

Toward an enhanced analysis of the human terrain in Sweden

*Men's and women's willingness to defend, mobilization,
resilience, and safety in the context of National Defense*

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


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1. Introduction

“The security situation in Sweden’s neighbourhood and in Europe has deteriorated over time. An armed attack against Sweden cannot be ruled out. Nor can the use or threat of military measures against Sweden. Sweden will inevitably be affected if a security crisis or armed conflict arises in our neighbourhood. Total defence capability should therefore be enhanced” (Regeringen 2020b).

Since the adoption of the 2016–2020 Swedish Defense Bill (prop. 2014/15:109), there has been an ongoing shift from prioritizing contributions to international missions to focusing on national defense (Regeringen 2015). This means a return to the Swedish Armed Forces’ “primary responsibility [...] to defend Sweden against armed attack, guard Swedish territory, and provide societal support in various ways.” This is encapsulated in its visions to “defend Sweden and the country's interests, our freedom and the right to live the way of our choice” and its intent on cooperation, that is to “work closely with other Swedish authorities and agencies, and the civilian population, to strengthen and protect critical societal functions” (Försvarsmakten 2020e). This process of a return to national defense has been deepened through the preparations of the 2021–2025 Total Defense Bill (Prop. 2020/21:30), adopted in December 2020. The basis for this Bill includes two extensive White books by the Swedish Defense Commission, “*Motståndskraft*” (Försvarsberedningen 2017) and “*Värnkraft*” (Försvarsberedningen 2019), collectively making up the *Swedish Defense Commission’s White books on Sweden’s Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defense 2021–2025* (hereinafter the White books), and studies, reports, and military advice by the Swedish Armed Forces.¹ Ongoing efforts by the Swedish Armed Forces include advancing the planning of territorial defense and the re-establishing of a total defense, that is, the cooperation and coordination with civilian government agencies and actors in a collective response to strengthen national security on a spectrum of different forms of crises, up to an armed attack (see Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019, and Försvarsmakten 2020a).

With this renewed emphasis on national defense and security, the Swedish population is increasingly coming into focus for the Swedish Armed Forces (see, for example, Försvarsmakten 2020a). This involves efforts to further enhance: a) the ability to estimate and handle effects from changes in the Swedish population’s mobilization and support, resilience, and safety on the Swedish Armed Forces’ ability to carry out its mission and tasks; b) the ability to successfully collaborate with other agencies and actors in the total defense, including forming joint

¹ See, for example, *Försvarsmaktens underlag för försvarspolitisk proposition 2021-2025* (Försvarsmakten 2019b), *Försvarsmaktens årsredovisning 2019* (Försvarsmakten 2020d) and *Försvarsmaktens budgetunderlag 2021* (Försvarsmakten 2020b). Further information about the Swedish Armed Force’s work were obtained through Försvarsmakten (2001; 2013), including about the total defense by FOI (2017a; 2018a; 2018d; 2019a; 2020a; 2020d).

assessments and plans; and c) the capacity to contribute to the protection of the population and handle secondary effects on the military organization (see Doctrine for Joint Operations adopted in 2020). These efforts have resulted in the development and incorporation of an enhanced analysis of the human terrain (or an Enhanced Human Terrain Analysis/EHTA for short)² incorporated in regular military planning and in total defense planning.

This report supports such ongoing efforts of establishing a more disaggregated and nuanced understanding of the ‘population’ as this can be thought of as consisting of a compilation of different but intersecting groups (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019 and Försvarsmakten 2020a). Our specific contribution is based on the fact that gender constitutes a dominant and fundamental organizing principle in all societies around the world – including in a fairly gender equal Sweden (see SCB 2020e³) – that can result in important variations between men and women⁴ when it comes to willingness to defend, mobilization, resilience, and population safety (see for example, Wester 2012; Bradshaw 2014; Bjarnegard et al., 2015; Ericson 2020; Enander 2020; Ericson & Wester 2020; Hobbins et al., 2020). This does not mean that we do not consider other gender identities or other forms of discrimination as highly relevant, but it is necessary to have a few limitations in this report to make concrete recommendations. The report is thereby in line with other policies related to total defense. This analysis is then further combined with insights into if, when, and how gender interacts with other conditions, such as socio-economic situation, ethnic background, and age.⁵ For example, women’s perceptions of security in socially disadvantaged areas could differ from those of women in central urban areas. To incorporate this nuance in an EHTA is additionally important for the Swedish Armed Forces: i) to limit risks, both directly toward the population stemming from military operations and related to the likelihood of success of military tasks; ii) to ensure that all of society’s resources are understood and can be properly utilized; and iii) to meet national and international laws, norms, and expectations of equal treatment of men and women. Thereby, the report aligns with the idea that there is a co-dependency on civilian agencies and on the populations’ resilience and will to defend the country for the Swedish Armed Forces to succeed in fulfilling its mission (Försvarsberedningen 2017;

² Captured in the Swedish term ‘fördjupad civillägesbild’.

³ For example, the analysis of Sweden in this report will demonstrate differences in terms of attitudes, access to resources, ability to mobilize, and knowledge of issues central for national security. See step four in this report.

⁴ Ergo, we nuance the considerations of the human terrain to consider men and women as two dominant and core groups in the population in line with current practical efforts. The report is thereby in line with other policies related to total defense. For example, the report ”Kön spelar roll” by Länsstyrelsen Gotlands Län (2019), original quote: “Att tänka på kön utifrån kvinnligt-manligt är begränsande i sig och stänger ute de av oss som bryter samhällets normer för kön och könsidentitet. Att länsstyrelsen presenterar statistik baserat på kön handlar om hur regeringens jämställdhetspolitik ser ut i dagsläget. Vi ser det även som ett sätt att belysa de strukturer vi har att jobba med – genom att synliggöra våra stängsel kan vi montera ner dem” (Länsstyrelsen Gotlands Län 2019, 3). The perspective in this report should therefore be completed by current studies which examine discourses, constructions, and structural dimensions of gender (see, for example, Ericson 2017; 2020; Enander 2020; Hobbins et al., 2020; Ericson & Wester 2020).

⁵ Often discussed in terms of intersectionality in qualitative research and interaction effects in statistical studies.

2019) and adds the dimension of variations between men and women regarding mobilization and support, resilience, and safety for effectively understanding this co-dependency.⁶

This contribution addresses an important gap in existing Swedish Armed Forces' efforts. An evaluation of the 2017 Swedish Defense Exercise 'Aurora' found that many of the personnel had a very limited understanding of how potential differences in men's and women's support, resilience, and safety could matter when executing a military mandate. The message by the military leadership of why and how this was to be addressed was also found to be unclear (FOI 2019c).⁷ This gap also exists in all core policy decisions.⁸ In fact, the 2015 Defense Bill (Regeringen 2015),⁹ the White books (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019),¹⁰ the follow-up reports by the Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten 2019b),¹¹ and, most recently, the 2020 Total Defense Bill (Regeringen 2020a), only provide guidance on international operations.¹² A further complication lies in the fact that there exists an equally limited knowledge base in other military organizations from which the Swedish Armed Forces could otherwise learn. For example, while NATO has recognized the need to consider the human terrain and potential variations between men's and women's roles and security in the context of an Article 5 scenario, the main responsibility for integrating these considerations lies with the state, where a crisis or conflict could take place (see Annex I for a detailed overview).

The importance of addressing this gap is established in the Swedish Armed Forces' Doctrine for Joint Operations adopted in 2020. This text underlines the need of nuancing the human terrain to

⁶ Author's translation. The original quote reads: "Försvarsmakten är idag i hög grad avhängig av att det övriga samhället fungerar för att kunna bedriva sin verksamhet" (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 43).

⁷ The original main conclusion reads: "Denna studie har funnit att förståelsen för nyttan med jämställdhetsintegrering och integrering av genderperspektivet är begränsad inom Försvarsmakten. De anställda har svårighet att förstå begreppen och syftet med genderperspektivet för kärnuppgiften, d.v.s. försvar mot väpnat angrepp, i det nationella försvaret d.v.s. försvar mot väpnat angrepp, i det nationella försvaret. Dessutom har ledningen svårighet att förmedla ett ensat budskap om varför och hur gender skall integreras i verksamheten" (FOI 2019c, 3).

⁸ The exception is the handbook on gender (Försvarsmakten 2016a; 2016b; 2016c). This issue has also been addressed at the senior leadership training program Gender Coach (see Olsson and Björsson 2017).

⁹ The Defense Bill prop. 2014/15:109 frames the UNSCRs on WPS as important for Sweden in the context of UN and NATO operations and efforts (Regeringen 2015, see pages 34 and 37).

¹⁰ In fact, the report Värnkraft only places the relevance of these resolutions in the context of international operations. (The text reads: "Försvarsberedningen anser att genomförandet av FN:s säkerhetsrådsresolution 1325 från 2000 samt efterföljande sju relaterade resolutioner, vilka tillsammans utgör den internationella agendan för kvinnor, fred och säkerhet, ska vara en integrerad del i arbetet med internationella militära insatser både internt genom t.ex. utbildningsinsatser och externt gentemot t.ex. civilbefolkningen" (Försvarsberedningen 2019, 291). Also note that after the publication of the report, two additional resolutions have been adopted.

¹¹ *Försvarsmaktens underlag för försvarspolitisk proposition 2021–2025* places the relevance of these resolutions in the context of international operations, where the Swedish contingents are expected to actively contribute to the implementation of the resolution in order to have an effect in the conflict area and to ensure that the personnel have the capacity to contribute to this aim (the quote reads: "aktivt verka för att FN:s säkerhetsresolution 1325 (2000) om kvinnor, fred och säkerhet implementeras, dels externt i konfliktområdet så att en varaktig effekt skapas, dels internt för att bygga Försvarsmaktens förmåga inom detta område genom att säkerställa att all deltagande personal har utbildning i att praktiskt verka för implementeringen" (Försvarsmakten 2019b, 45).

¹² This limited interpretation based on the UN resolutions adopted on Women, Peace and Security is not complete. The resolutions do not specify particular geographical areas to which they should be applied (Ní Aoláin and Valji 2019).

consider variations between men and women and to incorporate the meaning of the UN Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security (hereinafter the WPS resolutions) in military operations nationally (Försvarsmakten 2020a). The latter outlines international normative and practical demands on military operations to effectively handle both men's and women's participation and security (see NCGM 2020). In addition to this strategic decision, important steps are being taken in practice in developing the framework of total defense. For example, on Gotland, the P18 regiment and the County Administrative Board (Länsstyrelsen) are leading a cooperation to establish a common understanding of defense, different priorities and responsibilities of military and civilian actors, and key conditions in the operational environment. Other key examples are a course on the human terrain developed at the Land Warfare Centre in Skövde, and the consistent use of sex-disaggregated statistics by Swedish Armed Forces Department of Communication and Public Affairs to ensure that they reach the whole population.

While neither the defense bills in 2015 and 2020 nor the White books in 2017 and 2019 provide guidance for national defense, it should be noted that a first, but limited, direction at the political strategic level has been taken in 2016 in the Government adopted *Sweden's National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2016–2020* (hereinafter National Action Plan). This states that the Swedish Armed Forces should “work within the framework of the total defense concept [...] in accordance with the agenda for Women, Peace and Security in their national and international operations, exercises, cooperation and coordination” (Government Offices of Sweden 2016, 14). As the latter indicates, there are national and international legal and normative obligations as to how results coming out of an enhanced human terrain analysis should be handled in addition to Swedish legislation, the Laws of War, International Humanitarian Law¹³, and human rights which are to be considered in planning and operations.¹⁴ Nonetheless, as this direction in the National Action Plan's was not included in the Total Defense Bill in 2020,¹⁵ the document directing resources and objectives on national defense and security, this leaves the impression of ambiguity and unclear priorities.

1.1. Aim and target groups

This project will contribute with a factual basis, pedagogical material, and recommendations on how to enhance the human terrain analysis in the Swedish Armed Forces by incorporating issues related to variations between men and women when it comes to willingness to defend,

¹³ See for example, Tengroth and Lindvall (2015) for a discussion on the Swedish Red Cross' work on International Humanitarian Law and gender.

¹⁴ When the Swedish Armed Forces translate any recommendations of this report into actions, these should therefore be placed in the context of the legal and normative frameworks in addition to the other military operation planning and total defense planning considerations.

¹⁵ It only calls for a systematic integration in international operations (Regeringen 2020a, 79-80).

mobilization, resilience, and safety, further incorporating interactions regarding other conditions, such as age and background. The aim is to contribute to the evolving understanding of the operational environment in Sweden, thereby increasing efficiency and perseverance and reducing risks,¹⁶ in the spectrum from normal to high alert, including hybrid conditions.¹⁷ The target groups in the Swedish Armed Forces are threefold. First, the military leadership at the strategic level. Second, officers and personnel responsible for strategic and operational planning. Third, personnel who are cooperating with other government agencies and organizations to develop the total defense in order to establish joint understandings, priorities, and exercises.¹⁸

To ensure that we contribute to ongoing efforts, we first took the scenarios outlined in the Total Defense Bill 2020, the White books, and in evolving military policies, doctrine, and reports as our starting points. Second, we consulted in-depth with the Swedish Armed Forces' personnel and other government agencies and organizations in the identified target groups.¹⁹ They requested information which was concrete and practical (avoiding sweeping general statements and abstract concepts) and that speak to ongoing military efforts in three forms:

1. Information which is relevant for the Swedish Armed Forces' *direct responsibilities*. For example, information relevant for military operations in urban areas, or points central for strategic communication.
2. Information which is relevant for the Swedish Armed Forces' *indirect responsibilities* related to joint planning and coordination, most notably with civilian agencies in the total defense. For example, in education and exercises and in discussions to form joint assessments and priorities.
3. Information which *nuances and substantiates the situational awareness* in planning and in forming credible training scenarios that encapsulate relevant developments in the human terrain on the spectrum of potential antagonistic tools, including hybrid methods. This allows the personnel to prepare in great depth to be able to act effectively on the Swedish territory, down to the tactical level.

¹⁶ Operational environment is based on the definition of "Operationsmiljö" in Doktrin för gemensamma operationer. That is, it is a cohesive system comprising the physical environment, actors and information environment within which the civilian population constitutes a central component. Original quote: "Operationsmiljön är ett sammanhängande system av fysisk miljö, aktörer och informationsmiljö." (see Försvarsmakten 2020a 15).

¹⁷ Hybrid warfare or grey zone strategies are outlined in the White books (Försvarsberedningen 2017); however, there is still no consensus on a definition (see, FOI 2020d, for a discussion). This report will limit the scope to influence operations and more specifically disinformation campaigns.

¹⁸ In line with the thinking presented in the Doctrine for Joint Operations (Försvarsmakten 2020a, 13). Thereby, the report can be used in a broader total defense setting.

¹⁹ This has also included researchers such as Anna Enander (FHS), Helen Lackenbauer (FOI), Peter Thunholm (FHS) Misse Wester (Lund University), and Annick Wibben (FHS) in order to contribute to the national research debate.

This means that the report includes material that stretches beyond the direct responsibilities of the Swedish Armed Forces. For example, during an armed attack, the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to carry out their tasks might be directly affected, both by the success or by the failure of a roll-out of an evacuation conducted by other agencies and by other substantive patterns of movements in the population. Therefore, to enable a discussion on what such scenarios could entail for the Swedish Armed Forces, we include information capturing broader issues of population support, safety, and mobility. This means that not all developments in this report are considered as falling within the mission of the Swedish Armed Forces, but that such developments have been identified as being potentially relevant for obtaining a detailed and accurate understanding of the operational environment. In addition, as research indicates that both perceptions of risks and the prioritization between threats can vary substantially between governmental agencies involved in the total defense, the factual basis of this report can contribute to deliberations aiming to create joint assessments and priorities of execution in the Swedish operational environment (Börjesson et al., 2017; Enander 2020; Ericson 2020). For example, differences in assessments related to population safety between the Swedish Armed Forces, on the one hand, and the Swedish Police or Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (hereinafter called MSB in accordance with the Swedish abbreviation) on the other, could affect the i) latter's ability to prioritize tasks relevant for supporting the Swedish Armed Forces and ii) result in misunderstandings related to the Police's or MSB's expectation on support from the Swedish Armed Forces.

In consultations with personnel from the Swedish Armed Forces, we further obtained pedagogical suggestions on how to form useful and versatile material. This was deemed important, as the information in this report can be relevant for numerous ongoing processes. To that end, it was suggested that parts of the results should be formulated as questions connected to factual sections that could be used by personnel to form their own opinions and then integrate the results from their discussions into specific tasks. To that end, the section of the report that draws out key results and formulates recommendations (section 10) includes both questions for discussion and page references to the analysis of the Swedish human terrain (in section 9). That being said, it was also expressed by the personnel consulted that there is a need to combine extensive information with clear advice to overcome uncertainty and to enable an organizationally consistent approach in the Swedish Armed Forces. To support the latter, we therefore combine the questions in section 10 with the summaries of central findings and formulated recommendations and incorporate examples of ongoing internal efforts to enhance the understanding of the human terrain in national defense. Finally, to meet the need to address both national and international obligations on handling both men's and women's support and safety (as outlined in the Doctrine on Joint Operations and the National Action Plan), we conclude by formulating recommendations on what

the WPS resolutions could entail in the defense of Sweden. These are connected to the Swedish gender equality policy in order to support the forming of a consistent national approach in these policy areas (for a discussion, see section 2).

1.2. A step-by-step approach to nuancing the Swedish human terrain

To contribute to further enhance the understanding of the human terrain in Sweden, we take a step-by-step approach. We begin by drawing on the now 20 years of experience that exists from working with the WPS resolutions in situations of crises and armed conflict. This work has identified core areas where the population comes into focus and where women's and men's participation and need for protection can substantially differ (see, for example, Egnell et al 2014; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Ní Aoláin et al., 2018; Davies and True 2019; Egnell and Alam 2019).²⁰ It is important to note however that the WPS resolutions often has been used in scenarios or in international operations, which differ greatly from the Swedish context. Therefore, we begin by placing the identified core areas from the WPS resolutions in relation to the scenarios outlined in the Total Defense Bill, the White books, and in military reports and studies. This allows us to frame the focus on issues related to mobilization and support, resilience, and safety (see pages 17–20). Thereafter, we use two additional forms of material – systematic empirical research²¹ and material on previous crises and conflicts that have taken place in areas bearing some similar characteristics to the conditions that exist in Sweden – to provide depth to the focus areas. Nonetheless, utilizing these two forms of material does not mean that the results can be directly generalized to Sweden as the research quality and critical local conditions vary. Instead, we combine the results and ideas from research and the previous crises and conflicts into a framework of questions to guide an informed and targeted description and discussion of Swedish statistics and material. In this framework, we employ core concepts and measurements established in the White books, core documents by the Swedish Armed Forces (such as the Doctrine on Joint Operations), and state agencies, such as MSB and Statistics Sweden (SCB) to relate to the ongoing debate in Sweden. Accordingly, developments in some focus areas can be measured directly, whereas in others we have to use indirect measurements to estimate potential dynamics. Drawing on the results from the research and information from previous crises and conflicts can then help us to further understand how the findings from the Swedish material should be understood. The

²⁰ Such differences appear to take two forms: 1) differences in degree, related to how seriously a group is affected or 2) difference in types, that is, by what a group is primarily affected. For example, sexual violence in war is a type of violence that affects women more often than men. In comparison, both women and men are affected by the shelling of a city. However, the degree of the effects can still differ. For example, men tend to be killed in such scenarios to a somewhat greater extent if they are responsible for tasks that require them to more often leave the shelter zones.

²¹ This refers to statistical and comparative studies which test the effect of factors systematically, see section 1.3. Material in this report (for additional discussions, see Gizelis 2018 and Svensson 2020).

factual-basis stemming from the targeted study of Sweden thereby allows us to identify questions, results, and recommendations relevant for the Swedish Armed Forces in the three requested forms – direct, indirect, and situational awareness – when operating in a national context.

Thus, to fulfill the aim, the project was carried out in six steps, where each step builds on the previous one. The first five steps constitute the focus of this report:

1) **STEP I: ESTABLISHING FOCUS AREAS**

In section 2, we draw on national and international debates and research on the WPS resolutions and place these in the context of the Total Defense Bill, the White books, and ongoing development of military concepts and documents. This allows us to establish the focus areas of mobilization and support, resilience, and population safety where we could credibly expect men's and women's attitudes, roles, and situations to potentially differ in a manner which affects national defense and security.

2) **STEP II: REVIEWING RESEARCH AND PREVIOUS CRISES AND CONFLICTS**

Structured around the areas of focus, we review research and previous crises and conflicts in sections 3–7. This allows us to identify and discuss the human terrain more in-depth and to relate the effects of crises and conflicts at the population level to possible differences for men and women, further distinguishing this in relation to interaction with age and other background factors.

3) **STEP III: FORMING A FRAMEWORK**

Building on the knowledge from the review, we compile common trends in the results and ideas into a framework in section 8. This consists of questions that can be used to structure and study the human terrain in Sweden. We relate the questions to existing concepts and statistics in the Swedish debate.

4) **STEP IV: CREATING A FACTUAL BASIS FOR DECISIONS, PLANNING, AND EXERCISES**

In section 9, we begin by outlining core elements of the Total Defense Bill, the White books' scenarios, and ongoing development of military concepts and documents to create a structure for understanding the Swedish material. Thereafter, we apply the framework to statistical and policy material on Sweden, which broadly speaks to these scenarios. This provides us with rich material on the Swedish human terrain.

5) **STEP V: FORMULATING PEDAGOGICAL MATERIAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

In section 10, we conclude by outlining joint questions to discuss central developments and conditions in the human terrain in Sweden, and recommendations for the Swedish

Armed Forces' mission and tasks, including issues of importance for accurately addressing expectations related to the WPS resolutions and national gender equality policy. To provide further depth and to contribute to ongoing efforts, we include examples of existing work and excerpts from the reviewed crises and conflicts.

Besides this long report in English, a short pedagogical material in Swedish will be created in STEP VI to promote easy use of the information in this report by the Swedish Armed Forces.

1.3. Material

To provide concrete and credible advice, we have sought to be very careful in the methods and selection of material and in crafting the report to discuss the ongoing efforts and debates in Sweden. Concerning the selection of research, the report starts from the standpoint of a systematic review, that is, basing the inclusion of material on clear search criteria (Reis and Meitzes 2019). The search criteria first focused on systematic empirical and peer-reviewed research that seek to establish general trends on gender/women/men and crisis and gender/women/men and armed conflict. Given that we use the Total Defense Bill, the White books, Swedish Armed Forces' material, and the WPS resolutions to provide focus and structure, we then added to that search terms in the core focus areas. As systematic empirical research has undergone substantial development over the last few decades, we limited the review to studies published in the last 10 years (2009–2019). A final criterion was to focus on research on comparable geographical areas to that in Sweden and on globally generalizable findings. The latter means that it includes results of studies where it cannot be excluded that the phenomena would also occur in Sweden. Taking the risk of including results of lower quality into the study through the selection method seriously, we also made note of the quality of results when summarizing the articles, such as time span of empirical material, robustness of findings, and conceptual and operational vagueness.²²

Besides the research, we analyzed three crises and conflicts to complement and deepen the understanding of potential developments in the human terrain further: the disaster related to Hurricane Katrina, and the armed conflicts in Ukraine and Northern Ireland. Hurricane Katrina demonstrates the dynamics during a severe and rapidly escalating crisis striking a developed urban area. Northern Ireland and Ukraine both exemplify the effects of armed conflict on a population, both in urban (North Ireland) and in urban and rural areas (Ukraine). In addition, more limited material on the Storm Gudrun (a Swedish crisis affecting a substantial, mostly rural, area), the Tsunami in Japan (affecting infrastructure and heavily populated areas), and the siege of Sarajevo

²² Importantly, as systematic empirical research is still under development, there were cases where the time period was too limited to provide enough insights. Here, we sought to complement the material with resources of similar quality that were much cited but were beyond the time span.

(warfare in urban areas) were used to provide further empirical nuance of what different forms of crises and conflicts can look like in practice. Material for analyzing the crises and conflicts were selected based on what could capture the specific effects for men and women and which had been published in established forums. Notwithstanding, we could note considerable variation in the quality of material, particularly as awareness of women's and men's potentially different situations have grown in media, organizations, and research over time.

Based on the combination of research and the analysis of actual crises and conflicts, we formulate a framework with targeted questions. This is an important step, as we cannot assume that it is possible to generalize results from the research review or analysis of the crises and conflicts directly to Sweden. This is both due to the quality of research and the fact that every country has a unique set of conditions. For example, the regulations guiding state actors or the populations' basic access to resources can differ substantially between countries. Instead, we use the questions to structure a study and description of statistics and developments in Sweden, drawing on existing agreed upon concepts in this policy environment and the related statistics to address the ongoing debate in Sweden. This means that in the Swedish analysis, we mainly utilize recent sex-disaggregated statistics from state sources, such as Statistics Sweden²³ (SCB) and the SOM Institute. These statistics were complemented with information, policies, and data from state agencies, such as the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention²⁴ (Brå), The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency²⁵ (MSB), the Swedish Defense Research Agency²⁶ (FOI) and Försäkringskassan²⁷, as well as statistics from municipalities, regions, and county administrative boards. Consequently, some focus areas can be measured directly, whereas others are just indirect measurements to estimate potential dynamics of crises and conflicts.

STEP I: ESTABLISHING FOCUS AREAS

2. How can WPS provide focus?

In this first step, we draw on work to implement the WPS resolutions and place these in the context of the Total Defense Bill, the White books, and ongoing development of military concepts and documents to establish focus areas where we could expect potentially relevant variations in men's and women's mobilization and support, resilience, and safety. In addition, we consider these focus

²³ In Swedish Statistikmyndigheten SCB.

²⁴ In Swedish Brottsförebygganderådet.

²⁵ In Swedish Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap.

²⁶ In Swedish Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut.

²⁷ They do not have a public English name.

areas in relation to the Swedish gender equality policy to ensure consistency with existing national decisions.²⁸

2.1. A brief description of the resolutions

In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the first resolution on Women, Peace, and Security, UNSCR 1325, under the Namibian Presidency. The resolution has its roots in the UN Charter of 1945, wherein the preamble states the aim of creating equal rights for men and women. The Charter was, in fact, the first international policy to formalize this as a joint international goal. Thereafter, it was further developed and formalized in the *Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women*, which Sweden signed and ratified in 1980. From the UN Decade for Women (1975–1985) and onwards, the question of women’s empowerment and security became increasingly connected to international peace and security; an effort driven by women’s organizations from conflict areas. It was initially based on concrete problems and the interest of women from different areas around the globe. This development was further enforced in 1995 through the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women. This formulated specific targets on Women and Armed conflict.²⁹ From the late 1990s, this development began to influence the UN Security Council, which came under increased pressure to consider women’s participation and security in its regular processes. Women’s organizations worked persistently to bring to the forefront the importance of recognizing women’s agency. In March 2000, the Bangladesh Presidency took the initiative to issue the first Security Council statement, which underlined the important role of equality between men and women for peace, released on International Women’s day.³⁰ In October, Namibia arranged the first Open Debate on Women, Peace, and Security, which has since been a recurring theme on the Council’s agenda (Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Davies and True 2019).

Thus, when UNSCR 1325 was adopted on October 31, 2000, it rested on internationally agreed upon standards on gender equality and the contributions of member states – such as Bangladesh, Namibia, Canada, the U.K., and Jamaica – women’s civil society organizations, including many from areas affected by armed conflict, for example, Guatemala and Somalia – and the UN system; a collaboration between these categories of actors has remained a bedrock in the efforts for Women, Peace, and Security and in the adoption of the nine following resolutions (see Box 1).

²⁸ Notably, this does not mean that we translate the WPS resolutions into military scenarios per se, only that we use the existing discussion to identify relevant areas where we can expect variations between men and women. In the final section of the report, we will instead clarify what obligations the WPS resolutions can entail for the Swedish Armed Forces.

²⁹ For more information, see United Nations 1995.

³⁰ See United Nations 2000.

Box 1. The UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security

UNSCR 1325 (2000) first thematic resolution on Women, Peace, and Security. Sought to improve women's participation and to addressing the impact of armed conflict on women.

UNSCR 1820 (2008) specifically recognizes the problem of conflict-related sexual violence.

UNSCR 1888 (2009) establishes more practical measures for implementing resolution 1820, such as training and support structures.

UNSCR 1889 (2009) strengthens the commitments in Resolution 1325 and places a strong focus on women's participation and peacebuilding, as well as relief and recovery. It highlights the importance of accountability for implementation.

UNSCR 1960 (2010) focuses on measures aimed at ending impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence.

UNSCR 2106 (2013) focuses on conflict-related sexual violence and recognizes that men and boys are also targets.

UNSCR 2122 (2013) explicitly links women's empowerment and gender equality to maintenance of peace and security.

UNSCR 2242 (2015) focuses on the importance of assessing strategies and resourcing to advance the implementation of the resolutions on WPS.

UNSCR 2467 (2019) places a strong focus on sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and highlights the links between participation and protection of women. It has an overall victim/survivor-centered approach and stronger language on sexual violence against men and boys. It also places a more specific focus on the importance of documenting sexual violence.

UNSCR 2493 (2019) focuses on participation of women, the role of the civil society, and increased implementation and funding for the realization of WPS.

UNSCR 2538 (2020) on women in peacekeeping (adopted under a peacekeeping debate).

List developed based on NCGM (2020), see their WPS Guide for more information.

The content of the resolutions has been substantially nuanced over time into a large number of sub-themes, such as preventing and addressing conflict-related sexual violence; improved protection of women social leaders and human rights defenders; addressing discrimination in relation to transitional justice, rule of law, and human rights; addressing the situation and resources for women and girls among refugees and internally displaced persons; and women's influence on issues of addressing violent extremism. There is increased recognition that when seeking to address these sub-themes, each one will require its own specific measures and activities. There is no 'one size fits all' solution (see Davies and True (2019) for a description of a large range of ongoing efforts). In addition, the solution needs to be specific to the country context where it takes place. In recent years, we have seen a more determined integration into regular efforts to address armed conflict, that is, aiming to ensure that women's and men's participation, situation, and security are more equally considered. For example, this was something that Sweden promoted during its term in the Security Council during 2017–2018 in order to make WPS part of regular business and with accountability of the highest leadership (Olsson et al. 2021).

As the initial background to the resolutions clearly suggests, the translation of the resolutions to a national context should also be in line with broader efforts and targets for gender equality

ongoing in that state.³¹ At a fundamental level, these normative frameworks align as they consider different social roles and responsibilities for men and women as a “primary factor of social organization” in almost all societies in the world (Enarson 2000, 4). This encapsulates both private roles and responsibilities within households and public ones in societies. The latter thereby bring with them differences in access to resources – political, economic, and social – between men and women. When translating the content of WPS resolutions to the Swedish context, there is therefore a need to ensure that the translation is in line with the goal of the Swedish Government’s gender equality policy on the distribution of power, resources, and security (see Box 2³² for an overview). All government agencies in Sweden, including the Swedish Armed Forces, are responsible for helping to reach these goals through their regular work.

Box 2. Swedish Government’s Gender Equality Policy³³

“The objective of Swedish gender equality policy is that women and men shall have the same power to shape society and their own lives. With this as its starting point, the Government is working toward six sub-goals:

1. **Equal division of power and influence.** Women and men must have the same rights and opportunities to be active citizens and to shape the conditions for decision-making.
2. **Economic equality.** Women and men must have the same opportunities and conditions with regard to paid work which gives economic independence throughout life.
3. **Equal education.** Women and men, girls and boys must have the same opportunities and conditions with regard to education, study options and personal development.
4. **Equal distribution of unpaid housework and provision of care.** Women and men must have the same responsibility for housework and have the opportunity to give and receive care on equal terms.
5. **Equal health.** Women and men, girls and boys must have the same conditions for a good health and be offered care on equal terms.
6. **Men's violence against women must stop.** Women and men, girls and boys, must have the same right to and opportunity for physical integrity” (Government Offices of Sweden 2019, 2).

2.2. Forming relevant focus areas

How do we then move from general discussions and experiences captured in the work with the WPS resolutions to nuancing the understanding of the human terrain in Sweden? While an important theme in the WPS resolutions is a political-strategic discussion on the prevention of armed conflict and its long-term resolution as such,³⁴ the work with the resolutions in everyday practice includes the focus areas of participation, relief and recovery, and protection which

³¹ This was further underlined in the CEDAW Committee’s Recommendation 30 in 2013, which connects the WPS resolutions to a state’s reporting on gender equality to the UN (O’Rourke and Swaine 2019; see also Olsson 2018).

³² The quote is the Government’s own translation. For further information and details, see Regeringen 2016.

³³ For a description of how the Swedish Armed Forces seek to contribute to the identified sub-goals of this policy, see Försvarsmaktens Jämställdhets- och jämlikhetsplan 2016-2020 (FM2019-9956:8) (Försvarsmakten 2020c).

³⁴ These are often driven by a more in-depth and critically feminist transformative understanding of peace and security (see Davis and True 2019 for an overview). While these are central points, they are primarily located at the political-strategic decision-making level. For that reason, this broader critical discussion is considered beyond the scope of this report.

address practical issues and problems that women face before, during, and after an armed conflict (see also Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Ní Aoláin et al., 2018; Davies and True 2019; Olsson 2018; NCGM 2020). In a Swedish context, these three WPS focus areas speak to aspects in the national defense and security debate related to mobilization and support (i.e., area of participation), resilience (area of relief and recovery), and safety (area of protection). Moreover, these three areas have been the focus of established WPS policies for the Swedish Armed Forces in the Swedish National Action Plan and address the Swedish gender equality goals directly. For example, the Swedish Armed Forces' gender equality policy, *Jämställdhets- och jämlikhetsplan 2016–2019* (FM2018-15180, 9),³⁵ stated that the WPS resolutions mean that women and men should have equal rights to participate and influence as well as equal rights to protection (Försvarsmakten 2019a, 3).³⁶

Using mobilization and support, resilience, and safety as focus areas thereby means that we can build on established areas and knowledge in our analysis. Potential variations between men and women will be in focus, but we will particularly consider the interaction with other factors. For example, social class, age, or ethnic background can interact with sex. To exemplify relevance further, older women in Sweden constitute the group with the least access to resources, which might affect their ability to manage a severe crisis. Another example can be that young men in socially disadvantaged areas can be more at risk of joining criminal networks, which later can be exploited in a hybrid scenario. This underlines that the population does not constitute one coherent group and resonates with the White books, which highlight that Sweden is a complex and multicultural society where it is central to ensure a consistent effort to involve and strengthen all groups in society (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019).

Building on these considerations, the report is structured around the following three focus areas:

- a) **Mobilization and support.** Internationally, this has been nuanced into a debate on: a) If women's and men's *interests and access to knowledge* on ongoing processes on national security and defense are equally considered. We will therefore discuss women's and men's attitudes toward, and trust in, national defense matters and institutions. From the perspective

³⁵ To ensure that we present concrete advice and recommendations, we have also made limitations in our focus: First, although the resolutions underline the need to increase the number of women active in the military, prevent sexual exploitation and abuse of one's own personnel in the military organization, and uphold codes of conduct, these issues are currently covered in internal Swedish Armed Forces policies and are in focus in other ongoing efforts. They are therefore beyond the direct scope of this study. Second, discussion on WPS in the context of international operations is outside of the scope, with the exceptions of lessons that can be used in a national context. We also seek consistency in core thinking between international and national policies.

³⁶ The original quote reads: "Försvarsmakten ska ta hänsyn till civila kvinnors, mäns, flickors och pojcars respektive skyddsbehov i händelse av en väpnad konflikt och ta hänsyn till deras rätt att delta i konflikthantering." In the version of the policy adopted in January 2020, WPS has then been moved to fall under The Armed Force's Strategic Direction in the ongoing efforts to integrate gender equality and WPS in regular decision-making processes (see Försvarsmakten 2020c).

of the Swedish Armed Forces, this could be relevant in order to understand if these align or if there are differences which could entail variation in the willingness to defend the country. This is important also for understanding if potential differences in knowledge and stand points could be exploited in disinformation campaigns and b) If women and men are *included in decision-making and if and how they participate* in resolving crises or handling an attack. We will therefore look at positions and distributions of labor between women and men in organizations, making decisions and handling national defense and security questions. This will contribute to an understanding of potential risks related to succeeding with mobilization. Regarding the connection between the WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy, this focus area aligns with the notion that “women and men must have the same rights and opportunities to be active citizens and to shape the conditions for decision-making” (Swedish Government 2019, 2).

