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Varieties of Aesthetic Autonomy

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ABSTRACT

The concept of autonomy is central to many debates in aesthetics. However, exactly what it means to be autonomous in our aesthetic engagements is somewhat unclear in the philosophical literature. The normative significance of autonomy is also unclear and hotly debated. In this essay, I propose a method for clarifying this elusive concept by distinguishing three distinct senses or varieties of aesthetic autonomy: *experiential autonomy*, *competence-based autonomy*, and *personal autonomy*. On this taxonomy autonomy is a context-sensitive concept and autonomy applies to several different moments or stages of aesthetic appreciation. Throughout this critical discussion, important issues concerning the nature of aesthetic appreciation are also explored.

1 | Aesthetic Autonomy: Introducing a New Taxonomy

This paper concerns a specific type of autonomy: aesthetic autonomy. This is not to be confused with two other concepts that go under similar names in the aesthetics literature. On the one hand, there is *aesthetic autonomism*, which refers to the view that moral criteria are not part of the relevant considerations when evaluating an artwork's aesthetic value.¹ On the other hand, there is the *autonomy of art* thesis, according to which art is considered to be independent of any instrumental considerations.^{2,3} The form of *aesthetic autonomy* this paper concerns captures a general idea about aesthetic appreciation, namely that it should be done without relying on others.

Talk about aesthetic autonomy is central to many contemporary debates in aesthetics, particularly when philosophers attempt to understand why using aesthetic testimony is considered a sub-optimal or inappropriate means of forming aesthetic judgments (Hopkins 2001; McGonigal 2006; Konigsberg 2012). It is also invoked in discussions about aesthetic non-inferentialism (Cavedon-Taylor 2017), the subjective dimension of taste (Ginsborg 2014), aesthetic freedom (Matherne and Riggle 2020),

and in examinations of how the practice of aesthetic valuing is normatively structured (Nguyen, 2019; Riggle 2024; Page, n.d).

Philosophers working in the practical domain describe autonomy as a “murky concept” (Driver 2006, 634) and as an “over-worked term of art that performs so many tasks that it becomes at least as elusive and complex as the natural-language terms it was supposed to help clarify” (Arpaly 2002, 118). Following Catriona Mackenzie (2014), I will argue that autonomy is not a unitary concept, but a context-sensitive one, since it is employed for different purposes in different contexts. The variety of debates in aesthetics in which the concept of autonomy appears suggests that a certain ‘murkiness’ is also present in the aesthetic realm. This essay offers a critical analysis of the various conceptions of aesthetic autonomy that populate the contemporary literature in philosophical aesthetics. It does so by presenting a novel taxonomy that helps to clarify the different contexts in which aesthetic autonomy is thought to play a role, as well as the normative significance of autonomy in our aesthetic engagements.

I identify three varieties of autonomy in the aesthetic realm: *experiential*, *competence-based* and *personal*. Importantly, each of these variants has a key moment or aspect of aesthetic

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appreciation that it applies to. Firstly, experiential autonomy relates to the moment of aesthetic judgement-formation. This form of autonomy concerns the significant role that first-hand experience plays in forming a judgement about an object's aesthetic value. Secondly, competence-based autonomy relates to independent inquiry. This form of autonomy involves having a grasp of the aesthetic reasons that support one's aesthetic judgement. Thirdly, personal aesthetic autonomy is part of aesthetic self-cultivation. This variant concerns agents' capacity to identify themselves with the things that they judge to be aesthetically valuable.

A somewhat similar distinction can be found in the practical domain. Here is Julia Driver (2006) describing different senses of autonomy, for example:

Still when most people think of autonomy they do think that the autonomous agent is one who decides for herself using her own reasons. This intuition may well be conflating distinct senses or uses of “autonomy”. For example, there is a sense of autonomy which seems to involve “*independence of mind*”, where if a person lets someone else make up her mind for her, she lacks autonomy in this sense. Persons who are overly deferential lack this sort of autonomy. Then there is a sense of autonomy that involves *responsiveness to reasons* – the ability to act from reasons. On this view, roughly, we act autonomously when we act for reasons that we *endorse*. (p. 635; my italics.)

