The Rise or Fall of South Africa
Post-Apartheid Conflict Transformation

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Abstract
Years of political and economic mismanagement have brought South Africa to a critical turning point. After the demise of Apartheid and already during the transition to democracy, far-reaching efforts have been undertaken to achieve reconciliation, socioeconomic equality, and build sustainable peace in the county. However, the structural patterns of segregationist ideologies have only changed marginally, leading to a status in which the legacy of Apartheid determines South Africa’s future. Depending on the psychodynamic choice of dealing with the past traumata, as well as the government’s ideological tendency, there are different future scenarios. In this thesis, the conflict transformation policies in the fields of security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation are evaluated through an input-output analysis, to answer to which extent these measures are effective or not. This is done by considering transnational processes and developments, objectives in past and current conflicts, as well as by working out possible future scenarios. The result of the evaluation is that, with minor exceptions, the current approaches to conflict transformation are not effective, and different measures must be taken urgently to avert South Africa’s downfall.

**Keywords:** South Africa, Post-Apartheid, Conflict Transformation.
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1. **Introduction**
When Nelson Mandela walked free as the first democratically elected president in South Africa, the whole world celebrated the victory in a long fight for equality. The goal to create ‘a society which recognizes that all people are born equal, with each entitled in equal measure to life, liberty, prosperity, human rights and good governance’ was achieved, at least in theory (Mandela, 1993). His inaugural speech was broadcasted all around the world and millions of people listened to his words, just as they had followed the political developments in South Africa in the months and years prior. Already before the transition to democracy in 1994, the indirect confrontation with the struggle and protests against the systematic exclusion of the non-white majority of the population, incited a discussion about the legitimacy of racist segregation and structural norms of civil society in general, far beyond South Africa’s borders. Many governments, supranational organizations, and non-state actors scrutinized their views towards ethno-societal norms and reacted with economic sanctions, boycotts, and anti-Apartheid movements in the respective countries. Apartheid was, alongside the Spanish Civil War and the Vietnam War, one of the three conflicts in the 20th century that triggered the largest transnational solidarity movements (Thörn, 2006:49).

While the demise of the Apartheid regime indeed marks the political and ideological rebirth of South Africa and proved that conformity with international norms can be established, the internal state-building and reconciliation efforts, as well as creating a new national identity proved to be almost equally challenging, even with the help of policies, specifically aimed at confronting the past. The autocratic framework had followed decades of non-concrete Apartheid practice, which is why certain principles are still too deeply ingrained for a political shift to eradicate them. Even after the transition, the majority of problems and conflicts in post-Apartheid South Africa are linked to the legacy and institutional patterns of the Apartheid regime, which creates ‘racial differences in socioeconomic position larger than in any other nation in the world’ (Treiman, 2007:18).

Mandela’s dream of a rainbow nation with equal opportunities seems to have been outrun by imperialistic and racially ideological realities, which prevail despite great international exposure to culture and information. Throughout the last ten years, South Africa has constantly ranked as the most unequal country in the world, as well as one of the countries with the highest crime rate (Stats SA, 2019). Its infrastructure is failing, omnipresent corruption and state capture are daily fates, and extremist political upsurges pose a serious institutional danger. This alarming trend opens the door to the research focus of this thesis, namely whether the transnational efforts together with the internal negotiations to end Apartheid have or have not been effective in transforming the conflictual nature of South Africa’s past, and whether the policies and mechanisms introduced thereafter are indeed
fulfilling their objectives nearly three decades later. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the transition’s triggers and see what worked out or went wrong during the process, in the years that followed, but even in more recent years, and come up with strategies of how to avert the country’s fall into even deeper socioeconomic division. The policies to achieve the required objectives of conflict transformation and reconciliation have arguably failed; some less, some more. Even though not institutionally, but socioeconomically and ideologically, South Africa is still deeply divided. Zimbabwe, which went through a somewhat similar process of transition away from minority rule in the 1990s, fell into economic devastation already a few years later, due to a combination of nationalist politics and mismanagement features, including corruption, political incitement, and an overwhelming focus on racial affirmative action (Bourne, 2011). Patterns of bad policy that hamper the change needed, can be observed in South Africa up until today. If drastic, structurally rearranging measures are not immediately taken, the conflict that is still rooted in Apartheid structures could flare up again soon. This could present a danger not only for the future of the South African people, but also for the international community due to close economic interdependence and, more importantly, spillover of ideological norms.

Apartheid is of exemplary importance to the field of Global Politics as it had obstructed the post-war globalization process, and collaborative peacekeeping based on the adaptation to international norms. Therefore, studying and understanding this transformation becomes even more important when realism and nationalist isolationism prevail against liberalism and constructivism. To surmount this historical trauma and move forward, coordinated and adequate policy-making and the differentiated implementation of such are required. The mechanisms used during and after the negotiations to end Apartheid range from fundamental agreements and political compromises to very specifically targeted policies. The necessity of getting rid of Apartheid’s structural arrangements to transform the present conflicts is undeniable because South Africa’s current tendency of obstinate ideology is ineffective and counterproductive. In this thesis, I will be analyzing the policy areas that make up a major part of post-conflict transformation and reconciliation in South Africa, by evaluating their capability of achieving their objectives to a lower or higher degree, and presenting theoretical and empirical evidence that if the right decisions are made now, South Africa can rise once again.

1.1. Research Question

‘To what extent are Africa’s post-Apartheid conflict transformation mechanisms effective in achieving reconciliation and creating socioeconomic equality?’

1.2. Thesis Outline
After having classified the importance of post-transition conflict management and reconciliation on the greater socio-political scale, I am introducing approaches to conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction in general, as well as those focusing on post-colonial and southern African countries. I will present the methods of performance analysis and policy evaluation that inform the methodology used in this thesis. Then, the theoretical and methodological framework is defined, which is on the one hand based on established previous research, on the other hand, combined by me to fit the specificity of this topic. To understand how Apartheid could survive for more than 40 years, as well as in what way actors reacted and why it became a conflict of global importance, the first part of the analysis connects domestic with international developments and the essential role of globalized politics. This is crucial for understanding the reasoning behind political changes and potential reluctance to implement more effective conflict transformation measures. In the central part, past and current data related to four fundamentally influential policy areas is collected and analyzed by using an input-output system, which allows not only for visualization of previous errors and successes but also for providing valid criticism and necessary suggestions for the near future. To conclude the findings, the longitudinal and cross-cutting studies are combined.

1.3. Aim and Relevance

Apartheid played a seminal role in the dispute over a desirable social order for the future. Thereby, the norm of racial equality became increasingly recognized in the global discourse, and even manifested itself in the human rights policy of the United Nations (UN). This means that Apartheid coined this norm to the extent that it is now universally recognized, even though the conflictual reality in South Africa remains deviating. Has the impact of international anti-Apartheid measures been sufficiently combined with domestic policy? The purpose of this thesis is to give a detailed evaluation of the conflict transformation objectives that have received too much or too little attention during and after the transition, in order to identify the successful and missing instruments to transform past, current, and future conflicts in South Africa. Analyzing the efforts invested in tackling ethno-national conflicts during and after a transition is a core element of state- and peace-building, and has been made use of all over the world, from post-Soviet to post-colonial countries. As a global phenomenon, post-transition conflict transformation is specifically important in South Africa, because the nation’s unity is still very fragile. Assessing the shortcomings of socioeconomic reconciliation is of specific importance now, because the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on South Africa have mercilessly revealed just how unequal the society is. While the small, predominantly white middle class could often rely on reserve assets, the unemployment rate among the much larger, almost entirely black and
colored lower class had risen to almost 40% in late 2020 (Statista, 2021). This up-to-date issue is the result of a snowball effect that has been accumulating since the 1990s and links the nature of present-day conflicts to the institutional patterns of Apartheid. Furthermore, as corruption, unemployment, poverty, and crime levels in South Africa skyrocket, the necessity of pointing out the current and past mistakes becomes greater than ever. Many mistakes that South Africa makes now, have been made by other countries during their transition, even some in the immediate geographical proximity. South Africa needs to adhere to its initial policies and observe retroactively to avoid an unintentional spillover of injudicious policies driven by outdated ideologies. The correlation between the implemented policies and the effect they have on sustainability and stability will help the reader to deductively learn from the transition and transfer the theoretical and methodological approach to any of the countless conflicts around the world.

2. Research Landscape

Political transitions that are influenced or even fully induced by external intervention or sanctions always happen because one actor wishes to impose their norm onto the other, who then has to abide by these new norms and regulations. In the case of identifying the factors of change in South Africa, they must not be examined separately, according to internal and external factors, but instead by focusing on their interdependence. Thörn (2006) combines a transnational approach with a socio-historical perspective to assess the role of international anti-Apartheid movements in the development process of a global civil society. He sees it as part of political globalization that took place in the context of decolonization and post-colonial migration movements, and which showed significance in global institutions and organizations such as the UN or Amnesty International (Thörn, 2006:6). Apart from Liberia and Ethiopia, every African country underwent some kind of post-colonial transition, with most of them following the same pattern: The lack of profitability and growing nationalist movements in the colonies led to the decolonization, leaving the mostly uneducated and poor population in ethnically and territorially distorted countries where the formation of dictatorships and corrupt elites after independence was facilitated because a fundamental, democratic understanding was lacking (Greffrath, 2016:163). South Africa is one of the few countries in Africa that underwent a transition, in which the elite minority was not the colonizing power, but rather another internal group. This nexus is also explored by Greffrath (2016), who argues that the nature of conflicts in the post-Apartheid society is a socio-political trajectory of more conventional post-colonial politics.

