Stockholm University

Hand-in-Hand in the Peach Flower Land

Analysis of Huí Cadre Agency in the Literature Propaganda Magazine Kāidū River in the North-West Borderland of China

Kim Jarle Wroldsen

Doctoral Thesis in Asian Languages and Cultures at Stockholm University, Sweden 2023

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Abstract

This thesis studies how mínzú (ethnic) agency is effectuated through propaganda literature among Muslim minority cadres in the Yānqí Huí Autonomous County of the Xīnjiāng Uyghur Autonomous Region of North-West China in the 2010s. The aim is to understand to what extent and in what ways mínzú identification can have a socio-politically significant impact on the activities of mínzú cadres in a restrictive environment and in a medium where mínzú agency is controversial and difficult to implement. The thesis is motivated on the one hand by studies that presume the "monolithic" nature of cadres that speak the language of the Party-State, and on the other hand by studies that too readily presume that the invocation of Party-State orthodoxy is mere lip-service paid to authorities.

The questions are approached by studying the implications that the cadre writers' literary activities have on Huí mínzú identity in the context of the discourses that they invoke. In the process, national concerns are contrasted to mínzú concerns in order to evaluate and ascertain the intentional nature behind the invocation of mínzú concerns.

The implications of the writers' literary activities are identified by studying the role that they play in the discursive context of the literary Kāidū River magazine. The study finds that the discursive context can best be described as hybrid in nature, involving the three "sub" discourses of Neo-Confucian cosmology, Republican race theory, and Maoist thought transformation. The first revolves around a notion of cosmic truth, the second around the significance of mínzú or nations, and the third around the threats of and safeguards against ideological pollution. By employing this hybrid discourse of truth, the writers legitimized their texts as state orthodoxy.

Having identified the implications relevant for the formulation of Huí identity, the thesis describes the ways in which the Muslim minority cadres attempted to address mínzú concerns. Although national concerns permeated the texts of the Kāidū River, the writers demonstrated awareness of and the ability to work around the restrictions of Party-State discourse during the early 2010s—at least to some extent. Through selective interpretation, they legitimized off-center views while remaining within the discourse of "truth."

The thesis demonstrates how the intention of mínzú authors can be identified by studying the implications of their texts in the discursive context within which they are embedded, even when these implications are multivalent. Significantly, the thesis is able to do so by studying how relevant implications consistently are invoked and examining the degree of tolerance for contradictory meaning.

Keywords: *ethnic, minzu, cadres, literature, china, xinjiang, propaganda, ideology, islam, confucianism, discourse, nationalism, maoism.*

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PART I

Background

1.1 Introduction

In this thesis, I study the writings of Muslim minority cadres that have participated in the production of Party-State propaganda in the Yānqí Huí Autonomous County of the Xīnjiāng Uyghur Autonomous Region in North-West China in the 2010s. Specifically, I study how Huí propaganda cadres have formulated Huí identity, and what concerns and interests are served in their formulation.

Huí are among the 56 *mínzú* recognized by authorities in China. This means that Huí are imagined by most Chinese citizens and recognized by the Party-State as a population group that shares common ancestry, physical traits, and customs. Depending on the context, the term mínzú is usually translated as "ethnic group" or "nation." The Party-State defines 55 mínzú as minority mínzú, including the Huí. The 56th mínzú is the Hàn-Chinese, which in 2010 comprised about 91 percent of China's population.

The goal of studying Huí participation in propaganda has been to investigate a frequently asked question concerning mínzú minorities in China. The question concerns whether conformist minority mínzú cadres only act as pawns at the hands of the Party-State, or whether and if so in what ways they can act as autonomous representatives of their mínzú communities. The question has arisen in academic literature as a response to the uniform display of loyalty to the Party-State among many minority mínzú (and Hàn-Chinese) cadres and their monotonous adherence to officially sanctioned words and phrases.

One possibility is that the cadres' formulations of mínzú identity predominantly serve Party-State concerns, and that particularistic interests only can be addressed to the extent that they do not contradict national concerns. The US-based researcher Robert Barnett (2006/2015) labelled this the "monolithic cadre view." The view implies that minority cadres are "incapable of divergent thought" (ibid.). Or, in the words of Matthew S. Erie (2016), that they are "'angels' who through hymn and liturgy acclaim the sovereign" (p. 324), i.e., the Party-State. The "monolithic cadre view" is particularly pertinent for the case of Huí propaganda cadres in Xīnjiāng, who invariably profess loyalty to the Party-State and demonstrate intimate familiarity with and ascribe to the language of Party-State orthodoxy.

An alternative possibility is that cadres are willing to pursue particularistic concerns even when they are at odds with the concerns of the Party-State. If

this turned out to be the case among Huí propaganda cadres in Xīnjiāng, it would not mean that all Hui cadres are the same in their willingness to serve particularistic interests at the expense of the Party-State. Nor would it necessarily mean that their invocations of loyalty to the Party-State are a mere facade. It would, however, mean that some of these Huí cadres have displayed an autonomous agency beyond their role as servants of the Party-State, while continuing to situate themselves and being situated by the Party-State as loyal, albeit "monolithic," cadres. It should in such cases also be possible to illustrate how such agency is achieved under the restrictions of the Chinese political system, particularly the more severe restrictions observed in Xīnjiāng.

Studying the agency of mínzú is important because the lack of such agency would put into serious question the value of the kind of analysis that presumes the social significance of the mínzú categories recognized by the Chinese state. Whether in academic analyses or more popularized accounts in newspapers or literature, it is usually taken for granted that mínzú categories represent distinct people and that some of their socially significant behavior can be explained by such group membership.

Making such presumptions may serve analytical expediency. However, it does leave to the imagination exactly how and whether all members of the various mínzú categories exercise agency as members of the mínzú, under which circumstances their actions count as actions of the mínzú, and whether the actions related to their mínzú identity have a sufficiently significant impact on society, be it individually or collectively, to justify scholarly analysis.

The mere fact that some people call themselves Huí does not in itself mean that they behave any differently than Hàn or Bái or Salar or any other Chinese mínzú, nor does it entail that they in their behavior share something exclusive in common with all others designated with the same label, besides identification with the label itself. It is a distinct possibility that mínzú as an analytical category only attains significance through the assignment of labels and particular treatment by others. Consider the case of mínzú such as the Yí and Zhuàng, which the Chinese state famously synthesized from a variety of population groups in the 1950s loosely based on linguistic criteria, rather than criteria of self-identification (Mullaney, 2011, pp. 87–91, 114–117). Or the category-label "Huí," which—as noted by Dru Gladney—was a blanket term granted by the Communist Party-State to all Muslim citizens in China who neither spoke the language of nor otherwise identified with the Turkic minorities (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, etc.; quoted in Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, pp. 181–182). The nature of the agency of mínzú *as* mínzú in China is not as obvious as the run-of-the-mill analysis may imply.

The above questions—which concern mínzú—are familiar to researchers of "ethnic groups" and other group labels. The usefulness of "ethnic groups" as an analytical category has been a topic of discussion in anthropological works such as Thomas Hylland Eriksen's (1994/2010) *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (pp. 213–218). In fact, Chinese authorities, and with them

scholars and analysts influenced by official conventions, have since 1995 translated the term mínzú into English as "ethnic" groups (Uradyn Bulag, 2002; Millward, 2007, p. 348).

The Chinese term "mínzú" is not an import from Western Europe or the USA. Nor is it an import from minority politics in the Soviet Union, upon which the previous translation of mínzú as "nationalities" was based. Rather, the term was developed by Chinese intellectuals based on emic notions of the civilized center and the barbarian periphery, traditional ideas about lineage-based kinship, as well as Western and Soviet ideas about ethnicity, race, and nationality (Dikötter, 1992). The term has a wide range of connotations that are specific to the Chinese context and that deviate from those of the English terms "nationalities" and "ethnic groups." I have therefore chosen to leave the term untranslated, which is also recommended by scholars on mínzú in China (Jīn Bǐnggǎo, 2010, p. 171).

Studying the speech of mínzú cadres, i.e., mínzú employed by the Chinese Party-State and recognized as representatives of its official bodies, is useful for identifying and studying agency among mínzú. In China, power tends to be concentrated in the official bodies of the Party-State. This is particularly true when it comes to the power to define truth. Through mechanisms of censorship of virtually all media and public speech, either directly or indirectly, the Party-State decides what is right and wrong in matters that its leaders deem politically important (Shambaugh, 2007). Mínzú cadres engaged in propaganda act as conduits for, and thereby partake in, this power when they convey the truth of the Party-State to the general population. This power may be siphoned off to serve mínzú interests. And if they conveyed a truth that contradicts the interests of central authorities to the benefit of their own mínzú, this distortion could not be interpreted as a convoluted effort to serve Party-State interests.

The wide variety in expression of Huí identity in China makes Huí an interesting target for research on mínzú agency. In his multi-sited study, the American anthropologist Dru Gladney (1991) found Huí concerned with the minute details of interpretation of religious practice and Islam in a rural area of the Níngxià Region in North-West China, relatively secular Huí in the Chinese capital, and pork-eating Huí in South-East China. During the Qīng dynasty (1644–1911) and Republican times, the label Huí or Huíhuí was used as a general concept to denote Muslims. After the Communist takeover in 1949, the definition of Huí was narrowed down to Muslims that did not readily fall into other categories of mínzú, such as Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Salars, or Uzbeks. Chinese scholars have noted classifications of Huí into "Hàn-Huí" (Hàn-like Huí), "Tuōmào" (Mongol Huí), "Yí-Huí," "Kǎqì" (Tibetan Huí), "Bái-Huí," and "Huí-Dǎi," all depending on the language they speak and the other mínzú whose customs they adhere to (Wáng Fēng, 2012, pp. 49–50). The variety in expression of Huí identity and lack of unifying cultural practices accentuates the problematic of mínzú agency. For if Huí cannot

really be distinguished from other mínzú by reference to their cultural practices and values, it is not obvious how Huí as a mínzú could have particular interests on the behalf of which their acclaimed representatives could act. If the interests of Huí are indistinguishable from the interests of Hàn and/or other minority mínzú, any political proposition on behalf of Huí would be as much a proposition on behalf of these other mínzú.

The relatively hardline policies towards Islam in Xīnjiāng make it a feasible locality for studying Huí agency. Islam is the main identity marker that distinguishes Huí from Hàn Chinese. The hardline policies therefore accentuate the possible contradiction between Huí concerns with the preservation of their Muslim identity and national concerns about unity, thus facilitating the distinction between them. Huí in other parts of China, notably the Níngxià Huí Autonomous Region, have been known for enjoying considerable leniency from the Party-State in both religious practice and expression of religious thought. In 2006, a Níngxià Sufi could even get away with reminiscing his meeting Osama bin Laden and other radical clerics (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 68). Such leniency would be unheard of in Xīnjiāng, where a variety of restrictions to the practice of Islam have been implemented since the 1990s. As early as 1992, Gardner Bovingdon (2010) discovered a textbook from Kashgar which told students that they did not enjoy "freedom of religious belief" and that "teenagers must become atheists" (p. 70). In 1997, according to Amnesty International, the Party-State launched an "education in atheism" campaign (ibid.). When I was visiting Xīnjiāng in 2017 and 2018, signs stating "no access for minors" adorned the mosques' gates, prayers were strictly forbidden at university campuses, and Muslim students claimed they were atheist on official forms. According to the historian Rian Thum (2020/2022), after the mass internment system was introduced in 2016, it was also common to install surveillance cameras in mosques to monitor the religious habits of minorities. According to various sources, praying too often could lead police to suspect and eventually detain an individual or their relatives in facilities for ideological remolding and forced labor (p. 136).

The restrictions in Xīnjiāng were provoked by expressions of discontent that had been emerging among Uyghurs since the 1980s. Notably, following the inter-mínzú violence in the regional capital of Urumqi in July 2009, Xīnjiāng authorities tightened the supervision of religious affairs. After violence spilled over to other parts of China in 2014, Xīnjiāng authorities launched a major campaign to clamp down on anti-Chinese sentiments expressed in religion. Although Uyghurs had primary agency in provoking the restrictions on religious practice, Huí in Xīnjiāng have not been exempt from them. Xīnjiāng officialdom's discursive association of anti-Chinese sentiments with Islam meant that the assertion of Huí identity and related interests—i.e., demonstrating Huí agency—are more controversial in this region than elsewhere in China. Some observers have noted how restrictions

on religion initiated in Xīnjiāng have seeped over to other parts of China, but the restrictions on Islam in Xīnjiāng remain the strictest in the country.

Neither the definition of "mínzú agency" nor that of "ethnic agency" is self-evident. "Mínzú agency" could be defined as agency by any individual or collective that pursues a certain goal and that is associated with a certain mínzú label. However, such a definition would be highly problematic, as it would attribute a "mínzú" dimension to many activities that could be analyzed better in other ways. Activities may be carried out for economic or other reasons without the slightest regard for a certain mínzú, or even any awareness of a shared mínzú label. Applying such a definition would be like identifying trivial acts such as washing hands as "male agency" and "female agency" depending on the gender of the person involved. This is obviously not very useful, unless it signifies a relevant symbolic act.

The social work researcher Shirley Jenkins (1980) identified three different situations in which it would be appropriate to label the activities of social agencies as "ethnic." First, the activities might reflect a concern with the "culture" of the ethnic group involved. Second, the activities might reflect a concern with elevating awareness of ethnic affiliation. Third, the social agencies might be concerned with the ethnic affiliation of their staff and their clients. In short, Shirley Jenkins recognized the activities of social agencies as "ethnic" to the extent that they factored in different forms of "ethnic commitment" in their activities.

What should and should not be considered the interests of a mínzú is a highly complex question which involves political ideology. It may be controversial if the pursuit of specific mínzú-associated "interest" benefits all members of a given mínzú, and not all conceivable "mínzú" interests are necessarily emphasized or considered legitimate. I therefore do not consider it appropriate for me to *a priori* delineate categories of Huí interests. To study Huí agency, I have only considered interests that the writers themselves explicitly claim represent Huí interests. I have also analyzed if and how these interests are served in the texts produced by the cadres. This was necessary to evaluate whether and in what ways the concerns claimed by the writers affected their writing of propaganda.

The fact that I discuss mínzú interests as those recognized by Huí cadres as Huí does not mean that I consider these interests to represent the "real" interests of the Huí as a mínzú. Nor do I claim that they are mere imaginations that do not represent objective interests shared by all, a vast majority, or most Huí. I do not aim to make such a distinction. For my analysis, I am only interested in whether the idea of "mínzú" has a socially significant impact on the behavior of cadres. In this regard, agency intended to serve the "mínzú" is more important than whether the intent is misguided or not.

My definition of mínzú agency is analytically problematic in the sense that people may not be sincere (or self-aware) in terms of what they believe are mínzú interests, especially in propaganda literature. Minority mínzú

intellectuals and cadres are subject to strong incentives to define mínzú interests as identical with Party-State goals. They could, for example, imply that Huí benefit from an increased influx of Hàn migration to Yānqí by referring to economic and social development. In such a case, it is virtually impossible to tell if the cadres sincerely believe in the proposed benefits Huí derive from Hàn migration, or if they are merely trying to convince local Huí to accept and even support the migration policies of the Chinese Party-State. To overcome this analytical impediment, I focus on expressed interests that do not fully align with the policies of the Chinese state.

I am not the first to relate mínzú agency to interests. When studying ethnicity as a "new term" in 1975, the Harvard professors Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (1975) claimed that the current trend was to define ethnic groups as interest groups. They maintained that the Northern Ireland conflict was about ethnic competition over secular power, and that the contemporary language conflict in India was about differentiated access to the labor market based on ethno-linguistic affiliation. Glazer and Moynihan maintained that it was previously more common to analyze such conflicts in terms of cultural or identity preservation (p. 7). I am not sure if Glazer and Moynihan are correct in their assessment that movements calling for religious, cultural, and linguistic preservation have ever been entirely separated from more mundane interests. However, I do agree that interests should be a part of how ethnic groups, and mínzú, are defined and their agency interpreted.

During the Maoist period, the Chinese leadership also maintained that the formation of mínzú was closely linked to interests. Specifically, they claimed that all mínzú conflict boiled down to issues of class. Historical conflicts between mínzú were interpreted as conflicts of interest between oppressors and the oppressed. Mínzú consciousness was merely an incidental consequence. Based on such analysis, many Communist leaders predicted that the boundaries between mínzú would gradually vanish after China was liberated and equal rights were granted to everyone. There would simply no longer be any class-based conflicts of interest to fuel inter-mínzú conflict in a society where the shared enemy of oppressed minorities and oppressed Hàn-Chinese was defeated (Gladney, 1991, p. 73). The fact that the prediction turned out to be wrong does not invalidate the proposition that mínzú boundaries are reinforced through the identification with and pursuit of collective interests. Rather, it merely suggests that mínzú boundaries are not solely maintained by shared socio-economic situation and family background.

The analytical usefulness of relating mínzú to interests is perhaps most pronounced in the formulation of mínzú identity in the public language of propaganda. The British sociologist Richard Jenkins (2014) has described identity as "a multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it" (p. 6). This means that the formulation of Huí identity in Party-State propaganda provides a blueprint for who the Huí are and what role they play in Chinese society. The blueprint not only tells Huí how they should

be and act to be a proper Huí. It also tells Hàn-Chinese (and other mínzú) what they can, or should be able to, expect from their Huí countrymen. Such a blueprint can legitimize privileges such as extra scores on university entrance examinations for mínzú, the allocation of poverty funds to minority mínzú counties, or simply tolerance and respect for mínzú customs and religion. Conversely, it can legitimize and motivate policies to clamp down on expressions of religious fervency or mínzú particularism as symptomatic of anti-Party and anti-Hàn sentiments. It can guide security forces and cadres to trust members of specific mínzú, or brand them as high-risk individuals. Not all Huí, Hàn, and other mínzú may accept the blueprint of Huí identity offered by public language. Yet the authority granted to the blueprint by its sanctification as state orthodoxy is far too significant for it to be without significance to those recognized or classified by the state as Huí.

As source material for propaganda literature produced by Huí cadres in Xīnjiāng, I have studied the propaganda magazine called *Kāidū River* (开都河). The magazine is useful not only because it contains literature produced by Huí cadres in which Huí identity is discussed and formulated in a format recognized as state orthodoxy. What makes the magazine particularly useful is also that unlike a lot of other propaganda literature, it contains short biographies of authors, and articles are specifically attributed to authors that have contributed to the magazine. The biographies inform the reader about the occupation, mínzú affiliation, and former writings by the contributors involved. Thanks to the biographies, it is possible to know for certain that most authors are in fact cadres that hail from various government and Party institutions in the Yānqí Huí Autonomous County.

Another reason the magazine is useful as source material is that it was published in the period 2010–2017. This was a period in which the Party-State implemented increased supervision and control of Islam in Xīnjiāng. This means that I can study change in the mínzú agency demonstrated by Huí authors during a period in which the space for such agency was progressively narrowed down.

Furthermore, the magazine is valuable because it was earmarked for "internal publication." Although the label indicates that the magazine was only supposed to be read by other "insiders" (i.e., Party-State cadres), it was in fact freely distributed to interested readers in Yānqí Town, even through the local Xīnhuá Bookstore. A local cadre indicated to me that the "internal publication" label was useful for avoiding what Bovingdon (2010) describes as the "battery of censors" that all publications in Xīnjiāng are supposed to go through. At a thesis defense session at Xinjiang Normal University in 2017, I heard a teacher similarly suggesting that a controversial thesis could circumvent censorship by labelling it as an "internal publication" (and in this way pass the thesis defense). The relative absence of official censorship did not mean that the *Kāidū River* authors and editors could write whatever they

wanted. They would still be held accountable for their textual productions. However, it did mean that they could be more sincere about their opinions and not as restricted by official set phrases and viewpoints as other propaganda publications.

I am not the first researcher to tackle the question of mínzú agency in a discursive sphere largely characterized by ostensible subscription to and emulation of state orthodoxy formulated at the national level in China. Another scholar is the Tibetologist Robert Barnett (2006/2015), who argued that mínzú cadres that pay lip-service to the state, and even implement policies that harm the interests of their mínzú, often achieve more for their mínzú than cadres who openly defy the state. To bolster his argument, Barnett referred to Party-State distrust regarding the loyalty of Tibetan cadres, instances of defection to the West, as well as initiatives by mínzú cadres to promote Tibetan literature, music, religion, and medicine. He further noted that initiatives for the promotion of Tibetan culture have been hampered by public unrest and more open calls for Tibetan independence.

Barnett's analysis has one vital flaw, however. He made too many presumptions about the intentions of cadres that speak the language of the state and carry out its policies. He maintained that the mínzú elite's speech and actions are coerced by the state, and that they therefore do not represent their *true* thoughts and intentions. Because he cannot really know what is going on inside the minds of mínzú cadres, his short conclusion of two paragraphs was full with words such as "likely," "may," "seem," "apparently," and "might." Efforts such as promoting mínzú culture could have been motivated by concerns with the economic interests of the local Party-State in attracting tourism, demonstrating to mínzú citizens the magnanimity of the Party-State, or propagating a specific interpretation of mínzú culture that fits with the Party-State's interests in enforcing law and order.

Difficulty in ascertaining the intentions of the "collaborating" cadres and subsequent difficulty in separating servitude from autonomous agency is a flaw that Barnett shares with other researchers aiming to identify agency among mínzú cadres. For example, in his book exploring "the Mongol experience" in China, the Cambridge-educated Mongol scholar Uradyn Bulag (2002) interpreted former governor Ulanhu's (*in office*: 1947–1966) promotion of Mongol socialist models in Inner Mongolia during the 1960s as aimed at strengthening the credentials of Mongols in an ideological competition with the Hàn-Chinese. He portrayed Ulanhu's initiatives as an example of Mongol agency. However, Ulanhu's initiatives may just as well be interpreted as Ulanhu demonstrating his loyalty to Běijīng by intensifying ideological education in Inner Mongolia.

These forms of analyses generally presume—in the fashion of James Scott—that cadres are using a "public transcript" in which they demonstrate deference and loyalty when dealing with superiors, and a "hidden transcript" offstage in which they reveal their "true" feelings (Uradyn Bulag, 2002). This

could in some cases be a useful distinction to make. But making such presumptions about cadres when scholars only have access to a "public transcript" about them is not good science. Even in those instances where a "hidden transcript" is available, it is possible that the "hidden transcript" in question was produced in interaction with a soliciting foreign scholar or journalist and may not be any truer to the cadre in question than the "public transcript" when it was performed. Different circumstances, such as in an interview situation or following migration, may encourage variegated performances of loyalty. The categorization of speech and conduct into true and false "transcripts" will often be very vague and subjective. The performance of "hidden transcripts" must therefore be analyzed and subjected to scrutiny in many of the same ways as "public transcripts," and doing so is simply not possible in those instances where they are not available.

To overcome this methodological flaw, I have strived to be clear in my analysis in terms of what mínzú cadres did when they participated in the production of state orthodoxy on Huí identity. I will demonstrate that by making certain statements about Huí identity, they unambiguously served specific interests. I have strived to attain a clear and consistent theoretical understanding of how specific statements by mínzú cadres in the *Kāidū River* related to one another and how they interacted to produce what I call a blueprint of Huí identity. I have strived to clarify how statements made by Huí cadres in Yānqí related to statements made by Chinese leaders and their representatives at the national level, how they related to statements made by Huí cadres in other parts of Xīnjiāng and China at large, and how they related to statements made outside propaganda literature. By formulating a solid theoretical understanding of what it meant for cadres to make specific statements related to the formulation of Huí identity, I have been able to analyze the concerns and interests they served and avoided the pitfall of speculating about the hidden intents of the authors who made them.

Before proceeding to the theoretical chapter, I find it appropriate to provide a brief description of the Yānqí Huí Autonomous County and its people. This will provide additional context that may help readers follow my analysis.

Yānqí is also known as Qarasheher (喀喇沙尔), a Uyghur name which translates to "Black City" (Jīn Yīxīn et al., 2009, p. 235). It is a strategically located desert oasis in the passageway through the Tiānshān (Tengri Tagh) Mountains which divide the Xīnjiāng Uyghur Autonomous Region into the steppes and valleys of North Xīnjiāng and the Uyghur desert of South Xīnjiāng. The county seat, Yānqí Town, is located on the north bank of the Kāidū River.

Figure 1: Location of Yānqí in Xīnjiāng, North-West China.

Due to its strategic location, Yānqí was an important node on the historical Silk Road (Qí Shàngmíng & Liú Yīngguī, 1998, p. 2). Trade-related wealth is perhaps why the family that ruled over Yānqí from the second or third century until 766 was flatteringly labelled the "House of Dragon" (龙氏) in Chinese sources (pp. 618–625). It maintained some significance as an economic and administrative center up until 1961, when its status as seat of the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefectural government was passed on to Korla in the south (p. 756). Nowadays, the economic significance of Yānqí revolves around the production and processing of agricultural products—including staples, fruits, and spices—and service provision for residents (YHAC Statistics Bureau, 2011).

The premodern inhabitants of Yānqí or Qarasheher were proto-Uyghurs. I say proto because the term "Uyghur" was not used before the advent of nationalism in Xīnjiāng in the 20th century. The population of Yānqí and Xīnjiāng were instead referred to using generic terms such as Sarts, "Turban Muslims" (缠头回子) or simply "locals" (*yerlik*) (Brophy, 2016, pp. 31–34). The extent to which the "locals" of the different oases during the Qīng dynasty

(1644–1911) identified with one another vis-à-vis outsiders is a topic of contention (ibid., pp. 33–34).

Huí and Hàn presence in Yānqí dates back to the 18th century. Following the Qīng conquest of Xīnjiāng in 1759, presumably loyal subjects were relocated from Shǎnxī (Shaanxi) and Gānsù to "stabilize the borderland" (移民实边) (Qí Shàngmíng & Liú Yīngguī, 1998, p. 118). A number of merchants also came with the Qīng soldiers (p. 119). The colonizing project of the Qīng-rulers was severely disrupted during the Kokandian Yaqub Beg's occupation of Xīnjiāng in 1865–1877. Following the occupation, 3 800 Muslim rebels of the great Shǎnxī Hui (Dungan) Revolt (1862–1877) were settled in Yānqí (p. 136; Juānzi, 2007, p. 48). In 1903, about 2 000 Jahriyya Huí survivors from a rebellion in the Héhuáng area of Gānsù and Qīnghǎi were settled on the south bank of the Kāidū River, next to Yānqí Town (Qí Shàngmíng & Liú Yīngguī, 1998, p. 119; Juānzi, 2009, p. 86). According to the *YHAC Chronicle*, a census made towards "the end of the Qīng dynasty" (presumably around the years 1877–1911) counted 13 128 Uyghurs (51.1%), 8 606 Mongols (33.5%)[1], 3 956 Huí (15.4%), and 90 Hàn (0.35%) in Yānqí Town and its surrounding area (Qí Shàngmíng & Liú Yīngguī, 1998, p. 107). This indicates that the Jahriyya migrants of 1903 made up a quite significant part of the Huí population. The Huí rebels of the 1870s may have included Jahriyya as well, especially considering their role in the Shǎnxī Huí Revolt. But this is not specified in historical records. The concentration of Jahriyya in Yǒngníng Town next to Yānqí Town—and the fact that Yānqí became the place of residence for the inheritor of the spiritual lineage of Jahriyya in South Xīnjiāng (p. 1014)—contributed to a sense of community and a tendency to portray Jahriyya as representative of Huí in Yānqí.

The Jahriyya is a religious order founded in the 1760s by a returnee, Mǎ Míngxīn (1719–1781), who had spent his youth studying Sufism in Mecca and Yemen (Lipman, 1998, p. 86). His proselytizing in the Gānsù and Qīnghǎi

[1] The relatively large population of Mongols in this census is related to migration and a broader definition of the Yānqí area during the Qīng dynasty. In 1771, some 50 000 to 70 000 Torghut and Khoshuut Mongols returned from the Volga region in Russia to China (Millward, 2007, p. 100). In 1773, Qīng authorities divided these Mongols into a North, West, South, and East Division (路) (Qí Shàngmíng & Liú Yīngguī, 1998, p. 129). Ubashi Khan, who had led the Torghuts and Khoshuuts back to China, was appointed chief (盟长) of the South Division. The four Torghut and three Khoshuut banners of the South Division were settled in present-day YHAC and the neighboring counties of Héjìng ("Peaceful and Tranquil," changed from "Peaceful and Pacified" in 1965), Héshuò ("Khoshuut"), and Bóhú ("Bosten Lake") (ibid.). Before 1937, the administrative area of Yānqí County included the present day counties of Héjìng, Héshuò, Bóhú, and the city of Korla (ibid., p. 23, 70; Jīn Yīxīn et al., 2009, p. 46). This explains why Mongols counted 8 606 (33.5%) of the population in the Qīng census of the Yānqí area, yet only 3 621 (2.1%) in the 2015 census of YHAC. In contrast, Mongols counted 30 816 (16.8%) in Héjìng, 5 740 (8.7%) in Héshuò, and 4 303 (7.1%) in Bóhú county (Statistics Bureau of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 2017).

provinces brought him into conflict with another Sufi order, the Khufiyya. The Khufiyya secured the support of local authorities and got Mǎ Míngxīn arrested for disturbing public order (p. 107). This provoked the Jahriyya to revolt, who considered Mǎ Míngxīn to be their sacred leader. This was the first of numerous Jahriyya revolts against the Qīng dynasty in the 18th and 19th centuries. Each of these revolts were brutally oppressed. As punishment for subversion and to break their sense of community, the surviving Jahriyya were scattered by authorities to distant corners of the empire. But the collective memory of suffering and oppression only contributed to strengthening their sense of community. Resilience in the face of suffering and oppression are the main themes in Mǎ Lìjuān's Hong Kong-published novel on the Huí of Yānqí, which has been praised by some locals as conveying the essence of their identity. They are also the main themes of the famous novel *History of the Soul* by the Jahriyya author Zhāng Chéngzhì (1948–...).

During the Republican period (1911–1949), the number of Hàn Chinese increased to 1 086 (4.3%) in 1944 (Qí Shàngmíng & Liú Yīngguī, 1998, p. 107). During the Communist Period (1949–...), through migration and relocation policies, the Hàn-Chinese were transformed from a minority to the majority with a population of 91 225 (52.8%) in 2015, as compared to 45 786 (26.5%) Uyghurs and 31 052 (18.0%) Huí (Statistics Bureau of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 2017).

1.2 Theory

An initial answer to what Huí cadres do when they contribute statements about Huí identity in the *Kāidū River*, and how they in doing so may serve the Huí as a mínzú, is found in the writings of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Although Foucault himself never wrote about Huí or even Chinese mínzú, he did produce volumes of text discussing what he called discourse. As used by Foucault (1971/1972) in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, discourses refer to either relatively specific fields of knowledge, such as those defining what it means to be a Huí or a mínzú, or broader fields of knowledge setting the boundaries and forms of inquiry of people in a historical period. These discourses are not some sort of Zeitgeist from which ordinary language is produced. Instead, discourses are constituted by the very statements that they generate. Following Foucault, Huí cadres that make statements about Huí identity thus contribute to maintaining and even reinventing a field of knowledge about Huí and mínzú. Because knowledge frames and limits our interpretation of events, Foucault's model predicts that Huí should be interested in ensuring that this field of knowledge is favorable to Huí as a mínzú.

According to the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1993), people are motivated to participate in the production of knowledge to the extent that they can address their concerns through such participation. If people do not sense that a specific system of knowledge is effective for addressing their concerns, they tend towards alternative systems of knowledge ("traditions of knowledge") (p. 349). In present-day China, knowledge systems alternative to those recognized as state orthodoxy can be found in informal communication (certain social media, face-to-face conversations) that are subjected to less surveillance from the Party-State. The fact that Huí cadres from various components of the Party-State in Yānqí have chosen to contribute texts to the *Kāidū River*, a format in which they are forced to strictly speak in the language of the state, implies that they believe some of their concerns can be addressed through such participation. This is particularly true for elderly and retired contributors to the magazine, who could have referred to health issues or just fatigue to avoid the pressure of participating. Therefore, if these cadres maintain that Huí as a mínzú have certain interests and if they are motivated to engage in activities on behalf of these interests, then these interests were likely reflected in the texts of the authors—at least in those texts that relate to Huí identity.

Not all innovative statements about Huí identity are necessarily successful in reinventing the state discourse on Huí. In one of his lectures, Foucault (1970/1972) argued that several mechanisms exist to prevent the arbitrary development of a given discourse. One such mechanism can be found in the rules for who has the right to contribute to the discourse. This means that not all statements about Huí identity in China will become an accepted part of state orthodoxy. To contribute to state orthodoxy, a statement must be included in a media affiliated with Chinese propaganda authorities. Although authors affiliated with Chinese propaganda authorities may be influenced by contributions to the broader field of "knowledge" about Huí in society, these influences only become a part of state orthodoxy when a certified propagandist or leader of high political stature decides to include it in his or her writings or speech. This means that the affiliation of the *Kāidū River* with the Party's Propaganda Department in Yānqí is a necessary component for the mínzú authors' participation in the reproduction of state orthodoxy on Huí. Furthermore, for a given innovation to become socially significant, the statement must be sufficiently disseminated, convincing, and politically viable that other propagandists (and national leaders in particular) also incorporate it in their writings and speeches.

When it comes to the question of how statements by contributors to the *Kāidū River* interact to produce a blueprint of Huí identity, an initial answer has also been provided by Foucault. Statements, according to Foucault, take different forms. To make a statement, authors do not need to evoke a specific sentence that corresponds to the statement or even use specific words. They can convey the same message by implying it in a paragraph, by using a symbol or specific style of writing associated with the statement, by including a graph that implies the statement, or by writing a parable that conveys the statement. Statements conveyed in sentences, paragraphs, writing styles, graphs, symbols and so on are determined by the conventions of the discourse involved. These conventions are themselves made up of the statements of the discourse. To put it simply, when an author makes a statement about Huí identity, they do this with reference to and by reproducing existing conventions of the discourse. The authors get the message conveyed in the text because their readers already have some familiarity with the same discourse. As such, statements about Huí identity that are repeatedly reproduced in the *Kāidū River* constitute a blueprint of Huí identity.

While the state orthodoxy of the *Kāidū River* may have been produced in the geographical and political periphery of China, it was not made in isolation. The hierarchical structure in the production of truth in China has been described by the Swedish historian Michael Schoenhals (1992). From central levels of authority, the Communist Party of China's (CPC) Propaganda Department, the Xīnhuá News Agency, and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Political Department dispatch instructions to government bodies, party organs, media, and publishers listing expressions that are appropriate to use in

specific contexts and expressions that should no longer be applied. These institutions have also dispatched instructions on specific topics and research methodologies that should be avoided. These instructions are intended to force authors and editors to produce texts that are aligned with the current propaganda goals of national authorities, without having to make a full analysis of every text produced in China.

Foucault's description of the statement clarifies how the prescription of specific expressions forces authors and editors to produce texts aligned with Party-State propaganda goals. For if statements can take the form of everything from sentences, paragraphs, writing styles, graphs, and symbols, they can certainly take the form of formalized expressions. By using prescribed expressions in the discussion of specific issues, authors do not only demonstrate respect for and loyalty to the Party-State. They are also making statements that are implied by or directly spelled out in these expressions. For example, if an author wants to discuss inter-mínzú conflict and is forced to invoke a formalized expression celebrating the unity and equality of mínzú in Xīnjiāng, the author can only really refer to "a small minority" of troublemakers threatening to disrupt unity. The author cannot claim that the problems are pervasive. Doing so would be in direct contradiction to the official phrases for describing mínzú relations.

In the Yānqí Huí Autonomous County, the Yānqí CPC Propaganda Department is tasked with ensuring that local authorities, media, and artists abide by the guidelines from Běijīng (and Urumqi). They are also tasked with the overall supervision of work aimed at forming the ideological consciousness of Yānqí residents by organizing and instructing local party members and cadres in studying ideology and doing propaganda, and ensuring that research and education are aligned with state ideology. They are the county watchdog of political correctness. The *Kāidū River* is intended as a tool wielded by the Propaganda Department to shape the minds of Yānqí residents. Although it is edited by the Literature and Arts Department, a nominally autonomous "mass organization," the front cover of the magazine states in unambiguous terms that the magazine has been commissioned by the Propaganda Department.

As an officially labelled mouthpiece of the Yānqí propaganda authorities, the *Kāidū River* provided an avenue for Huí cadres to write as certified propagandists. They were delegated the power to speak with the voice of truth. Writing for the *Kāidū River* came with a price, however, in that the texts had to be accepted by the board of editors. The board of editors included high ranking cadres from the Yānqí Propaganda Department. This means that the authors should not have been able to contribute texts that the Yānqí Propaganda Department would not find to be useful for the national objectives of ideological education. To demonstrate mínzú agency, Huí cadres would have to do so while convincingly demonstrating that any interests they pursue are aligned with the goals of the Party-State. Their capacity to do so in

instances where the mínzú interests contradict the expressed interests of the Party-State is not obvious. However, the fact that Huí cadres have demonstrated the willingness to contribute articles to the *Kāidū River* suggests a conviction that they can address their concerns in this way.