- b) **Resilience:** This will be studied, in terms of differences in ability to act, prepare, and evacuate. To provide nuance, we will first discuss if women’s and men’s potentially different *social roles and responsibilities* affect this ability. This is important in several respects. First, it can affect their respective ability to act in order to handle a crisis or events during an armed attack. Second, it is important for understanding if men and women will be able to combine private and public responsibilities, as Sweden is dependent on men and women contributing to the labor market to uphold societal functionality. Third, this further relates to the gender equality goal, highlighting the fundamental role of informal work and roles in society and the effects this can have on an individual’s situation. Considering resilience further involves variations in men’s and women’s *access to resources*, such as access to cash or a car in an evacuation scenario. This is important in relation to a crisis or an armed attack to estimate patterns of behavior and the population’s expectations of support.³⁷ Core conditions of living under economic stress can also differ between men and women, having long-term effects on their vulnerability in a crisis. This is hence particularly related to *evacuation and displacement* scenarios, where we will take an in-depth look at what are potential effects and behaviors of men and women, as outlined in previous research. Finally, this is a theme that constitutes a core aspect of the WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy, the latter stating that “Women and men must have the same opportunities and conditions regarding paid work which gives economic independence throughout life” (Government Offices of Sweden 2019, 2).

³⁷ As outlined in the booklet “Om krisen eller kriget kommer” (MSB 2018).

c) **Safety:** This will be studied in terms of potential differences in men's and women's vulnerabilities and risks related to a crisis or attack.³⁸ To fully capture that, this section paints a broader picture of population safety as the White books suggests that existing vulnerabilities (factors having an impact in a specific scenario) in the society – such as those related to existing patterns of criminal violence or weakness in the healthcare sector – can be exploited in order to create uncertainty, distrust, or to tie up resources from various agencies such as the police (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 66; FOI 2018d). By extension, it can also affect the manner in which the population will behave and is able to evacuate. This means that this is an area where joint assessments of existing situations and priorities are likely to affect the potential for cooperation between the Swedish Armed Forces and other state agencies, such as the Swedish Police, MSB, or those in the healthcare sector. Based on these considerations, we will therefore look closer at potential *trends in violence* and existing social developments related to *crime* and *health*. Finally, the WPS resolutions entail an equal right to protection for men and women; a goal which corresponds to an aspect of the Swedish gender equality policy which states that “[w]omen and men, girls and boys, must have the same right to and opportunity for physical integrity” (Government Offices of Sweden 2019, 2).

As can be observed by these descriptions, there is a potential overlap between the focus areas in several respects. Given this overlap, areas should not be considered as exclusionary but are used to structure the material to enable a clear presentation and analysis as well as the identification of useful recommendations.

STEP II: REVIEWING RESEARCH AND PREVIOUS CRISIS AND CONFLICTS

Structured around the three focus areas – a) Mobilization and support related to attitudes, influence, and contributions, b) Resilience related to ability to act, prepare, and evacuate, c) Safety related to understanding vulnerabilities and risks – we will now review research and examples of crises and conflicts. This step is divided into two parts. The first discusses research relevant for understanding what a societal crisis can entail for men and women when core functions of a society start to malfunction. To deepen this understanding, the report then presents information on developments under Hurricane Katrina; a rapidly developing disaster in an urban area which seriously disrupted societal functions, displacing about 1,000,000 people, and resulting in the death of about 1,577. The second part presents research on armed conflict. The research is further

³⁸ For example, in the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's report on studying perceptions of risk and safety (Börjesson et al., 2017), it is found that there are certain specific patterns when it comes to risks, which are different, to a certain degree, between men and women.

supported by information from two examples of armed conflict: the recent example of Ukraine, which provides insights into a country under external attack; and Northern Ireland, which provides insights into a war mainly conducted in urban areas.

3. Society under stress: learning from research on crises and natural disasters

Boin et al. (2017, 448) have described a crisis as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms [of a society], which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions”.³⁹ There are several categories of crises, where the humanitarian is one of the most severe. This can be understood as a disruption of a community that results in human, material, economic, or environmental losses, exceeding people’s ability to cope and necessitating external support (Lahiri et al. 2017).⁴⁰ A related phenomena is a natural disaster, which is the result of natural events as well as human factors. It is a combination of a natural hazard (phenomena such as a flood or drought) and human exposure and vulnerability that results in substantial death or damage (Slettebak 2012). In research, these two forms of crises also dominate but still present relevant points for understanding a society under severe stress similar to those that could result from hybrid attacks or events. What can we then learn about women’s and men’s situations? A difference which has been increasingly discussed in recent years (Bradshaw 2014).

3.1. Mobilization and support

Attitudes toward and trust in state actors and information

Summary: Research suggests that opinions differ between men and women with regard to a) perceptions of threats, b) attitudes toward state actors, and c) trust in information. This can affect their response to a crisis. However, socio-economic aspects and whether one lives in an area directly affected can play a role in the attitudes toward risk and trust in the state over time.

Attitudes toward and trust in actors involved in disaster management and in information play key roles in a crisis (for overview, see Malesic 2019 and Wester 2009; 2011; Enander and Börjesson 2017). Can we expect differences in attitudes and trust between men and women that is relevant during a crisis or a disaster? Research observing potential differences between men and women remain in the early stages, but they suggest that attitudes toward a pending crisis can differ (see

³⁹Adoption from Rosenthal et al., 1989.

⁴⁰ There is still little research on the separate effects of humanitarian crises on men and women, but this report compiles the main trends.

for example, Wester 2012; Sundström and McCright 2014; Pearse 2017; Prescott 2018, for discussions). For example, Reser et al., surveying 3,096 Australian respondents and 1,822 British respondents, found that regarding perceptions on climate change and natural disasters, female respondents reported feeling greater distress and more vulnerability to the negative impact of climate change than men (Reser et al., 2012). West and Orr found similar patterns in their opinion survey in a coastal New England state: women and minorities were perceived to be more vulnerable than white persons and male respondents when it comes to natural disasters (2007).

Do such differences in attitudes then affect the response to, or the readiness to act? Seyedin et al. (2019) review a large body of previous research on risk perceptions and found that it was frequently reported that men and women had different risk perceptions. As a general trend, men tended to focus on physical effects of the disaster, while women were reported to pay more attention to emotional costs. As a result of this difference, women had a higher risk perception and were less risk-taking than men (Seyedin et al., 2019). Research furthermore suggest that the reason women tend to perceive risks to a higher degree than men actually is a result of women being more exposed to many risks than men. Importantly, this did not appear to result in an increased likelihood that women will take proactive action. Gender inequality and social roles impacted what risks could be undertaken. Instead, women's concerns could be classified as irrational. If they were in a marriage, they had to negotiate with their husbands to take the threat seriously (Villarreal and Meyer 2020). Similarly, in a study conducted by Reinard et al. (2013), it was found that households where women were more likely to evacuate depended on if the risk was perceived as equally grave by both men and women. In addition, the fact that women tend to have access to less resources than men meant that they were less able to afford protective actions compared to men. Finally, women's role as caregivers and responsibility for children and elderly were found to potentially further limit their options in a crisis (Villarreal and Meyer 2020).

The findings on trust in state actors and natural disasters are limited and inconsistent. For example, from case studies in Chile, it was found that in regions that were more affected by an earthquake and a tsunami, the population were more critical of their local government, compared to regions that were less affected (Carlin et al., 2014). Similar findings have been found in other case studies, such as in Houston (Arceneaux and Stein 2006). However, Albrecht, investigating 10 minor and major natural disasters in Europe and the political trust and satisfaction in government, did not find substantial effects on satisfaction with the government or the political trust after the disasters (Albrecht 2017). This might also depend on the form of the crisis. Examining the effects of the Greek economic crisis – which resulted in sometimes violent protests – Ervasti et al. found that

women tend to have more trust compared to men (2019). While weak, this still makes it interesting to look more closely at questions of differences in trust.

In terms of trust in media and access to information, West and Orr found that women were more likely than men to trust the media if it told them to evacuate (12 percentage points more likely than the male respondents). In addition, women were more likely to obey a government order to evacuate than men (West and Orr 2007). In their study on communication management and trust, Longstaff and Yang found a direct correlation between trusting the media and other emergency actors, and the effectiveness of the crisis communication (2008). “A local population is more likely to bounce back from a crisis such as a natural disaster or terrorist attack if it has access to trusted information” (Longstaff and Yang 2008, 13). In addition, a community that has well-functioning and trusted communication and media will react and make necessary decisions much faster in the event of a crisis (Longstaff and Yang 2008).

Inclusion in decision-making and practical efforts

Summary: While research is under-developed, one strand suggests that it is relevant to consider how women and men are organized in civil society organizations. These can follow quite specific patterns in the forms of contributions by men compared to women which, in turn, tend to be in line with their respective social roles and responsibilities in a society. Combined with women's social responsibilities in the home could entail that without child-care, women could be more limited in if and how they could contribute. In addition to participation, there can be differences in men's and women's inclusion in actual decision-making.

Villarreal and Meyer (2020) argue that it is only recently that research on disaster have moved away from seeing women as victims and vulnerable to active and instrumental in disaster management. This is important in order to understand both risk management and what forms of resources can exist in a society. For example, Bradshaw (2014) reviewed results in previous research and found that they suggest that women tend to be able to identify those who are in greatest risk in the community through their social networks (Bradshaw 2015). A similar conclusion appears to be used as the basis for policy. According to the International Labor Organization, women's organizations, and other local community-based organizations, play important roles in the event of a crisis. They often provide support and direct services and understand the local context. Women's groups also, generally, have an important role in identifying vulnerable groups and reaching them – such as indigenous communities or undocumented women (Tutnjevic 2004).

Nevertheless, research have found that men still tend to engage in community protection and recovery activities to a higher degree, whereas women are more isolated at home and responsible for domestic work. As an example, Villarreal and Meyer conducted 43 interviews comparing women's experiences in two small towns in Texas, U.S.A. that had suffered a disaster in 2013. They found that women reported that their concerns and opinions during the disaster as well as during the recovery process were undermined and questioned. This included being overlooked or excluded when seeking to be involved in management and community rebuilding and that they had been denied leadership positions. The exclusion had at times resulted in an increased danger for women, as the necessary precautions that they had identified as central had not been undertaken to handle a risk preemptively. In addition to handling the disaster, the women reported also having to handle their husbands' increased frustration with the situation. In addition, Villarreal and Meyer found that childcare was a priority for women, both during and after the disaster. Even women who did not have children stated that they were worried about the children's welfare. Women often brought up their children in the interviews, without receiving a question about them, and before themselves or damage to their homes. Finally, women wished to be more involved in community recovery processes and to be included in the social support system (Villarreal and Meye 2020).⁴¹

In addition to organizations that are focused on women as members, it is relevant to consider their inclusion in dominant organizations involved in crisis management. For example, in his dissertation on the large storm, Cyclone Gudrun, which hit Sweden in January 2005 (see a longer discussion on Gudrun in box 6), Guldåker found that the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF) was an important organization in the aftermath of the cyclone. LRF's members are represented in many rural, small villages all over Sweden. Their engagement, knowledge, and ability were perceived as very valuable in the aftermath of the disaster. Their members volunteered and helped in organizing and bringing people with chain saws and tools together for clearing up after the storm (Guldåker 2009). LRF has 140,000 members, and 60% are men and 40% women. In addition to balance, we should here consider access to decision-making. In order to become a more gender equal organization, one of LRF's goals is to ensure a more even balance among those

⁴¹ Similar findings are found in areas in the Global South, which are more regularly struck by disasters. For example, Webb (2020) presents empirical data from nine communities in Vanatu that were directly hit by a category 5 tropical cyclone Pam in 2015. The study compares actions taken by communities that were included in a disaster risk reduction (DRR) program with communities that were not. In areas with DRR programs, early warnings were widely adhered to and trusted. As the DRR programs prioritized disability inclusion and women's participation, their areas also had greater representation of women in community decision-making. This is reported to have contributed to an increased respect for women over time. Such programs also entailed that men and women collaborated more when preparing and responding to the disaster and that people with disability were supported by the whole community (Webb 2020).

elected that represent the organization. In 2020, however, women only constituted 20% in this group (LRF 2020).

3.2. Resilience: Ability to act, prepare, and evacuate

Social roles and responsibilities

Summary: While gender equality has improved, differences in social roles and responsibilities remain important for understanding how men and women will be affected by a crisis. This can concern what forms of skills they have developed, their access to resources and, fundamentally, their responsibilities in relation to other family members.

When a crisis or disaster strikes, the diverse roles and responsibilities of men and women and the difference in access to power and economy that these entail can result in women and men being affected in different ways (see e.g., Neumayer and Plümper 2007; Mehta 2007). For example, if women have a greater responsibility for home and family duties, this can bring with it a lower capacity to earn an income (Mehta 2007). In turn, this means less opportunities to save cash for emergency situations. Even more severely, Neumayer and Plümper reviewing a sample of 141 countries between 1981 and 2002 found that, on average, natural disasters kill more women than men and at a younger age due to social roles having built in socio-economic vulnerabilities. For example, in Sri Lanka, fewer women than men had been taught to swim and climb, skills that helped boys and men to survive the tsunami in 2004. They also highlighted the importance of women looking after children and the elderly. They argue that this responsibility can negatively affect women's ability to flee as they are unable both to leave alone and to bring these groups with them. Importantly, the difference in effect between men and women is smaller in countries with higher levels of gender equality but it still exists (Neumayer and Plümper 2007), underlining that this is a problem that can be addressed but still is relevant for all countries. This is further supported by Pearse's (2017) study of drought-affected farms in Australia. The study shows that men were more likely to take up difficult farm work and suffer ill mental health as an effect of the crisis, while women were more likely to take up paid work outside the farm and experience the stress of monitoring their work, home, and husbands' health.

Access to resources

Summary: Economic resources can be relevant for understanding how a society can equally address men's and women's security needs. For example, resources can affect a society's capacity to ensure maternal health support. It is also important for understanding individual men's and women's situations during a crisis. For example, individual women's access to cash

for emergencies and to information as compared to men. Research here underline that women are likely to be over-represented among those with less resources in a society.

On an overarching level, previous research has found that poverty and the socio-economic situation of a community will affect both the kind and the degree of damage a crisis will have. For example, there are studies on national differences (Brooks et al., 2005) and regional differences (e.g., Rubin 2014) that find correlations between socio-economic factors and fatalities during disasters. Research further suggest that if access to resources can affect how a person can cope with a crisis, access often varies within a society due to "...age, physical ability, citizenship status, racial/ethnic and cultural group, and gender" (Enarson 2000, 7). We should here note that women tend to be poorer, i.e., have less access to economic resources than men in almost every country in the world (Henrici et al., 2015; The World Bank 2019; The World Bank 2015; Chindarkar 2012; Seager 2006).⁴² Crises with clear economic dimensions could thereby be expected to affect men and women differently. For example, Blanton et al. (2019) examined how financial crises have impacted on women across 68 countries during the years 1980–2010 using quantitative data. The study found that a crisis had a negative impact on one's well-being and was negatively associated with women's participation in the labor force, proportion of women in the parliament, women's educational achievement (especially on tertiary level), and maternal mortality rate. This suggests that women's lives overall are negatively impacted both in the long- and short-term, which suggests that mitigation efforts should be broad.

Similar trends can be found in other forms of disasters. For example, Alston (2014) reviewed differences between men and women during and after climate disasters in socio-economically weak societies. She found that such events may compound existing vulnerabilities via loss of control over natural resources, educational or employment opportunities, or capacity for local organization as well as increased exposure to unsafe conditions. Interestingly, the study notes that women had less access to resources for disaster preparedness, mitigation, and rehabilitation. In poorer countries, women's work may also increase during disaster times because men are more likely to migrate for work as well as because of scarce energy sources, clean water, safe sanitation, and health issues. Brooks et al. found in a global study of climate-related disasters that eleven key indicators are correlated with mortality outcomes: (1) population with access to sanitation, (2) literacy rate, 15–24 year old, (3) maternal mortality, (4) literacy rate, over 15 years, (5) calorific intake, (6) voice and accountability, (7) civil liberties, (8) political rights, (9) government effectiveness, (10) female to male literacy ratio, and (11) life expectancy at birth (Brooks et al.

⁴² This is also prevalent in research on climate change; poor people will have the most difficulties to cope with climate change - and women are often those who are the poorest with the least capacity to prepare for and cope with a changing climate (Demetriades and Esplen 2008).

2005).⁴³ In this report, the effect of maternal health and female to male literacy ratio can be considered particularly interesting as the first is a global phenomenon and the second can relate to potential differences among groups in all societies. This further serves to underline that research also underscore the importance of not building action on stereotypes but on empirics and analysis of a specific situation in order to develop policies that can assist both men and women (Hilhorst et al. 2018; Bradshaw et al., 2017).

Handling evacuation and displacement

Summary: Men and women can face particular challenges in a situation where they are forced to evacuate or rapidly flee. These differences depend on their social roles, affecting access to cash and family responsibilities, and the forms of violence of which they are the target. Age matters, where boys can be vulnerable to sexual violence like women and girls.

Evacuations and displacement constitute frequent features of a severe crisis. Research suggest that being displaced can bring with it several different forms of difficulties for individuals depending on the context: issues related to security and safety, the stress of living in a temporary shelter, economic loss, and loss of one's home. Even more severe, during an evacuation or when forced to flee, one can become separated from family members and friends. These conditions might also affect the health of the displaced persons. People who can return home often recover better from trauma than those who are unable to return. Women, elderly, children, and minorities are often identified as more vulnerable groups during displacement (Oliver-Smith 2018).

While information is sparse in relation to learning on displacement from northern Europe, research on crisis have covered issues related to the migration wave into Europe 2015–2016 in-depth. While this research focuses on population groups entering into Europe, a few central points on potential differences between men and women of relevance for an evacuation scenario can still be distilled. This suggests that women face particular obstacles related to having less access to economic resources, being the main caretaker of the children, facing more restrictions on solo travel, and are more afraid of violence than men. For example, Freedman examined violence against refugee women in Greece, Serbia, and France between June 2015 and January 2016. Women traveling alone or with their children were at higher risk of sexual violence from

⁴³ There is also a discussion at the country level. Kim, using global data on where poor people live and exposure to natural disasters found that globally, poor people “are much more exposed to natural disasters than the non-poor” (Kim 2012, 208). The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction report (2009) further confirms that although poorer and richer countries face similar levels of disasters, poor countries have disproportionality higher economic and mortality risks (UNDRR 2009, see also Kahn 2005). High income countries account for 39% of the exposure to tropical cyclones but 1% of the mortality risks. Low income countries account for 13% of the exposure risk, but 81% of the mortality risk (UNDRR 2009). What regions are the most exposed vary over time. The high concentration of poor people in disaster-prone areas indicates that the greater concentration of people in risky areas due to migration, high population growth and less pro-poor growth, makes them the most vulnerable in the event of a disaster (Kim 2012).

smugglers or traffickers and from police and coastguards which Freedman reports from the Turkish border. Overcrowding, inadequate facilities, or no accommodation at all left women to sleep in tents, fields, parks, or overcrowded housing that often lacks access to sanitary facilities. During migratory journeys together with their families, women faced a greater risk of violence from their husbands, in particular as migration could lead to changes in power relations (Freedman 2016). These situations negatively impact women's health and further expose them to violence. Similarly, Chindarkar in a study on climate change and migration argues that some of the main risks for women during migration due to climate change is safety and security. There are risks of sexual violence during displacements, and emergency shelters often lack safety for women (Chindarkar 2012).

Age adds another dimension to this. Amid this crisis, Europe is hosting an unprecedented number of young migrants, many coming separate from their families (Mason-Jones and Nicholson 2018). Mason-Jones and Nicholson (2018) concluded that separated children are at a greater risk for vulnerability to physical violence, sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse. They found that despite the fact that the majority of literature have focused on women, some studies suggest that boys experience similar risks as girls for sexual exploitation and abuse (Mason-Jones and Nicholson 2018). Poverty conditions during a migration may lead both boys and girls to engage in "survival" sex (Mason-Jones and Nicholson 2018).

Box 3. Learning from the 2011 disaster in Japan: the role of gender and age

On the 11th of March 2011, Japan was hit by a severe earthquake followed by a large tsunami. Much of the infrastructure in the affected areas were destroyed, and approximately 18,500 people died. The disaster affected the elderly in the community to a very high extent. They constituted the majority of those who died: of the dead and missing, 64.3% were over 60 years old (and 45.5% were over 70) (Sun & Sun 2019). Children had lower mortality rates (González-Riancho et al. 2015). The cost for the disaster is estimated to be around \$ 235 billion (Pongponrat and Ishii 2018).

As Japan had continuously been affected by these forms of natural disasters, it had developed a preparedness system already prior to the 2011 crisis. Evacuation constituted the primary tool used to protect the population. Due to the size of the disaster in 2011, however, this proved to be insufficient, particularly regarding assisting the elderly. Key factors behind their increased vulnerability were being more socially isolated and/or suffering from chronic diseases, or from physical or cognitive disabilities. In Japan, older adults suffering from these social and physical issues a) planned to evacuate only to a nearby shelter, b) required more time to evacuate, c) expressed a disinterest in preparing for a crisis, and d) did not receive the warning messages to

the same extent as other groups. Single older women were found to be the most vulnerable, in terms of having low levels of preparedness. The same study found that women required more evacuation time than men and were not inclined to seek help with an evacuation. In addition, women held negative attitudes toward conducting night-time drills. Overall, single households had lower levels of preparedness, while households of three to five persons were better prepared. Having children also increased the chances of being prepared (Sun and Sun 2019). Finally, it was found that Thai women, a minority population, had even lower levels of preparedness than other groups. The reasons were twofold: 1) there were language barriers which meant that these women could not access material on crisis preparedness and 2) these women had not been recognized in existing public preparedness plans. Research also found that the Thai women needed more assistance in order to obtain the right form of help after the disaster (Pongponrat and Ishii 2018).

Overall, the gender differences in mortality were small. In the worst affected areas, women made up 54% and men 46% of those who died (González-Riancho et al., 2015). The difference in effect from the tsunami instead came from variation in assistance. Saito (2012) describes the social norms and responsibilities in the affected areas as very traditional and where women were responsible for the family. However, the evacuation centers did not meet their needs in terms of being able to carry out their caring activities. In addition, women reported not feeling safe in these shelters. This was made worse by violence against women being so stigmatized that it could not be discussed (and, hence, addressed). As an outcome of the disaster, therefore, women started to organize by creating women's groups and networks (Saito 2012).

3.3. Population safety

According to Bradshaw's review of results in previous research, it is central to ensure that women's situations are explicitly included when conducting a risk analysis (Bradshaw 2014). For example, the World Health Organization argue that while natural disasters do not per se discriminate, the risks associated with them might affect men and women differently due to variations in the starting points. Such variations need to be considered in disaster relief before, during, and after the event. Otherwise, the effect can be de facto discrimination as men's and women's concerns might not be equally considered or they might not benefit equally from efforts to address the situation (WHO 2017). Other studies tend to emphasize women's disadvantaged situation. For example, Shapira et al. (2015), Enarson (2000), Neumayer and Plümper (2007), and Seager (2014) argue that women and girls are more vulnerable than men and boys in the event of a disaster. While most research here primarily focus on maritime disasters and earthquakes, a few trends are relevant for our study, not least as these forms of crisis tend to play out in urban areas, have a rapid development, and result in mass casualties. Understanding vulnerability and risk can

be important from several perspectives. For example, Bergstrand et al. (2015) found a correlation between high levels of vulnerability and low levels of resilience when measuring the concepts of social vulnerability and community resilience across the U.S.

Direct effects of crisis/disaster

Summary: There can be differences in vulnerability between men and women. These can take two shapes: 1) differences in degree related to how seriously a person is affected or 2) difference in form, that is, by what form of risk a person is affected. In addition, these differences can interact with age and socio-economic status and how prepared the responsible actors are to handle a crisis in an aware manner. Overall, men – particularly younger ones – are found to survive many forms of disasters to a higher extent than women. This can be explained in part by different physical differences (in terms of upper-body strength) and in part by social roles with women often being responsible for children and elderly, thereby becoming less mobile.

Similar to research on resources, research argue that "...individual characteristics, such as gender, age, physical disabilities and behavioral strategies; household characteristics, such as socioeconomic status (usually household income); and community characteristics, such as the existence of ... medical aid response" affect the degree of vulnerability and "...that communities with socially vulnerable populations experience more casualties" (Shapira et al., 2015, 1449). Hence, gender/sex can potentially be important, but it is also central to consider the economic situation of the household and how society has prepared to handle potential differences in effects between men and women. One example, often used when seeking to capture variations in direct lethal effects from disasters, is that more women than men died in the 2004 tsunami in Asia (Felten-Biermann 2006). Notably, from using longitudinal population-based survey data in the areas that were most affected, Frankenberg et al. found that males aged 15–44 were most likely to survive. This is believed to be because they were the strongest. In addition, that age group of men were also likely to help others survive; a person who was in the vicinity of a male aged 15–44 years old was more likely to survive than a person who was around people that needed help and support – such as the elderly or small children. In turn, this is believed to have affected women's survival rate negatively as women have less upper body strength, in combination with being responsible for the care of these groups (Frankenberg et al., 2011)⁴⁴. Similarly, analyzing a database of 18 maritime disasters over three decades, Elinder and Erixon found that "the survival rate of women is, on average, only about half that of men" (Elinder and Erixon 2012). This is in line with Neumayer and Plümper who found that the life expectancy of women decreases more

⁴⁴ Note that this study takes into account both differences due to biological and social constructions. To read more on norms and constructions, see Woodward and Duncanson 2017; Hagemann, Dudink, and Rose 2020).

than the life expectancy of men after a disaster, indicating that women die to a larger degree and/or at an earlier age, than men; Part of that can stem from maternal health effects. Furthermore, the stronger the disaster is the more severe effect on women's life expectancy (relative to that of males). It was also found that the higher women's socioeconomic status were, the weaker were the natural disaster's effect on the gender gap in life expectancy (Neumayer and Plümper 2008).

In addition to fatalities, the effect from a crisis can be more indirect. For example, the 2011 earthquake in Japan affected the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, resulting in all hospitals within a 20 km radius of the plant being evacuated. After nine months, these patients had "significantly higher mortality rate than the nursing home residents..." from outside of the evacuation area. Male patients had a substantially higher mortality rate than the female patients (Igarashi et al. 2018). Nevertheless, a review of a large number of quantitative research studies on earthquakes found inconsistent findings on sex and age and that preparedness in terms of medical aid and support could play a key role to mitigate effects (Shapira et al., 2015).

Crime rates

Summary: There can be differences, both in terms of women's and men's attitudes and concern with crime and what form of crime they are exposed to. As noted in research, it is important to differentiate between crime forms when seeking to understand the effect of a crisis and that domestic violence is a form of crime that is likely to increase substantially.

A general trend in previous research (found in multiple case studies, both on Sweden and other countries) is that women tend to be more concerned with, or even scared of, crime than men (Smith et al., 2001; Söderström 2019; Brück and Müller 2010).⁴⁵ While underdeveloped, Zahran et al. (2009) argue that research on crime rates in the aftermath of different disasters are dominated by two main theories: one that states that in the event of a natural disaster, crime will not rise – instead people will be altruistic and want to help one another. The second theory claims the opposite: in the event of a natural disaster, the crime will increase massively due to the opportunity for organizations to commit various crimes. They looked closely at the aftermath of natural disasters in Florida and different forms of crimes, such as index crimes (e.g., murder, rape, aggravated assault), property crimes, and domestic violence crimes. They found that the natural disasters significantly decreased all forms of crimes apart from domestic violence, which increased significantly. They argue that in the initial phases of the disaster, survivors had to focus

⁴⁵ From her research on exposure to crime and political knowledge, Söderström found that those who had been exposed to crime have a reduced sense of security, and that the reduced sense of security reduces the political knowledge. However, this finding is only apparent for men, not for women – which indicates that a reduced sense of security among women does not lower their political knowledge (Söderström 2019).

on their basic needs, and that they were helping each other out. In the private sphere, however, post-disaster stress could be one explanation for the increasing rates in domestic violence (Zahran et al., 2009).⁴⁶

Zahran et al.'s (2009) findings are also in line with other studies that have shown increased domestic violence after exposure to a natural disaster. For example, Parkinson (2019) conducted in-depth interviews with thirty women in the Victoria region of Australia after the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfire. Many of the women interviewed spoke of their relationships having been disrupted by the fires and experiences of increased violence from their husbands. Explanations for this increased domestic violence included reasoning that disaster might bring existing violence up to the surface or exacerbate women's vulnerability (Parkinson 2019). After the earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand, in September 2010 and February 2011, the police reported that domestic violence had increased by one-fifth, in the weeks after the disasters (True 2013). Further, women's shelters reported a spike in domestic abuse following the disasters, with more incidents and an increase in young women seeking help in safe houses (True 2013). This means that while the overall criminal behavior might not increase, it is important to be aware of rising levels of violence in the private sphere. This, in turn, might affect some women's ability to handle a crisis.

Sexual Violence

Summary: There is limited research on sexual violence in crises, but the examples that exist speak to the need to prepare for increasing levels of violence, not least related to opportunity.

According to the WHO, anecdotal evidence and some systematic studies do indicate that sexual violence, intimate partner violence, and child abuse can become prevalent after disasters (WHO 2005; Enarson 1999). Focus groups conducted in Sri Lanka, after the disastrous tsunami of 2004, suggest that the turmoil in the initial phase after the tsunami led to rapes and sexual violence – with perpetrators 'seizing the opportunity' (Fisher 2010).⁴⁷ However, more systematic research is needed on this area (World Health Organization 2005; Enarson 1999; Seager 2014). What can be drawn out of this is the need to consider that the possibility of violence against women will increase during a crisis and what this can entail for how state actors prepare for supporting the population.

⁴⁶ In addition to noting the importance of recognizing different forms of crime, there is also a question of where the crimes take place. In a case study on Brisbane neighborhoods after a flood, Zahnnow et al. found that property crime rose after the flood. However, after a closer examination, it turned out that the increase in crime was driven by "property crime trends in non-flooded, affluent neighborhoods" (Zahnnow et al., 2017, 857). Their finding indicates that the flooded areas led to displacement of property crime to the non-affected and richer areas (ibid).

⁴⁷ There are concerns with previous studies on violence against women during emergencies, since they often rely on nonprobability samples (Stark and Ager 2011). An issue is that organizations utilize data from patient records or formal reports to the police. This might produce an overestimated picture of stranger violence and can be underestimating violence against women within the home (2011).

Health

Summary: There is limited research on health impacts for women and men separately. However, it does suggest that women and men can be impacted mentally and physically different by a crisis. This can involve variation in patterns of post-traumatic stress disorder and in terms of maternal health effects.

Apart from Neumayer and Plümper's investigation into whether or not the strength of a disaster affects the life expectancy differently for men and women (2008), few studies have examined physical health impacts for men and women separately. However, in a review of studies on vulnerability during and after natural disasters, Alston (2014) found that while men's mental health is found to suffer, morbidity and insecurity are found to increase for women (Alston 2014). Within the field of research on mental health consequences of natural disasters, Forbes, et al. (2015) examined the role of anger in mental health after such events. Using existing data on adult residents in rural and regional Victoria, Australia after the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfire, they found that females showed a direct significant relationship between exposure to the fires and mental health outcomes. Indirectly, anger and major life stressors such as disruptions to their occupations, accommodation, or personal relationships were significant for both men and women. They suggest that anger and stressors can mediate the effect of disaster exposure on mental health problems (Forbes et al. 2015). Myles et al. (2018) presented results from surveys with children and adolescents after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005–2006.

Overall, there is a general consensus in the research community that people that have been exposed to stressors such as a disaster, are at risk of developing psychological issues, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In a systematic review of published articles on PTSD symptoms from 1980–2007, Neira, Nandi, and Galea found that PTSD among people who have been exposed to a disaster is substantial (Neira et al., 2007). Furthermore, it is found that PTSD after a natural disaster is lower than after a human made or technological disasters. PTSD is also higher among those who have been directly exposed to the disaster (ibid). There are numerous case studies on PTSD in post-disaster societies (see e.g., Bokszczanin 2007; Kar and Kumar Bastia 2006; Dell'Osso et al., 2010). The results differ when looking at differences between men and women: in several studies, it is found that women and girls have higher levels of PTSD than men and boys (Bokszczanin 2007; Dell'Osso et al., 2010), but in other studies it is found that women have higher levels of depression but less levels of PTSD than men (Kar and Kumar Bastia 2006).

4. Learning from a society under stress: Hurricane Katrina

Summary: *On the 29th of August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern Louisiana, USA, destroying property and infrastructure in about 90,000 square miles of land and particularly affecting the city of New Orleans. One critical result was mass-evacuation and movement. Prior to the disaster, New Orleans had approx. 455,000 inhabitants. In 2006, this number had fallen to 209,000. As such, this example demonstrates what it can entail when a major crisis strikes an urban area at a rapid pace.*

Prior to the crisis:

On average, women had less access to resources than men. More women than men were also living under the poverty line; in particular, female-headed households with children were vulnerable. While gender equality had started to rise, the social roles and responsibilities followed traditional lines. Women were to a higher extent responsible for children and the elderly, more men than women worked outside of the home or were involved in decision-making.

During the crisis:

Misinformation and rumors became prominent as the public communication broke down. This included reports of increased crime rates and rapes, which later often proved to be false. The misinformation contributed to lowering the populations' trust in the state agencies. Crime rates in general remained stable or even declined, even in the areas that received the most of those evacuated during the hurricane. The one form of crime that increased was inter-partner violence targeting women.

Because of a lack of resources, many in New Orleans had difficulties evacuating in time. This resulted in a substantial number turning to close by, but often ill-equipped and risky, shelters in the city center. This included women who had less access to a car and to cash. Of those that evacuated, pregnant women or women with small children constituted particularly vulnerable groups as water supplies, sanitation, and food supplies broke down. Men were overrepresented among those that were reluctant to leave their houses in fear of looting. In addition, age mattered for the willingness and ability to leave. More men than women also died during the crisis. Potentially, this was the result of men staying behind to protect their property to a higher extent. Drowning was the most common cause of death. Age mattered as 49% of those who died were 75 years old or older.


After the crisis:

Physical and psychological violence toward women are reported to have remained high after the crisis. Men were primarily the target of psychological violence (though still to a lesser extent than women).

4.1. Background to the Hurricane and the conditions in New Orleans

On the 29th of August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern Louisiana, destroying 90,000 square miles of land (a size as large as the United Kingdom). From New Orleans to Biloxi in Mississippi, cities were damaged by severe flooding – the sea level was approximately 8 meters above the normal levels in Mississippi, and around 5–8 meters above the normal sea level in Louisiana. When the levees and flood walls that were supposed to protect New Orleans failed, most of the city ended up under water (The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006).

Picture 1. Map: Flood depth and social vulnerability (Finch et al., 2010)



One of the most critical aspects of the hurricane was the mass-evacuation and movement of the population. In total, 300,000 homes were destroyed or damaged. In the Gulf region, more than 1,000,000 people were displaced. At its peak, relief shelters housed around 273,000 people. An estimated 114,000 households remained in state supported trailer parks, long after the disaster (CNN Library 2019; The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006). New Orleans' population fell drastically after the hurricane. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2010), the city's population decreased from 455,000 inhabitants prior to the crisis to 209,000 in 2006. Close to 20 years after the event, in 2018, the population still had failed to return to pre-disaster levels (approximately 391,006 in 2018). Groen and Polvika, using Current Population Survey, found that age, income, and severity of damage in the country of origin were predictors

of being able to return or not. In addition, they found that Afro-Americans were less likely to return. This had generated a shift in racial composition of the most affected areas as these had seen an increase in Hispanic residents (Groen and Polvika 2010).