The global anti-Apartheid movement was ‘one of the most influential social movements during the post-war era’, because South Africa’s racial politics did not conform with what was perceived as ‘the
societal norm’ by the rest of the world (Thörn, 2006:48). The transfers of norms and policies are fundamental concepts not only in the field of conflict studies but also in Global Politics, which is why they are essential for analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness of past and current policies in South Africa. Hereby, the transfer process is similar, including the differentiation between voluntary and coercive transfer. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), norms undergo a ‘life-cycle’ from emergence to internalization, where they are certainly not adopted as fast as policies, but serve as the foundation for the necessity or incentive of policy transfer in the first place. In the case of Apartheid, the South African government’s abidance to international racial norms was first exerted through sanctions, and only later induced the independent implementation of policies aimed at achieving the convergence towards the globally accepted standard.

Dolowitz’ and Marsh’s (2000) framework focuses on policies being actively transferred between individual actors through rational choices. It can be applied to actors on the same level under some form of overarching governance, for example, within any federal or even supranational system. Stone (2012) goes a step further and includes categories of policy mobility that happen almost rationally and are not necessarily induced by individual actors, but rather by changing environments, the willingness to learn, or the input of ideologies. The geographical proximity of many states hereby facilitates the contagious spread, and as the socio-historical factor in many African cultures plays a strong role in decision-making, it can also influence the adoption of policies. However, while an internal political shift did arguably happen in South Africa, the institutional aspect of ‘policy convergence’ helps to identify whether the decisions are ‘economic or ideational, and whether the state retains agency in the face of globalization’ (Stone, 2012:487).

Knox and Quirk (2000) have approached the transition in South Africa under the umbrella of international peace-building, comparing the case with those of Israel and Northern Ireland, as in all three cases the predomination of ethnic conflicts hampered state-building to a great degree. This is done to identify similar (cross-cutting) features and categorize the process in a linear (longitudinal) structure. In the beginning, an agenda is created out of necessity or pressure, which, if pursued, causes transition. Then, the divided society must move from transition to transformation, arguably the most difficult step, because it requires social, economic, and socio-psychological changes (Knox and Quirk, 2000:26). Only then can the last step, reconciliation, be taken into account, ultimately leading to sustainable peace. These steps to reconciliation are based on John Paul Lederach’s (2014) seminal concept of conflict transformation.

The South African scenario-planner Frans Cronje (2020) adds the most contemporary analysis by gathering evidential data and information about the effectiveness of the policies aimed to transform
the conflict in recent years, strengthen equity between ethnicities, and overcome the ideological and institutional struggles of the past, as well as those which have been exposed even more by the Covid-19 pandemic. In his analysis, he also focuses on the psychodynamic aspect, which plays an elementary role in the development of a nation (Volkan, 2001). Cronje uses this qualitative data to offer suggestions and predictions for the country’s future.

Besides the phenomenon of transition, the concept of conflict transformation makes up the biggest theoretical foundation in this thesis. Just like during the first step to reconciliation, the incentive for tackling a conflict can be suggested by an external actor. Conflict transformation through international mediation is a structured process in which an independent third party accompanies the conflicting parties in their resolution process, proposes solutions, and aims to guide them towards a mutual agreement that corresponds to their needs and interests (Coppieters, 2007). It is mainly used when the corresponding intervention is aimed towards a redesign of the conflict parameters. This means that achieving a changed behavior or attitude towards the conflict, as well as appropriately processed structural and cultural dimensions, make it possible to create a new, non-violent reality. Such processes take place both on the psychological and the social level, which is why the general framework of conflict transformation can be applied to many areas like economics or socio-political sciences, where it outlines the scope and effort that is required for a successful transformation. However, as it is an indirect form of transnational norm transfer, it also involves questionable legitimacy, and the long-term progress is arguably more sustainable if transformation originates internally. Of course, the most ideal way of dealing with conflicts is to not let them arise, which is why conflict prevention is proposed by Coppieters (2007) as one of the most effective instruments to tackle ethnical and ethno-territorial conflicts. It is also why reconciliation initiatives in post-transition societies include these policies to a great extent.

Lederach argues that the danger of focusing too much on mere conflict resolution is that it is ‘just another way to cover up the changes that are really needed’ (Lederach, 2014:8). From a philosophical standpoint, this concept lacks the additional step from ending the non-desired situation to building a desired scenario, in turn, leading to a long-term solution (Lederach, 2014:28). In contrast, conflict transformation works with an extended understanding of violence and aims to reform structures, question cultures, expose basic needs, and heal relationships. Therefore, the conceptual focus that I will be working with in this thesis is conflict transformation.

3. Theoretical and Methodological Framework
The previous research contains those theoretical and methodological stances, as well as political and psychological foci, that help to gain a picture of how significant transnational politics are for conflict transformation, and therefore, also for answering both layers of the main research objective. The structural complexity of the transition process in South Africa and the multi-level nature of the repercussions require the framework to be created by combining elements of case-related political transition and state-building, with the underlying concepts of conflict transformation, norm transfer, and reconciliation. The interlinkage of these concepts becomes even more evident as they undergo a two-dimensional performance analysis. It includes assessing all angles, from the internal democratization process that encompasses all violent and non-violent negotiations to end Apartheid, over the incentives of external involvement, up to the current and future issues the country is facing.

3.1. Theoretical Framework

The theory used to combine Lederach’s concept with South Africa’s transition, thereby creating the first dimension of the performance evaluation, is the ‘Post-Conflict Reconstruction theory’ (PCR). Originally, this interdisciplinary strategy was developed to serve as a guideline for external intervention as the first stage of nation-building after violent conflicts in (failed) states (Fukuyama, 2004). As the economic, social, and political categories of the theory have proven to be very effective when used as an operational framework for the return to normalization, also by the affected actor themself, it started to be useful when studying peace-building processes and their effectiveness (Sakalasuriya et al., 2016). Based on the PCR theory, a task framework (2002) was created to offer suggestions on how to cease active conflict, step by step, achieve normalization, and ultimately move ahead towards a stable status quo. While the set goal sounds a lot like aiming for conflict resolution, it is important to note that ‘normality’ is a subjective concept, which is why the transformative nature of these tasks has to be highlighted. This is crucial for an unbiased evaluation, especially when goals are formulated vaguely or range in difficulty to achieve.

For the performance analysis of South Africa’s mechanisms during and after its transition, the task framework is re-imagined as a graph for evaluation. On the x-axis, it encompasses three conceptual phases, defined as ‘initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability’ (Task Framework, 2002:2). The semiotic content of these phases coincides with Lederach’s steps towards reconciliation and peace-building, which also have to be undergone gradually (Knox and Quirk, 2000). The initial response to the conflict can be put on the same level as the agenda that is created by the actor themself or an external mediator. Here, the main debate is whether it was the characteristic external intervention in the form of fundamentally threatening economic sanctions and global pressure that
triggered South Africa to enter this stage, or whether the agenda was mainly induced from within the country. Today, sanctions are an established tool used in foreign policy to achieve equal adherence to international guidelines. The transformative step after a successful transition is aimed at developing legitimate and stable institutions, but also the first attempt to reconcile. Thereby, the debate extends to an interplay of coerced and voluntary policies, implemented to tackle past traumata. Finally, fostering sustainability by consolidating capacity for peace-building is arguably the most difficult to follow through with, but also the most crucial step for the prevention of conflicts and the reemergence of violence (Task Framework, 2002:2). Until today, South Africa struggles with the realization of this stage. Throughout the entire process, the framework must be applied holistically, so that economic, social, and political infrastructure can be repaired and rebuilt, while conflict-preventing measures are being taken at the same time.

External intervention during and after conflicts is a common phenomenon in practice, but in relation to its coercive norm transfer, the fundamental issue of its legitimacy remains. Conflicts are tackled from the outside because they are considered a conflict in the eyes of another actor. However, this can only be done successfully if the intervening actor has obtained the legitimation to do so from other actors, according to globally recognized and accepted norms; otherwise, the violation of a country’s sovereignty would be equally sanctioned (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:903). In South Africa, this second stage of the ‘norm-cycle’ could happen interdependently, because the individual sanctions reflected the UN’s guidelines of racial equality which became more or less binding after the Second World War. Norms are often derived from values and while states usually embrace new norms through a combination of pressure for conformity or to enhance international legitimation, the recent global trauma of social exclusion practices based on ethnic criteria naturally facilitated their direct and firm internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895). For the analysis, the extent to which these norms reflect in South Africa’s measures to adhere to them during and after the transition process indicates how important transnational intervention was to induce it.

On the y-axis of the graph, four categorical post-conflict reconstruction ‘pillars’ respectively relate to the conceptual phases. However, the separate realization of these policy objectives does not imply that they should be achieved in sequence but rather pursued simultaneously and interlinked with one another, according to their respective applicability and implementation possibilities. ‘Steps taken within one of the policy objectives will have an immediate effect on the others, while the sole emphasis of one objective may happen at the expense of the others’ (Jeppsson, 2015:6).
1. ‘Security’ addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions (Task Framework, 2002:3).

2. ‘Social and economic well-being’ addresses fundamental social and economic needs, restoration and maintenance of essential services to the population, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive, sustainable development program (Ibid). In the case of South Africa, racial equity and reparation efforts for past traumata, are equally fundamental.

3. ‘Justice and reconciliation’ addresses the need for an impartial and accountable and open legal system, the creation of effective law enforcement, fair laws, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict (Ibid).

4. ‘Governance and participation’ addresses the need for legitimate political and administrative institutions and participatory processes, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies (Ibid).