In short, Huí cadres have an objective interest in portraying Huí identity in a way that is favorable to Huí as a mínzú. National authorities have their own interests and seek to ensure their representation in locally produced state orthodoxy on Huí identity by restricting the forms of language and by direct supervision through the Yānqí CPC Propaganda Department. When Huí cadres contributed statements on Huí identity in the textual format of the *Kāidū River*, they had to cater to such national interests. At the same time, if local Huí cadres were concerned about the interests of Huí as a mínzú, they would likely attempt to address these interests while respecting the forms of language demanded by propaganda authorities.

The questions of identifying whether local Huí cadres demonstrate such concerns in the *Kāidū River*, whether it was possible for them to address mínzú interests while under tight restriction of national guidelines and Xīnjiāng policies, whether mínzú interests can be distinguished from national interests, and to what extent mínzú interests that contradict national interests have been voiced in propaganda literature are as much methodological questions as they are empirical ones. What is needed is not only observation of what the Huí cadres have written in their texts about Huí identity but also a methodology for identifying the texts as part of discourses and for identifying and distinguishing national interests and local Huí interest.

1.3 Methodology

As an initial step in my analysis, I read through all 18 of the 29 issues of the *Kāidū River* magazine that I was able to find in Yānqí Town—i.e., the administrative seat of the Yānqí Huí Autonomous County—in the year 2017. These include all issues preserved at the Yānqí library as well as those available at the local Xīnhuá bookstore. I made an unsuccessful attempt to request the missing issues from Kòu Yùyīng, the editor-in-chief of the magazine. I could probably have acquired them if I had made further inquiries among locals where the magazine had been distributed. However, my presence in the town was already a source of suspicion, and such a venture would have been difficult. For example, one day while resting in my hotel room, I received a surprise visit from three police officers, one of whom was armed. Someone had reported that I had walked past the local Uyghur Mosque. The police officers inquired about my intentions in Yānqí, whether I was in possession of religious materials such as the Quran, and whether I *really* was allowed to borrow materials from the library. When I revisited Yānqí in 2018, I made an inquiry about the matter to a local cadre in charge of cultural affairs and who also happened to be a friend. However, she indicated that it would have to wait until the political situation in Xīnjiāng is less tense.

Identifying discourse

When reading through these 18 issues of the *Kāidū River*, I encountered a problem in terms of identifying a discourse on Huí identity and mínzú. Rather than finding a single discourse on Huí identity and minority mínzú, the authors used multiple discourses to discuss Huí identity. Furthermore, these discourses constituted systems of knowledge much broader than the field of knowledge on Huí and minority mínzú. Huí and minority mínzú were only specific cases that the discourses interpreted. The simultaneous invocation of multiple discourses made it difficult for me to pinpoint exactly how Huí identity was constructed by the Huí cadres of the *Kāidū River*.

To deal with this challenge, I decided to focus on texts written by the most active contributors to the magazine. This allowed me to get a sense of the different authors' narrative styles and techniques. By having a sense of their styles, I was able to comprehend more precisely what the authors wanted to convey when making various claims. When reading the texts, I not only made

note of the statements they made about Huí identity, I also analyzed the function these statements had in the texts. As I engaged in this process, I began to get a sense of the systems of knowledge that were used in the writers' formulation of Huí identity. Furthermore, I found that these systems were not only reproduced by the authors in their separate texts, oeuvres, or in the *Kāidū River*, but that they were part of broader discourses in China that should be familiar to keen observers of Chinese society. To more efficiently comprehend how the authors' usage and reproduction of these statements were related to the broader discourses in China, I read academic works on these discourses. I have labelled the identified discourses Neo-Confucian cosmology, Republican race theory, and Maoist thought transformation. I found that all statements on Huí identity in the *Kāidū River* invoked one or multiple of these three discourses.

The above description of my process for identifying discourses is relatively abstract. I will attempt to clarify my methodological process through the example of my reading of an essay by the Jahriyya Sufi author Mǎ Lìjuān, summarizing it and then pointing out the challenges. While some readers may find this unconventional, I think the inclusion of a brief analysis will convey my methodology more effectively than a purely abstract discussion. The essay in question is called "The Pear Flowers are Blossoming, the Fragrance of Nan-Bread is Hanging in the Air" (Juānzi, Summer 2011). In the essay, Mǎ Lìjuān wrote about how she one day decided to make Uyghur-style nan-breads. She sought help from her Uyghur neighbor, an odd-looking man by the name of Jappar. After some reluctance, as Uyghur men (according to Mǎ Lìjuān) find household chores beneath them, Jappar decided to help her out. After making the nan-breads, Mǎ Lìjuān fantasized about the Peach Flower Land—an imaginary utopia in Chinese literature where people are untouched by modern society. She contemplated demonstrating contentment and tranquility while treating her worn-out friends to nan-bread. She thought about being a warm and gentle housewife that serves tea. She thought about reading books and poems while listening to the song of birds. And she thought about walking in Jappar's peach garden with feet as light as if she was walking on clouds or water.

When reading the essay, what Mǎ Lìijuān said about Huí identity is not obvious. In fact, she did not mention Huí people in the text at all. What she did was to describe a representative of another mínzú, Jappar, as a scrawny Uyghur with Picassoesque facial features and slightly male-chauvinist attitudes—when she put the nan-bread in the oven the wrong way, Jappar yelled at her for being an idiot. Yet despite his rough edges, Mǎ Lìjuān implied that Jappar was good on the inside. In her essay, Jappar and his peach garden represent society before it became civilized and polluted by modernity.

Although Mǎ Lìjuān's text concerns a Uyghur, she was also making a statement about Huí. By situating Jappar as the epitome of unpolluted primitivity and contrasting it to an unspecified "we" or "us," Mǎ Lìjuān was

situating herself, her readers, and other Huí as civilized and modern. To Mǎ Lìjuān, the men among "us" are less chauvinist and "we" have normal facial features. Yet "we" are driven to toil and suffering by modernity. "We" therefore have much to learn from the primitive Uyghur man. By studying the primitive Uyghur, "we" can achieve peace of mind and learn to appreciate simple joys such as reading, making food, strolling among pear trees, making and serving food, and being a good wife.

To understand what "we" or "us" meant for Mǎ Lìjuān, one needs to be familiar with both the discursive context in which Mǎ Lìjuān was invoking her message and her habitual style of writing. Mǎ Lìjuān assumed that the reader would understand what she meant by the unspecified "us."

When reading other texts by Mǎ Lìjuān and her fellow authors in the *Kāidū River*, it becomes clear that Mǎ Lìjuān's "we" had different meanings. In some contexts, she specifically referred to "us" as "us Huí." In other contexts, she and other authors used the term to refer to modern people. The latter meaning was predominant in this essay. She associated modern people with urban residents, who stand in contrast to rural residents, especially those of her parental generation and people with lower education. Significantly, she and other authors in the *Kāidū River* associated modern society with Hàn-Chinese, Hàn-Chinese language (Mandarin) and the Chinese education system. In fact, official forms in China typically refer to progression in the public education system as "level of culture." In the *Kāidū River*, Hàn-Chinese and modern society tended to be contrasted to premodern minority mínzú. The association of minority mínzú with the premodern included Huí. However, as implied by the "we" in the essay, younger people such as Mǎ Lìjuān were presumably tainted by the modern society of the Hàn-Chinese. By situating a modern "we" that includes Huí people in contrast to premodern Uyghurs, she implied that Huí are more modern (and Chinese) than Uyghurs. This went along with prevalent portrayals in China of Huí as culturally similar to the Hàn-Chinese and Uyghurs as familiar "strangers," as Bovingdon (2010) described it.

The above reading of Mǎ Lìjuān's essay suggests that the contrast between the modern and premodern is the essence of the discourse on Huí and mínzú reproduced in the *Kāidū River*. It suggests that statements on Huí and mínzú may be related to this dichotomy. After all, Fredrik Barth's circumstantialist theory on the maintenance of ethnic boundaries emphasizes dichotomies in which one ethnic group is defined in opposition to the other. In his linguistic approach to anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss similarly emphasized "binary opposites" as a fundamental aspect of how people from different cultures interpret the world (Dundes, 1997, pp. 46–48). Even Foucault famously emphasized the dichotomies of reason and madness, truth and falsehood (1961/2006).

However, even though it is an important component of how Huí authors of the *Kāidū River* conceptualized Huí identity and mínzú, I found that it would be both simplistic and inaccurate to attempt to attribute all statements, or all

essential statements, on Huí identity and mínzú in the *Kāidū River* to a single dichotomy of the modern and the premodern. For one thing, the authors of the magazine sometimes romanticized the premodern as a manifestation of good from which the corrupted modern person can learn, as in Mǎ Lìjuān's essay. At other times, they praised modernity and rationality as the path to salvation from the poverty and savagery of the premodern. The premodern as negative and the modern as positive (or vice versa) is therefore not a trait that can accurately encapsulate the discourse of the *Kāidū River*. The dichotomy of the good and the bad did not consistently overlap with the dichotomy of the premodern and the modern. This implies that the authors were invoking not one but two or more discourses that each have their internal logic, a logic that does not remain consistent across the discourses.

By doing a focused reading of the texts written by the most prolific contributors to the magazine, and with the help of my prior knowledge in the field of China studies, I was able to attribute recurring statements to different discourses. To investigate further, I consulted academic writings describing these discourses in the broader context of China and compared them to the texts of the *Kāidū River* authors. The result of this effort was that I identified three different discourses dominating the authors' formulation of Huí identity and minority mínzú. The three discourses were Neo-Confucian cosmology, Republican race theory, and Maoist thought transformation.

At the core of Neo-Confucian cosmology is the idea of an eternal and immutable standard of cosmic truth. In the discourse, the moral value of any pattern of behavior, thought, and speech is evaluated by its alignment to this standard. The Huí authors of the *Kāidū River* referred to the discourse to legitimize their formulation of Huí identity.

At the core of Republican race theory is the idea of race, ethnic group, nation, or mínzú being the primary principle of identification. In the discourse, people are morally evaluated by their display of loyalty to their mínzú or nation. People are often also evaluated by the perceived social development of their affiliated race or mínzú.

At the core of Maoist thought transformation is the notion that most people are inherently good, but susceptible to deception and corruption by the few people that are evil. Their minds must therefore be protected by leaders with a superior insight into cosmic truth. In the discourse, people are therefore morally evaluated by their ability to comprehend the wisdom of the national leadership.

Although the invocation of the three discourses led the authors to contradict themselves, the discourses were not independent of one another. The Republican demand for loyalty to the race, ethnic group, nation, or mínzú was justified with reference to Neo-Confucian ideas about filial piety as a manifestation of truth. The Maoist concern with the vulnerability of the common people to deception was derived from Neo-Confucian ideas about the pure yet vulnerable traits of children. Conversely, Republican and Maoist

invocation of Neo-Confucian discourse ensured its continued legitimization and perpetuation. In this sense, the three discourses constituted a larger, integrated, hybrid, and simultaneously inconsistent discourse of truth.

In addition to looking at texts written by the most active Huí authors in the *Kāidū River*, I have also looked at publications by the most active Hàn authors. This is because the texts by the Huí authors were not made in isolation from the texts of the Hàn authors. Not only were readers of the *Kāidū River* equally exposed to texts by both Hàn and Huí authors. The Hàn and Huí authors also made references to each other's texts. They engaged in the same discourses in their discussion of Huí and mínzú identity. To understand if and how Huí authors attempted to address the concerns and interests of their mínzú through the discourses of the *Kāidū River*, I thus found it useful to relate their texts to those produced by their Hàn-Chinese colleagues.

For the same reasons, I also studied the texts by Uyghur contributors to the magazine. While Uyghurs have made far fewer contributions to the magazine, portrayals of Uyghurs and Uyghur identity were and still are sufficiently significant for Xīnjiāng politics that studying them is important for attaining a more wholesome understanding of the context in which the Huí authors were writing. Nevertheless, the primary focus of my analysis is the texts by Huí authors, and I will only occasionally refer to texts by Hàn-Chinese and Uyghur authors.

9

Identifying national concerns

As already discussed, the leaders of the Chinese Party-State attempt to control public discourse through the censorship apparatus. Schoenhals and Foucault have provided me with a description of how such control can be achieved through the mandatory formalization of language. In Yānqí, the supervision of language is officially carried out by the CPC Propaganda Department, with which the *Kāidū River* is directly associated. This means that the concerns and interests of the national leadership ought to be directly reflected in the texts of the magazine.

To identify such concerns and to distinguish them from the authors' own, I decided to study white papers published by the Chinese State Council in the period from 1997 to 2019. This period extends before and shortly after the publication of the *Kāidū River*, which was from 2010 to 2017. I chose to include publications from a couple of years before and after the timeline of the magazine because I recognize that they may shed additional light on the concerns and interests of the national leadership in China. I did not consider white papers from further back in time because the concerns of the Chinese leadership have changed over the decades, and earlier State Council publications may therefore not be as relevant for understanding the restrictions faced by authors in the 2010s.

The white papers were compiled and published under purview of the State Council Information Office. Together with the CPC Propaganda Department and sometimes the General Administration of Press and Publications, the office had overall authority for monitoring the content of news nationwide (Shambaugh, 2007, p. 30). The office was merged with the External Propaganda Leading Group in January 1991, an institution formerly established under the joint sponsorship of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council (p. 47). Since then, the Information Office has been responsible not only for propaganda in the form of news aimed at domestic audiences, but also for propaganda aimed at foreigners. The compilation of white papers is an important component of the latter effort.

Through its white papers, the Information Office aims to explain and justify Chinese domestic and foreign policies to the outside world. This includes domestic policies aimed at minority mínzú. Because they are intended as a tool for justifying the decisions of the Chinese leadership to domestic and foreign audiences, the white papers provide a useful source of information about what Chinese leaders have agreed represent the collective concerns and interests of the Party-State. The authors of the white papers may not always be honest (nor fully conscious) in terms of why the Chinese leadership pursues certain policies—assertion of specific motivations can be a pragmatic technique of justification. Yet the white papers provide an authoritative list of concerns and interests claimed by the national leadership that can be analyzed and discussed.

Using the list of concerns and interests that the national leadership claims have motivated minority mínzú policies during the period that the *Kāidū River* magazine was published, I will discuss to what extent and in what ways these concerns and interests were addressed by Huí cadres in their formulation of Huí identity. By comparing the concerns expressed by authors in the *Kāidū River* to national concerns, I will demonstrate to what extent the concerns claimed by authors were homages to those expressed by the national leadership or represented distinct concerns on behalf of Huí as a mínzú. If the concerns voiced by the authors repeatedly deviated from or even contradicted concerns expressed at the national level, and if this deviation was reflected in their formulation of Huí identity, this would indicate that Huí cadres did indeed play a distinct role in the formulation of Huí identity in which they demonstrated agency as a mínzú. If, on the other hand, they were fully aligned with concerns expressed at the national level, and Huí concerns cannot be distinguished from these, it may suggest that the Huí authors were not acting on behalf of the Huí and that they were merely reproducing national propaganda to serve the interests of the Party-State.

It is possible that propaganda aimed at molding Huí identity in the Party-State's image of the ideal minority mínzú was motivated by a desire to benefit Huí, either because they would derive benefits from the state or because the cadres genuinely believed that manifesting the Party-State's image of the ideal

minority mínzú would benefit Huí. However, because such efforts would be indistinguishable from efforts made in one-sided service to the Party-State, I do not believe it makes sense to speak of mínzú agency in such a case. If Huí as a mínzú have no real or perceived interests distinct from those of the Party-State which motivate Huí cadres to act (and write) any differently than if they were labelled Hàn, Miáo or Bái, then mínzú as an analytical concept to explain the social behavior of Huí cadres would not be very useful.

I will also compare concerns expressed in State Council white papers and changes expressed in the *Kāidū River* to evaluate whether these coincide in time. Verifying that they do is necessary to ensure that what appears to be a deviation between national concerns and local formulations of Huí identity is indeed a deviation, and not merely reflecting a change in national concerns. It is also necessary to verify that the contributors to the magazine are responsive to the concerns expressed by the national leadership and are not merely caught up in the reproduction of local idiosyncratic discursive trends.

Identifying Huí concerns

If Huí cadres recognized that Huí have interests as a mínzú, and if they were trying to pursue these interests, then these interests were likely reflected in their formulation of Huí identity. This is because, as already mentioned, the formulation of Huí identity in state propaganda is a blueprint for who the Huí are and what role they play in Chinese society. Furthermore, it is a blueprint legitimized by the authority of the Party-State. The blueprint can support political claims based on the distinctiveness of Huí as a mínzú, encourage individuals labelled Huí to demonstrate certain behavior, and create expectations for Hàn-Chinese and other mínzú in terms of how people designated with the Huí label are likely to behave. The multitude of functions played by the formulation of Huí identity in state orthodoxy means that it is of direct relevance to a variety of what Huí cadres in Yānqí may have recognized as Huí interests.

To identify the kinds of interests that motivated Huí participation in the production of state orthodoxy on Huí identity in Yānqí and evaluate if these entailed concerns for Huí as a mínzú, I have adapted three main methods.

First, I have taken note of concerns that the authors explicitly claimed are their own. It is of course possible that the authors had ulterior motives for doing so. A particular Huí cadre may for example have expressed a deep concern with serving the propaganda goals of the Party-State. It would be difficult (if not impossible) to tell, without making assumptions about what is going on in the mind of a given cadre, whether they claimed the concern to show that the Huí as a mínzú support the Party-State, or if they only did so to benefit their occupational career. Regardless of interpretative difficulty, the authors themselves are the primary source of information about what motivated them to write about Huí in one way or another.

Second, I have taken note of how concerns expressed by the authors were reflected in their texts. By comparing what the authors explicitly stated they were doing and what they conveyed by presenting Huí in one way or another, I can make an informed interpretation regarding their intention. Notably, I can evaluate whether specific statements served Party-State interests, alleged Huí interests, or both. The identification of statements that served alleged Huí interests, but not Party-State interests, is significant for avoiding the pitfall of presuming minority mínzú agency. In addition to being useful for interpreting the authors' explicit concerns, analyzing what they conveyed when making their statements is also useful for identifying implicit concerns. Notably, whereas a concern stated explicitly by author A may not be stated explicitly by author B, both author A and B may unambiguously address the same concern in their formulation of Huí identity. In such a case, I find it reasonable to assume that author B shares the same concern, especially when the two authors describe each other as colleagues and friends.

Third, I have taken note of the biographical data of the authors, in particular the authors' active identification with labels. For example, a cadre emphasizing their status as an employee of the Propaganda Department may, in their vocational capacity, be particularly concerned about improving the image of the Party and the government in the minds of the magazine's readership. An author emphasizing their affiliation with the Jahriyya Sufi religious faction may have been particularly concerned about praising the virtues of the faction and even Islam in general. I am, however, highly cautious about presuming such a link between identification with an identity label and the performance of the associated identity stereotype. I use the third method only as supplemental evidence when evaluating the concerns claimed by the authors.

In addition to the three methods described, I should perhaps have done interviews with the authors to directly inquire about their motivations for contributing to the magazine. The primary reason I have not attempted to do this is the heightened political sensitivity of mínzú issues in Xīnjiāng in recent years. First, even though I went as a visiting researcher to a social anthropology department at a university in Xīnjiāng, I did not receive permission to do interviews in Yānqí. Secondly, engaging in informal communication would have been difficult as several of the authors had migrated or fallen ill. Third, even if informal conversations had proven feasible with more effort, it would have been ethically irresponsible to encourage explicit statements from the authors regarding motivations for writing anything that contradicts Party-State interests. This is because the Party-State is known, especially in Xīnjiāng, for applying various means of silencing criticisms or unorthodoxy concerning what its leaders consider politically sensitive topics. Fourth, even if ethical issues were disregarded, there is no guarantee that the authors would be any more explicit regarding their motivations than they were when writing their texts. Although I was able

to acquire the contact information of a few authors, in the end I decided that analyzing concerns and interests as they are voiced in the source material itself is the most feasible and ethically responsible approach.

The wide variety in expression of Huí identity in China means that statements made by Huí cadres on Huí identity in Yānqí are not going to be representative of Huí in all of China. They may not even be representative of Huí in all of Yānqí. This does not mean that the production of state orthodoxy on Huí in the *Kāidū River* is unrelated to discourses in other parts of China, be it in propaganda literature or other works. The authors of the *Kāidū River* read and expressed familiarity with the broader discourse on Huí in China. One example is references to the famous Huí author Zhāng Chéngzhì, who wrote a novel on the historical struggles of Huí belonging to the Jahriyya faction of Sufism. Zhāng Chéngzhì was frequently referred to not only because he is perhaps the most well-known contemporary Huí author, but also because Yānqí is the center of Jahriyya Sufism in southern Xīnjiāng. This sense of belonging to the Jahriyya Sufi school of Islam is not shared by most Huí in China. There is most definitely more than one blueprint of Huí identity, and they may differ in their adherence to national guidelines of state orthodoxy.

In no way do I contend that a case study of a single magazine will provide a comprehensive illustration of Huí identity construction in China. Yet the variety of expression of Huí identity does not exclude the possibility of mínzú agency as I have defined it. Even if the Huí cadres in Yānqí pursued interests that are specific only to local Huí, I would still define this as mínzú agency if I can substantiate that the cadres considered them to be the shared interests of all Huí. It would show that analyzing the imaginations of Huí as a mínzú is important for understanding why many Huí do what they do, regardless of the extent to which these imaginations correspond to social reality.

1.4 Conclusion

In the first part of my thesis, I described why studying mínzú agency is important and how Huí cadres participating in the production of propaganda on Huí identity and minority mínzú may demonstrate mínzú agency in doing so. This means dealing with several methodological and theoretical challenges. The challenges include distinguishing activities representing mínzú agency from activities that do not. This requires identifying alleged mínzú interests, identifying how mínzú interests can be addressed through participation in propaganda discourse, identifying and distinguishing the concerns and interests of the authors from those of the national leadership, and identifying if and how alleged mínzú interests are addressed by the authors in their formulation of Huí identity.

Put simply, in my reflections on these issues, I have argued that only activities that purport to support alleged mínzú interests should be defined as mínzú agency. I have argued that mínzú interests are likely involved and can be identified in the mínzú authors' formulation of Huí identity. I have argued that what the mínzú authors identify as mínzú interests can be distinguished from the homage they must pay to the interests of the Party-State by comparing the concerns they voice to those voiced by the national leadership. I have also argued that identifying such interests in the authors' texts requires an understanding of how the statements they make on Huí identity and minority mínzú adds to the discourses of state orthodoxy.

Because the writers invoked different discourses, establishing an understanding of the implications of the statements they made meant going beyond identifying a single, over-arching, and internally coherent discourse in the magazine. Instead, I identified three different discourses that were invoked by the authors, namely Neo-Confucian cosmology, Republican race theory, and Maoist thought transformation. Although these discourses were intertwined and reinforced one another, they would at times also contradict one another.

To what extent and in what ways the authors demonstrated mínzú agency through their participation in state propaganda is, of course, in the final analysis, an issue of empirical observation. The observation that mínzú authors are likely to pursue what they perceive as the collective interests of Huí in their writings does not necessarily mean that they do so in practice. First, they may not recognize that Huí have interests that distinguish them from other mínzú. Secondly, even if they do claim that Huí have particular

interests, it is not certain that agency in the name of Huí ought to be classified as mínzú agency. The authors could be using the slogan of "Huí identity" as a convenient means of arguing on behalf of national, commercial, religious, community, or personal interests. In such cases, it might be more reasonable to analyze the agency of corporations, religious institutions, communities, or individuals, rather than mínzú as such. Third, even if the authors do maintain that Huí have interests particular to their mínzú and that those interests are worth striving for, it is not certain that the authors are able to pursue Huí interests under the conditions of censorship and surveillance that were characteristic of Xīnjiāng in the 2010s, especially in a medium designated as the voice of state orthodoxy.

The goal of the second part of my thesis is therefore to analyze if, to what extent, and how Huí cadres in the *Kāidū River* magazine demonstrated mínzú agency in their writings. One by one, I will discuss recurring statements that they made on Huí identity and explain what the statements meant in the discourses from which they were derived. In this analysis, I employ the various methodological means described in the first part of my thesis. By employing the methodology described, I aim to avoid relying on the kind of presumptions that some other scholars have made about what most "likely" goes on inside the minds of mínzú cadres.

PART II

Source material

2.1 The *Kāidū River* Magazine

Before beginning my analysis, I will provide a brief overview of the magazine and its authors. This chapter is intended to make it easier for the reader to follow my examination of the source material. As an overview, this chapter does not provide a focused analysis of what the facts mean or how conclusions were derived. Such analyses can be found in the other parts of my dissertation.

The Magazine

The *Kāidū River* magazine was published by the Yānqí Huí Autonomous County (YHAC) Literature and Arts Federation, under the supervision of the YHAC CPC Propaganda Department. It started as an initiative by Kòu Yùyīng in communication with the Propaganda Department in 2010. Prolific contributors, notably Sū Xiàoquán, Liú Yīngguī, Mǎ Lìjuān, Mǎ Guìlín, and Lǐ Shǒufēng participated from the very first issue of the magazine. On the front cover and in many texts, Kòu Yùyīng claims that the magazine was produced to promote ideological values of the Party-State and related patterns of behavior among the local population through literature. At the same time, in some texts, Kòu Yùyīng and other authors directly state or indicate that the magazine was produced to ensure the survival of Huí as a distinct mínzú. They described Huí as threatened by silent assimilation into the Chinese "mainstream" (主流). As the Propaganda Department is tasked with ensuring alignment of literature (and other cultural products) with national ideology, the front cover justification of the magazine was by all appearances what allowed the magazine to be produced. The inter-mínzú violence in Urumqi in 2009 may have been a contributing factor to Kòu Yùyīng's initiative, encouraging her and other Huí to defend their mínzú (and Islam) against criticism. The violence may also have made the YHAC Propaganda Department more open to initiatives for promoting ideological values among minorities.

The magazine contains essays and literature, primarily written by cadres in YHAC. Most of the contributions were provided by Hàn or Huí cadres. Only a few Uyghur authors have contributed to the magazine, even though Uyghurs make up a third of the population in YHAC. The dominant role of Huí writers was likely justified by that the magazine was produced in a county designated for the self-governance of Huí—however limited such self-governance might

be. The conspicuous absence of Uyghur writers may be due to linguistic barriers. Unlike Huí, most Uyghurs did not grow up in an environment where Mandarin ("Hàn-language" 汉语) was the primary language spoken at home. All articles in the magazine were written in Mandarin. The absence of Uyghur writers may also be related to limited social interactions between Huí (or Hàn) editors such as Kòu Yùyīng and local Uyghurs.

As previously mentioned, the magazine was published as an internal publication. This does not mean that the magazine was only distributed among cadres at the Literature and Arts Association or the Propaganda Department. When I visited Yānqí Town in 2017, I found issues of the magazine both in the local Xinhua bookstore and at the public library. This indicates that Kòu Yùyīng and her colleagues made a notable effort to disperse the magazine among the public. Considering that the magazine was funded with the explicit goal of promoting ideological values, failure to distribute the magazine would have delegitimized its publication. The goal of defending Huí and Islam against criticism indicates that the magazine was also directed towards Hàn-Chinese readers specifically, particularly cadres. The exact distribution and number of active readers is difficult to verify. As such, in my thesis, I can only indicate that efforts were made that should be described as Huí agency. To evaluate the efficacy of this agency is methodologically difficult and goes beyond the scope of what I am trying to achieve.

The Authors

As previously mentioned, I decided to focus on the most active contributors to the *Kāidū River* magazine. Huí writers that have contributed to eight or more issues of the magazine include Kòu Yùyīng, Mǎ Guìlín, Sū Xiàoquán, Mǎ Huìlíng, Mǎ Sīxīn, Liú Yīngguī, Bǎi Yánbīng, Mǎ Xiǎopíng, Yān Rán, Cài Míng, Mǎ Lìjuān, and Yīngzǐ (pen name). Among these writers, after reading their source material, I decided to focus on Kòu Yùyīng, Sū Xiàoquán, Mǎ Guìlín, Liú Yīngguī, and Mǎ Lìjuān. Having read all articles by every author, I concluded that the inclusion of a focused analysis of Mǎ Huìlíng, Mǎ Sīxīn, Bǎi Yánbīng, Mǎ Xiǎopíng, Yān Rán, Cài Píng, and Yīngzǐ would not add notable value to my analysis. Instead, it would unnecessarily inflate the material and create repeated arguments in my text.

Kòu Yùyīng was the main editor of the *Kāidū River*. Judging by her pictures, she appeared to be middle-aged in the 2010s. In the magazine, she often used the pen name Xīnyù. Her family migrated from the Zhāngjiāchuān Huí Autonomous County in Gānsù province to YHAC at an unspecified point in time (Xīnyù, 2017). Like YHAC, Zhāngjiāchuān is best known as a bastion of Jahriyya Sufism in China. The pattern of migration strongly indicates that Kòu Yùyīng's family belongs to the Jahriyya religious faction. She used to be a teacher at the YHAC 1st Primary School ("The Spring Has Come," 2019).

In the 2010s, she was deputy chairperson of the YHAC Literature and Arts Federation. She was also the Chairperson of the YHAC Authors' Association (YHAC Performance Evaluation Leading Small Group, 2013).

Sū Xiàoquán (August 1924–April 2010) was an elderly cadre retired from his duties at the YHAC Political Consultative Conference (Jī Chángwěi, Summer 2010, p. 16). To close friends and family, he went by the Quranic name Ali. He initially studied at the Yānqí Normal School. During the early 1930s, he witnessed violence and murder among Hàn, Huí, Mongols, and Uyghurs. In 1942–1945, during the Japanese invasion, he studied at the Central Police Academy in Chóngqìng. Upon graduating, he was appointed Head of Education in Yānqí. From February 1948 until 1949, he held the position as Party Secretary for the Republicans in Yānqí (p. 15). He also attended the 1st National Assembly of the Republicans in Nánjīng. At the assembly, he got embroiled in arguments with the Republican leadership over assimilationist wording in the proposed constitution that described Huí as Muslim Hàn-Chinese, and not a distinct mínzú (p. 15). After the CPC takeover, he underwent ideological remolding and took on a consultative role for the CPC authorities in Yānqí. During the late 1950s, or the Cultural Revolution, Sū Xiàoquán was detained in re-education camps for "more than ten years" (p. 16). After the Opening and Reform of China in 1978, he regained a consultative role for the Party-State in Yānqí.

After being released from detainment, Sū Xiàoquán became an active writer. It was in this context that he got into contact with Kòu Yùyīng and became a contributor to the *Kāidū River*. Shortly before passing away, he entrusted several drafts to Kòu Yùyīng and implored her and her colleagues to write for the Huí people (Kòu Yùyīng, Summer 2010, p. 25). Many of these texts were included in the *Kāidū River* and published over the following years. They were also repeatedly referred to by Kòu Yùyīng and other contributors to the magazine, who described Sū Xiàoquán as an elderly and wise man. As such, his texts are central to understanding the discourse of the *Kāidū River*.

Mǎ Guìlín was a folklorist employed at the Běidàqú Township in the north-west of Yānqí Town. Judging by her pictures, she appeared to be middle-aged in the 2010s. At the Běidàqú Township, she oversaw the local Culture Station (Mǎ Guìlín, Autumn 2010, p. 72). The YHAC culture stations provided Party-approved cultural products—notably books—to the countryside (Qí Shàngmíng & Liú Yīngguī, 1998, p. 806). They were also in charge of preventing the dispersal of unwanted cultural products, such as pornography (p. 800). In 1986–1989, the YHAC Bureau of Culture organized the collection of local folklore (p. 791). Mǎ Guìlín apparently participated in this project. All her contributions to the *Kāidū River* are in the form of folklore, with many texts being specifically dated to this period. She joined the YHAC Authors' Association, which was chaired by Kòu Yùyīng, at an unspecified point in time. Her texts are included in every issue of the *Kāidū River*.

Liú Yīngguī (*c*.1942–...) was a retired Party historian that contributed to the *Kāidū River* under the pen name Shǐzhì, which literally means "Chronicles." The pen name was chosen because from 1993 until the early 2000s, Liú Yīngguī was one of two directors at the YHAC Chronicles Bureau (YHAC CPC Organization Department, 2008, p. 222). In this role, he and the other director compiled the *YHAC Chronicle* spanning more than one thousand pages. Liú Yīngguī came from a well-known family, being the great-grandson of former figurehead Xīnjiāng governor Lǐ Róng (*in office*: 1934–1940) and grandson of a former Xīnjiāng director of education (Juānzi, Spring 2011, p. 25). In his twenties, he had become a teacher. During the Cultural Revolution, he was ostracized because his family had served under Xīnjiāng warlord Shèng Shìcái (1933–1944). The treatment he received made him, as he described it, disillusioned and void of emotion (Shǐzhì, Winter 2010). By then, Liú Yīngguī had married a pious Muslim woman (Shǐzhì, Winter 2012). He was sent to the countryside to receive ideological re-education from poor and lower middle-class peasants in the Winter of 1970 (Shǐzhì, Winter 2010). In the late 1980s, he served as principal and Party chief at the 1st Primary School of YHAC (YHAC CPC Organization Department, 2008, pp. 231–232), where Kòu Yùyīng has also been a teacher. When Kòu Yùyīng began working on the *Kāidū River*, Liú Yīngguī was chosen as advisor. Liú Yīngguī was also a friend of Sū Xiàoquán. At his funeral, Liú Yīngguī was one of the three last persons to leave (Shǐzhì, Summer 2010, pp. 22–23). Like Kòu Yùyīng, Liú Yīngguī was by all appearances affiliated with the Jahriyya Sufi religious faction. He traveled to Korla, the prefectural seat of the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, to visit the Yānqí-based Jahriyya Sufi leader Mǎ Hóngwǔ (August 1932–May 2013) at his deathbed (Juānzi, 2013). Mǎ Hóngwǔ was the leader of the Jahriyya Sufi sect in South Xīnjiāng.

Mǎ Lìjuān (*c*. 1963–...) was a writer from YHAC best known for her historical novel, *The Huíhuí of Qarasheher*. Qarasheher is the traditional name for Yānqí and is still the preferred term for the town by Uyghurs. Mǎ Lìjuān published under the pen name Juānzi. To close friends and family, she went by the Quranic name Hāzhēn'er. She was the daughter of Mǎ Jíxiáng, who served as Party Secretary at the Běidàqú Township Youth Committee in the 1960s (YHAC CPC Organization Department, 1992, p. 367) and county magistrate from 1987 until 1993 (YHAC CPC Organization Department, 2008, p. 96, 112). During the 1980s, Mǎ Lìjuān left Yānqí and got employed at a railroad corporation. There, she worked as a telegraphist, secretary, editor, and journalist. She began to write novels in the early 2000s (Juānzi, 2007).

At the deathbed, Mǎ Lìjuān's father (in late 2006 or early 2007) implored her to write a book about the Huí people of Yānqí (Juānzi, 2013). To achieve this task, Mǎ Lìjuān decided to return to Yānqí Town. Here, she got acquainted with the Jahriyya leader Mǎ Hóngwǔ, who had been a friend of her father. As she described it, she became like a daughter to him. She also gained renewed interest and conviction in her childhood religion and began covering her hair

on some occasions. To Mǎ Lìjuān, the return to Jahriyya and Islam represented a return to her true self (ibid.).

After her return to Yānqí, Mǎ Lìjuān also became acquainted with Liú Yīngguī, Sū Xiàoquán, and Kòu Yùyīng. Liú Yīngguī showed much interest and provided guidance when she was writing her historical novel (Juānzi, Spring 2011). Both he and Mǎ Lìjuān were among the last three people to leave at Sū Xiàoquán's funeral (Shǐzhì, Summer 2010, pp. 22–23). Mǎ Lìjuān also traveled together with Liú Yīngguī when they visited Mǎ Hóngwǔ in Korla (Juānzi, 2013). Like Liú Yīngguī, Sū Xiàoquán expressed an interest for her novel and provided source material. References to the texts of Sū Xiàoquán are numerous in her novel. Beyond appearing together on pictures in the *Kāidū River*, Mǎ Lìjuān described Kòu Yùyīng as a "literature friend" (文友) (Juānzi, 2013). She managed to complete her 250-pages long historical novel in the summer of 2007. Presumably due to its religious content, it was published in Hong Kong instead of mainland China. At an unknown point in the 2010s, Mǎ Lìjuān relocated to Shǎnxī (Shaanxi) Province.

Hàn writers that have contributed to eight or more issues of the magazine include Lǐ Shǒufēng and Wú Qiáng. I have included both authors in my analysis.

Lǐ Shǒufēng (August 1962–...) was a former Deputy Magistrate of YHAC and an active writer. He is best known for his essay collection *Songs of Joy*. Many of his contributions to the *Kāidū River* can also be found in this essay collection. In the early 2010s, he served at the Standing Committee of the Bayingolin People's Congress in Korla. He was originally a secondary school teacher. He moved to Xīnjiāng from Hénán province in the 1980s (Lǐ Shǒufēng, 2005, p. 40). He became a member of the YHAC Authors' Association at an unknown point in time. He wrote favorably about the *Kāidū River* and expressed admiration for minority mínzú.

Wú Qiáng was director at the YHAC Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. From his pictures, he appeared to be middle-aged in the 2010s. At an unknown point in time, he became a member of the YHAC Authors' Association. In his texts, he liked to write about cultural artifacts, notably coins and talismans.