4.2. Mobilization and support

Attitudes toward and trust in state actors and information

When the hurricane made landfall, the communication infrastructure broke down. This meant that the cell phone towers were out and that the landlines did not work. One of the consequences was that it became impossible to contact the police or other critical social functions for three days. In addition, the state authorities failed to distribute any information about how they were addressing the crisis. Instead, rumors and speculation spread among the population. Several news channels even contributed by reporting murders and rapes taking place and that snipers were shooting at rescuers. Most of these reports were later proved to be false. The overall result was a decreased degree of confidence in the state's services and ability (Miller 2006; Thornton and Voigt 2007). According to a poll conducted by CBS News directly after Hurricane Katrina, it was found that the approval rates for President George Bush fell drastically – from 54% prior to Hurricane Katrina to 38% after the crisis (Roberts 2005). A study surveying residents in the most affected areas found that those who had been most negatively affected by the hurricane had lower levels of political trust and more pessimistic views on the recovery efforts (Nicholls and Picou 2012).

4.3. Ability to act, prepare, and evacuate

Social roles and responsibilities

In relation to Hurricane Katrina, policy and research have sought to understand the effect of men's and women's social roles and responsibilities on how they could act and handle the crisis. In the U.S., women are more often than men the major caregiver and spend more hours doing unpaid labor in the home (Enarson 2012). Women also, more often than men, take care of the elderly. Both children and elderly were difficult to evacuate during a crisis which came to affect women's ability to leave the city in time (Butterbaugh 2005; Institute for Women's Policy Research 2010). Building on interviews with 96 individuals, Peek and Forthergill support the suggestion that the mothers took the core responsibility for the family during Hurricane Katrina. According to this study, women prepared before the evacuation, made the decisions regarding when to leave, and were responsible for their children during the relocation to the shelters. This was due to both personal decisions but also due to distribution of labors. The men more often had employment, which had taken them away from home (Peek and Forthergill 2008). Women were also

represented among the poorest. Governmental statistics on New Orleans show that in 2000, 49% of all children lived in a female-headed household, with no father present. This can be compared to 5% of children who lived in a single male-headed household (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Women with shared custody of their children could or would not evacuate without their children. Many women and others unable to leave the city thereby ended up staying or were in nearby shelters of last resort, such as the Superdome in the city, which was ill-equipped to handle a large number of those evacuated. Furthermore, women and especially women with small kids were facing other kinds of issues when living for an extended amount of time in the state shelters and in trailer parks – since the environment was not adapted to small children and nursing mothers (Peek and Forthergill 2008).

Access to resources

From a study of New Orleans which used GIS⁴⁸ technology, it was found that Hurricane Katrina damaged most areas of the city. Nevertheless, the interaction of sex, ethnicity/race, and socio-economic status of different groups in the population still played a significant role in who could respond in time and who could rebuild successfully in the aftermath (Masozera et al., 2006). Most notably, African-American women in the Gulf coast region of Louisiana were some of the poorest people in the United States (Ransby 2006; Gault et al., 2005). In New Orleans city, these women were more likely to be poor, to lack health insurance, and to have a low-wage job than men (Gault et al., 2005). Many poor women in single households with children also lived in the low-lying housing area called the Ninth Ward, an area that was among the worst affected (Ransby 2006). The lack of resources contributed to many being unable to evacuate the city (Gault et al., 2005). Particularly, access to a car appeared to have played a key role. Fifty-five percent of those who did not evacuate in time had no car or any other form of transport to evacuate (Bay 2010). In the Ninth Ward, less than 70% of the households had access to cars (Bay 2010). There were also reports and witnesses stating that as the hurricane struck just before paychecks and social security checks had arrived, this meant that even fewer had enough money to buy fuel or pay for alternative lodgings (Fussell 2006; Phillips and Fordham 2010).

4.4. Population safety

Direct effects of the disaster

In total, 1,577 people are estimated to have died directly or indirectly from Hurricane Katrina (CNN Library 2019; The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006). Based on suggestions from the reviewed research, we would have expected more women than

⁴⁸ Geographic Information System

men to die from the disaster. However, this did not happen during Hurricane Katrina; more men than women died. Fifty-three percent of the casualties were men, and 47% were women (Brunkard et al., 2008). Afro-Americans were overrepresented among the casualties, and 49% of those who died were 75 years old or older (Brunkard et al., 2008). According to Brunkard et al., one could perceive two potential explanations for why older people were overrepresented among those who died from Hurricane Katrina. First, the older population might have been less likely to want to leave their homes. This could be either due to previous experiences of false alarms and fear of looting, or they did not want to leave medical equipment that they needed behind. Secondly, older people are more likely to die of drowning or injuries during a hurricane due to vulnerabilities that come with age (Brunkard et al., 2008).

Crime rates

There is a lack of reliable and precise statistics on the eventual rise of crime rates in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Leitner et al., 2011). However, from using Index Crimes from the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau, Leitner et al. still found that the crime rates appeared to have remained stable or even declined in the areas that received the most evacuated persons. At the end of 2007, they found that crimes such as burglary and robbery returned to pre-Hurricane Katrina levels, whereas crimes such as murder and aggravated assault even rose above pre-Hurricane Katrina levels in the same period (Leitner et al., 2011). Media played a central role in the debate on crime. In the initial phases of Hurricane Katrina, stories of massive looting were spread. Thereafter, many of these reports have been argued to have been blown out of proportion. The looting that occurred turned out to mainly consist of people getting food and water; looting that can be perceived as justifiable at a time when the state/federal assistance failed in supplying the population with food and water (Nobo and Pfeffer 2012).

A form of violence that did appear to not follow the same trend was domestic violence. For example, Schumacher, studying 23 lower Mississippi counties 6 months before and after Hurricane Katrina, found an increase in both psychological and physical intimate partner violence toward women, and an increase in psychological violence toward men (Schumacher et al., 2010).⁴⁹ At this point in time, women remained displaced from their homes and lived in temporary shelters and trailer parks. These women appeared to be at the greatest risk. A study using statistics

⁴⁹ The sample used was 445 married persons or those co-habiting. Before Katrina, 4.3% of the women reported to have had experienced physical victimization. After Katrina, the number rose to 8.3% of the women reporting that they had experienced physical victimization (Schumacher et al., 2010).

from two health needs assessments⁵⁰ of violence against women⁵¹ show that after the hurricane, the rate of violence against women – including both intimate partner violence (IPV) and sexual violence without specification to the perpetrator – in Mississippi rose from 4.6/100,000 per day to 16.3/100,000 per day (2006). The rates have declined in the years after (The Institute for Women's Policy Research 2010; Anastario et al., 2009). The main category of violence that increased was intimate partner violence. These findings are in line with similar research, which find that after disasters, the rate of intimate partner violence tends to rise, especially among internally displaced persons (Anastario et al., 2009). This can be made worse if the safety-net and social network around domestic violence victims also collapse during a disaster as the same time as the criminal justice system, including courts, jails, as well as shelters for battered women, fail to function. In addition, the disaster response system will be unprepared to deal with domestic violence. For example, due to lack of housing, women had to return to their abusers in order to receive financial support from the state,⁵² which they needed to survive (Jenkins and Phillips 2008).

Health

Pregnant women and women that had recently given birth are a lot less mobile than other groups, which makes them vulnerable during a disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina (Gault et al., 2005). Women who were pregnant during or immediately after Hurricane Katrina were more associated with stress and induction of labor. The stress in turn predisposed to pregnancy-induced hypertension and gestational diabetes (Oni et al., 2014). Other risks and special needs for this group and their infants concerned them being extra sensitive to the lack of clean water, lack of access to appropriate and safe food, exposure to toxins, interruption of healthcare, unsafe and crowded living conditions (such as in shelters and trailer parks), as well as loss of electricity (Callaghan et al., 2007). In addition, it has been found that the overall prevalence of PTSD post-Hurricane Katrina was rather high – 22.5% when using a broad criterion and 15.5% using a strict criteria to measure PTSD. It was most common in relation to Hurricane Katrina among those who were female, had suffered financial loss, had a low degree of social support, and had suffered a high number of traumatic events (Galea et al., 2008).

⁵⁰ The method was “using systematic, random sampling among IDPs living in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) travel trailer parks since the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricane season” (Anastario et al., 2009, 17).

⁵¹ Termed gender-based violence.

⁵² Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

5. Society under attack: Learning from research on armed conflict

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, armed conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 2020c). This section draws on the review of systematic empiricist research on armed conflict, providing specific insights into variations in roles, situations, and effects for men and women. While much remains to be studied, research has improved much since 2000 (see Olsson 2009; Gizelis 2019), primarily due to an improved access to disaggregated data. The review is additionally supported by insights from two examples: Northern Ireland and Ukraine.

In addition, we should here recognize that research discussed in this section exist in a broader gender equality context; studies have found a robust support for a relationship between gender inequality and the risk of armed conflict. These results all point in the same direction: countries that display higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to become involved in armed conflict, violence is likely to be more severe, and post-conflict peace appears to be more fragile compared to countries where women have a higher status (Caprioli 2005; Demeritt et al., 2014; Gizelis 2009; 2011; Melander 2005; Forsberg and Olsson 2020). In fact, gender inequality may potentially even trump the level of democracy and economic development in terms of explanatory power in civil war research (Bjarnegård et al., 2015; Hudson et al., 2008).

For a few of these studies, however, it is not entirely certain that the causal relationship is not the reverse, that is, it is not the armed conflict that is causing a positive development in gender equality. Most notably, Webster et al. (2019) used cross-national data from 1900–2015 to examine how conflicts affect women’s empowerment. They found that war can interrupt social institutions, shifting roles and politics, and increasing women’s empowerment in the short- and medium-term, up to 10–15 years. Although battle fatalities were not related to women’s empowerment, regime change and role shifts were, with the latter likely to have impermanent impacts (Webster et al., 2019). War can create opportunities for women to enter more traditionally male-dominated vocational and social roles, which could lead women to become more valued in these roles, as well as for women to take on new economic activities. It can also create environments where there is more critique of the status quo gender hierarchy. Finally, conflict may shift social and political orders that allow for women to participate more in civil, social, and political movements. Political changes are found in the 3–5 year term. Longer wars correspond with more increases in women’s empowerment (Webster et al., 2019). However, positive changes were arguably dependent on political efforts for institutionalization and women’s access to the implementation process. In

relation to the 15-year anniversary of WPS resolution 1325 in 2015, women's continued lack of access and influence on conflict prevention and peace processes therefore became central themes in the debate (UN Women 2015; UN Security Council 2019b). This was further promoted by research indicating that women's exclusion undermines both the durability and the quality of peace (see Krause et al., 2018; Olsson and Gizelis 2019; and Joshi and Olsson 2020), resulting in a surge in the use of more instrumentalist arguments for the importance of women's participation to complement the rights-based ones.

5.1. Mobilization and support

Attitudes toward and trust in state actors and information

Summary: Research suggest that there can be differences in men's and women's attitudes on defense, such as to the military and to the use of force, and in the trust of state actors and information. Such differences can be caused by other factors, such as ideology, but are prevalent in most states. It is also central to recognize that such attitudes vary over time. For example, men's and women's level of trust could vary during a conflict, and groups with prior experience of war might have different levels of trust compared to those without such an experience. These attitudes might be colored by the manner in which war violence was directed toward men and women. Taking advantage of such differences in attitudes is possible and research indicate that disinformation campaigns could potentially target women and men in different ways.

In one area of research, attitudes and trust are placed in relation to how it affects the military and other state actors involved in the defense of the national territory. Here, ensuring the trust of the population is considered crucial for success. Another aspect concerns the relationship between trust and the behavior of the population. If a state is not successful in protecting its citizens, research suggest that there is a risk that citizens will take on the duties of protecting themselves or be less willing to contribute to society (see Kasher 2003). The level of trust in the military and attitudes toward deference-related issues are also consistently measured in many countries such as the U.S. and U.K., as in Sweden (see Wallenius et al., 2019 for an overview).

Based on such data, studies have found differences in attitudes between men and women. For example, using survey material from the U.S. about attitudes toward the use of force in relation to twenty-four conflict-related events occurring between 1982 and 2013, Eichenberg showed that women tended to be less supportive than men (2016). Nonetheless, these gaps can vary over time and across situations. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are such examples. There, the gaps were reduced as men's support of the war decreased over time, while women, on average, remained more negative (Eichenberg 2016). Feinstein (2017), drawing on U.S. opinion poll material

between 1986 and 2007, also found that men were more supportive of military action than women. Similar to Eichenberg, however, Feinstein found that in some situations, the attitude gap was reduced in the later stages of more prolonged military engagements. But are these due to biological differences as was first suggested (see Caprioli 2000 for an overview)? Probably not. When controlling for political ideology, sex becomes a less relevant explanation. Specifically, there are, on average, some differences in men's and women's ideological standpoints that explain the difference in attitudes to violence (Bjarnegard and Melander 2017). There is no evidence that education or income affect support for military action, nor for arguments that women are less inclined to support war due to empathy or motherhood (Feinstein 2017). Overall, this discussion indicates that it can be important to disaggregate attitude data to the defense and military action but that we should avoid assuming that such differences depend on biological explanations.

These aspects concern attitudes primarily during peace time. In addition, research have studied perceptions of state institutions during an ongoing armed conflict (for overview, see Deglow 2018). Deglow pointed out that how the population will react, can depend on a number of factors. She states that the "type of state institution, the extent to which individuals are exposed to organized violence, as well as the perpetrator, victim and type of violence are all likely to matter for the direction and magnitude of effect" (Deglow 2018). While many of these studies have primarily focused on low income countries, they still highlight important considerations. For example, De Juan and Pierskalla examine the Nepalese civil war and found that exposure to war violence has a negative effect on peoples' trust in the state compared to people who lived in areas unaffected by the armed conflict. This is exacerbated by material and human loss and can stem from both a failure of the government to halt an aggression and to seeing the state perform violence. This negative effect is similar for men and women. Overall, they find that age is positively related to trust in the population at large (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). Effects can also be long-term. For example, Hong and Kang (2017) found that those who were born during the Korean War and exposed to violence are still "less supportive of the South Korean government, especially the administration and the military" (Hong and Kang 2017, 264–265) compared to those born only a few years after the conflict. These are indeed long-term effects, as this study measured attitudes over 60 years after the war ended. The Korean War was a war with a high degree of civilian casualties, including a "systematic and widespread killing of male civilians" and which included a stigmatization of family members of the victims along identity lines (Hong and Kang 2017, 264–265).

A final trend in research concerns trust in information and how disinformation campaigns are used during an armed conflict. Since the rise of the internet, disinformation aiming to decrease

trust in the state has become easier to distribute to the population. Recent examples include the Brexit referendum in Great Britain and the use of the internet by extremist groups, such as ISIL and right-wing groups. The latter also use online campaigns to recruit new members, adapting the information to the target groups so that they can reach both men and women (Lock and Ludolph 2019). There are several reviews and analyses of different actors' use of disinformation (see e.g., Haines 2015; Kamalov 2012), which show how disinformation is used, to demoralize – to damage the target of the propaganda – the goal of which is to change the attitudes and minds of the recipients (Lock and Ludolph 2019). How disinformation campaigns play on variations in men's and women's attitudes, knowledge, and roles are thereby central to consider.

Inclusion

Summary: In order for both men's and women's concerns to be addressed, research identifies both the role of their participation in the organizations involved in matters related to defense and national security and their inclusion in formal decision-making. In this way, research furthermore brings out the need to consider both the legitimacy in decision-making and the potential effects that a distribution of labor can have. Finally, while research finds that there exist trends in where and how women and men participate, research also underlines that it is essential not to make stereotypical assumptions based on these trends as women's and men's roles can be affected by the degree of gender equality, by ideology, as well as by socio-economic conditions.

Research have studied women's involvement in politics at the decision-making level and the potential relationship to changes in political focus and priorities⁵³. A gap in political standpoints have been noted. For example, prior to the 1970s, women in Europe tended to be more conservative than men. Since then, however, women have shifted more to the left, although there are considerable differences between countries and across generations. While often small, the gaps appear to be stable and can in competitive environments be important for election outcomes (Dassonneville 2020). Another strand in research discussed women's inclusion and defense issues. As noted by Schroeder and Powell, trends in research "have found that women in politics can impact a variety aspects of civil–military relations. This includes findings such as states with higher levels of female representation act less militaristically in international affairs, spending less on their militaries, and using less violence interstate relations" (Schroeder and Powell 2018, 460). Potentially, this depends on the issue. Shea and Christian, analyzing data on humanitarian military interventions and women legislators from 1946–2003, found that women legislators

⁵³ For further discussion see Campbell et al 2009 for analysis of the relationship between the representatives and the represented in Britain.

showed more support for military interventions that were specifically designed to prevent sexual violence and protect children in humanitarian crises (2017).

In addition to issues on inclusion at the decision-making level, research suggest that there are clear trends in the inclusion of men and women in organizations involved in an armed conflict. One of the most obvious patterns is that military organizations tend to be male dominated, from the management and down to the individual soldier. In many geographical areas, men are also often in the majority, of those who participate in political movements and parties linked to opposition movements. Nonetheless, the absolute majority of men will remain civilian during an armed conflict. This is important. Since younger men, in particular, constitute the recruitment base for armed movements, this association with combat may increase the risks for men as a group. The events in Srebrenica during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where men and boys were separated from women and girls and then executed is one extreme example (Olsson 2017; Bjarnegard et al., 2015; Goldstein 2001). In the same way that men are often presumed to be soldiers, women tend to be associated with civilians. This has resulted in a poor understanding of when and how women participate in war. Research actually suggest that women participate to quite a high degree.⁵⁴ Both men and women's roles during the war can be affected by the level of gender equality and by socio-economic status. Thomas and Wood's (2018) "Women in Armed Rebellion" dataset covers female combatants from 211 rebel organizations active from 1979–2009 and shows that gender equality is related to whether or not women participate in armed conflict: women's increased social and economic access corresponds with the likelihood that women will participate in rebel groups (Thomas and Wood 2018).

Research have also highlighted that the level of gender equality in a society can impact types of conflict through which form of mobilization is possible. Schaftenaar (2017) uses a global sample of nonviolent and violent conflict events from 1961–2006 to examine the effect of gender equality. She departs from previous findings that women participate in combat positions for only one-third of armed groups, and argues that nonviolent campaigns may not face the same barriers to women's participation as armed movements might. Schaftenaar found that higher gender

⁵⁴ For example, several studies have looked specifically at women's participation in non-state organizations (see Henshaw 2016). In a mixed methods study, Thomas and Bond (2015) examined data on women's participation in 166 violent political organizations active across 19 African countries from 1950–2011. They found that women participated in 45 % of the groups and in more than half of the terrorist organizations. Women participated more in groups with an aim to overthrow the government than with goals of territorial self-determination, and less in radical Islamist groups. Women participated in combat in over half of all organizations, particularly for the groups that had a gender equality platform. Building on this work, Henshaw (2016) compiled a global sample on women's participation in 72 rebel groups since 1990 and found that women have participated in the majority of groups. These women are more likely to be members of groups with leftist or redistributive ideologies, and more likely to serve in supporting or noncombatant roles. In these roles, women were least likely to participate in Islamist organizations and more likely to participate in organizations seeking redress for ethnic or religious grievances. Meanwhile, women's participation did not seem to be impacted by incentives for personal gain, nor by political grievances.

inequality was associated with higher risk of armed conflict, while societies with the higher gender equality have the highest nonviolent campaign onset (Schaftenaar 2017).⁵⁵

5.2. Act, prepare, and evacuate⁵⁶

Access to resources

Summary: Research finds that women are over-represented among the poorest group in a society and have, on average, access to less resources than men in all states. This can affect how they can handle a crisis, such as, having access to cash or a car. Research further suggests that this unequal distribution can be aggravated during an armed conflict. Finally, changes in the distribution of resources between state institutions can affect men and women differently due to men and women, to a degree, being dependent on different forms of state support.

According to the informational pamphlet “If crisis or war comes” distributed to the population by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, some resources are especially critical in order for the citizens to be able to handle and survive a severe crisis or conflict. One core aspect is to have access to cash in case the financial institutions break down (MSB 2018).⁵⁷ This is central as research suggest that armed conflict has economic consequences for both the institutions as well as individuals (Brainard et al., 2007). As discussed in the section on crisis, women are, on average, poorer than men in most countries. Such inequalities during peace can be expected to remain, and potentially be reinforced, during an armed conflict as the society’s institutions are negatively affected or lack resources. For example, due to women’s reproductive role, lack of food in combination with a damaged healthcare systems increase the number of miscarriages, and maternal and infant mortality rates (Plümper & Neumayer 2006).⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Women and women’s groups have increasingly become included in security and counter-terrorism efforts, and they have been found to promote several aspects, including community-based approaches, effective counter-narratives, more voices visible and educational and other long-term investments. In a study on Nigeria, it was found that institutionalizing women-led civil society organizations can increase women’s participation in society in general (Nwangwu and Ezeibe 2019).

⁵⁶ Systematic research under the criteria used in this study is nascent in the area of social roles and responsibilities for men and women during armed conflict. What is suggested is that this follows similar traits as those outlined in this section under the review of crisis research.

⁵⁷ In addition, there is a long standing debate among scholars if access to resources, i.e., poverty leads to conflict, and if conflict leads to poverty. Civil wars usually lead to a large increase in people living in poverty (Brainard et al., 2007; Malapit et al., 2003). Poverty can both cause insecurity and be a consequence of insecurity in a region – but the links are far from clear (Brainard et al., 2007; Braithwaite et al., 2016).

⁵⁸ There are also research on effects that can have a long-term impact. For example, with regard to schooling, children who have experienced conflict are observed to have completed less schooling, though differences in outcomes for boys and girls depend on the context (Buvinić et al., 2014; Akresh 2016; Burde et al., 2017). Differences between boys and girls depend on factors such as pre-war education levels, educational opportunities, or the nature of child abduction or recruitment to armed groups (Akresh 2016). Buvinić et al. (2014) highlight that boys’ educational attainment may be impacted if they are enlisted in the military, if they drop out of school in order to contribute to the household income, or due to higher exposure to physical violence that results in injuries, posttraumatic stress disorder, or death. Boys’ school attainment may appear to decline at a higher rate than girls,’ in settings where girls’ pre-conflict schooling was

Evacuation and displacement

Summary: Research suggests that women and men face different risks associated with evacuation and displacement. Women have been found to be more vulnerable to maternal health issues, and sexual violence. In border areas, women are more likely to die during harsh conditions, while men are more often the victims of homicide.

During war, an evacuation and living in displacement camps exacerbate the risks for men and women. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 41.3 million people were living in internal displacement because of conflict and violence at the end of 2018. The distribution between men and women was fairly even among the UNHCR refugees, although the proportions varied between the continents (IDMC 2019). According to UN Women, women that are displaced are vulnerable to maternal health issues and are at risk of sexual violence (UN Women 2019). Concerning the western context, research focusing on the border area between the U.S. and Mexico find that women were 2.87 times more likely to die of exposure to heat than men even when controlling for age. The study also found that men trying to cross the border were more likely to die from homicide than women (Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006). In addition, Pickering and Cochrane found that “[w]omen are more likely to die crossing borders at the harsh physical frontiers of nation-states than at ‘internal border sites,’ such as immigration detention centers” Pickering and Cochrane 2012, 28). By “harsh physical frontiers,” they are referring to the “physical spaces that cover the territorial border” – and in Australia and the EU, these areas are mainly maritime spaces, and between the U.S. and Mexico it is the desert (Pickering and Cochrane 2012, 43). Why this is the case is not established, but the authors suggest that it can be related to practices of smuggling and social roles within families – such as caring for small children (Pickering and Cochrane 2012).⁵⁹ In fact, evacuations could also potentially reinforce social roles of women and men. Stephan (2014) found that for Lebanese-American women, who

low. Meanwhile, girls are found to be more affected in situations of abductions or where their parents keep them at home in an effort to protect them from rape or other threats to their honor, which could be increased during conflict. It is noted that girls who were educated may be perceived as more valued and therefore more at risk of abduction than non- or less-educated girls (Buvinić et al., 2014). Burde et al. (2017) reviewed existing literature, noting trends that girls may be less likely to enroll and attend school during conflict, especially as the breakdown of the rule of law and social norms may create threats to girls’ safety as they travel to and from school. In a case study in Afghanistan, girls’ attendance in school was sensitive to the distance they needed to travel during conflict, and women were subsequently found to have less educational attainment than their male peers. Male enrollment in school, meanwhile, could be particularly affected by conscription or if they join armed forces (Buvinić et al., 2014; Burde et al., 2017).

⁵⁹ While outside of the responsibility of the Swedish Armed forces mandate, when people have arrived at a camp, other security issues are central to consider. Notably if not properly organized, health can be poor in camps and the spread of diseases can be more common. In some camps, Plümper and Neumayer argue, mortality rates can be much higher than the “normal” rate in the rest of the country (Plümper and Neumayer 2006), although research argue that this can depend on the organization of the camps (see Urdal and Che 2013). Long-term effects could also potentially be important to consider. For example, examining children evacuated from Finland during World War II, Santavirta et al. (2018) found that among the Finnish evacuees, “girls evacuated to Swedish foster families during World War II were more likely to be hospitalized for a psychiatric disorder” than girls who had been left with their families. No relationship was found for boys (Santavirta et al., 2018).

experienced the war in Lebanon in 2006, gender became a master identity that influenced the women's decision on how to evacuate to the United States. Some embraced dependency on men (as they held the power in the society), while others claimed agency and did not depend on male kin or state and carried out their independent evacuation (Stephan 2014).

5.3. Population safety

When discussing how armed conflict potentially affects women and men differently due to variations in vulnerabilities and risks, it is important to recognize the negative impact conflict generally has on a society. In a global study on the consequences of war, Gates et al. found that a conflict with 2,500 battle-related deaths is estimated to reduce life expectancy in the population by one year, and to increase both undernourishment (an additional 3.3%) and infant mortality (by 10%). In addition, it will deprive an additional 1.8% of the population's access to potable water (Gates 2012). Conflict is also associated with destruction of infrastructure, refugee flows, and strengthened criminal networks focusing on drugs, weapons, and trafficking (Brainad et al., 2007; Iqbal 2006). Due to war, there are often breakdowns in the legal system and in healthcare systems, including, for example, vaccination programs, which make especially children and pregnant women vulnerable. Most notably, war negatively affects men, creating a deficit in the demographics of especially young men (between 20 and 40) for families, leaving many women behind in female headed households with children (Guha-Sapir and D'Aoust 2011).

Conflict violence

Summary: As the main part of the violence in an armed conflict is used to directly attack the opponent, men are more likely to be killed, suffer injuries and harm than women, as the absolute majority of combatants are men. Due to this effect, many women are also likely to be left responsible for the family. That being said, as violence primarily tends to be related to how women and men are engaged in the political movements and in state agencies involved in defense, the more equal the involvement, the more probable that the negative effect for women will also be direct. Finally, if the violence is directed also at areas where there are civilians, both men and women are likely to be the targets as the example from Sarajevo demonstrates.

Research find that direct combat-related violence disproportionately affects men as they are the main targets of war violence. Thereby, this trend, according to research, can also have effects for male behavior during the conflict. Since men constitute the majority of the combatants, armed conflicts directly kill, injure, and harm significantly more men than women (Plümper and Neumayer 2006 see also Goldstein 2001). In addition, expectations of male roles in the military can have a negative effect on the majority of men who remain civilian (Bjarnegard et al., 2015).

For example, in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, civilian men were singled out and massacred (Neumayer and Plümper 2006). In fact, after the wars in former Yugoslavia, 92% of the 18,000 missing people were men, according to estimations from the ICRC. Similar patterns have been found in other armed conflicts. Research argue that it is primarily due to the fact that military-aged men are believed to be potential combatants and thus, a threat. In spite of men constituting a vulnerable group, according to Carpenter, women, children, and elderly have been prioritized for evacuation over military-aged men (Carpenter 2003). Furthermore, from case studies on armed conflicts, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was found that wars lead to an increased risk for young men to be forcefully recruited into an armed group. Due to fear of this and to protect themselves and their families, some men “voluntarily” join the army (El-Bushra and Sahl 2005).

Women could be targeted for having a political role during a conflict. Research show that this is a prevalent problem. ACLED has a dataset on political violence targeting women, which is understood as “the use of [physical] force by a group with a political purpose or motivation” in the public sphere in which women and girls are the only, the majority, or the primary targets” (Kishi and Olsson 2019, 2). The ACLED dataset shows that the most common form of political violence targeting women is direct non-sexual attacks. This form of political violence targeting women makes up two-thirds of the reported violence in the southeastern and eastern Europe, in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and in the Middle East. The second most common form of political violence targeting women is sexual violence. It makes up one-third of the political violence targeting women in Africa and in Southeast Asia (Kishi and Olsson 2019). The perpetrators are often unidentified groups. Among the identified perpetrators, state actors (such as state military or the police) are the most common in Central Asia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and in the Caucasus (Kishi et al 2019; Kishi and Olsson 2019).

Box 4. Learning from a city under siege: Sarajevo 1992–1995

Context of war

Up to 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted one out of the six republics of Yugoslavia. After Croatia and Slovenia had declared their independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit in March 1992. These events sparked a high intensity civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the formation of armed groups along identity lines and with external involvement. Between 1992 and 1995, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program registered 26,333 deaths in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

both in the war with the state and in the one-sided violence against civilians (UCDP 2020a).⁶⁰ Generally, more men than women were soldiers; as a result, it is estimated that more men died in battle. In addition to men being involved in direct fighting, civilian men were also more likely to be killed than women. There were several events, Srebrenica being the most known, where civilian men of an age when they could be serving in the military were reportedly separated from women, children, and elderly and massacred or forced into labor. According to the ICRC, out of the 18,000 missing persons after the war, 92% are men and 8% women. Women, children, or elderly were instead more often permitted to flee or forcibly deported. In these scenarios, a large number of women were singled out for rape or held in concentration camps for indefinite periods (Carpenter 2003). Numbers are difficult to estimate but a special CEDAW report states that in a low estimation, approximately 25,000 persons have been victims of rape between the years of 1992 and 1994. Additionally, women had been victims of mass deportation and detention in most of the 2,000 registered camps in the occupied territories (CEDAW 1994). There have been reports of men becoming victims of sexual violence (Carpenter 2003). It has been estimated that approximately 3,000 men were victims of rape during the war (Djelilovic 2020). For the surviving rape victims, healthcare facilities and opportunity of abortion were reported to not be sufficient; hence, cases of self-inflicted abortions have been registered (CEDAW 1994).

The siege

One of the traits of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict was the battle and siege of Sarajevo, a city with 340,000–500,000 inhabitants, between April 1992 and February 1996. On the 6th of April 1992, one day after the siege officially started, about 50,000 civilians gathered in the city to protest against the war. The protest came under sniper fire by soldiers on the Serbian side, killing two of the women protesting. This is an event that is considered to be the start of the terror of the civilian population (Berry 2019). Violence included shelling and sniper fire. For example, these were consistently used to target food queues or markets, such as the Markale open market, and other meeting points, such as those important for the collection of water supplies (Riordan 2010). This violence thereby directly affected the everyday life of the civilian population. Schools were closed or held in basements. The availability of electricity, water, and gas were scarce and depended on which group controlled the supply side at the current moment. Access to food was difficult as well and expensive. Older people, especially, had troubles collecting essentials and reported dying

⁶⁰ A little more than half of them being state-based and the rest one-sided violence. UCDP divides violence recorded into three categories: state-based (“violence between two organized actors of which at least one is the government of a state”), non-state (“violence between actors of which neither party is the government of a state”), and one-sided violence against unarmed civilians perpetrated by organized non-state groups or governments (For more see UCDP 2020b). Note that at the time of this writing, these numbers are being updated. For a further discussion on casualties see Zwierzchowski and Tabeau 2010.

of malnutrition (ICTY 2003). In order to handle the shortages of food, supplies, and water, there was an influx of foreign aid. However, this also contributed to the establishment of a black market. The psychological stress on the population was substantial. They had to constantly weigh the risks of going out and consider where snipers could currently be located. They listened for noises of weapons firing and often waited for fog to provide cover before venturing outside. Some civilians took refuge in cellars, where they would stay for weeks. Others were forced to take refuge in other parts of the city (Rosner et al., 2003; Maček 2009). It was also difficult to maintain social traditions to handle grief, as funerals were often attacked.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has prosecuted leading military officers in the siege. This also revealed relevant information on how men and women were targeted with violence. In preparation for the case against General Stanislav Gali,⁶¹ who headed the Serbian Sarajevo Romanija Corps attacking the city, the office of the prosecution gathered information about the number of persons killed and wounded from September 10, 1992 until August 10, 1994. The minimum number of individuals killed in battle were 3,798, of whom 82.33% were men (3,127) and 17.64% were women (670). A minimum of 12,919 individuals were wounded, 80.80% men (10,438) and 19.17% women (2,477).⁶² As demonstrated, men are a clear majority in both categories. However, if we compare civilians killed, a different picture emerges. The minimum civilians killed were 399 individuals, where 55.90% were men (782) and 44.10% were women (617). The minimum civilians wounded were 5,093 individuals, where 55.02% were men (2,802) and 44.98% were women (2,291). With regard to civilian deaths, the main cause was either shelling (66.62%) or sniper fire (18.08%); in total, 439 women and 493 men were killed by shelling, and 99 women and 154 men were killed by a sniper. For soldiers, the majority died from shelling (1192 men and 29 women) or were killed by a sniper (441 men and 4 women) (Tabeau et al., 2002). In the section of Sarajevo that the Serbs attacked and held, rape against women and girls occurred, both in their homes and in holding centers. Some women were held for quite some time and released, while others were killed (Human Rights Watch 1994).

The siege also had long-term mental-health consequences in the population. A study conducted by Rosner et al. (2003) of 311 individuals⁶³ found that everyone had experienced at least one traumatic event and that the average was a staggering 24 traumatic events. Women reported

⁶¹ General Stanislav Gali was the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps during 1992–1994. He was later sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for crimes against humanity (murder and other inhumane acts) and violations of the laws or customs of war (acts of violence of which the primary purpose was to spread terror among the civilian population).

⁶² One person killed was unknown and four persons wounded were unknown.

⁶³ Divided into three groups: residents, individuals receiving medical treatment, and individuals receiving psychiatric treatment.

having themselves experienced sexual violence during the war⁶⁴ (women 1.2%/men 0%); a member of their closest family being killed during the war (women 21.6%/men 19.5%); having witnessed threat, violence, or injury to a loved one during the war (women 96.3%/men 96%). More men reported themselves having sustained an injury during the war (men 17.4%/women 5.6%); being the victim of torture during the war (men 12.1%/women 8%); having experienced other forms of threat during the war (men 100%/women 98.8%); having witnessed violence to a loved one during the war (men 75.2%/women 59.3%); witnessing violence to someone else (not loved one) during the war (men 90.6%/women 79.6%); loved one (not a member of close family) killed during the war (men 85.6%/women 83.3%). The study showed that women showed a higher risk for developing PTSD than men (women 38.8%/men 21.5%) (Rosner et al., 2003).

Sexual violence in armed conflict

Summary: Conflict-related sexual violence is a frequent form of violence conducted by the warring parties. It can be strategic but more often, it is the effect of poor leadership, negative norms, and problems with cohesion and discipline in a military organization. This means that any military organization potentially could develop this form of behavior, particularly under stress. In addition, when seeking to prevent or address sexual violence, it is important not to use a too limited understanding of what this form of violence can look like and under what situations men and women can be especially vulnerable, also noting that different places can entail different forms of risks of women or for men. For example, places with increased risks appear to be in detention (targeting men and women), at check points (often targeting women, girls, and boys), or in the homes (often targeting women, girls, and boys).⁶⁵

Conflict-related sexual violence, namely sexual violence that is the result of the armed conflict and which is often conducted by the armed groups involved, is an issue that the WPS resolutions outline as a central responsibility of the armed actors to prevent and address. Systematic research tend to use the International Criminal Court (ICC) definition of sexual violence as a category of violence that includes “rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and forced pregnancy” (Wood 2009, 133; Cohen and Nordås 2014). Contrary to the manner in which conflict-related sexual violence is discussed in policy debates on WPS, research show that only a minority of armed political and security organizations commit widespread or pernicious sexual violence in conflicts. Notably, Cohen and Nordås, covering 129 active conflicts involving 625 armed actors for the period 1989–2009, found that 43% of the

⁶⁴ The authors note that the real number could be much higher due to stigma.