These fundamental parts of a nation’s functioning economic, political, and social infrastructure have to be built over time. This includes labor and property rights, racial empowerment, equality through equity, preventing corruption, and solving mismanagement. They are important in a global context, but even more so to South Africa due to the long history of institutionalized political and economic exclusion, inherited Apartheid-era inequalities, and enormous levels of, maybe not accepted, but tolerated corruption (Cronje, 2020:82). In summary, the categorical pillars of the PCR theory shall serve as instrumental guidelines for measuring and assessing the achievements and shortcomings of post-Apartheid transformation.

### 3.2. Methodological Framework

In the following paragraphs, I will present the methodology designed for this study. The individual operational questions and variables are already present in previous research, but selected and combined in such a way, that they specifically suit my research focus. Here, the methodological approach involves psychodynamic and policy-analytical tools, to ensure an unbiased and scientifically sound evaluation. With the help of the concept of ‘effectiveness’ the impact and target achievements of policies are recorded, assessed, and evaluated. As a sub-categorical measuring tool of performance analysis, this comparative concept concerns the degree to which something is successful in producing the desired result; not to be confused with efficiency, where instead of having the goal of obtaining the highest quality result, the profitability is decisive (Krems, 2014).
In the case of international politics, the most common definition of effectiveness is goal-attainment or problem-solving capability by actors. In this case, the x-axis must not be seen as temporal stages but as conceptual phases of conflict transformation encompassing what was there, what has been done to change it, and what actually happened. The method that I am using to evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa’s post-Apartheid conflict transformation and reconciliation efforts is an ‘input-output analysis’ based on the conceptual x- and y-axis of the PCR theory, and the task framework (2002) it entails. In a narrower sense, this means, that I am creating a table in which I can determine whether an objective within the pillars, that should be achieved to transform the conflict and contribute to normalization, has been achieved, achieved to a degree, or not been achieved at all. In the case of a negative result, the policy is deemed ineffective and has to be reassessed or different measures have to be taken (Jeppsson, 2015).

1. For the evaluation, security policies have met their objectives and are therefore rated as effective if collective and individual safety is provided, no lives of civilians are in danger, and violence has been reduced to a minimum with little danger of recrudescence.

2. Policies concerning social and economic well-being have met their objectives and are therefore rated as effective if the population is protected from poverty, starvation, and disease through good infrastructure and growing economic development, as well as education levels.

3. Justice and reconciliation policies have met their objectives and are therefore rated as effective if mechanisms to redress grievances are provided and appropriate penalties for previous crimes are enforced by law. Furthermore, the element of social reparation must be addressed by making traditional and extraordinary efforts to reconcile combatants, victims, and perpetrators (Pali and Pelikan, 2007:12).

4. Governance and participation policies have met their objectives and are therefore rated as effective if set rules and procedures for political decision-making are being followed, and public services are delivered efficiently and transparently. This includes countering corruption, promoting free speech, and giving voice to the population.

The main operationalizing sub-question to connect the repercussions of previous conflicts to contemporary problems, and to highlight their importance within the field of Global Politics concerns the extent to which transnational politics have influenced South Africa’s post-Apartheid conflict transformation mechanisms. Afterwards, it is possible to point out the necessary measures to avert a recrudescence and possible escalation of ideological or racial violence as well as socioeconomic desperation.
3.3. Choice of Sources and Cases

The information is gathered through a mainly qualitative research approach. While it is indeed possible to select cases randomly and to lower the risk of being biased, the input-output analysis of effectiveness requires sampling those, which are either confirming the positive relation between input and output, meaning the achievement of objectives, or the opposite. The cases that are being used to exemplify a positive or negative development of South Africa in each of the four policy areas are either of contemporary importance or representative of their respective failure or success. This comparative selection requires the same dependent variable, so that its application to the policies can then bring forth the differences, or in this case, the degree of effectiveness (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:304). Because of the ambiguity of effectiveness, the variables are adequately selected to represent the policies and aspects that have been and are most prominently impacting the aforementioned steps from transformation to reconciliation and building peace. It is important to stress that the ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ aspects of South Africa’s way towards reconciliation weigh almost equal (Cronje, 2020:20). This epistemological obstacle has to be acknowledged and addressed when evaluating the effectiveness of conflict transformation because some data like trauma or discrimination cannot be measured quantitatively (Knox and Quirk, 2000). This approach is chosen because it allows for the whole spectrum of measurable and non-measurable problems to be considered, which is essential in a case of such great social, economic, and political instability.

4. The Rise and Fall of Apartheid

‘Never, never, and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another’ (Mandela, 1994). These words were then, and are maybe even more today, of great importance to the fundamental understanding of South Africa as a nation-state. That is because the institutionalized discrimination and segregation of certain ethnic or racial groups as a method of social engineering has been a global phenomenon for centuries. Thörn (2006:73) argues that Apartheid was not a new invention, but rather an ideological overhaul of the existing segregation measures, transformed into a coherent political concept and systematized in terms of practical domination. Hand in hand with the establishment of the Apartheid regime go the elements that hamper equitable development in South Africa since the democratization process in the 1990s. As many of today’s problems are results of events that happened before and during the Apartheid regime, it is crucial to contextualize the conflicts in the light of internal legitimacy, segregationist ideologies, and norm transfer. This also highlights the importance of assessing security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation policies.
After the end of the Second World War, white supremacy and European influence in Africa diminished, as colonies moved towards independence. This wave of decolonization influenced the policies in South Africa so far, that domestic legitimacy could suddenly be upheld without much effort due to the lack of international pressure. Initially, there was no retaliation or outrage amongst Western countries, because they themselves still exerted prejudicial policies in their colonies, and because it was no novelty in South Africa. International legitimation becomes important only when the internal perception of domestic legitimacy deviates from the belief that current political institutions are better than other alternatives (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:903). Already before 1948, but especially after the election victory of the National Party (NP) in 1948, radical racial segregation was implemented against the background of a seemingly democratically legitimate government policy. However, the NP could never invoke a democratic legitimacy, because the black majority of the population had been almost entirely excluded from elections and any kind of non-white participation in the government was severely restricted (Kirkpatrick, 2017:3).

The Afrikaner government was able to institutionalize the discrimination of non-whites by developing authoritarian Apartheid structures which consistently and systematically divided the country and everyday life into a two-class society (Knox and Quirk, 2000:145). The idea that a minority group can be socially and not numerically defined, forms the presupposition for a political structure in which the elite minority, also called ‘dominant minority’, exerts the power. During the Apartheid regime, black South Africans became the minority group, and whites had the political, economic, and cultural control of the country, although they only made up 10% of the entire population (Pilger, 2014). In Rhodesia, where the white minority government restricted the electoral influence of the black population and criminalized the resistance movements, the de-jure discrimination was strongly encouraged by the South African government (Bourne, 2011:55).

Under the motto ‘why negotiate when you can criminalize?’ the South African government had successfully prevented all organizations that opposed the state from expressing their political and ideological standpoints by banning meetings, publications, and protests (Kirkpatrick, 2017:3). The radicalization of these anti-Apartheid protests happened due to the interplay of internal and external factors. Within South Africa, passive boycotts turned into active resistance like strikes, protest marches, and even sabotage attacks against the anti-communist Apartheid regime. Meanwhile, the main liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), was supported by the Soviet Union and its allies. The development of the Cold War, the decolonization and victory of other liberation movements in Africa, and later the anti-Apartheid movements primarily in Europe and the USA worked from outside (Knox and Quirk, 2000:150).
4.1. **International Response**

The Apartheid laws still provoked international criticism in the 1950s, but by no means led to the country’s isolation. Until the late 1960s, South Africa experienced rapid economic growth, and neither internal nor external pressure was a considerable danger to the stability of the government, let alone a motivation for reconsideration. Only the Sharpeville Massacre, where around 70 unarmed people were killed by the police, triggered the turning point in the international community’s attitude. The gross violation of human rights according to established norms urged governments to actively impose sanctions and push vehemently for the Abolition of the Apartheid system. The internal, racial conflict transformed into a governmental, multilateral one.

The ANC had been banned but became widely recognized as the South African government-in-exile, even though its key figures such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu were imprisoned (Worden, 2012:141). The resistance movement had spilled over to other countries in the fight against the ethnically focused nationalism of the regime. This external legitimation helped the ANC to become an equally recognized actor in the decisions concerning South African politics within the political community (Pierson, 1996:11). The conflict in South Africa was and is often viewed as a subtext of the Cold War. Since the fundamental independence of the state and its self-determination in questions of its own structure remained, the interests and ideologies advocated by the Superpowers in southern Africa can be seen as a proxy war. Through this conceptualization, the incentives and reluctance to act or intervene can be explained. Countries of the Western Bloc initially hesitated to take sides, let alone imposed sanctions against the NP government, an ally in a potential upcoming war, because of the ANC’s pro-communist agenda and support from the Soviet Union, thereby compromising racial equality for geopolitical reasons.

However, South Africa was subject to immense external pressure, when foreign governments, the European Community, and the UN imposed more political and economic sanctions in order to motivate the NP to relent its racist domestic and foreign policy. Since its inception, the UN has condemned Apartheid as a serious example of systematic racial segregation and crime against humanity. In 1962, the UN called for member states to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa, refrain from importing and exporting goods, including arms, and reaffirmed that the continuance of Apartheid policies and increasing ruthlessness seriously endanger international peace and security (UN General Assembly, 1962:6). A boycott of South African products was also called for by the British anti-Apartheid movement, which achieved considerable success. That is because although cheap labor at the expense of human rights meant cheap production and profitable export, it
also severely limited the domestic market because the purchasing power of the majority of the population was extremely low. Apart from a few exceptions like Switzerland, which has not yet had to abide by UN sanctions and continued trading with South Africa, no exchange of capital took place anymore. Alongside the decline in gold production, increasing political legitimacy problems that caused the flight of international capital, and extensive divestment campaigns induced by the United States, the sanctions drove the economic situation, which had already been weakened by emergency defense expenditures exceeding the state’s capacity, into ever-narrowing straits. The cost of Apartheid was financially no longer supportable. Therefore, the argument that Apartheid was necessary for economic progress is invalid. External intervention in the form of sanctions was in so far beneficial for the South African economy as the exclusion of the non-dominant majority from education, movement in urban areas, and skilled labor limited the country’s future possibilities so that a crisis would have become inevitable sooner or later.