The Uyghur authors I have analyzed include Anargül Niyaz, Tursun Mehmet, Qurban Nuraxun, Dilmurat Telet, Zordun Sabir, Husen Rozi, and Zurun Mehmet. None of these authors have contributed more than one article to the *Kāidū River*, except for Anargül Niyaz who has contributed two. Most of the authors appear to be native to YHAC, apart from Zordun Sabir (1937–1998), a celebrated Uyghur writer from Yili, and Dilmurat Telet (middle aged), whom Kòu Yùyīng befriended during a study session in Běijīng, and Tursun Mehmet (1968–...), a member of the Xīnjiāng Authors' Association.

Few biographical data are provided about the Uyghur authors in the *Kāidū River*. Anargül Niyaz was a cadre at the People's Government of Qīgèxīng

Town, located in the far west of YHAC. Judging from her picture, she appeared to be a young adult. She was also a member of the YHAC Authors' Association. Qurban Nuraxun was a retired Party Secretary of Huòlāshān Village in Qīgèxīng Town. He learned Mandarin from youth sent down to YHAC from Jiāngsū province in the 1960s. He was previously employed as a mediator resolving conflicts in YHAC villages. His contribution to *Kāidū River* was made in an oral report recorded and edited by what appears to be two Hàn-Chinese or Huí propaganda writers (Xú Jūn and Yǐn Qīngyǒng). Husen Rozi (1943–...) was a native of YHAC and a member of the Xīnjiāng Authors' Association. His contribution to the *Kāidū River* was translated from Uyghur language. Zurun Mehmet is an obscure author who wrote a piece about the activities of the Uyghur Culture Promotion Association in Yānqí during the 1930s. His article was reprinted from the 1999 chronicle of the Bayingolin Political Consultative Conference.

Several of the Uyghur writers, except for Dilmurat Telet, Anargül Niyaz, Qurban Nuraxun and possibly Husen Rozi, were highly passive contributors to the magazine, and unaware that their texts were included. As such, the message conveyed by the texts in the context of the magazine reveals more about Kòu Yùyīng, her co-editors, and the YHAC propaganda department than about the authors themselves.

When reading my dissertation, the reader will discover that I often explain and interpret one text in the magazine by quoting and referring to another. This is because, after reading through all the texts, I found the magazine to constitute a self-referential system. The authors displayed awareness of each other's texts, quoted one another, used terms and concepts in similar ways, and maintained a shared adherence to the logics of the three discursive formations discussed.

The reason why I often only use one or two authors as evidence that a term or statement is used in a certain way in the magazine is to avoid pedantic repetition that would make all explanations inflated and my argument difficult to follow. Instead, I quote an author or authors that invoke a term or statement in a relatively unambiguous way, or in a way that allows for a fluent interpretation of what it means. A full list of contributors to the *Kāidū River* in the issues I have accessed can be found in the Appendix.

The critical reader may still, however, suspect that I have worked towards a hermeneutic interpretation of the magazine without this being justified. After all, the writers came from diverse backgrounds and the texts were also written in different contexts. In some instances, their authors were not even aware that their texts would one day be included in the magazine.

Regarding these concerns, I would like to point out that the most active contributors to the magazine not only were aware of the context in which they were writing and frequently quoted one another, but also had notable interactions on a personal and professional basis, as reflected in the above biographies. The result was that the authors formulated arguments and used

terms and statements in many similar ways. Such similarities and patterns are what I refer to when I talk about discourse. Permeating the texts of the core contributors to the magazine, these patterns allowed the main editor Kòu Yùyīng and her colleagues to exert a form of epistemological dominance over certain texts that were not originally produced for the magazine, such as that of Zordun Sabir or the folklore of Mǎ Guìlín. It matters only to a limited degree how the original authors intended for such texts to be read. Through their selective inclusion in the *Kāidū River*, the meanings conveyed by the texts were effectively altered by their new context of publication, allowing them to serve the purposes of Kòu Yùyīng and her colleagues. These purposes included Huí concerns about the preservation of Huí as a distinct mínzú and tolerance for their practice of Islam. They also included national concerns about the promotion of Party-State ideology.

2.2 Neo-Confucian Cosmology

When I began reading the texts of the *Kāidū River*, I was struck by the sheer extent to which the authors used words such as "truth," "goodness," "purity," "spontaneity," "simplicity," and "beauty" in junction with one another. The authors used these terms not only to describe the ideal minority mínzú individual and ideal inter-mínzú relations, but also more broadly when making recommendations to their readers for how to attain happiness and contentment in life. I found that whenever the authors wanted to write about something in morally positive terms, they drew from a very specific vocabulary of words. It appeared as though exactly which words from the vocabulary they used was not too important. By attributing one or multiple words from this vocabulary to an activity or manner of being, the authors were situating it in the same field of moral right. In contrast, the authors would use opposite terms, such as "falsehood," "evil," and "ugliness," to situate activities and ways of being in a field of moral wrong.

As I read through the magazine, I noticed seven recurring statements used in the formulation of Huí identity and minority mínzú that directly played on this notion of moral right. The seven statements were:

(i) Truth is the standard of good
(ii) People should strive to ensure the manifestation of truth
(iii) Truth can be found in the paradigms of purity
(iv) Pure people are vulnerable to pollution
(v) Truth can be comprehended in the production and consumption of culture, the study of history, or nature
(vi) Truth mandates family values
(vii) Islam represents truth

In what follows, I will discuss these statements one by one and analyze what the authors achieve when invoking them. I will evaluate whether the invocation of the statements suffices to demonstrate mínzú agency among Huí cadres in Yānqí. To do so, I will demonstrate the relation of the statements to Neo-Confucian discourse, explain what the statements mean when interpreted as part of Neo-Confucian discourse, and discuss if and how the meaning invoked serves to address mínzú-related concerns voiced by the authors and concerns voiced by national authorities.

i. Truth is the standard of good

Statements indicating "truth," "goodness," "purity," "spontaneity," "simplicity," and "beauty" as designating a self-evident, singular source of moral right are repeatedly invoked by all the Huí and Hàn authors that I have focused on in my analysis. Many of the authors designate this source of moral right with the label "truth" (*zhēnlǐ* 真理). For example, the editor-in-chief, Kòu Yùyīng (Huí, female), wrote about how she and her colleagues "hold the pen of truth" to illustrate "that which is true, good, and beautiful" (Kòu Yùyīng, Spring 2012). Former Party archivist and primary school Party secretary Liú Yīngguī (Huí, male) described a relentless chase by "us" (writers) to find "truth, goodness, and beauty" (Shǐzhì, Summer 2010, p. 23). And former county magistrate Lǐ Shǒufēng (Hàn, male) characterized "truth" as a divine savior of all mankind that manifests order, vitality, humility, omnipresence, as well as eternal self-perpetuation (Lǐ Shǒufēng, 2011, p. 229).

But what exactly is this source of moral right that the authors emphasized? What did it mean in the formulation of Huí and minority mínzú identity? Did the authors' repeated invocation of this statement benefit Huí interests, national interests, both, or neither? Without answering these questions, it is impossible to assess the extent to which the magazine writers displayed mínzú agency.

An indication of the discursive origins (and implications) of statements on truth is found in an essay by the former Nationalist Party Secretary of Yānqí and later reformed Communist Sū Xiàoquán (Huí, male). In the essay, the late Sū Xiàoquán reflected on a concept which is commonly translated into English as "principle."

> Whether or not a person is living in apprehension is always determined with reference to principle [理]. [...] Joy and worries, ascendance and descendance—they all relate to this principle. […] Those that defy its [the principle's] way scoop up big gains in actual life [...] [Yet] the person that makes an apt account [of things in life] is the person in apprehension [of truth/principle] and that lives with a settled mind. When such a person nears the end [of his/her life], people will say: "that person was alright. [(S)he] lived in apprehension. [(S)he] lived a clean life. [(S)he] was easy-going." (Sū Xiàoquán, Winter 2011, p. 50)

By including this essay in the *Kāidū River*, the magazine's editors indicated that what their authors meant by "truth" (*zhēnlǐ*), a word that can be directly translated from its Chinese character composition as "true principle," is in fact "principle" (*lǐ*). This is significant because "principle" is a word intimately associated with the discourse of Neo-Confucian cosmology as it was developed from the Northern Sòng dynasty (960–1127). Taking into consideration Sū Xiàoquán's usage of the term "principle," it should come as no surprise that Sū Xiàoquán (Winter 2010) mentions intensive studies of the

"books of sages" (圣贤书) during his pre-teen years in the 1930s (p. 54). The "books of sages" usually refers to the classics of Confucian literature, typically those compiled by the eminent Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhū Xī (1130–1200). His later encounters with May Fourth-style anti-traditionalist education (1938–1946) and Communist ideological re-education (1950s–1970s) notwithstanding, Sū Xiàoquán was, according to himself, influenced by Neo-Confucian thought during early childhood. He may later have been influenced by what Zhào Suìshēng (2004) has dubbed the "Chinese/Confucius learning" fever of the 1990s, in which many Chinese intellectuals suggested that the time had come for the West to learn from "Chinese" thought, rather than the other way around (p. 149).

The equation made in the magazine between divine "truth" and Neo-Confucian "principle" is further illustrated by the fact that the Chinese character for *zhēn* in *zhēnlǐ* ("truth" or "true principle") is designated in classical Chinese lexicons with the meaning of cosmic "principle." For example, in the dictionary *Shuōwén Jiězì* ("Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters") from the Han dynasty (202 BC–220 AD), the graphical representation of *zhēn* is described as illustrating "an immortal man that changes form and ascends to heaven" (仙人变形而登天也) (Xǔ Shèn, 121/1963, p. 168). Attaining unison with the principle or order of heaven/cosmos (天) was the main objective of mankind in Neo-Confucian literature. The ability to ascend to heaven indicates such unison. From a Neo-Confucian reading of the *Shuōwén Jiězì*, therefore, the graphical representation of *zhēn* implies that the term concerns the principle or order of cosmos. In the 18th-century *Kāngxī Dictionary,* in addition to citing *Shuōwén Jiězì*, *zhēn* is glossed with descriptions such as "divine" (神), "pure" (淳), "essence" (精), "righteous" (正), "utmost refined and truthful" (精诚之至也), and "antonym of falsehood" (伪之反也). These are the very same synonyms and antonyms used by the authors of the *Kāidū River* to situate things in a singular field of moral right. The *Shuōwén Jiězì* and *Kāngxī Dictionary* illustrate that the classical meaning of *zhēn* in Chinese literature is much more about cosmic order and moral good than about facts as unbiased empirical observations. A similar interpretation of the notion of "truth" was made by the California-based scholar Philip Huang in 1995 in his analysis of the reformist slogan "seek truth from facts" (实事求是) (Uradyn Bulag, 2002, p. 198).

By using the vocabulary of Neo-Confucian discourse to designate things in a field of moral right, the magazine authors did more than simply state that some things are bad and other things are good. They effectively stated that some things are good because they are in accordance with the way of cosmos. In Neo-Confucian discourse, every action and thought could be evaluated by its correspondence to or deviation from such divine order. This divine order was described by the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhōu Dūnyí (1007–1072) as originating from and identifiable with the very origin of all being, *tàijí*

(Carson Chang, 1957, pp. 50–51). With cosmic principle being in the essence of all things and existing beyond time itself, the good or evil of any action is not open to subjective interpretation or cultural relativism. Whether an action is good or evil is determined by whether the people involved think and act along the lines of cosmic law. By relating moral good to cosmic principle, the authors of the *Kāidū River* stated that certain thoughts and behaviors are bad because they offend the very being of human nature and cosmos itself.

At first glance, the invocation of cosmic principle or truth as the standard of moral good seems detrimental to potential Huí interests in Party-State tolerance of deviant values, thought, and even behavior particular to minority mínzú. If there is only one universal and absolute standard of moral propriety, then every person of every mínzú ought to think and behave in the same way. There is seemingly no space for relativist arguments. The invocation of cosmic principle seems to legitimize the efforts of a Party-State geared towards comprehensive and absolute assimilation of minority mínzú.

However, this is not necessarily the case. Neo-Confucian ethics are a form of virtue ethics in which the propriety of a thought or action is determined by the social status of the people involved. The Táng dynasty (618–907) statesman Hán Yù, whom the Chinese philosopher Carson Chang (1957) identifies as an early contributor to Neo-Confucian thought, emphasized that the order of cosmos mandated different thoughts and behavior depending on whether the person involved is a king, minister, parent, child, older brother, younger brother, husband, or wife. Hán Yù also lists different foods, clothing and living facilities appropriate to people depending on their status (pp. 96–97). To Hán Yù, the correct way to be one with cosmic truth depends on who you are. In terms of minority mínzú particularities, the authors of the magazine may have argued that idiosyncratic Huí values, thoughts, and behavior are appropriate to them as a minority mínzú, even if they are not appropriate for the majority mínzú.

The Huí authors of the *Kāidū River* have indeed made this argument. It was perhaps spelled out most unambiguously in the Party historian Liú Yīngguī's eulogy to the late Sū Xiàoquán. In the eulogy, Liú Yīngguī stated that "[Sū Xiàoquán] persistently promoted the idea that the essence of the way of Confucius and Mencius and the doctrines of Islam—on the doing of good and watchfulness of one's character—should work together to standardize the speech and actions of people [...] I find that the gentleman [Sū Xiàoquán] was both long-sighted and wise" (Shǐzhì, Summer 2010, p. 22). Here, "the way of Confucius and Mencius" referred by implication not only to classical Neo-Confucianism, but more significantly to the moral order of the Hàn-Chinese and the Party-State. This interpretation aligns with that of Western scholars such as Daniel Bell and Hahm Chaihark, who according to Uradyn Bulag (2010) maintained that "China's social relations are governed by Confucianism" (p. 11). "People," as used in this context, referred to Muslims, or more specifically to Huí. Liú Yīngguī and Sū Xiàoquán did in no way

suggest that the Party-State should promote Islam among all mínzú. They only stated that Islam is an appropriate and efficient tool for promoting the cosmic good in the case of Huí. They expressed a concern with preserving the Muslim character of Huí identity, which they maintained will benefit both the Huí as a mínzú and the Party-State itself.

In Liú Yīngguī's and Sū Xiàoquán's formulations of Confucianism and Islam, promoting Confucian values was the "self-evident" way to promote the interests of the Party-State. Promoting Islam, on the other hand, was the "self-evident" way to promote Huí interests. Liú Yīngguī indicates that promoting the former is his duty as a Party cadre. However, in terms of promoting the latter, he expressed reluctance by noting that he initially felt Sū Xiàoquán's texts had too much religious "flavor." As noted by Uradyn Bulag (2002), the Party-State mandates "the welfare of a wider community at the expense of a smaller one." (p. 13) Or, in the words of Zhào Suìshēng (2004), the Party-State "emphasizes national rights at the expense of individual rights" (p. 160). Only upon further reflection did Liú Yīngguī, a self-identified Muslim, "dare" (敢) to concede that promoting Islam is in fact beneficial to promoting the values of the wider community and therefore something that should be cherished in society (Shǐzhì, Summer 2010, p. 22).

In the white papers of the State Council published in the period between 1997 and 2019, promoting "Chinese" culture among minority mínzú and religious groups was emphasized. The earlier white papers emphasized that minority mínzú have been, and should continue to be, part of the Chinese cultural and political sphere since "ancient times." The texts emphasized that no one should disrupt the territorial, cultural, and political unity of China. In the context in which the texts of the *Kāidū River* were written, promoting minority mínzú culture was therefore a political gray zone in the sense that it could be interpreted as disruptive towards Chinese unity. This danger was explicitly voiced in another propaganda publication in Yānqí, *We Are All One Family* (YHAC Propaganda Department & YHAC Spiritual Civilization Office, 2010), which warned against the dangers of "narrow mínzú emotions and mínzú consciousness" that would harm the collective interests of the nation (p. 3). By the spring of 2018, the State Council Information Office (2018) went as far as to state in unambiguous terms that religion should be "Sinicized" and aligned with "traditional Chinese culture."

Although the State Council has lauded China's efforts for protecting minority mínzú culture, its own statements on the Sinicization of religion stand in stark contrast to this effort, at least for Huí for whom Islam is the primary marker of their mínzú identity. The contradiction was particularly visible in a State Council Information Office (November 2018) white paper on the protection and development of culture in the minority mínzú region of Xīnjiāng. In the paper's section on the development of mínzú languages, the State Council emphasized the Party-State's efforts in teaching minority mínzú

Hàn-Chinese language, rather than preserving minority languages such as Uyghur or Kazakh. Although the most explicit statements by the State Council were made after the *Kāidū River* publication had been terminated, the Party-State's primary interest in preserving and promoting Chinese territorial, cultural, and political unity was also implicit in the earlier papers. Liú Yīngguī and Sū Xiàoquán were therefore on solid political ground when they associated the cosmic good with traditional Chinese culture.

Only by lauding the benefits of Islam for the promotion of Neo-Confucian values were Liú Yīngguī and Sū Xiàoquán comfortable enough to commend it in the *Kāidū River*. While they indicated that it was the desire of the Huí people to promote Islam, they did not consider the national laws guaranteeing protection of mínzú customs and religious freedom to be sufficient to legitimize such promotion. In fact, they implied that the promotion of Islam was superficially harmful to national interests in ideological homogeneity. Liú Yīngguī's reluctance stemmed from the Party-State dogma that national interests trump mínzú interests. The only way to legitimize Islam, therefore, was to claim that Huí interests in religion benefit national interests. By invoking Neo-Confucian discourse, Sū Xiàoquán was able to do just that.

A former Hàn-Chinese propaganda chief in Yānqí also voiced the idea that presenting Huí interests when promoting Islam by intuition would seem harmful to national interests, but in fact was beneficial. In a text posted on an online forum in 2013, the Muslim author Mǎ Lìjuān attributed the following statement to former propaganda chief Jiāng Yīng:

> A famed Xīnjiāng author [Zhōu Tāo] once said that the Huíhuí mínzú has only used but one boat to ensure the survival of their race in the long river of their history. This boat is Islam. I think, whether it is a mínzú or individual, [you] always need to believe in something. When the aspiration to goodness and truth becomes an innate ability, it has become the force of religion. When a kind of religion lauds the aspiration to goodness and truth, it has become a kind of culture. If such a culture can mutually adapt with mainstream society, why should [we, the Hàn-Chinese] not be able to co-exist [with them, the Muslim Huí]? (Juānzi, 2013)

In the excerpt, Jiāng Yīng implied that Hàn-Chinese people, including leading cadres such as herself, tend to believe that allowing Huí to cultivate their Muslim identity is harmful for the realization of ideological homogeneity in China. However, upon further reflection and communication with Huí people such as Mǎ Lìjuān, she came to realize that Muslims are not necessarily ideologically opposed to China. She claimed to have realized that Muslim Huí tend to be good people and that assimilationist policies may in fact not be necessary.

By promoting truth or cosmic good as the standard for evaluating the morality of minority mínzú thought and behavior, the authors of the *Kāidū River* were thus able to convince at least one leading Hàn-Chinese cadre about

the benefits of preserving a Huí identity based on Islam. Instead of contrasting Huí culture to Hàn-Chinese culture, they argued that Hàn-Chinese culture—in the form of Neo-Confucianism—allows and even mandates minority mínzú to be different. This is because the difference presumably benefits the core ideological values that the Party-State leadership *really* cares about.

In conclusion, therefore, the Huí authors' own invocation of the statement "truth is the standard of good" primarily benefits Huí interests. The statement has allowed the authors to interpret Chinese "culture" as a system of values, rather than customs or religion. If the same values are cherished, they argued, Huí can be Huí while also being Chinese. This interpretation of national interests contradicts national interests in the way they were explicitly formulated in State Council white papers of the later 2010s. According to these later white papers, the Party-State demands not only political loyalty from its minorities, but also identification with the cultural forms of the Hàn-Chinese majority. At the time when Sū Xiàoquán and Liú Yīngguī were writing their papers, however, national guidelines were ambiguous enough that they could argue to the benefit of Huí interests and to the potential detriment of national interests in cultural unity, while also speaking in the orthodox voice of the Party-State.

ii. People should strive to ensure the manifestation of truth

The authors of the *Kāidū River* did not only laud cosmic truth as the standard of good, they also emphasized the importance of ensuring that things in society are aligned with this standard. They emphasized that people should work to ensure their own alignment with cosmos, as well as the alignment of society, their fellow citizens, and their own mínzú with cosmos. All the most prolific Huí contributors to the magazine invoked this statement repeatedly, as did the Hàn-Chinese contributors.

In the previous section, I argued that the invocation of Neo-Confucian discourse allowed the authors to advocate for the practice of Islam among Huí while avoiding the juxtaposition of minority mínzú interests and the interests of Hàn-Chinese society. Advocacy voiced in the form of juxtaposition would have been glaringly at odds with national interests.

Does this mean that the authors in their call for the mobilization of people to the benefit of cosmic alignment also benefitted the religious interests of Huí? Or do these statements primarily benefit national interests in unity, dressed up in the garments of Neo-Confucian ethics? To answer these two questions, it is necessary to understand both the characteristics of the statement in Neo-Confucian discourse and its contextual invocation by the Huí authors in the magazine.

In classical Neo-Confucian literature, calls for ensuring the manifestation of truth were formulated either in terms of self-cultivation or in terms of demanding a proper social order. The former tended to emphasize individual

responsibilities, while the latter often implied certain expectations towards the rulers of the state.

Self-cultivation was particularly emphasized by early Neo-Confucian thinkers. Hán Yù's student Lǐ Áo (772–841), for example, suggested that mundane emotions made man deviate from their true nature as defined by cosmos. Likely inspired by Buddhist thought, he recommended cleansing the mind of emotions so that the individual achieves a state of tranquility in which they spontaneously act in accordance with man's true or cosmic nature (Carson Chang, 1957, pp. 109–110). The Chéng brothers (Chéng Yí, 1033–1107; Chéng Hào, 1032–1085), who were significantly more influential than Lǐ Áo, also suggested that mundane thoughts and emotions tampered with man's alignment with cosmos. But instead of cleansing away emotions they recommended that emotions, like conduct, should be aligned with cosmos (Carson Chang, 1957, p. 197).

The Neo-Confucian thinkers maintained that alignment with cosmos would both bring true joy to the individuals involved and benefit society at large. Consider for example the following quote from the *Great Learning*, a pivotal text in the Neo-Confucian school of thought:

> In ancient times, those who wanted to spread virtue in the world would first put their country in order. To put their country in order, they would first put their household in order. To put their household in order, they would first put themselves in order. To put themselves in order, they would first put their minds in order. To put their minds in order, they would first put their will in order. And to put their will in order, they would perfect their knowledge through the examination of objects. (Zēngzi, 5th Century BC / 2009, p. 45)

The Neo-Confucian philosophers maintained, in other words, that the perfection of (cosmic) knowledge would make people want the right things. By wanting the right things, they would think along correct lines. By thinking along correct lines, they would behave appropriately. By behaving appropriately, they would influence other members of their family so that they also behave in appropriate manners. And if their family behaved appropriately, they would exert a positive influence on the country at large. The goal of self-cultivation was therefore to benefit society.

This suggests that the *Kāidū River* calls for ensuring the alignment of the world with cosmic ideals were not made in the interest of preserving a distinct Huí identity, but were first and foremost made to benefit national interests in nurturing law-abiding citizens that put the interests of the country ahead of individual and parochial concerns. For if understanding cosmic truth means engaging in behaviors that either directly or indirectly benefit the country, then any mínzú interests would be subordinate to national interests and would only be legitimate if they can be formulated in terms of such interests.

In their texts, the Huí authors in the *Kāidū River* do indeed indicate that the ultimate purpose of cultivating good thoughts and behavior is to benefit the country. The articles by Sū Xiàoquán, for example, can generally be divided into laudatory texts on how Huí have contributed to China and texts on how happiness can be achieved through self-cultivation. The former group of articles typically take the form of historical treatises on the activities of Yānqí Huí in the past. In one of these articles, Sū Xiàoquán (Winter 2014) described how the progenitors of a local mosque community built rafts to assist Qīng dynasty forces in crossing the Kāidū River and subdue Central Asian invaders in Xīnjiāng. The latter group of articles includes texts that provide guidelines for how to think good thoughts, descriptions of why thinking good thoughts are important, as well as recommendations for how to nurture good thoughts. Thinking good thoughts, according to Sū Xiàoquán, meant being content with one's lot, appreciating the simple things in life, being honest and compassionate, and not least wanting to serve the country.

The two categories of articles are interrelated. The Party historian Liú Yīngguī maintained that Sū Xiàoquán's purpose with promoting self-cultivation was to "standardize the speech and actions of people" in a way that benefits society (Shǐzhì, Summer 2010, p. 22). In terms of national interests, being content with one's lot and appreciating simple things meant being a citizen that does not complain about existing distributions of wealth and hierarchies of power. Being honest and compassionate meant contributing to the general well-being of the population. Sū Xiàoquán's texts on self-cultivation, in other words, encouraged Huí readers to be law-obedient citizens that did not complain about politics, did not give other citizens reason to feel discontent, and cherished the rule of the Communist Party of China. His texts on patriotic deeds by Huí in the past directly portrayed patriotism as a core component of Huí identity.

However, the Neo-Confucian thinkers emphasized not only the individual's responsibility of self-cultivation, but also the importance of rulers to be virtuous and the duty of scholar-bureaucrats to criticize improper governance. For example, the founder of the Dōnglín movement[2] of the late Míng dynasty and early Qīng dynasties, Gù Xiànchéng (1550–1612), encouraged people to take an active interest in political questions and to speak out about what is right and wrong. A scholar associated with the movement, Gāo Pānlóng, was initially released from public office after impeaching the incumbent prime minister. Thirty years later following rehabilitation, Gāo Pānlóng accused a noble consort of plotting murder against her son's competitor for the throne. Then he accused a high official under the protection of the most powerful eunuch in the empire of corruption. Being fully aware of

[2] The Dōnglín movement was based around the Dōnglín Academy of Wúxī in eastern China. In the years after the academy was restored by Gù Xiànchéng in 1604, it became a center of political dissent (Carson Chang, 1957, p. 35).

the consequences of such criticism, Gāo Pānlóng drowned himself in the family pond before being apprehended by imperial authorities (Carson Chang, 1957, pp. 160–169)

This means that Neo-Confucian discourse on the importance of aligning society with cosmic standards of propriety could have been used by Huí authors to remind Party-State authorities of their responsibilities towards the minority mínzú population. By the logic of this discourse, just as individuals are responsible for cultivating good thoughts to the benefit of society, the rulers of the country should govern in a way that aligns with cosmic truth. And if, as the Huí authors argued, Islam is a manifestation of cosmic truth, then the Party-State should not only tolerate but actively encourage its practice among those parts of the population that submit to its authority. Should the Party-State fail to support or even oppress religious practices aligned with cosmic truth, Huí authors would have a cosmic duty to speak up against and rectify the erroneous ways of the government.

The Huí authors of the magazine did in fact put considerable emphasis on the importance of speaking out truth, of the cosmic kind, even when doing so could cause political and occupational problems for the person involved. In his eulogy, Liú Yīngguī claimed that speaking out truth despite political pressure was one of Sū Xiàoquán's key virtues:

> The Mister [Sū Xiàoquán] was an upright person that did not fawn upon others. [He] hated evil as his greatest enemy. [He] knew what to love and what to hate. In his position as committee member at the Political Consultative Conference, he ferociously railed against the errors of the time, filled with passion, never afraid to speak out what is right. (Shǐzhì, 2010, p. 21)

Interestingly, Liú Yīngguī was not writing about "errors" during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) or pre-Communist times (before 1949), which would be in accordance with Party ideology. According to local Party records, Sū Xiàoquán served as member of the Yānqí Political Consultative Conference Standing Committee in the period from 1993 until 1998 (Wáng Shìliáng et al., 1999, p. 246). The "errors" mentioned by Liú Yīngguī were therefore prevalent in rather recent times. Liú Yīngguī did not specify what the errors were. His claim that Sū Xiàoquán was able to voice criticism against policy practice by implied Party-State superiors—the people he did not "fawn upon" and from which he did not fear repercussions—is supported by the observation made by a deputy chair of the Political Consultative Conference in another county in south-western China. According to the deputy, discussions in these local advisory assemblies are often lively. This could be because they have no actual authority in terms of decision making and the other bodies of the Party-State have not paid much attention to them (Hillman, 2014, p. 88).

In their texts, the Huí authors portrayed their practice of Islam as beneficial to the manifestation of truth. By demanding that the Party-State aligns itself

with truth, the authors thus effectively called upon intellectuals and cadres to condemn any policy practice that denies Huí their freedom to practice religion. The authors' call for ensuring alignment between the empirical and the ideal world entailed encouragement for their Huí compatriots to be obedient citizens of the Chinese Party-State. But it was also a call for defending the cosmic right of Huí to practice Islam. The former reinforced the latter: if Huí are exemplary citizens, then it would be even more unjust for the Party-State to deny them access to activities and thoughts that allow them to be just that.

Because the *Kāidū River* magazine was published under the direct purview of the local Propaganda Department, it would be very surprising to find direct criticisms of minority mínzú or religious policies in its texts. In fact, the editor-in-chief Kòu Yùyīng consistently portrayed herself as a propaganda cadre and the magazine as a tool for helping people understand the wisdom of the Party-State's policies.

However, even Kòu Yùyīng made a few comments that can be interpreted as criticism against policy practices, or at least suggestions for change in these practices. For example, in 2012, she complained about how hotels in the Chinese capital used to discriminate against and refuse to lodge Muslims like herself. She lamented that she felt treated like a dog or second-rate citizen (Kòu Yùyīng, Autumn 2012, p. 23). In a later text from 2015, she further described such discriminatory behavior as "misinterpretation" and "ignorance," and claimed that it was common among Hàn-Chinese from the eastern provinces and municipalities (Kòu Yùyīng, Summer 2015, p. 15). Her attitude is radically different from that expressed by the Uyghur Party chief of the neighboring county Ruòqiāng (Chaqiliq) in 2017, who also happens to be from Yānqí. After admitting that many Uyghurs were dissatisfied by the tendency of hotels to deny Uyghurs accommodation, the party chief Hesenjan Abdullah (2017) excused the trend by claiming that most or all "terrorist" actions in China were committed by Uyghurs and that mínzú-profiling was therefore acceptable. Unlike Hesenjan Abdullah, Kòu Yùyīng strongly implied that the Party-State ought to do something. She maintained that allowing mínzú-profiling was in defiance of the true, good, and beautiful cherished by enlightened intellectuals.

Sū Xiàoquán, like Kòu Yùyīng, also criticized Hàn-Chinese mistreatment of Chinese Muslims:

> Huí is a mínzú burdened by many considerations. [...] Unlike other minority mínzú, they do not sing jolly songs and perform cheerful dances. [...] In their forbearance [for the Hàn-Chinese] they do not sacrifice their dignity. [...] When they erupt [and forbearance ends], they are extremely fierce and brave. Whether it is the scorching heat of the desert, the destitution of the mountains, or the coldness they encounter [when meeting Hàn-Chinese] in the cities, they can endure it all. But there is one aspect in which you [the Hàn-Chinese reader] must not provoke them. You cannot humiliate and slander his [the Huí man's

religious] convictions and taboos, that is his dignity and creed as a human. (quoted in Juānzi, Summer 2010, p. 19)

In conclusion, the Huí authors' invocation of the statement "people should strive to ensure the manifestation of truth" benefits Huí interests. Interestingly, national (Party-State) interests were implied by Sū Xiàoquán and Mǎ Lìjuān to be contingent on Huí interests. It is true that the authors encouraged their Huí compatriots to be exemplary citizens that accepted the political status quo and that did not foment discontent. At the same time, loyalty to the Party-State was not the only manifestation of truth. To the authors, Islam was also a manifestation of truth and its practice by Huí should therefore be defended despite personal risks that doing so may involve. Possibly inspired by texts such as Liú Yīngguī's eulogy on the fearlessness of Sū Xiàoquán, the editor-in-chief criticized Hàn-Chinese (lit. "people from the Interior" 内地人) for misunderstanding (误读) and demonizing (妖魔化) Muslims in Xīnjiāng. At the time when she was writing in 2015, regional authorities had been engaged in a campaign against religious extremism for about a year. Placing the blame of unrest in Xīnjiāng on Hàn-Chinese, rather than on people stained by extremist forms of Islam, was therefore against the political winds of the time. It appears that despite all their rhetoric on loyalty to the Party-State, and their efforts to accommodate Huí identity within national interests, the Huí authors were not willing to let national interests stifle Huí interests in freedom of religious practice and thought.

iii. Truth can be found in the paradigms of purity

The theme of truth as manifested by exemplary individuals was repeatedly invoked by the contributors to the *Kāidū River*. The theme was not only found in the magazine but also widely applied in Chinese propaganda texts. The most famous exemplary individual in Chinese propaganda was perhaps the soldier Léi Fēng. From 1963 and until the present day, he has been promoted as the epitome of altruism, socialist diligence, and loyalty to the Party and the national leadership. The exemplary individuals celebrated in the *Kāidū River* were primarily minority mínzú. In this section, I will explore how the Huí authors invoked the theme of paragons, the role paragons played in the formulation of Huí identity, and whose concerns this formulation served.

The paragons in the *Kāidū River* were characterized in a way very similar to the paragons in classical Neo-Confucian texts. Neo-Confucian treatises on paragons provide systematic descriptions of characteristics pertaining to paragons, which the magazine writers tend to indicate are obvious. Reading the Neo-Confucian classics is therefore useful for understanding the role played by paragons in the *Kāidū River*.

Neo-Confucian philosophers such as the Chéng brothers maintained that people are essentially good. Before they are born, they are untainted by the physical world and their entire being is defined by cosmic nature, which also is human nature. After birth, however, people are endowed with a physical body and mind. If people were in a perfect body and a perfect world, their thoughts and actions would be seamlessly synchronized with the intended way of cosmos. But because of the imperfections of the human body and the world, they start to behave and think in erroneous ways, and amplify their own misery and that of mankind.

The goal of self-cultivation in Neo-Confucianism is to eradicate erroneous thoughts, emotions, and conduct. Recognizing newborn infants as being most in tune with cosmic nature, numerous Neo-Confucian thinkers from the Míng dynasty (1368–1644) recommended emulation of children as the superior methodology of self-cultivation. Yán Jūn (1504–1596), for example, advised his pupil Luó Rǔfāng to always act in accordance with "what comes to you in a natural way." This was an interpretation of the influential philosopher Wáng Yángmíng (1472–1529), who claimed that people have an intuitive sense of right and wrong and that they therefore could trust themselves to make moral judgements. By acting on spontaneous thoughts and emotions, Yán Jūn maintained, people's minds would behave more like those of children. They would stop worrying about the effects of their actions and would spontaneously treat the vulnerable with kindness, the wicked with righteousness, and elders with ritual propriety. Luó Rǔfāng fully embraced the teachings of Yán Jūn. According to Luó Rǔfāng,

> When you were a child, your body was happy and smiled […] The child of innocence has intuitive knowledge and ability [of good]. When you regain this stage, you will feel at home in yourself. Your mind will then be pure. There is no need of troubling yourself about how to discipline yourself afterwards […] just look at the mother! […] when a process belongs to heaven [cosmos] it is natural and works out spontaneously. (Carson Chang, 1962, pp. 122–123)

The repeated praise of the infantile mind in Luó Rǔfāng's texts reflects the significance attached by many Neo-Confucian scholars to the infant as a paragon of cosmic truth. Besides the philosophical argument that children have had less time to be polluted by the corruption of their physical existence, the philosophers identified several characteristics manifested in children that they associated with cosmic truth. They argued, first, that unpolluted children are utterly honest. They trust what they are told and cannot comprehend that anyone would lie to them. Second, children are spontaneous. Being completely honest, they do not develop elaborate schemes to achieve what they want. If they want something, they openly convey their desire. Third, the Neo-Confucian scholars maintained that children are inherently compassionate and loving. According to the philosopher Wáng Yángmíng,

"no toddler has ever failed to love their kin" (孩提之童无不知爱其亲). Luó Rǔfāng's reference to maternal love is intended as proof that all humans have intuitive knowledge of good that is acquired at birth rather than through socialization. It is a reference to Mencius' (372–289 BC) famous claim that any person would want to help a child falling into a well and that compassion therefore is universal in all beings since birth. Fourth, children have an innate sense of respect for parents and elder siblings. It is from this innate sense that ritual propriety for dealing with parents, siblings, and even the emperor is derived.

I am describing the Neo-Confucian portrayal of children as paragons of truth in such detail to illustrate the striking parallels between this portrayal and the virtues praised in present-day Chinese paragons. The similarities extend not only to paragons praised in the *Kāidū River*, they also extend to other paragons celebrated in Chinese propaganda from the Maoist period until the present day. In the posthumously published diary of the Maoist paragon Léi Fēng, he literally stated that

> I am like a child learning to walk. The Party is like a mother holding my arm, supporting me, teaching me how to walk. Every fēn[3] I grow, and every step I take is saturated with the affectionate concern and tireless solicitousness of the Party. (Léi Fēng, 1963/2003, p. 51)

In the excerpt, Léi Fēng indicated that his loyalty to the Party was derived from his understanding of the Party as a parent. Ritual propriety in dealing with parents or metaphorical parents (the ruler) was one of the core attributes of the infantile paragon of truth. The propaganda texts of Léi Fēng were also replete with examples demonstrating infantile virtues of honesty, spontaneity, compassion, and righteousness.