These senses relate to different levels of autonomous decision-making. The first (independence of mind) relates to independently arriving at a judgement about what to do, that is, without deferring to others. This sense shares similarities with experiential autonomy, which involves experiencing for oneself the object being aesthetically judged, that is, without relying on aesthetic testimony. The second (responsiveness to reasons) involves being sensitive to the reasons that favour or justify one's actions. Competence-based autonomy similarly involves having a grasp of the aesthetic reasons that support one's aesthetic judgement. Linked to this second sense, the endorsement aspect that Driver mentions at the end of the quote suggests a third sense,⁴ namely, a form of autonomy that concerns whether one identifies oneself with one's actions and with ‘being true to oneself’. Personal aesthetic autonomy maps onto this third sense, as it also concerns an agent's capacity to critically reflect on the relation between their identity and their aesthetic preferences.

As I will show throughout the paper, this comparison with the practical domain, although illuminating, is not exact. This is because one important difference between practical and aesthetic autonomy is that the focus of aesthetics is on appreciation, not on action (Gorodeisky 2022). For the remainder of the essay, my plan is to examine in more detail each variety of aesthetic autonomy. This will allow us to better understand the different moments or stages of aesthetic appreciation in which agents are required to be autonomous. I will conclude the essay by briefly presenting some interesting implications that adopting this taxonomy could have for our theories of appreciation.

2 | Experiential Autonomy

Since the beginnings of aesthetics as a discipline in the 18th century, the term ‘autonomy’ has been closely tied to a kind of judgement: aesthetic judgement. A distinguishing feature of aesthetic judgement is that it is formed on the basis of an agent's first-hand experience of an object.⁵ Unlike empirical judgements, aesthetic judgements are not formed by applying rules or inferential principles. Instead, they result from engaging with the unique complexities of each object, focussing on what is salient, and making nuanced discriminations based on observations. As Frank Sibley (2001, 74) noted, aesthetic perception involves “perusal or prolonged attention”. It is not surprising, then, that aesthetic autonomy has primarily been conceived in terms of first-hand experience. I refer to this variety of autonomy as ‘experiential autonomy’.

The formation of an agent's aesthetic judgement is typically understood to be closely related to, or identical with, their aesthetic perception and appreciation of an object, rather than their beliefs about it. This centrality of perception⁶ in aesthetics explains why there seems to be something normatively amiss about making a judgement, for example, that *Las Meninas* is beautiful without having visited the Prado Museum and personally experienced Velázquez's masterpiece. Similarly, making a judgement about Bach's *Goldberg Variations* requires listening to the piece, just as forming a judgement about *Madame Bovary* requires reading Flaubert's novel for oneself. In the words of Frank Sibley (2001), we must directly experience the aesthetic qualities of a work of art:

People have to *see* the grace or unity of a work, *hear* the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music, *notice* the gaudiness of colour scheme, *feel* the power of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty of tone. They may be struck by these qualities at once, or they may come to perceive them only after repeated viewings, hearings, or readings, and with the help of critics. But unless they do perceive them for themselves, aesthetic enjoyment, appreciation, and judgement are beyond them (p. 137).

The original formulation of the view that appreciators must judge objects for themselves is found in Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (2002 [1790]).⁷ Famously, according to Kant:

it is required of every judgment that is supposed to prove the taste of the subject that the subject judge for himself, without having to grope about by means of experience among the judgments of others [...] Taste makes claim merely to autonomy. To make the judgments of others into the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy (§32, 5:282).

The passages above can be understood as making two distinct claims about autonomy that it is useful to distinguish.⁸ The first is a constitutive claim, the second is a normative claim. The constitutive claim concerns the very nature of aesthetic judgement, arguing that for a judgement to be truly aesthetic, it must

be based on first-hand experience. Agents who form their judgements through means other than first-hand experience are not making aesthetic judgements at all. The normative claim, by contrast, is that agents *should* form aesthetic judgements via first-hand experience. While it is possible to make aesthetic judgements by means other than first-hand experience, such judgements are normatively illegitimate. This second claim supports the intuition that forming aesthetic judgements through inferential reasoning or by deferring to others is, in some way, normatively proscribed.