4.2. A Democratic Transition?

Determining the catalyst, or the temporal initiation of the transition in South Africa is complicated because it must not be approached as one single event, like a war or revolution, but rather an accumulation of internal and external factors that induced the process simultaneously. To say that there is a black version and a white version of history, as well as the groundbreaking steps that led to the demise of Apartheid, would be exaggerated, but there are of course different interpretations of the process. As a result, one of the conflicting parties’ roles in dismantling the system is often overly minimized (Thörn, 2006:127). The purpose of this part of the analysis is to identify the most influential factors that led to the transition and the reason for the change of the government’s tendency, while actively considering all actors, namely the NP, the ANC, as well as the international community. This is done to analyze the importance of the transnational political processes in relation to the internal ones, as well as to incorporate the effectiveness of the conflict transformation already during the transition into the evaluation.

After the regime had reached the peak of its coerced legitimacy, the goal was to enhance the acceptance of Apartheid through policies like the promotion of a black middle class, the establishment of an ethnically determined three-chamber parliament, and the abolition of the passbook. However, by that time the conflict had escalated to such an extent that the system became economically and ideologically unsustainable. The end of the Cold War and the erosion of the Eastern Bloc exacerbated the maintenance of the NP’s legitimacy because with it collapsed the main ideological justification of halting a Soviet-directed takeover. As a consequence of the newly regained black consciousness
and influenced by empowerment movements in the USA, the ‘Soweto Uprising’ in which up to 700 black students were killed by the police marks the turning point towards the decline and fall of Apartheid (Worden, 2012:129). During this first step towards reconciliation in South Africa, the growing pressure combined with the necessity of fundamental change led to the creation of a negotiated agenda. Here it is important to mention that a conflict does not always mean the emergence of violence, but rather ‘an interaction between parties who perceive incompatible goals and who expect interference from the other party if they attempt to achieve their goal’ (Draman, 2003:4). Hence, while there have been escalations of violence during the Apartheid regime, the analysis encompasses the whole ideological dissent, which was further amplified by the economic sanctions taking a toll on the mindset of both sides.

Legitimacy is, besides sovereignty and territoriality, one of the most crucial pillars to the functioning of a state mechanism (Pierson, 1996:6). If it is contested, or fragile, it can lead to resistance or war. As mentioned earlier, this can be of internal, or external nature. Internal sovereignty of the government can be upheld by force, but is almost impossible, and was only possible in South Africa through the elimination of the opposition and the enormous economic boom. Compliance with the government’s rules and laws is much easier to achieve through rational rule, wherefore the fundamental requirement is democratic participation and generally perceived legality of that legitimacy (Pierson, 1996:17). In theory, Apartheid could have survived in an isolated, economically self-sufficient entity without any form of external relations, merely through authoritarian rule (Thörn, 2006:60).

In reality, ‘international legitimation is important insofar as it reflects back on a government’s domestic basis of legitimation and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in power’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:903). Disregarding this feature became South Africa’s undoing in a time when the concept of systematized racism had lost considerable legitimacy through the context of Nazi Germany and its suppression by a worldwide anti-Hitler coalition. Globalized collaboration was increasingly perceived as a benefit and universal norms of human rights and sovereignty were adopted by the UN, under which institutional discrimination was no longer acceptable (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:889). The consequences thereof became apparent also in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The pressure from the respective resistance movements, supported by the Soviet Union, had turned the revolutionary struggle in the former Portuguese colonies into bloody civil wars, while in Rhodesia, the armed conflict had taken on a nationalist character that would profoundly divide society in the future (Phimister, 2006). In South Africa, the liberation efforts and the pressure by the ANC did not result in a guerrilla or civil war, but it can be assumed that it was on the verge of one and that
only mutual efforts of conflict transformation could avoid a catastrophe (Bourne, 2011:66). Already before the transition, it had become clear that in the case of the conflict in South Africa, conflict transformation was the only feasible approach, rather than aspiring resolution or settlement. In the narrower sense of this objective, the efforts and measures to achieve it were highly effective. There are three ways in which a transformation could be observed:

Firstly, context transformation happened mainly externally, such as through the collapse of the Soviet Union as the biggest ideological and financial support of communism, the demise of colonialism and independence movements in adjacent countries, but also through world public opinion. The Cold War and its demise influenced but were not the most defining factors which ultimately washed away the Apartheid regime. More importantly, the time when ‘race’ had been accepted as an institutionalized segregation category was over (Thörn, 2006:80). The cross-bloc solidarity movement in favor of the liberation movements in southern Africa made this abundantly clear.

Secondly, issue transformation happened over time, initiating with the founding of the ANC to demand equal rights during the colonial era, leading to more and more violent actions during Apartheid, especially political mobilization after Sharpeville and Soweto, up until the stalemate of conflict and economic devastation right before the transition. Bond (2000:149) raises the argument that the economic factor was equally, if not more important for the NP’s reconciliation than their aspiration of international legitimacy or a conscience-driven need for transformation.

Thirdly, and often underestimated in its influence, actor transformation took place when FW De Klerk became president and immediately took on negotiations with Nelson Mandela. At that time, the ANC and the NP had both recognized that their conflict was stalemated and could only be continued at an unacceptable cost (Welsh, 1994:22). For De Klerk, Apartheid was morally no longer justifiable. That same year the government repealed laws that were considered pillars of Apartheid and officially accepted the ANC’s demands, including releasing its leaders from prison, acknowledging that Apartheid was unjust, and the formation of a non-racial, equal state with common citizenship and nationality. During the transition phase from Apartheid to legal and economic equality sought for all inhabitants of South Africa, Apartheid structures gradually disappeared from the legislation. De Klerk understood that political action must be based on coordination of morality and power, as per contemporary international norms (Ibid). This factor is most commonly post-positioned because of the overwhelming black trauma and resulting white guilt that lasts until today, as well as the ubiquitous adaptation of empowerment and equality norms, and the perceived heroism of the resistance movements.
Therefore, the conflict in South Africa could have been transformed only through an interplay of all three categories. De Klerk stated in an interview, that while the black resistance, international pressure, and the economic crisis played a role in the collapse of white authority, the decision to negotiate and willingness to reconcile was conscience-driven.

‘I haven’t only apologized. I and my team initiated the process that would bring Apartheid to an end. By the time Mandela became president all the major apartheid laws had been scrapped by the NP, (…) to rectify the wrongs of the past and work out a program of fundamental reform which would bring justice to all. It wasn’t because of sanctions, (…) it was conscience-driven, admitting that Apartheid was wrong. The ANC and the NP both played an honorable role in that effort, and we shouldn’t claim victory for any side.’ (BBC News Africa, 2020).

On the other hand, when Mandela was asked if economic sanctions were necessary for the demise of the Apartheid system, he answered: ‘Oh, there is no doubt’ (Zimmermann, 2013). This contradiction supports the overall argumentation of a multi factoed trigger, but it also leads to one very important interim result: In both assumptions, transnational politics have played an essential role in the transformation of the conflict, because no matter the validity of either side’s arguments, the developments always fall back on international norm transfer, voluntary or coerced.

5. Post-Apartheid South Africa

After the transition, South Africa found itself in a globally unique situation, so that it could neither be located in a comparative African perspective, nor was there a politological predecessor for it. It had indeed undergone a decolonization process, but also years of discriminating minoritarianism, followed by a relatively peaceful transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state system. Therefore, the demise of Apartheid can be defined as ‘transplacement’, a process when the ruling regime and the opposition are involved in power-sharing negotiations and which is mainly characterized by the point at which the ‘ruling regime loses control and/or power over the entire process’ (Osaghae, 1997:477). This means that black South Africans never really won the fight for equality, but rather negotiated the oppressing regime out of office.

With the transition, the legitimacy on the international level was restored, but South Africa had entered the critical stage of norm internalization. Here, adequate measures had to be implemented by the government to achieve a convergence of prevailing policies towards what was internally understood as the societal ideal but also defined by the internationally prevailing standard of appropriateness (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895). This meant facing inclusive state-building
challenges, but also the task of dealing with the past, promoting equality, and bringing justice and sustainable reconciliation in the short and the long term. As a result, it can be said that South Africa as a ‘post-Apartheid’ state made several crucial policy-related mistakes in the first phase during the following years, of either ideological or psychological nature, that negatively affect security, justice, economy, and governance policies today (Cronje, 2020:82). Meanwhile, democratic South Africa was off to a good start. Despite the originally left-wing political concept, the ANC government always pursued aspects of a liberal economic policy, which has contributed significantly to strong economic growth, but also new disparities in the country’s social structure. The Rand was strong and the globally broadcasted success of Mandela’s fight for freedom reawakened the confidence of international investors. As a result, a small, successful black middle class emerged, encouraged by affirmative action policies (Worden, 2012:156). Nevertheless, as the prosperity generated by foreign investments during Apartheid had mainly benefited the white minority, which was reflected in terrible education levels and labor policies for decades to come, the situation of millions of non-white South Africans has not, or only slightly improved.

The problem was that the ANC was so deeply engaged in healing the past traumata and keeping its promise of a united democratic society, that it neglected to transform the economic, social, and ideological aspects of Apartheid. The post-Apartheid ‘supra-ethnic’ nationalism, which was characterized by all-inclusive ideology, did not prove to last long as it turned more and more into a post-colonial one, which traditionally lacked deep historical roots as it was born out of protest movements against European minority rule (Tordoff, 2002:72). Therefore, the adopted nationalism during and after the ‘liberating’ transition was unconsolidated and predestined to be unsustainable.