⁶⁵ Sexual violence as a civilian crime – that is, conducted by others than the warring parties and therefore under the jurisdiction of the police – is not addressed here.

individual conflicts had no reports and only 14% of the conflicts had high levels of prevalence (Cohen and Nordås 2014). Muvumba Sellström, studying 23 armed actors in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2011, found that out of these, only eight actors were reported as responsible for 68% of the abuses and assaults (Muvumba-Sellström 2015; Olsson et al. 2020). This means that we can expect conflict-related sexual violence to occur under specific circumstances. In order to be able to prevent and address violence, we need to understand these better.

First of all, Wood (2009) do not find support for the idea that we should expect a direct correlation between groups that show general restraint in their use of violence and the use of sexual violence. Sexual violence might not follow the same logic as other forms of violence. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka demonstrated a high degree of violence against civilians but still had low levels of sexual violence. On the contrary, Wood suggests that we should look at the norms of the armed group to understand the group's behavior. Notably, if sexual violence is banned by the leaders and a strict internal discipline is upheld, sexual violence can be prevented (Wood 2009). Thus, groups that show problems in these areas are likely to commit this form of violence even if it is not in the interest of the leadership. Importantly, drawing on data from all civil wars from 1980–2009, Cohen (2013) points to the role of recruitment to an armed group to prevalence of wartime rape. Brutal recruitment strategies, such as abduction, are statistically significant explanations (high probability) for occurrence of rape during war. Cohen further suggests that rape may not be a strategy of war, but rather due to socialization and as a way to bond the recruits together (Cohen 2013). This means that studying the behavior and norms of the groups involved is important for predicting sexual violence.⁶⁶

In addition, Manivannan (2014) found that sexual violence against men has largely been overlooked and most studies focus on instances where women were the victim. Partly, these events have been described or coded as torture or similar crimes and can be more prevalent than research has been able to show. For example, Manivannan's study found that sexual violence against men has been committed in 25 conflicts occurring in 10 countries between 2007 and 2009. The violence may result in physical consequences, post-traumatic stress disorder, and psychological symptoms for the victim (Manivannan 2014). Studying the civil war in Peru, Leiby (2018) found that sexual violence against men has been very overlooked if the definition of sexual violence focuses on penetrative rape or excludes combatants in conflicts. There is also risk of overlooking such violence if there is limited understanding of how gender roles and norms can have an impact on the events of a man reporting sexual violence and the investigators have a

⁶⁶ In fact, many local military organizations already display diverse approaches to preempt sexual violence by their members, with some instituting effective normative constraints against wartime rape, from which we could learn.

limited ability to understand and recognize male victims. For example, men might be more willing to report torture, humiliation, and disgrace rather than report that he has been subjected to sexual violence. Looking at the reported cases of conflict-related sexual violence abuses against men and women illustrates the difference. Most reported violations against women were rape and gang rape (62% of the reported types, followed by sexual humiliation (15%). Against men, it was sexual humiliation (55% of the reported cases) compared to rape and gang rape which were the fourth most frequent type (9%), following sexual torture (19%) and mutilation (13%) (Leiby 2018).

Crime

Summary: Armed conflict can increase access to weapons and result in new opportunities for organized crime as judicial institutions are weakened. Young men constitute a recruitment base for such organizations.

Utilizing criminal organizations or displeased population groups to spread disorder and benefiting from vulnerabilities in the society are key parts in a potential scenario. Thereby, improved capacity to uphold societal functions and protect the population is central (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019). Research show a correlation between the absence of “material well-being and the prospects for violence, from crime in inner-city neighborhoods to instability in poor nations” (Atwood 2003, 160). In addition, armed conflicts could potentially open for possibilities for organized crime activities by increasing access to weapons, destruction of infrastructure, and disruption of the social systems contribute to high levels of crime, post- or during conflict (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). Most notably, young men can be targeted by organized crime or drawn into gang violence, which can increase during the conflict period (Olsson 2009) similar to how they are recruited into military organizations.

Health

Summary: Armed conflict can affect the access to, and quality of, healthcare. As a result, we can expect both men and women to suffer from the indirect consequences of war. In addition, research has found that women’s need for maternal care is likely to cause an additional substantial number of excess deaths during war if the health care system breaks down or if this form of health care is not prioritized. In addition, we can expect negative health impacts on boys and girls from war. This can be made worse if the armed conflict has resulted in increased levels of sexual violence. As regards mental health, and women and children report PTSD more often than men.

An armed conflict is expected to place a substantive strain on the healthcare system, involving decisions on a distribution of resources between civilian needs in the population and the needs of

the armed forces (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019). This is in line with research by Plümper and Neumayer analyzing armed conflicts' effect on the life expectancy gap between men and women. They found that conflicts often lead to limited resources in health services and medical care for civilians. This is important as risks related to health differ between men and women, particularly concerning maternal health and sensitivity to malnutrition. Notably, Plümper and Neumayer found that armed conflict either results in the death of more women than men if the broader social consequences of war are included or that women die, on average, at a younger age than the men who die as a result of war. They argue that women could be "more adversely affected by conflict than men, despite the fact that men naturally are the main direct victims of war" (Plümper and Neumayer 2006, 747). Urdal and Che suggest that this finding could be driven by situations where there has been a complete breakdown of state institutions related to healthcare as women are deprived of maternal healthcare there. Bosmans et al. 2008 found that severe restrictions on mobility had reduced access to health care for both staff and residence among refugees in West Bank and Gaza.

Research focusing specifically on health impacts of conflict on women have indeed found that sexual and reproductive health play a key role. For example, Pillai et al. (2017), by reviewing previous research and empirics available, highlight reproductive rights (such as maternal health), sexual violence, displacement, and trafficking as key factors for understanding the impact of war on women. Conditions may be further compounded by damage or disruption of social services or welfare during conflict. For example, war can affect transportation and interrupt delivery of healthcare, as well as result in a decreased number of qualified healthcare professionals. In addition to these challenges in health services, women may also face greater lack of adequate nutrition, sanitation, or shelter due to inequalities between men and women (Pillai et al., 2017).

Research using global level data on the health effects of conflict experienced by children show that violence against pregnant women resulted in stillbirths, congenital malformations, or low weight due to premature births as well as low-weight, stunting, and deficits in the children later in life linked to lower school attainment and reduced adult income as a result of poor nutrition (Devakumar et al., 2014). Children born as a result of sexual violence during conflict have been found to be at a higher risk of neglect, abuse, malnutrition, or abandonment (Devakumar et al., 2014). Damage to girls' reproductive system due to infection, trauma, or substances may negatively impact their reproductive capacity and their own children. Maternal stress can also be linked to mental disorders in children, and mother's post-traumatic stress disorder is linked to similar symptoms in their children (Devakumar et al., 2014). An important factor in mediating

these negative impacts is a child's environment where separation from parents can result in long-term impairment in social mobility in children (Cummings et al., 2017)

In terms of the more long-term psychological effects, a review by Boulanger Martel, Forsberg and Brounéus (forthcoming) shows that many studies find that women report poorer psychological health, such as PTSD, than men in a post-conflict setting (Boulanger Martel et al. forthcoming). In addition, psychosocial health was found to impact children. Children may be affected by political trauma through media exposure, personal exposure such as presence during an attack, or severe personal exposure such as witnessing or experiencing death or injury. Such traumas can interfere with normal development. In a review of the field, Slone and Mann (2016) found varied evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder, with the highest prevalence among children with prolonged exposure to the trauma. Health symptoms can result from direct impacts of experiencing or witnessing violence, as well as secondary stressors. Both boys and girls may suffer psychological symptoms including depression, anxiety, conduct disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorders as well as behavioral and emotional symptoms such as hyperactivity, problems relating to their peers, increased risk-taking, or trouble sleeping (Cummings et al., 2017).

6. Learning from a society under armed attack: Ukraine

Summary: The conflict in Ukraine started as a peaceful mass-protest by civilians in November 2013. After three months, the protests escalated into violent riots, concluding with the Ukraine President resigning. Shortly thereafter, Russia annexed Crimea. Pro-Russian separatist groups formed in the eastern Ukraine areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and an armed conflict with the Ukraine Government begun. In the areas directly affected by the conflict, many fled, resulting in a substantial number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Ukraine.

Pre-conditions:

Traditional male and female roles were prevalent, although gender equality was improving. Women were mainly responsible for the unpaid home labor and were unemployed or earning less than men on average. Violence against women was recognized as a problem.

Non-violent protests:

Men and women – starting with primarily students and younger people – participated in rather equal numbers in the non-violent protests. However, the distribution of labor followed traditional roles. Both men and women were mobilized based on issues related to a low degree of trust in the government, lack of employment opportunities, and relatively low trust in the media. In addition, women were more concerned with every day economic issues and their children's future. Men, on the other hand, were more concerned with the democratic development and the relations to

the EU. More men than women reported that they were willing to fight for their country, but women scored higher on being nationalistic compared to men. Over one-third of the population were concerned about the prospect of war.

Escalation: Violent protests and the armed conflicts in eastern Ukraine:

When the Maidan protests escalated into violence, the proportion of women decreased; in part voluntarily and in part as a result of being forced out of the movement by the male participants. As the conflict in eastern Ukraine began, a substantially higher number of men than women joined the military organizations on both sides of the conflict. Over time, however, the number of women increased somewhat on the Ukraine state side, even in combat positions. Women were very much engaged in the civil society. This could be in the form of support for the war (such as collecting funds for uniforms) or for peace (promoting exchange with women on the other side). A number of women dominated civil society organizations and also responded to humanitarian needs and IDP issues.

Both disinformation and misinformation were prevalent in the conflict. This included threats against the families of male fighters and slander campaigns against female politicians.

How men and women were targeted with violence varied. Men constituted the majority of combat soldiers and, hence, likely the majority of battle casualties. Both women and men were reported as being victims of sexual violence in detention camps, but only women were reported as being victims of rape when moving in society, for example, at check points. In the civilian group, women constituted a larger proportion of those killed. In the eastern Ukrainian areas outside of the government's control, domestic violence primarily against women) increased. This was made worse by the fact that the supportive and healthcare systems failed.

Women were reported to have struggled economically to a greater extent than men both before and during/after the conflict. Particularly, the IDP women faced discrimination in the job market. Among the most vulnerable, some have had to turn to prostitution to survive. Women and men were victims of human trafficking, both for labor and for prostitution. IDPs were especially vulnerable to being the targets of organized crime networks.

There are reports of PTSD and psychological ill-health for mainly men but also for women. For women, there are also indirect effects of living with a man with this disorder.

6.1. Background to the conflict in Ukraine

The conflict in Ukraine began as non-violent mass-protests on the Maidan square on the 21st of November 2013 as a result of the president announcing that Ukraine would step away from making a trade agreement with the EU. The conflict escalated when the state police forcefully

tried to evacuate the protest areas (UCDP 2020d). More than 20 people (both civilians and people from the security forces) were reported to have died and hundreds were injured (Traynor 2014). At the end of January, the Maidan movement managed to oust the president, who fled to Russia. A new pro-EU government was formed, and the trade agreement with the EU was adopted.

Picture 3. Map of Ukraine (Al Jazeera 2017)



This ended the initial part of the conflict. However, it also set off a chain of events, leading to the currently ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine, as pro-Russian supporters in eastern Ukraine and Crimea began to protest this change in leadership. In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, which spurred other groups to organize themselves into militias and to call for independence. Two groups, Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), even began to take over the control of these areas in eastern Ukraine, resulting in armed conflicts with the Ukraine state. The conflicts have entailed civilian casualties on both sides, and there have been attempts at negotiations and ceasefires. While casualties have been reduced significantly since early 2015, no permanent solution has been reached (UCDP 2020d.; Nedozhogina 2019; Clawson 2017). The armed conflicts have primarily taken place in Kyiv, Crimea, Donetsk, and Lugansk, but the effects have been felt in large parts of the country. At the end of January 2017, 1,642 million people were displaced within Ukraine. One million of these settled within government-controlled areas (Benigni 2016). In the early stages, most IDPs were Crimean Tatars that left Crimea and moved to western Ukraine. During the years following, the most IDPs were people

that have moved within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Those regions together with the neighboring regions including Kyiv, host 80% of the IDPs (Zhyznomirska and Odynets 2018).

6.2. Mobilization and support

There are considerable differences in the ability for men and women to influence decisions concerning how to handle the conflict as this developed. This is apparent when we study their interests and actual participation.

Attitudes toward and trust in state actors

A survey in 2011 revealed that both women and men had little confidence in the state, with women being more negative (40.9% of the women compared to 37.9% of the men). The situation was more positive when asked about the confidence in the Ukraine armed forces, where the most common answer was “quite a lot,” and where women were more positive than the men (men 46.2% and women 49.9%). However, the population appeared to be divided as 33% of the men and 31% of the women had very low levels of confidence. In the same survey, 40.3% of respondents answered that they were willing to fight for their country but with clear differences between men and women. Specifically, 50.7% of the males compared to only 31.8% women but with a high degree of women being unsure (18.1% of the men compared to women 25.9% of the women). Interestingly, more women than men stated that they were proud to be Ukrainian. Hence, women’s unwillingness to defend the country cannot entirely be explained by a lack of patriotism. At the same time, on questions regarding war, only 10.7% of the total population (12.6% men and 9% women) agreed with the statement “Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice,” whereas 89.3% disagreed (World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014 Ukraine).

On questions regarding prioritizing goals for Ukraine in the coming ten years, both men and women prioritized economic growth (80% men and 76.1% women), and employment (15.2% men and 13.7% women). Thereafter, the priorities differed. The third place for men was investing in the defense force (men 3.9%), while this was the least prioritized area for women (2.0%). Instead, beautiful cities and countryside was placed in third place for women (5.4%), which then came in last place for men (2.4%). When asked to arrange statements based on degree of importance, men and women also differed somewhat in their assessments: “maintaining order in the nation” was ranked as the most important by most men (43.6% compared to 42% for women). In second place, “fighting rising prices” (men 32.5% and women 38.6%) and in third place was “giving people more to say in important government decisions” (men 20.6% and women 16.6%). In the final place came “Protecting freedom of speech” (men 3.3% and women 2.8%). This could mean that women were more concerned about the everyday economic situation, whereas men

focused, to a somewhat higher degree, on having a say in governmental decisions. Hence, while both men and women do worry about the security situation in the country, employment, access to resources, and political influence were prioritized by the vast majority of Ukrainians (World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014 Ukraine).

The reasons for why men and women became engaged in the protests are interesting as it exemplifies that men and women's mobilization can be the result of similar kinds of arguments but still vary in interesting respects. At the core, both men and women reacted to similar kinds of grievances: they felt that the living standards were too low, they were tired of corruption, and they wanted a more thorough democratization process. In addition, men were mobilized to a slightly larger degree than women due to the Ukrainian move away from the EU. Women, on the other hand, reacted more than men out of concerns for their children and their future. In terms of triggering factors for mobilization, more women joined the protest when repression and violence against the students – who had constituted the majority of the first protesters – became known to the public (Benigni 2016; Onuch and Martsenuky 2014). Mirova and Whitt (2020) found that when the conflict escalated, the Ukraine state primarily sought to mobilize men. Men that had been active at the Maidan protests were more likely to respond to the call to serve in eastern Ukraine. These men displayed character traits such as “self-efficacy, optimism, risk tolerance, patriotic nationalism, and feelings of in-group solidarity with protesters and the military” (Mirova and Whitt 2020, 391). They also held views that were more positive to the use of force, had less faith in negotiations as a way to resolve the conflict, and were more afraid that Russia might seek to obtain more of the Ukraine territory in the future, than the average male civilian who did not enlist (Mirova and Whitt 2020).

Looking at confidence in the press prior to the war, women were overall somewhat more positive (54.4% had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the press compared to 52.3% of the men). The majority of the respondents stated that they turn to news on the TV to obtain information on a daily basis (79.1% men and 80.1% women) or a weekly basis (13.4 men and 12.8% women) (World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014 Ukraine). During the conflict, disinformation, propaganda, and rumors have been prevalent in both social and mainstream media (Dougherty 2014; Makhortykh & Lyebedyev 2015), playing on the low levels of trust in the state and the divisions in attitudes. The narrative on the Russian side has been communicated through state media, which reaches the southern and eastern Ukraine (Dougherty 2014). In a large-scale interview study by Internews, an international non-profit media development organization, between 2015 and 2019, about 75% of the respondents stated that they were aware of the prevalence of disinformation. One-third of those stated that they could distinguish between

disinformation and accurate information. When tested, however, only 11% were actually able to correctly distinguish between disinformation and correct information. A majority had a tendency to classify even true articles as false (Internews 2019).

Such disinformation campaigns have played on men's responsibilities for their families and on women's roles in society as well as targeting the norm of gender equality. For example, Col. Liam Collins argues that: "[The Russian army] have penetrated the cellular network for locational data and information operations, sending targeted messages to individual soldiers showing them nearly real-time pictures of their families and asking if they know whether their families are safe. On other occasions, they have sent messages after an artillery strike telling soldiers to go home; their corrupt oligarch government officials aren't worth dying for" (Col. Liam Collins 2018). Another example concerns a series of fake tweets and images of Ukrainian MP Svitlana Zalishchuk, who has fought for democracy and human rights. These campaigns have used and manipulated traditional norms and stereotypes of women and men by either showing women as vulnerable and need of protection or as breaking from the norms and becoming violent aggressors. Similar examples are the disinformation campaigns on the "Islamisation of Europe" portraying women as victims of sexual violence from immigrants, having to turn to prostitution, or to wearing a hijab. Similarly, white-extremist groups use disinformation around the threat of immigrants' sexual violence toward innocent women while at the same time portraying gender equality as anti-family, pro-gay, and anti-life ideology (UK Government 2020).

As indicated by the example above, technology has become an essential part of warfare in Eastern Ukraine. Another critical example concerns the access and usage of mobiles. Soldiers use mobiles at the front for several reasons. Some are social, such as keeping in touch with friends and family or for entertainment. Other reason are more for military usage, such as intercepting or placing false information, or producing videos from the frontline. The more sinister kind involves using media, such as videos or photos, found on captured and/or killed enemies' phones. Furthermore, the ability to share tales of events directly with civilians changes and minimizes the space between the civilian and the military sphere (Shklovski and Wulf 2018; IRES 2020).

Inclusion and the importance of social roles and responsibilities

In order to understand inclusion of men and women in decision-making and participation in the organizations acting in, and around, the conflict, let us begin by looking more closely at the social roles and responsibilities. As is demonstrated by the situation in Ukraine, these are affected by the norms, guiding what is considered correct male and female behavior; in Ukraine, these are changing but still quite traditional. In a nationwide survey prior to the conflict, when asked if "children suffer if a mother works for pay," a majority of both sexes disagreed (World Value

Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014 Ukraine).⁶⁷ Nonetheless, more than one-third of the population – men and women with men being slightly more negative – think that this is harmful for children. More men than women also think that it would cause problems “if a woman is earning more money than a man” (27% of the men and 14.5% of the women strongly agree). When asked if men should be prioritized over women by employers in a difficult job market, more men strongly agreed than women (37.6% compared to 22.9%).⁶⁸ These survey results illustrate that while gender equality is quite high, more men have maintained the ideas of more traditional roles than women, although it is evident that many women also share those norms. A survey on what masculine and feminine roles by UNFPA in early 2018 suggests that the conflict appeared not to change this.⁶⁹ The survey found that women were conducting most of the unpaid household work, and feminine roles was associated with the household economic dependency. Masculine roles were instead associated with economic independence and not with domestic work. The absolute majority of men stated they there were generally satisfied with the division of labor in the household, and the majority thought that their spouse agreed to this as well (UNFPA 2018).

Given this background, it is interesting to look at the patterns of inclusion of women and men in the Maidan movement and the following armed conflict. Women have remained underrepresented in decision-making roles at higher level due to barriers of traditional roles, namely, the view of women’s role as mothers, and unequal access to resources and opportunities (OSCE 2018). However, in the early phases of the mass-protests, 47% of the protesters were women. The women were reported to have contributed with cooking, cleaning, negotiating, peacekeeping, with medical care and logistical support, but also in the fighting at the barricades along with the men (Martsenyuk et al., 2016). Hence, the roles followed, in general, traditional distributions with women in supporting roles and men being much more likely to be active at the barricades. Men were also more likely to participate in protest events that took place at night, whereas women to a larger degree participated during daytime (Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014; Benigni 2016).

The distribution of labor between men and women becomes even more pronounced when the conflict escalated due to the government attempt to forcefully remove the protesters. At the end of January 2014, women made up only about 12% of the participants. Reportedly, this change was not only due to women’s own choice but because many were pushed out of the movement by men who “feared for their safety” and who expressed that they did not believe that the women

⁶⁷ More specifically, “agree strongly men 12.1% women 9.6% - agree men 25.5% and women 23.9% - disagree men 53.2% and women 54.1% - strongly disagree men 7.3% and women 12.4%” (World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014 Ukraine).

⁶⁸ When asked the same question, replacing “women” with “immigrants,” the majority of both women and men agreed (73.8% in total agreed).

⁶⁹ Often talked about as constructions of masculinity and femininity in research.

could withstand the hardship and riots (Benigni 2016, 62). Especially young women rejected these assumptions. This resulted, for example, in the formation of a number of military or non-military “Women’s Squads.” These groups co-habited with predominantly male groups but chose to also organize feminist theory- as well as self-defense classes to strengthen internal cohesion. These women were also engaged in clashes with the Ukrainian special riot police (Benigni 2016; Martsenyuk et al., 2016).

Other groups of women were involved in the funding and even buying of soldier’s uniforms as the conflict escalated or they were engaged in demonstrations in traditional roles as mothers and wives of soldiers, protesting against the conditions that soldiers have to experience in combat as the conflict progressed into war in eastern Ukraine (OSCE 2015). Another form of organization of women took place in the civil society, and women composed the vast majority of Ukrainian mediators working with conflict-related mediation on the grass-roots level. These women’s organizations mainly responded to humanitarian needs, or to provide medical assistance, reception of displaced people, establishing a database for missing people and other needs that the state was unable to address as the conflict escalated. With these kinds of engagement, women were building bridges between the pro-Russian and the pro-Ukrainian communities (OSCE 2015). There were also several groups of mothers that had been active in engaging for peace (Strelnyk 2019).

For handling the conflict in eastern Ukraine, mainly men have been mobilized by the state. These men were given short (about one week long) military training and then sent to the front (Mironova and Whitt 2020). In fact, before 2016, there were laws in place that prohibited women from many hazardous jobs, which formally excluded them from combat (Benigni 2016; OSCE 2018).⁷⁰ According to UN Women, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) consisted of only 8.5% women in 2016 (UN Women Europe and Central Asia 2016). With time, however, women have come to participate in combat roles. This is partly as a result of women’s groups having organized combat training or when women have followed their mobilized husbands or sons to the front. Over time, the number of women in the military has also increased. According to AFU, 20,000 women served in January 2017 (52,000 if the civilian positions are included), something which increased to 25,000 in January 2018 (55,000 if civilian positions are included) (OSCE 2018⁷¹). There have been, however, reports of discrimination and sexism toward women in the AFU (Martsenyuk et al., 2016). Of the military organizations operating in the non-government-controlled areas, OSCE

⁷⁰ This not only discriminated them from access to regular job contracts with the military but also benefits and entitlements following demobilization.


⁷¹ Based on material released to the press by the UAF.

has observed that recruitment has been specifically directed toward men. Women have mainly been assigned supportive tasks with few expectations (OSCE 2018).

6.3. Access to resources and the ability to handle the conflict

Due to the more traditional roles for men and women, Ukraine has had fewer women in the public life, and women's rights had been limited in the labor market (Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014). As a result, there were more men than women in the Ukrainian labor force, in both high, middle-, and low-income jobs. This is true for both before the conflict and the years following its outbreak (The World Bank 2016). As can be seen in Graph 1, the employments rates have also been negatively affected after the war and have gone down in both urban and rural areas.

Graph 1. Employment rates in Ukraine⁷² (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2020)



As noted in the research sections, women are over-represented among the poorest groups, particularly women who are solely responsible for their children. Ukraine appears to display similar kinds of traits. For example, in a survey before the war, more women than men reported that they/their family “often” had gone without enough food to eat (9.1% female compared to 6.1% of the male respondents). Moreover, 53.3% of male respondents reported that this never happened, compared to 51.4% of female respondents (World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014 Ukraine). In addition to employment, when assessing women's and men's access to resources, one must consider income levels. The wage gap, meaning the difference between average earnings of men compared to women was 21.0% in 2013 and 17.6% in 2017 (UNECE 2020). This can affect the ability to access resources. In the areas directly affected by conflict, 30% of the female headed households reported poor food consumption levels, compared to 17.5% of the male headed households (WFP

⁷² *Excluding the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. **Excluding the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and part of the anti-terrorist operation zone. ***Data exclude the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

2016). In short, both before and during the conflict, there has been variations in the economic conditions under which men and women live. The economic conditions in combination with the expected gender roles have affected their ability to cope with the consequences of the conflict and have resulted in more women evacuating, together with children and the elderly. Women have consistently been less employed and earned less money than men both before and during the conflict. As evident by the findings of food insecurity, female-headed households within conflict affected areas were the most food insecure.


6.4. Population safety

In Ukraine, women and men are found to be vulnerable to different forms of risk as well as to different degrees. This next section will present general risks found; however, among the IDPs, women are the most vulnerable group, which will be discussed in the next section separately.

Direct lethal effects

During the Maidan protests, approximately 500,000 people participated. The result of the escalation of the protests was 88 deaths (UCDP 2020d). To date, the conflict in Donetsk has 2,021 registered battle-related deaths, and the conflict in Lugansk has 712 registered battle-related deaths. In total, 6,875 deaths have been registered for Ukraine (UCDP 2020d).

Picture 4. Map of Ukraine (Pavlik and Landman 2019)



Given that men constitute the absolute majority of the combatants, it is reasonable to assume that they also constitute the majority of those killed in battle, but it is not possible to find sex-disaggregated statistics. In addition to those killed in direct relation to the battles, Kate Gilmore, the United Nations' Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that 3,000 civilians

had been killed and over 7,000 injured since the beginning of the conflict and until 2019 (OHCHR 2018). Here, there are estimates but it is still uncertain how many of those killed were men compared to women. For example, the OSCE writes that the Special Monitoring Mission during 2016 documented 442 cases of civilian casualties in the areas affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine: 88 civilians were killed (58 men, 22 women, one girl, five boys, and two adults with unknown sex), 354 were injured (209 men, 118 women, 15 boys, and 12 girls). The vast majority of the casualties were attributed to shelling, women were proportionally more affected by shelling than other types of incidents. Casualties were also attributed to explosives such as mines and small arms and light weapons (OSCE 2016). OHCHR states that 40% of those killed had been women and children (measured in a period between January and May 2018). Research is still not clear on how and when women are particularly targeted with violence. For example, ACLED, which tracks conflict events, states that: “Conventional warfare does not necessarily imply higher levels of violence targeting women; in ... Ukraine, civilian targeting amid a conventional war has not been accompanied by high levels of violence targeting women” (Kishi et al., 2019).

Conflict-related sexual violence

Both sides of the conflict (pro-Russian and Ukrainian Government) have reported incidents of rape, but international organizations have found no indications that rape has constituted a strategy or tactic in the wars. Rather, opportunistic rapes, for example, at check points, or rapes when people were held in detention camps appear to have taken place (OHCHR 2017; Clawson 2017). For example, the OHCHR report, “Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine 14 March 2014 to 31 January 2017,” concluded that the majority of the cases reported had taken place in the early phases of the conflict in 2014, and there were no grounds to believe that sexual violence has been used as a strategy of war by the Government of Ukraine, armed groups in eastern regions of Ukraine, or by the Russian Federation. What they did find was that sexual violence had been used as a method of torture and ill-treatment during detention in both the eastern regions of Ukraine as well as in Crimea. The violence was described as “beatings and electrocution in the genital area, threats of rape, forced nudity and rape” (OHCHR 2017, 14). Both men and women had been victims of this form of sexual violence. In some cases, relatives of the individuals detained had also been targeted. In addition to sexual violence in detention camps, other identified risk factors include growing impunity, collapse of law and order, lack of clear prohibition of sexual violence, as well as insufficient reporting systems. Women were stated to be particularly vulnerable in circumstances such as check-points and when military forces or armed groups were moving within populated areas (OHCHR 2017). UN Women Ukraine reported that 90.6% of these rape

survivors are women (UN Women Ukraine 2017: referring to Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine). Apart from direct violence, OHCHR has stated that they have received information of women and girls having turned to survival sex; offering sexual services for food or money to members of the armed forces as the economic situation had deteriorated in the country (OHCHR 2017).

Crime rates

Due to the situation in especially eastern Ukraine, reliable statistics on crime levels is scarce. Nonetheless, there are reports of organized crime being prevalent in the country and that this has been fueled by the armed conflicts. For example, according to the US Overseas Security Advisory Council, there are reports of an estimated three million illegal weapons being in circulation within the country due to the security situation in the east (OSAC 2019). In addition to illegal weapons, human trafficking takes place, targeting both men and women, particularly among the IDPs. Men are primarily targeted for labor exploitation and women for sexual exploitation (OSCE 2018; Benigni 2016). The main country of destination for the victims is Russia (Benigni 2016). While it is difficult to assess the extent of the human trafficking, an indication is provided by the measurements of the International Organization on Migration, which, in 2016, identified 1,151 victims of trafficking, compared to 740 in 2014 (Benigni 2016). The high level of organized crime and corruption are argued to have impacted the well-being of the Ukrainian population and the economic growth of Ukraine (Independent Advisory Group on Country Information 2019). According to Transparency International, Ukraine got a score of 32 out of 100, where 0 indicates that a country is highly corrupt and 100 is not corrupt at all. This makes it ranked as the 120th most corrupt state in the world (out of a ranking of 180 countries) (Transparency International 2018).

In relation to personal crime, women worry more about their own safety than men. In a national survey, a question on if the respondent avoided going out at night due to security reasons, 72.5% of women said yes compared to 48.6% men. Older women were more afraid than younger women. However, the opposite was true for men. Younger men were more afraid to go out at night compared to older men; specifically, 50.2% of the men up to 29 years of age avoided going out. Interestingly, when asked if one feels safe in their neighborhood, the differences between men and women were not as apparent. Here, 19.2% of the men stated that they felt very safe compared to 16.7% of the women, and only 3.8% of the men compared to 5.2% the women stated that they did not feel secure at all World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014 Ukraine.

Domestic and intimate partner violence affecting women have been recognized as an issue before the conflict. The conflict then affected both the prevalence of and the ability to receive help,

particularly in the areas outside of government control. Here, social worker posts have been cancelled; moreover, hospitals, women's centers, and shelters, as well as schools and kindergartens have been destroyed or have had to relocate to government-controlled areas (Benigni 2016). The incidence of violence against women is difficult to measure due to underreporting, but one indicator that shows a strong increase was calls to women's and children's helplines, which increased dramatically. One helpline had an increase from 7,725 in 2014 to 38,292 in 2016. The majority of the callers were women (68% compared to 32% men). Most calls were about domestic violence (indicating a dramatic increase), but new topics (not occurring before the conflict) were also raised from IDPs regarding their status and allowances, from mobilized and demobilized soldiers and their families, as well as from civilians seeking support on overcoming PTSD (Benigni 2016).

Health

There are differences in Ukraine, in terms of areas unaffected by the protests and the conflicts, those that are bordering on the conflict areas and those in which the conflict plays out. While data are scarce, there are reports of eastern Ukraine and Crimea, which are currently outside of state control, lacking healthcare and medicines (Benigni 2016). For example, many of the health facilities have been shelled and damaged in attacks, and there are no medicines and drugs to treat cancer, diabetes, or other chronic diseases (Twigg 2017). In addition, there have been reports of a lack of access to support for victims of sexual violence as such centers are primarily located in Kyiv and, hence, not available for survivors in eastern Ukraine (OHCHR 2017).

In addition to physical health, there have been concerns about increasing levels of PTSD among men, especially among combatants and ex-combatants (UN Women Ukraine 2017). The OSCE also highlight in a report on returning soldiers, which mainly are men, that those men will need support with psychosocial issues. The prevalence of PTSD can also result in self-medication with alcohol or drugs, resulting in increased risks for domestic violence (OSCE 2015; OSCE 2018). Women have reported that they do not fully recognize their husbands when they come back from the front, in terms of their behavior and attitudes (Clawson 2017).

6.5. Displacement and evacuation

At the end of January 2017, three years after the conflict started, 1,642 million people were displaced within Ukraine. One million of these people were settled within government-controlled areas (Benigni 2016). There are inconsistent figures regarding how many of the IDPs are women. UN Women Ukraine estimates that two-thirds are women and children (UN Women Ukraine 2017). Other numbers that come up in reports and research range between 60 and 65%. A major

part of these IDPs are elderly women (Benigni 2016). In the early stages of the conflict, most IDPs were Crimean Tatars that left Crimea and moved to western Ukraine. Thereafter, the majority of the IDPs are those that have moved within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Today, these regions, the neighboring ones, and Kyiv host 80% of all IDPs (Zhyznomirska and Odynets 2018). This means that many of the IDPs are living along the 500-kilometer-long contact line in eastern Ukraine (OSCE 2017). The result is that these civilians face both the hostilities from the armed groups operating in Donetsk and Luhansk and live with the presence of government soldiers on an everyday basis.

IDPs are reported to have specific challenges, in terms of influence and access to resources. For example, due to the Ukrainian election laws, IDPs could not vote in the local elections held in 2015 (Benigni 2016; OSCE 2016). Inside the areas outside of government control, the armed groups have adopted their own rules and institutions, which do not adhere to the rest of the Ukrainian system (Benigni 2016). In addition, many women face particularly difficult economic situations and inadequate housing as many women evacuated alone while the men stayed behind in order to look after their land, were mobilized, or emigrated to find jobs or escaped from being mobilized. One result of this is that there are many female-headed households responsible for children and elderly, with a very difficult economic situation (Benigni 2016; OSCE 2015). We can combine this with the women facing quite a discriminatory job market. Among the IDPs seeking employment, 21% are men and 79% are women. Generally, employment rates are lower in non-government controlled areas than the rest of the country (IOM 2019). Women who were not active in the labor market stated that the main reason was their “family responsibilities,” namely, they need to take care of children, and sick or elderly members of the family (ILO 2016). In 2016, 19% of the interviewed households were found to be food insecure⁷³ in eastern Ukraine based on the interviews. Low food consumption levels were more common among female headed households than male headed (WFP 2016).

In eastern Ukraine, aerial bombardments have destroyed the water supply, electronic infrastructure, and schools. The contact line has furthermore divided families and isolated communities and has made it difficult and dangerous for civilians to access jobs, education, or public services (Human Rights Watch 2016; OSCE 2017). As the Ukraine Government institutions have failed in the non-controlled areas, social benefits have been suspended. To

⁷³ In the WFP report, Food Security is measured with Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) – which is a measure consisting of four food security categories: 1. Able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical coping strategies (food secure), 2. Has minimally adequate food consumption without engaging in irreversible coping strategies; unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures (marginally food secure), 3. Has significant food consumption gaps, OR marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with irreversible coping strategies (Moderately food insecure), and 4. Has extreme food consumption gaps, OR has extreme loss of livelihood assets which will lead to food consumption gaps, or worse (severely food insecure) (WFP 2016).

receive the benefits, one must take permanent residence in government-controlled territories and register as an IDP (Benigni 2016). Similarly, or often due to the challenges listed above, women, among the IDPs, are particularly vulnerable to certain risks:

- Internally displaced women are more vulnerable to violence than local women. IDP women were three times more likely than local women to have been victims of some sort of violence outside of the family in the conflict setting (15.2% compared to 5.3%) (Ukrainian Center for Social Reform 2016).
- Due to the difficult economic situation, internally displaced women have turned to survival sex in order to get money or other services (Benigni 2016). Especially women who are former sex-workers are at a high risk of returning to sex work or survival sex (OSCE 2015). Towns and villages near the contact line have reported cases of survival sex to the OSCE, in order to get food, alcohol, or money from soldiers (OSCE 2018).
- The checkpoints at the contact line were identified as the most dangerous place, in terms of violence against women, and women IDPs are a large part of those attempting to cross (Ukrainian Centre for Social Reform 2016; OSCE 2018; Benigni 2016).
- IDPs are at especially vulnerable risk for trafficking due to lack of employment and social networks (OSCE 2018; Benigni 2016). Lack of adequate services to help the victims and impunity increases the vulnerability of IDPs (OSCE 2018).