In 2017, a Uyghur deputy director of the YHAC CPC Propaganda Department invoked a statement highly similar to that of Léi Fēng:

> In my infant heart, the Party planted a sacred seed. She [Mother Party] is so great, so sacred, and so yearn-inspiring [让人向往] [...] We must be grateful for and cherish [the happy lives that we have been given by the Party]. From the depth of [our] hearts, we must love our ancestral land, be grateful for the benevolence of the Party, listen to the Party, and walk with the Party. As a Uyghur party cadre, I will pro-actively have an impact, using my advantageous position to broadly do propaganda [...] daring to say "no" to all kinds of disharmonious sounds [...] forever [...] being a good child of the Party. (Gülxan Osman, 2017)

Whereas Léi Fēng and other cosmic paragons from eastern China tend to be Hàn-Chinese, the paragons lauded by the Huí authors of the *Kāidū River* were

[3] Unit of measurement equivalent to $^1/_3$ cm.

primarily minority mínzú. This could be interpreted as an attempt by mínzú cadres to gain political merits for their mínzú by portraying them to the Hàn-Chinese Party-State in a favorable way. However, this is not necessarily the case. It could also be an effort solely aimed at inducing paragon-like behavior in the wider minority mínzú population, in unequivocal service of the Party-State.

When analyzing the texts of the magazine, I found evidence that the authors simultaneously attempted to achieve both goals. They portrayed Muslim minority mínzú in a favorable way to Hàn-Chinese readers, and they encouraged their Muslim readers to manifest classical virtues of purity. By classical virtues of purity, I mean sincerity, contentment, diligence, altruism, and spontaneous emotions of love, respect, and obedience for parents and the rulers of the country (in this case the Party).

That the writers encouraged Hàn-Chinese readers to emulate the purity of minority mínzú indicated that the portrayal of minority mínzú as paragons was directed at both Hàn-Chinese and minority mínzú readers. The Sufi author Mǎ Lìjuān, for example, described a Uyghur girl in Kashgar as pure, simple-minded, and honest (Juānzi, Autumn 2010). The girl in question was working at a tourist site in the city and was dressed up in the costume of a Turkic princess. When one of the Hàn-Chinese tourists tried to give her money, she became embarrassed and refused. To Mǎ Lìjuān, this was a manifestation of the purity of Uyghurs. In her texts, Mǎ Lìjuān contrasted the purity of the premodern to the corruption of the modern. The modern, in turn, she associated with Hàn-Chinese, and by implication also Sinicized Huí such as herself. Whereas modern people tend to value material gain, the premodern are more concerned with appropriate human relations. By praising the Uyghur girl's conduct in contrast to that of the Hàn-Chinese tourist, she indicated that not only classical virtues of purity should be cherished among minority mínzú. Hàn-Chinese should also appreciate their traditional ways of thought and even learn from them. In the case of both Uyghurs and Huí, the traditional ways of thought are presumably shaped by Islam, which Mǎ Lìjuān made perfectly clear in her texts.

Whereas Mǎ Lìjuān described herself as modern and Sinicized, she and other Huí contributors to the magazine indicated that not only Uyghurs but also Huí were premodern. This was perhaps most explicitly stated by Sū Xiàoquán. According to him,

> My Huíhuí mínzú manifest the fine character of mankind, yet they also manifest a certain primordial wildness. In the fierce clash with the [Hàn-Chinese] modern world, their [the Huí] cultural state of mind has appeared to be more characteristic [than other mínzú]. (Quoted in Juānzi, Summer 2010, p. 19)

Here, Sū Xiàoquán seems to imply that the traditional ways of the Huí made them into troublemakers for the Party-State. In the same text, he suggested

that such conflicts were provoked by misunderstandings of the Hàn-Chinese and that Huí people are in fact pure and good. To Sū Xiàoquán, therefore, the archetypical Huí were premodern and identifiable in contrast to the modern Hàn-Chinese.

Lǐ Shǒufēng, former deputy magistrate of Yānqí, is a Hàn-Chinese author highly praised by both Kòu Yùyīng and Mǎ Lìjuān. Their appreciation of Lǐ Shǒufēng can be attributed to the content of his writings. He has written extensively on the purity of the infantile mind, how it is manifested in minority mínzú, and how Hàn-Chinese may learn from these paradigms of purity. In one of his texts (Lǐ Shǒufēng, Summer 2013), for example, Lǐ Shǒufēng wrote about a visit to Tibet. He described Tibet as an exotic, strange, and beautiful land reminiscent of those in fairy tales. He and his fellow Hàn-Chinese travelers were shocked by the Tibetans' simplistic and naive ways of thinking. Notably, the Tibetans were not worried about theft or about customers running away from the hotel bill. After living among the Tibetans for a few days, Lǐ Shǒufēng maintained that he and his fellow travelers had become simple-minded like the Tibetans. This made them feel happy and content.

In their portrayal of minority mínzú and their traditional patterns of thought as pure, the authors addressed Huí concerns about the Party-State's tolerance of Islam. The concern with ensuring Party-State tolerance of Islam was spelled out explicitly by Sū Xiàoquán:

> We must speak out, prove, and make other people [non-Muslims, i.e., Hàn-Chinese] understand [...] [W]e have both opportunity and reason to show the world what Islam really is and the warm emotions of Muslims. The media of our times strike our throats. Staying in the fortress of [our] homes and lamenting [our fate] is mocked [by the Hàn-Chinese] [...] We must speak out. We have no other option. (Quoted in Juānzi, Summer 2010, p. 19)

The authors, as minority mínzú often do in China, strongly associated the Party-State with the Hàn-Chinese. Uradyn Bulag's argument on the role of mínzú paragons in creating a positive image of mínzú is therefore substantiated in the texts of the *Kāidū River*. The authors of the magazine used the propaganda theme of paragons not only to portray minority mínzú in a positive manner, they also claimed to write with the specific intent of letting Hàn-Chinese readers understand that they have nothing to fear from Muslims.

In addition to portraying minority mínzú and their religious convictions as pure, the Huí authors' usage of the paragon theme also served national interests. Notably, when the theme was used to contrast minority mínzú to the Hàn-Chinese, it implied that minority mínzú are infantile, backwards, and emotionally volatile while Hàn-Chinese are mature, modern, and rational thinkers. This served national interests in nurturing law-abiding and content citizens and, paradoxically, in the Sinicization of minority mínzú. The former follows from the reasoning that if minority mínzú are children and the Party-

State is the adult, then minority mínzú as children ought to obey the adult who understands their own good and what is best for the world better than they do. The latter follows from the idea that although adults should cherish the purity of childhood, all children must eventually grow up. As pointed out by both Sū Xiàoquán and Lǐ Shǒufēng, pure and naive individuals are vulnerable to abuse by others. The logical approach for a young minority mínzú reader would therefore be to cherish the traditions of their parents while avoiding abuse by accepting assimilation into Hàn-Chinese society.

The paradox is transparent in the following excerpt from Kòu Yùyīng, the editor-in-chief, in which she described a Uyghur policewoman that was awarded the title of paragon by local authorities:

> She truly is a rare gem of simple-mindedness. In the eyes of others she is a naive and stupid elder sister [傻大姐]. But it is this hard-to-get simple-mindedness and naivety that let her rise above others. [...] [Political] instructor Lǐ Xiǎoyuán perceptively noted that Ayshemgül Emet is a diligent, good police officer. Her only lack is in a leader's boldness. She is too kind, too soft, and too concerned about people's feelings. (Kòu Yùyīng, Spring 2017, p. 11)

On the one hand, Kòu Yùyīng praised Ayshemgül Emet as a model for her readers to emulate. On the other hand, she stated that successful emulation would be an impediment to career development and would make the reader subject to ridicule and abuse. While most people may appreciate the purity of Ayshemgül Emet, Kòu Yùyīng indicated that only a few would want to become like her themselves. In the words of the Míng dynasty philosopher Lǐ Zhì (1527–1602):

> If the infant mind is lost, the truthful mind will be lost. If the truthful mind is lost, the true self will be lost. If the true self is lost, what once was cannot be regained. (Lǐ Zhì, 1585/1990, p. 97)

According to Lǐ Zhì, after adults have learned to be suspicious of other people's intentions and motives, they can never become naive like children again. If being Muslim means being backwards and stupid, the texts may encourage some readers to be less religious and more like the people of the Hàn-Chinese mainstream. When I was visiting the Xinjiang Normal University in 2017, I encountered such attitudes among a few Uyghur students who expressed shame about the backwardness of their parents. This is clearly not the *Kāidū River* authors' intention or what they strived to do. They maintained that being suspicious and highly conscious of personal interests is the easy path to follow, and something that their readers should avoid for the sake of their own well-being as well as for the good of society. But the benefits of mínzú maturation is part of the message effectively conveyed by the texts.

In conclusion, in their invocation of the theme of paragons, the Huí authors strived to ensure Party-State tolerance of Huí religious practice. It served their expressed concern with maintaining a Huí identity distinct from the Hàn-Chinese mainstream. At the same time, the authors encouraged their Muslim readers to manifest classical virtues of purity and to be model citizens. This may have been motivated by a desire to counter negative ideas about Muslims among Hàn-Chinese, a desire to serve the interests of the Party-State, or both. Paradoxically, the invocation of the theme may have encouraged some readers to become less pure and less Muslim. However, this can only be considered an incidental effect.

iv. Pure people are vulnerable to abuse

As a corollary of the theme of paragons, statements on the precarious situation of paragons play a significant role in the *Kāidū River*. As mentioned in the previous section, the portrayal of minority mínzú as pure and infantile encouraged mínzú readers to accept and not question the wisdom and authority of the Party-State. Statements on how minority mínzú required guidance from the Party-State are found in the texts of Kòu Yùyīng, Sū Xiàoquán, and Liú Yīngguī. The goal of this section is to further discuss what these statements meant for the formulation of Huí identity and to explore whether Huí concerns also were involved. The alternative would be that these statements only reflect effective servitude by the authors to the Party-State's propaganda apparatus.

In Confucian texts, the problematic precarity of the pure was often resolved by the laws of cosmos. According to the Hàn-dynasty compilation *Biographies of Exemplary Women*, when the stepmother and half-brother of the legendary sage ruler Shùn failed in their attempt to murder him, he did not resent them (Liú Xiàng, 1st Century BC / 2014). Doing so would be to violate the cosmic principle of ritual propriety. This made him vulnerable to another murder attempt. Fortunately Shùn's sister, filled by distaste for her brother and mother's scheme, told on them. Shùn was thus able to survive once more. The half-sister's distaste for the scheme can be interpreted as a consequence of the cosmic laws by which human nature is defined.

In the *Kāidū River*, authors such as Sū Xiàoquán also emphasized the efficacy of cosmic laws. He noted that while purity may not be conducive to career development, accumulation of wealth, or the realization of grand ambitions, it ensures that people can live with peace on their minds. By living in accordance with human nature, he claimed, people would become happy and content, their health would improve, and they may live longer. At the end of their days, they can pass away feeling confident that people will speak well of them. Impure people, however, get none of these things (Sū Xiàoquán, Winter 2011).

The efficacy of cosmic laws was perhaps emphasized most in the fairy tales provided by the state folklorist Mǎ Guìlín. In these fairy tales, cosmic laws were enforced by superhuman beings. Before the superhuman beings entered the story, the pure and innocent were abused by selfish evildoers. In one fairy-tale, for example, a wealthy man murdered the incumbent imam and took his position. As the new imam, he neglected his religious duties to the poor and served only those who could pay him high fees. Later, the imam traveled to Mecca with an impoverished pilgrim and a holy man. They did not get far before the imam was transformed into a wolf by the holy man and burned alive. The impoverished pilgrim, on the other hand, was enticed to go back to his house, which had become a large and luxurious mansion (Mǎ Guìlín, Summer 2012).

The classical paradigm of the pure person is naive and never suspects evil in others. This was particularly true regarding parents (including metaphorical ones) and elder siblings. Even if they knew about the moral flaws of their parents or elder siblings—however egregious—they would wish them no harm. The superhuman beings, on the other hand, would mete out justice against the wicked without hesitation or remorse. Their knowledge of good and evil was supreme. If a person was evil, the superhumans would carry out extreme acts of violence with a gleeful smile. Being both wise and pure, they transcended the dilemma of infantility and adulthood. They engaged in calculated falsehood without being corrupted by selfish wants. Their thoughts and actions were one with cosmic righteousness.

The protagonist of a series of Mǎ Guìlín's fairy tales was a socialist hero named Ali. He was employed by a selfish and abusive landowner. Ali would find clever ways to deceive and bring misfortune to his employer. In one story, for example, he intentionally misinterpreted the landowner's instructions to "filter out" the feces of his toddler. Rather than resolving the toddler's needs in the conventional fashion, Ali gutted the toddler's belly and pulled out the intestines in preparation for filtering. After discovering the infanticide, the terrified landowner was left dumbfounded by a sharp-witted remark by Ali that he was just following instructions. Naturally, the story made sure to emphasize that the toddler was as wicked as his father, portraying the brutality as the fulfillment of cosmic righteousness (Mǎ Guìlín, Summer 2011). However, such acts were never done by characters portrayed as paradigms of infantile purity in the fairy tales.

Coming from one of the most active contributors to the *Kāidū River*, the moral lessons conveyed in the texts of Mǎ Guìlín should not be trivialized as insignificant cultural remnants. While the texts may primarily originate from oral testimonies of local Huí peasants in the 1980s, it is doubtful that the magazine's editors would have allowed their repeated inclusion if they did not perceive some benefit to the overall propaganda message of the magazine.

The identification of superhuman beings with the socialist hero, who was the fairy-tale manifestation of the Chinese Communist Party, strongly implied

the involvement of Party-State concerns. The authors indicated that the Party-State is the real-life superhuman being that allowed for infantile minority mínzú to remain pure. Just like the holy man transformed the wicked, wealthy imam into a wolf and burned him alive, so did the Party-State apply force against anyone that would want to deceive minority mínzú and do them harm. And just like Ali could ruthlessly mutilate the wicked and remain unquestionably pure, so should also mínzú trust in the wisdom and benevolence of the Party-State, even when its policies may seem questionable to those of less intelligence. In 1956, Máo made a similar statement to justify the personality cult of Stalin in the Soviet Union. He said: "the question is not whether or not there should be a cult of the individual, but rather whether or not the individual concerned represents *truth*. If he does, then he should be worshipped" (quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2006, p. 262; my emphasis). By endorsing Stalin as a target of worship, Máo effectively stated that Stalin was a superhuman being representing truth.

In the texts of the *Kāidū River*, however, superhuman beings and the Party-State are not the only solution to the precarious infantility of minority mínzú. Notably, the former county-magistrate Lǐ Shǒufēng, but also Kòu Yùyīng, Sū Xiàoquán, and Mǎ Lìjuān, promoted what I would call *enlightened intellectuals*. This was spelled out perhaps most clearly by Lǐ Shǒufēng in 2011, when he wrote about a poet friend of his employed at "a large corporation." His friend was not only intelligent and wise but would also treat people with the warmth and spontaneity characteristic to those pure of heart. When asked about his secret, the friend encouraged Lǐ Shǒufēng to apply intelligence and wisdom in "life" and to be innocent and pure in "writing." Lǐ Shǒufēng thus reached the epiphany that it is possible for writers to be wise without being "polluted" by this wisdom or getting engaged in vulgar "schemes and treachery" (Lǐ Shǒufēng, Spring 2011, p. 5).

Kòu Yùyīng directly related enlightened intellectuals to the issues of minority mínzú and religion. In the 2015 article *Using the True Force of Literature to Promote "De-Extremification,"* she maintained that minority mínzú intellectuals have a social responsibility to guide their mínzú away from extremist forms of religion. To Kòu Yùyīng, the responsibility followed from the privileged position of intellectuals (in terms of authority and wisdom) and from the power of the pen. As examples of extremist interpretation of religion, she mentioned wearing Arab-style clothing, refusing to participate in social activities or in dance, forcing others to also be religious extremists, and engaging in violence in the name of religion. She claimed that the writers of the *Kāidū River* have fulfilled their social responsibility as intellectuals by promoting classical virtues of purity (such as filial piety, love for children, mutual aid, and support for the vulnerable), as well as mínzú clothing culture and marital culture (Kòu Yùyīng, Summer 2015).

Kòu Yùyīng's mention of marital culture related to claims that religious extremists in Xīnjiāng neither apply for nor recognize the marriage certificates

of the Party-State. In her text on Huí marital culture, Kòu Yùyīng (Xīnyù, Autumn 2010) emphasized that Huí people always make sure to get a marriage certificate from the Party-State. Polygyny and non-registered marriages appear to be common among Huí in the neighboring provinces of Gānsù and Qīnghǎi (Erie, 2016, pp. 238–240; Wroldsen, 2014, pp. 36–38). Kòu Yùyīng is likely familiar with such marriages, as her own family hails from the Zhāngjiāchuān Huí Autonomous County—a bastion of Jahriyya Islam located in Gānsù. Her apparent choice to hide this knowledge is indicative of her desire to paint a positive picture of Huí for her Hàn-Chinese peers and the Party-State leadership.

Kòu Yùyīng's 2015 article served at least two functions. The first is that it encouraged writers to promote classical virtues of purity. The second is that it reinforced the authority of writers. The second function was clearly intentional. This is shown by Kòu Yùyīng's persistent emphasis on the achievements of her fellow *Kāidū River* writers. By promoting writers as wise intellectuals that have transcended the contradictory duality of wisdom and purity, infantility and adulthood, she encouraged readers to recognize the authority of both minority mínzú writers and writers in general. Through their portrayal of minority mínzú as infantile and in need of parental guidance, the contributors thus served not only Party-State interests, but also more particularistic interests, not least when portraying *Kāidū River* writers as enlightened intellectuals.

The celebration of writers was apparently intended as an indirect means of promoting Huí interests by enhancing the authority of those very texts that portray Huí practice of religion as true and pure. In her eulogy to Sū Xiàoquán, Kòu Yùyīng (Summer 2010) stated that she had previously been a lone warrior in the effort to preserve Huí culture and identity before the publication of the magazine. She indicated that with the aid of her fellow *Kāidū River* writers, she would now be able to prevent the looming "extinction" of Huí identity and allow Sū Xiàoquán to rest in peace. As argued by the renowned anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1994/2010), "social identity becomes most important the moment it seems threatened" (p. 81). Kòu Yùyīng's claim that the magazine was a response to her belief in such a threat therefore seems plausible.

Concerns about Huí as a mínzú were also reflected in the differentiated portrayal of Huí and Uyghurs. Whereas both Huí and Uyghurs were portrayed as pure and susceptible to deception by evildoers, Kòu Yùyīng and her colleagues made sure to portray Uyghurs as more susceptible to such deception than Huí. By this I am not only referring to texts such as those in which Mǎ Lìjuān, herself a minority mínzú individual, exoticizes Uyghurs as a backward and pure other. I am also referring to texts in which religious extremism is portrayed as primarily a Uyghur rather than Huí problem.

Notably, in her article on "de-extremification" (去极端化), Kòu Yùyīng (Summer 2015) opens with mentioning a letter from the regional Literature and Arts Federation to *Uyghur* authors, poets, and translators. All her examples and counterexamples of religious extremist tendencies in the article involve Uyghurs. All pictures attached to the text portray Uyghurs and no Huí. Despite Huí also being a Muslim mínzú, Kòu Yùyīng does not use the word "Huí" a single time in the article. Huí are only indirectly mentioned when she states that "our" mínzú clothing culture is unrelated to Arabian clothing culture. Herself being a Huí and not a Uyghur, "our" mínzú clothing culture cannot refer to that of Uyghurs. The text strongly indicates that she and her Huí colleagues used statements about infantile mínzú to portray Uyghurs as more infantile and therefore more prone to extremist deception than Huí. Huí may be pure and thus vulnerable to deception, but if anyone has been polluted by religious extremist thoughts, it must be Uyghurs, and definitely not Huí.

v. Truth can be comprehended in the study of culture, history, and nature

A multitude of texts in the magazine emphasized how cosmic truth can be comprehended through the production and consumption of culture (texts, paintings, calligraphy, photography, etc.), or the study of history and nature. Due to the prevalence of such statements in the magazine, I have included this section in which I briefly discuss their significance for mínzú agency.

Like the other statements in this chapter, statements on how truth can be comprehended through the study of history and nature originate from Neo-Confucian discourse. During the Sòng Dynasty (960–1279), philosophers like Zhū Xī or the Chéng brothers maintained that by studying a multitude of phenomena and things, people would find cosmic principles repeated in the essence of them all. The philosopher Wáng Yángmíng allegedly spent a considerable amount of time and effort contemplating how cosmic truth could be found in the study of bamboo.

In the magazine, culture, history, and nature are portrayed as objects that are studied by writers and artists. Sū Xiàoquán, for example, contributed several texts in which he encouraged his readers to write texts and read books (Spring 2017; Summer 2015; Spring 2013; Spring 2010). Former deputy magistrate Lǐ Shǒufēng (Spring 2011) maintained that literature makes people happy and content and allows them to discern truth from falsehood and good from evil. The Uyghur poet Dilmurat Telet (Summer 2013) claimed that truth can be comprehended through the study of clouds, stars, the sun, mountains, and icy peaks. Acutely aware of Party-State concerns, the Hàn-Chinese cadre Wú Qiáng (Summer 2012; Autumn 2010) asserted that the truth about the blood and sweat spilled by generations of mínzú to ensure Xīnjiāng's eternal belonging to China can be comprehended by learning about Táng-dynasty (618–907) coins excavated in Yānqí.

The sanctification of textual writing and artistic production reinforced the authority of the magazine writers. Portrayed as trained experts in discerning truth in culture, history, and nature (as well as infantile minority mínzú), they allegedly held the key to individual contentment, social harmony, and supreme moral judgement. They asked that their audience read and consume their texts with utmost solemnity. Through such portrayal, the writers situated themselves favorably within state orthodoxy. They presented their contributions as necessary for the Party-State to succeed in protecting the infantile mínzú. This portrayal benefitted the continued printing of the magazine. This was not a trivial effort. The magazine was in fact discontinued in 2017, failing to survive increased restrictions on public language during a period that the anthropologist Ildikó Bellér-Hann (2021) has labelled the "final silencing" of Uyghur writers in Xīnjiāng.

By claiming that cosmic truth can be identified in unambiguous and precise ways through the study of culture, history, and nature, the magazine writers legitimated their statements as universal. They maintained that their claims in terms of cosmic truth were not personal opinions, or values specific to Huí or even Chinese culture, but facts that can be verified by anyone with a keen eye for analysis.

The following excerpt from the song *Mínzú Unity – A Kinship-Affectionate Family*, written by the Chinese Uzbek PLA singer Shamil Shakir, illustrates this very well:

> The Chinese mínzú are one family,
> Ardently loving the big ancestral home.
> Brothers and sisters are bek yaxshi [Uyghur: "very good"],
> Truthful to each other and emotionally close as hands and feet.
>
> [Just like] the Tiānshān Mountain pines are intertwined by the roots,
> The people of each mínzú are intertwined by the hearts.
> The Tiānshān Mountain pines are intertwined by the roots,
> Mínzú Unity – a kinship-affectionate family.
>
> [Like a family] eating a very round nan bread together,
> Building the peaceful China Dream together.
> Drinking the same snow-water of the Tiānshān mountains,
> [The mínzú] have not been separated for generations.
>
> [Just like] the Tiānshān Mountain pines ...
>
> People of the same mind, same virtues, same path,
> Enjoying happy lives together.
> Embracing one another like pomegranate seeds,
> Welcoming the beautiful and good way forward.

This song was often used by Xīnjiāng propaganda authorities in the late 2010s. At a Huí cultural festival in Yānqí in 2018, organized by the Yānqí Propaganda Department and the Yānqí Bureau of Culture, it was performed no less than five times over the course of a few days. In the song, the relationship between the mínzú of China is compared to the relationship between hands and feet, and that between seeds in a pomegranate. For one seed to dislike the other seeds, or for the feet to seek separation from the hands, is implied as being both perverse and detestable. Similarly, pines that are intertwined by the roots and a family consuming the same food and water ought to feel kinship-affection for one another.

In the song, the statement about how truth can be verified through the study of nature is invoked in the direct service of Party-State interests. However, in the *Kāidū River*, such statements were also invoked in the service of Huí interests. One example is when Sū Xiàoquán stated that cosmic truth can be comprehended through the study of books and implied that he, a wise elderly intellectual, understands that Islam is a manifestation of truth. He indicated that any perceptive intellectual with sufficient knowledge about Islam would reach the same conclusion. To the extent that Sū Xiàoquán and other Huí magazine writers were successful in their efforts, legitimization of the magazine indirectly benefitted Huí as a mínzú.

vi. Truth mandates family values

Among the classical virtues of purity emphasized by the magazine writers, none are as prevalent as those on the importance of family. More specifically, the writers celebrated filial piety and love among siblings. Both were significant in their formulation of Huí identity, and both were intimately tied to the national interests of the Party-State.

Filial piety is directly related to the Chinese discourse on patriotism. In the Chinese discourse on patriotism, the country (China) is portrayed as a mother and the citizens as her children. Being a patriot is to be grateful to Mother China—the entity that has nurtured the citizen, and without which the citizen's existence would not have been possible. In this discourse, forgetting the debt to Mother China is as heinous as the fictitious villain Chén Shìměi who abandoned and did not care for his mother (Shǐzhì, Spring 2011, p. 56). Since at least the 1950s, the leaders of the Party-State have attempted to conflate the state and the nation ("China"). It is no coincidence that the Uyghur Deputy Director of propaganda in Yānqí spoke about the Party as "she," implying that the Party was her mother. By emphasizing the importance of parents, the magazine authors therefore effectively served national interests in fostering love, reverence, and loyalty among minority mínzú for China and the Party-State.

Statements that called for love among siblings were related to the Chinese discourse on mínzú unity. In this discourse, the collectivity of mínzú were

portrayed as a family. This is illustrated in the song, *Mínzú Unity – A Kinship-Affectionate Family*. In the *Kāidū River*, the relationship was perhaps most transparent in Kòu Yùyīng's 2017 text on the state-designated paragon of mínzú unity, Ayshemgül Emet. In the text, Kòu Yùyīng praised Ayshemgül Emet for treating the impoverished Hàn-Chinese man Sūn Jiànfēng and his close relatives as if they were part of her own family. When Sūn's house caught fire, she contacted the political commissar of the YHAC Public Security Bureau to mobilize administrative and financial support in the name of mínzú unity. Later, at important Muslim and Hàn-Chinese festivals, Ayshemgül's and Sūn's families would visit one another and bring gifts (Kòu Yùyīng, Spring 2017).

Statements on the importance of family were often made without emphasis on patriotism and mínzú unity. In one of Mǎ Guìlín's (Winter 2012) fairy tales, for example, a girl was transformed into a rat for telling slanderous lies about her sister-in-law. In one of her essays, the Uyghur writer Anargül Niyaz (Summer 2012) reflected on all things that her mother had done for her and the importance of gratitude. In one of Liú Yīngguī's (Shǐzhì, Winter 2011) essays, he praised a hen that displayed filial piety towards Liú Yīngguī's mother. The hen was mindful, compliant, and obedient.

Some of the writers may not have had national Party-State interests in mind when writing these texts. This is particularly true of texts in which the writers praise the virtues of loved ones that have passed away. Such reminiscence may simply have been a way for these authors to process their emotions. However, because the articles were published in a propaganda magazine, they effectively contributed to a discourse on family in which Party-State interests are vested. They contributed to the portrayal of love for family and parents as sacred, ensuring that the questioning of such love remained an anathema. In this discourse on family, it is taboo to suggest that one should be a filial child if and only if one's parents are kind and considerate. Because the child's entire existence is owed to the mother, the duty of filial piety cannot under any circumstances be absolved. Similarly, by extension, Chinese propagandists often indicated that it is not permitted to suggest that the citizen should be loyal if and only if the country treats one well. Just like a mother, the country has given birth to and fed the citizen. This is a given by being born on Chinese soil. The dual sanctification of family and country is highly transparent in some Muslim sermons in China, as observed by Matthew S. Erie in Gānsù Province (2016, p. 181).

According to the British sociologist Anthony D. Smith (1998), countries are likened to families not because the family engenders powerful attachments, but because both families and countries have "powerful interests" that function as catalysts for such attachments (p. 140). Ethnic groups are sometimes described by scholars as networks in which members can invest their identities, pool social capital and attain an alternative path to social mobility separate from mainstream society. To the extent that mínzú

have interests and function as "ethnic" networks, the likening of the minority mínzú to family is a highly salient strategy for its members.

Statements on the value of family were potent for propaganda purposes precisely because they did not blatantly mandate patriotism. In the Yānqí propaganda booklet *We Are All One Family* (YHAC Propaganda Department & YHAC Spiritual Civilization Office, 2010), love for one's own mínzú was contrasted to love for the country and the Chinese collectivity of mínzú. The booklet authors indicated that some people find the two concepts to be contradictory, presumably because both the individual mínzú and the collectivity of mínzú are family. While some Chinese citizens maintain that primary loyalty should be to the Huí or Uyghur mínzú family, others maintain that the primary loyalty should be to the Chinese mínzú family. But whichever of the two opinions a given citizen holds, they can in general agree on and get behind propaganda that elevates the family to the status of sacred.

Discourse on the mínzú or nation as family could cultivate mínzú particularism, threatening primary loyalty to China and the Party-State. Yet it also makes mínzú particularism vulnerable to the arguments of Chinese nationalism. This is particularly true to the extent that the Party-State was able to take credit for feeding, clothing, and providing jobs for minority mínzú. This is likely part of the reason why Uyghur mínzú particularists ("religious extremists"), according to the magazine contributor Qurban Nuraxun (Winter 2014), refused to "eat grain produced by, walk on roads built by, go to hospitals constructed by, and wear clothes made by Hàn people" (ibid., p. 25). They apparently found that accepting such services was putting Uyghurs in a debt to the Chinese family, and that this debt was detrimental to their political goals.

Despite their expressed concerns with Sinicization and the disappearance of a distinct Huí identity, the Huí magazine writers did not encourage their readers to refuse partaking of Hàn-Chinese grain or wear their clothing. This does not mean that their contribution to the sanctification of family was exclusively made with Party-State interests in mind. The fact that appreciation of family is encouraged by Party-State propaganda authorities made this an excellent loophole for promoting Huí identity, without being branded with the label of mínzú particularism.

The Huí sociologist Mǎ Róng (2004/2010) has demonstrated a certain awareness of this loophole, as can be seen in his argument against the "politicization" of mínzú issues in China. According to Mǎ Róng, by defining mínzú as political entities with rights that should be catered to by national authorities, minorities have become more conscious and demanding in terms of such rights. Similarly to Beijing University professor Ning Sao in 1995 (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 16), Mǎ Róng was particularly concerned that the same word, mínzú, was used to refer to both the Chinese nation and its minorities. This blurred the subordination of the latter to the former and indicated that they should have similar rights.

There are numerous indications that the promotion of family in the *Kāidū River* was intended to reinforce the affection of Huí for their own mínzú rather than, or in addition to, their affection for China. When visiting China in the 1980s, Dru Gladney (1991) found many informants stating that "we Hui nationality [mínzú] are very united" (p. 313). They interpreted the public slogan on mínzú unity to mean unity among Huí rather than unity among different mínzú. Gladney also found the saying "all Huí under heaven are one family" (天下回回是一家) to be quite popular among Huí before concerns about accusations of mínzú particularism had made them become more careful by the late 1980s (ibid., p. 36, 514). In Chinese source material on minority mínzú, such as the *We Are All One Family* booklet (YHAC Propaganda Department & YHAC Spiritual Civilization Office, 2010), it is common to distinguish mínzú by differentiated ancestry. In a text from 2012, Kòu Yùyīng (Xīnyù, Summer 2012) referred to a Huí merchant from Hénán province that lamented the lack of unity among Huí in Xīnjiāng (p. 14). By doing so, she indicated that Huí are a collective of relatives with interests distinct from the Hàn-Chinese, which should be protected through such unity.

In addition to strengthening unity among Huí, the celebration of family values displayed by Huí also benefits Huí in Uradyn Bulag's sense of accruing political merit. By their inclusion in the discourse of the *Kāidū River*, both Sū Xiàoquán's (Spring 2011) romantic poetry and Liú Yīngguī's (Shǐzhì, Winter 2012) eulogy to his wife are implied to be prime examples of the true, pure, and beautiful. By including these texts, the magazine editors indicate that prominent Huí, who also happen to practice Islam, display the same family values that are cherished by the Chinese Party-State. Liú Yīngguī's eulogy is particularly notable in this regard as he praised the religious piety of his wife. Whereas texts praising love among siblings and for parents may be intended as means for the inculcation of patriotism in the service of the Party-State, texts praising love for spouses do not play such a role, at least not directly. That Kòu Yùyīng, as the editor-in-chief, finds these texts to be good examples of the pure and true, and that she is particularly pleased to see them manifested within the ranks of her own mínzú, is a more convincing explanation. The political merit gained for Huí may mean more leeway in their practice of religion and other activities for the preservation of Huí identity.

In short, the celebration of family values in the *Kāidū River* was clearly encouraged by the Party-State leadership. It was perceived as beneficial to the national propaganda goals of solidifying inter-mínzú unity and nurturing loyal and obedient minority mínzú citizens. At the same time, the celebration of family values was conducive to mínzú particularism. The *Kāidū River* writers invoked statements about family values to address Huí concerns about intra-mínzú unity and the preservation of a distinct identity.

In the State Council's white papers, the national leadership only displayed a concern with inter-mínzú unity. In *We Are All One Family* (YHAC

Propaganda Department & YHAC Spiritual Civilization Office, 2010), the Yānqí CPC Propaganda Department indicated that intra-mínzú unity may have some value, but that inter-mínzú unity is far more important and that the former should not be allowed to interfere with the latter. Any indication of intra-mínzú loyalty as equally or even more important than inter-mínzú loyalty was therefore at direct odds with national concerns. In this regard, the authors' sanctification of the Huí family, while tolerated by the local Propaganda Department, was a sensitive area in which the authors' efforts were at odds with Party-State concerns.

vii. Islam represents truth

All the studied Huí contributors to the magazine indicate that Islam is a manifestation of cosmic truth. The Party historian Liú Yīngguī (Shǐzhì, Winter 2012) praised the religious virtues of his wife. The Sufi author Mǎ Lìjuān (Juānzi, Spring 2010) wrote about how the rebel ancestors of Huí in Yānqí would listen to verses from the Quran and chant "Allahu Akbar" (God is the greatest) to gain strength in the face of suppression by Qīng Dynasty forces. Kòu Yùyīng (Summer 2015) and Sū Xiàoquán lamented that Hàn-Chinese were ignorant about and misunderstood Islam. In Mǎ Guìlín's folklore, Muslim holy figures and even God (Allah, Khuda) himself intervened to ensure that cosmic justice was served. By portraying Islam as a manifestation of cosmic truth, the authors implied—or directly spelled out, as in the case of Sū Xiàoquán—that Islam and its practice among Huí should not be only tolerated but rather promoted.

The Huí contributors to the *Kāidū River* magazine were not the first to justify Islam through the invocation of Neo-Confucian philosophy. Since at least the 17th century, Muslim scholars in China have translated Arabic and Persian religious texts into Chinese language and attempted to explain Islam to Chinese readers. These translations became known as the Hàn-Kitab. The most renowned of these scholars, even among Huí in contemporary China, is Liú Zhì (1655–1754). He claimed that both Confucianism and Islam recognize the Chinese emperor as the embodiment of cosmic will on earth (Ālǐmù, 2007, p. 133). Similarly propagating the compatibility of Islam and Confucianism, Mǎ Déxīn (1794–1874) encouraged Chinese Muslims to honor the saints of both the East (China) and the West (Islam) (Yáng Guìpíng, 2002, p. 93). According to Professor Wáng Fēng (2012) at Níngxià University, the book *Islamic Rites* by Liú Zhì has been "profoundly influential" among Qadim ("old school," mainstream), Jahriyya Sufi, and Hall of Western Dao (Xīdàotáng) Muslims in China (p. 137).

Huí scholars of the 21st century, such as the Northwest Minzu University Professor Mǎ Míngliàng (2009), typically maintain that the Hàn-Kitab scholars did not accommodate Confucianism and Islam to serve Qīng dynasty (1644–1911) interests in cultivating obedient Muslim subjects. Rather, they

presumably did so to avoid persecution of Islam by Chinese authorities. They also aimed to increase knowledge and understanding of Islam among Chinese Muslims that were unable to read the texts in their original languages.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that their efforts benefitted and were appreciated by Qīng dynasty authorities. Liú Zhì's texts, unlike those deemed subversive and banned by Qīng dynasty authorities, were included in the Qiánlóng emperor's (1735–1796) national catalogue of books. The Deputy Minister of Personnel, Xú Yuánzhèng, proclaimed with great pleasure that although Liú Zhì was seemingly writing about Islam, he was "in fact casting light on our Confucianism" (Mǎ Míngliàng, 2009, p. 59). The Hàn-Kitab scholar Wáng Dàiyú (1570–1660) was similarly praised by the Confucian elite for propagating values of the Confucian social order (ibid.).

It is therefore not obvious whether Liú Zhì and the other Hàn-Kitab scholars are better described as "Sinicized" Muslims that were trying to encourage Muslims to accommodate themselves within the established order, or Muslims trying to legitimize and preserve their religious practices in a society suspicious of Islam. The tendency of Huí scholars to characterize such efforts as the latter may be based less on historical evidence and more on intuition, combined with a desire to prove that their ancestors were pious Muslims making endeavors in the interest of their people, and not mere pawns serving the interests of Qīng dynasty authorities.