Politically, this meant a more intense rejection of pluralism in favor of centralized power in the form of the governing party (Greffrath, 2016:163). Moreover, African tribalism remains a problem for stability in South Africa, because people are not, or less loyal to the new national society, than to the ethnic group to which they belong. In many African countries, this factor has contributed significantly to the political and socioeconomic descent of the state system. Through conflict transformation measures the ethno-national conflict was never meant to be resolved or eradicated immediately, but after the transition, the government neglected to invest more efforts to tackle it gradually. Some South Africans think that after the transition, Apartheid structures and racism became a part of the past, however, the conflict has literally been transformed and evolved into another one, as a result of bad policies combined with historical trauma.
5.1. A Time for Choosing

The number of problems that have accumulated since 1994 cannot be understated, but as the transplacement process showed, successful conflict transformation in South Africa was possible once and can be achieved twice, if the temporal aspect of this paradigm is disregarded, and the successful variables are transferred to today’s policies. Psychologically, it is hard to step away from events that shaped the national identity, just as it is ideologically challenging to recapitulate past agendas that helped tear down Apartheid. However, these agendas are outdated, and exactly these choices will determine the course of South Africa’s future trajectory.

On the one side is the choice between a ‘National Democratic Reform’ (NDR) or a liberal reform (Cronje, 2020:13). This means that an ideological battle amongst the governing elite has not yet been dominated by the idea of either a free and democratic society or a socialist autocracy. This goes back to the ANC’s fundamental doctrine which includes objectives, like shifting the country’s economy from a capitalist one to a socialist and then a communist one. However, the realization of such is largely regarded as implausible because a transition to socialism would be harder to achieve if the economy is striving, unemployment is low, and living standards and equality are rising; something that any government should always aspire (Cronje, 2020:19). Paradoxically, current policies aim towards the opposite, which is why policies influenced by classic liberal ideologies are necessary to fight institutionalized poverty and disadvantage, to allow any person to send their child to a good school, to provide life in a safe community with access to excellent healthcare, and to promote free speech, and equal opportunities in a broad job market (Cronje, 2020:23).

On the other axis is the psychological aspect, the choice of how South Africans deal with the past and will see themselves in the future. There are two ways a national narrative can be shaped after a group of people suffered a catastrophic loss, humiliation, or helplessness: The first option is adopting a ‘chosen glory’, a phenomenon of shared mental representation through which large group identity is bolstered (Volkan, 2001). It is a narrative of how this group of people, this nation, overcame great adversity, and one that inspires future generations. For state-building and societies with increasingly mixed populations in an increasingly interdependent and globalized world, chosen glory serves as a collective impetus, as the cases of Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust, or Rwanda in the light of the genocide show. Until 2007, post-Apartheid South Africa was ‘perhaps the most prominent global case study of this phenomenon in action’ (Cronje, 2020:29). However, as Mandela’s influence diminished, Zimbabwe’s system collapsed, and the Mbeki administration faced energy failures and an HIV epidemic, all chosen glory began to fade away. This was reinforced by the renewed emphasis
on land reform, the traditionalist approach of Jacob Zuma as a leader, the loss of ANC support in urban areas, and a deteriorating economic situation (Greffrath, 2016:178). Subconsciously slipping into the ‘chosen trauma’ psyche, the government fell back on the helplessness of the Apartheid era. This second option has fatal effects on a country’s future because the victim group passes on to their offspring the images of their injured selves and psychological tasks that need to be completed (Volkan, 2001). Even worse, it builds a narrative that uses past events and their consequences as an explanation of why present challenges cannot be overcome, similar to ‘what the ANC now presses onto the country’ (Cronje, 2020:31). Therefore, the trauma must not be sought in the body count or living standards of its victims, but instead in how the system stripped its victims of dignity over generations. Depending on the tendency towards either NDR or liberal reform, and chosen trauma or chosen glory psychodynamics, the conflict that has transformed in its opposing standpoints as a result of bad policy and repercussions of the past, can still take a turn towards a resurgence of South Africa.

6. Policy Analysis

‘We lost our way. We are on the wrong road now’ (BBC News Africa, 2020). Over the years, many policies have been tightened up, dismissed, or replaced by others. Whilst it can be argued that the ANC fails to implement them, or that their content is too vague, they are predominantly policies that are aimed towards objectives they either cannot meet or do so to such a great extent, that they influence their very outcome retroactively, damaging the process as a whole (Cronje, 2020:82). The four policy areas that are stated in the task framework (2002) represent the most problematic issues in the post-Apartheid system that can be associated with past structures and insufficient transformation. Their effectiveness is an indicator of how far off the policies are from meeting their initial objectives and transforming the past and current conflict.

6.1. Security

While no policy area must weigh more or less than another, security for all inhabitants of South Africa is the precondition on which all further steps must be based. In this context, security is understood as a state of non-violent coexistence among individuals. Because transitions in an African context usually happen in the form of civil wars, military coups, or other armed conflicts, and South Africa underwent a transplacement through negotiation, the definition of security must be divided, on the one hand concerning the containment of belligerent activities, on the other hand, the combating of the omnipresent crime rate, that affects all parts of society. Since 1994, the protection of human rights occupies a central position in all of South Africa’s policies, which is why the government has been
mostly supportive in questions of international action to grant security to all, for instance through the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ commitment, for the establishment of which, Apartheid was not insignificant (Smith, 2016). The importance of global ‘checks and balances’ became apparent, as through transnational politics the NP and the ANC avoided a catastrophic situation and possibly irreversible impediment to any future prosperity. De Klerk went so far as to say that if they had clung to the old policies, South Africa might have looked like Syria today (BBC News Africa, 2020). Today, the crime rate in South Africa is what is decisive for the country’s future. It has often been labeled the ‘second catastrophe’, because it is the second-highest cause of unnatural death, the first one being Aids (Samson, 2007). On average, 58 people are victims of intentional homicide every day, at a rate of 35.8 murders per 100.000 people, one of the highest in the world (UNODC, 2019).

In criminology, murder rates are used as an index for comparing crime levels over long periods. This method is particularly reliable for violent crime and theft (Ibid). Figure 1 shows that from the 1930s to the late 1970s the homicide rate increased from below 10 to over 30. After that, during the stormy years of Apartheid resistance, the rates rose to around 80 in just 13 years. From 199 4 to 2011 they continuously fell again to 30. Even though the numbers have decreased since the transition, the pattern of peaking crime levels in the 1990s followed by an extensive decline is similar to many Western countries, but on a much higher level. In Western European countries today, the homicide rate per 100.000 people is around 1. The numbers shown in Figure 1 are presumably set far too low due to a lack of data, records, and legal inconsistencies, meaning the dark figure is even higher. The nature of crime included here is solely violent because it poses an immediate danger to life and physical integrity.

In this category, gender-based violence plays a significant role. In a 2009 study, a quarter of all men surveyed stated they had raped a woman at least once, while 40% of South African students say they have been raped at least once (Schwikowski, 2009). In 2019, there were 42,289 cases of rape registered, which means that, statistically, 40% of South African women have to expect to be raped at some point in their life (World Population Review, 2021). There is a multitude of reasons for the disproportionately high crime rate in South Africa, for the most part a result of bad counter-policy.
poor education levels, insufficient law enforcement, and therefore a lack of accountability, frustration among the population, as well as a widespread normalization of violence as a justified mean of solving conflicts among people (Kynoch, 2005). Especially in rural areas, where traditional views about unconditional male dominance are widespread, and where financially dependent women are not taken seriously, no upward trend can be observed.

On the other hand, at least parts of the outbreak of criminal activity are attributed to the damage of Apartheid policies, which violently distorted communal and social relationships and triggered political conflicts. This led to a desperate ‘hand to mouth’ existence in townships and widened the gap between up and down, a fundamental reason for crime (Knox and Quirk, 2000:159). Since 1994, only little and largely unsatisfactory progress could be made regarding the goal of equal development opportunities for all citizens and higher living standards for the many poor South Africans. The country’s ‘Gini-coefficient’, a tool for measuring wealth inequality and in most cases directly transferable to a country’s crime rate, is with 0.63 the highest in the world (Stats SA, 2019). Correlations thereof can be observed in other southern African-, and South American countries. The living standard according to the ‘Quality of Life Index’ of white South Africa is on the same level as Belgium, while black South Africa ranks just above the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Numbeo, 2021). Harmse (2013:43) identifies ‘the policies of the pre-democratic government, marginalizing black people on the economic and social terrain, and the lingering generational effect thereof’ as the number one reason for the high level of inequality in South Africa, closely followed by ‘poor management by the government of education and affirmative action policies, resulting in the fast-tracking of careers and subsequent wealth of only a few’.