These claims are often discussed in relation to the *Doubt principle*, which holds that doubts about one's aesthetic judgement are legitimate in cases where others disagree or where one's judgement differs from that of aesthetic experts. Understanding how 'autonomy' and 'doubt' connect is an important question in debates about the nature and normativity of aesthetic judgement. Though I will not explore this issue here.⁹

Experiential autonomy pertains to aesthetic judgement-formation. This variety of autonomy is manifested in judging an object to be aesthetically valuable on the basis of one's own experience of it. The next form of autonomy I will discuss, competence-based autonomy, concerns aesthetic understanding. While these two varieties are closely related, distinguishing between them— as I will demonstrate in the following section— helps clarify the different mental states involved in aesthetic appreciation and the distinct roles they play.

3 | Competence-Based Autonomy

In several recent papers, various authors have proposed interpretations of aesthetic autonomy that highlight the role of an appreciator's cognitive abilities¹⁰ in coming to understand the aesthetic value of things (Hills 2017; Ransom 2017; Nguyen 2019, 2023). These authors appeal to this second form of autonomy in order to try to make sense of the cognitive effort and interpretative tasks that individuals engage in to better understand certain aesthetic objects, especially artworks. As C. Thi Nguyen explains, "we not only look at art; we investigate it" (2019, 1127). This investigative process requires a form of autonomy that can be described as 'competence-based autonomy'.

Competence-based autonomy is manifested in the process through which we gain first-personal insight into *why* an object possesses the particular aesthetic character and value that it has. This is the kind of competence that we expect art critics and experts to possess. Though theorists regularly claim that there is some normative requirement that all agents develop this form of autonomy in their aesthetic engagements (at least to some degree). This may be because a grasp of the reasons *why* an object has the aesthetic character and value that it has is a necessary component of justifying one's aesthetic judgements. However, theorists have recently been more interested in uncovering non-epistemic considerations that may explain the significance of competence-based autonomy. The following options illustrate some of the differing perspectives on this issue.

For Alison Hills (2017), autonomy in our aesthetic engagements is crucial because it is related to the general value of understanding. Hills argues that it is valuable to come to understand why objects are aesthetically (dis)valuable. This capacity, which Hills terms *aesthetic understanding*, involves being sensitive to the relationship between an aesthetic proposition (p) and the explanation (q) of why that proposition is true. According to Hills, this is something that, generally, cannot be acquired through testimony alone; it requires a kind of mastery that can only be achieved through an individual's own efforts.¹¹ Therefore, being autonomous in aesthetics is necessary for developing this aesthetic understanding.¹²

C. Thi Nguyen (2019) takes an altogether different route. According to Nguyen, we care about grounding our aesthetic judgements autonomously because this pursuit implicates us in an enjoyable and exploratory form of engagement, which is a key aspect of our appreciation for the arts. Importantly, for Nguyen, the value of our aesthetic practices lies not only in reaching a correct aesthetic judgement about an object's value, but in the active process of discovery that occurs along the way. He compares aesthetic appreciation to games where the joy comes from playing, not just from winning: "we aim at winning, but winning isn't the point: playing is" (1129). For Nguyen, deferring to others in our aesthetic experiences frustrates the true purpose of appreciation and diminishes the enjoyment, much like looking up answers in a crossword spoils that activity.

Recently, there has been some discussion regarding whether experiential autonomy and competence-based autonomy are essentially the same (Riggle 2024). Both varieties seem to advocate for the exercise of one's own aesthetic capacities in engaging with an object. Moreover, when forming an aesthetic judgement, it seems like we also need to aesthetically understand (at least to some degree) something about the object of appreciation in order to be able to form a correct judgement about its aesthetic character. This raises the question: should we distinguish between these two varieties of autonomy?¹³ There are several reasons that we should.

The distinction between experiential autonomy and competence-based autonomy hinges on a differentiation between two different mental state types: aesthetic judgement and aesthetic understanding.¹⁴ This distinction also connects to two different capacities—'aesthetic perception' in the case of experiential autonomy, and 'cognitive control' in the case of competence-based autonomy. We can define aesthetic perception and cognitive control in the following way. Whilst aesthetic perception involves being responsive to the aesthetic character of an object through first-hand experience, cognitive control involves finding and having rational support for one's aesthetic perception. To have cognitive control is to be properly oriented towards the reasons that would help one to explain why one has ascribed certain aesthetic properties, and not others, to a particular object – in the sense of detecting the underlying structure of the object that is aesthetically perceived.