Likewise, it is not obvious whether the *Kāidū River* writers' portrayal of Islam as aligned with cosmic truth is intended to legitimize Islam in Party-State discourse, or to "Sinicize" their Muslim compatriots. Previously in this chapter, I have leaned towards the former interpretation.

A primary reason for my interpretation is that the *Kāidū River* writers explicitly spell out a concern with the disappearance of Huí culture and the assimilation of Huí into Chinese society. Alarmist claims about how Huí as a mínzú will disappear if they become too Chinese were contradictory to the goal of Sinicization as expressed by the Party-State. It is highly plausible that the writers promoted an interpretation of Islam aligned with patriotism and displayed classical virtues with the intent of ensuring Party-State tolerance of Islam. But Sinicization interpreted as such would mean integration rather than cultural assimilation. It would primarily be intended as a means of preserving Huí identity and legitimizing the continued practice of religion. If the writers' goal was cultural assimilation, then the disappearance of Huí as a mínzú should have been trivialized or perhaps even celebrated by the writers. This strongly indicates that although the portrayal of Islam as a manifestation of cosmic truth in certain ways benefits Party-State interests, these statements are primarily intended by the writers as a service to Huí interests in freedom of religious practice and thought.

Concluding remarks

The Huí writers were clearly aware of national Party-State interests. Their emphasis on cosmic truth encouraged Huí to recognize classical virtues promoted by the Party-State's propaganda authorities. Their call for self-cultivation encouraged readers to be patriotic, law-abiding and obedient citizens. The theme of paragons benefitted Party-State interests by providing positive reinforcement to Huí who manifest infantile virtues of purity, such as obedience and trust in parental figures (i.e., Party-State representatives). Their portrayal of infantile minority mínzú as vulnerable to deception legitimized the role of Party-State tutelage. The celebration of family benefitted Party-State interests by sanctifying patriotism, loyalty to the Party-State, and inter-mínzú unity. Even the portrayal of Islam as a manifestation of cosmic truth benefitted Party-State concerns by encouraging accommodation of religious practice to Neo-Confucian values, which can be labelled Sinicization of Islam.

The invocation of Party-State interests is per Schoenhals' description of the Chinese propaganda system forced upon writers and cadres by coercing them to use certain terms and themes. It would therefore be surprising and highly questionable if I were not able to identify the involvement of Party-State interests in my analysis. The theme of pure model individuals, for example, has been employed by Chinese propaganda authorities for decades. The Uyghur policewoman Ayshemgül Emet was not designated as a paragon of mínzú unity by the *Kāidū River* magazine or even the Yānqí Literature and Arts Federation. Rather, she was awarded the title of paragon by Party-State authorities. Kòu Yùyīng's choice to interview Ayshemgül Emet and write an article about her as a paragon of mínzú unity was in a sense predetermined to benefit the Party-State.

At the same time, in terms of intentions, my findings leave little doubt that the Huí writers attempted to use the magazine as a locus for the promotion of Huí concerns. The emphasis on cosmic truth enabled them to argue that cross-mínzú values, rather than thought patterns or customs primarily associated with Hàn-Chinese people, are the essence of Chinese culture. Their call for the realization of cosmic truth encouraged readers to criticize discriminatory treatment of Muslims by Hàn-Chinese and to defend the right of Huí to practice Islam. The theme of paragons was invoked to portray minority mínzú and their culture as symbols of purity that Hàn-Chinese and Sinicized minority mínzú individuals should cherish and even emulate. Statements on the vulnerability of pure but infantile minority mínzú were used to legitimize the magazine as part of state orthodoxy, and to emphasize how vulnerable to deception Uyghurs were compared to Huí. The celebration of family encouraged intra-mínzú unity among Huí. And the portrayal of Islam as a manifestation of cosmic truth was used to encourage the Party-State's tolerance, appreciation, and even promotion of the practice of Islam among Huí.

The writers were careful to portray the magazine and themselves as tools of the Party-State. Kòu Yùyīng described herself on multiple occasions as a

loyal servant of the propaganda apparatus. In her eulogy to Sū Xiàoquán, for example, she mentioned that she was dispatched to visit him by the Yānqí Party Standing Committee as a representative of the Propaganda Department. In another article, she directly stated that the text was written at the behest of the county magistrate, who called upon her to do propaganda about a local economic development project. Considering the expressed goals of the Huí authors and the fact that the magazine was distributed in the form of "internal materials," i.e., among Party-State cadres, this makes a lot of sense. Failure to present themselves as legitimate voices of the Party-State would mean that any cadre concerned about political correctness would be unable to accept their arguments, however well presented.

In short, the findings of this chapter show that the authors were aware of national concerns and made sure to address them in their texts. At the same time, they made sure to relate Huí interests to national interests and portray the latter as depending on or at least benefitting significantly from the former. They even went as far as claiming that "Sinicization," in the sense of value integration, relies on the preservation of a Huí identity distinguished from Hàn identity by religion and cultural customs. This was contradictory to national interests to the extent that intra-mínzú unity is considered harmful to inter-mínzú unity, as for instance was the case in the propaganda booklet *We Are All One Family* (YHAC Propaganda Department & YHAC Spiritual Civilization Office, 2010). The writers' interpretation of "Sinicization" implies that if faced with contradictions between national and Huí concerns in the preservation of identity and religion, the writers would be inclined towards Huí concerns. They demonstrated, in other words, mínzú agency.

2.3 Republican Race Theory

To make statements about Huí identity, the writers drew not only on Neo-Confucian discourse. The statements identified in the previous chapter were closely related to words such as "truth," "goodness," "beauty," "spontaneity," "simplicity," and "naivety." However, when reading the magazine, I also discovered a series of statements that were more tied to words such as "mínzú," "nation-state" (国家), "patriotism" (爱国), "civilization" (文明) and "backwardness" (落后). Although these statements often involved Neo-Confucian terms about truth and beauty, Neo-Confucian discourse did not seem to be the main discourse from which these statements were derived. Rather, the statements drew on another influential discourse in China, which I have identified as Republican race theory.

The main ideas of Republican race theory are that members of the same people (mínzú, ethnic group, race, etc.) share personality attributes (bravery, ingenuity, patriotism, etc.) and other characteristics (religion, customs, physical traits). These attributes are inherited through shared ancestry ("blood"), genetics and cultural immersion. Notably, both religion and customs are often presumed to be in the "blood" of the mínzú (see, e.g., Uradyn Bulag, 2010, p. 228). Because such people are like a family, its members owe loyalty to the collective. Those who fail to display such loyalty are disparaged as mínzú/ethnic/race traitors. The members of such people share certain interests that are often in conflict with those of other people. These interests are often but not always tied to territorial claims.

As I read through the magazine, I noticed three recurring statements used in the formulation of Huí identity that were derived from the discourse of Republican race theory. The three statements were:

(i) Truth mandates patriotism
(ii) Truth mandates the collectivity of mínzú as family
(iii) Minority mínzú are pure

In what follows, I will discuss these statements one by one and analyze what the Huí authors achieve when invoking them and evaluate whether they demonstrate mínzú agency. I will do this by demonstrating the relation of the statements to Republican race theory, explaining what the statements mean when interpreted as part of Republican race theory, and discussing if and how

the meaning invoked serves to address mínzú-related concerns voiced by the authors and concerns voiced by national authorities.

i. Truth mandates patriotism

Most of the prolific Huí contributors to the magazine emphasize the importance of love for the "Chinese mínzú" (中华民族). The US-educated scholar Zhào Suìshēng (2004), directly or indirectly influenced by the scholarship of Ernest Gellner and Elie Kedourie, argued that Chinese nationalism is a novel phenomenon originating in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (ibid., p. 3). To discuss what the authors' calls for patriotism mean for the formulation of Huí identity, I will therefore begin by tracing Chinese nationalism to its early origins.

During late imperial times, revolutionary thinkers concerned with overthrowing the Qīng dynasty (1644–1911) began to promote the idea that "Hàn" people are a people distinct from the Manchu rulers. The term referred to a dynasty from two thousand years earlier (ibid., pp. 21–22). At that time—in the imagination of the revolutionaries—China was strong and ruled by its own kind (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 46). The early revolutionaries used the term to refer to the sedentary population of the eastern portions of the Qīng empire. They claimed that all Hàn people were descendants of the Yellow Emperor and that, therefore, they were of the same lineage, *zú*. Since 1903, they also used the term *mínzú*, a neologism borrowed from Japan that literally translates to "people-lineage" (Dikötter, 1992, p. 97). By contrasting the Hàn-lineage to the Manchu-lineage, the revolutionaries successfully portrayed the Manchu as alien rulers that were oppressing a once proud people.

This formulation is, for example, found in the texts of Chén Tiānhuá (1875–1905). According to Chén: "the Yellow Emperor is the great ancestor, all those who are not of the Hàn race are not descendants of the Yellow Emperor, they are outsiders [...] If one assists them, one lacks a sense of ancestry [...] Racial feeling begins at birth. For the members of one's own race, there is surely mutual intimacy and love [...] [T]he Hàn-race is one big family" (quoted in Dikötter, 1992, p. 117). It is also found in the texts of Zōu Róng (1885–1905), who maintained that "when men love their race, unity will arise internally, and what is outside is repelled" (ibid., p. 118). In these two texts, race is synonymous with *mínzú*.

Anthony D. Smith (1998) has argued that ethnic groups are not constituted by lineages, but a "sense of continuity, shared memory and collective destiny" (p. 192). However, to the early revolutionary intellectual immersed in Republican discourse, shared ancestry and lineages were the definitional foundation of any mínzú, nation, or ethnic group. It was the very conviction in shared ancestry—contrasted to the ancestry of other mínzú—that gave a sense of continuity, bestowed significance to shared memories, and affirmed

the *truth* of a collective destiny. Without the conviction of shared ancestry, the legitimacy of the mínzú as a family and nation would be fragile. Smith's argument can be defended by defining Republican discourse as the legitimization of the mínzú, and not the essence of the mínzú itself. This would nevertheless be a highly etic interpretation.

When Sūn Zhōngshān's followers launched the Wǔchāng rebellion in Húběi province in 1911, they used a flag with 18 stars to represent the 18 provinces of eastern China. This excluded the boundary regions of Manchuria, Xīnjiāng, Mongolia, Qīnghǎi and Tibet (Mullaney, 2011, p. 24). They did not recognize the inhabitants of these regions as Hàn-Chinese and did therefore not include them in their vision of the Chinese nation-state. These five regions contained almost 60 percent of the territorial expanse of China today, and even larger parts of the territory claimed by Republican China and the Qīng empire, which notably included Outer Mongolia (now an independent country) in addition to Inner Mongolia.

The early dogmas of nationalism in China thus indicate that the *Kāidū River*'s calls for patriotism meant that Huí should identify with the Hàn-Chinese. Instead of emphasizing Huí idiosyncrasies, they should celebrate their commonality with the Hàn-Chinese. Doing so would presumably make them more united against outsiders. They should presumably not trace their ancestry to early Muslim migrants to China, but to the Yellow Emperor. They may continue to be Muslim, if this does not make them distinguish themselves from the Hàn-Chinese collective. Failure to identify with (and being identified with) the Hàn-Chinese and the 18 provinces of eastern China would mean that Huí are outsiders and enemies or rivals of the Chinese state. As such, early nationalism in China suggests that calls for patriotism among Huí authors in the *Kāidū River* are a blatant call for assimilation.

However, after the Qīng empire collapsed in 1911, anti-Manchu rhetoric was no longer necessary to unite Hàn-Chinese against their previous rulers. Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence in December 1911, followed by Tibet in 1913, also caused concern among the Republican revolutionaries. As noted by the Denver-educated Chinese scholar Zhào Suìshēng (2004), the Republicans promoted race theory and nationalism to strengthen the Chinese nation. The threat of losing the borderlands was therefore antithetical to their aspirations. They soon adopted a more integrationist rhetoric.

Republican leaders proposed the slogan "Republic of Five Lineages" to resolve the tension between Hàn-nationalism and national unity. Hàn, Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus, and Huí were to be recognized as five allied people. While Sūn Zhōngshān initially balked at this notion, his counterproposal was overruled by a provincial assembly in 1912. A five-colored flag representing the five lineages was adopted (Wroldsen, 2021, p. 7; Mullaney, 2011, p. 25). This adaptation of the Republicans suggests that calls for patriotism among Huí merely meant to celebrate the alliance of Huí, Hàn, and other mínzú against non-Chinese outsiders. In this sense, the early

Republican period offered a model for both the integration and the assimilation of Huí into Chinese society. Evaluating which of these models are relevant for statements about patriotism in the *Kāidū River* requires an understanding of how Chinese authorities have vacillated between these two positions throughout the last century of Chinese history.

Despite the Republicans' call for an alliance among the Five Lineages, the chauvinist preferences of the Republicans remained. The first Republican constitution directly called for "racial assimilation" (种族同化) (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 81). The Republicans maintained that it was both possible and necessary for the allied lineages to become culturally indistinguishable from the Hàn-Chinese majority. In 1924, Sūn Zhōngshān dismissed minorities as numerically insignificant in China and argued that they, therefore, did not need to be included in the definition of the Chinese nation (Ye Hui, 2022, p. 24). After Sūn Zhōngshān died in 1925 and the Republicans became a national force following the Northern Expedition of 1927–1928, the new leadership of Jiǎng Jièshí (Chiang Kai-shek) decided to abolish the five-colored flag in 1928 in favor of a flag demonstrating the homogeneity and indivisibility of the nation (Mullaney, 2011, p. 25). In *China's Destiny* (published in 1943), Jiǎng Jièshí outright claimed that all five lineages were one and the same race, namely Hàn-Chinese. The ostensible differences between the lineages were attributed to geographical environment and religion (Gladney, 1991, p. 84). In fact, Jiǎng Jièshí maintained that the proto-northwest minorities of Xiōngnú and Xiānbēi were merely different branches of descendants of the Yellow Emperor than those of the Hàn-Chinese. This view was shared by intellectuals such as Dài Jìtáo (1891–1949) (Uradyn Bulag, 2010, p. 42) and the Daur Mongol Merse (Uradyn Bulag, 2002). To reassimilate these branches into the Chinese nation would by implication be both just and proper. Therefore, calls for patriotism continued to imply cultural and "lineage" assimilation, at least as patriotism was interpreted by the Republican leadership.

An alternative vision of minority politics was provided by the Chinese Communists. In 1934, they were driven out of their base in Jiāngxī province by nationalist forces. They embarked on the Long March along the southern and western borderlands of China before re-establishing themselves in Yán'ān of Northwest China in 1935. During the Long March, they passed through the territories of Miáo, Yí, and Tibetans (Uradyn Bulag, 2010, p. 11). Yán'ān itself borders both Huí and Mongol territories. During the Long March and the Yán'ān period, the Communists were in acute need of support from the non-Hàn minorities. Instead of insisting on cultural homogeneity, they emphasized equal status between mínzú, right to self-governance, and respect for mínzú customs and religion (Yú Zhènguì, 2012, p. 365). Unlike the Republicans, who referred to minority mínzú (Mongols, Hui, Manchu) who collaborated with the Japanese invaders as *Hànjiān* (traitors to the Hàn people), the Communists prescribed the label *Méngjiān*—i.e., traitors to the

Mongol people (Uradyn Bulag, 2010, pp. 103–105). Up until the 1940s, the Communists—inspired by the Soviet Union's minority policies—went as far as guaranteeing the right of secession (Mullaney, 2011, p. 27; Gladney, 1991, p. 88). As late as October 1949, Premier Zhōu Ēnlái felt the need for clarifying to government officials that they should not "emphasize the doctrine of 'self-determination' anymore" (quoted in Jacobs, 2010, p. 1300).

After their takeover of China in 1949, the Communists formalized many of their promises in the *Common Program*. The Program acted as a provisional constitution in the early years of the People's Republic. The Communists offered political representation and training to former religious and community leaders. They trained up low-class members of minority mínzú as Party cadres. They criticized Hàn-chauvinism and negative stereotypes of minority mínzú. They embarked on programs to protect minority mínzú customs. And they designated large tracts of national territory as autonomous regions for minority mínzú. Within these regions, the Party-State promised special consideration of the particularities of local mínzú when implementing national policies.

It should be noted that the "autonomy" of the regions was and still is highly limited. The most powerful positions in the regions, i.e., that of Party-Secretary, have almost always been held by Hàn-Chinese, with only a few exceptions (such as Saifuddin Azizi in Xīnjiāng and Ulanhu in Inner Mongolia). In Inner Mongolia, autonomy is to a large extent exercised by Hàn-Chinese cadres (Uradyn Bulag, 2010, p. 160). Adaptation of national laws or policies to the needs of minority mínzú regions have been rather limited, with a handful of exceptions (most notable are perhaps the delay of collectivization policies in Xīnjiāng and Inner Mongolia in the 1950s, special considerations in terms of legal age of marriage, and exceptions from birth control policies in the 1980s–2015).

Nevertheless, whether motivated by ideology, political expediency, or both, the Communists' initial mínzú program was considerably more lenient and integrationist than that of the Republicans. The mínzú were to be united by shared socialist ideals rather than blood or cultural homogeneity. For a period, the call for patriotism did not necessarily imply assimilation.

The Communist takeover of China did not mean the final triumph of integrationist mínzú policies. Even during the early years of Communist rule, tensions existed between cadres with assimilationist inclinations and those who wanted to respect the cultural particularities of minority mínzú. This can for example be observed in a 1950 work report by the Kashgar (South Xīnjiāng) Party Secretary, Wáng Ēnmào (1950/1997). He warned against both the promotion of atheism and the widespread oppression of imams and Islam in Xīnjiāng. He recommended that a work report from the Aqsu Party Committee (dated four days earlier) should be revised because it called for wooing *only* "the occasional" imam who unambiguously supported the Party. He warned that alienating the imams would make them a threat to the rule of

the Party, particularly when facing the lingering threat of the Republican influence. Therefore, even "the worst of the worst" (最坏的分子) among imams should not be persecuted unless they directly worked with the Republicans. The religious convictions of Muslims are wrong, Wáng Ēnmào maintained, but imams should not be forced "to admit their errors." Doing so would harm the Party's relation with the people of Xīnjiāng, for whom Islam was important and whose "apprehension" (觉悟) of truth had not yet reached the same level as that of atheist Hàn-Chinese (ibid., pp. 26–30).

Wáng Ēnmào's suggestions for how to deal with Muslim mínzú became the official policy of Xīnjiāng, and he was appointed regional Party chief two years later. However, the fact that he found it necessary to defend these policies beyond referring to calls for religious freedom in the *Common Program* indicates the persistent presence of Party voices concerned about ideological purity. For if the truth of socialism was universal, why should minority mínzú be different from or be subject to any different policies than the Hàn-Chinese?

Assimilationist rhetoric grew stronger as the 1950s went on. In 1956, the Party-State launched the Hundred Flowers Movement in which they encouraged people to openly express their opinions about government policies. Dissatisfied with the volume of negative feedback, the Party-State launched a rectification campaign in July 1957. Three months later, in October, the CPC Central Committee announced a campaign to specifically target local mínzú-ism (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 189). This meant criticizing people deemed overly concerned with the special needs of their own mínzú, and who were presumed to have secessionist and anti-Hàn inclinations. In 1958, at the outset of the Great Leap Forward, previous delays of collectivization policies in mínzú regions were criticized as parochial. Increased calls were made for "melting" (熔合) the minority mínzú into the Hàn-Chinese mainstream (p.190).

As the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) miserably failed and the country descended into "Three Years of Great Famine" (1959–1961), moderate voices (notably Liú Shàoqí and Dèng Xiǎopíng) regained traction and the push for assimilation of minority mínzú subsided. Some of the purged community and religious leaders were rehabilitated and communes were disbanded (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 190). However, this was only temporary. Dissatisfied with the developments, Máo Zédōng made a new push for ideological dogmatism. This push was marked first by the 1963 Socialist Education Movement and thereafter by the infamous Cultural Revolution of 1966 (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2006). The campaigns were marked by large-scale persecutions of both cadres and intellectuals. During the Cultural Revolution, cadres and intellectuals—both low and high—were purged. Party-State offices were seized from bureaucrats and Party-leaders all over China, first by student Red Guards and thereafter by the People's Liberation Army. During this period,

which lasted until the end of the 1970s, special treatment for minority mínzú was abolished, religious practice was banned, mosques were demolished or converted to other usages (such as pig pens), Muslim men had their beards shaved in public, and minority mínzú customs were mocked and attacked as backward and feudal (Bovingdon, 2010, pp. 51–52; Millward, 2007, pp. 271–276; MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2006, pp. 387–388; Gladney, 1991, p. 26). The assimilationist drive of Chinese nationalism reached its peak.

After the demise of Máo Zédōng in 1976 and the return of the ideological moderates (labelled "pragmatists" by Zhào Suìshēng, 2004) in 1978, the Chinese Communists once again made a U-turn in their minority mínzú policies. Community and religious leaders were rehabilitated. Minority mínzú customs, language, and religious practice were designated to be protected. Humiliation and abuse of minority mínzú culture and sensitivities were to be met with legal prosecution. Mosques were rebuilt. And people were again encouraged to speak their minds and not be restrained by ideological fetters.

Assimilationist voices regained some traction after the failed student rebellion in 1989 and the subsequent patriotic campaign of the 1990s. The patriotic campaign of the 1990s was aimed at fanning up nationalism to legitimize the Party-State's rule after the decay of Communist ideology (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 6). However, relative to the period lasting from the late 1950s until the late 1970s, the Party-State leadership continued to maintain a notably more integrationist mindset towards minority mínzú up until the 2010s. When the writers of the *Kāidū River* commenced their efforts in the early 2010s, therefore, they could be relatively open about their ambitions to promote Huí identity and interests, while also subscribing to the discourse on Chinese patriotism.

The mid to late-2010s were marked a by a distinct return to assimilationist policies, especially in Xīnjiāng. A large number of Uyghurs were detained in special facilities for ideological remolding. Hallmark events in the return to assimilationist policies were the redefinition of Xīnjiāng dissidents and protesters from troublemakers to "terrorists" in the early 2000s (Millward, 2007, pp. 339–340), the protests in Lhasa (Tibet) and Urumqi (Xīnjiāng) in 2008 and 2009, the 2014 Uyghur knife attacks in Kūnmíng (Yúnnán), and the repercussions that followed these events. Also notable was the ascendance of Xí Jìnpíng as General Secretary of the Party (*in office*: 2012–...). He has pursued a particular brand of strongman politics—which for some Western and Chinese observers is reminiscent of Máo Zédōng—and has called for a return to the ideological roots (坚守初心不忘本) of the Party. He called for the Chinese people to take pride in their political system and ideological heritage (道路自信、理论自信、制度自信) (Xí Jìnpíng, November 2012/2014).

Assimilationist minority mínzú policies were a response to persistent dissidence among mínzú. They were also the result of Xí Jìnpíng catering to

popular demands from Hàn-Chinese for national dignity. As noted by Zhào Suìshēng (2004), the Party-State under the leadership of Jiāng Zémín (*in office*: 1989–2002) and Hú Jǐntāo (*in office*: 2002–2012) had often tried to rein in Chinese nationalism. They found it difficult to control. It had in many ways threatened the legitimacy of the Party-State, as its leaders were often willing (or forced) to compromise with foreign states in ways that citizens with more fervent nationalist inclinations were not (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, pp. 162–163, 264–290). The Máo-cult had become popular in the 1990s precisely among people frustrated by the lack of a strong leader to protect the dignity of the nation (Barmé, 1996, pp. 16–17). Xí Jìnpíng's rough treatment of minority mínzú was, by all appearances, part and parcel of his ambition to fulfill such a role.

In short, Chinese leaders have for more than a century vacillated between assimilationist and integrationist attitudes towards cultural minorities. This duality is reflected in the very terminology of nationalism used in China today. Due to the limited use of plurals in Chinese language, love for the Chinese nation (*Zhōnghuá Mínzú*) can be interpreted as either love for the collectivity of Chinese mínzú ("mínzús") or love for a single, homogeneous Chinese nation (mínzú). The duality of meaning is clearly pronounced in the famous 1988 passage of the Chinese anthropologist Fèi Xiàotōng (1998): "the Chinese nation/mínzú is a single entity of many components" (中化民族多元一体). The former interpretation indicates that China is an alliance of mínzú, each with their own distinct and valuable culture. This is the interpretation found in the *Great-Hàn Language Dictionary*, in which the term "Chinese mínzú" is glossed as "the collective term for all mínzú in our country." The latter interpretation indicates that all Chinese citizens share a homogeneous culture (大民族) formed by melting together the previously distinct cultures of China. This culture is predominantly Hàn-Chinese, and the role of minority mínzú is at best to enrich the flavor of the primary culture.

The *Kāidū River* was produced in a transitional period in which the call for patriotism could either imply that Huí should embrace assimilation into the Hàn-Chinese mainstream, or just that they should recognize common interests and cherish comradery with the Hàn-Chinese. The Huí authors of the magazine were strongly inclined towards the latter interpretation. Sū Xiàoquán celebrated the patriotic virtues of Huí and the contributions they made to the collectivity of mínzú. He even took the initiative to write a laudatory text about his Hàn-Chinese primary school teacher who taught him patriotism (Sū Xiàoquán, Winter 2010). Yet he also expressed a deep concern about the danger of Huí becoming virtually indistinguishable from Hàn-Chinese. Mǎ Lìjuān similarly lamented her own assimilation into the Hàn-Chinese mainstream ("modern society") and conveyed a desire to return to her Muslim roots. In other words, in their call for patriotism, the writers of the

Kāidū River demonstrated little to no intention of encouraging Huí assimilation into the Chinese mainstream.

The writers' call for patriotism encouraged loyalty to the Party-State and thereby serve national interests. But because they formulated patriotism in a way that encouraged the recognition of a distinct Huí identity, they also served Huí interests. They primarily did so not by promoting a specific interpretation of patriotism, but by portraying Huí as patriots. For example, when Sū Xiàoquán (Winter 2014) wrote about how Huí of the Yānqí Town Língù congregation assisted the People's Liberation Army at the end of the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), he not only encouraged Huí readers to be patriots. He also conveyed the message that Huí not only are but always have been patriots. Kòu Yùyīng (Winter 2011) did the same when she lauded the efforts by educated Huí women during the 1950s to mobilize other women in the construction of the socialist state in China. The women took care of public sanitation, made clothes, shoes, and socks for the People's Volunteer Army who fought in the Korean War, and taught the other women socialist songs. The *Kāidū River* writers measured patriotism not by the degree of cultural assimilation or Huí identification with the Hàn-Chinese, but by the historical display of loyalty to the Party-State. A successful portrayal of Huí as patriots would presumably make the Party-State more tolerant and even appreciative of Huí religious practice.

In the mid to late 2010s, the authors' efforts to serve Huí interests through the portrayal of Huí as patriots were undermined by the assimilationist change in national politics. This is because the interpretation of Huí as culturally, religiously, and ideologically distinct but politically loyal subjects of the Party-State turned unfeasible. In 2018, the assimilationist turn was signified by the demolition of religious symbols on mosques, churches, and other constructions. This included domes, crescent moons and stars, crosses and so on. This was both reported in international news and observed by me. Xīnjiāng authorities have installed surveillance cameras in mosques and reportedly detain people who themselves, or whose family members, "engage in too many religious activities" (Thum, 2022, p. 136). When I visited Yānqí Town in 2018, I was questioned by local police about a book in my possession that they suspected might be a Quran, confirming that Islam per se—and not just extremist and violent forms of religion—was a target of suspicion. In a white paper from the same year (State Council Information Office, April 2018), the leaders of the Party-State outright and literally called for "Sinicization" of Islam and other religions. Because religion was (and still is) the defining trait of Huí identity, the call for "Sinicization" of religion was therefore a *de facto* call for the assimilation of Huí.

While the assimilationist turn was most blatantly visible from 2017 and 2018 onward, the pendular shift had already begun years earlier. Of particular notice was the Kūnmíng knife attack of March 2014. Unlike previous expressions of Uyghur separatism turned violent, the attack occurred outside

the Uyghur region of Xīnjiāng. About a month after the attack, the new CPC General Secretary Xí Jìnpíng went on a four-day trip to XUAR and called for showing "absolutely no mercy" in an all-out struggle against "terrorism, infiltration and separatism." The speech was followed by the 2014 "Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism" campaign (Wroldsen, 2021; Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). The attack occurred only five years after the major violent incident in Urumqi of 2009, where mobs of Hàn-Chinese and Uyghurs had taken to the streets to assault members of the opposing mínzú.

The pendular shift is also visible in the *Kāidū River*. Before the Kūnmíng knife attack, Kòu Yùyīng wrote favorably about the Arab influence on Huí clothing culture. In 2011, notably, she described a Huí boy dressed up in the fashion of "an Arab prince" as proof of the superior looks of Huí children (Xīnyù, Winter 2011, p. 20). Considering that Huí generally claim to be descendants of Arab and Persian migrants to China (Gladney, 1991, p. 7, 24), her statement is not surprising. By 2015, however, Kòu Yùyīng (Summer 2015) directly contradicts herself by adamantly claiming that Arab culture has nothing to do with Huí culture. In a matter of a few years, the word "Arab" had turned from a symbol of Huí cultural distinction to verbal abuse in her texts. By 2015, Kòu Yùyīng's inclination for catering to national interests meant that she was no longer able to argue in favor of a distinct Huí identity in the same way as before. She may have found it necessary to change her attitude towards Arab culture to preserve the magazine as a space for voicing Huí concerns. However, as loyalty to the Party-State no longer sufficed for the classification of Huí as loyal patriots, calls for patriotism in the mid to late 2010s no longer served Huí concerns to distinguish themselves from the Hàn. For if Huí cannot be patriots without identifying with the Hàn-Chinese, then any claim that Huí are ideologically, culturally, and genetically distinct, but also the most ardent of patriots, would be dubious by the logic of Republican race discourse. As such, the discontinuation of the magazine in 2017 may have had as much to do with disillusionment on the part of the contributors as it had to do with increased political restrictions on publications in the period.

In short, the *Kāidū River* writers have attempted to address Huí concerns in their invocation of statements about patriotism. In the early 2010s, they were able to convey the message that Huí are patriots, and that their cultural and ideological distinctiveness should therefore be cherished. As such, the mandatory calls for patriotism by the national leadership were compatible with Huí interests. In the mid to late 2010s, national discourse on patriotism and minority mínzú policies made an assimilationist shift, as had happened multiple times before during the last century. The discursive shift did not mean that the *Kāidū River* writers were no longer concerned about Huí interests. But it significantly hampered their efforts to justify Huí idiosyncrasy by invoking patriotism.

ii. Truth mandates the collectivity of mínzú as family

Some contributors to the *Kāidū River*, notably Kòu Yùyīng in her texts about Ayshemgül Emet in 2017, took particular care to portray the mínzú of Xīnjiāng (and China) as family. The goal of this chapter is to discuss what the portrayal of the Chinese mínzú as family meant for the formulation of Huí identity, and whether the *Kāidū River* authors were able to demonstrate mínzú agency in their invocation of such statements. As a point of departure for understanding what statements about mínzú as family meant in the magazine, I will begin with discussing the historical characterizations of mínzú relations in Republican and Communist China.

This portrayal of mínzú as family is reminiscent of the theory of the Republican Party leader Jiǎng Jièshí, who maintained that all Chinese lineages are different branches of descendants from the Yellow Emperor. Cultural differences between the Hàn-Chinese and minorities did not make minorities distinct mínzú. All the branches were of the same Chinese lineage and ought therefore to identify with the same Chinese culture and polity. On the first page of the chronicle *Overview of Suíyuǎn Mongols*, the authors stated that the Chinese mínzú "are very much like a family" (大家好像一家人一样) (Chén Yùjiǎ, 1936, p. 1). Crudely speaking, the Republican Party before and during the leadership of Jiǎng Jièshí aimed for minority mínzú to become Hàn-Chinese. If interpreted as such, the portrayal of mínzú as family in the *Kāidū River* stands in direct contradiction to expressed Huí concerns about preserving a distinct identity apart from the Hàn-Chinese.

The minority policies of the Republicans were criticized as Hàn-chauvinism by the early Communists (Uradyn Bulag, 2002). The Communists accepted that minority mínzú were of different lineages from the Hàn-Chinese. Significantly, Party-leaders were concerned that coerced assimilation would turn minority mínzú hostile, even if such hostility in their opinion would be misguided. This does not mean that the early Communists were opposed to assimilation per se. On the contrary, they claimed that the cultural and genetic divides between mínzú would become insignificant—and even disappear entirely—once people comprehended the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. The more integrationist-minded cadres, such as Xīnjiāng Party Secretary Wáng Ēnmào, often asserted that assimilation would take very long time (see, e.g., Wáng Ēnmào, 1950/1997). But—arguing that minority mínzú as oppressed people shared indisputable interests (and common enemies) with the lower classes of the Hàn-Chinese—they claimed that such assimilation would happen eventually. Under socialist rule, the minorities would simply no longer have any reason to preserve their interests by distinguish themselves from and uniting against the Hàn-Chinese. For these reasons, the early Communists concluded that the Party-State both could and should be patient and generous towards minority mínzú.

According to the Washington-based historian James Millward (2007), statements about mínzú as siblings were used by Party-State propagandists in the early to mid 1950s. They were used to emphasize that the Hàn-Chinese people as an older brother had a duty to take care of their younger siblings (p. 349). The terminology may have carried connotations related to Republican thought. Or it may have been a simple metaphor for comradery instead of a literal claim about a blood relationship. At the end of the 1950s, according to Millward, the metaphor was abandoned by Chinese propagandists (ibid.). At the time, the Party-State leadership demanded increased ideological conformity and loyalty to mainstream ("socialist") culture and values. The framing of minority mínzú as younger siblings suggested patience and understanding in regard to their erroneous ways. As such, the metaphor of siblings apparently became detrimental to the goals of the Party-State. Alternatively, the metaphor may have been abandoned due to its implied inequality. To the extent that claims about the Chinese mínzú as family are interpreted as a metaphor for comradery, statements about mínzú as family in the *Kāidū River* were not necessarily harmful to the expressed concern of maintaining a distinct Huí identity. In some ways, they may even have been beneficial.

In short, the Republican attitude towards mínzú was framed by an ideology of nationalism and race that prescribed assimilation of minorities. While accepting the basic premises of nationalism, the early Communists were able to circumvent the prescription of coercive assimilation by invoking class theory. Assimilation was still desirable. However, the minorities were friends and allies against the common foes of class enemies in China and foreign imperialists. United by class, ties of blood were presumed to be unnecessary for ensuring mínzú loyalty and national cohesion.

The assimilationist turns in the late 1950s and during the Cultural Revolution, and especially the campaign of 1957 targeting mínzú-ism, represented faltering confidence regarding the loyalty of minority mínzú. In Xīnjiāng (and Inner Mongolia), minority mínzú expressed skepticism towards massive state-sponsored inbound Hàn-Chinese migration as well as the socialist collectivization programs. Skepticism towards collectivization were not exclusive to minority mínzú. It became a national trend among Chinese cadres both during and after the spectacular failure of the Great Leap Forward. The mass exodus of some 60 000 Kazakhs and Uyghurs to the Soviet Union in 1962 caused particular concern among Party-State leaders. After the launch of the Cultural Revolution, ideological dogmatists turned skeptical both of such cadres and of how collectivization programs had been delayed in the autonomous regions. The dogmatists justified assimilative policies by claiming that they were for the minorities' own good. Anyone who opposed assimilation was branded as a lackey of reactionaries and foreign imperialists.

During the Cultural Revolution, the "blood theory" (血统论) was used to discriminate against the children and other relatives of designated class enemies (Guldana Salimjan, 2019/2022, p. 45). This increased emphasis contributed to Hàn-Chinese suspicion against minorities, as individuals could be targeted not only for their own "feudal" practices and conduct, but also for that of their elders. The Party historian Liú Yīngguī described his Huí background as one of the factors that made his class dossier "severely bad" (十分不好) (Shǐzhì, Winter 2012). Discrimination in terms of blood likely contributed to the fact that many Uyghurs, to improve their revolutionary credentials, chose to side with rebel (anti-establishment) Red Guard students who came to Xīnjiāng from Běijīng (Qiao, Monte, & Wright, 2020, p. 171). The rebel Red Guards were outnumbered by their pro-establishment adversaries in Xīnjiāng. The two factions were often engaged in bloody struggles, which involved both self-made and army-provided weaponry. This made the rebel Red Guards in need of allies, and they admitted Uyghurs to their ranks who harbored what the old Party-State considered to be separatist sympathies (Millward, 2007, p. 273; Anti-Revisionist Red Guard, 1968/2005, pp. 4945–4946). As such, ideas about blood and lineages prompted the assimilation of minorities—even after Chairman Máo dictated that all mínzú issues should be analyzed as issues of class (Máo Zédōng, 1963/2008)—making some willing to ally with "ultra-leftists" promoting iconoclasm.