The problem with the policies used to counteract the murder-, rape-, and general crime rate, is that their implementation has become far more reactive than preventative, and that the reaction is usually ineffective or insufficient. Already in 1996, the ‘National Crime Prevention Strategy’ was established to address the fragmented previous approach to crime prevention (The Presidency Office, 2003). The reactive measures regarding gender-based violence thereof included victim empowerment, offender programs, and more effective border controls to prevent trafficking. When in 2011 crime levels were at their lowest since the transition, the ‘National Development Plan for 2030’ (NDP) was drafted, based on a diagnosis of South Africa’s achievements and shortcomings since 1994. It recognizes that ‘safety and security are directly related to socioeconomic development and equality’ and that the ‘main reason for the slow progress is the failure to implement policies’ (NDP, 2011:363).
The objectives for a safer South Africa include the preventative measures of the previous policies and tackling the root causes of violence: Strengthening the criminal justice system, countering alcohol and drug abuse and the widespread availability of weapons, poverty alleviation, employment creation, social and economic upliftment programs, and the improvement of education and infrastructure (Ibid). However, as the data shows, those policies have not, or only for a short period after their creation been effective. All of the NPD’s objectives can be confuted with hundreds of examples on South African news every day. Drunk driving, gang violence, weapon misuse, corruption of police officers, and the neglect of public-school facilities belong to normality. The accumulation of the above-mentioned issues is an obstacle in itself that prevents those very policies from overcoming it. Can security only be achieved if equality, economic well-being, and good governance are present? This vicious cycle can be escaped by implementing more drastic policies, potentially dangerous for the fragile status quo but necessary for change, or a change in political direction, which is challenging but not entirely impossible, based on the steady decline of ANC support in the last three national elections from 65% to 57.5% in ten years (Isike, 2021).

The ANC government and the far-left populist ‘Economic Freedom Fighters’ (EFF) downplay or deny the phenomenon of racially motivated crimes. Since 1994, an average of around 100 white farmers are murdered every year, but there is no evidential data that suggests that these incidents are disproportionate to the total crime in South Africa (De Villiers, 2020). The opposition party has recurringly queried the upsurge of these farm attacks, especially since the start of the Covid-19 related lockdown in 2020, but the ANC and the EFF see the so-called ‘Plaasmoorde’ as nothing more than economically driven crimes (Kohler Barnard, 2020). The point can be made, that this phenomenon had occurred in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s when land expropriation and distribution policies induced by Robert Mugabe have forced thousands of white farmers from their lands (Bourne, 2011:151). This attempt to ‘correct’ colonial wrongs can be considered as one of the biggest mistakes that led to the demise of the Zimbabwean economy.

6.2. Social and Economic Well-Being

The seizure of productive land in the hand of white Zimbabweans for redistribution to black Zimbabweans was originally aimed at providing equal opportunities and income for everyone, as a form of affirmative action reparation measure. However, the policies were far too influenced by ideological, rather than rational-economic decision-making. After years of white minoritarianism and war, receiving justice came at the cost of precipitous decisions. Thousands of white farmers were evicted and fled to South Africa or Mozambique which happily took in the skilled farmers to boost
their economy. The farmland in possession of unskilled people was neglected, and Zimbabwe soon faced famine due to shortages of crops, which until today, have to be imported (Bourne, 2011:164). Now, Zimbabwe is paying white farmers compensation to return and save what is left. Especially with the radical EFF on the rise, but also by the ANC, intentional or subconscious policy diffusion takes place as more and more incitation is made in South Africa on ‘Expropriation Without Compensation’, a dangerously similar approach to what happened in Zimbabwe before. Even though Article 25 of the South African Constitution states that ‘no one may be arbitrarily deprived of property, and no law may permit this’, recently proposed amendments would allow ‘where land and any improvements thereon are expropriated for purposes of land reform. The amount of compensation may be nil’ (Gerber, 2021).

In the pursuit of complete Apartheid (Afrikaans: separate, individual, different) the NP had enforced racial segregation not only in the form of subordination, as it had been known from other colonial examples, but the separate social and territorial development of blacks and whites according to their respective traditions in the spheres of work, residence, and government. This ideal is derived in part from cultural relativism (Worden, 2012:81). Among others, this was achieved by giving the geographical isolation of the black population a spatial-administrative structure through the resettlement of non-whites into designated areas (Worden, 2012:120). Those affected were practically expatriated to change the numerical preponderance of black nationals in favor of the white minority, while remaining under South African administration. The current policies that aim to address this historic injustice overlook the uncontrolled shift in demography that already happened right after the transition, as well as the failure in Zimbabwe.

With so many similarities between South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is dangerous to disregard the past failure of myopic policies in the immediate geographic proximity, and crucial to proceed through a legislative framework that is transparent and fair, if land expropriation is necessary to build infrastructure (National Development Plan, 2011). South African policies to rearrange this spatial legacy, and to utilize land in a way that equitably benefits the disadvantaged population are measures to achieve the objective of social and economic well-being, arguably the widest ranging of the four policy pillars. These policies have initiated with the ‘Reconstruction and Development Program’ in 1994 (Iheduro, 2004). The ANC realized that only through poverty alleviation and a stronger economy, both mutually supporting objectives, the country’s racial inequalities could be addressed. Despite notable infrastructure improvements in rural areas and townships, as well as in expanding the education and healthcare sectors, the employment conditions for large parts of the non-European population did not change much. Even with the affirmative action policy ‘Black Economic
Empowerment’ (BEE) and the elimination of the principle of white job reservation, macroeconomic patterns have changed little after Apartheid, as Figure 2 shows. BEE intends to guarantee equal opportunities and participation in the work environment, to contribute to the creation of property for the previously disadvantaged, through employment equity, preferential procurement, the promotion of black-owned businesses, and prioritizing certain groups for management positions (Ibid).

This policy is directed specifically at the legacy of one of the most fundamental Apartheid laws, the ‘Population Registration Act’, under which every South African was classified according to the color of their skin (Ndlovu, 2008). As with spatial segregation policies, separate public facilities, job hierarchies, and educational standards served to expedite separate social development. Furthermore, most inter-racial social contacts were banned, and relationships were criminalized in an attempt for ‘pure’ reproduction (Worden, 2012:104). In practice, these structures are still present today, which is why affirmative action is necessary in the first place.

While BEE aims to achieve equality through equity, it also brings several problems with it. Firstly, if any part of a system is favored above another, it will inevitably lead to inequality, because defining when equality is achieved is subjective and, therefore, impossible in a democratic system. Secondly, ‘positive discrimination’ can easily transform into reverse discrimination, therefore replacing the existing problem, especially when institutional enforcements spill over to ideologies, supporting extremist mindsets (Alexander, 2007). Accordingly, in the post-Apartheid phase, only a relatively small number of people have benefited from these policies, and the Gini coefficient even increased (Ibid). Thirdly, BEE promotion is not based on qualifications and experience, inducing a brain drain of highly qualified and educated whites, because even a less qualified black person applying for the same position is always favored. Economic marginalization and racial discrimination reinforce each other. In a country where rich equals white and poor equals black, the affirmative action policies have benefitted only a few middle-class blacks who are now included in the ‘ruling’ group, which is increasingly moving away from the ‘ruled’ population. Instead of the ‘up and down’ problem, the policies only address ‘black and white’. The categorization of such is meant to be beneficial to achieving equality, reflects, however, Apartheid-like structures of differentiation according to race,
rather than class. During Apartheid, non-whites had to carry a passbook that contained all of their information and restricted their freedom of movement and employment (Worden, 2012:104). The fact that the ‘Population Registration Act’ was scrapped gives job recruitment offices, government or private systems, no legal right to classify anyone by race, yet South Africans still need to state their race in all official documents and applications, according to BEE policies (BBC News, 2021). Strictly speaking, even though aimed to tackle past injustices, these policies do not conform with the UN’s understanding of embracing diversity and demanding that all humans be treated without any kind of discrimination (Smith, 2016).

In the light of a pursued NDR, the concentration of these policies may intend to bring about the nationalization of agricultural land, which farmers would have to lease from the state on the condition that various, escalating BEE criteria are met. ‘This would transform them from entrepreneurs into civil servants, creating wealth extractions for the political elite’ (Cronje, 2020:100). Cynically, the government is making use of historical traumata to justify the gradient erosion of property rights and systematic disadvantaging of whites, in pursuit of its ideological objectives. Indirect nationalist incitement propaganda such as ‘stolen the land’ or ‘responsibility for the social instability now threatening South Africa’s future’ reversely resemble the justification of discrimination before and during Apartheid (Ibid). This ideology easily sparks over to the less educated majority of the population, therefore engendering further racial segregation (Areff, 20218). The BEE and land reform are the most prominent examples of policies that have negative effects on employment, education, and economic recovery, therefore also social well-being. Like in the case of security policies, insufficient policy implementation and a widening social gap add to the deterioration of infrastructure throughout the whole country. During the Covid-19 lockdowns, the previously advantaged groups were considerably less impacted by their economic consequences than the already struggling and impoverished lower classes. South Africa’s economy and infrastructure are directly linked to inequality, which is why overcoming the past trauma and the structural heritage of Apartheid is essential for the achievement of all policy areas.

6.3. Justice and Reconciliation

The first-ever mechanism to investigate and try the politically motivated crimes during the Apartheid era was the ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (TRC), working from 1995 to 1998. Established under the ‘Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act’ this institution had the overall aim to bring justice for the hurt and promote national unity in a spirit of understanding, rather than vengeance, and reparation rather than retaliation. For conflict transformation in South Africa, next to
security or economic stability, dealing with the past is incisive and equally important for achieving the common policy objectives. Looking back and reappraising national trauma or crimes against humanity is a common phenomenon in history, as post-war trials in Germany, but also Zimbabwe have shown. However, a Nuremberg-style process was not possible in South Africa, because the country did not emerge from a full-scale war situation, and the previously oppressing minority had almost all economic power, meaning that criminal persecution would have destroyed the already weak economy. Even more important, it would have annulled the work of the negotiations and turned South Africa into a ‘reverse Apartheid’ state, splitting the society once again. Therefore, ‘Restorative Justice’ (RJ) was used. This approach encompasses the mediation as a solution-oriented, participatory supplement or alternative to traditional criminal procedures, highlighting the social and reconciliatory elements of such (Pali and Pelikan, 2007). In a manner of voluntary policy transfer, the TRC was based on similar tools set up in Chile and Argentina after their transition, which in turn provided the impetus for the establishment of further truth commissions all around the world. Hereby, RJ considers the normative dimension of responsibility, meaning that as laws, norms, and ideologies change, so should the handling of wrongdoing.