It is important to note that aesthetic judgement-formation and aesthetic understanding are not mutually exclusive, and

similarly, experiential and competence-based autonomy can coexist. e.g., we expect agents exercising competence-based autonomy to also be perceptually responsive to the relevant aesthetic features of an object and capable of forming a judgement based on such experience. However, we can think of cases where agents are experientially autonomous without engaging in competence-based autonomy. This occurs when agents form an aesthetic judgement based on first-hand experience but choose not to further engage with the object, or when artists form aesthetic judgements that guide their creative process but do not yet have a full understanding of their works.

Experiential autonomy and competence-based autonomy also involve different kinds of autonomous actions. For instance, having a first-hand experience of *Las Meninas* allows one to assert true propositions about its aesthetic value (e.g., “*Las Meninas* is an enigmatic painting”) with greater confidence than someone who has never experienced the work. In contrast, an agent who also understands the painting can provide explanations for its aesthetic value (e.g., pointing out that the features that make *Las Meninas* enigmatic are tied to Velázquez’s original and complex use of perspective). Moreover, an awareness of aesthetic reasons is likely to help an agent to make better judgements about related artworks and take better aesthetic actions in the future (Hills 2022, 28). An important related question concerns the degree of understanding that it is good for agents to have. For example, Alexander Nehamas (2007) has suggested that the desire to understand an artwork is central to aesthetic appreciation, but that *fully* satisfying this desire may result in a loss of interest and affection for the artwork in question.¹⁵

In summary, experiential and competence-based autonomy highlight different aspects of aesthetic appreciation. Although these aspects are importantly interconnected, distinguishing between them enhances our understanding of how agents achieve autonomy in different phases or moments of aesthetic appreciation.

4 | Personal Aesthetic Autonomy

Throughout the history of philosophical aesthetics, it has been common to characterise the aesthetic domain as independent of individual preferences and idiosyncrasies. One guiding thought is that appreciators should engage with objects of aesthetic value in a disinterested matter¹⁶—judging them ‘on their own terms’, without allowing personal desires, needs or practical goals to influence their judgements. However, contemporary aesthetics has seen growing interest in reconsidering how personal matters influence aesthetic appreciation and, conversely, how aesthetic objects can shape and transform us.¹⁷ This shift has led to a conception of aesthetic autonomy, which I refer to as ‘personal aesthetic autonomy’. Personal aesthetic autonomy concerns whether one properly identifies their aesthetic responses as expressions of their ‘aesthetic self’.

The aesthetic self is a key aspect of personal identity, reflecting the central role that aesthetic matters play in defining and distinguishing who we are. Various views exist on what exactly

constitutes an aesthetic self. According to an influential view, the aesthetic self is defined by the totality of one’s aesthetic preferences (Levinson 2010). Others argue that these preferences must form a coherent whole, or at least appear to do so from the agent’s perspective, in order to constitute an aesthetic self (Cohen 1998). In contrast, Nick Riggle (2015) proposes that one’s aesthetic identity should not be understood as a collection of preferences but as a set of pro-attitudes—such as aesthetic liking or disliking—towards certain objects.

In discussions of personal autonomy in the practical domain, autonomy is often described as encompassing two distinct but interdependent features: self-determination and self-governance. Although these distinctions have not been explicitly applied to aesthetic autonomy, several authors seem to be operating with a similar framework. Below, I briefly outline what I believe to be the aesthetic counterparts of these two features of personal autonomy.

First, aesthetic self-determination involves deciding for oneself which aesthetic objects and practices merit our aesthetic interest and which ones do not. Felix Bräuer (2023) suggests that agents who shape their aesthetic identity by blindly following others are being, in some sense, dishonest or inauthentic about their taste. Similarly, Madeleine Ransom (2017) points out that those who do not express their own taste are often perceived as “posers” or “sheep. Aesthetic posers are those who “pretend to be something they are not—fundamentally, they are misrepresenting themselves as having good taste” (14). Aesthetic sheep, on the other hand, are those who “simply follow the herd” and adopt the predominant aesthetic (or moral) views and tastes of the moment without giving them much thought” (14). Both “sheep” and “posers” fail to be autonomous, in this personal sense, because the aesthetic objects they engage with lack a significant relationship to their aesthetic identity.