The demise of Máo in 1976 and the ascendance of Dèng Xiǎopíng and his allies in 1978 were marked by the loss of an ideological vision to unite and strengthen the country. The new leadership abandoned Communist dogmatism and aimed to induce economic development by pushing for private ownership, a free market, import of foreign technology, foreign investments, and a movement away from ideological dogmatism in education and media. Dèng Xiǎopíng was opposed by the likes of Chén Yún and the propagandist Dèng Líqún, who felt Dèng Xiǎopíng's heterodoxy was going too far (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, pp. 212–213). As a result of the move away from ideological dogmatism, visions of a liberal, democratic China gained foothold at Chinese universities. After the student dissidence and subsequent Tiān'ānmén Square massacre of 1989, Dèng Xiǎopíng conceded along with his opponents that the state of ideology had gotten out of hand. In response, the Party-State launched the Patriotic Education Campaign in 1991, which was implemented in full force in 1994 (ibid., p. 218). Nationalist sentiments fueled by historical victimization by foreign powers, love for the motherland, and pride in the achievements of the Communist Party were to supplement the cohesive role previously played by socialism. The national leadership especially emphasized that patriotism mandated loyalty to the Party-State. As noted by a Western reporter in the mid 1990s, "today's students are far less willing to criticize the [P]arty because to do so would be seen somehow as being unpatriotic" (ibid., p. 243).

In Xīnjiāng, the loss of an ideological vision to legitimize Hàn-rule over minorities was of major concern to the regional leadership. This is most likely why, in 1982, foreign observers encountered Máo portraits and banners with slogans praising Chairman Máo in the public spaces of Urumqi. In other parts of China, such symbols had already been removed as part of Dèng Xiǎopíng's reforms (McMillen, 1984, pp. 572–573). Uradyn Bulag (2010) has similarly noted persistent political and economic "conservatism" among the leadership of Inner Mongolia (p. 233). The ideological concerns of the Xīnjiāng authorities were likely motivated by local disturbances. In the 1980s, Xīnjiāng was marked by demonstrations and expressions of grievances by both Uyghurs and Hàn Chinese.[4] Uyghurs demonstrated against a variety of issues such as police brutality, mosque arson, poor university campus conditions, racist graffiti, lack of democracy, lack of equality between the mínzú, nuclear testing in Lop Nor, Hàn-migration, and the extension of policies limiting the family size of minorities (Millward, 2007, p. 281). Some of these demonstrations turned violent. Outside Kashgar in the Uyghur south of Xīnjiāng, a few "mínzú-ist separatist organizations" reportedly caused an "armed turmoil" in October 1981 (ibid.; Chén Wǔguó, 2014, pp. 546–547). According to Bovingdon (2010), the incident involved about 6 000 Uyghur rioters who were infuriated after a Hàn-Chinese shot a Uyghur youth (p. 179). By the end of the 1980s, some Uyghurs began to denounce Hàn-Chinese as "infidels" (Millward, 2007, p. 282). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the leadership in Xīnjiāng was more reluctant than those in other parts of China to abandon the ideological certainty of the Máo-era.

The loss of ideological vision and confidence in the loyalty of minority mínzú is also why Wáng Ēnmào, who returned as Party-Secretary to Xīnjiāng in 1981, came up with the slogan "Two Cannot-Be-Withouts" (两个离不开) (Chén Wǔguó, 2014, p. 43). According to this slogan, Hàn-Chinese need minority mínzú, and minority mínzú need the Hàn-Chinese. Or, to put it more crudely, the territorial nationalism of the Hàn-Chinese mandates that Xīnjiāng remains a part of China, while minority mínzú cannot modernize their economy, mindset, and society without assistance from the more advanced Hàn-Chinese. Wáng Ēnmào also launched multiple initiatives to enhance "Mínzú Unity." For example, he designated the month of May as the "Mínzú Unity Education Month" in 1982 and began to award honorific titles to individuals and Party-State institutions that manifested "Mínzú Unity" (ibid.,

[4] Notably, in 1979–80, Hàn Chinese youth sent down to Xīnjiāng expressed their dissatisfaction with being abandoned in the Xīnjiāng Production and Construction Corps (Millward, 2007, p. 280). At one point, Hàn Chinese youth sent down to the Aqsu Municipality (some 500 km south-west of YHAC) occupied the municipal CPC Committee administrative offices for 50 days. During this period, they handled affairs such as punishing pickpockets and filling out marriage licenses for Uyghur couples (p. 280). After suppressing the civil disobedience and arresting the leaders of the movement, XUAR and Běijīng leaders agreed in early 1981 that youth filling certain criteria may be transferred back to Shànghǎi (ibid., p. 281).

p. 551). These initiatives aimed at inculcating gratitude for the developmental aid provided by the Hàn-Chinese Party-State to minority mínzú. They also emphasized the intimate relationship between mínzú in China. Being gradually forced to abandon the certainty of Maoist ideology, the Xīnjiāng leadership hoped that economic and social development might suffice to placate the mínzú of Xīnjiāng and legitimize Party-State rule.

At a work report meeting related to the "Mínzú Unity" campaign, in 1982, Wáng Ēnmào (1982/1997) made a speech in which he suggested that the mínzú of Xīnjiāng should be like a literal "family" (家庭), and not just a metaphor for comradery. Wáng Ēnmào opened his speech with a story about a Uyghur man who in the 1930s adopted two Hàn-Chinese orphans. He argued that by turning into a family, the alliance of laboring mínzú would be more united against foreign invaders and class enemies. Interestingly, the Hàn-Chinese orphans were specifically described as the younger siblings in the family, which indicated a continued sensitivity to potential accusations of Hàn-chauvinism.

An alternative explanation has been provided by Uradyn Bulag (2010), who attributed Hàn-Chinese enthusiasm for the adoption of Hàn-Chinese by Mongols to feelings and emotions. He stated that such adoption "makes the Chinese feel good. Moreover, it makes the Chinese lovable [...] orphan adoption [...] kindles a ray of self-confidence for the Chinese" (p. 226). However, as Uradyn Bulag had no privileged access to the minds of "the majority Chinese," this explanation is speculative. Considering the political goal of Wáng Ēnmào, i.e., to bolster mínzú unity by inducing sentiments and imaginations of family or kinship among Uyghurs and Hàn-Chinese, it is not necessary to make guesses about the late Party-Secretary's personal emotions. Whether it was Hàn-Chinese who adopted Uyghurs or the other way around, it would serve his goal. As noted by Uradyn Bulag (2002) himself, the historical dispatchment of Chinese princesses to "barbarian" rulers were initially seen by imperial intellectuals as symbols of national humiliation and weakness. Yet these would also later be invoked by the Party-State to emphasize Hàn–minority kinship and to legitimize Hàn-Chinese governance over minority mínzú.

As "family" kinship in the Xīnjiāng of the 1980s still could be interpreted as a metaphor for comradery and friendship—rather than actual kinship or shared ancestry—the portrayal of Hàn and minority mínzú as family did not necessarily harm Huí interests in preserving a distinct identity from the Hàn-Chinese. As shown in the previous section of this chapter, the *Kāidū River* writers eloquently argued that Huí can be loyal to a Hàn-dominated China without the need for assimilation.

By the 1990s, mínzú as family was described in national Chinese propaganda as a fact rather than in the form of a suggestion. For example, in the well-known 1991 song *Loving my China* (爱我中华), the 56 mínzú were

directly referred to as a family. When mínzú policies turned more assimilationist in the mid to late 2010s, particular attention was given to portraying the Chinese mínzú as family. This was a natural development following 20–30 years of propaganda emphasizing family values and patriotism. For if China is a mother and the people her children, then the only way minority mínzú can be a part of and expected to be loyal to China is if they are also her children and therefore siblings of the Hàn-Chinese. Consider for example the song *Big China* (大中国), which was composed as part of the 1990s patriotic education movement:

> We all have one home, the name is China,
> Brothers and sisters are many, the scenery is nice too.
> In the garden are two dragons, they are the Yangzi and Yellow River,
> And there is the Chomolungma [Mt. Everest], the highest mountain.
>
> Our big China, it is a big home,
> Forever and ever, I shall be at her side.
> China, I wish you all the best, you are always in my heart,
> China, I wish you all the best, there is no need for a catharsis of words.

The song was performed on national television in 1995. It was aimed at a broad audience of mostly Hàn-Chinese people. However, when the Yānqí Propaganda Department held an event to celebrate Huí folksongs in 2018, the song was performed in seamless synchrony with songs that unambiguously celebrated kinship among Chinese mínzú. According to local propaganda cadres, the local audience did not enjoy listening to folksongs exclusively. Therefore, they encouraged performers to contribute "modern" songs, such as *Big China*. The performers chose their songs in communication with cadres from the Yānqí Propaganda Department and government bureaus. Most of the songs performed praised patriotism and the Party (personal observation and communication).

Figure 2: "Our beloved ancestral land, we love you!"—Oration following a performance by Uyghur and Mongol "peasants" of Qīgèxīng Town performing at the 11th Yānqí Huār Festival. The woman seen from behind guiding the oration is a government cadre.

In the context of this event, "brothers and sisters" in the song *Big China* took up the unequivocal meaning of family kinship among Chinese mínzú. The reference to Mt. Everest in Tibet, a minority region, also amplified this interpretation. Furthermore, the term "big home" fit very well with slogans about the "Big Mínzú Family of China" (中华民族大家庭).

It is very possible that listeners in the 1990s interpreted "brothers and sisters" as referring exclusively to the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, i.e., Hàn-Chinese. This interpretation is particularly salient considering the phrase about dragons. In addition to describing themselves as descendants of the Yellow Emperor, Hàn-Chinese often describe themselves as "inheritors of the dragon" (龙的传人). Furthermore, both the Yangzi River and particularly the Yellow River—the "Cradle of Chinese Civilization"—are associated with the Hàn-Chinese. Minority mínzú, on the other hand, are typically associated with the mountains, deserts, steppes, and wilderness of the borderlands. Yet, whichever way the song was interpreted in the 1990s, it contributed to the portrayal of Hàn-Chinese and mínzú as family.

After the demise of Chairman Máo, some Chinese intellectuals and bureaucrats went as far as portraying the mínzú family as factual, in the sense of shared ancestry. In 1978, the scriptwriter Cáo Yú wrote a national award-winning play in which he claimed that the minorities of the borderland (Xiōngnú) shared common ancestry with the Hàn-Chinese, specifically the mythical ruler Yǔ of the pre-historic Xià dynasty (Uradyn Bulag, 2002, pp. 91–93). The portrayal of the "family" kinship of mínzú as factual rather than metaphorical can also be found in a text by the former Party Secretary at the Tibetology Research Center in Běijīng:

> The lineage-origins [族源] of Hàn Chinese and Tibetans are blood-bond by marriage [血缘关系]. [...] [The Chineseness of Tibet originated from the] relationship of long-term, intimate, and continuously strengthening communication [...] [Tibetans] are a member of the great family of Chinese mínzú. (Zhū Xiǎomíng, 2013, pp. 142–144)

A noticeable deviation from the Republican formulation is the emphasis on shared ancestry through intermarriage. As early as 1963, Vice-President Dǒng Bìwǔ (*in office:* 1959–1975) wrote favorably about the possibility of marital union between Hàn-Chinese and the minorities or "barbarians" of the North-West borderlands (Hú) (Uradyn Bulag, 2002, p. 90). Presumably minority mínzú are more willing to accept that they are affine rather than deviant branches of the Hàn-Chinese.

Yet, despite all the national propaganda on inter-mínzú kinship, the Huí writers of the *Kāidū River* did not interpret their calls for mínzú as family as statements about literal kinship between Hàn-Chinese and minority mínzú, even in the marital sense. Instead, they continued to interpret inter-mínzú kinship as metaphorical. I will provide another example from the folksong event that illustrates their position. In addition to organizing performances of folksongs and patriotic songs, the Propaganda Department and its related government bureaus organized a painting competition for "peasants" (农民). At the event, one of the "peasant" artists provided the following contribution:

*Figure 3: "They are not sisters, yet they are even better than sisters."—Painted by Zīxiáng (*c.*1930–...). Dated September 10, 2018.*

The painting shows a woman sitting on a Uyghur-style carpet being combed by another woman. The painting is annotated: "They are not sisters, yet they are even better than sisters." In the context of the propaganda event, this can only be interpreted as meaning that one of the women is Hàn-Chinese while the other is minority mínzú. The fact that one of the women takes care of the other may be a reference to how Hàn-Chinese are often portrayed as caretakers of minority mínzú. The fact that the woman is sitting on a chair while the other is sitting on a Uyghur carpet adds to this impression. In online propaganda in the late 2010s Xīnjiāng, Uyghurs sitting on a carpet rather than chairs while dining was used to indicate that Hàn-Chinese are a more advanced mínzú that should help Uyghurs. In fact, authorities in Xīnjiāng went as far as to smash the traditional *supa* in many Uyghur homes to make space for "modern" furniture. The *supa* is an elevated platform that was used for both ritual and profane applications, such as eating, sleeping, entertaining guests, circumcisions, and performing marriage vows (Grose, 2021/2022, pp. 117–119).

We can only speculate whether or not conveying these messages was the intention of the artist. It is worth remembering that even Hàn-Chinese propagandists like to emphasize how minority mínzú have taken care of vulnerable Hàn-Chinese, possibly to avoid the appearance of Hàn-chauvinism, or out of confidence that the superior "blood" of Hàn-Chinese will ensure that they transform minorities, rather than vice versa. What I want to point out here is that the painter explicitly states that the two women are not really sisters. They may be close to one another, but because they are different mínzú, they are definitely not real family, even in the affine sense.

In the Yānqí propaganda booklet *We Are All One Family* (YHAC Propaganda Department & YHAC Spiritual Civilization Office, 2010), to which Kòu Yùyīng also made contributions, the ancestral origins of the various mínzú in Xīnjiāng are listed separately. Hàn are described as descended from the Yellow Emperor, Huí from Arabs and Huíhú (medieval Uyghurs; Gladney, 1991, p. 19), Uyghurs from the Dīnglíng of Lake Balkhash, Kyrgyz from nomads in the Upper Yenisey River Area, Daur from people in the Liǎo River Basin, and so on. By listing separate ancestral origins of the various mínzú, the booklet's authors emphasized their distinct blood. An alternative would be to emphasize common ancestry, for example among Uyghurs and Huí who both claim descendancy from the Uyghur (Huíhú) Khaganate (744–840). The booklet may have been published before propaganda on mínzú as family was implemented in full force in Xīnjiāng. However, it illustrates that it would have been highly unlikely for the Huí contributors to consider Hàn to be family in the sense of shared ancestry. The fact that Huí Muslims are famously inclined to endogamy and often refuse to marry their daughters to Hàn-Chinese also supports this argument. Initiatives such as when the Qiěmò (Cherchen) County promised monetary rewards (10,000 CNY) to newlywed Hàn–Uyghur couples in 2017 imply that most

Xīnjiāng cadres do not actually consider Hàn and minorities to be family bonded by "blood" (Radio Free Asia, 2018). In 1995, Gardner Bovingdon (2010) recorded an incident on a bus where a Hàn-Chinese allegedly knocked over the stereo of an Uyghur man. When another Hàn-Chinese tried to calm down the Uyghur man by reminding him that "we're all Chinese," the Uyghur man outright responded with "you Hans are Hans. We Uyghurs are Xinjiang people. We're not one family" (p. 5).

Chinese propagandists are by all appearances fully aware that some minority mínzú—such as the Huí who contribute to the *Kāidū River*—are concerned about preserving a distinct identity from the Hàn-Chinese. Portrayals of Hàn and minority mínzú as actual family are detrimental to such Huí concerns. Wáng Ēnmào's portrayal of Hàn-Chinese as the younger or more vulnerable relative was likely a conscious strategy to make the concept of Hàn-Uyghur kinship more digestible to Uyghurs. Zhū Xiǎomíng's description of Hàn-Tibetan "blood" kinship meaning intermarriage, rather than actual shared ancestry, also appeared to be a similar compromise. In fact, a ruling was reprinted in 1985 in which the Central Propaganda Department called for all official documents and speeches to stop referring to the Chinese people as descendants of the Yellow Emperor (Schoenhals, 2007). Such statements implied that minority mínzú, as members of the Chinese nation, shared the same ancestor as the Hàn-Chinese. It was described as acceptable to use the term only if referring to mainland relations with people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and "overseas Chinese compatriots" (Schoenhals, 2007, pp. 25–27). These people were presumably more comfortable with being referred to as Hàn-Chinese kinsmen.

Therefore, when the Huí authors of the magazine wrote about mínzú as family, they were not stating that Hàn and minority mínzú are related by blood or even marriage. Unlike many other propagandists, they did not write about kinship among Hàn and minority mínzú as a fact. Kòu Yùyīng explicitly used the phrase "affectionate *like* a family" (my emphasis) to describe the relationship between the Uyghur Ayshemgül Emet and the impoverished Hàn-Chinese Sūn Jiànfēng. In a fashion similar to the "peasant" artist who painted two women who treated each other like sisters, she did not concede that Hàn and minorities are real family.

Kòu Yùyīng's terminology is different from that of Lǐ Shǒufēng, the former Hàn-Chinese deputy magistrate. When writing about the relationship between Uyghurs and Hàn, he stated that they "have become siblings and *adash* (friends)." Unlike Kòu Yùyīng, he was willing to claim Hàn–minority kinship. At the same time, he used the term "has become" (成了) family. This was different from Zhū Xiǎomíng's statement that Hàn-Chinese and minorities share ancestral origins from premodern times. Rather, it suggested a relatively recent date of Hàn–minority kinship. Also, the fact that he used the word "siblings" in conjunction with the Uyghur term "*adash*" indicated that he too

considered Hàn–minority kinship to be metaphorical. This may have been out of consideration for Huí and Uyghur sensitivities.

Like Lǐ Shǒufēng, the national Chinese leadership has been ambiguous regarding the exact relationship between Hàn-Chinese and minority mínzú. In white papers such as the "Protection and Development of Culture in Xīnjiāng" (State Council Information Office, November 2018), the State Council did not use terms such as blood or shared ancestry. Instead, they simply indicated that all mínzú are part of the same family/country. They justified this statement by referring to cultural exchange, common interests, organic interdependence, and the debatable claim that the minority mínzú territories have been governed by Chinese rulers "since ancient times." But they did not specify whether the mínzú are distinct bloodlines, affine bloodlines, or the same bloodline divided into branches. The ambiguity of the national leadership was beyond doubt informed by a certain sensitivity towards potential accusations of Hàn-chauvinism. It may also explain why Matthew Erie (2016), who specializes in law and anthropology, observed that the line between "permissible" and "prohibited" behavior seemed to shift for Huí cadres in Gānsù Province (p. 4). The failure of national authorities to clearly specify whether minorities should be assimilated or tolerated meant that policy practice was vulnerable to the whims of decision makers and *ad hoc* considerations of political expediency.

I find it necessary to point out that although the authors have written about kinship affection among Hàn and minorities as a fact since at least the 1990s, the relationships between Hàn-Chinese and several minorities were in many ways troubled. Numerous contemporary Uyghurs and Huí speaking to foreign observers have expressed suspicion and even hostility towards Hàn-Chinese people and the Party-State. The *Kāidū River* authors themselves reflected on troubled Hàn–Uyghur/Huí relations. Complaints by Uyghurs and Huí to foreign observers are of course anecdotal evidence. But the volume of such complaints is ample enough to ascertain that a notable portion of Uyghurs and Huí did not consider Hàn-Chinese to be "family" even in the metaphorical sense.

Crudely speaking, throughout modern Chinese history, there have been three main attitudes regarding the idea of mínzú as family. Proponents of the first attitude, notably Republican authorities, maintained that minority mínzú share ancestry with Hàn-Chinese and that they therefore should be loyal and assimilated into China. Justification of assimilation in terms of ancestry disappeared during the Maoist period, but gradually resurfaced after the Opening and Reform of China in 1978. Proponents of the second attitude—notably integrationist-minded Communist Hàn and minority cadres during the Republican Period, the 1950s, and after the Opening and Reform of China in 1978—maintained that the mínzú are of distinct ancestral lineages. According to them, statements about family are metaphorical and the mínzú are merely united through bonds of friendship, common interests, and organic interdependence. Proponents of the third attitude—the official viewpoint of

the national leadership—remained relatively ambiguous in terms of whether family means shared ancestry or merely comradery. They have instead emphasized obligations to the nation as manifested by the Party-State. This attitude was by all appearances a strategy to address interests in national unity, without offending minority mínzú concerns about the preservation of their distinct identities.

The Huí authors of the *Kāidū River* consistently tended towards the second viewpoint, namely that the mínzú are of distinct ancestral lineages. By doing so, they contributed to tilting local propaganda discourse in favor of preserving a Huí identity distinct from the Hàn-Chinese. If the Huí authors were solely concerned with fulfilling the national directive of boosting national cohesion, they could have emphasized instances of intermarriage between Huí and Hàn-Chinese ancestors, real or imaginary. That is, they could have aligned themselves with the first viewpoint, that they share a common ancestry. Or, if they were concerned about Huí opposition against such a notion, they could have remained ambiguous in terms of what Huí and Hàn as family meant. Instead, they indicated that statements about inter-mínzú kinship should only be interpreted as metaphorical. In this way, they demonstrated some agency on behalf of Huí.

iii. Minority mínzú are infantile

The Huí contributors to the magazine tended to portray minority mínzú as pure, infantile, emotionally volatile, and backward in social development. Minority mínzú were juxtaposed to the Hàn-Chinese, who were portrayed as polluted by distrust and selfishness, as mature, rational thinkers, and as forward in social development. Whereas minority mínzú were commended for preserving the innocence of old generations, the Hàn-Chinese were praised as bringers of modernity and civilization. As with previous chapters, there is a temporal perspective to this portrayal. Whereas the purity of Huí (and Uyghurs) was frequently praised in the pre-2014 editions of the magazine, post-2014 publications paid more attention to the contributions of Hàn-Chinese in the development of the borderland.

The theme of minority mínzú as infantile is reminiscent of the theme of minority mínzú as paradigms of purity. I reiterate a similar theme in this chapter because in addition to being a product of Neo-Confucian discourse on purity and paradigms of infantile purity or truth, the theme can also be interpreted as a product of Republican race discourse. The goal of this chapter is to discuss what statements about minority mínzú as infantile meant when interpreted as part of this discourse, what this meant for the portrayal of Huí identity in the *Kāidū River*, and whether the writers could demonstrate Huí agency in their invocation of such statements.

As illustrated by Dikötter (1992) in his book on racial discourse in China, the thinkers of the Republican period did not simply import ideas about race

from the West. They were also heavily influenced by native ideas about the relationship between the civilized people of China and the barbarians of the borderlands. Some scholars have argued that the ancient Chinese considered it possible for barbarians to become civilized. Therefore, according to these scholars, the divide between the Chinese and the barbarians was "cultural" rather than "racial." However, as pointed out by Dikötter, there are multiple instances throughout Chinese history in which the divide between the civilized people and barbarians was described as insurmountable. This is particularly true of periods in which the Chinese elite's sense of cultural superiority was threatened. Examples followed the influx of Buddhism—a previously "barbarian" religion—during the Six Dynasties (221–589), and after the Jurchen "barbarians" established themselves in northern China (1115–1234) at the expense of the "civilized" Sòng dynasty (960–1279) (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 39). Emphasis on the racial divide between Hàn-Chinese and Manchu following the empire's humiliation at the hands of foreign powers was only the latest instance of a recurring historical trend. As such, the Republicans inherited a tradition of contrasting a civilized and advanced "China" (华夏) to a barbarian and inferior borderland.

I have not explored in what ways and to what extent the discursive link between backward barbarians and ideals of infantile purity was made by members of the traditional Confucian elite, or in ritual exchanges between barbarian vassals and imperial authorities. This is a topic that deserves investigation of its own. However, by the Republican period, the discursive link was unambiguously voiced by some intellectuals. At the time, the Hàn-Chinese minzuologist Jiāng Yìngliáng (1909–1988) argued that the lack of contact with "modern" society made the south-western minorities able to avoid the "cheating and hypocrisy of civilized man." The south-western minorities had instead "preserved the instinctive nature of primitive guilelessness" (Mullaney, 2011, p. 77). Just like the Huí writers of the *Kāidū River*, Jiāng Yìngliáng invoked the juxtaposition of the modern and the backward to portray minority mínzú as paradigms of infantile purity. His motivations may have been different, but the statement was the same.

The writers' portrayal of minority mínzú as paradigms of infantile purity benefitted Huí by depicting their customs and traditions (notably Islam) as favorable to the national goal of cultivating law-abiding and docile citizens. Their portrayal indicated that religious practice among Huí should be tolerated and cherished. However, the discursive link between infantile purity and racial backwardness is not unambiguously favorable to the goal of preserving Huí distinctiveness. For if Huí are backward and the Hàn-Chinese are modern, the Huí would presumably benefit from becoming more like the Hàn-Chinese.

This negative aspect of the portrayal of Huí (and other mínzú) as paradigms of infantile purity was amplified by both the evolutionary paradigm of Republican race discourse and the attribution of bestial characteristics to

backward "races". The *Kāidū River* writers that portrayed minority mínzú as paradigms of purity may not have taken these negative consequences into consideration. However, regardless of their intent, by invoking statements about minority mínzú as infantile, they reinforced the discursive divide between the modern Hàn-Chinese and the backward minority mínzú, the adult and the infant.

When speaking of the evolutionary paradigm of Republican race discourse, I refer to the fact that the Republican thinkers abandoned the center-periphery model in favor of a linear theory of development. The Republicans no longer determined the degree of civilization by geographical and cultural proximity to the emperor. Instead, inspired by Herbert Spencer's (1820–1903) belief in a universal principle—which they found reminiscent of the Neo-Confucian concept of cosmic principle—the Republican thinkers praised and criticized races by their alignment with imagined characteristics of the ideal race (Dikötter, 1992, p. 102). Heightened alignment with these characteristics or principles were considered good and deviation bad. There were no such things as alternative paths to modernity and civilization. Therefore, they translated the foreign term "evolution" as "forward-change" (*jìnhuà*). According to this paradigm, if the Hàn-Chinese are more advanced than minority mínzú, then minority mínzú ought to become more like the Hàn-Chinese, as it would mean that the Hàn-Chinese are closer to the universal end-state of evolutionary progress. Any call for revitalizing minority mínzú customs and tradition would be a call for evolutionary regression or "backward-change" (*tuìhuà*). In this sense, the implications of portraying minority mínzú as paradigms of infantile purity were detrimental to the *Kāidū River* authors' expressed desire of preserving a distinct Huí identity.

During the Republican period, intellectuals invoked highly negative stereotypes of other races. These negative stereotypes were raised as proof that the Hàn-Chinese race was more advanced than others, presumably to bolster confidence and strengthen the nation. This was a continuation of the historical trend in which all sorts of physical oddities were attributed to those designated as barbarians. These oddities indicated that barbarians were more beast than men. In the 4th century BC, the *Classic of Mountains and Seas* portrayed inhabitants from faraway lands as having one eye or three hands. Zhèng Xuán (127–200) and Dù Yòu (735–812) wrote that barbarians may at best become half-human through proper exposure to Chinese culture (Dikötter, 1992, pp. 8–49). Throughout Chinese history, Chinese characters denoting barbarian people were generally adorned with the beast radical (犭). As illustrated by Dikötter (1992), by the Republican period, the vogue was to attribute hairiness as a prime sign of bestiality among backward races. In 1905, for example, the revolutionary writer Zōu Róng described Chinese minorities as "furry," "bestial," and "savage" (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 171). In contrast, the literature professor Lín Yǔtáng (1895–1976) boasted that some Chinese

women have naturally bare mons veneris—which he saw as proof of the racial superiority of the Hàn-Chinese (Dikötter, 1992, pp. 138–141).

Stereotypes of minorities as "bestial" were not only offensive, but also directly harmful to the expressed concerns of the *Kāidū River* writers. During the Republican period, intellectuals such as Zhāng Jūnjùn (1897–...) and Wèi Jùxián (1899–1989) recommended programs for cleansing the Chinese race of unwanted traits. Wèi Jùxián argued that the Hàn-race initially carried the superior blood of the Yellow Emperor but had regressed due to the dilution by the blood of minorities. Zhāng Jūnjùn and Wèi Jùxián recommended segregation, exile, and castration to purify the Chinese race of its unwanted characteristics. They recommended Nazi Germany as a positive example for China to follow and Wèi Jùxián lamented that its eugenics laws were not always put fully into practice (Dikötter, 1992, pp. 185–186).

Negative stereotypes of minority mínzú persist in China today. Not only are the Hàn-Chinese often described as a more advanced mínzú. Minority mínzú are also attributed with "bestial" characteristics, such as hairiness and emotional volatility. Such negative stereotypes have even been invoked by Party-State authorities to criticize unwanted behavior, despite national laws that explicitly forbid the humiliation and abuse of minority mínzú. Consider the following frame from a cartoon published by a police office in Yānqí Town:

Figure 4: "People that possess dangerous terrorist-related articles, and that handle knives beyond what is normal."—Annotation on excerpt from a cartoon by the Xīyù Police Station of Yānqí Town.

The frame purports to portray run-of-the-mill terrorists in Xīnjiāng. It portrays three Uyghur men and a woman. The Uyghur identity of the terrorists is not spelled out in words but is indicated by the two men wearing traditional

Uyghur headwear. Paying homage to Republican imagery of barbarians, the artist made sure to give two of the men disheveled beards. Following stereotypes of Muslim mínzú as emotionally volatile and violent, the artist portrayed the Uyghurs with fierce eyes and twisted facial features. The fact that the Uyghur man behind the table fondles a knife adds to this portrayal. When I visited eastern China in 2013–2014, many Hàn-Chinese interlocutors emphasized that Uyghurs like to carry knives, to convince me of their emotionally volatile nature.

According to Adil Apar, Dilmurat Omar, and Liú Míng (2010) in their book on Shamanist practices in today's Xīnjiāng, Uyghurs believe that demons and evil spirits fear knives. To avoid misfortune, they therefore "always" carry a knife when travelling at night. They also sleep with a knife beneath their pillow when they are away from their hometown (p. 321). As such, carrying knives did not signify hostility towards Hàn-Chinese or emotional volatility. These customs are no longer possible to uphold in today's Xīnjiāng. Now, all knives must have a registration number, should not be carried in public, and are difficult to purchase. When I visited Yānqí Town in 2018 and bought a mango, I could not find a single shop selling a usable tool for peeling the fruit. The knife-ban was a policy directly motivated by Hàn stereotypes of Muslims as emotionally volatile and dangerous.

When it comes to Huí, their physical similarity to the Hàn-Chinese does not mean that they have avoided being portrayed as barbarian or even half-human by Hàn-Chinese. Therefore, Sū Xiàoquán—who, like many Huí, has to some extent internalized such stereotypes (Wroldsen, 2014)—writes about the "primordial wildness" of Huí. Many Hàn-Chinese sincerely believe that Huí do not eat pork because they revere it as their god or their ancestor. In his book on the Huí, the anthropologist Dru Gladney (1991) recorded a rhyme from Sìchuān that not only described Huí as descendants of a pig, but also likened them to monkeys and dogs (p. 188). The host of negative connotations related to "backwardness" does perhaps account for the popularity of the Yīhèwǎní school of Islam among Huí in Gānsù, Níngxià, and Qīnghǎi. The proponents of this school tend to emphasize that Islam is a "modern" religion and that evidence of such modernity can be found through a careful reading of the Quran (Erie, 2016, p. 280). By doing so, Yīhèwǎní proponents attempt to distance Huí and Islam from their discursive connotations with backwardness.

The Australian historian David Brophy (2019/2022) has claimed that Huí "face little to none of the stigmatization and discrimination directed at fellow Muslims," because they have not "become *racially Muslim*" in the same way as Uyghurs (p. 53, emphasis in original). Brophy's claim is likely influenced by recent observations by Western media and scholarship about the relatively lenient attitude of the Party-State towards Huí in other parts of China, notably Níngxià and Yúnnán.

The Huí might be better at hiding their Muslim identity than Uyghurs. Yet they have definitely faced "stigmatization and discrimination" due to the racialization of their Muslim identity, and continue to do so. Huí often express suspicion that Hàn-Chinese do not differentiate between them and Uyghurs (Erie, 2016, p. 15; Wroldsen, 2014, p. 32). As a result, some Huí consciously abstain from wearing certain garments (white caps, headscarves), growing beards, or otherwise indicating their religious convictions and mínzú affiliation in public. In fact, wearing burqas and growing large beards was prohibited by Xīnjiāng authorities in the mid and late 2010s (see e.g., Erie, 2016, pp. 194–195).

Even when hiding their identity, Huí cannot arbitrarily change the mínzú label on their identity cards. In 2017, for example, a Huí student and acquaintance of the Canada-based anthropologist Darren Byler (2019/2022) was detained for re-education after she used VPN-services to access her foreign university's mailbox. The police claimed she had committed a cyber violation, which was indicative of religious extremism (p. 184). The low tolerance for the application of VPN-services in Xīnjiāng appears to be common knowledge. Even I (a non-Muslim, albeit foreigner) was warned by Uyghur students in 2017 not to use VPN services. Yet the disproportionate punishment for a minor transgression indicates that her Huí identity made her a target for the police.

When about 150 Huí villagers in the Chāngjí Huí Autonomous Prefecture (located north of the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, in which Yānqí is located) in 2016 protested the seizure of their land, they received the same treatment as Uyghurs and Kazakhs suspected of harboring "terrorist" or religious extremist sympathies. That is, they were detained in facilities for ideological remolding (Guldana Salimjan, 2021/2022, p. 160). When Yānqí Huí traveled to "Yúnnán and other places" in the late 2000s to learn about Islam (学经), they were labelled as "problematic" (存在的问题) elements in a 2009 work report of the Yānqí Political Consultative Conference (Mǎ Xuéliáng, Exmetjan Semet, & Bā Bīnbài, 2009, p. 61). Yúnnán is notably the location of the Shadian Village, where an uprising of Huí was violently suppressed in 1975. Locals in the village have maintained networks with Muslims abroad (Erie, 2016, p. 113) and trained imams for other Huí communities (Hillman, 2004, p. 64). The attitude of Yānqí cadres towards such exchanges clearly indicated that the leniency towards religious practice by Huí in places such as Níngxià and Yúnnán did not extend to Xīnjiāng.

Even in places such as Níngxià, the relatively lenient policies towards Islam were never implemented without reluctance or caveats from the Party-State leadership. As observed by Gladney in 1991: "[Níngxià] [c]adres [we]re surprised to find that some Hui peasants hold the mistaken idea that the Party not only allows religious belief but encourages it" (p. 118).

The portrayal of Huí (and other mínzú) as infantile and backward in the *Kāidū River* was therefore potentially detrimental not only to Huí interests in preserving their identity, but also to national interests in the assimilation of Huí. It may have harmed the first by portraying traditional Huí customs as inferior and something that should be discarded through evolutionary progress. It may have harmed the latter by reinforcing sentiments of racial superiority among Hàn-Chinese. Such sentiments in combination with assimilative policies might lead to what the Canadian psychologist John W. Berry (2003) describes as marginalization. According to Berry, marginalization occurs when minorities no longer pursue cultural maintenance yet fail to be accepted by the dominant group (p. 24). Uyghurs are admittedly more vulnerable to such marginalization, considering physiognomic and linguistic differences from the Hàn-Chinese. However, Huí by their very categorization as minority mínzú may also be marginalized.

In short, the portrayal of minority mínzú as infantile had insidious effects to the extent that readers recognized the discursive origins of such statements. By all appearances, the Huí writers attempted to address the concerns of Huí by portraying backwardness as something positive and thereby encourage tolerance and protection by the Party-State of their "backward" customs and religion. The writers did not seem to recognize that by portraying Huí as backward, albeit using positive terms such as "pure" and "true," they ran the risk of reinforcing Hàn-chauvinism and a sense of Huí inferiority. In one of her texts, Kòu Yùyīng lamented what she called the "demonization" of Xīnjiāng and Muslims by Hàn-Chinese. But she herself may have reinforced such imagery by juxtaposing the backwardness of Huí with the modernity of the Hàn-Chinese. Backwardness and barbarity have a host of negative connotations rooted in racial discourse. The benefits of invoking Neo-Confucian discourse of infantile purity and ignoring these connotations were therefore ambiguous at best.

The writers' efforts at presenting Huí backwardness as something positive may have done more harm than good to the overall interests of the Huí as a mínzú. However, in their texts, the writers demonstrated that the intention of these statements was to benefit the preservation of a Huí identity defined by Islam and distinct from the Hàn-Chinese, rather than a veiled attempt to induce such negative effects. Therefore, by my own definition—as efforts made for the real or perceived interests of a mínzú—the writers demonstrated mínzú agency.

Concluding remarks

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the writers invoked Neo-Confucian discourse to align Huí interests with national interests. This allowed them to address Huí concerns without exceeding the definitional boundaries of "state orthodoxy." Staying within these boundaries, they were

able to keep the magazine operative for seven years. They were also able to convince at least some local Hàn cadres of their arguments.

In this chapter, I found that the writers similarly attempted to align Huí concerns with national interests in their invocation of Republican race theory. Their primary approach was to emphasize the contributions made by Huí to China, and emphasizing that their patriotic fervor could be attributed to the psychological and religious particularities of Huí. In this way, they simultaneously encouraged Huí loyalty to China while also encouraging Party-State tolerance of Huí particularities.

The secondary approach was to adopt a distinct interpretation of the statements about the collectivity of mínzú as family. When making statements about mínzú as family, the Huí writers made sure to indicate that it meant comradery among mínzú rather than actual kinship. This was notably different from statements that emphasized bonds of "blood" or shared ancestry among Hàn-Chinese and minority mínzú. It was also different from intentionally ambiguous statements about the mínzú family.