The TRC’s main tasks included investigating the human rights abuses that took place between 1960 and 1994 to establish their very causes, nature, and extent; restoring the victims’ human and civil dignity through rehabilitation and financial compensation; as well as considering and granting applications for amnesty to the accused who admitted their actions (Knox and Quirk, 2000:178). ‘Those who made full disclosure received amnesty from all sides. Those who did not apply were prone to the persecution of serious crimes’, a stark contrast to the retributive nature of the Nuremberg Trials (BBC News Africa, 2020). The TRCs’ intention was not to punish anyone but to bring victims and perpetrators into a dialogue, hear the perception of the other, and collectively acknowledge that the Apartheid state was responsible for cruelty and murder. Ultimately, this was done to compile measures to prevent future human rights violations and achieve reconciliation (Knox and Quirk, 2000:15).

The TRC was undoubtedly a crucial conflict transformation mechanism in the immediate aftermath of the transition, and has, at least formally, calmed the waves. However, as the chosen trauma stance of the current government displays today, the people’s pain and the underlying conflicts of the past have not been sufficiently resolved by the TRC. One severe critique of the TRC, in fact, all global counterparts, is based on perceived justice (Du Toit, 2017:173). The perpetrators’ predefined impunity was regarded as a helpful concession in order to be able to investigate the crimes because otherwise, no one would have been willing to confess. In practice, this led to situations that were
considered unacceptable by many. Members of the police and the military would confess to serious crimes before the commission, even torture or execution, only to then leave the room as free men. They were not only protected from criminal prosecution, but also from civil law claims for damages by surviving victims or their dependents, many of whom were left traumatized and without having found justice (Ibid.).

Collective amnesty is important to overcome a national trauma, but without precursory justice, the victims’ side will forever feel deprived and fall into a chosen trauma with generational transmission. This makes the reemergence of violence in order to achieve final justice very likely (Bollaert, 2019:89). In the sense of punishing the guilty through conviction to bring justice to the victims of Apartheid, the TRC has not been effective. However, the very process of actively rejecting amnesty allowed for the truth to be exposed to the glare of publicity, which is also a ‘form of justice in the court of public opinion’ (Knox and Quirk, 2000:17). Reviewing the TRC today, it was the only feasible approach but lacked a balance between RJ and retribution, as well as the sustainable implementation of its measures. The EFF actively agitate violence against whites as an old score that must be settled, the reparations for the victims’ families have fallen far below any expectations, and the ideological segregation amongst the population that was aimed to be eradicated continues to exist throughout economic, societal, territorial, and institutional dichotomies (Du Toit, 2017:177).

6.4. Governance and Participation

Good governance on a national level, according to the World Bank (1992), is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. Together with transparent decision-making involving universal democratic participation, a society theoretically has the optimal chances of socioeconomic performance at the best possible rate. In present-day South Africa, the mismanagement of this key policy is decisive for the country’s neglect and lack of transformation. Especially in regard to the aforementioned crime and health problems, bad policies and corruption have contributed to their increase. Petty corruption, like bribing police forces to evade arrest, but also on a higher level where police files are bought and disappear, and serious perpetrators are released then due to ‘no evidence’ have created a climate in which the rule of law has no significance to those who can pay. Connivance on the highest level, combined with the failing infrastructure, missing medical enlightenment, and bad general education, can explain why South Africa has the second-highest HIV and Aids rate in the world, right after Lesotho.
In 2020, between 5.2 and 10 million people lived with HIV, leading to a mean of 83,000 adult and child deaths due to Aids (WHO, 2021). The fatality number, however, was over three times higher in 2005 (Ibid). The Mbeki government criticized the scientific consensus that HIV causes Aids and denied that South Africa had a problem, much like the current government does not want to see a connection between racism and crime. Only after 2008, Aids awareness policies and antiretroviral treatments were fully reimplemented, and as Figure 3 shows, this policy change instantly reduced Aids-related deaths, and benefit millions since then.

For post-transition conflict transformation, good governance must rely on sufficient participation even more in a previously minoritarian system. The year 1994 marked a seminal step towards equal participation and distribution of power amongst all citizens, but it is important to note that corruption and nepotism in the government existed before, during, and ever since Mandela’s presidency. To say that they increased after the transition, would be incorrect in so far that during the colonial and Apartheid eras it was omnipresent and then inevitably inherited by the new ANC government. The anti-corruption instruments, much like in most African countries, are not effective enough to counter the large-scale mismanagement that harms the country. Already in 2003, South Africa implemented the African Union’s ‘Convetion on Preventing and Combatting Corruption’ as a roadmap to eradicate government and business corruption (Friedman, 2020).

In 2018, the government reaffirmed to fight against corruption with additional policies, including investigations against state capture and corruption allegations, or the intervention in procurement processes at state-owned enterprises. For instance, the actions taken in the electricity sector to strengthen governance and the financial position of anti-corruption measures to stabilize infrastructure and therefore also ensure socio-economic well-being, are overshadowed by the reality of energy shortages, that are continuing to reach their all-time highs (Herman, 2018). Illicit enrichment, elite nepotism, and state capture continue to exist and a change in this pattern requires equally fundamental reforms, as solving the problems mentioned in the previous chapters does. Friedman (2020) argues that removing or convicting a few high-profile people will not change much because the networks will survive, and the tenacious corruption patterns ‘go back many years and spring from the exclusion of many from the benefits that democracy was meant to bring’.

![Number of deaths from Aids-related diseases 1990 to 2014](Image)

![Antiretroviral therapy coverage](Image)

Figure 3 (Alexander, 2019)
When the Covid-19 pandemic required intelligent and adequate decision-making, the reality of long-established, sugarcoated top-down power structures, in the form of elite benefitting at the country’s societal expense, became apparent. Furthermore, it has shown how unthoughtful policies could harm the economy more than already necessary. The country’s lockdown in 2020 was one of the longest and toughest in the world. People were only allowed to leave the house for absolute essentials. The longer the restrictions, the more difficult the situation became, especially for the lower class of society. Those who work in the informal sector, spend every Rand they earn to feed their families, and often up to ten people rely on one person’s income, which then, was no longer possible. The consequences are dramatic. A hunger crisis quickly broke out among the poorest, and more than three million people lost their jobs during the first lockdown alone. The number of total unemployed before Covid was 28.7%, now it is 34.4%, or as high as 44.4%, according to an expanded definition that includes those discouraged from seeking work (Statista, 2021). In contrast to the starving majority, the comparatively small middle and upper class suffered only a little or no negative economic or existential impact. This reality again reflects the hierarchical patterns of the Apartheid era which have not been sufficiently transformed since the transition.

Unlike the current and post-transition policies, some of the conflict transformation mechanisms of governance and participation policies that supported the transition can indeed be regarded as effective. The decriminalization of the resistance movements to become legitimate opposition actors, which was significantly owed to their international recognition, has been essential for the state-building process (Kirkpatrick, 2017:14). Removing the restrictions on political activity allowed negotiations on an eye-to-eye level in the first place. Decriminalization of political identity also meant that the ANC would no longer be defined solely by their ‘crimes’, but by their political objectives. This represented the willingness to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. In the light of actorness, it meant that the political groups could openly engage in nonviolent political dialogue, while at the same time the criminalization of violent acts was maintained to delegitimize them as a form of political expression (Ibid).

Today, the reconciliatory steps taken by former political opponents have been replaced by a mentality of solo action and egoistic incentives, instead of collaboration to resolve the country’s undeniable issues. This challenges predominantly the power of the ANC, which is increasingly losing voters to more radical parties, and to existing, but also newly founded opposition parties. Groundbreaking catalysts like the Covid-19 lockdowns from 2020 on, or the unprecedented looting or floods in the KwaZulu-Natal province in the years after, potentiate the change of political climate even more towards the fundamental reform of the country (Cronje, 2020:121).
7. Evaluation

Over the last 25 years, the South African government has drafted and partially implemented 15 policy and economic turnaround plans which despite their reassessed ineffectiveness remained essentially the same since 1994: The state should plan direct economic activity, race should be the basis of policy, and wealth redistribution should be the purpose of policy (Cronje, 2020:166). The ANC has so desperately clung to its ideologies that an effective turnaround requires a completely new approach to policy and state direction. Apart from ideological redirection, it is crucial to rebuild and consolidate the national narrative to avert a national trauma dynamic. To evaluate the performance in each of the policy areas and to find out if the policies towards reconciliation and peace-building meet the requirements for effectiveness, their objectives are matched with the reality in the country. Throughout the analysis, it has become apparent that the conflict transformation mechanisms of the four policy areas are closely interlinked. Certain agendas, like affirmative action policies for economic and reconciliatory reasons, or accountability for security and governance purposes, cannot be allocated to one pillar. South Africa can only change if progress in all four areas is made, which is why the holistic pursuit of the entire framework is so important.

One of the main reasons why South Africa has made little progress in achieving the objectives of security policies is undoubtedly the high level of financial inequality. This applies to both the racial and the numeric wealth distribution in total, which, as Figure 4 shows, is disproportionally unequal. Chances of economic advancement are extremely low because only those from already wealthy backgrounds can afford the significantly better non-public education, leaving the majority with little perspective apart from turning to crime. As a reactive measure to provide individual safety, middle- and upper-class South Africans live in fenced-off areas to protect themselves from crime. This has been accepted as the norm by citizens and government, instead of taking preventative and proactive measures to tackle the root of the problem. Even though a reform towards accountable and incorrupt law enforcement will contribute to reducing the crime rate, it requires more fundamental endeavors in education, healthcare, and housing policies to achieve long-term profits in terms of security and economic growth. This has not been done, which means that apart from having reduced violence and prevented the outbreak of belligerent activity in the early 1990s, the policies taken to provide and

Figure 4 (Scott, 2019)
sustain everyday collective safety after the transition have not been effective. Furthermore, South Africa’s foreign policy is experiencing a shift from an explicit focus on the protection of human rights and firm support of all protective measures, to ‘a more ambiguous position that at times seems to be supportive of the primacy of state sovereignty’ (Smith, 2016:392). Domestic security is in so far affected by this, as it is a deviation from the international norms that have been adopted after Apartheid, therefore the foundation for all future policymaking.

