophobe et sioniste !
Tweet #	125
Writer	@GladysPinville
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	Défendre la #laïcité =être islamophobe, intégristes =musulmans:Quand des moutons ignorants imitent des moutons analphabètes #JeSuisCharlie
Tweet #	126
Writer	@AutantLedire
Date	Jan 9, 2015
Tweet	Même modéré, l'islam au quotidien agace par son prosélytisme outrancier et son arrogance. Mais pas d'amalgame... #JeSuisCharlie #laïcité
Tweet #	127
Writer	@Jffirst
Date	Jan 8, 2015
Tweet	Mobilisons nous, levons nous pour lutter contre le racisme et pour la liberté d'expression ! #RespectForMuslims #Laicité
Tweet #	128
Writer	@Michel_Verrier

Date	Jan 8, 2015
Tweet	#laïcité = #tolérance de l'autre: l'#Islam doit tolérer la caricature du prophète, et l'égise #catholique le mariage pour tous
Tweet #	129
Writer	@DaveCork9
Date	Jan 8, 2015
Tweet	Ta religion s'arrête là où commence ma liberté. #JeSuisCharlie #laicité