7. Learning from the Civil war in Northern Ireland

Summary: The civil war in Northern Ireland had extensive historical roots, but the more organized part started in the late 1960s and ended with the signing of the so called Good Friday Peace Agreement in 1998. The main conflict party was the U.K. Government, including its state military and police, and the Irish Republican Army but it often stood between sectarian paramilitary groups. The conflict mobilized and affected large segments of the population, and living standards and socio-economic injustices between the groups contributed to its duration. The conflict mainly played out in the streets – and even in peoples' homes – of the larger cities, with many civilian casualties as a result.

Before the armed conflict:

Catholics were over-represented in the lower socio-economic parts of the society and were three times more likely to be unemployed than the Protestants. Traditional roles and responsibilities for women and men were prevalent. Women who were employed generally earned less than men.

There was a high degree of social mobilization, for example, in civil society organizations prior to the conflict. These networks were later used for the mobilization of popular support and recruitment of primarily young men.

During the armed conflict:

Both women and men were engaged in the conflict. Engagement followed traditional social roles and responsibilities, particularly in the early phases of the conflict. Men were more involved in the political organizations. Protective roles, including the use of violence, gave status to men, particularly in working-class areas. This meant that many men in these areas had difficulties to find new roles post-war. Women played more active roles in the nationalist/Catholic side, than on the unionist/Protestant side. Some were fighters but most had supportive functions.

Nine out of 10 killed were men. Civilian men, most between the ages of 15 and 39, or men in the security forces were the main groups targeted. Working class areas were the most affected. Many women became heads of household due to the arrest, injury, and killing of men. As a result, many women on both sides of the conflict faced difficulties regarding poverty and single parenthood.

Many women were later mobilized for peace across the conflict lines, becoming a party in the peace negotiation. However, a survey shows that most men were also against violence, only 10–20% saw violence or paramilitary groups as legitimate or good for security.

Women on both sides of the conflict faced domestic violence. Support from the police to these women was very limited, either due to a militarization of the police (i.e., limiting its ability to assist in this form of crime) or since the police could not operate in some urban areas. Many Catholic women also did not trust a Protestant dominated force enough to report violence.

After the armed conflict and peace process:

Men were found to be more satisfied with the peace agreement (institutional arrangements) than women.

There has been an increase in PTSD as a consequence of the war, among both men and women. Men are overrepresented among the suicide victims.

7.1. Background to the Civil war

“The period of 1968–1998 was characterized by bombings and shootings by the IRA, Protestant violence, and sectarian and interfactional murders” (UCDP 2020e).

The civil war in Northern Ireland had extensive historical roots, but the more organized part lasted between the late 1960s until the signing of the so called Good Friday Peace Agreement in 1998.⁷⁴ The main conflict party was the U.K. Government, including its state military and police, and primarily the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who wanted Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic of Ireland. However, conflict often stood between sectarian groups, such as the Northern Irish Protestant groups, primarily Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), who wanted Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom, and the Catholic groups, primarily the IRA. Thereby, the conflict mobilized and affected large segments of the population, and living standards and socio-economic injustices between the groups contributed to its duration. Most notably, in the 1960s, Catholics were over-represented in the lower socio-economic parts of the society and were three times more likely to be unemployed than the Protestants (UCDP 2020e; Chang et al., 2015). The conflict mainly played out in the streets, not least in the working-class areas – and even in peoples' homes – of the larger cities, with many civilian casualties as a result.

The upstart of the formal conflict began with clashes between the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the protestant dominated police force, and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in 1968 (UCDP 2020e; Chang et al., 2015). One of the more known events is *the Bloody Sunday* in 1972, a protest march in the city of Derry, where 14 male protesters were killed. The Bloody Sunday contributed to an escalation of the conflict as it also enabled mass recruitment of Catholic participants to nationalist paramilitary groups, such as the IRA (Hammond Callaghan 2002; Chang et al., 2015). The IRA had originated as an organization of fighters who had been part of the liberation conflict of the Republic of Ireland. In the 1960s, it served to assist the organization of youth riots in Northern Ireland, protesting U.K. control. In 1970, it formally declared that it considered the U.K. Government its enemy and that "the British Army is a foreign army on Irish soil" (UDCP 2020e).

As the initial quote highlights, the conflict was carried out at two levels in society. One was between the U.K. Government's forces and police and primarily the IRA. Most of the attacks were targeted toward political and/or military buildings and individuals. The other level stood between sectarian groups, again mainly the IRA but also more informal Catholic militia groups, and unionist groups, mainly the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force. Many civilians were caught in cross fires and whole neighborhoods were militarized. Even after the termination of the conflict, the cities were segregated. Particular working-class areas in close

⁷⁴ Negotiations to resolve outstanding issues lasted till 2005 when the IRA formally reformed into a political movement. For a detailed description of the conflict, see Uppsala Conflict Data Program United Kingdom: Northern Ireland (UCDP 2020e).

proximity to each other were affected by war violence and remain separated by walls, which still remain today (Harland 2011, 415).

Picture 5: Left: The memorial of the events when Bombay street was burned down (Catholic area). Right: Sign of local militia (Protestant area). (Photo: Olsson, Belfast 2019)




The conflict raised issues regarding the intersection between the mandate for the British military compared to the police force. This distribution of tasks varied over time, from a military dominated mid-1970s back to police control as a result of political decisions. While successful, (Edwards 2010), it also meant a militarization of the police which is argued to have affected their ability to carry out other core tasks in protecting the population (McWilliams and Ní Aoláin 2013). It also put the spotlight on how to handle the category of political prisoner; a new group in the U.K. penal system, and the perceptions of their release back in to society after having served their time and undergone political risk assessments (Dwyer 2007).


Approximately, 3,500 people were killed as a direct result of the conflict (Chang et al., 2015), and over 20,000 are estimated to have been injured (Alison 2004). Approximately, 9 out of 10 killed were male (Harland 2011). As demonstrated in the maps of conflict related deaths (CAIN Web Service 2010a; 2010b), civilians were mainly killed in the cities of Belfast and Derry. In the latter city, most deaths occurred within a small geographical area (CAIN Web Service 2010a; CAIN Web Service 2010b).⁷⁵ Since the Good Friday Agreement was adopted in 1998, incidents of political violence continued for a time but the transition from war to a peaceful society has been considered to be mainly successful (Ashe 2012). However, studies have found that many young men still remain in the networks of former militia groups and that attitudes toward violence and the opposing side in the conflict have remained unchanged (Harland 2011).

⁷⁵ The Conflict Archive on the Internet, located at Ulster University, which compiles conflict-related data from governmental resources.

Map 6. Death rates of civilians, Derry 1969-2001 (CAIN Web Service 2003b)



Map 7. Death rates of civilians in Belfast 1969-2001 (CAIN Web Service 2003a)



7.2. Mobilization and support

Attitudes toward and trust in state actors and information

The conflict involved control over government and territory in Northern Ireland. As such, the U.K. state met with limited trust from the outset by the Catholic population. A contributing factor

to the conflict was that the Catholic population had met with much discrimination historically. In 1972, local institutions in Northern Ireland were also dissolved and direct rule from London was instituted. As a result, existing civil society organizations were strengthened to compensate. Many of these had very extensive roots and the dominant ones were organized along sectarian lines – such as the Orange Order (Protestant) and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) (Catholic). These, in effect, came to represent large segments of popular interests and were primarily male dominated (Belloni 2007). For example, the marches organized by the Orange Order mobilized primarily men to a high extent. As efforts were made to prevent the marches by the local police toward the end of the conflict, these actions served to decrease trust in the Protestant side, which had previously felt represented by the U.K. Government (Belloni 2007). On the Catholic side, trust in the U.K. state military and police were negative from the outset, and events of violence decreased trust even further. For example, when a young man was killed on his way to a football match organized by the GAA, trust reached an all-time low in 1988. Sport events thereby came to play a central identity marker (Belloni 2007).

As concerns trust in state forces more specifically, the fact that the police was dominated by one party to the conflict while at the same time being unable to maintain order, resulted in a low degree of confidence from the population on both sides of the conflict. As a result, many civilians, both on the Catholic and Protestant side, turned to paramilitary groups for their protection. Over time, such groups thereby became the de facto police in the communities in which they operated. In addition, both Catholic and Protestant paramilitary organizations established parallel criminal justice systems and punishment mechanisms (Sarma 2007). Efforts were later made to come to terms with this but with limited success; most paramilitary organizations maintained control over particularly working class areas in the larger cities (Harland 2011). After the Good Friday Agreement in 1999, polls showed that security remained the main priority for the population. However, the priorities varied between the groups. For Protestants, the demobilization of IRA and the collection of their weapons were the most pressing issues. Catholics instead focused on the need to reform the police force in order to create a more impartial force (Nolan 2012).

What then happened with the trust as the war ended? Hayes and McAllister (2012) analyzed the 2010 election survey and found major differences between men's and women's support of, and trust in, the institutional arrangement set up by the Good Friday Agreement. Men were more supportive than women regarding the Northern Ireland Assembly, the power-sharing Executive, and the transfer of police and justice powers to the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly. These findings should not be interpreted as men being more positive toward the peace per se. Rather that men in general were more satisfied with the institutional arrangements that came with

the peace. Hayes and McAllister discuss possible explanations for this; in general, men find the Executive and the Assembly as being more effective than women and men appear to be more trusting and politically engaged than women in Northern Ireland (Hayes and McAllister 2012).

Inclusion and social responsibilities

On average, the roles of men and women during the conflict followed stereotypical roles and responsibilities. Women's duties were mainly to take care of the families, to be involved with female prisoners and victims of domestic violence and abuse. Men, on the other hand, were more involved in political movement and civil society and constituted the absolute majority of the fighters (Ashe 2012). Particularly in the working class and in the rural areas, the male role of protector of the community and family and the acceptance of violence as a way to defend the group living in a neighborhood gave status and prescribed value to many men (Harland 2011). How men perceived these roles is less clear. However, a survey after the war ended shows that socially disadvantaged men, in particular, had problems letting go of these roles and that violence remained a part of the youth culture. However, this does not mean that the majority of the men accepted or welcomed this situation. Approximately, 10–20 percent viewed this situation as positive, whereas 80% of the young men actively sought to avoid violence and to find new roles. Similarly, only 10% thought that the continued presence of paramilitaries was positive for the development, whereas most felt unsafe by their presence (Harland 2011). While men constituted the majority of those recruited, it was not rare that military organizations were recruiting several family members or whole families in order to ensure secrecy and to avoid infiltration (Bloom 2017).

Although only a relatively small number of Catholic adults supported the terrorist tactics used by the IRA, the IRA still had enough support to move freely and operate in the Catholic working-class areas (Price 1977). The IRA's recruitment of new members was also strengthened on occasions when the authorities were seen as arresting non-violent Catholic proponents (Price 1977). The daily struggles with home-raids, stop-and searches, and police arrests also generated a resistance among many women, particularly in working-class areas. On average, women on the Catholic side were more active in community protests and in political groups than were protestant women (Alison 2004). In Catholic neighborhoods, there were examples where women would knock on pots and the lids of bins in order to warn the community living on the same street that the police was coming (Hammond Callaghan 2002; Chang et al., 2015; McWilliams 1995). There were times when women entered the streets and tried to stop the police or army from entering their neighborhoods and arresting the men living there (McWilliams 1995). On the Catholic side, women were also involved in most parts of the conflict: as fighters for the IRA, in keeping families

together, visiting husbands in prison, and as peace makers (Dowler 1998). This further meant that women were often responsible for getting food, meaning that they had to go out of the house, which could make them vulnerable to attacks or violence (Cawley 2016). As men constituted the majority of those arrested, killed, tried in nonjury courts, and held for long times without trials, this led to many women being left on their own as head of household (McWilliams 1995).

Women were also active in the informal sector and community organizations, such as women's groups in church (Racioppi and O'Sullivan 2001) and eventually also formed politically for peace. The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition gained support from women from both sides of the conflict and managed to get enough votes in order to obtain two seats at the negotiation table during the peace process (Chang et al., 2015). Another example of participation and resistance from women was when members of the Belfast Relatives Action Group went to London and chained themselves outside of 10 Downing Street, the home of the Prime Minister (McWilliams 1995). The work for peace was also related to improvements in gender equality. The women's movement had come to Northern Ireland during the 1970s and had focused on demanding proper housing, legal rights for women, and a reform of the police. The movement eventually introduced an equal pay act and a sex discrimination act. Women's centers were established all over Northern Ireland– and built bridges between the Protestant and Catholic women (Chang et al., 2015; Hammond Callaghan 2002). This work continued as the conflict ended, where women were engaged in decreasing violence and building peace in their communities, for example, by the posting of peace walls (see example in photo below).

Picture 8. Women's peace wall (Protestant area). (Photo: Olsson, Belfast 2019)



7.3. Access to resources

The conflict affected Northern Ireland's economy. Using economic methodology, Dorsett estimates that the conflict negatively affected the GDP per capita with up to 10% (Dorsett 2012). Income levels have been significantly lower in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the United

Kingdom, apart from Wales (CAIN Web Service 2019a). Protestants have historically earned higher wages than Catholics, although the gap has decreased since the late 80s (ibid). Furthermore, women have generally earned less than men regardless of working full-time or part-time (CAIN Web Service 2019a). In the earlier phases of the war, the housing situation in Northern Ireland was rough. In 1971, 63% of the catholic population and 72% of the Protestants had access to hot water, a fixed bath or a shower, and a WC inside (CAIN Web Service 2019c). Since many women were left alone during the conflict due to mass-arrests, injuries, and killings of men, many women had a very difficult socio-economic situation (Chang et al., 2015). Women on both sides of the conflict faced difficulties regarding poverty and single parenthood. In addition, women had to face home raids and arrests of their children (mainly sons), while men had to deal with being arrested and beaten up on the street, as well as getting stuck in stop searches (Chang et al., 2015).

Some general trends regarding the Northern Ireland context is that during 1986–1996, which is the later part of the conflict, the long-term unemployment in Northern Ireland was higher than in the rest of the United Kingdom as a whole (CAIN Web Service 2019b). Catholics have always had a higher rate of unemployment than the Protestant community, but there had been progress during the 1980s–90s (ibid). Comparing Protestants and Catholics, the economic situation is still generally worse for Catholics (Nolan 2012). During the late 1970s, the number of women within the workforce started to increase. Between 1978 and 1996, the number of female employees increased by 71,000 compared to the increase of 30,000 male employees (CAIN Web Service 2019b). In general, there are more women within service, social work, education and health, and more men working with construction industries and manufacturing (ibid). However, in 2011, the gender pay gap⁷⁶ in Northern Ireland was 91.9% (percent of female to male), which is significantly smaller than in the U.K., where the gap is at 80.5%. In Northern Ireland, female full-time and female part-time median earnings are above the same male median earnings; however, an overwhelming majority of men are full-time employed (compared to women), where the pay rates are higher and thereby women are still earning less than men (Nolan 2012).

Table 1. Unemployment rates in Northern Ireland (Gallagher 1991)

Rate of Unemployment	Protestant (%)		Catholic (%)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1971	7	4	17	7
1981	12	10	30	17
1983-1984	15	11	35	17
1985-1987	14	9	36	17

⁷⁶ Three measurements are used: median of hourly pay of; all employees, full-time employees, and part-time employees.

In addition, when looking at the long-term effects of the conflict, 33% of the Protestant respondents reported in 2006 that they would apply for a job in a Catholic area. Likewise, 36% of the Catholics stated that they would apply for a job in a Protestant area (Nolan 2012). This indicates that despite the peace, people are still not comfortable enough to reconcile completely.

7.4. Population safety

Violence during the conflict

On the level of the conflict between the U.K. Government and the IRA, UCDP estimate that between 1989 and 1998,⁷⁷ approximately, 183 persons died. The security forces constituted a large proportion of those killed. Violence was primarily targeted toward state and military facilities and businesses (UCDP 2020e.; Fay et al., 1999). When we include the sectarian violence, a total of 3,532 people are estimated to have been killed during the conflict. Out of these, 322 were women and 3,210 were men (CAIN Web Service 2001). Moreover, 32% of those killed were young males, aged 17–24 years old. Furthermore, 1,521 of the persons killed were Catholic, 1,289 were Protestant, and 722 were not identified as either of those two religions (Harland 2010). The most violent year of the conflict was 1972, which resulted in 472 deaths. Out of these, 321 were civilians (CAIN Web Service 2019d). Harland states that from 1969, there were 34,000 shootings, 35,000 injuries, 14,000 bombings, and more than 3,000 punishment shootings by paramilitary organizations (Harland 2010). The vast majority of the civilians who died and were injured during the conflict were men between 15 and 39 years of age (Fay et al., 1999; McDowell 2008; McWilliams 1995).

Civilian women and men in Northern Ireland lived close to the violence, and it is often described that they were ‘having the war on their doorstep.’ Civilians faced violence from the state and paramilitary forces on the streets, but also in their homes (Hammond Callaghan 2002). The war zone was always close to their homes; there were raids, night raids, house searches, arrests and shootouts between the IRA and the British Army in the working-class communities (Hammond Callaghan 2002). The house searches doubled from 36,000 in 1972. There are reports of physical violence, children separated from parents for long periods, and raids through the houses (Hammond Callaghan 2002). Women living in the “wrong” neighborhoods, that is, Protestant women living in Catholic areas and vice versa, were extra vulnerable to violence and harassment. Furthermore, gang rapes, on a small scale, was reported (McWilliams 1995). One phenomenon that was identified as a risk toward women during the conflict was the massive increase in access to weapons among men, and women witnessed that weapons were being used as a tool and/or

⁷⁷ The range of the conflict data set.

threat during domestic violence (McWilliams 1995). Compared to the rest of Great Britain, Ireland and Canada, Northern Ireland had higher levels of spousal homicide ratio during the conflict. This might be due to the conflict and the massive numbers of weapons in the homes of Northern Ireland (McWilliams 1997). The total number of firearms found between 1969 and 2003 was 12,025 (CAIN Web Service 2019f). In addition, 115,969 kilograms of explosives were found (ibid).⁷⁸

In addition, women were victims of domestic violence. It is difficult to find reliable statistics on domestic violence in the context of the conflict (McWilliams 1997); such violence has been observed on both sides of the conflict (Chang et al., 2015). Importantly, instances of domestic violence were underreported for a number of reasons. On some occasions, women did not want to report since their husbands were important for the war, such as being a fighter in the IRA or the security forces (McWilliams 1997). Many Catholic women did not want to report crimes to the police, which was dominated by the Protestant side. For the same reason, the police were vary about entering into Catholic areas. In spite of the fact that the militia constituted an informal police in many of these areas, Catholic women did not want to report crimes to the IRA either. The reason was that they thought they might be asked to support the IRAs work later on (McWilliams 1997). Finally, during the ongoing war, domestic violence was not considered a prioritized crime. As the police force became increasingly militarized and focused on counter-terrorism, limited attention was directed toward issues such as domestic violence (McWilliams & Ní Aoláin 2013). After the war ended, women's trust in the police has once again increased. The proportion of women that described the police as helpful in cases of domestic violence rose by 40% between 1992 and 2016 (McWilliams and Doyle 2017).⁷⁹

Crime

Violent crime was present during most of the conflict, often as a result of the war. Between 1969 and 2003, there were 36,923 shootings reported (CAIN Web Service 2019e). Between 1968 and 2003, the total number of people who were injured due to the security situation in Northern Ireland is calculated to be 47,541 individuals (CAIN Web Service 2019f). Since the war ended, the crime rates have decreased. In 2012, Northern Ireland had proportionally lower crime rates than both England and Wales (Nolan 2012). That being said, in 2011, 97% of the respondents thought that Northern Ireland had a problem with organized crime, and 71% thought that paramilitary groups were behind the crimes (Nolan 2012). Men were also consistently less afraid of crime, even during

⁷⁸ As a reference point, in 2004, 5.9 women/1,000 were reported as being victims of domestic violence compared to 1.8 men (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) 2015).

⁷⁹ A number based on 100 in-depth interviews.

the conflict than women, although men were targeted with violence to a much higher degree than women (OFMDFM 2015).

Health

There are also higher rates of PTSD and mental health issues in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the U.K., which may be related to the conflict (Nolan 2012). From interviewing 3,000 adults in Northern Ireland, Muldoon and Downes found that 10% have symptoms that were related to PTSD. There were no differences between men and women. Risk factors for experiencing PTSD symptoms were: being from a low-income group and having been highly exposed to conflict violence (Muldoon and Downes 2007). Another study, focusing on women's health, found that women in Northern Ireland consumed more tranquillizers such as valium than elsewhere in the U.K. (Fairweather et al., 1984). Since the war ended, there has been an increase in alcohol and drug abuse as well as a 64% increase in suicide rates, particularly affecting socially disadvantaged areas (Nolan 2012). Men are highly overrepresented. Male deaths from "suicide, self-inflicted injury and undetermined injury" have increased substantially between 1995 and 2014, from 105 to 207. Female deaths, however, have increased from 41 to 61 (OFMDFM 2015).

7.5. Displacement and evacuations

Displacement due to the conflict is a very under-researched area. This is surprising, as an estimated 45,000–60,000 civilian families were displaced in this time period. Many had to flee their homes as they were destroyed by bombs or shooting. As a consequence, evacuation during this time got labeled as a 'Burn out' (Browne and Asprooth-Jackson 2019). The result of the displacements was even more segregated areas, often separated by so called 'peace walls' (Browne and Asprooth-Jackson 2019; Cawley 2016). Victims of displacement have also witnessed that they often had to leave larger cities, such as Belfast, for smaller rural areas. In many cases, people who had previously been home- and landowners became dependent on the state for social housing (Browne and Asprooth-Jackson 2019). During the most intense parts of the conflict, the British Government closed down the Belfast city center each night (Cawley 2016). Women were also reported to have been able to move around more freely in the cities than men. The reason was that they were considered to be less of a threat than men. As a result, women played a role in smuggling weapons, for example, in shopping carts or strollers (Cawley 2016). Apart from this, research does not describe if men and women were affected differently by displacement. However, it is not unlikely that since women were responsible for taking care of the home and family, this might have affected their strategies for handling displacement compared to the men's strategies.

STEP III: FORMING A FRAMEWORK

8. Identifying questions of relevance for a national context

Building on the knowledge from the review and combining this with the scenarios in the White books, we will now compile the results and ideas into a framework comprising questions that can be used to capture and study the human terrain in Sweden. This means that we do not generalize the above findings directly to Sweden, but use the generated information to focus our study of the national context. Why is this an important step to take? As we have seen, the review of research and of previous situations has exemplified what a crisis or armed attack could mean for a population. However, it is also obvious that many conditions that are central in the reviewed research and examples might not exist in the Swedish context. This means that while the problems and dynamics captured are important for improving our understanding, these findings can primarily be used to formulate a framework which will allow us to conduct a targeted analysis of Sweden. In forming the framework, we will also connect even more closely to concepts and terms used in the discussion on Swedish national defense and security. In section 9, we can then proceed to use this framework to form a context-relevant factual basis of the human terrain in Sweden.

8.1. Leveraging support and mobilization

As the review has indicated, it is important to evaluate if women's and men's interests and knowledge are equally considered. We will therefore discuss women's and men's attitudes and trust in national defense matters to understand if these align or if there are differences which could entail that both groups have not been equally addressed in strategic communication and efforts of mobilization. This is important for understanding if potential differences could affect the willingness to defend the country as well as if differences could be exploited in disinformation campaigns. Finally, this focus area has implications for the WPS resolutions' demands for equal influence and Swedish gender equality policy, which states that "women and men must have the same rights and opportunities to be active citizens and to shape the conditions for decision-making."

Attitudes toward and trust in state actors and information

While systematic research on variations in men's and women's attitudes and trust⁸⁰ is still under development, what can we still learn from this and previous crises and conflicts if we set this knowledge in the context of the White books? Four trends stand out in the combined material.

⁸⁰ In this report, attitudes and trust are measured by the use of data from the SOM-institute which measures individuals' responses to questions regarding confidence (author translation "förtroende") in specific institutions.

First, the White books claim that attitudes are important for understanding the potential for resilience⁸¹ and the will to contribute to the defense of the country (Försvarsberedningen 2019). What we could see in the material is that men's and women's attitudes toward defense related issues can vary substantially. For example, in Ukraine, 50% of the men and only 31.8% of the women thought it was important to fight for their country. In general, research indicate that women often tend to show a lower degree of support for the use of military force. There can also be variations in their views on how resources in a society should be distributed between security, health, education, etc. Thus, it is imperative to disaggregate data on attitudes in the population in order to accurately understand the degree of support, resilience, and the will to defend the country.

Second, the White books suggest that the level of trust in the military and other state actors involved in defense is crucial. If the state is not perceived as being able to protect its citizens, they can be less willing to contribute or to follow instructions. Moreover, if the trust in the armed forces, or other institutions whose mission is to keep the citizens safe, declines, there is a risk that parts of the population will turn to other actors for safety. This happened, for example, in Northern Ireland, where people turned to paramilitary groups to police their communities. Again, research suggest that the degree of trust can differ between women and men. In research, it also appears as if the starting points between men and women can differ. For example, female respondents and minority groups report feeling more vulnerable, i.e., their attitudes and perceptions of security differ from men's (on average). Potentially, this difference could depend on women and men having different degrees of knowledge about the military and security aspects, given men's and women's different social roles and expectations. Consequently, we need to: a) study trust in state actors in a disaggregated manner, b) consider if variations in the level of knowledge affect their perceptions, and c) consider potential variations in the starting points. Are there differences between men and women in how they perceive their current security situation – the best indicator for how they will perceive their situation in times of a crisis or armed attack.

Third, disinformation campaigns⁸² could play on variations in men's and women's attitudes, knowledge, and trust. Media and state information campaigns could thereby play key roles. For

⁸¹ Resilience is here understood as the ability to uphold the will to defend the country and handle a crisis (translated from the Swedish word "motståndskraft"). For a further discussion on the concept, see Statens Offentliga Utredningar 2020.

⁸² Disinformation campaigns are understood as one form of 'influence operation' using information as a part of hybrid warfare. Influence operations are defined as actions which are targeted to impact the ability to make decisions and to defend the country. In Swedish, "Påverkansoperationer för att störa vår förmåga att fatta beslut och vår försvarsvilja kommer att vara en del i krigföringen. (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 64)" Further defined in the Doctrine for Joint Operations as "[s]amordnad och ofta förnekbar verksamhet som initieras av en statsaktör och som har som målsättning att påverka beslut, uppfattningar och beteenden hos en statsledning, befolkning eller särskilt utpekade målgrupper i syfte att främja egna säkerhetspolitiska mål. Bedrivs huvudsakligen genom spridande av vilseledande eller oriktig information kompletterad med annat för ändamålet särskilt anpassat agerande" (Försvarsmakten 2020a, 100).

example, few Ukrainians, both men and women, had trust in the media, although women reportedly had more confidence than men. With Hurricane Katrina, the breakdown in infrastructure resulted in rumors, speculation, and unreliable information in the media. In addition, variations could also result in differences in behavior. For example, under conditions where women feel more vulnerable but have more trust in the media, this could result in women being more likely to evacuate than men when ordered to do so. This means that we need to consider a) potential variations in how men and women have access to information and if such variations are used in disinformation or recruitment campaigns and b) if variations in access and trust in information can affect the behavior in the time of a crisis. Accordingly, it can be important to consider a further combination of factors.

Finally, differences in attitudes and trust can depend on previous experiences of violence and conflicts – differences that can follow different trends for men and women. Therefore, we could expect that geographical areas where men and women have a prior experience of war can differ from areas without such experiences.

Key questions to ask in a national context

The trends and ideas suggested in research and the empirical material lead us to ask if there are variations in men's and women's:

- ✓ Attitudes toward the military defense and the willingness to defend?
- ✓ Attitudes and perceptions of security?
- ✓ Trust in the Swedish Armed Forces?
- ✓ Trust in media and variation in patterns in information use?
- ✓ Use of disinformation?

Furthermore, if we consider how age and socio-economic situations interact with sex, we need to consider if there are differences in attitudes among Swedish citizens previously exposed to armed conflict or living under more difficult socio-economic conditions?

Mobilization and influence

Another core aspect of this focus area is if women and men are included in decision-making and if and how they participate in resolving a crisis or handling an attack. This concerns positions and distributions of labor between women and men in organizations making decisions and handling national security and defense. Moreover, a core aim of the WPS resolutions is to improve women's opportunity to directly influence processes related to security and peace, i.e., to ensure that they can participate under the same conditions as men. This meets a fundamental goal of Swedish gender equality policy, which states that "women and men shall have the same power to shape society and their own lives" (Government Offices of Sweden 2019). As our focus is on the population level, this means that we need to look closer at distributions of labor and men's and

women's actual capacity to influence developments.⁸³ In order to place the questions of inclusion in a broader picture, this means that we should look at information about women's and men's participation in decision-making and in organizations involved in the Total Defense. This will contribute to an understanding of existing contributions and of potential risks related to succeeding with a mobilization.

Key questions to ask in a national context

The trends and ideas suggested in research and the empirical material lead us to ask if there are variations in men's and women's:

- ✓ Distribution of labor and influence in the national security and defense in Sweden?

Furthermore, if we consider how age and socio-economic situations interact with sex, do we need to consider if there are differences in men's and women's roles that can cause tensions between family and public roles for women and men that will affect how different groups prepare and handle a crisis?

8.2. Creating Resilience: Identifying the ability to act, prepare, and evacuate

The review highlighted several ways in which there can be differences between men and women regarding the ability to act, prepare, and evacuate. This was partly because of women's and men's social roles and responsibilities, which affected their ability to act during a crisis or war. It also appears to be relevant in understanding if men and women will be able to combine private and public responsibilities. As Sweden depends on both men and women contributing to the labor market to uphold societal functionality, this could be a critical aspect to explicitly consider. Properly estimating resilience further appears to involve understanding variations in men's and women's access to resources, which is a theme that also constitutes a core aspect of the Swedish gender equality policy, stating that "Women and men must have the same opportunities and conditions with regard to paid work which gives economic independence throughout life," that is, men and women can face differences in access to resources. In relation to a crisis or an armed attack, this concerns key issues in preparedness, such as access to cash or a car in an evacuation scenario. Core conditions of living under economic stress can also differ between men and women, having long-term effects on their vulnerability in a crisis.

⁸³ In other words, it relates to the conditions in the terms of sub-goal 4 of the Swedish gender equality policy: "Equal distribution of unpaid housework and provision of care. Women and men must have the same responsibility for housework and have the opportunity to give and receive care on equal terms." This is recognized as directly affecting the space for participation (Government Offices of Sweden 2019).

Social roles and responsibilities⁸⁴

The White books emphasize that both women and men are needed in the defense of Sweden and that the inability to recruit both women and men is a failure, not least stemming from failing to address discrimination (Försvarsberedningen 2019, 238). While important, no consideration is made for the broader social context affecting women's and men's ability to take part in national defense efforts, which will involve demands on the ability to undertake assignments over long periods of time away from home. This can entail that women's social roles as a parent might take precedence over public responsibilities, unless the social roles have been reversed due to gender equality. In addition, the social roles appear to play a part in what roles and actions women and men undertake in the organizations involved in handling a crisis. For example, in the early stages of the conflict in Ukraine, both men and women took part in the mass protests, although in more traditional roles. Women cooked, handled administration, and provided supplies; men, however, undertook more risky tasks, such as protests at night and being involved in violence. This distribution of labor became even more pronounced along traditional lines when the crisis escalated. A previous study found that young men who were involved in the Maidan protests were more likely to mobilize for the conflict in Donbass (Mironova and Whitt 2019). A similar division of labor was found in Northern Ireland; women were engaged in the conflict but in general more in women's groups, church groups, and the civil society. Moreover, they were responsible for keeping the family together, whereas more men were involved in the fighting and violent actions. While the Swedish Armed Forces' mission and tasks are not focused on the labor market per se, issues related to distribution of labor in the society highlight risks related to mobilization and collaborations with agencies more dependent on female labor force participation.

Set in an even broader frame, the review of research and the empirical material clearly suggest that social responsibilities could clearly affect women's capacity to act in the public sphere during an actual crisis or conflict. For example, in New Orleans, more women than men were the primary caregiver of children and of the elderly. This meant that the mothers took the core responsibility for evacuation during Hurricane Katrina. However, social responsibilities can be affected by the development of the state support system. This means that such institutions could cloud our understanding of how much of a redistribution in social responsibilities is actually substantial in a society. As noted by the Swedish Government, "[t]he development of affordable public

⁸⁴ Social roles are to be understood as the normative expectations of male and female roles in society. For example, women being the main contributor of time to the unpaid work in the household and caregiver of children. For further information, see Sweden's gender equality policy and the goals related to economy and distribution of unpaid housework and provision of care work (Government Offices of Sweden 2019). Note that it is beyond the scope of this report to discuss constructions of gender and norms and on how they promote changes. For a discussion on these aspects, see Ericson 2017;2020, Wester 2012 or Ericson & Wester 2020.

childcare facilities available to all is a prerequisite to Sweden's large proportion of women in gainful employment. Together with public elderly care, this gives families an opportunity to combine professional life and family life (Government Offices of Sweden 2019, 3).” Should these break down, which could be expected to happen during a severe crisis or conflict, then what would happen to male and female roles and responsibilities? Moreover, it also took until the Covid-19 crisis before the military defense was declared as an area dependent on child-care for mobilization (MSB 2020b). This should be particularly considered, given that the research and empirical material suggest that social roles and responsibilities of men and women could be enforced in a crisis or a conflict.

Taken together, this means that we need to consider a) social roles and responsibilities in relation to women's and men's mobilization during a crisis or a conflict, b) how dependent that is on childcare, and c) if variation in these roles and responsibilities will affect how they will be able to handle a crisis or a conflict, including how they will move and be able to prepare and evacuate.

Access to resources

As noted in the review, if access to resources⁸⁵ can affect vulnerability toward a crisis, access often varies within a society due to “...age, physical ability, citizenship status, racial/ethnic and cultural group, and gender” (Enarson 2000, 7). This resonates with what the White books highlight, which is that Sweden is a multicultural society, where it is central to ensure a consistent effort to involve and strengthen all groups in society (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019). Hence, in the scenarios outlined in the White books, key areas where women's access to critical resources compared to men's access would be particularly important are: a) during an evacuation and b) how they can prepare and handle the consequences of a war or a crisis. Research and the empirical material suggest that the distribution in labor roles and income (the latter directly related to access to cash) and access to a car are key resources. In this context, research underlines that women, on average, tend to be poorer than men in almost all countries in the world. This means that it can affect the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to carry out its tasks if it is so that it affects the patterns of mobility of the population.

For example, regarding evacuation and displacement, access to resources played into how women could respond to evacuation during Hurricane Katrina, a situation resulting in 1,000,000 people being displaced. African-American women along the Gulf coast belong to the poorest group in the United States. Many of these women lack health insurance and have low-wage jobs. In fact,

⁸⁵ The report acknowledges that a variety of resources are important in order to mitigate a crisis, such as knowledge, networks, and language skills (see Enarson 2000). However, this report will focus on economic resources identified in the ‘If the crisis of conflict comes’ (MSB 2018; 2019a) in order to contribute to the ongoing national debate.

25.9% of the women lived below the federal poverty line, and a staggering 70% of the household in one of the worst hit areas did not have access to a car to be able to evacuate. Furthermore, electricity and telephone lines were out for days because of the hurricane, which made it impossible for people to call for help, for example. In Ukraine, 1,642 million people had been displaced by January 2017. A major part of this group are women, including elderly women. Men stayed behind in order to look after their land, mobilized, emigrated to find a job, or escaped from being mobilized. Regarding differences in access to resources and being prepared to handle the situation during a war, the empirical material suggested several scenarios. In Ukraine, women were primarily responsible for the care of children and the household. Together with limited women's rights, they were limited in the labor market. The result was that women had a lower degree of access to resources than men. In Northern Ireland, women earned less than men and many women were left on their own during the war when men were mobilized, injured, or arrested during the conflict. Many women therefore faced very difficult economic situations. Nonetheless, research also suggest that gender equality levels play into how a crisis will affect men and women's access to resources in the short- and long-term by evening out the imbalance somewhat. A growing theme in the WPS resolutions and a core aspect of the Swedish gender equality policy relates to access to resources; a component that also plays into how both inclusion and vulnerability are distributed among men and women.