Providing a safe environment for South Africa’s citizens goes hand in hand with good infrastructure, education levels, and economic development. Because the government has neglected these aspects for many years in the blinkered pursuit of their ideological goals, the affirmative action-, and land reform policies to provide equal living standards and labor opportunities for everyone, cannot be rated as effective. The Apartheid structure of rich whites and poor non-whites continues to exist, but instead of a growing black and colored middle class, the already small upper class separates further from the rest of the population. Recent events only amplified the divide and demonstrated that most of the population is indeed not protected from poverty, disease, and starvation. Furthermore, the policies have led to reverse discrimination and contributed to territorial and social seclusion, because they failed to extend the first world standards of whites to all (Osaghae, 1997:482). BEE and land reform in South Africa must be replaced by alternative policies that use class instead of race as a criterion for redress and affirmative action, as otherwise, the categorization of Apartheid will never be overcome. This is specifically important for attracting sufficient capital investment and securing economic growth, but will only happen if the idea of expropriation and nationalization of land and industry is abandoned together with the plans to raise BEE ownership levels, which would result in the effective expropriations of businesses (Cronje, 2020:169). The government must, to experience a competitive growth in GDP, focus on creating a liberal and lightly regulated economic climate that is friendly to entrepreneurs in all sectors (Ibid).

Getting empowerment policy right is a moral necessity in post-minoritarian systems but it must be done deliberately. As South Africa’s policies to meet UN guidelines reflect transnational diffusion from other countries, it also must learn deductively from abroad in a manner of preventative policy translation, to avoid the involuntary repetition of similar historic processes. Even Zimbabwe has understood that radical equity and retaliative policies can be highly contra-productive and economically destructive. Joseph Tshuma claimed that the eviction of whites was one of the most dangerous things that ever happened to the country: We made a mistake when we said ‘Blair, keep your England and we keep our Zimbabwe. Yes, we kept our Zimbabwe but what kind of Zimbabwe did we keep? We cannot do away with that person called white’ (New Zimbabwe, 2018).
In view of dealing with a history of segregation, South Africa has made ambiguous progress in justice and reconciliation policies, and that is predominantly owed to the immediate establishment of the TRC and the trials of Apartheid crimes as mechanisms to redress grievances, as it was inspired by the previous success in other countries, too. The unconditional focus on past trauma even more than 25 years later inhibits innovative and contemporary transformation, but redress after the transition was nevertheless essential for state-, nation-, and peace-building. Still today, the psychological aspect weighs far heavier in politics than efforts towards reaching a state of ‘completed reparation’, which is neglected at the expense of economic growth and showcases the government’s tendency. Adopting chosen glory or chosen trauma plays a guiding role right now because the young generation that will play the biggest political and economic role in the next years has not experienced Apartheid itself and can, therefore, use the past as motivation rather than a burden. If a chosen trauma psyche is maintained trans-generationally, people belonging to a previously deprived group suffer indoctrinated discrimination whether they had a first-hand experience of the injustices or not.

Racial affirmative action policies to the current extent are therefore contra-productive because no guideline for a maximum duration of redressing efforts was ever given, so the young generation continues to live with the idea of a divided society. It can further be said that reconciliation has only been achieved on paper because appropriate penalties for Apartheid crimes were not enforced by the TRC, and the majority of those affected have not been compensated. However, current non-governmental movements, such as ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ or ‘Black Lives Matter’ and the global influence they have through social media, interchangeably in- and outside of South Africa, are effective measures towards peace and reconciliation, because they unveil a system’s history-owned deficiencies and readdresses the oppressive past; therefore, achieving indirect justice by changing the narrative for the future. It is not about eradicating history, if anything, the historical context of exploitation, subjugation, and discriminatory legacy is hereby highlighted (Timalsina, 2021).

The African continent is home to some of the world’s most corrupt and least democratic countries, but according to the post-Apartheid rulebook, South Africa should theoretically not be anywhere near there. In reality, good governance has already started to diminish under Mandela. The divided society that should have become one, the participatory exclusion, and economic minoritarianism that should have been tackled with the greatest efforts, have only changed to a small extent. Again, change has mostly been achieved on paper, and corruption and state capture are very much present in South Africa. Rating the decriminalization of the ANC, and the achievement of universal suffrage and juridical equality as effective measures is on the one hand legitimate, because they count as active measures taken towards democracy, on the other hand, contradictory, because they represent the
prerequisite and subsequent benchmark of the democratic system in the first place. However, while the debate of who initiated the transition process and when remains unanswered, the analysis has certainly proven that without the international recognition of the ANC and the sanctions imposed on South Africa, the transition would not have happened, or only much later (Thörn, 2006:189). Today, as the cases of HIV denial, energy failure, and Covid detainment policies have shown, the counter-corruption and accountability measures, taken so far, are not sufficient. Solving the deeply rooted corruption and state capture problems requires the reform of South Africa’s electoral system to increase political and institutional accountability (Cronje, 2020:186). Voters must be able to decide directly who their political representatives on the national and provincial levels are, instead of voting for a party as a whole. This model would minimize the possibility of internal nepotism and bribing, protect the interests of smaller and minority parties, and enable higher levels of internal economic competition. The alternative is ‘more years of public railing at corruption, while the problem remains because its causes have been ignored’ (Friedman, 2020).

8. Conclusion and Prospects

The main purpose of this study was to evaluate and contextualize the post-Apartheid conflict transformation process to achieve reconciliation and socioeconomic equality. This was done by analyzing the implemented policies in four fundamental areas, comparatively exploring the structural arrangements of the past and today, and deductively working out necessary measures to prevent the fall of South Africa. As an operationalizing sub-question the extent to which these policies have been impacted by international politics, more precisely sanctions, norm- and policy transfers, was explored. Hence, it can be stated that these political decisions have influenced the post-Apartheid conflict transformation policies insofar, that without them, a transition and subsequent implementation of the latter would not have been possible in the first place. International dependencies gained considerable importance in times of increasing globalization of the economy and shifting political norms.

Noteworthy progress has been made in each of the policy areas, but for the most part, the conflict transformation policies have not or only to a small extent been effective. In other words, the negotiations were effective in transforming the conflictual nature of structural Apartheid, but the measures to do the same with the conflict after the transition were not. This means that their continuous pursuit will not produce change or divert the aggravating situation in South Africa. If, however, just some of the recommendations presented in the previous chapter were considered and sufficiently implemented, a positive impact on employment, growth, investment, and income levels
could be measured in one to two years, and see South Africa as a middle-income country with unemployment of below 10% in the 2040s (Cronje, 2020:189). Unfortunately, there is every indication that the government will not take these necessary steps while the ANC is the dominant power. Therefore, the ideological and psychodynamic choices that are decisive for the country’s future go hand in hand with the restructuring of the government, should the ANC prove unable to stage an internal reformation. In this case, Cronje (2020) and Isike (2021) put the end of ANC dominance to as early as 2024, but more likely 2029, when South Africa would enter a new era of governance. It is unpredictable which way the country will go, but the next few years will inevitably be decisive for the rise or fall of South Africa. The x- and y-axis of the earlier presented matrix for the possible evolvement create four quadrants, each formed by a combination of an ideological and a psychodynamic shift and, based on the realities of the evaluation, representing a plausible scenario of South Africa’s future.

![Diagram of the matrix](image)

- The top-right quadrant entails a future in which the national psyche has become a chosen glory and the government has undergone deep structural reform towards liberalism. The positive effects of this tendency are far-reaching, as the peoples’ interests align with the government’s policies, even under the ANC. In the best case, the economy could recover quickly and living standards would rise significantly, leading to the so-called ‘Rise of South Africa’.

- In the bottom-left scenario, the chosen trauma psyche aligns with an NDR. Like in the first case, public mood and governmental policies coincide, only this time in a socioeconomically negative manner, which the ANC might survive nevertheless, and even profit from. This polar opposite, irreversible trend is called the ‘Fall of South Africa’.

- The top-left quadrant entails a more complicated scenario because it can neither be classified as entirely positive nor entirely negative. A national chosen glory mindset will demand a liberal reform from the ANC which pursues NDR policies. This will lead to a clash between people and government, the curtail of civil rights, poor economic performance, and the emergence of a new political movement, which will prevail through center-right governance.
The bottom-right scenario is equally difficult to categorize. Society will adopt chosen trauma as the national psyche and force the ANC to drive liberal reforms, in order to avoid national bankruptcy. As these reforms will undoubtedly fail, emerging leftist politics will prevail and define the country.

These decisions will be reflected in quantitatively measurable indicators like the unemployment rate, infrastructure failings, murder rate, GDP, government debt, Rand value, or economic growth, but also normative accordance in international politics. Further research can be conducted in this relation, to identify the progress rate at which South Africa is headed a certain way, but also to recapitulate this research conducted in 2021, once a further transition will have happened in the future. This can take place at any time and in any of the analyzed policy areas. All it needs is another trigger, a straw that breaks the camel’s back. Transformation of the conflicts that are still rooted in Apartheid structures can happen again, effectively and purposeful. There is still hope for the rainbow nation, but the necessity to act now is omnipresent and more important than ever.
9. Bibliography