The third approach was to combine discourse about the evolutionary supremacy of Hàn-Chinese with Neo-Confucian discourse about infantile purity. The Huí writers did not refute statements about Hàn-people as more aligned with universal principles of modernity. This would be harmful to national interests in legitimizing the rule of the Hàn-dominated Party-State as well as the immense migration of Hàn-people to the region. Instead, they argued that modernity was not only beneficial and that backward mínzú—just like children—possessed certain positive attributes lost to adult Hàn-Chinese. Children may be emotionally volatile and naive, but they are also honest, loyal, trustful, and unburdened by ambitions and greed. The writers conveyed that the childlike nature of Huí ought to be cherished while it lasts, and preferably extended.

In short, while paying tribute to national interests, the writers demonstrated awareness of how their choice of words affected Huí interests. They made sure to praise aspects of Hàn-Chinese modernity, without prescribing it as a blueprint for the development of Huí identity. It is debatable whether the strategy of devaluing Huí customs and religion as "infantile" in comparison to the "maturity" of Hàn culture was beneficial to the concerns of the authors. On the one hand, it may have encouraged Huí-readers to abandon cultural particularities associated with their mínzú in favor of assimilation. On the other hand, it may have encouraged Huí-readers to appreciate their own culture as unpolluted by the filth of modern society and therefore superior to Hàn-Chinese culture. It may also have encouraged Hàn-Chinese cadres to be more lenient in their evaluation of the security risk posed by their Muslim compatriots. Analyzing more precisely the effect of the employed strategy would require anthropological fieldwork and analysis. However, regardless of what the results of such research may be, my findings show that the writers made a notable effort to address Huí interests. In their intentions, they

sacrificed national interests in Huí assimilation for the preservation of Huí distinctiveness. As such, they were demonstrating agency on behalf of their mínzú.

2.4 Maoist Thought Transformation

When analyzing the texts of the *Kāidū River*, I discovered a third set of statements that the writers invoked in their formulation of Huí identity. These statements also involved Neo-Confucian terminology and ideas about universal principles and cosmic truth. Notably, they involved ideas about paradigms of infantile purity and their vulnerability to deception. Yet, as with Republican race theory, they were characterized by a set of terms and ideas quite distinct from classical Neo-Confucian discourse. The statements generally involved ideas about how the pure minds of "the people" (人民) were prone to pollution from malicious influences emanating from the people's enemies. Such pollution made those who were affected cause harm to themselves and others. To protect the minds of "the people" and cleanse them of pollution, the Party-State should guide the people with "education" and propaganda. "The people" (including minority mínzú) were valorized by the degree to which they comprehended and accepted the supreme wisdom of the Party-State as conveyed by its emissaries (cadres) and remained unpolluted. I have identified this discourse as Maoist thought transformation.

I have identified two recurring statements derived from Maoist thought transformation that are relevant to the formulation of Huí identity in the *Kāidū River*. The two statements are:

(i) Pure people are vulnerable to pollution
(ii) Pure people should be guided through "education"

In what follows, I will discuss what the Huí authors achieved when invoking these two statements and evaluate whether the authors demonstrated mínzú agency. I will do this by showing the relation of the statements to Maoist thought transformation, explaining what the statements meant when interpreted as part of this discourse, and discussing if and how the meaning invoked served to address mínzú-related concerns voiced by the authors and concerns voiced by national authorities.

i. Pure people are vulnerable to thought pollution

In the chapter on Neo-Confucian cosmology, I already discussed how Huí writers portrayed minority mínzú as pure yet vulnerable, and how they used such statements to position the magazine as a legitimate platform for

addressing Huí concerns. I reiterated a similar theme in the chapter that followed, where I discussed the relationship between discourse on infantile minority mínzú and racial discourse on evolutionary backwardness. The reason I now reiterate a similar theme a third time is that statements about the precarity of infantile mínzú also can be interpreted from the perspective of the discourse of Maoist thought transformation. In fact, the writers themselves made this connection.

One can see changes over time in how the writers invoked statements about pure mínzú in a precarious position. In texts before 2014, the writers tended to address the vulnerability of the pure in fairy tales or in the dealings of the pure-hearted with "modern" and "selfish" people. In these texts, Republican romanticism of backward barbarians and Neo-Confucian idolization of the infantile were predominant. Although statements about the infantile nature of Huí and other minority mínzú were frequent, concerns about thought pollution from outside enemies were not prevalent. After 2014, texts that were concerned about thought pollution and critical about the backward nature of minority mínzú began to appear in the magazine. In these texts, writers expressed their criticism by relating the backwardness of minority mínzú to "terrorism" (恐怖主义). They did so by connecting the simple-mindedness of minority mínzú to being vulnerable to thought pollution. Among the Huí writers of the *Kāidū River*, the editor-in-chief Kòu Yùyīng was most vocal in this respect. It is worth investigating to what extent and in what ways the writers were able to address Huí concerns in their invocation of statements about infantile minority mínzú. To do this, it is necessary to discuss what such statements implied for Huí concerns in the new discursive context after 2014.

The shift in how the writers referred to minority mínzú was directly related to the tightened political atmosphere in Xīnjiāng. As mentioned, 2014 was marked by the Kūnmíng knife attacks, the President's visit to the region, and the subsequent launch of the "Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism" campaign. Xīnjiāng media was flooded with articles that spoke against terrorism and warned against the dangers of thought pollution. The texts argued that Xīnjiāng's minorities (primarily Uyghurs) were prone to deception by terrorist thought due to both their simple-mindedness and their Muslim creed.

The "terrorist" as portrayed in the *Kāidū River* and other Xīnjiāng media is different from the villain in the fairy tales of Mǎ Guìlín. In the fairy tales, the villain is the antithesis to the paradigm of infantile purity. Whereas the paradigm of infantile purity is honest, generous, and hardworking, the villain is deceptive, greedy, and lazy. The "terrorist" of Xīnjiāng media was frequently attributed with the negative traits of the villain. However, they were also attributed with the negative traits of the infantile paradigm. Consider, for example, the following citation from a Uyghur village cadre in south Xīnjiāng:

> Policies that benefit the people are many these days. If you just work hard, life will be good. Most of those violent terrorist elements are gluttonous and lazy. They want to gain without working. After being infected by the poison of religious extremist thought, they begin to kill people like crazy. They do all kinds of evil. (Dòu Xīnguó, 2014, pp. 31–32)

Like children, the Uyghurs ("terrorists") were portrayed as irrational and emotionally volatile. They were therefore inferior to the mature Hàn-Chinese Party-State. However, like corrupted adults they were selfish, detested honest work, and abused those who were pure of heart. They therefore did not fit into the classical Neo-Confucian dichotomy of infantile purity and adult pollution. They were modern "barbarians," but without any of the positive attributes of backwardness. They were corrupt adults capable of concocting vicious schemes, yet also mentally inferior children on an irrational rampage.

Rather than being the antithesis of the paradigm of infantile purity, the "terrorist" was the antithesis of the superhuman beings that ensure the will of cosmos in Mǎ Guìlín's fairy tales. As discussed, the superhuman agent of cosmos per definition transcended the contradiction between infantile purity and adult wisdom. They possessed the fine qualities of both the paradigm of infantile purity and the mature adult, without being tarnished by the weaknesses of either. Whereas the superhuman agent was the manifestation of all good on earth, the terrorist was the manifestation of all evil. Like the agent of the cosmos, the terrorist was also "superhuman" (or non-human), in the sense that they too transcended the juxtaposition between infantility and adulthood that applied to mankind. The attribution of emotional volatility, irrationality and backwardness was an import from international discourses on terrorism. Yet the discursive positioning as the definitional opposite of the superhuman agent already existed in Chinese discourse.

The discursive positioning of an evil beyond the dichotomy of infantile purity and adulthood was elucidated by none other than Chairman Máo in 1957. That year, he published a document by the title "On the Correct Handling of the Problem of Internal Contradictions Among the People." In the document, he argued that it is important to discern between two types of contradictions: those between "the people" (人民) and its external enemies, and those among "the people" itself. Whereas internal contradictions among the people could be solved, Máo argued that contradictions between the people and its enemies are insurmountable. In their fundamental nature, all members of the people were good. Any contradiction that had emerged was due to the pollution by erroneous thought. They should therefore be redeemed through ideological remolding and education. As for the people's enemy, their fundamental nature was evil. Any amount of guidance would do no good, and they should therefore be oppressed and persecuted by the Party-State. They were a sinister force with presence both within and particularly outside China. They were the source of erroneous thoughts that polluted the people. Should

initially good people be deeply infested with thought pollution, they may be beyond redemption and become one of the enemy themselves. In this sense, the "terrorist" of today is the people's enemy of the Maoist period. They are portrayed as lackeys of outside forces scheming to dismember and humiliate the Chinese nation.

The definitional juxtaposition between the Party (as the superhuman agent of cosmos) and the "terrorist" (as the manifestation of evil) was unambiguously spelled out in a *Kāidū River* article attributed to the Uyghur village Party Secretary Qurban Nuraxun (Winter 2014). In one of her own texts, Kòu Yùyīng (Summer 2015) commended this article. The article was divided into six sections, each with a short title that defined the Party-State (党和政府) and the "terrorist" in opposition to one another. The titles were as follows:

(a) The Party-State provides our children with education—The terrorists send our children to hell
(b) The Party-State lets women be masters at home—The terrorists let women abandon their families and their Lord
(c) The Party-State brings prosperity and happy lives to the peasants—The terrorists bring destitution and misery
(d) The Party-State guides the masses to a bright future—The terrorists teach the masses profane arts (邪门道)
(e) The Party-State provides the peasants with delicious water—The terrorists provide the peasants with bitter water
(f) The Party-State teaches the mínzú unity and harmony—The terrorists teach the mínzú divisiveness and separation

In the first three and the fifth title, Qurban Nuraxun emphasized the achievements of the Hàn-dominated Party-State in the fields of education, equality, and economic development. In the fourth title, he assured his readers that Xīnjiāng will not be able to continue its forward development without the perpetuated aid (and governance) of the evolutionarily more advanced Hàn-Chinese. In the sixth title, he conflated territorial separatism with terrorism. Such conflation was frequent in Xīnjiāng media at the time. By the logic of Maoist discourse, this fully made sense, as it tacitly presumed that the people's enemies are in league against China. In short, Qurban Nuraxun asserted the legitimacy of Hàn-Chinese rule by emphasizing Uyghur mental backwardness and naivety.

Statements about the precarious state of minority mínzú did not directly demonize the mínzú. They implied that minority mínzú individuals who were convinced by the arguments of terrorists and territorial separatists were not necessarily evil. As with "the people" at large, the majority of such individuals were simply misguided. Chairman Máo liked to state that 90 or 95 percent of the Chinese population were "good" or at least ideologically redeemable. The

current President Xí Jìnpíng talks favorably about the "large majority" (大多数), implying that only a small portion (极少数) of the population are true enemies (Xí Jìnpíng, March 2013/2014, p. 41). When Red Guards in Kashgar (southern Xīnjiāng) were targeted by Uyghur peasants during the Cultural Revolution, they claimed that the peasants were hoodwinked (蒙蔽) by a "handful" (一小撮) of bad guys (走资派) in the regional Party-State leadership (see, e.g., Azure Blood in the Borderland Metropolis, 1968/1999a, p. 419). These Red Guards did not entertain the possibility that some of their own views—notably the advocacy of iconoclasm (Spark Ignites Prairie, October 1967, p. 3)—were alienating otherwise "good" Uyghurs and other Muslims. This was the case even as they ridiculed imams, who were travelling from Kashgar to Běijīng to complain about the behavior of the Red Guards (Azure Blood in the Borderland Metropolis, 1968/1999b, p. 419). The above example illustrates that numerical statements about the "majority" were political rhetoric and did not require any verification in terms of opinion polls and statistical analysis. In fact, those who made such statements presumed that even people who acted and spoke against the Party-State's "truth" only did so because they were mentally underdeveloped, and that they would stop doing so once they were awakened from their slumber through propaganda and education.

The association of Islam and backwardness with the evil of terrorism did not serve the Huí argument for the maintenance of a distinct identity. In her text on cleansing religious "extremism" from Yānqí, Kòu Yùyīng (Summer 2015) clearly indicated that terrorism is first and foremost a Uyghur problem and not a Huí problem. However, she tacitly admitted that also Huí—being Muslim, infantile, and fascinated with Arab culture—were vulnerable to the allure of terrorist propaganda. Even in her own text, therefore, she failed to insulate Huí from the negative implications of associating backwardness and Islam with terrorism. Early in the text, Kòu Yùyīng expressed a criticism of Hàn-chauvinism and the demonization of Muslims. Yet in the main body of her text, she reinforced the very ideas that encouraged such demonization in the first place. This is true even as Kòu Yùyīng continued to identify herself with Huí interests. The Maoist shift in the *Kāidū River* discourse in 2014—mandated by the change in Xīnjiāng's political atmosphere—undermined in many ways the Huí attempt at agency.

As with earlier iterations of statements about the infantile precarity of minority mínzú, Kòu Yùyīng attempted to reinforce the authority of the magazine and its writers. Kòu Yùyīng's 2015 text opened with a statement about the importance of having minority mínzú writers expose the falsehoods of terrorist propaganda (and Hàn misconceptions about Muslims). She stated that few, if anyone, were in a better position to convince misguided minority mínzú of their erroneous ways than trusted members of their own intellectual elite. By doing so, Kòu Yùyīng reinforced the identification of the *Kāidū River*

with national interests and portrayed it as a legitimate voice of Party-State orthodoxy. This allowed the magazine's continued operation as a space for representation of Huí concerns, even if such representation turned increasingly tenuous in the latter half of the 2010s.

The increased difficulty of addressing Huí concerns in the magazine after 2014 did not mean that the Huí authors ceased their efforts in this regard. As late as 2017, after the mass detainment of Uyghurs already had begun in 2016 (Guldana Salimjan, 2021/2022, p. 150), the Huí Party historian Liú Yīngguī invoked the following words of Sū Xiàoquán:

> Fate would just so have it that the people of our age live[d] in times of political tumultuousness. When we are allowed to write, we do not dare to write. When we dare to write, we have no force left in us. Dear child[ren], the extinction of a mínzú is not determined by their number, but its culture. (Shǐzhì, Spring 2017a, p. 51)

The "child" in the text originally referred to Kòu Yùyīng but has been decontextualized by Shǐzhì to refer to Huí intellectuals in general. The "people of our age" referred to elderly Huí, like Sū Xiàoquán, who had lived through the Cultural Revolution. However, the language used was ambiguous enough that the statements can be interpreted as referring to the present-day situation of Xīnjiāng. In 2017, Xīnjiāng authorities embarked on a program of mass detention of Muslims, including not only writers, artists, and cadres, but also "common" people. Mostly Uyghurs, but also other Muslim minorities, became victims of the program.

Historical allegorism is a literary tool that has often been used, or been suspected of being used, to criticize authorities in China. In fact, the Cultural Revolution began with the purge of a playwright—Wú Hán—who commended a Míng dynasty (1368–1644) minister for his bravery in criticizing the emperor. Chairman Máo interpreted the "emperor" as an allegory referring to himself (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2006, pp. 15–19). Therefore, Liú Yīngguī's choice to write about "tumultuous times," censorship, and assimilation came with a significant political risk. It could be interpreted as "narrow nationalism," in the sense once described by the *Xīnjiāng Daily*: "Narrow nationalism exaggerates the characteristics of one's own nationality [...] [and] one-sidedly emphasizes the development of the so-called survival space of one nationality" (Zhào Suìshēng, 2004, p. 234). It was not at all in accordance with national policies. It indicated a continued commitment by Liú Yīngguī, but also Kòu Yùyīng as the editor-in-chief, to use the magazine to the advantage of Huí interests.

ii. Pure people should be guided through "education"

Statements about how infantile minority mínzú need "education" from mature caretakers were repeatedly invoked in the *Kāidū River*. Among the Huí authors, such statements were most explicitly invoked by Kòu Yùyīng, the editor-in-chief. These statements were a corollary of statements about the precarious situation of minority mínzú, in the sense that it was this very precarity that prescribed the need for a caretaker. As mentioned, the Huí writers of the *Kāidū River* offered two solutions for a caretaker to escape the juxtaposition of the infantile and the mature. The first solution involved the superhuman Party-State. The second solution involved intellectuals, often cadres, that through the study of literature and culture and reflection on truth were able to transcend the dilemma.

Since the portrayal of infantile minority mínzú predated the Maoist turn in 2014, it should come as little surprise to find statements about the "educational" needs of minority mínzú years before the "enemy" influence was properly identified and designated for elimination. One possible interpretation is that statements about the infantile minorities' need for education are not the product of a distinct "Maoist" discourse but rather part and parcel of Neo-Confucian and racial discourse. However, I would argue that also these early statements about the infantile minorities' need for education represent Maoist discourse. Whereas the Confucian discourse of Yānqí fairy tales emphasized divine intervention, and racial theory facilitated ideas about support to less advanced mínzú, the emphasis on redeeming those with erroneous thoughts was Maoist. Therefore, to explore what the Huí writers achieve when invoking these statements, and whether they address Huí concerns, it is necessary to analyze their implications from the perspective of Maoist discourse on thought transformation.

During his period as the supreme leader of the Communist Party (1935–1976), Chairman Máo initiated multiple ideological rectification campaigns. These campaigns aimed at cleansing "erroneous" thoughts from the minds of the cadres and those they governed, while conveniently purging dissenters and Máo's political rivals in the process. The most well-known of these campaigns were the Yán'ān Rectification Movement (1942–1945), the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign, and the infamous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). A common theme was that those purged and detained were told to repent and were promised the possibility of redemption through labor and ideological studies. Already in the Jiāngxī–Fújiàn Soviet (1931–1934), the leaders of the Party organized Labor Reformatory Camps (劳动感化院) and Hard Labor Teams (苦工队) for "educat[ing]" and "reform[ing]" convicts, while providing consumer goods and military products in the process (Hongda Harry Wu, 1992, pp. 26–57). Common criminals, political prisoners, and delinquents were all sent to such facilities. Besides being put to labor, the convicts were "force-fe(d)" socialist ideology and legal knowledge. The leadership argued that many of them were not inherently evil, just polluted by erroneous

thoughts. They could therefore, at least in theory, be rehabilitated through proper guidance (ibid.). Such labor camps have been part and parcel of the Chinese Communist legal system ever since.

In Maoist discourse, the detainment in facilities for ideological remolding and forced labor was likened to treating sick patients in hospitals. Máo often used the phrase "[We] punish [you so that you will] be more cautious [about your thoughts] in the future, [we] treat [your] illness so that [you] may be saved" (惩前毖后，治病救人). The language was adopted by administrators and security personnel in the facilities. It is a common theme in memoirs by former detainees in these camps, such as that by Bào Ruòwàng (Bào Ruòwàng, Pasqualini, & Chelminski, 1973/1976), also known as Jean Pasqualini. When the Chinese Party-State began to mass-detain Uyghurs in such facilities in 2017, the Xīnjiāng Party Youth League described the facilities as "hospitals" in which the people were offered a "one-time only, free-of-charge opportunity" to cleanse their "brains" from the "virus" of "extremist ideology" (Radio Free Asia, 2018). In 2019, the Party's Disciplinary Committee published an article that hailed Máo's phrase as a "fine tradition" that had been developed by the Party since the purges of the 1940s, and that could summarize the philosophy behind all the Party's disciplinary work. The phrase has been endorsed by President Xí Jìnpíng himself (June 2013/2014).

The above examples illustrate that the Maoist discourse on thought transformation is closely intertwined with the Chinese penal system. In addition to prescribing "treatment" for those infected by ideological "diseases," the Maoist discourse also prescribed the application of pre-emptive measures to ensure that people do not get infected by such diseases in the first place. Before the prevalence of the "disease" was identified in 2014, and its "victims" targeted for intensive treatment in 2016, the Huí writers of the *Kāidū River* were already engaged in work to vaccinate the people against "extremist" and other erroneous thoughts. An example of such pre-emptive ideological treatment can be observed in an article about the Yānqí Town neighborhood (团结社区) Party-Secretary Mǎ Míngfāng. The article was published in 2005 in the Yānqí special issue of the literary magazine *Kroran*, in the neighboring city of Korla. Korla is the administrative seat of the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, in which Yānqí is located.

> Mǎ Míngfāng discovered that the Uyghur woman Xelchem [海力且姆] wielded certain authority among the masses. Xelchem had deep religious consciousness. She believed that Khuda [胡达; "God"] was responsible for the good lives of today. [...] [After considerable effort] she finally managed to open the heart of Xelchem. Mǎ Míngfāng told Xelchem: You were born in poverty, it is the Party [not God] that has ensured that you [Uyghurs] now live in happiness [幸福生活]. (Qiū Líng, 2005, p. 46)

A common characteristic of all ideological "diseases" among minority mínzú is that they are either anti-Party, anti-Hàn-Chinese, or a combination of both. Notably, in Xīnjiāng media, whether it is "terrorists," "separatists," or "religious extremists," they were attributed with a fervent desire for the Hàn-Chinese to leave Xīnjiāng and for ending the rule of the Party-State. By (allegedly) convincing Uyghurs that the Party is more important than God, Mǎ Míngfāng contributed to "vaccinating" Xelchem and her community against anti-Party sentiments. Although the Huí writers of the *Kāidū River* magazine never derided Islam in their praise of the atheist Party, they often wrote about the need for and their own efforts at educating the masses about the benevolence and magnanimity of the Hàn-Chinese Party-State, and the wisdom of its minority mínzú policies. By doing so, the *Kāidū River* writers encouraged their readers to appreciate the Party-State and the Hàn-Chinese presence in Xīnjiāng.

The writers also made sure to emphasize that, among the mínzú of China, the Huí are particularly good at listening to the guidance of the Party-State. This was true regarding statements about the need for education both before and after the Maoist shift in 2014. In 2010, Kòu Yùyīng described Huí as "a mínzú that grasps the bigger picture of things, that loves the country and that submits to the administration of the government" (Spring 2010, p. 11). Similarly, in 2017, the Party historian Liú Yīngguī (Shǐzhì, Spring 2017b) described Huí as a wise people that worked hard for realizing the policies of the Chinese Communist Party (p. 43). This is in stark contrast to how Kòu Yùyīng (and Qurban Nuraxun) singled out Uyghurs as the main perpetrators of terrorism. In the texts of the *Kāidū River*, both Huí and Uyghurs are minority mínzú and therefore infantile and emotionally volatile compared to the Hàn-Chinese. However, whereas the Uyghurs are portrayed as easily corrupted by outside influences, the Huí are depicted as far more resilient to such deception. And if some Chinese Muslims are evil, then those Muslims are mostly, if not exclusively, Uyghur. In this sense, the writers of the *Kāidū River* safeguarded Huí concerns at the expense of Uyghurs, rather than defying national guidelines.

The *Kāidū River* writers' cautious treatment of how Huí are portrayed in their response to Party-State "education" can be compared to the portrayal of Huí in the *Kroran* magazine. Consider the following excerpt, which narrates the efforts of a Huí cadre in Yānqí to "educate" local Huí about the relocation of their cemetery:

> Township Magistrate Mǎ personally came to the scene and mobilized for the patient persuasion work of the village people. He asked that the villagers should recognize the bigger picture, think about everyone, and relocate as soon as possible. But the villagers stubbornly refused to relocate. Some villagers pointed fingers at Township Magistrate Mǎ and swore at him [...] You have brought shame to eight generations of your ancestors, you will not enter heaven

> when you die, you will burn in the flames of hell [灾海], no one is more shameless than you. Some people even ran forth to beat up township magistrate Mǎ. (Jamal ad-Din, 2005, p. 35)

The *Kroran* writer Jamal ad-Din showed little to no concern about how he portrayed Huí as a mínzú. Not only did he not portray Huí as a docile and obedient mínzú that comprehends the wisdom of the Party-State. He also vividly described how Huí invoked religion and discourse on mínzú as family to criticize the decision of the Yānqí government and to portray the magistrate as its shameless lackey. By doing so, Jamal ad-Din implied that Huí cadres such as Magistrate Mǎ were first and foremost loyal to the Party-State and not to the Huí as a mínzú. Loyalty to the Party-State was more important than avoiding accusations from his constituents of being a self-serving collaborator. Jamal ad-Din also implied that Huí as a mínzú were hostile to and suspicious of the Party-State and that the Party-State therefore needed Huí cadres to placate these people. Jamal ad-Din was willing to protect the interests of Huí cadres at the expense of Huí as a mínzú.

It is no coincidence that these kinds of statements are completely absent from the *Kāidū River*. It would be antithetical to their acclaimed concern for Huí interests. They never criticized the behavior of Huí as a mínzú to demonstrate their own loyalty as cadres. Even in post-2014 texts, including from early 2017, Kòu Yùyīng and her fellow Huí writers did not describe religious practice among Huí in negative terms. All examples of anti-Party and anti-Hàn Islam-related practice were attributed to Uyghurs. Even as policy practice in the Party-State grew increasingly suspicious of all things religious after 2014, the Huí writers continued their struggle to insulate Huí practice of Islam from association with the evil of thought pollution. In this way, the *Kāidū River* writers demonstrated agency on behalf of Huí.

Concluding remarks

After 2014, the discourse of the *Kāidū River* (and Xīnjiāng media in general) took a distinct Maoist turn. Writers began to lament the vulnerability of minority mínzú in the face of the people's enemy, i.e., the "terrorists," "separatists," and "religious extremists." This discursive shift undermined in many ways the previous efforts of the *Kāidū River* writers. Yet despite the difficulties, the Huí writers continued to address the concerns of their mínzú, even in their own invocation of Maoist discourse. This situation lasted for another three years, until the Party-State began to mass-detain Muslims in 2016 and the *Kāidū River* ceased its publication in 2017.

After 2014, the Huí writers—especially Kòu Yùyīng—made a considerable effort to reconcile their project with the new discursive trends. In her text on religious extremism, Kòu Yùyīng criticized not only anti-Hàn and anti-Party sentiments, but also Hàn-chauvinism. At the time, it was far more common in

Xīnjiāng media to find one-sided criticism of anti-Hàn and anti-Party sentiments as feudal, irrational, and evil. Furthermore, she attempted to isolate the identified problem of terrorism as a Uyghur problem that was unrelated to the religious practices of Huí—despite the discursive association in Xīnjiāng media between Arab culture and terrorism. Kòu Yùyīng tacitly admitted the attractiveness of Arab culture to Huí, who presumably are descendants of Arab migrants to China. However, all her examples of anti-Hàn and anti-Party sentiments are attributed to Uyghurs. She thereby implied that despite their Arab and religious affiliation, Huí were far more resilient than Uyghurs to the influence of religious extremist influences.

Even before 2014, the Huí writers engaged in textual production that portrayed the Huí as aligned with Party-State orthodoxy. Whereas Uyghurs were portrayed as relatively backward and unpredictable, the *Kāidū River* writers repeatedly emphasized that Huí always accepted the guidance of Party-State authorities. Kòu Yùyīng's account of the relocation of a Huí graveyard in Yānqí is radically different from that of Jamal ad-Din, who was not part of the *Kāidū River* writers' project. Whereas Jamal ad-Din sacrificed Huí as a mínzú to emphasize the loyalty of Huí cadres to the Party-State, Kòu Yùyīng and her colleagues consistently refused to do so.

In short, the writers of the magazine continued to demonstrate agency on behalf of their mínzú even after the Maoist shift in 2014, despite such agency becoming increasingly difficult and politically risky. As late as 2017, Liú Yīngguī reinvoked their commitment to the preservation of Huí as a mínzú distinct from the Hàn-Chinese. When romanticism of backwardness became more controversial, the writers began to emphasize that Uyghur were more backward than Huí. In this way, and by portraying anti-Hàn and anti-Party sentiments as primarily a Uyghur problem, the writers attempted to divert attention away from their own mínzú's religious practice. This is perhaps why Kòu Yùyīng in 2017 chose to praise a Uyghur policewoman instead of a Huí as an epitome of infantile purity. At the time, it was politically more safe to be a "wise" (智慧) mínzú than a "stupid" (傻) one.

The writers' continued commitment to Huí preserving a distinct identity from the Hàn-Chinese ran contrary to national interests in the gradual assimilation of all mínzú. Their efforts could easily be interpreted as "mínzú particularism" or "little mínzú-ism" (小民族主义), a thought pattern designated as erroneous in publications such as *We Are All One Family* (YHAC Propaganda Department & YHAC Spiritual Civilization Office, 2010). In these publications, such thought patterns were associated with the greatest crime a minority individual could be accused of by national authorities, i.e., territorial separatism (and by extension religious extremism). The writers' continued commitment to Huí interests, despite growing national pressure for conformity, had likely to do with why the magazine ceased operations in 2017.

PART III

Final remarks

3 Final Conclusion

Findings

In my thesis, I have identified concerns and interests, in the sense of matters considered important and influencing ideological interpretation by individuals and collectives, that are reflected in the production of the propaganda literature of the *Kāidū River* magazine between the years of 2010 and 2017. Identifying the concerns and interests of the writers allowed me to analyze the role minority mínzú played in participating in the production of local propaganda on minority mínzú, and how mínzú agency can be enabled through such participation.

Using a typological analysis of the content of the articles and the background of the writers, I identified statements that encoded three historically salient modes of thought. The statements used language derived from Neo-Confucian cosmology, Republican race theory, and Maoist thought transformation, which gave the imprimatur of "truth," while allowing variation in the interpretation of such "truth." The discourses allowed the authors to address concerns expressed by Party leaders and other cadres at the national level, but also to express their own concerns for the Huí as a mínzú. This is the case even though Huí concerns sometimes were in conflict with national concerns. Uradyn Bulag (2010) has suggested that discourse surrounding the slogan "mínzú unity" (民族团结) is a domain "open to contention and manipulation by both the majoritarian state and the minorities" (p. 205). My thesis affirms this hypothesis.

I argue that the contributors to the *Kāidū River* magazine between 2010 and 2017 produced a discourse of truth that created a subtle field of contention in which national and particularistic interests intersected. National discourse about mínzú expressed a particular set of concerns and assumptions about mínzú identity. The writings of Huí cadres in the *Kāidū River*, for the most part, reflected these national concerns. In some cases, their writings were at odds with national concerns. Yet they remained within the "discourse of truth" because these views were embedded in the epistemology of Neo-Confucian cosmology, Republican race theory, and Maoist thought transformation that allowed these off-center views to be legitimated.

The imprimatur of truth was assigned in national discourse by reference to a variety of historically situated discursive norms. *Kāidū River* writings

referred to these norms selectively. Some of their statements paralleled Neo-Confucian discourse on where and how to find "truth" or "principle." Some statements paralleled Republican race theory on the significance of mínzú or race for individual attributes and obligations. And some statements paralleled Maoist thought transformation, describing an enlightened leadership defined in opposition to the polluting influence of the people's enemy. The writers related "self-evident" truths, like family obligations, to demands of loyalty to the country and Chinese authorities. By variously relating Huí culture and identity to these standards of truth, the writers were able to create a narrative that both fit the national narrative about minorities and was at cross-purposes with it.

At the outset of my dissertation, I emphasized the need for a methodology to prevent researchers from making assumptions about what goes on in the mind of minority mínzú cadres that speak the language of the Party-State and carry out its policies. Researchers like Robert Barnett argued against the "monolithic cadre view," emphasizing instead activities that could be interpreted as autonomous agency on behalf of the cadre's mínzú. While these researchers make a compelling argument against the simplified, monolithic cadre view, the activities they describe can generally be interpreted as done in service of the Party-State. This is perhaps inevitable, as all "monolithic" cadres need to justify the activities for their mínzú with reference to national interests, lest they be designated as dissidents. When doing so, even activities that they directly claim are for the benefit of their mínzú can be interpreted as being done for the primary benefit of the Party-State, with the claimed benefits being incidental or even a ruse for the sole purpose of harnessing popular support. As such, there is an ever-present duality to the meanings and implications of activities initiated by such cadres for the acclaimed benefit of their mínzú—whether the claim was made by themselves or by others.

In order to avoid the same pitfalls, I described a methodology for distinguishing Huí concerns from national concerns, and for evaluating discursive implications of statements made by the *Kāidū River* writers. By identifying discursive activities that indisputably benefitted Huí concerns without benefitting national concerns, I could demonstrate that the *Kāidū River* writers exerted agency on behalf of their mínzú. To distinguish Huí concerns from national concerns, I compared concerns claimed and addressed in the texts of the authors with concerns voiced by the Information Office of the State Council in Běijīng. And to evaluate the discursive implications of statements in the *Kāidū River*, I identified the statements as both constituent of and generated by broader discursive formations in China as well as a hybrid discourse of truth within the *Kāidū River*.

My emphasis on the concerns of authors is a deviation from the recommended approach to discourse analysis described in Foucault's (1971/1972) *Archaeology of Knowledge*. In the first chapter of the book, he explicitly questioned studies concerned with the "intention of the speaking

subject, his conscious activity, what he meant, or again, the unconscious activity that took place, despite himself" (p. 27). Foucault claimed that these studies force the researcher to identify a discourse that silently murmurs behind the empirically observable discourse. He indicated that a project such as mine would inevitably encounter the same pitfalls as Barnett, because identifying a silent discourse would mean to make presumptions about what goes on in the conscious or unconscious minds of the writers. Foucault therefore called for excluding "intention" from the analysis of discourse and for "defin[ing] a method of analysis purged of all anthropologism" (p. 16) that "allow[s] the commanding presence of authors to fade into the background" (p. 38).

Foucault described discourse as something that limits (and enables) interpretation. He indicated that people get caught up in discourse and become unable to escape how it frames expression and interpretation. Because the limits of discourse are embodied in statements, he indicated that studying "intention" would not only be methodologically questionable but also unnecessary for characterizing the essence of discourse. However, as argued by Barth (1993) and shown in my analysis, people demonstrate awareness of how different discourses (systems of knowledge) frame understanding. They are capable of disregarding a specific discourse if its limitations exceed its perceived benefits, presuming the availability of alternatives. This means that people's concerns—whether they be conscious or unconscious—are not necessarily restrained by the limitations of their employed discourse. As noted by Foucault himself, discourse is constituted of statements *made by people*. In my analysis of the *Kāidū River*, identifying concerns was not only necessary to ascertain mínzú agency. It was also necessary for understanding how the writers simultaneously engaged with multiple discourses and how they contributed to them.

While I fully agree that speculation about a "silent" or "hidden" discourse to which researchers do not have access is dubious science, concerns can be embodied in discourse itself. To the extent that concerns are embodied in texts, it is reasonable to assert that they tell us something about the motivations of the authors. The relation is not linear. Concerns embodied in texts may not be those of the authors, especially in the context of a propaganda magazine, and some discursive implications may be unintentional. However, by analyzing embodied concerns, it is—under specific circumstances and with sufficient source material—possible to make some assessment of the authors' motivations that go beyond reasonable doubt.

Identifying such circumstances is a notable contribution of my thesis. "Monolithic" cadres such as the *Kāidū River* writers persistently maintained deniability that their texts represented anything other than national interests. Even statements such as "Islam represents truth" could be interpreted as an effort to "Sinicize" religious practice and make Huí cater to national interests in ideological unity—rather than demanding tolerance and support from the

Party-State for existing religious practice. It is not obvious whether one meaning is more intended or pronounced than the other. Nor is it obvious how any statement made by "monolithic" cadres and voiced as state orthodoxy could be shown to unambiguously benefit mínzú concerns but not national interests.

I overcame this difficulty in two ways. First, I noted the consistency by which Huí concerns were addressed in the invocation of all statements that I have studied. In multiple instances, their attention to Huí concerns was notably more pronounced than their attention to national concerns. It seems unlikely that the writers would have maintained such consistency if their only and primary concern had been for national interests. It is not unthinkable that their expression of Huí concerns in each instance was either accidental or a ploy to gather support for statements which they primarily intended to benefit national interests. But their consistency made the former explanation seem more convincing and plausible. After all, the regularities and rules of discourse are formed through repetition.

Second, I studied how the writers engaged with multiple discourses at the same time. As noted by Foucault, even a single sentence may constitute different statements within different discourses. Notable cases in my thesis are statements about the vulnerability of the infantile. From the perspective of Neo-Confucian cosmology, texts that describe mínzú as infantile imply that the infantile nature of minority mínzú ought to be preserved. From the perspective of Republican race theory, texts describing the infantile nature of mínzú imply that they ought to learn from more mature and advanced mínzú and abandon their old ways. From the perspective of Maoist thought transformation, such texts indicate the precarity of minority mínzú and their need for paternalistic guidance from the Party-State. By taking into consideration these different aspects of meaning, I was able to avoid a one-sided interpretation of the texts.

The multifaceted nature of meaning was not only an impediment to identifying mínzú agency. It was also part of what made creating (and identifying) a field of contention possible in the first place. Without the multifaceted nature of meaning, it would not have been possible for "monolithic" cadres to voice off-center views. In the aforementioned example, the texts argued that traditional Huí customs (including religion) are a manifestation of infantile purity that should be preserved. But they also indicated that Huí should strive for the maturation or modernization of their mínzú and become more like the Hàn-Chinese. Both of these meanings are present in the *Kāidū River*, even in single texts, magazine issues and oeuvres. Individually, both meanings benefitted national concerns. Together, they constituted a contradiction in regard to the value of Huí culture and religion, and the need for its assimilation into the Hàn-Chinese "mainstream." Having identified this contradiction, it became evident that if the Huí writers were solely concerned with national interests in ideological unity, it would be

inexpedient to situate traditional Huí culture and religion as a manifestation of purity. It indicates that they were willing to allow the contradiction within the discourse of the *Kāidū River* because they considered the promotion of Huí culture and religion as beneficial on its own, and not just as a means to benefit the nation. Put another way, it is my contention that the contradiction expresses conflicting concerns of appeasing national authorities and preserving Huí identity.