Key questions to ask in a national context

The trends and ideas suggested in research and the empirical material lead us to ask if there are variations in men's and women's:

- ✓ Ability to act, affected by social roles and responsibilities?
- ✓ Variations in economic resources?
- ✓ Level of preparedness for a crisis or attack?

Furthermore, how does age and socio-economic situations interact with sex? For example, are there generational difference and do we need to consider if there are variations between men and women living in socially disadvantaged areas?⁸⁶

8.3. Population safety: Understanding vulnerabilities and risks

The review identified potential differences in men's and women's safety with regard to vulnerabilities and risks⁸⁷ related to a crisis or an attack. In addition, the review described a broader picture of population safety. This is important as the White books suggest that existing

⁸⁶ Socially disadvantaged area is defined as being an area with "...a large percentage of residents with low socioeconomic status, and criminal elements that have significant impact on the local community" (BRÅ 2018, 5).

⁸⁷ Vulnerability is understood as factors that will affect a group or individual in a specific scenario. Risk is understood as a broader identification of what could happen, how likely that is, and what the consequences of that would entail (see MSB 2012).

vulnerabilities in the society – such as those related to existing patterns of criminal violence or weakness in the healthcare sector – can be exploited in order to create uncertainty and chaos and can affect the manner in which the population will behave, survive, and are able to evacuate. This means that this is an area where joint assessments of existing situations and priorities are likely to affect the potential for cooperation between the Swedish Armed Forces' other state actors, such as the Swedish Police or those in the health care sector. Finally, the WPS resolutions entail an equal right to protection for men and women; a goal which corresponds to an aspect of the Swedish gender equality policy which states that “[w]omen and men, girls and boys, must have the same right to and opportunity for physical integrity” (Government Offices of Sweden 2019, 2) Most notable for our study was the review finding that war violence tends to target women and men in different ways. The degree to which they live under the threat of violence and health trends even under normal conditions might also be as close as we can come to understanding their feelings of security prior to a crisis or a conflict.

Lethal effects and direct violence

A clear trend in research is the disproportionately negative effect of war on men since they constitute the majority of the combatants. Therefore, most armed conflicts directly kill or injure significantly more men than women. In Ukraine, 6,632 battle-related deaths have been recorded, of which the absolute majority have been men and boys. In Northern Ireland, 3,532 people are estimated to have been killed during the conflict. Out of these, 322 were women and 3,210 were men. The vast majority of those who were injured were also men.⁸⁸ We could hence expect that lethal violence will follow trends related to how women and men are engaged in the military, but also in other state agencies involved in the Total Defense, and in the political movements. This could further mean that a higher degree of gender equality – that is, when more women are mobilized in these settings – could affect the consequences of the conflict. When and how violence is used during the war can potentially also have potentially different effects for men and women. In Northern Ireland, violence took place both in the streets and in the home: there were night raids, house searches, arrests, and shootouts between the IRA and the British Army in the Catholic working-class communities. This will more directly affect both men and women, although men were killed to a higher degree. In Ukraine, checkpoints along the contact line have been identified as the most dangerous place in terms of violence against women, although the war has killed more men than women.

⁸⁸ A bit more unexpectedly, in the disaster in New Orleans, 1,577 people died directly or indirectly from Hurricane Katrina. Out of these, 53% were men.

In addition to lethal war violence, we need to carefully estimate the risk of conflict-related sexual violence.⁸⁹ This is an area where the WPS resolutions set out clear responsibilities for all armed actors involved in a conflict. While only a minority of armed groups commit widespread sexual violence, it is important to recognize that such violence is likely to appear under certain conditions. In order to understand when, research point to three scenarios. If we simplify, one scenario involves the deliberate choice of an armed actor to spread fear by strategically using (or at least allowing) sexual violence by its troops or in using it as torture in detention camps. We should also consider sexual violence against captured combatants. The second scenario – which is more common – is the result of the military organization having a weak internal command and control structure, low morale, and problems related to destructive group dynamics. In order to estimate the risk of conflict-related sexual violence, an analysis would need to consider political rhetoric around violence toward women, the norms of the armed group, codes of conduct, leadership capacity, group cohesion, and recruitment strategies. A third scenario involves much less violence, as sexual violence by armed actors does not have to be systematic but can be acts of opportunity. In Ukraine, for example, there have been some reports of rape and sexual violence committed by both sides but not on a systematic level. When addressing and seeking to prevent sexual violence, it is also very important not to use a too limited understanding of what this form of violence can look like. For example, sexual violence against men is much under-researched but appears to often be reported in relation to torture and imprisonment.

Crime

Research on criminal behavior after a crisis or a conflict is inconclusive. What it does suggest, however, is that it is important to be aware of rising levels of violence in the private sphere (domestic violence or intimate partner violence⁹⁰) that tends to directly affect women's capacity

⁸⁹ Defined in accordance with the Conflict Related Sexual Violence report of the United Nations Secretary-General (UN Security Council 2019, 3). The term “conflict-related sexual violence” refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict. That link may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator who is often affiliated with a State or non-State armed group, which includes terrorist entities; the profile of the victim who is frequently an actual or perceived member of a political, ethnic or religious minority group or targeted on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; the climate of impunity, which is generally associated with State collapse, cross-border consequences such as displacement or trafficking, and/or violations of a ceasefire agreement. The term also encompasses trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual violence or exploitation, when committed in situations of conflict.” This is in accordance with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 7 (ICC 2011) on crimes against humanity “Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”

⁹⁰ Domestic violence or intimate partner violence is defined according to the Istanbul Convention (Council of Europe 2011): It includes “all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur within the family or domestic unit, or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim.” In this report, only figures on physical violence will be presented in accordance with Brå. Brå presents reported cases of assault to the police, with variables on sex and the perpetrator's relation to the victim (Brå 2020c).

to handle a crisis – in addition to heightened direct risks to their lives. For example, intimate partner violence was reported after Hurricane Katrina, especially when women were displaced and forced to live in temporary shelters and trailer parks. As critical social institutions collapsed, the safety-net for women living in these high-risk situations also became non-existent as a result.

In addition to understanding what forms of violence can occur, we can use crime statistics to understand perceptions of insecurity for the population.⁹¹ This is likely to affect their behavior during a crisis – and can be taken as an indication of trends that could be exacerbated in a society under stress.

In relation to crime, we need to consider young men's vulnerability for being recruited into organized crime⁹² or extremist environments.⁹³ In Northern Ireland, for example, there were 36,923 shootings, with men as the main targets between 1969 and 2003. Since the end of the war, the crime rates have fallen. Due to the situation in eastern Ukraine, reliable sources are scarce, but there are reports of illegal weapons, organized crime, and corruption. In addition, there have been reported cases of trafficking, where both men and women are victims, and domestic violence is an issue, especially for displaced women. As the White books underline the risk of social unrest and mobilization, understanding existing organized crime and extremist groups allows us to understand such risks.

Health

Research and the empirical material suggest that there are potential differences regarding men's and women's health,⁹⁴ which could affect their capacity to evacuate and their need for resources during a crisis or a conflict. Due to the latter, there is a potential for competition for resources and critical infrastructure for the protection of the population; a failure to find a balance could result in quite clear differences in the consequences for men and women.

Most notably, pregnant women and women who recently gave birth were particularly vulnerable during and after Hurricane Katrina; there was a lack of clean water and a lack of appropriate and safe food in the emergency shelters. These vulnerabilities become even more pronounced during

⁹¹ Perceptions of insecurity are operationalized based on the Brå Swedish Crime Survey, which measures "fear of crime" by a question on whether respondents feel unsafe outdoors late at night (Brå 2018).

⁹² Organized criminal groups are to be understood as an umbrella term, including multiple forms of groups and networks which commit crimes to make a profit (Brå 2016). The report acknowledges that within the term organized criminal groups, many different groups are included and debated. Groups with the ability to impact the society and national security in some form are relevant for the analysis in this report.

⁹³ Extremist environments (våldsbejakande extremism) are to be understood in accordance with Säpo (2019): "individer, grupper och organisationer som hålls samman av en ideologi och betraktas som våldsbejakande genom att de utifrån denna förespråkar, främjar, eller utövar våld, hot, tvång eller annan allvarligt brottslighet för att uppnå förändringar i samhällsordningen; påverka beslutsfattandet eller myndighetsutövningen eller hindra enskilda individer från att utöva sina grundlagsfästa fri- och rättigheter" (Swedish Security Service 2019, 60).

⁹⁴ In this report, Health will capture both physical and psychological aspects including pregnancy-related issues.

an armed conflict. For example, in parts of eastern Ukraine and Crimea, there is very limited healthcare and medicine, including a lack of support for victims of sexual violence. In terms of psychological health, the PTSD levels post-Katrina were higher among women, those who had sustained financial losses, and those with low levels of social support. In Northern Ireland, the three decades of conflict resulted in PTSD for many men and women, especially among low-income groups that had been exposed to the war. There has also been an increase in alcohol and drug abuse, as well as in suicide rates where men are much over-represented.

For the translation to a national context for the Armed Forces, this would mean being able to systematically consider differences in how violence and risks can affect men and women and to estimate risk for conflict-related sexual violence specifically. In addition, these vulnerabilities will be aggravated during an evacuation and displacement. Being displaced comes with several issues that vary depending on the context; issues are related to security, safety, stress of living in a temporary shelter as well as economic losses and loss of homes. There is also a risk of violence, sexual violence, and health issues when displaced. If not properly organized, health can be poor in camps and the spread of diseases can be more common. While the latter is not the responsibility of the Armed Forces, it can affect the patterns in mobility and behavior of the population.

Key questions to ask in a national context

The trends and ideas suggested in research and the empirical material lead us to ask if there are variations in men's and women's:

- ✓ Risks of conflict violence and conflict-related sexual violence
- ✓ Perceptions and risk of crime? (Understanding existing violence).
- ✓ Risks of crime in socially disadvantaged areas?
- ✓ Young men and organized crime?
- ✓ Factors that can affect physical and psychological health?

Furthermore, if we consider how age and socio-economic situations interact with sex, do we need to consider if there are variations between men and women living in socially disadvantaged areas?

STEP IV: CREATING A FACTUAL BASIS FOR DECISIONS, PLANNING, AND EXERCISES

9. Assessing the human terrain in Sweden

We will first outline core elements of the Total Defense Bill, the White books⁹⁵ scenarios to focus our description and study of the human terrain on aspects that can be central for the Swedish Armed Forces. We then apply our framework to material capturing areas where there can be potential differences between men and women, including interacting factors such as age, socio-economic conditions, and so forth regarding: a) Mobilization and support related to both interest and knowledge, and influence and inclusion, b) Resilience in terms of ability to prepare, act, and evacuate, and c) Population safety, that is, existing vulnerabilities and risks, the latter outlining a broader spectrum of conditions under which the population lives and acts. In this description, we build on concepts and their operationalizations with related statistics to address the ongoing debate in Sweden. This means that we primarily make use of material which fulfills two criteria: 1) systematic population data or other material which are representative and comparable over time, such as that collected by SCB and 2) material collected by public actors, such as Brå, Försäkringskassan, MSB, and the SOM Institute, which is an independent survey research organization under the University of Gothenburg.⁹⁶ As a result, some focus areas can be measured directly, whereas in others we have to rely on indirect measurements to estimate the potential dynamics of a crisis or a conflict. Each question in the framework is addressed separately, and a brief summary of the main trends and characteristics is presented in italics in the beginning of each section.

9.1. Scenarios of potential crises and attacks in Sweden

According to the Total Defense Bill (Regeringen 2020a) and the White books (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019), it is expected that an antagonist first and foremost will try to obtain its political goals without the use of force (see also Försvarsmakten 2020a). This could mean that the Swedish society will be placed under severe stress, i.e., societal functions and the state's ability to rule the country are targeted and come under serious risk of breaking down. In such a scenario, the spreading of rumors and use of disinformation will be a common feature. It is expected that hostile actors will utilize criminal groups or networks as a proxy to, for example,

⁹⁵ The White books refer to Värnkraft (2019) and Motståndskraft (2017).

⁹⁶ The SOM Institute has conducted representative surveys annually since 1986. Each partial survey is nationally representative and includes a sample of 3,500 individuals aged 16–85. Note that the questionnaires occasionally are complemented with questions related to current events and that some questions are not asked annually (SOM-institutet 2019).

mobilize disadvantaged population groups to create disorder. Existing vulnerabilities in the society – such as those related to existing patterns of criminal violence or weakness in the healthcare sector – can be exploited in order to create uncertainty and chaos.⁹⁷ It is not expected that Sweden will be the main target of a direct attack. However, if an international crisis was to escalate into war, parts of the Swedish territory could become occupied (Regeringen 2020a; Försvarsberedningen 2017; Försvarsmakten 2020a). As outlined in the White books, this would mean that parts of the Swedish territory would be affected by intense military activity, with large-scale consequences both locally and regionally. This could involve direct attacks on, for example, military bases, critical infrastructure and transportation hubs, other forms of civilian and military facilities or resources, as well as directly targeting key personnel groups. An armed attack is also expected to affect the population if the enemy force targets critical social infrastructure and public services such as electricity and healthcare. Disinformation campaigns will also be directed against the population in various ways in order to lower the population's resilience and reduce the will to defend the country (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019). In terms of geography, the Defense Committee suggests that the Stockholm area, Gotland, the Öresund region, the West Coast including Gothenburg, western Svealand, and parts of Jämtland and Norrbotten County are all strategically important areas. Nonetheless, long-range weapon systems could affect the whole country (Försvarsberedningen 2017).

9.2. Ensuring mobilization and support

The Total Defense Bill, White Books, and the Doctrine for Joint Operations all emphasize that a severe crisis or armed attack against Sweden is likely to be an extremely chaotic situation where an antagonist might strive to use deception. According to the White books, influence operations, spreading of disinformation and rumors, sabotage, and elimination of key personnel will reinforce the chaotic impression (Försvarsberedningen 2019; see also Försvarsmakten 2020a; Regeringen 2020a). To counter disinformation and to uphold the will to defend the country, it is imperative to understand if men and women in Sweden feel equally engaged, knowledgeable, and included. Here, we will measure and discuss attitudes toward state actors, and the media, as well as perceptions of security. In addition, we will look at variations in women's and men's inclusion in the labor force in order to understand how this can affect mobilization; a central issue when considering how to uphold critical societal functionality during a crisis or an attack on Sweden is dependent on both women's and men's contributions.

⁹⁷ For example, FOI reports increased cyber-attacks against the healthcare facilities during the COVID-19 crisis (FOI 2020e).

Attitudes toward and trust in state actors and the media

A key starting point in assessing influence is recognizing that attitudes and trust can vary between men and women. An analysis using sex-disaggregated statistics can therefore assist us. What can we then learn from the Swedish material?

✓ Attitudes toward the military defense and the willingness to defend?

Summary: Are there any differences between Swedish men and women regarding attitudes toward the military, the country's security, and the willingness to defend the country? Yes, men, on average, have stronger opinions on security and defense than women. Men are also more positive toward external military support. Women, on average, are much more likely to express being unsure on issues related to national security. Potentially, this could be why their willingness to defend the country is lower than among men. This requires more analysis, not least as more women, on average, than men still express that the country's security is important. In order to understand these dynamics and how to come to terms with them, there is a need for more in-depth study of interactive factors and further examination of if, and if so how, a lower level of knowledge or engagement among women affect their attitudes.

Let us look closer at this by using sex disaggregated statistics from the SOM Institute, which has conducted measurements capturing attitudes toward political priorities and security-related matters from 1986 and onwards.⁹⁸ Using this data, Naurin and Öhberg (2019) found that women more often than men mention social issues when asked to motivate their choice of party. Further, in later years, men have increasingly identified themselves as being more to the right, and women more to the left, on the classical left-right political scale. However, on questions related to reducing the public sector, there has been a decrease in the differences between men and women over time as men have become more hesitant to this proposal, while women have remained negative. A possible explanation for women consistently placing more emphasis on funding a large public sector is that women depend more on health- and childcare than do men (Naurin and Öhberg 2019).⁹⁹ Is this reflected in how women and men perceive questions about military spending and importance?

With regard to reducing defense spending, we found that more men than women are negative toward this proposal, as outlined in Graph 2 (SOM-institutet 2019).¹⁰⁰


⁹⁸ In this report, the data available are presented in graphs with additional information on years measured and the original question in Swedish included in footnotes.

⁹⁹ However, there are some issues where women's and men's political opinions diverge more substantially. For example, men are much more negative toward receiving refugees than are women.

¹⁰⁰ Frågetext Svenska: Hur ställer du dig till följande förslag som gäller utrikes och säkerhetspolitik= - Minska försvarsutgifterna. Mätningar har gjorts: 1986, 1988–1997, 1999–2001, 2003–2010, 2013–2015.

Borttagen data: Ej svar – del av fråga (2.2% av respondenterna), Dubbelkyss (0.0%), Ej svar – hela fråga (3.2%).

Graph 2. What is your opinion about the proposal: Reduce defense spending? (SOM-institutet 2019)



Nonetheless, at a first glance, the graph appears to suggest a very limited difference between men's and women's attitudes. However, when looking closer at this data in table 2 below, it reveals a potentially disturbing trend, pointing to substantial differences in knowledge and/or engagement levels between men and women.

What does this mean? Well, in 1986, the first year that this survey was conducted, the most common response from both women and men was either that they were unsure, that is, 'neither good nor bad,' or that it was a 'fairly bad proposal.' Thirty years later, in 2017, we see a shift to an even more negative attitude toward reducing defense spending. While the most common response from men is still that reduced spending is a 'fairly bad proposal,' the groups that feel this way have now increased to 31% (from 22.5% in 1986). Regarding women, one of the more noteworthy changes is that the number of women who think that this is 'neither good nor bad' has increased to 40% (from 23% in 1986). According to Berndtsson et al. (2017), a possible reason for this response is that women feel they lack sufficient knowledge/information to make a decision or that they lack engagement; if this interpretation is correct, a substantial portion of women in Sweden – 40% – might be outside of the current security discussion. An increase in the number of men who feel less engaged or knowledgeable is also apparent, indicating a potential widening


gap between the armed forces and the population in general at the time, indicating that it could be relevant to further disaggregate by age group.

Table 2. Reduce defense spending 1986 and 2017, by gender (SOM-institutet 2019)

1986	Very good proposal	Fairly good proposal	Neither good nor bad proposal	Fairly bad proposal	Very bad proposal
Women	17%	19%	23%	23%	12%
Men	17%	15%	22%	22.5%	19%
2017					
Women	6%	10%	40%	26%	13%
Men	5%	10%	30%	31%	22%

When asked whether it is important to have a strong military defense, seen in Graph 3, the results are similar to that of military spending (Berndtsson et al., 2017). As we can see, while most respondents completely or somewhat agreed with the statement that “it is important to have a strong military defense,” more women, close to 20 percent, have no opinion, which, again, could reflect lower knowledge or engagement (Berndtsson et al., 2017).

Graph 3. "It is important to have a strong military defense" (Berndtsson et al., 2017)



However, the SOM Institute’s question on the importance of the country’s security¹⁰¹ appears to contradict the idea that women are less engaged. On average, a substantially larger group of

¹⁰¹ Frågetext: Hur viktigt tycker du att följande saker är för dig? – Landets säkerhet. Mätningar har gjorts 1986, 1988, 1990-1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2014. Borttagen data: Ej svar – del av fråga (1.5%), dubbelkryss (0%), ej svar- hela frågan (1.9%), Frågan ej ställd.

women than men rate this as very important, a difference that has remained over time. In 1986, the most common answer was ‘very important’ for 76% of the women and 65% of the men. The last time this question was asked, in 2014, the most common answer for both men and women was still ‘very important,’ now for 70% of the women and 57% of the men. Hence, a substantially smaller group of men consider this a priority. Given that a large portion of women appear to be unsure of the importance of military spending or the importance of having a strong defense, it is puzzling that such a large proportion of women rank the country’s security so highly. This could point to women feeling like they lack knowledge/information rather than them being less engaged in these issues.


Nonetheless, there are also differences in attitudes related to the willingness to defend the country. According to a study conducted by MSB (2017), when asked about a scenario where Sweden is being attacked, 71% of the respondents thought that Sweden should defend itself with the use of force, even if the outcome is uncertain. Here, there are quite substantive differences between men and women. Men express that they are more willing to defend the country than women, with 81% of the male respondents compared to 62% of the female respondents (MSB 2017). FOI (2018) conducted a survey including a question if Sweden has been military attacked by another country - do you think that Sweden should make armed resistance? 51% responded yes absolutely, 30% responded yes probably, 16% responded no doubtful and 3% responded absolutely not (FOI 2018a)¹⁰².

A more specific but critical part of the current debate on the defense of the country involves being able to obtain international military support (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019). Are there variations regarding opinions here that could affect women’s and men’s attitudes during a crisis? An indicator that could be used to answer that question is attitudes toward NATO membership, a question that has been asked by SOM since 1994. As we can see in Graph 4, the average attitude toward NATO membership is quite negative, but men have become a bit more positive toward the idea than women over time (SOM-institutet 2019).¹⁰³

¹⁰² Original question: Scenario: ”Sverige har angripits militärt av ett annat land. Angriparen har förstört både militära anläggningar och civil bebyggelse och infrastruktur. Cyberattacker har riktats mot viktiga samhällsfunktioner. Angriparens soldater har landsatts på svensk mark vid vissa strategiskt viktiga platser. Utmaningarna för samhället är omfattande. I ett sådant scenario, skulle du tycka att Sverige bör eller inte bör göra väpnat motstånd?” (FOI 2018a, 32).

¹⁰³ Frågetext, svenska: Och vilken är din åsikt när det gäller följande förslag? – Sverige bör söka medlemskap i NATO. Mätningen har gjorts sedan 1994. Borttagen data: Ej svar – del av fråga (2.4%), dubbelkryss (0%), ej svar – hela frågan (4%), samt Frågan ej ställd.

Graph 4. What is your opinion about the proposal: Sweden should apply for NATO membership? (SOM-institutet 2019)



As can be seen in table 3 below where the question on NATO membership is further disaggregated, the most common response from both men and women in 1994 was ‘neither good nor bad proposal’ and the second most common was ‘very bad proposal.’ In 2017, in comparison, both men and women felt quite unsure as the category of ‘neither good nor bad proposal’ is the most substantial, but now men have become more positive than women. The second most common response from women was ‘very bad proposal’ compared to men where more now find this to be a ‘fairly good proposal’. The shift appears to have taken place after 2013 (SOM-institutet 2019).

Table 3. NATO membership,¹⁰⁴ 1994 and 2017 (SOM-institutet 2019)

1994	Very good proposal	Fairly good proposal	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad proposal	Very bad proposal
Women	4%	7%	38%	21%	22%
Men	7%	12%	32%	24%	24%
2017					
Women	9%	12%	43%	15%	16%
Men	16%	20%	31%	16%	16%


¹⁰⁴ Table is based on the same question as Graph 3 above, albeit more disaggregated.

✓ Attitudes toward and perceptions of security?

Summary: Given that women express being more unsure about issues of defense than men, does this mean that women are also less focused on potential territorial threats? No, women consider military conflict and developments in Russia as being more worrisome than do men. It is possible that these concerns could be fueled by women having a more limited knowledge base regarding the ongoing political processes on national defense; again an area needing deeper analysis.

Drawing again on data from the SOM Institute, let us look closer at perceptions of threat. Since 2011, SOM Institute has repeatedly asked the Swedish population about their concerns regarding a future military conflict?¹⁰⁵ This data as reflected in Graph 5 indicates that women perceive the prospect of a military conflict as more worrying than do men (SOM-institutet 2019).

Graph 5. Looking at today's situation, what worries you most? - Military conflicts? (SOM-institutet 2019)




Around 2014–2015, possibly due to the situation in Russia and Ukraine, both men and women became more worried about a potential risk of armed conflict. When we look even more closely at this data in table 4, we can see that the most substantial change that has taken place is among women, who expressed being ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ worried about military conflicts, to an increasing extent.

¹⁰⁵ Frågetext: Om du ser till läget idag, vad upplever du själv som mest oroande inför framtiden? – Militära konflikter. Mätningar: 2005–2007, 2009, 2011- framåt. I diagrammet ovan är data enbart med ifrån 2011 och framåt. Borttagen data: Ej svar- del av fråga (2%), dubbelkryss (0%), ej svar- hela frågan (2.2%), frågan ej ställd.

Table 4. Military conflicts (SOM-institutet 2019).

2011	Very worrying	Somewhat worrying	Not particularly worrying	Not at all worrying
Women	22%	37%	32%	3%
Men	17%	33%	41%	6%
2017				
Women	28%	44%	23%	2%
Men	16%	40%	36%	7%

A similar difference can be observed regarding the situation in Russia, as reflected in Graph 6 (SOM-institutet 2019), which was measured between 2013 and 2017.¹⁰⁶

Graph 6. Looking at today's situation, what worries you most? - The situation in Russia (SOM-institutet 2019)

On average, women express that they find the situation in Russia as being more worrisome compared to men (SOM-institutet 2019). In 2017, that is, post-Russian annexation of Crimea, the most common response from women was that the development in Russia was 'somewhat worrying,' followed by 'very worrying.' In comparison, for male respondents, the most common response in 2017 was 'somewhat worrying,' followed by 'not particularly worrying.' This follows

¹⁰⁶ Frågetext: Om du ser till läget idag, vad upplever du själv som mest oroande inför framtiden?- Situationen i Ryssland. Mätningar har gjorts 1993–1994, 1996, 2000, 2008, 2013-. I diagrammet är endast mätningar från 2013-med. Borttagen data: Ej svar -del av fråga (2%), dubbelkryss (0%), ej svar – hela frågan (2.2%), frågan ej ställd.

the trend found in studies on risk perception, namely that women, due to their social and cultural roles, perceive risk differently, and it is common that men score lower on risk perception scales than women (Wester 2012). That being said, as our review of existing research showed, one should be careful in how such general trends are interpreted, given how men's and women's attitudes might also be differently evaluated (see also Börjesson et al. 2017).

Table 5. The situation in Russia, 2013 and 2017, by gender (SOM-institutet 2019)


2013	Very worrying	Somewhat worrying	Not particularly worrying	Not at all worrying
Women	13%	42%	33%	7%
Men	12%	34%	41%	10%
2017				
Women	28%	42%	21%	4%
Men	24%	37%	31%	7%

✓ **Trust in the Swedish Armed Forces?**

Summary: Can the above gaps in attitudes toward the importance of a military defense between men and women depend on differences in their level of trust in the Swedish Armed Forces? Again, more women than men appear to be unsure about how to respond to questions about defense, suggesting a lack of knowledge and/or engagement. The expectation that all state actors will help the population, however, is high among the entire population. Women hold the highest expectations. This potentially speaks to the importance of the Swedish Armed Forces' mandate, which remains less operationalized – support for upholding societal functions and contributing to the population's health and safety – could be critical for establishing and maintaining improved trust from women.

We take as a starting point that, on average, the Swedish population has a high degree of trust in Swedish state agencies, with women having a higher degree than men. This also means that expectations on state agencies are high. Ninety percent of the population think that it is reasonable that Swedish authorities have the responsibility to help or rescue Swedish citizens if they are affected by a catastrophe in Sweden, with no fault of their own (e.g., a forest fire). Eighty-one percent believe that the Swedish authorities have the same responsibility if the citizen is in need in a similar situation but abroad (MSB 2017).

Looking closer at attitudes related to trust in the Swedish Armed Forces specifically, we can observe that this has improved somewhat over time among both men and women, as described in Graph 7 (SOM-institutet 2019). Women have a slightly higher degree of confidence than men.

Graph 7. How much confidence do you have in the Armed Forces?¹⁰⁷ (SOM-institutet 2019)

As this has been measured between 1986 and 2017, we can look closer at the data described in the graph over time, as reflected in table 6. First of all, this shows that there is a relatively high degree of insecurity or lack of engagement among both men and women that persists over time. In addition, a larger proportion of men were directly negative than women even in 1986 when the total defense and conscription were still in full force. Comparing this to 2017, the unsure response of ‘neither much nor little’ remains the most common, but the percentages have increased substantially. Women appear to express a higher degree of insecurity than men; almost 1 out of 2 women in the population report being uncertain. More men than women are also still negative, where 22% of the male population have ‘fairly little’ or ‘very little’ confidence (compared to 13.5% women) (SOM-institutet 2019). This means that strategic communication will have to address both male (more negative) and female (more uncertain) attitudes while recognizing that these groups need different forms of information.

Table 6. Confidence in Armed Forces 1986 and 2017 (SOM-institutet 2019)

1986	Very much	Fairly much	Neither much nor little	Fairly little	Very little
Women	7%	31%	38%	12%	7%
Men	9%	27%	32%	20%	10%
2017					
Women	7.5%	29%	46%	9%	4.5%
Men	7%	29%	39%	16%	6%

¹⁰⁷ Frågetext: ”Hur stort förtroende har du för det sätt på vilket följande institutioner och grupper sköter sitt arbete?-Försvaret. Mätningen har gjorts varje år sedan 1986.”

Considering the fact that we are now moving toward increased collaboration between state agencies in the total defense, it is important to observe that the population displays more uncertainty about the role and function of the Swedish Armed Forces compared to other state agencies. This is evident in the SOM Institute's data, where Berndtsson et al. found that a larger group in the population has 'neither much nor little confidence' in the Swedish Armed Forces compared to, for example, the police or healthcare (Berndtsson et al., 2017).

✓ **Trust in the media and variation in patterns in information use?**

Summary: In order to come to better understand and address the lack of engagement or insecurity among women and the more negative views among men, can we use traditional media channels to disseminate information? Women tend to trust traditional media to a higher extent than men although these variations are minor. Still, it is important to be aware of these variations to ensure that we reach both groups with information. Moreover, age appears to be central regarding which media channels can best be used for information dissemination. Additionally, disinformation, as part of hybrid warfare, is believed to become a concern and already established forums online do disseminate anti-gender equality or promote radical traditional gender norms.

According to Förtroendebarmetern, 30% of the Swedish population had a relatively high or high degree of trust in the daily press in 2019. This level of trust varies substantially between the two most dominating morning newspapers and the evening papers, where the latter category had a substantially lower degree of trust. Public media is trusted by a large share of the population, where 61% of the respondents stated a relatively high or high degree of trust in the Swedish Television, and 65% a relatively high or high degree of trust in the Swedish Radio (Kantar SIFO & Medieakademin 2019). This is important as the latter sends out alert messages to the public in case of emergency ("Viktigt meddelande till allmänheten"). According to the SOM Institute's surveys, women have a slightly higher degree of trust in the Swedish Radio and the Swedish Television than men (Weissenbilder 2019).

In terms of media outreach, there are some variations in terms of age. The most commonly used news platforms are the Swedish Television (SVT) and the morning newspapers (Myndigheten för Press, Radio och TV 2019). Approximately, 71.0% of the population in Sweden listened to the radio on a daily basis during 2017. The older age groups tune in the most, and men listen to the radio more than women, referring to both reach and listening time (Kantar SIFO 2017). In terms of Internet use, during 2019, 95% of the population between the ages of 16 to 85 had access to the Internet in their homes (95% women and 96% men).¹⁰⁸ Eighty-four percent of the population

¹⁰⁸ About 4% of the population do not have access to the Internet in their home, and the main reason stated is lack of interest or not finding it necessary; this includes 4% of men and 4% of women, all in the ages of 55 and over.

used the Internet several times daily. The usage of the Internet is generally similar between men and women. The activity where the difference is the most substantial is searching for health-related information (men 53% and women 65%). Furthermore, 75% of the population stated that they have used a governmental agencies' website (74% men and 75% women). Regarding security related issues when using the Internet, the most commonly reported problem was receiving emails from an imposter (Phishing) for 40% of the men and 33% of the women (SCB 2019a).

Does this then affect how the population can receive warnings and information about a crisis? A survey in 2018 shows that 69% of the population state that they turn to news media to get information during a crisis, and the second common option is to turn to governmental agencies (17%). The older generation were more negative to how information from the governmental agencies was distributed during a crisis than the younger age groups. The younger age group had also received alert messages, to a higher extent, than the older age groups. On average, messages over the radio reached 21% of the men and 16% of the women, whereas media and news pages reached more women than men, namely, 15% of the men and 20% of the women. Krisinformation.se reached only 1% of both men and women (Enkätfabriken 2019).

✓ **The role of disinformation?**

Summary: Is disinformation targeting men and women in the same way? While we cannot fully predict what disinformation and similar influence operations during a crisis or conflict scenario would look like, there are already informal online media platforms in use. The majority are not only substantially male dominated, but a majority of them also use an ideologically driven anti-gender equality rhetoric and, at times, even anti-women rhetoric. Furthermore, an increased polarization can be detected, with women being more engaged in informal forums that have a left-wing agenda, compared to men who are engaged in more right-wing and conservative forums. These dynamics are central for understanding both how security, the armed forces, and gender equality are discussed among the population and how the value of gender equality, which the Swedish Armed Forces should contribute to uphold, should be defended.

The Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service¹⁰⁹ (Must) (2019) reports a growing number of intelligence activities by external actors. This situation is characterized by, for example, new technologies, changing conflict dynamics which include grey-zone activities, and a deterioration of the security situation in Sweden's immediate area (Försvarsmakten 2020f). This could involve using local extremist groups as a proxy to target or underline the Swedish state

¹⁰⁹ In Swedish Den militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten.

(Försvarsberedningen 2017, 67). Recent reports find that external actors do spread disinformation online; one example is information related to Covid-19 (FOI 2020e). According to the Security Service¹¹⁰ (Säpo), violent extremism within Sweden is a current and enduring problem facing the country (see section 9.4. in this report for further discussion). Islamic extremism movement represents the greatest direct threat. In addition, the threat from the white-power movement and the autonomous environment are growing and are predicted to constitute a more long-term threat to the country's security (Säkerhetspolisen 2019). How do existing extremist groups then make use of informal information platforms to promote their interests? And how is this directed toward men and women?

Regarding groups related to violent Islamist extremism, IS still makes use of its platforms for propaganda and for recruiting new personnel (FOI 2018c; Försvarshögskolan 2015). This propaganda promotes a masculine culture where men and male roles are placed at the center and where women are portrayed as needing protection. Women can also be used in motivating men to fight. A study by FOI (2018c) of 267 persons from Sweden who traveled abroad to join Jihadi groups (from 2012 to 2016) found that 76% were male and that 75% were Swedish citizens (and 34% born in Sweden). Concerning the radical right-wing or white power movements, studies have found that these are active both on Swedish online forums and on international forums (FOI 2017b; FOI 2019a). According to FOI, in 2017, at the two main Swedish sites – Nordfront and Avpixlat (that latter which no longer exists) – the absolute majority of the writers and commentators are men. The messages promote a highly masculine culture and very traditional gender roles, portraying women as subordinate to men and responsible for the home and children. White women that accept this hierarchy are celebrated. In addition, the forums play on portraying women as victims of rape due to immigration. Another opinion the members at these sites have in common is a critical view of migration to Sweden (FOI 2017b). Migration is the only theme where men reportedly are more worried than women (SOM-Institutet 2019). Ergo, a similarity between the Islamist and right-wing movements, is a strong ideological anti-gender equality standpoint, where women who do not follow the projected roles are perceived in very negative terms. A third group is the autonomous movements or left-wing; according to FOI, more women are active in these groups, and this movement does not promote an overtly masculine culture (FOI 2018b). Finally, a fourth, but smaller group, which has started to be noticed, are the Incels (involuntary celibacy), meaning individuals that believe that their misfortune and loneliness are due to women's increased liberty and rights. On the three largest international Incel forums online, Swedish citizens (Swedish Incel is called Swedecel) are among the most frequent nationalities of

¹¹⁰ In Swedish Säkerhetspolisen.

members (top five). Some Incels do promote violence, which is why the Swedish Security Police have started to monitor these forums (FOI 2020c).