Second, aesthetic self-governance involves pursuing and maintaining intrapersonal consistency between one’s aesthetic judgements and aesthetic likings or preferences. The concept of aesthetic akrasia (Martínez Marín 2023) captures the challenge agents face when they struggle to achieve this coherence. For instance, if someone believes that reality TV programs are aesthetically terrible, aesthetically judges a show like *Love Island* to be of poor aesthetic quality, but still likes it, an internal conflict arises. This conflict highlights the difficulty of integrating or dismissing certain aesthetic objects in a way that aligns with one’s overall aesthetic identity.

In considering personal aesthetic autonomy, it is crucial to acknowledge the relational aspect of this concept. The fact that we are socially situated and dependent on others is something to take into account.¹⁸ This relational dimension is often overlooked or misrepresented in discussions of aesthetic autonomy,¹⁹ but it is important to recognize that our aesthetic responses, even those claimed as expressive of our aesthetic self, are never entirely independent of others. Friends, mentors, and experts play a fundamental role in shaping and refining our aesthetic selves. As such, the aesthetic realm is not merely a space for personal expression but also one for learning, sharing, and mutual influence.

This social situatedness can present both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, it facilitates personal growth through exposure to new perspectives and experiences. On the other hand, it can be harmful when deviations from established aesthetic standards lead to shaming or when aesthetic norms are enforced in oppressive ways. Cases of aesthetic harm can be found in the realm of personal beauty, for instance, where cultural standards often impose narrow definitions of attractiveness. These narrow standards marginalize and stigmatize those who don't conform, which can be particularly damaging to certain groups. Navigating personal autonomy in such cases requires revising, critiquing, or expanding these standards (Martin-Seaver 2023).

Finally, this relational dimension does not imply that the aesthetic realm involves less autonomy than previously thought. Instead it reveals that the things we value aesthetically are typically made accessible to us and shaped by the experiences of others.

5 | Summary

The goal of this essay has been to identify three varieties of aesthetic autonomy in the contemporary aesthetics literature:

1. **Experiential Autonomy:** Autonomous aesthetic appreciation involves a first-hand experience of the object of appreciation.
2. **Competence-Based Autonomy:** Autonomous aesthetic appreciation involves a grasp of the features of an object that make it aesthetically good or bad.
3. **Personal Aesthetic Autonomy:** Autonomous aesthetic appreciation involves identifying one's aesthetic responses as being expressive of one's aesthetic self.

These different varieties of aesthetic autonomy are not mutually exclusive, as each focuses on a distinct aspect or moment of our aesthetic appreciative encounters. *Experiential autonomy* concerns the formation of aesthetic judgements. *Competence-based autonomy* is related to the activity of independent inquiry into an object's aesthetic value. *Personal aesthetic autonomy*, on the other hand, connects autonomy to the cultivation of the aesthetic self.

This proposal suggests a connection between senses of autonomy and degrees of aesthetic appreciation that has not been explored in the literature. In my proposed taxonomy, aesthetic autonomy can vary in degree. Put another way, aesthetic autonomy is a gradable property of aesthetic appreciation. Agents can be more or less autonomous depending on how many moments of aesthetic appreciation that they have achieved autonomy in relation to. Achieving *full* aesthetic autonomy entails exercising autonomy across all stages of aesthetic appreciation. This proposal explains why we strive to be autonomous in all three senses with the objects we value most highly. For those aesthetic objects we hold dear, we aim to become properly acquainted with them, to understand them thoroughly, and to integrate them into our aesthetic lives. The three senses of autonomy presented here hint at a theory of appreciation as gradual that is worthy of further consideration.