In short, I was able to affirm that some statements were made for the benefit of Huí concerns by studying the consistency and multivalence of meanings of statements. I went beyond Foucault's neglect of people's "intention" in the analysis of discourse. I also demonstrated how it is possible to identify how concerns are embodied in discourse and—under specific circumstances—legitimately attribute such concerns to specific authors.

Observers of Xīnjiāng may be interested in knowing what happened to the magazine and its authors after 2017, and particularly whether or not they could continue their efforts on behalf of Huí interests after the implementation of increased restrictions in the region at the time. The magazine itself was discontinued in 2017 in the context of such restrictions. I was informed by a local cadre that authorities had become more cautious about internal publications in Xīnjiāng that year, indicating that the publication of magazines such as the *Kāidū River* would no longer be supported. Regarding the authors themselves, they apparently did not face disciplinary measures for their efforts on behalf of Huí interests. In 2018, I heard from Kòu Yùyīng's colleagues that she was doing well, except for some health issues. Mǎ Lìjuān had migrated to Shǎnxī (Shaanxi) province in the east, possibly due to the lower restrictions on religious practice outside Xīnjiāng. Lǐ Shǒufēng, the Hàn-Chinese ex-magistrate that had vocally supported the magazine, was still active as a literary and political figure in Korla.

The lack of repercussions against the *Kāidū River* writers should not necessarily come as a surprise, as they consistently demonstrated a concern with national interests. It is possible that the outcome would have been different if they were Uyghurs and subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny. It may also indicate a relatively high degree of familiarity with how to effectively navigate the treacherous waters of state orthodoxy. As such, it seems likely that Huí cadres will continue to find ways to address the concerns of their mínzú while situating themselves within the realm of "truth." These efforts may continue in new internal publications, at institutions such as the local Political Consultative Conference, or through arts and literature. After all, Huí scholars claim that the elite of their mínzú have been making such efforts for centuries.

Contributions

The perspective of my thesis is interdisciplinary, drawing from social anthropology, sociology, and literary analysis. In my master's thesis on Huí migrants in an eastern metropolis of China, my theoretical framework was purely social anthropological in nature. At the outset of planning my PhD research project, I similarly planned to use anthropological methods. However, at the time I began collecting data, gathering source material that required field access was no longer feasible in the context of Xīnjiāng. The source materials I was able to access were literary texts produced by propaganda authorities in the region. These required a new methodological approach. I found Foucault's theory of discourse to be the most useful for making sense of my source material. Through Foucault, I was able to parse the *Kāidū River* texts as the production of a discourse. Foucault provided me with a more systematic understanding of the objective existence and attributes of such discursive unities. And through Schoenhals, I was made aware of the political functionality of such discursive unities in China.

Although I believe that my thesis will be useful to scholars interested in the production of discourse in authoritarian societies, my thesis is not primarily intended as a contribution to the field of discourse analysis. Instead, my aim has been to understand the way minority mínzú identities in contemporary China are shaped through official discourse and how this can differ at the local and national levels, all the while submitting the various discourses to the same historical touchstones of truth.

My thesis should interest scholars studying the relations of minority mínzú to the Party-State in contemporary China. In my thesis, I illustrate not only how a discourse on minority mínzú is produced in the borderlands of China, but also how minority mínzú participate in the production of such discourse, and how they are able to attain agency as a mínzú through such participation—even under the circumstances of severe repression in Xīnjiāng. The Cambridge-educated Uradyn Bulag (2010) has suggested that Mongols and Tibetans in present-day China compete to "bleed for China" to strengthen their political position (p. 4). Huí have clearly also participated in this competition. However, my thesis shows that Huí cadres in Yānqí consider bleeding for Huí to be at least as or even more important than bleeding for China, and that they act upon this conviction. Due to persistent ideas about lineage, blood, and kinship—which are only reinforced by discourse on loyalty to the Chinese nation (中华民族)—minority mínzú (少数民族) as an analytical category remain highly relevant in today's China.

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Note on naming conventions

In Chinese language, it is exceedingly common for Chinese scholars (and people in general) to share certain surnames (e.g., Wáng or Zhāng), even within the same field of scholarship. Therefore, while I largely follow APA conventions, I always use the full name when referring to Chinese authors, as is the convention in Chinese language academia. I generally write the surname of Chinese authors before the personal name for in-text references, in line with Chinese language conventions.

According to Uyghur naming conventions, it is common to attach a person's father's name to their personal name. The father's name is often used as a surname in official documents. According to Äsäd Sulayman (2007), this sometimes creates confusion (pp. 120–121). For example, it might seem odd to refer to Gülxan Osman (a woman) as Osman, as Osman is a male name. Also, certain names (such as Tursun) are widely shared. Only referring to one name, whether it be the personal name or the father's name, does not make the reference to the individual sufficiently distinctive. I therefore always refer to Uyghur authors by their full name (or first name when the father's name/ surname is unknown), even if the repetition of full names may seem unnecessary to some readers. I thus follow the order of Uyghur naming conventions, a practice which also is common among Chinese writers referring to Uyghurs.

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Appendix I: *Kāidū River* Authors (2010–2017)

The following list provides some information about the writers of the 18 issues of the *Kāidū River* that I was able to access. For most of the writers, the editors provided a short biography and an indication of the authors' mínzú affiliation.

The list excludes contributions by primary and secondary school students, included at the final section of each magazine. The main reasons are that these students are very numerous, their texts are quite short, and each student only contributed one article each. Their inclusion would considerably inflate the list.

Abbreviations used include: YHAC (Yānqí Huí Autonomous County); XUAR (Xīnjiāng Uyghur Autonomous Region); BMAP (Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, where YHAC is located); CPC (Communist Party of China); PLA (People's Liberation Army); and GMD (Guómíndǎng, KMT; the Nationalist Party of China).

The bracketed numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 refers to the spring, summer, autumn and winter issues of each magazine, respectively. The two numbers before the brackets indicates year.

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
Ā Bādūmù	Mongol		- *Kāidū River* Magazine (Advisor) - Xīnjiāng Writers' Association	10(2)	
Āhuì (Lǐ Zhìhuì)	Huí	Female	- *Dàhé* Literature Magazine (Deputy Editor-in-Chief) - Fàngzhī Road Primary School, Zhōukǒu Municipality, Hénán Province (Principal) - Zhōukǒu Municipality Writers' Association (Deputy Secretary-General) - Hénán Province Writers' Association - China Writers' Association - China Minority Mínzú Research Society - China Prose Research Society	17(1), 11(4), 10(4)	
Ālǐ Bóshèng		Male		10(3)	
Ān Yuán	Hàn	Female	- (Writer)	13(2)	Liǎoníng Province
Ān'ān				12(3)	
Anargül Niyaz	Uyghur	Female	- People's Government of Qīgèxīng Town, YHAC - YHAC Writers' Association	13(3), 12(2)	YHAC
Ānzǐ (Sòng Cháng'an)	Hàn	Male	- (Poet)	12(2)	Kāifēng Prefecture, Hénán Province
Bái Chuān	Huí	Female	- Urumqi travelling agency (Tour Guide)	12(4)	YHAC
Bǎi Yánbīng	Huí	Female	- Administrative Office of the YHAC People's Congress - YHAC Writers' Association	13(1), 13(3), 12(1), 12(2), 11(1), 11(2), 11(4), 10(3), 10(4)	
Bāwúdōng Àisàn (1959–...)	Uyghur	Male	- (Uyghur–Chinese Translator) - Xīnjiāng Writers' Association	14(4)	
Cài Liányì	Huí	Male	- YHAC Political Consultative Conference	15(2), 14(1), 14(4), 13(3), 12(4)	
Cài Míng (1980s–...)	Huí	Male	- (Poet) - YHAC Writers' Association	15(2), 14(4), 13(2), 12(1), 12(2), 12(4), 11(1), 10(4)	XUAR
Cài Píng	Huí	Female	- Xīnhuá Community District, Yānqí Town	14(1)	
Cài Tíng	Huí	Female	- XUAR Supreme People's Court	15(2), 14(1), 12(2)	YHAC
Chē Wénjūn	Hàn	Female	- (Teacher of fine arts) - (Painter) - 10th YHAC Political Consultative Conference(Member) - China Artists' Hong Kong Association (Member) - XUAR Artists' Association - Xīnjīang Production and Constructions Corps Artists' Association - Xīnjiāng Fine Arts Education Research Society	12(1)	
Chén Jiànfēi				14(4)	
Chén Lín	Hàn	Female	- Xoten Political Consultative Conference - Xoten Prefecture Writers' Association (Secretary-General) - *Wind of the Western Region* (Website Administrator)	12(3)	
Chén Xiá	Hàn	Female	- Xīnjiāng Writers' Association (Member)	12(3), 12(4)	
Chén Xīn				14(4)	
Chéng Yuèyuè	Hàn		- Xīnjiāng Economy Paper (Journalist)	10(1)	
Cuī Shūfāng	Hàn	Female	- YHAC Teacher Training School (Teacher) - (Collector of Local Huí Oral Culture) - YHAC Writers' Association (Director)	11(1), 11(4), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4)	
Dān Jiāngshuǐ				14(4)	
Dào Lǐjiālā	Mongol	Male	- Administrative Office of the Standing Committee of the BMAP People's Congress (Consultant) - China Prose Research Society - China Poetry Research Society	14(1), 14(4), 13(3)	

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
			- China Cí and Fù Research Society (Member) - China Contemporary Literature Association (Director) - Xīnjiāng Poetry Research Society (Standing Director) - BMAP Writers' Association (Honorary Chairperson)		
Dilmurat Telet	Uyghur	Male	- (Writer, Translator) - China Writers' Association - Literature Translation Division of the Xīnjiāng Writers' Association (Standing Deputy Chairperson, Standing Deputy Secretary-General)	13(1), 13(2)	
Dǒng Jīchūn				11(4)	
Duàn Zhìyuǎn (1950–...)	Hàn	Male	- (Poet) - XUAR Literature Federation (Poetry and Song Editor)		Xīnjiāng
Fán Qiánfēng	Hàn		- Níngxià Media	13(2)	
Féng Zhōngwén (Féngshí)	Hàn	Male	- (Poet) - BMAP Trade and Industry Bureau - BMAP Trade, Industry, and Administration Research Society (Deputy Secretary-General) - China Contemporary Literature Research Society - XUAR Writers' Association - China Calligraphy and Painting Association - China Official Documents Research Society - XUAR Secretary-Generals' Association		
Fù Zēngtáng	Hàn	Male		17(1)	
Gāo Wéishēng	Manchu	Male	- (Writer) - *Huázhāng* Magazine (Specially Invited Editor) - China Writers' Association - Shāndōng Province Writers' Association - Shāndōng Province Prose Research Society	11(1)	
Gǒu Fājūn	Huí	Male	- Administrative Office of the *BMAP Daily*	14(1), 12(1)	
Gǒu Míngdé	Hàn	Male	- YHAC Publicity Department - Junior Secondary School of Yǒngníng Township, YHAC (Language Teacher, Head Teacher) - (Journalist) - PLA (Ex-soldier that participated in the Communist takeover of Lánzhōu, Kashgar, and Ngari)	14(1)	
Gǔfēng (Zhāng Hǎi'ān) (1970s–…)	Hàn	Male	- Xīnjiāng Production and Construction Corps Publishing House - XUAR Writers' Association	14(4)	
Guō Chéng				14(4)	
Guō Mǎ	Huí			17(1)	
Hā Yánlíng	Huí	Female		11(4)	
Hǎibǎo				12(3)	
Hǎihǎi	Huí			13(1), 13(2)	
Hǎinífā	Huí		- YHAC Writers' Association	13(3), 13(2), 11(4), 10(1)	
Hǎiwā				12(1)	
Hǎizhīyùn				12(2)	
Hán Dōngliàng	Huí	Male	- Administrative Office of the YHAC People's Congress - YHAC 3rd Junior Secondary School	13(2), 12(1), 12(3), 12(4), 11(2)	
Hán Jiànxīng	Huí	Male	- Línxià Chinese-Arab School, Gānsù Province (Arab Language Teacher)	13(2)	Qīnghǎi
Hán Níng	Hàn	Female	- YHAC Maternal and Child Health Hospital - YHAC Writers' Association	11(2)	
Hǎo Rán	Hàn	Male	- *Wényuàn Magazine* (Contract Writer)	15(2)	

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
Hè Hāribālā (1941–...)	Mongol	Male	- (Poet) - China Writers' Association	13(1)	Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Hésù (Fāng Sīrú)	Dǎi (Thai)	Female	- (Contract Writer) - (Educational Worker) - Yàzhōu Shīgē Publishing House (Deputy Editor) - Hong Kong Music & Literature Research Society (Standing Director) - China Prose Association - China Minority Writers' Association	17(1), 13(1), 13(2), 13(3), 12(1), 12(3), 12(4), 11(4), 10(3), 10(4)	Mángshi Municipality of Déhóng Prefecture, Yúnnán Province
Hóng Yǒngxiáng	Huí	Male	- Héjìng County Chronicles Office, BMAP, XUAR (Director) - *China Report Literature* Magazine (Specially Invited Writer) - *Harmonious China* Magazine, Běijīng (Specially Invited Journalist) - XUAR Local Chronicles Research Society (Director) - BMAP Literature Federation (Committee Member) - BMAP Writers Association (Director) - China Local Writers' Association - XUAR Writers' Association	10(1), 10(2)	YHAC
Hú Píngdé	Hàn		- Xīnjiāng Production and Construction Corps Writers' Association - (Editor-in-Chief)	10(2)	
Hú Zéxīn	Hàn	Male	- Korla Municipality Prison, BMAP	12(1)	
Jī Chángwěi	Hàn			10(2)	
Jī Shū				10(2)	
Jì Xiànlín (1911–2009)	Hàn	Male	- (Indologist, Linguist, Paleographer, Historian, Writer)	17(1)	
Jiāng Yīng	Hàn	Female	- YHAC Political Consultative Conference (Chairperson) - Xiāngdū Wine Corporation (Deputy General Manager)	17(1), 15(2), 14(1), 14(4), 12(4)	
Jiǎng Zīlóng	Hàn	Male	- (Writer)	17(1)	
Kahlil Gibran (1883–1931)	Lebanese	Male	- (Prose Writer, Poet, Painter)	14(1)	
Jīng Qí				11(4)	
Jīnmǎ Qiángē			- *NetEase* (Blog Writer)	13(1)	
Juānzi (Mǎ Lìjuān) (*c.*1963–...)	Huí	Female	- (Writer) - Xīnjiāng Railroad Paper (Journalist) - XUAR Writers' Association	13(1), 12(1), 11(1), 11(2), 10(1), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4)	YHAC
Kòu Kòu	Huí		- Administrative Office of the *BMAP Daily* (Journalist) - YHAC Writers' Association	10(1), 10(4)	
Kòu Yùyīng (Xīnyù)	Huí	Female	- *Kāidū River* Magazine (Editor-in-Chief) - YHAC Writers' Association (Chairperson) - YHAC Literature Federation (Deputy Chairperson) - XUAR Writers' Association - China Minority Mínzú Writers' Association - China Huí Research Society - XUAR Local Literature Research Society	17(1), 15(2), 14(1), 14(4), 13(1), 13(2), 13(3), 12(1), 12(2), 12(3), 12(4), 11(1), 11(2), 11(4), 10(1), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4)	Zhāngjiāchuān Huí Autonomous County of Tiānshuǐ Prefecture, Gānsù Province
Qurban Nuraxun	Uyghur	Male	- Huòlāshān Village, Qīgèxīng Town, YHAC (Party Secretary)	14(4)	
Lán Wūzī	Huí	Male	- Gānsù Province Countryside (Teacher)	12(2)	
Lǐ Jiàntāo	Hàn	Male	- YHAC People's Hospital - YHAC Writers' Association	12(1), 12(3)	
Lǐ Jiěfàng	Hàn	Male	- People's Government of Chāhǎncǎikāi Township, YHAC County	14(1)	
Lǐ Léi	Hàn		- University Student Volunteers to the China Western Region Project - YHAC Disabled Persons' Association	15(2)	(Studied in Sìchuān Province)
Lǐ Líng				14(4)	
Lǐ Pèilún	Huí	Male	- Central Mínzú University (Professor) - Theater Research Centre, Central Mínzú University (Director)	13(2)	

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
			- Yuán Dynasty Literature Research Office (Director) - China Minority Mínzú Dramatists' Research Society (Deputy Director) - China Dramatists' Association		
Lǐ Qí	Huí	Female	- (Professional Writer) - Hēilóngjiāng Literature Institute (Director) - *Northern Literature* Magazine (Deputy Editor-in-Chief)	17(1)	Hēilóngjiāng Province
Lǐ Shǒufēng	Hàn	Male	- Standing Committee of the BMAP People's Congress - YHAC People's Government (Deputy Magistrate) - Administrative Office of the CPC in BMAP (Deputy Director) - Administrative Office of the BMAP Literature Federation (Director) - BMAP Literature Federation (Chairperson, Deputy Secretary-General) - YHAC Writers' Association - XUAR Writers' Association	17(1), 14(1), 14(4), 13(1), 13(2), 13(3), 12(1), 12(2), 12(3), 12(4), 11(1), 11(2), 11(4), 10(1), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4)	Xīnxiāng Prefecture, Hénán Province
Lǐ Xīnfáng	Hàn		- Discipline Inspection Department of the CPC in Korla Municipality, BMAP	14(4)	
Lín Wénqīn	Hàn			13(3)	
Liú Fùlán	Huí	Female	- (Poet) - Petroleum Administration Bureau of Karamay Prefecture, XUAR - Xīnjiāng Poetry Association	15(2), 14(4), 12(2), 12(4), 10(4)	
Liú Qīngzhī (Fèngpíng Xuānzhǔ)	Huí		- Department under the direct administration of Lánzhōu Municipality, Gānsù Province - (Researcher studying the administration of mínzú religion)	11(1)	Líntán County, Gānnán Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gānsù Province
Liǔ Xǐfēng	Hàn		- *Péngchéng Evening Paper*, Jiāngsū Province (Employee)	13(1), 12(2)	
Liú Yánwén	Hàn	Male	- Yānqí Bǎolàng Oil Field Mechanical Repair Sub-Corporation of the South of the Tarim River Resource Exploration Corporation (Technical Worker) - Xīnjiāng Mechanical Repair Sub-Corporation of the South of the Tarim River Resource Exploration Corporation (Engineer)	13(3), 11(2), 10(3)	
Liú Yuān (Liú Hóngyīng)	Hàn	Male		15(2)	
Liúshā	Huí			11(2)	
Luó Xī	Hàn	Female	- (Column Writer) - *World of Entrepreneurs* Magazine (Deputy Editor)	17(1)	
Lǚ Zhènbāng	Hàn	Male	- *Qínshāng Magazine* of BMAP (Deputy Editor)	17(1)	
Mǎ Ěr	Hàn	Female	- *BMAP Daily* Press (Employee)	13(3)	
Mǎ Fèngmíng	Huí	Male	- (Writer, Poet)	15(2)	
Mǎ Guìlín	Huí	Female	- People's Government of the Běidàqú Township, YHAC - Culture Station of the Běidàqú Township, YHAC (Director) - *Impression of Yānqí* Book Collection (Editor) - YHAC Writers' Association	17(1), 15(2), 14(1), 14(4), 13(1), 13(2), 13(3), 12(1), 12(2), 12(3), 12(4), 11(1)	
Mǎ Huìjuān	Huí	Female	- ("Peasant" Writer)	17(1)	
Mǎ Huìlíng	Huí	Female	- ("Peasant" Writer)	14(1)	
Mǎ Lì	Huí	Male	- YHAC Tourism Bureau (Director)	15(2), 14(1), 13(1)	
Mǎ Shūhǎi			- YHAC Culture, Sports, Television and Broadcasting Bureau (Deputy Director) - YHAC Literature Federation (Deputy Chairperson) - YHAC Calligraphy and Painting Association (Chairperson)	13(2)	

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
Mǎ Sīxīn	Huí	Female	- Education Bureau of Bóhó County, BMAP - XUAR Writers' Association	17(1), 14(1), 14(4), 13(1), 13(2), 13(3), 12(2), 12(3), 12(4)	
Mǎ Sōngyuè				10(1)	
Mǎ Wénxué	Huí	Male	- Mosque of Shíyàn Municipality, Húběi Province (Imam) - Mosque Management Committee of Shíyàn Municipality, Húběi Province (Director) - Húběi Province Islamic Association (Deputy Director) - Overseas Fellowship Association of Shíyàn Municipality, Húběi Province (Standing Director) - China Islamic Association - China Stiff Pen Calligraphy Association - China Huí Research Society	13(1), 11(4)	
Mǎ Xiǎojuān	Huí	Female	- YHAC Finance Bureau	15(2)	
Mǎ Yànlín	Huí			17(1)	
Mǎ Yǒngpíng				14(1)	
Mǎ Yuè	Huí	Female	- YHAC Culture & Sports Television Channel (Journalist)	15(2)	
Mù Qúnsēn	Huí	Female	- Media School of Sìchuān Province (Teacher) - Railroad and Transportation School of Chéngdū Municipality, Sìchuān Province (Teacher) - China Photographers' Association - China Artistic Photographers' Association - Sìchuān Province Photographers' Association	14(1), 14(4), 13(2), 13(3), 12(1), 12(2), 11(4)	
Mù Xuéwǔ	Hàn		- Cháhǎncǎikāi Townsip, YHAC (Teacher) - YHAC Writers' Association	10(2)	
Niú Chūnméi	Huí	Female	- *Běijīng Daily* (Cultural Journalist)	14(1)	
Niú Mànlíng	Huí	Female	- Standing Committee of the CPC in YHAC	11(2)	
Qí Shàngmíng (January 1931–…)	Hàn	Male	- *Yānqí Chronicle* (Editor) - Chronicles Office of YHAC (Deputy Director) - Educationan Bureau of YHAC (Educational Inspector) - Teacher Training School of YHAC (Teacher) - XUAR Writers' Association - Aqsu Municipality Writers' Association (Deputy Chairperson)	12(3)	YHAC
Rèn Kèliáng (Wǎndīng, Gǔbái, Yàkèfū)	Hàn	Male	- CPC Committee of Bàichéng County, Aqsu Municipality, XUAR - County CPC Committee (Secretary) - County CPC Youth League (Party Secretary) - County Middle School (Teacher) - Writers Association of Aqsu Municipality, XUAR (Deputy Chairperson) - Xīnjiāng Writers' Association - (Journalist) - PLA (Ex-Soldier)	12(3)	Tóngbǎi County, Nányáng Prefecture, Hénán Province
Sānyà				12(1)	
Shàng Chónglóng				13(1)	
Shěn Jingxiū	Huí		- Pre-1949 Government of the GMD in Ruòqiāng / Chaqiliq County, BMAP (Magistrate)	10(3), 10(4)	
Shěn Wěi				10(1)	
Shī Gē	Hàn		- *Kāidū River* Magazine (Managing Editor) - YHAC Literature and Arts Federation (Deputy Chairperson)	13(3)	
Shí Jiān				10(4)	

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
Shǐ Jīngqiān (Jonathan Spence) (1936–...)	British		- US History Society (Chairperson)	12(3)	
Shǐzhì (Liú Yīngguī) (*c*.1942–...)	Huí	Male	- YHAC Chronicles Bureau (Director) - *Kāidū River* Magazine (Advisor)	17(1), 14(1), 12(1), 12(2), 12(4), 11(1), 11(4), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4)	
Shīyǔ			- (Writer)	10(3)	American-Chinese
Sī Línà		Female		12(4)	
Sī Wěi	Hàn	Male	- YHAC Fire Brigade - University Student Volunteers to the China Western Region Project	13(3)	
Sòng Qióngxiān	Hàn	Female	- YHAC 1st Primary School - YHAC Writers' Association (Deputy Secretary General)	11(2), 11(4), 10(2), 10(3)	
Sū Hǎiyàn	Huí	Female	- Central Primary School of Běidàqú Township, YHAC - YHAC Writers' Association	14(1)	
Sū Xiàoquán (August 8, 1924–April 16, 2010)	Huí	Male	- YHAC Political Consultative Conference - Pre-1949 GMD in Yānqí (Party Secretary; 1946–...) - Pre-1949 Education Office of the GMD in the Yānqí Special Administrative District (Director; March 1946–...) - 1st National Assembly of the GMD	17(1), 15(2), 14(1), 14(4), 13(1), 13(2), 13(3), 12(2), 12(2), 12(3), 12(4), 11(1), 11(2), 11(4), 10(1), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4)	YHAC
Sū Xiùmǐn	Hàn	Female	- Education Bureau of Korla Municipality, BMAP	17(1)	
Sū Yǒngméi	Huí	Female	- YHAC 1st Junior Secondary School	15(2)	
Sūmǎ Yúnyuè	Huí	Female	- Technical College (Student)	15(2)	
Sūn Jì	Hàn		- Literature Federation of Xoten Municipality, XUAR	12(3)	
Sūn Júyīng				12(1)	
Sūn Yànlì	Hàn	Female	- Discipline Inspection Committee of the CPC in YHAC - YHAC Writers' Association	15(2), 14(1), 12(3), 11(1)	
Sūn Yùhǎi		Male	- Hotel in YHAC (Deputy General Manager) - YHAC Photographers' Association	12(1)	
Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941)	Bengali	Male	- (Poet, Philosopher, Nationalist)	14(1)	
Tán Chéngjūn	Huí	Male	- (Photographer) - XUAR Photographers' Association (Director) - Photographers' Association of the Chāngjí Huí Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR (Standing Deputy Chairperson) - China Photographers' Association - Artistic Wild Horse Photography Research Society of the XUAR Photographers' Association	11(1), 10(4)	
Táng Xuéměi	Hàn	Female	- People's Government of Sishílǐchéngzi Town, YHAC - YHAC Writers' Association	17(1)	
Táng Yànqiān (...–893)		Male		10(2)	Jinyáng City, Tàiyuán Prefecture, Shānxī Province
Tián Shūzhēn	Hàn	Female	- YHAC Federation of Trade Unions (Chairperson) - YHAC Writers' Association	14(1), 13(1), 12(1), 11(4)	
Tóngzi	Hàn	Female		12(2)	(Resident of Guǎngzhōu Prefecture, Guǎngdōng Province)

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
Tursun Mehmet (1968–...)	Uyghur	Male	- (Writer) - XUAR Writers' Association	14(4)	
Wáng Jiàntíng	Hàn	Male	- Publicity Department of the CPC in Wūqià / Ulugqat County, Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR - Writers' Association of the Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture	14(1)	
Wáng Jìng	Hàn		- *51 Literary Creation and Appreciation* Website (Deputy General Administrator)	10(4)	
Wáng Jùn				10(1)	
Wāng Lì	Hàn	Female	- YHAC 2nd Junior Secondary School (Teacher)	12(2)	
Wáng Lín	Hàn			14(1)	
Wáng Zhèndōng	Hàn			12(3)	
Wèi Déxīn	Huí	Male		12(2)	
Wèi Guìyīng	Hàn		- Culture Bureau (Professional Writer) - Héběi Province Writers' Association - Héběi Province Literature Institute (Contractual Writer of the 6th Session)	15(2)	Cāngzhōu Prefecture, Yánshān County, Héběi Province
Wèi Hónglǐng	Hàn		- Administrative Office of the YHAC Court - YHAC Writers' Association	10(2), 10(3)	
Wèi Xiùlíng (Wèi Xiùpíng)	Hàn	Female	- YHAC Development and Reform Commission - YHAC Writers' Association	14(1), 12(2), 12(3), 12(4)	
Wú Huá	Hàn			12(1)	
Wú Miǎo	Hàn	Male	- Huòlāshān Village (Qīgèxīng Town, YHAC) Work Group of the BMAP Construction Bureau	15(2)	
Wú Qiáng	Hàn	Male	- YHAC Center for Disease Control and Prevention (Director) - YHAC Writers' Association	14(4), 13(3), 12(1), 12(2), 12(3), 11(1), 11(2), 10(3)	
Wú Yǔnfēng	Hàn		- (Writer)	13(1)	(Resident of Guǎngdōng Province)
Wú Zhōngzèng	Hàn		- Húnán Province Writers' Association	12(1), 12(2)	Chángdé Prefecture, Húnán Province
Xiàng Hóng	Huí	Female	- YHAC Culture, Broadcasting and Television Bureau - YHAC Writers' Association	14(1), 12(2), 11(2), 10(1), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4)	
Xiè Hǎijūn	Hàn	Male		10(2)	
Xíngzhě				11(2)	
Xīngkōng (Hán Yàozǔ)	Hàn		- 3rd Office of the Resource Exploration Corporation	15(2)	
Xú Dēngyàn	Hàn		- Chronicles Office of the 150th Regiment of the 8th Army of the Xīnjiāng Production and Construction Corps	13(3)	
Xú Hǎiyún			- YHAC Writers' Association	1(3)	
Xú Huáiqiàn			- *People's Daily* (Deputy Editor)	12(3)	
Xú Lìpíng	Hàn	Female	- *Lǜfēng* Poetry Periodical Editorial Department (Director) - *Shíhézi Wényì* Magazine Editorial Department (Director) - XUAR Writers' Association - Xīnjiāng Production and Construction Corps Writers' Association - Shíhézi Writers' Association	13(2), 12(3), 12(4)	Jiāngsū
Xǔ Huílián	Hàn	Female	- YHAC 2nd Junior Secondary School (Teacher)	10(4)	
Yān Rán	Huí	Female	- (Freelancer) - YHAC Writers' Association	17(1), 13(2), 12(1), 12(2), 11(1), 11(2), 11(4), 10(2), 10(4)	
Yān Tíng	Hàn	Female	- YHAC Culture, Sports, Broadcasting and Television Bureau (Director)	12(4), 11(10)	

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
Yáng Bīngxīn			- XUAR Writers' Association	11(4)	Urumqi, XUAR
Yáng Dōngshēng	Hàn		- Hóngshēng Trading Company (Manager)	15(2)	
Yáng Fēng	Huí	Male	- (Writer, scholar, poet, translator) - YHAC Library (Director) - *Kāidū River* Magazine (Advisor)	13(1), 12(10), 11(1), 11(4), 10(3), 10(4)	Urumqi, XUAR
Yáng Huá	Hàn	Male	- *Yáng Huá's Travelling and Reading* Television Show (Program Host)	12(2)	
Yáng Xiùdǒu			- Political Consultative Conference of Wēihǎi Municipality, Shāndòng Province - China Writers' Association - China Prose Research Society	10(3)	
Yáng Yùmí	Huí	Female		12(2)	
Yáng Zhìróng				14(4)	
Yè Hóng	Hàn		- YHAC 2nd Junior Seconary School (Teacher) - YHAC Writers' Association	11(1)	
Yě Xiǎojìng	Huí	Female	- YHAC Writers' Association	17(1)	
Yí Rán				10(2)	
Yīngzi 樱子	Huí	Female	- YHAC Writers' Association	15(2), 14(1), 14(4), 12(2), 12(3), 12(4), 11(2), 11(4)	
Yīngzi 英子	Huí	Female	- YHAC Political Consultative Conference	11(1), 10(1), 10(2)	
Yìqīng	Hàn			11(2), 11(4)	
Yù Róng	Huí	Female	- *Kāidū River* Magazine	13(2)	
Yù'ér de Shìjiè	Hàn	Female		14(1)	
Yúnhé Xiánkè				12(3)	
Husen Rozi (1943–…)	Uyghur	Male	- XUAR Writers' Association (1987–...) - China Minority Writers' Association (1988–...)	10(1)	YHAC
Zhāng Chénglín	Hàn	Male		12(2)	
Zhāng Jīfāng	Hàn	Female	- Hǎinán Television Station of Hǎikǒu Municipality, Hǎinán Province (Program Editor)	12(2)	
Zhāng Shànyīng	Huí	Female	- BMAP Tanning Factory (Cadre) - XUAR Poetry Research Society - BMAP Writers' Association	10(1)	YHAC
Zhāng Yàn	Huí	Female	- YHAC Broadcasting and Television Bureau (Journalist, Program Editor)	13(1)	
Zhāng Yīngqín	Hàn		- School in Korla Municipality, BMAP (Teacher)	13(2)	
Zhāng Yǒngfú	Hàn		- YHAC 3rd Junior Secondary School (Teacher)	10(4)	
Zhào Guāngmíng				11(1)	
Zhào Guóyàn				12(1), 11(4)	YHAC
Zhào Shèngguǒ				12(1), 12(2)	
Zhào Xīngzhāng	Hàn		Korla Municipality (Cadre), BMAP	13(2)	
Zhèng Shūpíng	Hàn			10(2)	
Zhìrén				10(2)	
Zhōng Xiáng	Dōngxiāng	Male	- Political Consultative Conference of Guānghé County, Línxià Huí Aut. Prefecture, Gānsù Profivince - China Prosaists' Association - Writers' Association of Gānsù Province	12(2), 12(4), 11(4)	Kānglè County, Línxià Huí Autonomous Prefecture, Gānsù Province
Zhōu Guǎnglín	Hàn	Female		14(1), 12(2)	Jiāngsū Province
Zhōu Tāo	Hàn	Male	- PLA (Travel Writer) - Creative Workshop of the Xīnjiāng Army District (Director)	13(1), 13(2), 12(1), 12(4), 10(1), 10(3)	
Zhū Dīngyì	Hàn	Male	- School in Shànghǎi Province (Teacher)	12(2)	
Zhū Yǒngxīn	Hàn	Male	- Junior Secondary School (Teacher) - Lètiě Junior Secondary School of Korla Municipality, BMAP (Deputy Principal)	13(2)	
Zhū Ziqīng (1898–1948)	Hàn	Male	- (Writer)	14(1)	Zhèjiāng Province
Zī Yù		Female		10(2)	
Zǒuguò Huākāi de Chángláng				11(2)	

Author	Mínzú	Gender	Affiliation(s)	Issue(s)	Origin
Zordun Sabir (1937–1998)	Uyghur	Male	- Xīnjiāng People's Publishing House (Editor) - XUAR Literature and Arts Federation (Writer) - Standing Committee of the XUAR Political Consultative Conference - XUAR Writers' Association - China Writers' Association - Minorities' History and Culture Research Society (Standing Director)	13(1)	Yīníng, Yīlì Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR
Zurun Mehmet	Uyghur			12(1)	

Appendix II: Sammanfattning

Den här avhandlingen studerar hur minzú (etnisk) handlingsförmåga uttrycks i propagandalitteratur bland muslimska minoritetskadrer i Yānqí Huí autonoma län i Xīnjiāngs uiguriska autonoma region i nordvästra Kina på 2010-talet. Syftet är att förstå i vilken utsträckning och på vilka sätt mínzú-identifiering kan ha en sociopolitiskt betydande inverkan på minzú-kadrernas aktiviteter i en begränsande miljö och i ett massmedium där mínzú-handlingsförmågan är kontroversiell och svår att genomföra. Avhandlingen motiveras å ena sidan av studier som förutsätter en "monolitisk" beskaffenhet hos kadrer som talar partistatens språk, och å andra sidan av studier som alltför lättvindigt antar att åberopandet av partistatens renlärighet bara är en läpparnas bekännelse till myndigheterna.

Frågeställningarna behandlas genom att studera de följder som kaderförfattarnas litterära aktiviteter har för Huí mínzú-identiteten med avseende på de diskurser som de åberopar. I processen ställs nationella överväganden i motsats till minzú-överväganden för att utvärdera och fastställa den avsiktliga karaktären bakom åberopandet av mínzú-överväganden.

Följderna av författarnas litterära aktiviteter identifieras genom att studera den roll som de spelar i det diskursiva sammanhanget av den litterära tidskriften Kāidū River. Studien påvisar att det diskursiva sammanhanget bäst kan beskrivas som en hybrid till sin natur, som involverar de tre underdiskurserna i nykonfuciansk kosmologi, republikansk rasteori och maoistisk tankeomvandling. Den första kretsar kring en föreställning om kosmisk sanning, den andra kring betydelsen av mínzú eller nationer, och den tredje kring hoten om och skydden mot ideologisk förorening. Genom att använda denna hybrida sanningsdiskurs legitimerade författarna sina texter som statsortodoxi.

Efter att ha identifierat följderna som är relevanta vid formuleringen av Huí-identitet, beskriver avhandlingen de sätt på vilka de muslimska minoritetskadrerna försökte behandla mínzú-problem. Även om nationella överväganden genomsyrade texterna i Kāidū River, visade författarna en medvetenhet om och förmåga att kringgå restriktionerna i partistatsdiskursen under det tidiga 2010-talet - åtminstone till viss del. Genom en selektiv tolkning legitimerade de perifera åsikter samtidigt som de höll sig inom diskursen om "sanning".

Avhandlingen visar hur minzú-författares avsikter kan identifieras genom att studera följderna av deras texter i det diskursiva sammanhang där de återfinns, även när dessa följder är mångbottnade. Anmärkningsvärt är att avhandlingen kan göra det genom att studera hur relevanta konsekvenser systematiskt åberopas och undersöka graden av tolerans för motsägelsefull betydelse.

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