A recent study by FOI (2020) additionally showed that men and women are treated differently online. By mapping incidences of hate speech¹¹¹ on the Internet forum Flashback among different occupational groups, FOI concluded that women receive more incidences of hate speech than men. Women are mostly subjected to hate targeting their physical appearance or as expressions of sexual harassments, whereas men are targeted for their actions or competence. There are also differences between professions. In total, journalists and politicians are the groups that receive most hate (FOI 2020b).¹¹²

Mobilization and inclusion

✓ **Distribution of labor and influence in national security and defense in Sweden?**

Summary: How and where are women and men involved in the defense of Sweden? While the political and political-bureaucratic levels in Sweden are fairly balanced in terms of men's and women's participation, on the other levels, Sweden still displays more traditional distributions of labor between men and women when it comes to a crisis or an armed attack. The defense itself is male dominated. Areas involving broader social responsibilities, particularly related to care, involve larger proportions of women. Similarly, two of the major civil society organizations involved in the Defense are female dominated, Lottakåren and the Swedish Red Cross. Whereas the Home Guard, which also relies on volunteers, remains male dominated.

Sweden is one of the most gender equal countries in the world if we measure participation at the higher levels of decision-making. For example, in 2018, 52% of the government ministers were female. In 2019, 44% of the members of the parliament were women (EIGE 2019). Does this mean that women are equally active within the institutions that are important for national military defense? Of the 17 members of the Parliaments' Defense committee, 69% were men and 31% were women in 2017. This number has remained fairly stable over time. For example, if we compared this to 1998 and 2010, there were 65% men and 35% women in the committee at both points in time. In 2017, the head of the Defense committee was a man (SCB 2019e), as was the Minister of Defense. Historically, there have only been two female Ministers of Defense, in 2002–2006 and in 2012–2014, and two female acting Ministers of Defense. At the bureaucratic level,

¹¹¹ Hate speech (translated from "hat" in Swedish) refers to a behavior due to hate and not the emotional state. Examples are communication driven by hate, such as writing messages that are hateful.

¹¹² In total, 55% of women included in the study received hate messages and 41% of men. The occupational groups included were journalists, politicians, musicians, influencers and comedians. In total, 54% of all journalists responded they had received hate messages, whereas 67% were women and 41% men. Fifty percent of all politicians received hate messages, 45% women and 53% men (FOI 2020b).

49% were women and 51% were men of the 151 persons working at the Ministry of Defense in 2018 (Regeringskansliet 2018). On average, all these forums are indeed still male dominated, but women are quite well represented. This can be important for understanding legitimacy as well as determining the extent to which women have influence¹¹³.

Regarding distribution of labor, the agencies involved in the total defense follow more traditional distributions of labor. As reflected in table 7, in the Swedish Armed Forces, men remain in absolute majority (Försvarsmakten 2019c). Over time, steps have been taken to increase the number of women. During 2017, 22,563 individuals applied for the basic military training; of these, 4,358 (19%) were women and 18,205 (81%) were men. Of the 2,241 admitted, 13% were women and 87% men (Regeringen 2018).

Table 7. Participation in the Swedish Armed Forces 2019 (Försvarsmakten 2019c)

	Total	Women	Men
Career officer	9,100	800	8,300
Continuous serving group commanders, soldiers, and sailors	5,500	700	4,800
Civilian employees	8,100	3,100	5,000
	Total	Women	Men
Contracted by Home Guard	20,700	2,700	18,000
Part-time serving group commanders, soldiers, and sailors	5,000	600	4,400
Reserve officers	6,700	300	6,400

In other state agencies involved in the total defense organization, the Swedish Police reports that 33% women and 66% men work as police officers, and 69% women and 31% men work in the civilian staff (Polisen 2018). Of the personnel in the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), 51% are women and 49% are men; within the units working toward municipal emergency services, there are roughly 30% women and 70% men.¹¹⁴ Women also constituted only 7.1% of full-time employees in the actual emergency services in 2018 (MSB 2019b). Another central actor in the total defense is the County Administrative Boards (Länsstyrelser). By comparison, these tend to be female dominated workplaces. For example, at Stockholm County Administrative Board, 67.4% were women and 32.6% were men in 2018 (Länsstyrelsen Stockholm 2018a). At the County Administrative Board in Gotland, 60% were women in the same year (Länsstyrelsen Gotlands Län 2018b).

¹¹³ See, for example, Wester and Mörn's (2013) article on participation in security-related debates.

¹¹⁴ Numbers collected from email correspondence with MSB.

Another important actor within the total defense is the civil society organizations that rely on volunteers (“De frivilliga försvarsorganisationerna”), FFOs for short. In total, there are 18 FFO active in Sweden.¹¹⁵ Together, they comprise 350,000 volunteers (Frivilligutbildning n.a.). There are here trends regarding which organization men and women choose to volunteer in. For example, Lottakåren had 4,452 members in 2018, of which the absolute majority were women. They were organized in 91 different local groups all over Sweden. Most members are aged 51–70 years old (38%) or 31–50 years old (30.4%). Moreover, 21.1% of the members are 71 years old or older (Svenska Lottakåren 2018). As a comparison, the Home Guard, while part of the Armed Forces but relying on volunteers, is much male dominated as can be seen in table 7 above. One of the largest FFOs is the Swedish Red Cross, which had about 26,000 volunteers organized in 800 local associations all over Sweden in 2018.¹¹⁶ Among those who are employed by the Swedish Red Cross, the majority are women: 309 out of 430 employees are women. In addition to providing volunteers, as, for example, was visible during the forest fires in 2018, the Swedish Red Cross have a dual role. In one respect, in terms of educating the public on issues related to a crisis or a conflict in the new Total Defense Bill, on the other to play a more independent role during an actual armed attack. (Svenska Röda Korset 2018). This means that both men and women are organized to play important roles during a crisis or an attack, albeit in different ways. It is therefore critical that both sexes can mobilize.

In addition to actual representation, interview studies after the 2014 forest fires in Västmanland highlighted the need to pay attention to how we value different contributions by different actors. It was found that focus had been placed on the details of firefighting, leaving important contributions, often carried out by women, with less appreciation (Hobbins et al., 2020). Finally, it is important to recognize that the fact that a large number of women are organized or work in national security and defense should not be mistakenly assumed to mean that women in the population are equally involved or have equal access to knowledge/information. As was seen in the discussion on attitudes above, there is still a gap that needs to be addressed. FFOs can play a role here, for example LottaKåren’s podcast Lottapodden, which focuses on how women can contribute (Svenska Lottakåren 2020.).

¹¹⁵ These 18 Svenska försvarsutbildningsförbundet, Insatsingenjörernas riksförbund, Flygvapenfrivilligas riksförbund, Frivilliga automobilkårens riksförbund, Frivilliga flygkåren, Frivilliga motorcykelkårens riksförbund, Frivilliga radioorganisationen, Försvarets personaltjänstförbund, Svenska blå stjärnan, Svenska röda korset, Riksförbundet Sveriges lottakårer, Sjövarnarskårernas riksförbund, Svenska brukshundklubben, Svenska fallskärmsförbundet, Svenska pistolskytteförbundet, Svenska skyttesportförbundet, Sveriges civilförsvarsförbund, och Sveriges bilkårens riksförbund.

¹¹⁶ According to the Swedish Red Cross, the number of local associations is decreasing due to reconstruction.

9.3. Understanding resilience: prepare, act, and evacuate

As established in the White books, some of the most strategic areas in Sweden from a military perspective are the populated urban areas of Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, and the island of Gotland (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 102). An attack is likely to result in mass-evacuations and displacement, as exemplified in box 5. The result is that the Swedish Armed Forces are likely to be affected by the success or failure of an evacuation and by other patterns of movements and behavior in the population.

Box 5. Previous crises and conflicts: Factors that impacted evacuations

In this report, we have reviewed a number of crises and conflicts. These provide key insights into what can happen during the actual event and during evacuation:

- ✓ Hurricane Katrina: Because of a lack of resources, many in New Orleans had difficulties evacuating in time. This resulted in a substantial number turning to nearby, but often ill-equipped and risky, shelters in the city center, including women who had less access to a car and to cash. Others, often men, were reluctant to leave their houses for fear of looting. Age was also a factor for the willingness and ability to leave. Older people were overrepresented among the dead.
- ✓ Tsunami in Japan: The tsunami affected the older community to a very high extent. They constituted the majority of the dead and missing. The older residents required more time to evacuate; planned to evacuate to the closest shelter rather than what was perceived as the safest one, due to their perception of their own strength; expressed a disinterest in preparing for a crisis; and did not receive warning alerts at the same rate as other groups. Comparing women and men, women required more evacuation time than men, were more disinclined to seek help with an evacuation, and held more negative attitudes toward conducting night-time drills. Generally, the most prepared households were households of three to five, including children.
- ✓ Ukraine: At the end of January 2017, three years after the conflict started, 1.642 million people were displaced within Ukraine. There are inconsistent figures presented regarding the percentages of men and women among the IDPs; however, it is believed that women are overrepresented at around 60–65%. A major part of these IDPs are elderly women.

✓ Social responsibilities which can affect the situation during a crisis?

Summary: While previous research shows that gender equality has an effect on social roles and responsibilities, there is little to suggest that differences in male and female roles in Sweden have been removed. In fact, statistics reflect that a substantive part of our gender equality could be artificial, as it might rest on state support systems rather than on actual substantive changes in

male and female roles. Such roles could become even more pronounced during a crisis if these support systems break down. Thus, social roles and responsibilities will influence which personnel groups can come to work during a crisis if the childcare services fail to function.

As noted by the Swedish Government, “[t]he development of affordable public childcare facilities available to all is a prerequisite to Sweden’s large proportion of women in gainful employment. Together with public elderly care, this gives families an opportunity to combine professional life and family life” (Government Offices of Sweden 2019, 3). Should these support systems break down – which we could expect might happen during a severe crisis or an attack – would male and female roles and responsibilities then revert back to the more traditional ones? In short, how much of the Swedish gender equality is a substantial result in a change of male and female roles and how much is artificially created through support systems? This is important, as research on crises have found that social roles play into behavior of individuals (Enander 2020). To better understand this aspect, we need to look closer at statistics and data which can uncover more nuances of social roles, such as the distribution of parental benefit days and estimates of unpaid work within households.

Equal rights for men and women to take parental leave with income was established in 1974 when the earlier maternity insurance was replaced with a more neutral system (SCB 2020e). However, data on parental leave still reveal variations in women’s and men’s social role and responsibilities. In 2018, women took out a substantial portion of the parental leave, 70% compared to 30% of the men. The older the children get, the more even the balance in parental leave becomes. In a situation concerning temporary parental leave, such as care for a sick child, the numbers are also more even. In such cases, 61% of all temporary leave is taken by women and 39% by men (SCB 2020e). However, if we look at families with children that have long-term special care needs in table 8, 83% of recipients are women and 17% are men. Similarly, for longer temporary parental leave due to child sickness, a substantially larger proportion is handled by women.¹¹⁷

Table 8. Special needs childcare allowance recipients 2019 (SCB 2020e)

Total number		Distribution (%)	
Women	Men	Women	Men
38,340	7,915	83%	17%

How about caring for the elderly and the sick? Of those that received cash benefits for care of a closely related person in 2019, 71.6% were women and 28.4% were men. This distribution has

¹¹⁷ ”Vårdbidrag utbetalas till förälder med barn eller ungdomar som på grund av sjukdom eller funktionsnedsättning är i behov av särskild tillsyn och vård. Vårdbidrag betalas ut längst till och med juni månad det år barnet fyller 19 år. Den 1 januari 2019 kom det två nya ersättningar; omvårdnadsbidrag och merkostnadsersättning. De kommer på sikt att ersätta vårdbidraget” (from SCB 2020e).

not changed over the last 20 years (SCB 2020c). Taken together, this means that women remain dependent on state support to a much larger extent than men in order to hold both public and private roles; women are still the main caregivers in most households in Sweden.

Generally, women also spend more time performing unpaid labor within the household than men. Furthermore, there is a pattern of distribution of chores within the household to a substantial extent. When asked about time spent on unpaid labor within the household, women spend more time than men cooking, doing dishes, and cleaning as well as doing laundry and ironing. Men spend more time than women maintaining the house and equipment. In total, women spend 26:52 hours and minutes on unpaid labor per week, compared to 21:14 hours for men (SCB 2020e). This difference in time spent on unpaid labor primarily appears to take place after the couple have children. Prior to that, the distribution in hours was more even. There is little to indicate that the distribution of tasks and hours spent reverts to a more balanced situation after the children have left the household (SCB 2020e). In all, this means that, on average, we have maintained traditional roles and responsibilities for men and women in Sweden. This is likely to mean two things during a crisis or an armed conflict: a) women will continue to be mainly responsible for family members, including the elderly and b) due to the division of chores, men and women are likely to have different skills, affecting their ability to act and evacuate. This expectation becomes even more likely, as research on crises has found that individuals have difficulty not following societal norms during a crisis. Many factors such as one's experiences, the environment one is in, and social roles affect how an individual will act and his or her abilities. It has also been found that in collective threat situations the individual is also affected by other people's reactions (Enander 2020).

Potentially, these differences in men's and women's roles – particularly related to childcare – could result in tensions between private and public roles and responsibilities during a crisis. Since Sweden has a high level of labor force participation of both men and women, both groups would likely be expected to contribute, in the event of an armed attack or a crisis that requires a heightened state of alert.¹¹⁸ If the childcare system fails, then that would reduce the capacity for primarily women to continue working. For example, Guldåkers (2009) found that during the storm Gudrun, that hit southern Sweden in 2005, traditional roles and responsibilities were followed. Men did the physical external work, whereas women tended to plan and work with the social care duties (see box 6 below). As childcare and schools closed down, this limited the capacity of both parents to work (Guldåker 2009). This became further apparent during the Covid-19 crisis, where childcare was identified as fundamental for upholding a functioning society in many sectors, including healthcare and defense. Similar results were found in interview studies after the 2014

¹¹⁸ Höjd beredskap enligt översättning av MSB

forest fires in Västmanland. However, a study of the last situation underlined that while crisis preparation and management can risk cementing existing social role and responsibilities, these situations can also offer opportunities to challenge them, as was seen in cases where women participated in firefighting and men took care of the children (Hobbins et al., 2020). Given that social roles have started to change in Sweden, it is important to include gender equality into debates on national defense to ensure that total defense preparations do not contribute to a negative development.

Box 6. An example of a Swedish crisis: the storm 'Gudrun' in 2005


In January 2005, southern Sweden was severely hit by the storm Gudrun. Eleven regions¹¹⁹ were affected and seven people died during the night of the storm (Sveriges Radio 2015). As graph 8 also illustrates, a total of 141 accidents were reported during the clearing up process in the months following, including 11 with a deadly outcome (Hanewinkel et al. 2013). Guldåker (2009) found that the social roles and responsibilities of men and women during the storm and the period of clearing up tended to follow stereotypical traits. Those 'who could handle a chain saw' were out clearing away fallen trees – mainly men. Women dealt with information, planning, cooking, and household duties. This is in line with previous research, showing that men often do the physical work, whereas women tend to plan and handle social care duties and have supporting roles (Guldåker 2009). A further complication was that in many areas, childcare and schools were closed for an extended period of time; the result being that it was impossible for both parents to work. As a consequence of the distribution of labor, the physical risks were higher for men. Of the eleven persons who died as a direct consequence of clearing up after the storm, most were related to handling fallen trees and restoration of infrastructure, that is, male dominated tasks. Primarily, men were also reported to have mental health issues from seeing all the earlier work they had put into the forest being destroyed by the storm (Sveriges Radio 2015), including reports of suicides (Hanewinkel et al., 2013).


During the storm, approximately 730,000 subscribers lost electricity, and 30,000 kilometers of power networks were damaged (Energimyndigheten 2014). Transportation and communications were down. In the areas facing the longest period without electricity, respondents interviewed by Guldåker report that firewood and gas ran out after 10 days. After that, it could be around 10 degrees Celsius inside the houses. One of the biggest challenges in the aftermath of Gudrun was lack of water. Old wells, lakes, and streams came into use. This also resulted in a lot more physical work for the households. Despite difficulties, it is worth noting that most people chose not to

¹¹⁹ Län

evacuate. They did not want to leave their homes behind, mainly because they were afraid of looting and theft (Guldåker 2009). However, the elderly, disabled, and sick were, in many cases, evacuated to either service-homes or other housing that had functioning electricity and heating systems, as many in these groups were also dependent on personal security alarms (trygghetslarm), lifts, door openers, and other medical equipment that require electricity to function. Consequently, society's resources were stretched. However, there are also reports of a strengthened sense of community and solidarity after the storm; people helping each other out (Sveriges Radio 2015). The ruling political party at the time, the Social Democratic party, however, was reported to have lost trust due to a perceived low crisis management capacity. The situation was worsened by the fact that the storm hit only weeks after the Tsunami during Christmas 2004, which had generated a discussion on the government's lack of crisis preparedness. Apparently, this affected the substantial loss of votes in the elections the following year (Eriksson 2017).

Picture 9. Map of affected areas (Guldåker 2009)



Graph 8. Reported accidents when clearing up after Gudrun (Hanewinkel et al., 2013)

✓ Variations in economic resources?

Summary: Research reflects that women, on average, are poorer than men in almost all countries in the world. This is also true in Sweden. Women tend to have a lower average income, and women who are solely responsible for children are overrepresented in the groups of economically vulnerable. The statistics reflect that the Swedish society has maintained many traditional social responsibilities for women, as women tend to work part-time to a much higher degree than men. In terms of resources central for evacuation, women's lower income could mean less access to cash, and women are also less likely to have access to a car compared to men.

Overall, the population in Sweden is fairly wealthy but, according to SCB, 2% of the Swedish population still live under conditions of severe material deprivation.¹²⁰ We can compare this to the European Union, where the average is 6%. To live with severe material deprivation is more common among the unemployed as well as among individuals who are born outside of Sweden (SCB 2019f). If we look closer at how resources are distributed between men and women, there are variations in men's and women's employment and salary that affect their respective risk of poverty. The average yearly income for men is 391,000 SEK compared to 301,700 SEK for

¹²⁰ This is measured as: "Allvarlig materiell fattigdom mäts genom att undersöka om personer kan betala oförutsedda utgifter, en veckas semester per år, en måltid med kött, kyckling eller fisk (eller motsvarande vegetariskt alternativ) varannan dag, tillräcklig uppvärmning av bostaden, kapitalvaror som tvättmaskin, färg-TV, telefon eller bil eller kan betala skulder (hypotekslån eller hyra, räkningar, avbetalningsköp eller återbetalning av lån). En person i allvarlig materiell fattigdom har inte råd med minst fyra av dessa nio poster" (SCB 2019f).

women. This means that women's income is 77% of men's income.¹²¹ The gap between men's and women's income is substantial, especially within the older population. Within the population of respondents who are 65 years and older, the average yearly income for women is 68,700 SEK compared to 127,000 SEK for men (SCB 2019b). In the population that is still active in the labor market, more women than men work part-time: specifically, 25% of men compared to 41.5% of women. Within the group who works part time, the distribution also varies substantially. For example, 17.5% of women compared to 7% of men work 20–34 hours per week (SCB 2019c). Finally, we need to compare households with or without children where table 9 presents families' available average income throughout the country.

Table 9. National figures on family income (Länsstyrelsen Gotlands Län 2019)

	Married/living together		Single women		Single men	
	without kids	with kids	without kids	with kids	without kids	with kids
Sweden	560,000	714,000	229,000	338,000	265,000	445,000


As presented in the table above, single women have the lowest disposable income, including when they are responsible for children. In fact, it is reported that every sixth single woman with children has economic problems. This is defined as being behind with payments for housing/rent, interests, installments for housing, or bills for electricity, gas, phone, water, garbage collection or similar (SCB n.a.). As could be observed in the conflicts in Ukraine and Northern Ireland, it was certain groups of women, in particular, who faced particular risks during that conflict; risks which stemmed out of being in an economically vulnerable situation. Limited income can also result in short-term consequences in accessing resources, such as cash or a car, during a crisis. According to SCB, among the groups living with severe material deprivation, every fifth person lacks a cash margin for unforeseen expenses. To not have a cash margin for unforeseen expenses is more common among younger individuals, aged 25–34 (SCB n.a.).

Regarding access to a car, the case of Hurricane Katrina displays that this was important in order to be able to evacuate in time. Especially female-headed households in lower socio-economic groups did not have a proper means of transportation. We can find similar trends in Sweden. As the transportation system is expected to break down during a crisis or an armed conflict (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019), this can be critical. When being asked, "Do you, or anyone else in your household, have access to a car?" in 2003, it was found that in all categories by age, by type of household, as well as by socio-economic group, and by geographical region, more men than women had access to a car. In fact, close to a fourth of all women do not have access to a car compared to 15% of all men (SCB 2008) (see graph 9 below). Similar trends can be seen regarding

¹²¹ For women and men that have an income from labor.

ownership of a car. According to SCBs annual data on car registration, in 2019, out of the total of 4,887,904 cars in Sweden, 2,492,772 cars were registered to a man and 1,360,541 were registered to a woman.¹²² There are also regional trends: at the end of 2019, a total of 935,865 passenger cars were registered in Stockholm County. Of those, 214,270 were owned by a woman, 417,625 by a man, and 303,970 by a legal entity. (Out of those legal entities, 68,010 were a company with individual ownership) (SCB 2019d).

Graph 9. Percentage of women and men who stated having access to a car within their household in the year 2003¹²³ (SCB 2008).



✓ Level of preparedness for a crisis?

Summary: These above-mentioned basic economic frames set the conditions for handling a crisis for men and women. However, as Hurricane Katrina displayed, a lack of short-term resources can be partly compensated if there is some time to prepare. Are women then preparing for a crisis to a higher degree than men? Or is the assumed limited knowledge and engagement in security issues affecting their ability to undertake such efforts? In Sweden, it appears as though women started from a weaker position than men but are now starting to prepare. However, their lower level of knowledge and engagement in defense and crisis management, on average, could potentially affect how they perceive the distribution of information on a crisis.

¹²² The remaining were registered to a business.

¹²³ This graph is created based on SCB data from the following question: "Har Du (eller någon annan i hushållet) tillgång till bil?" In the source, the data are presented as individuals answering "no" (men 14.9% and women 23.4%).

In order to address limitations in the understanding of risk and preparedness, MSB sent out the brochure “If Crisis or War Comes” to all households in Sweden in 2018. According to business owners, the brochure appeared to raise the demand for survival kits. It has been reported that most customers were middle-aged and older women (Nandorf 2019). One could therefore assume that women are more prepared than men. However, in May 2019, MSB conducted a comprehensive study on the effects of the brochure. They found interesting variations between women and men, regarding reactions and actions. Men reported feeling more curious about what a crisis could entail, and almost twice as many men than women stated that they had learned about how the defense of Sweden is structured from the brochure. Women, on the other hand, reported feeling a higher degree of concern, and more women than men had discussed the content with friends and had made plans to improve their preparedness (MSB 2019a). From this, it could be perceived that men took this more lightly. However, men’s and women’s starting points appear to have been slightly different. Before receiving the brochure, men to a larger extent than women reported already having access to relevant resources, such as fuel and some sort of stove for camping (gas or spirit). In addition, men more than women had already sought to improve their preparedness such as having cash at home, ensuring that they could communicate, had stored medicine, etc. (MSB 2019a). This is an interesting finding but not surprising given that more men than women either work or have hobbies that involve relevant practical supplies. Placed in the context where women appear to know less about the defense issues and crisis management, as we noted above, this could explain the increased concerns among women.

9.4. Population safety: Understanding vulnerabilities and risks

According to the White books, an armed attack will entail substantial stress and hardships for the population, particularly in areas directly affected by armed violence. Other areas will suffer from problems with access to food, as well as handling and housing IDPs and the wounded (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 144). Under conditions which fall within a hybrid scenario, the White books further suggest that existing vulnerabilities in the society – such as those related to existing patterns of criminal violence or weakness in the healthcare sector – can be exploited in order to create uncertainty and chaos. As these scenarios are still primarily fictional because we have no actual situations to learn from, we are dependent here on statistics that can give us an indirect indication of how a crisis, or an attack could play out. We will begin by discussing potential trends in violence if Sweden is affected by an armed attack. To understand broader perceptions of safety, we will then describe women’s and men’s attitudes toward this in Sweden today and then discuss how such differences could affect their response and ability to act also during a crisis or an armed attack. In addition, the White books describe the risk of organized groups and networks being

used as part of a grey-zone strategy, to reach political or military objectives by, for example, being used as a proxy or cover (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 67). We will therefore look closer at statistics on existing criminal groups and how men and women are mobilized in these groups. Finally, health and access to medical attention could affect vulnerability (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 84). According to the Total Defense Bill, upholding health care during a crisis or an attack is central (Regeringen 2020a, 139-141). We will therefore look closer at statistics on women and men regarding health and discuss potential risks related to that.

Violence during a crisis or a conflict

✓ Risks of conflict violence and conflict-related sexual violence?

Summary: Falling under the direct responsibility of the Swedish Armed Forces, it is central to take note of the fact that war violence tends to follow specific patterns, where men are targeted in partly different ways from women due to their roles and responsibilities in society. Deadly violence, detention, and torture will primarily be directed at those involved in the fighting or in political organizations. We can expect a majority to be men also in Sweden, given the distribution of labor. However, given women's involvement in total defense efforts, we can expect a high degree of loss in this group as well. In addition, we are likely to see other forms of violence toward the population, such as conflict-related sexual violence. The latter might depend on the capacity and cohesion of the fighting parties.

Research reviewed in this report suggested that violence in armed conflict tends to follow certain trends in how they affect men and women. We could identify this with regard to direct lethal violence as a consequence of an armed conflict – both against the military but also against civilians – and concerning conflict-related sexual violence, in this report with a focus on sexual violence conducted by the warring parties.

Regarding lethal violence, we expect that violence will primarily be directed at the military and at actors involved in the national defense. Although many women would be filling central roles during an armed attack on Sweden, we would still expect that the largest number of those killed will be men, given the overall distribution of labor. Notably, this was the effect in both Ukraine and Northern Ireland. However, other scenarios are more unclear. For example, if there is organized political resistance resulting in public protests and riots, here we would expect both women and men to be targeted, depending on the role they play in these movements. It is also important to note here that research point to large-scale protests involving women being targeted with more violence than those primarily involving men (Kishi et al. 2019). Violence tends to

follow trends in political participation and protests involving women who show strong popular discontent and mobilization.

In addition to conflict-related deadly violence, we must estimate the risk of conflict-related sexual violence in accordance with the resolutions. For example, UNSCR 1820 (UN Security Council 2008, 3) states that it:

“Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety.”

The reviewed research highlights that an analysis to accurately estimate and have the ability to address this form of violence must include not only considerations of the interest of a military organization to allow or prevent such violence but also their ability to succeed with prevention. This analysis needs to include considerations of morale, strength of leadership control, recruitment policies, and group dynamics. In addition, research point to sexual violence against men and boys being more common than expected and that different forms of sexual violence can take place in different scenarios or conditions. This means that women, girls, boys, and men can be vulnerable at different times, such as at check points, detention centers, when displaced, or when in desperate need of food or water. There is nothing in research or the empirical cases that indicate that this analysis is not relevant for Sweden. The WPS resolutions here identify the need to maintain the chain of command and to establish field manuals on preventing sexual violence. Incidents should be reported and investigated and armed actors should actively work against impunity.

Box 7. Handling conflict-related sexual violence

Conflict-related sexual violence – sexual violence which is conducted by a warring party to a conflict – is prevalent in many armed conflicts. In order to understand how to prevent or stop it, it is important to be able to differentiate between violence which is the result of leadership orders (a strategy/policy), and violence which is the result of the leadership’s lack of control, weak morale, and negative group dynamics among the soldiers concerned (a practice). We could see the difference between these in two of the conflicts discussed:

- Ukraine: Although there is no indication that rape has been used as a systematic tactic of war, rape and sexual violence have been prevalent. This example demonstrates the importance of considering the risk of rape of women in areas around the front, such as checkpoints, and when armed groups move in populated areas. Sexual violence was also more deliberately used during torture in detention camps in eastern Ukraine. Here, both men and women as well as relatives of the detained have been victims, although the vast majority have been women.

- Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sexual violence was prevalent during the Balkan wars, mostly for strategic reasons. The violence could follow specific patterns, where civilian men and women were separated from each other; men to be massacred or forced into labor, while large groups of women were singled out for rape or held in concentration camps. Some women were released after the rape, while others were killed. According to what is believed to be a low estimation, approximately 25,000 persons have been victims of rape between the years of 1992 and 1994. While women were the majority of the victims, young men, in particular, are also reported to have been victims.

These examples also underline the importance of differentiating between sexual violence, which is conducted as part of the warfare – and thereby could fall under the responsibility of the Swedish Armed Forces – and sexual violence as a civilian crime. Both are important but may require different responses. As will be seen in the discussion on sexual violence below, the latter is also important to consider, as it will affect women's and men's sense of security and their behavior. For example, will they dare to evacuate or stay?

Crime

Already existing violence in a society primarily stemming from crime can affect a population's ability to cope with a crisis or an armed attack. This includes the capacity or willingness of a population to evacuate an area. Escalating violence can lead to decreased trust in the state's ability to both uphold basic social functions and to protect its citizens. As part of a hybrid strategy, it is expected that an antagonist can use organized criminal groups or networks to reach political or military objectives directed at the Swedish Armed Forces. In order to assess the impact of gender, we will look at trends in type of crime, victims, and perpetrators.


✓ Perceptions and risk of crime?

Summary: Existing violence in the Swedish society is directed at both men and women and follows specific patterns. Men are overrepresented among those killed and assaulted and women among those being victims of sexual violence or inter-personal violence in the family. We expect the populations' perceptions of crime levels and the risk of being a victim to affect their patterns of

mobility and perceptions of security in society. More women than men in Sweden report having been a victim of a crime and also report feeling more unsafe. More women than men avoid going out after dark due to this insecurity. The most substantial difference in perceptions of security appears if we compare women living in socially disadvantaged areas to men living in other urban areas. In addition to affecting the pattern of mobility, the strain on public resources during a crisis or a conflict can further affect the populations' perception of the state – and, hence, the resilience and will to fight.

Let us therefore look closer at what types of crime affect women's and men's security today and their feelings of safety and trust related to law enforcement. According to Brå, 1,548,406 crimes were reported in Sweden during 2019 (Brå 2020a). Brå annually also presents the Swedish Crime Survey (SCS), which comprises self-reported victimization of crimes, broken down into the following areas of enquiry: victimization, fear of crime, confidence in the criminal justice system, and crime victims' contacts with the criminal justice system. The survey includes a sample of 200,000 people between the age of 16 years and 84 years, and the selection is random. In the SCS 2019 (composed of data from 2018, here referred to as "SCS 2019" and referenced as Brå 2019a), approximately 73,500 people from the sample participated. In 2018, 26.4% of the Swedish population stated that they had been victims of one or several crimes that are referred to in the SCS 2019 as offences against an individual: assault, threats, sexual offences, robbery, pick-pocketing, sales fraud, card-/credit fraud, harassment, and online harassment. More women (27.7%) than men (25%) stated they had been a victim. As evident in Graph 10 below, young women are the group with the highest number of self-reported victims (Brå 2019a).

Graph 10. Men and women self-reported victim of crime against an individual (%) by age-groups during 2018 (Brå 2019a)



This difference between men and women is mainly due to women being the absolute majority of the victims of sexual offences. In total, 6.0% of the population (16–84 years) stated that they had been victims of a sexual offence during 2018. Women in the ages of 20–24 years old were the majority among the victims (34.4%). Women in the ages of 16–19 were the majority among self-reported victims of harassment. To compare, most men (3.6%) that reported being a victim of a sexual offence were within the age group 25–34. However, it is not unlikely that men tend to under-report sexual violence due to stigma, to an even higher degree than women. Nonetheless, it should be noted that under-reporting could be true for all categories of crime. While women are the majority of the self-reported victims of sexual offences, men were instead in the majority among the self-reported victims of robbery and assault. Men between the ages of 16 and 19 years constituted the majority of the self-reported victims (Brå 2019a). In addition to sex and age, vulnerability and risk can be affected by socio-economic conditions. One particularly vulnerable group is households composed of one adult with children, where 38.6% were self-reported victims of a crime in 2018. As discussed previously, such households tend to be female-led. Another vulnerable group is individuals born in Sweden with parents that are born abroad, where 14.5% were self-reported victims of a crime in 2018 (Brå 2019a).


Who are then the perpetrators? In 2018, 58,600 assaults, where the victim was over 18 years old, were nationally reported to the police. In 41% of those cases, the offender was unknown to the victim. More men than women are victims of assault by unknown perpetrator, which speaks to men being the target of assault and robbery. Similar to the trends presented in research and the empirical cases, women are highly over-represented among the victims of assault by a family member or an intimate partner in Sweden (see Table 10 below) (Brå 2020c).

Table 10. Perpetrators of assault reported (Brå 2020c).

	Assault against individual 18 years or older		Assault against women 18 years or older		Assault against men 18 years or older	
	Number of cases	Percentage	Number of cases	Percentage	Number of cases	Percentage
Intimate partner	10,200	17	8,550	31	1,690	6
Family	8,500	15	6,090	22	2,420	8
Other relation or acquaintance	15,900	27	7,300	26	8,600	28
Unknown to the victim	24,000	41	6,090	22	17,900	59
Total	58,600	100	28,000	100	30,600	100


In terms of deadly violence, 111 cases occurred in 2019 (108 cases in 2018). The absolute majority of those killed were men (77%) compared to women (23%). The vast majority (90%) of the victims were adults (above 18 years), except for two girls and nine boys (10%) (Brå 2020b). Among the female victims, the majority (64% or 16 cases) of the perpetrators were an intimate partner (Brå 2020b).

Graph 11. Victims of deadly violence divided by sex (Brå 2020b)




As expected, these trends in violence are reflected in women's and men's perceptions of risk. On average, women (11%) and men (10%) are somewhat equally worried about assault, but women (21%) are significantly more worried about sexual offences and rape than men (2%). Similar to the figures for self-reported victims, the lower age-groups score a higher stated prevalence and worry (illustrated in Graphs 12 and 13) (Brå 2019a).

Graph 12. Percentage of age-groups that state feeling very / somewhat worried about being a victim of assault (Brå 2019a)




Graph 13. Percentage of age-groups that state feeling very/somewhat worried about being a victim of sexual offence/rape (Brå 2019a)



While it should be underlined that the majority of the population, 72%, state that they feel safe or quite safe, a total of 28% state that they feel very unsafe or quite unsafe in their own residential area and, as a consequence, avoid going out alone at night. More women (36%) than men (19%) state feeling unsafe, and more women (10%) than men (2%) state that they do not go out due to this insecurity. In other words, 1 out of 10 women avoid leaving their home at night out of fear. Interestingly, for women this fear does not decrease with age. Graph 14 below illustrates the differences between the age-groups. Other groups that stated feeling unsafe are individuals living in multi-family residences as well as individuals born in Sweden with parents that are born abroad.

Graph 14. Percentage of age-groups that state feeling very / somewhat unsafe in their residential area (Brå 2019a)



In terms of confidence in the criminal justice system, the result of the SCS 2019 shows that 48% of the population state that they have a high (very high or quite high) degree of confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole. Moreover, 52% of the population state confidence in the Swedish police, while 39% state confidence in the prosecutor, and 38% in the criminal justice system. Overall, women state a higher degree of confidence than men. It is most common for men between the ages of 16 and 19 to state high confidence, while it is most common among women between the ages of 35 and 44 to do so. Furthermore, the SCS 2019 found that individuals with tertiary education stated a higher confidence than groups of individuals with pre-secondary or upper secondary education (Brå 2019a).

✓ Risk of crimes in socially disadvantaged areas?

Summary: The feeling of insecurity and the actual risks are higher when living in a socially disadvantaged area than other urban areas, i.e., the general problems in the population are more pronounced. The stated feeling of insecurity varies substantially between men and women. This could entail that the population's movements and responses toward, for example, evacuation orders would develop differently in different areas.

Women and men living in 'socially disadvantaged areas'¹²⁴ are, to a larger degree, exposed to offences against an individual than men and women living in other urban areas (Brå 2018). According to data from SCS 2006–2017, table 11 shows that significantly more women stated being exposed to sexual crimes, and significantly more men stated being exposed to assault.