To conclude, I would like to raise several questions for future work that merit further investigation. Even if we accept that the different varieties of aesthetic autonomy correspond to distinct moments in aesthetic appreciation, as I have proposed here, could one variety of aesthetic autonomy enjoy primacy over the others? Or should we regard all three varieties to be on a par? Furthermore, there are broader questions concerning the normative status of aesthetic autonomy within this taxonomy that one would need to answer. For instance, what exactly is the positive normative status that aesthetic appreciation bears when agents are *fully* autonomous? How demanding is the theory of appreciation implied by this taxonomy? Are agents *required*, or are they simply *enticed*, to be autonomous at these different moments and in these different ways?²⁰

Finally, I hope this taxonomy can help clarify the concept of aesthetic autonomy and advance various debates in aesthetics. I hope to have addressed the 'murkiness' surrounding this concept.

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Endnotes

¹ For an examination of aesthetic autonomism in contemporary aesthetics, see Clavel-Vázquez (2018).

² See Stecker (1984) for a discussion of the autonomy of art thesis.

³ A historical version of the autonomy of art thesis is given in Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* (1984).

⁴ This third sense will only seem distinct from the second for those who think that being responsive to reasons, including acting rationally, is not necessarily connected to endorsement. For more on this, see Arpaly (2002).

⁵ The idea that aesthetic judgement involves first-hand experience is famously captured in a thesis known as the *Acquaintance Principle*. This principle was originally formulated by Richard Wollheim (1980).

⁶ Note that the working notion of perception in the aesthetic context tends to be quite broad so as to include the wide variety of objects that can be aesthetically experienced.

⁷ Recent scholarship has shown a growing interest in Kant's views on aesthetic autonomy and how these views fit with other aspects of his philosophy (Matherne 2019, 2021; Lopes 2021; Williams forthcoming). While I do not intend to provide a detailed interpretation of Kant's notion of aesthetic autonomy, many contemporary ideas I explore here trace their roots back to various interpretations of Kant's views on the subject.

⁸ These two claims are respectively connected to what is known in the literature on aesthetic testimony as 'unusability' and 'unavailability' pessimism. See Hopkins (2011) for discussion.

⁹ See Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018), for more on this point.

¹⁰ Following Hills (2017, 2022), it is important to note that the cognitive abilities that lead to aesthetic understanding are not based on

conscious inference, but rather on “cognitive control”, which fundamentally involves grasping aesthetic reasons. This grasp entails the ability—or know-how—to respond to these reasons by yourself, by judging whether a work of art is good or not, and by explaining why it holds that value. I expand on this ability below.

¹¹ Note that, for Hills (2022), an art critic’s testimony can, in some cases, enable one to grasp aesthetic reasons and thereby understand a work’s value or disvalue. In her words: “An exceptional critic might describe the work very accurately and conjure up a vivid image of it, on the basis of which you can understand why it is good” (30). However, this does not mean that one should simply defer to art critics and think no more about the work in question. For Hills, to acquire aesthetic understanding, one “must not just put [their] trust in the critic, but explore what they say, the work of art, the relations between reasons and the overall evaluation until [they] have mastered it and are able to go on [themselves] in new cases.” So, trust in exceptional art criticism is provisional until we are in a position to make up our own mind.

¹² Hills (2017, 2022) gives one account of aesthetic understanding. For another account in which competence-based and experiential autonomy are more closely related, see Page (2022).

¹³ I am thankful to a reviewer for pressing me on this point.

¹⁴ See Kubala (n.d) for a compelling discussion on the general differences between these aesthetic responses.

¹⁵ See Kubala (forthcoming) for a critical discussion of this point.

¹⁶ This has been common in the Kantian tradition, but note that there are other traditions, notably the Platonic and Nietzschean traditions, where the self is not meant to be eradicated from aesthetic experience.

¹⁷ See, for example, Nehamas (2007), Riggle (2015), Aumann (2022).

¹⁸ See John (2012) for more on the relational dimension of aesthetic autonomy.

¹⁹ Some notable exceptions are Riggle’s aesthetic communitarianism (2024) and Lopes’ network theory (2018). These aesthetic theories are socially sensitive, recognising that aesthetic valuing is a social practice where autonomy involves collaborating with others. See also, Cross (forthcoming) for a valuable discussion on social aesthetic goods.

²⁰ I am grateful to Robbie Kubala for raising several of these issues in his comments on this paper and inviting me to consider the normative implications of my proposed taxonomy.

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