Table 11. Self-reported crimes in socially disadvantaged areas and other urban areas (Brå 2018)

	Women		Men	
	Socially disadvantaged	Other urban	Socially disadvantaged	Other urban
Crime against an individual	19.9%	16.9%	19.4%	16.1%
Violent crimes	10.4%	7.8%	11.8%	9.4%
Feeling unsafe outdoors late at night	48%	30%	22%	9%

In 2016, more women living in a socially disadvantaged area stated to have been exposed to offences against an individual (that is, assault, sexual crime, mugging, fraud, and harassment) than women living in other urban areas – 19.9% compared to 16.9% (Brå 2018). The same finding is true for men; thus, 19.4% of men living in socially disadvantaged areas compared to 16.1% of men living in other urban areas reported having been exposed to a crime against them as an

¹²⁴ For definition of "socially disadvantaged areas" (translation from "socialt utsatta områden") see BRÅ (2018). "Utvecklingen i socialt utsatta områden i urban miljö 2006–2017"

individual. There are no comprehensive studies conducted on honor-related violence and oppression in Sweden. However, according to a report by the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society¹²⁵ (2009), 70,000 young women and men between 16 and 25 years were not allowed to marry without the family's consent or that their family decided on their partner (Mucf 2009).

Regarding self-reported victim of violent crimes (that is, assault, threat, and mugging), 10.4% of women in socially disadvantaged areas compared to 7.8% of women in other urban areas reported having been victims of such crimes in 2016. It was also more common for men in socially disadvantaged areas (11.8%) than men in other urban areas (9.4%). More men than women in socially disadvantaged areas have been self-reported victims of violent crimes. When it comes to confidence in the justice system as a whole, there were very small, or no, differences reported between men and women. The confidence was, on average, higher in other urban areas (57%) than in socially disadvantaged areas (52%) (Brå 2018).

✓ **Young men and violent organizations?**

Summary: A potential hybrid scenario includes the opposing force utilizing existing local criminal or radicalized networks to reach their objective, for example, to cause societal unrest or create suspicion toward the state. Several organizations, both organized criminal networks or groups and extremist environments, in Sweden today could possibly be used this way – what is significant is that they direct themselves primarily to men, and violence is part of their ideology or practice. This creates a risk of men being recruited, and women and gender equality as an ideal being negatively targeted. Among these are violent Islamic extremists, white power, and left-wing autonomous environments as well as street gangs or outlaw MC-clubs.

A potential hybrid scenario outlined in the White books includes using existing criminal networks as a proxy or cover to reach political or military objectives (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 67; Hågström and Brun 2019). These could potentially be used by external actors to undermine the trust in the state and its agencies or cause havoc to use up or redirect state resources which could cause internal unrest. An example is riots, as described by Säpo (Säkerhetspolisen 2018).

As noted in the above discussion on disinformation (see section 9.2. Ensuring mobilization and support), there are several organizations – both organized criminal networks or groups and extremist environments – in Sweden today, which direct themselves primarily to young men and where violence is part of their ideology or practice. Therefore, it is important to start from the understanding that these vary, both in form and to the extent that a political agenda plays a part in their behavior. According to Säpo (2018), the majority of individuals in Sweden who believe

¹²⁵ In Swedish Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamhällesfrågor.

that criminal acts are an inevitable part of changing the society are members of these three groups: the violent Islamist environment, the white power environment, and the autonomous environment. In addition, there are individuals who are not part of any of these movements but share the same values and who alone or together with someone state that they are willing to conduct an assault or commit serious violent crimes based on their values. Importantly, it should be noted that these groups do not only use violence or criminal acts to spread their message but also use legal and peaceful acts such as demonstrations, fliers, and social activities (Säkerhetspolisen 2018).

Overall, according to Rostami et al. (2018), 15,244 individuals were involved in organized crimes and violent-extremist milieus in Sweden in 2018. Rostami et al. categorized these into three main groups: organized crime, extremist environments, and so-called football firms. Organized crime constitutes the largest group (83% n=12,768), followed by extremist environments (10.7% n=1,641). These groups can be further divided into antagonistic types of organizations: criminal networks, partial organizations, street gangs, outlaw motorcycle clubs, organized-crime syndicates, football firms, Islamic extremism, left-wing autonomous movements, white-power groups, and other extremists.¹²⁶ The majority of the individuals recruited are men, mostly young men, but many groups do include female members. It is therefore important not to make stereotypical assumptions about women's agency in these groups. Table 12 below illustrates the gender and age balance within the groups:

Table 12. Age and gender, divided by the groups (Rostami et al., 2018)

Group	Men			Women		
	Percentage	Most common age	Average age	Percentage	Most common age	Average age
Criminal networks	90.4	19	26.1	9.6	19	30.1
Partial organizations	95.3	18	22.2	4.7	16	23.8
Street gangs	94.7	19	24.0	5.3	42	27.3
Outlaw motorcycle clubs	92.9	21	27.7	7.1	27	30.8
Organized-crime syndicates	95.7	21	24.6	4.3	45	29.0
Football firms	99.3	20	23.9	0.7	18	20.5
Islamic extremism	86.5	19	25.7	13.5	22	24.7
Left-wing autonomous movements	81.9	21	22.2	18.1	21	24.6
White-power groups	89.3	20	23.0	10.7	17	20.8
Other extremists	81.5	21	25.3	18.5	55	44.1

¹²⁶ Individuals that are assessed as not having a clear connection to an organization, group, or environment.

The autonomous and other extremist groups, that is, left-wing autonomous movements, had the highest level of participation of women (over 18%), followed by violent Islamic extremist' groups (13%). However, the average participant in all of these organizations is male and 26 years old. The percentage of those being born outside of Sweden varies between the groups, from least within white-power (3%) and most in the Islamic extremist group (72%). About half of all have a degree from secondary school (46%), and only a small part has higher education (8%). The left-wing autonomous movements contained the highest number of individuals with a higher degree of education (20%). Football firms and outlaw MC-clubs members had the highest number of secondary school degrees (over 50%). More severe psychiatric disorders are rare in the population studied, but 45% had a psychiatric diagnosis. This is most common within the category 'other extremists' and least common among the Islamic extremist group (Rostami et al., 2018).

The level of violence in existing criminal networks and extremist environments can indeed be high. Since 2011, when the usage of firearms began to be recorded, the number of deadly cases using a firearm in Sweden has steadily increased from 17 cases in 2011 to 45 cases in 2019. During 2011–2019, the percentage of male victims ranged been between 82 to 98% (Brå 2020b). For example, from January to November 2018, the police registered 42 shootings with deadly outcomes, and 129 individuals were wounded. The increase in deadly and non-deadly shootings mainly affects young men in the ages of 15–29. The shootings are more common in the metropolitan areas and were especially prevalent in socially disadvantaged areas. Of these, an increased proportion of the incidents can be linked to conflicts in or between the criminal networks, as other forms of shootings have decreased (Brå 2019b).

Health

Estimating effects of crises or of an armed attack on the population's health concerns decisions on the distribution of resources and prioritizing between civilian and military needs.¹²⁷ Notably, variations in health-related vulnerabilities between men and women can be expected to become aggravated during a crisis, not least related to pregnancy and childbirth.

✓ Factors which can affect physical and psychological health?

Summary: There are potential variations in vulnerability when it comes to men, women, and health. Decisions on how healthcare resources are distributed and used in a society can therefore have different effects for men and women. While women report higher physical and psychological ill-health, men tend to die at an early age due to an accident or as a result of risk behavior. Risk

¹²⁷ As specified in the goal, "Women and men, girls and boys must have the same conditions for a good health and be offered care on equal terms" (Government Offices of Sweden 2019, 2).

of suicide, particularly among older men, is also substantially higher than among women. A particular issue, in the short-term, is that during a crisis or a conflict, research highlight that pregnant women, women who recently gave birth, and infants, can constitute a substantial proportion of excess deaths.

Regarding average health, women in Sweden report being in poor health to a higher extent than men. However, if we consider the potential role of education, socio-economic factors, sexuality, and being born in or outside of Sweden, the picture becomes more nuanced (Regeringen 2016). In particular, low income is connected to poorer health. Since women on average have a lower income than men, this could potentially be the reason why more women perceive their health to be poor. In addition to reported health, apart from the age group of between 16 and 19, women have a higher number of days within a 12-month period for receiving compensation due to a reduced work capacity than men as displayed in table 13.

Table 13. Poor health number¹²⁸ by age groups and sex (Försäkringskassan 2020)

Age	Women	Men
16-19	1.7	2.1
20-29	13.9	12.0
30-39	18.6	12.3
40-49	26.4	15.8
50-59	45.5	28.9
60-64	65.5	46.0

Nonetheless, a concern related to men's health is that men, in general, tend to seek healthcare later than women. Moreover, it is more common for men to die at an early age due to an accident or as a result of risk behavior (such as that involving traffic, violence, or alcohol). It is also more common for men to die or to get hurt in a workplace accident (Regeringen 2016).


An example of the complexity of health numbers concerns diagnoses such as depression, anxiety, and stress. A substantially higher number of women received compensation from for this within a 12-month period (Försäkringskassan 2020). Moreover, twice as many women compared to men in the age category 16–24 years reported that they suffered from anxiety (Regeringen 2016). At the same time, if we look closer at neuropsychiatric conditions, it is much more common for boys to have been diagnosed with these problems. In addition, suicide is much more common among men in all age categories, and it is more common among older men than it is among younger men. In total, men commit suicide twice as often as women, and it is twice as common among men

¹²⁸ Ohälsotalet is a measurement of how many days during a twelve-month period Försäkringskassan pays compensation for reduced work capacity in relation to the number of insured individuals aged 16–64. The measurement, ohälsotalet, includes sickness benefit, rehabilitation allowances, and activity allowances (sjukpenning, rehabiliteringspenning, sjukersättning och aktivitetsersättning). The measurement is based on the number of net days paid. Net days mean that days with partial compensation are converted into whole days.

with no high school education than it is among men who have post-high school education. Potentially, this is due to men seeking help to a lower degree than women. For example, failed suicide attempts, which could often be a call for help, are three times higher among young women than among young men (Regeringens 2016).

Finally, as demonstrated by the research and the examples, in a crisis or an armed conflict, pregnancy and child birth constitute a particular issue that could result in a substantial degree of excess deaths during a crisis or an armed attack. In addition, pregnancy and caring for infants will affect women's movements and need for public resources. According to the National Board of Health and Welfare,¹²⁹ around 110,000 children are born each year in Sweden (Socialstyrelsen 2020). This constitutes approximately 300 births/day. The average fertility rate is 1.7 children/woman, but the number varies greatly between regions. For example, in 2019, in the larger cities, Stockholm reported a fertility rate of 1.54, Gothenburg 1.56, and Malmö 1.69 (SCB 2020a). What does this mean? Let us use Stockholm as an example. In May 2020, 2,666 children were born in the Stockholm region. This equals about 86 births/day. The city has six delivery units. Of those born in May 2020, 683 were born at Södersjukhuset, 236 at Södertälje Hospital, 309 at Karolinska University Hospital, 455 at Karolinska University Hospital Huddinge, 611 at Danderyds Hospital, and 372 at BB Stockholm (Region Stockholm 2020). When the health infrastructure is fully functional, health risks related to pregnancy are quite low. For example, of the 115,832 deliveries in 2018, five women died in relation to childbirth (SCB 2020e). However, graph 15 of Sweden's own history demonstrates the importance of maternal health for infant health and how boys' infant health has increased the most in the recorded statistics.

Graph 15. Infant mortality per 1,000 live births in Sweden from 1885 to 2019 (SCB 2020e)



¹²⁹ In Swedish, "Socialstyrelsen".

STEP V: FORMULATING PEDAGOGICAL MATERIAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10. How to use the factual basis in planning and exercises

As established in the introduction, this reports starts from the understanding that there is an ongoing shift from prioritizing contributions to international operations to focusing on national defense; a process which entails a return to the Swedish Armed Forces' "primary responsibility [...] to defend Sweden against armed attack, guard Swedish territory, and provide societal support in various ways." This is encapsulated in its visions to "defend Sweden and the country's interests, our freedom and the right to live the way of our choice" and to "work closely with other Swedish authorities and agencies, and the civilian population, to strengthen and protect critical societal functions" (Försvarsmakten 2020e). This development has meant that the Swedish population is increasingly coming into focus for the Swedish Armed Forces (see, for example, Försvarsmakten 2020a; Regeringen 2020a) in order to further enhance: a) the ability to estimate and handle effects from changes in the Swedish population's mobilization and support, resilience, and safety on the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to carry out its mission and tasks; b) the ability to successfully collaborate with other agencies and actors in the total defense, including forming joint assessments, plans, and exercises; and c) the capacity to contribute to the protection of the population and to handle secondary effects on the military organization (Försvarsmakten 2020a). The aim of the report is to contribute to this evolving understanding of the operational environment in Sweden,¹³⁰ thereby increasing efficiency and perseverance and reducing risks, in the spectrum from normal to high alert, including hybrid conditions. To that end, this report supports ongoing efforts to further nuance the enhanced human terrain analysis (EHTA)¹³¹ in the Swedish Armed Forces by incorporating issues related to variations between men and women regarding mobilization and support, resilience, and safety, further incorporating interaction with other conditions, such as age and other background conditions.¹³² This is critical as the population does not constitute one coherent group; a starting point which resonates with the White books, and further highlight that Sweden is a complex and multicultural society where it is central to ensure a consistent effort to involve and strengthen all groups in society (Försvarsberedningen 2017; 2019).

¹³⁰ Operational environment is based on the definition of "Operationsmiljö" in Doktrin för gemensamma operationer. That is, it is a cohesive system comprising the physical environment, actors and information environment within which the civilian population constitutes a central component. Original quote: "Operationsmiljön är ett sammanhängande system av fysisk miljö, aktörer och informationsmiljö." (see Försvarsmakten 2020a 15).

¹³¹ The Swedish term is "fördjupat civilläge".

¹³² Often discussed in terms of intersectionality in qualitative research and interactive effects in statistical studies.

The report has been developed for three main target groups in the Swedish Armed Forces. First, the military leadership at the strategic level. Second, officers and personnel responsible for strategic and operational planning. Third, personnel who are cooperating with other government agencies and organizations to develop the total defense in order to establish joint assessments, priorities, and exercises. To ensure usability, the scope and focus of the report are based on the scenarios outlined in the Total Defense Bill 2020, the White books, and in evolving military policies, doctrine, and reports as well as on in-depth consultations, primarily with Swedish Armed Forces' personnel, but also with other key government agencies, organizations, and researchers.

In the consultations, the target groups for the report requested information which was concrete and practical (avoiding sweeping general statements and abstract concepts) but that enabled discussions which could allow for adapting the information to a range of process-specific needs related both to advancing territorial defense and re-establishing total defense. To meet this request, the included information speaks to ongoing military efforts in three forms:

1. Information which is relevant for the Swedish Armed Forces' *direct responsibilities*. For example, information relevant for military operations in urban areas, or points central for strategic communication.
2. Information which is relevant for Swedish Armed Forces' *indirect responsibilities* related to the joint planning and coordination, most notably with civilian agencies in the total defense. For example, in education and exercises and in discussions to form joint assessments and priorities.
3. Information which *nuances and substantiates the situational awareness* in planning and in forming credible training scenarios, encapsulating relevant developments in the human terrain on the spectrum of potential antagonistic tools including hybrid methods. This allows for the personnel to be fully prepared to act effectively in the Swedish territory, down to the tactical level.

Importantly, an EHTA naturally constitutes only one component out of many to consider in military operations planning and in total defense planning. Moreover, which parts of the information presented in this report that are relevant will depend on the processes in which each individual user is involved. Finally, there are additional national and international legal and normative obligations affecting how results coming out of an EHTA should be handled including Swedish legislation, the Laws of War, and International Humanitarian Law.¹³³

¹³³ See for example, Tengroth and Lindvall (2015) for a discussion on the Swedish Red Cross' work on International Humanitarian Law and gender.

To meet the request by the target groups for a versatile and pedagogical material, each sub-section below begins by outlining joint questions for discussion. We complement these questions with a short summary of key results and page references to specific parts of section 9 where more in-depth information can be found. Where relevant, we also relate the results to discussions in the reviewed research and to excerpts from the reviewed crises and conflicts to provide more nuance. Thereafter, we formulate recommendations which cover the above three forms of usage (direct, indirect, and situational awareness). To further ensure that these recommendations contribute to ongoing efforts, we include examples of existing work by the Swedish Armed. We conclude by tying the material back to the national and international expectations on gender equality, forming recommendations on how the Swedish Armed Forces can address the WPS resolutions in a national context.

10.1. Strive to establish equal knowledge and support

Strategic communication: Address differences in knowledge and attitudes

According to the Total Defense Bill, the population's willingness to defend the country should be strengthened. Furthermore, popular support is dependent on their knowledge and understanding of the needs of society and total defense during a crisis or an armed attack (Regeringen 2020a).¹³⁴

Questions for discussion (read pages 94–104; and 127–128):

- ✓ How can differences in attitudes between men and women a) toward military defense, and b) willingness to defend the country, be exploited by an antagonist/opposing force?
- ✓ What can the consequences be for the military that women express being more unsure (potentially due to having less knowledge/information) about a) the Swedish Armed Forces' mission and tasks, b) what a severe security crisis or armed attack in Sweden could mean for the population and oneself?

Using sex-disaggregated statistics, the study of attitudes toward defense and national security signaled a higher level of insecurity among women compared to men in Sweden. This requires further analysis to ensure that women do not have a lower level of knowledge about crises and conflict-related matters or feel less engaged in this key area of the state. Moreover, there were important differences between men and women regarding attitudes toward the military, the country's security, and the willingness to defend the country.¹³⁵ Notably, women were more concerned with the risk of an armed conflict. Still, a larger proportion of the women felt undecided

¹³⁴ Civil society organizations are considered as particularly important in this respect in the Bill but also the Swedish Armed Forces undertakes efforts in these areas. For example, the YouTube series, "When the war comes" (released in January 2021).

¹³⁵ It should be recognized that there exists a broader debate on this where willingness to defend the country is discussed both in relation to the military and in relation to building a society that is deemed worthy of protection (for a discussion, see Wedebrand and Johansson, 2020).

regarding the role of the Swedish Armed Forces rather than displaying distrust. Men, in comparison, had a slightly higher overall degree of trust in the Swedish Armed Forces, but this group also included a larger proportion who were directly negative toward the military. This finding should be further disaggregated, if possible, to obtain an understanding of what creates this distrust and if, including how, it could be manipulated to target the Swedish Armed Forces. In addition, while attitude data is not easily available on more specific geographical areas, research and the White books suggest that we need to specifically consider that attitudes and levels of knowledge about the Swedish Armed Forces could vary between areas, such as urban versus rural or in socially disadvantaged areas. In addition, the review of research suggests that when communicating with the population in socially disadvantaged areas, it is important to be aware that parts of the population may have previous experiences of war, which can affect the perception of military actors in both negative and positive respects. Additionally, levels of proficiency in Swedish should be analyzed and considered in communication.

In addition, research and data suggest that men and women might have different prioritizations when it comes to state responsibilities in some important respects. Such differences could support their perception of the priority of national defense. Notably, women tend to perceive state spending on social issues as being of higher importance than men, even though the gap has decreased in recent years as men have become more positive. This could speak to the importance of communicating explicitly about the Swedish Armed Forces' tasks to support society under a crisis, in addition to direct military tasks. Hence, support for upholding societal functions and contributing to the population's health and safety could potentially be key when seeking to gain and maintain improved trust from women.¹³⁶ In developing the communication about such tasks, several of the Swedish Armed Forces' personnel consulted for the study underlined that there is a need to clarify under what conditions the Swedish Armed Forces should support civilian functions and what form this support should take overall.

Recommendations: Strengthen targeted strategic communication to reach both men and women

- ✓ Continue to analyze the potential gap in women's knowledge of defense-related matters.
- ✓ Integrate considerations of how variations in women's and men's attitudes and priorities relate to the Swedish Armed Forces' different tasks and adapt the messages.

¹³⁶ The potential of this argument could be further examined in attitude data in the context of the ongoing Covid-19 crisis, as this has brought the Swedish Armed Forces' mandate of support into focus.

- ✓ Ensure that both women and men can obtain a better understanding of national defense and security by targeted messaging. This should include women and men in socially disadvantaged areas.

Recommendations on WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy:

According to the WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy, men and women should have equal opportunities to be part of the debate and decisions on national defense and security.

- ✓ Ensure that communication strategies, information packages, and messages are formed to reach both women and men, including age, socio-economic situation, and background.

Box 8: Communication Department's strategy to strengthen support from women¹³⁷

Efforts by the Swedish Armed Forces Department of Communication and Public Affairs¹³⁸ is an example of how sex-disaggregated statistics can be utilized to strengthen a more equal engagement and debate on national defense and security. For example, such statistics are used when tracking and analyzing population attitudes toward the Swedish Armed Forces' tasks and efforts. In such surveys, women between the ages of 15 to 35 have been identified as a specifically relevant group to reach with information as the data have unearthed that these women appeared to have less knowledge of issues related to national defense and security while also expressing a higher degree of concern about ongoing developments compared to men.

In addition, there are efforts to ensure that information reaches both men and women in an adapted way to secure commitment, increase the willingness to defend, and improve perseverance among all groups of citizens. Public messaging includes:

- ✓ Why and how a strong military defense lowers the risk of an armed attack on Sweden.
- ✓ That it should be considered primarily a right for both men and women to participate in the defense of the country rather than just an obligation.
- ✓ That the national defense of Sweden means defending our democracy and our right to self-determination.
- ✓ The attitude that it should be "one for all, all for one." Regardless of your gender or background, you should be treated equally in the Armed Forces.

These efforts are deemed to have been successful, as recent survey results indicate that both women and men are starting to become increasingly more positive toward the Swedish Armed Forces' mission and tasks. Moreover, as part of the efforts to strengthen the total defense, the Swedish Armed Forces are now targeting their communication toward women. This can include communication concerning the connection to sectors such as healthcare and education in the messaging to engage women.

¹³⁷ Based on email correspondence with the Swedish Armed Forces' Department of Communication and Public Affairs

¹³⁸ Ledningsstabens kommunikationsavdelning

Strategic communication: Handle disinformation directed at both men and women

As part of a hybrid strategy, influence operations¹³⁹ such as disinformation campaigns, are likely to target segments of the Swedish population. According to the Total Defense Bill, such campaign can also be part of an armed attack where part of the aim is to undermine the willingness to defend the country (Regeringen 2020a, 60). Disinformation regarding men's and women's roles and contributions can also be seen as targeting fundamental values, such as democracy, human rights, and gender equality.

Questions for discussion (read pages 104–107 and 127–131):

- ✓ How can differences in attitudes between men and women be exploited against the Swedish Armed Forces as part of influence operations?
- ✓ Can popular attitudes toward gender inequality be exploited in disinformation campaigns to target the Swedish Armed Forces?

While we cannot fully predict what form disinformation during a crisis or an armed attack would take, existing examples of online media platforms provided us with some indication. This sex-disaggregated data made it clear that these platforms do not target men and women in the same way. The majority of existing platforms are not only substantially male-dominated, but most also use a right-wing ideologically or extremist religious driven anti-gender equality rhetoric and, at times, even anti-women rhetoric. Of the more radical left-wing groups, these often have an explicit anti-sexist agenda and see substantially more women engaged. Attitudes toward gender equality thereby already appear to play a part in an ongoing radicalization of both women and men, but in different manners and degrees. Moreover, generally women seem to be the target of hate propaganda online to a higher degree than men. This targeting often involves forms of sexual harassments and/or a focus on their physical appearance. Ergo, we should assume that the current use of anti/pro gender equality rhetoric is strategic and serves central purposes for the movements and groups that utilize such rhetoric. The consequences for society could potentially be substantial. For example, for a small country such as Sweden, it is vital that all resources can be mobilized, notably, that both men and women are part of the labor force and when the state seeks to uphold effective social and economic development. Gender equality is also one of the strongest values, along with democracy and equality, in the Swedish society. Finally, to reach men and women with counter-messages, it can be noted that both groups have a relatively high trust in the regular media. Age also plays a role where elderly people, in particular, rely on traditional media.

¹³⁹ Påverkansoperation, dvs. ”Samordnad och ofta förnekbar verksamhet som initieras av en statsaktör och som har som målsättning att påverka beslut, uppfattningar och beteenden hos en statsledning, befolkning eller särskilt utpekademålgrupper i syfte att främja egna säkerhetspolitiska mål. Bedrivs huvudsakligen genom spridande av vilseledande eller oriktig information kompletterad med annat för ändamålet särskilt anpassat agerande.” ur Doktrin för gemensamma operationer (Försvarsmakten 2020a, 100).

Recommendations: Consider the role of gender equality in influence operations such as disinformation.

- ✓ Gender equality should be explicitly considered as one of the core values that the Swedish Armed Forces is to contribute to uphold. This must include considerations of what upholding this value can practically entail in scenarios of a crisis or an armed attack.
- ✓ Increase awareness and develop counter strategies to the use of anti-gender equality rhetoric in current disinformation campaigns, in particular those campaigns which directly target the Swedish Armed Forces.¹⁴⁰
- ✓ Consider if male and female personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces can be targeted with different forms of online threats and harassment.

Recommendations on WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy:

Gender equality constitutes a core value in Sweden. International work for gender equality also constitutes the foundation for the WPS resolutions.

- ✓ Anti-gender equality arguments should be considered in terms of how they affect the foundation of Sweden's political norms and the foundation of the WPS resolutions.
- ✓ Recognize the importance of women's involvement in forming and countering extremist arguments. Consider particularly the situation of men and women in socially disadvantaged areas and in contexts of economic exclusion.

Ensuring mobilization: Consider social roles and responsibilities

According to the Total Defense Bill, ensuring general mobilization is critical for success. Mobilization should be fast and possible to conduct even during the midst of an armed attack (Regeringen 2020a, 28). Given the co-dependency between the military and civilian defense actors, this can be postulated to include a mobilization of personnel from both groups of actors.

Questions for discussion (read pages 107–109 and 110–115):

- ✓ What are the consequences of differences in men's and women's social roles and responsibilities for general mobilization?¹⁴¹
- ✓ How should a difference in men's and women's social roles and responsibilities be handled in total defense planning to ensure that they both can contribute during a severe crisis or an armed attack?

¹⁴⁰ For further information, see section 9.4 Vulnerabilities and risks.

¹⁴¹ For example, women tend to dominate health care and civilian defense administration and men the military and the civil contingency service.

The political and political-bureaucratic levels in Sweden were found to be fairly balanced in terms of representation. Hence, men and women have the opportunity to work in this sector and to be part of critical decisions at the highest levels. Beneath the highest political-strategic and political-bureaucratic levels, however, Sweden was found to have a more traditional distribution of labor between men and women. The defense sector is male dominated. Larger sections of the civilian defense, such as administration, most notably County Administrative Board (Länsstyrelsen) and agencies involving social responsibilities, such as healthcare, are women dominated. Similarly, two of the major civil society organizations, Lottakåren and the Swedish Red Cross, involved in the total defense are female dominated. These are organizations where the average age is also quite high. Another sector dependent on voluntary service, the Home Guard, remains male dominated. This distribution of labor means that both women and men would have critical roles to play in the defense of Sweden. Ensuring that they can be mobilized during a crisis or an armed attack is thereby of absolute importance. This means that we need to start from the realization that there is little to suggest that the traditional social roles and responsibilities in the family have changed substantially in Sweden. On average, women take longer parental leaves, take care of sick children to a higher degree, and conduct more of the unpaid labor at home. While it is difficult to predict behavior and action by individuals during a crisis, it has been found that it is very difficult for an individual to not follow societal norms. This means that we can consider these conditions to be established patterns that need to be incorporated in planning. Hence, ensuring that both women and men can mobilize during a crisis can rest on upholding or rearranging child- and elderly care and explicitly addressing norms and expectations. Should these state-support systems break down, we can expect, from reviewing research and Swedish statistics, that traditional roles and responsibilities will become more pronounced.¹⁴² As such, a large part of the personnel needed at a crisis or attack might be unable to mobilize unless this is explicitly made part of the planning and exercises.

Recommendations: Explicitly consider diverging social roles and responsibilities when preparing for mobilization.

- ✓ Explicitly consider the importance of social roles and responsibilities in the Swedish Armed Forces' personnel's ability to mobilize. Develop strategies to ensure that both men and women can fulfill their obligations during a crisis and/or an attack.

¹⁴² A recent example is the Covid-19 pandemic, where early estimates indicates that this has been the result of the crisis. If you are interested in a discussion about this, listen to podcast Konflikt, the session called "Kvinnofällan Covid" aired November 19, 2020.

- ✓ Consider specifically how to handle the fact that women and men tend to dominate different parts of the total defense. That is, that women are the majority in critical civilian defense functions, such as healthcare and County Administrative Boards, and men are the majority in the military defense functions. Include the role of FFOs specifically.
- ✓ Include discussions in military and total defense exercises on how the personnel perceive their ability to mobilize in relation to handling their competing social roles and responsibilities. Collecting their views can contribute to avoiding ending up with stereotypical solutions and attitudes that risk reinforcing inequality.
- ✓ While there are differences between men and women in the data, there is substantial variation in the personnel groups that need to mobilize quickly. For example, in cases where the parents are divorced, responsibilities for children can be expected to take priority for men as well.
- ✓ Consider how norms around social roles and responsibilities can hinder an individual from acting in accordance with plans, for example, women from leaving their children to mobilize. Such issues can be brought up by the Swedish Armed Forces in their communication, thereby potentially increasing women's willingness to contribute.¹⁴³

Recommendations on WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy:

According to the WPS resolutions and even more so the Swedish gender equality policy, women and men should have equal opportunities to participate and for economic independence. Addressing this includes the need to explicitly consider the role of unpaid housework.

- ✓ Explicitly consider the connection between women's and men's social roles and responsibilities (as related to work in the home and child- and elderly care) and their public functions in order to ensure equal opportunities to contribute.

Countering negative recruitment

A potential hybrid scenario outlined in the White books includes using existing criminal networks as a proxy or cover to reach political or military objectives (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 67; Häggström and Brun 2019). These could potentially be used by external actors to undermine the trust in the state and its agencies or cause havoc to use up or redirect state resources which could cause internal unrest. There is a risk that an antagonist can use all forms of societal weaknesses to gain an advantage. This responsibility falls primarily on other state agencies, such as the

¹⁴³ As recently captured in the information videos 'Just nu' by the Swedish Armed Forces.

Swedish Police and Säpo, but could, in extension, affect the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to carry out its tasks.

Questions for discussion (read pages 127–129):

- ✓ Why and how are attitudes toward gender equality and ideas about what it means to be a 'real' man¹⁴⁴ being exploited in informal recruitment campaigns to criminal networks or groups and extremist environments? Moreover, can such exploitations also be used to target the credibility of the Swedish Armed Forces?

Of the organized criminal networks or groups and extremist environments in Sweden today, most primarily target young men and have violence as part of their ideology or practice. Socially disadvantaged areas that struggle with organized crime see a vast over-representation of young men as both culprits and victims. According to Säpo (2018), the majority of individuals in Sweden who believe that criminal acts are an inevitable part of changing the society are members of these three groups: the Islamist extremist environment, the white power environment, and the autonomous (left-wing) environment. As discussed under disinformation, particularly those that use a right-wing ideologically or extremist religious include a specific anti-gender equality rhetoric. Of the more radical left-wing groups, substantially more women are engaged, and these groups often include an explicit anti-sexist rhetoric. Attitudes toward gender equality thereby also appear to play a part in the ongoing recruitment of both women and men, albeit in different manners and degrees. Moreover, it should be noted that all organizations recruit women to some extent. Therefore, it is important not to make stereotypical assumptions about women's agency or roles in groups that can be utilized against the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Police.

Recommendations: Consider the role of (anti)gender equality and masculine ideals in negative mobilization.

- ✓ Develop analytical tools to understand the role of gender equality in the mobilization to extremist environments on both sides of the political spectrum.¹⁴⁵
- ✓ Increase the understanding of how ideas of 'ideal' masculine roles and expectations on male behavior can be manipulated in the recruitment of men into criminal networks and/or extremist environments. Consider if these portrayals can have a secondary impact on the Swedish Armed Forces' own recruitment and information campaigns.

¹⁴⁴ Discussed in research in terms of masculinity. For example, Bjarnegård et al. (2019) identify a number of different attitudes that can be exploited in recruitment and be related to the use of violence.

¹⁴⁵ For further information, see section 9.4 Vulnerabilities and risks.

Recommendations on WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy:

See recommendations regarding handling disinformation.

10.2. The importance of the population's ability to prepare, act, and evacuate**Operating in areas with fleeing civilians: Gender inequality still matters**

Population safety is the key objective for the civilian defense (Regeringen 2020a, 144). However, depending on how this plays out during an armed attack, population behavior or an evacuation can directly affect the ability of the Swedish Armed Forces to carry out its tasks. During a severe crisis which is not related to an armed attack, the Swedish Armed Forces can also be called on to assist civilian agencies with tasks related to population safety (Regeringen 2020a, 87). Dynamics related to evacuations also constitute important information for situational awareness.

Questions for discussion (read pages 107–109 and 121–127):

- ✓ What are critical differences in men's and women's situations that can affect their ability to evacuate and what are the implications for the Swedish Armed Forces' operations?
- ✓ How do differences in men's and women's perception of personal safety affect their perception of encountering personnel from the Swedish Armed Forces during a crisis/attack?
- ✓ How could a difference between men's and women's responsibilities, vulnerabilities, and perceptions of security be exploited by an antagonist/enemy force?

In the framework of total defense, there is ongoing work to improve the safety of the population. Until 2023, there are two separate assignments involving the strengthening of both the ability to handle peacetime crisis and the civil defense. These efforts are primarily conducted by the municipalities and regions in cooperation with MSB.¹⁴⁶ Currently, however, few of the public plans and guiding documents explicitly consider the potential difference in women's and men's security and situation directly (see, for example, Harbeck 2018; Johansson and Eriksson 2018; Landenmark et al., 2018; Västerås stad 2018; Stockholms läns landsting 2018a; MSB 2014; MSB and 2020a; Wijkström and Falk 2013) although the aim is to strengthen this perspective.¹⁴⁷ Due to the fact that the work on population safety and evacuations is in its relatively early phases, a central question raised by personnel consulted for this report was: How well does the population's expectation of support currently match reality? Is the Swedish population prepared enough to handle a shortage of electricity or food? This was central as the population's ability to prepare, act, and evacuate was considered important for understanding the consequences of carrying out military operations in populated areas. In short, understanding the population's level of

¹⁴⁶ *Överenskommelse om kommunernas krisberedskap* and *Överenskommelse om kommunernas arbete med civilt försvar*.

¹⁴⁷ Conversations with MSB, October 2020.

preparedness was deemed to allow for a more accurate estimation as to where they would be and how they would act in a crisis or during an attack. In such discussions, it was again important to recognize that women's lower degree of knowledge on issues related to crises and attacks could have a negative effect and that men and women tend to perceive risks slightly differently. This could negatively affect their ability to handle information and their estimations of how to act. Combing this information with the fact that women, on average, score lower on health than men, it could further impact their abilities to act or even survive a crisis or an attack in the long-term.

With regard to access to resources, a critical area for handling a crisis, research and our data underline that people who are born outside of Sweden are often more economically vulnerable and that women, on a national average, tend to be poorer than men. In fact, women were found to have a lower average income, and they were over-represented among the economically vulnerable. This includes women working part-time, single women with children, and elderly women who tend to have a much lower pension than men. This could mean less access to cash during a crisis. In addition, women were found to be less likely to have access to a car compared to men – around 25% of the women compared to 15% of the men had no access to a car. If a crisis or an attack were to occur, as the example of Ukraine suggested, these women could be in an even more vulnerable situation.

As the situation during Hurricane Katrina suggested, however, a lack of short-term resources in the population can be partly compensated if there is some time to prepare. We therefore need to ask: are women preparing for a crisis to a higher degree than men in order to catch up? Or is their potentially more limited knowledge in defense issues affecting their ability to undertake such efforts? In Sweden, results are still unclear, but it appears as if women started from a weaker position in their preparedness than men but are now starting to become more prepared. This underlines the importance of continued use of sex-disaggregated analysis and ensuring that the communication strategy consistently addresses potential variations in vulnerabilities. In addition, it cannot be excluded that women's, on average, potentially lower level of knowledge of defense and crisis management can play into how they can handle information distributed by the Swedish state. This too should be further analyzed and considered in information campaigns.

Finally, existing differences in men's and women's perceived safety can affect how they will behave in terms of the willingness to leave their homes at the time of an evacuation. More women than men in Sweden already report being the target of crime and express feeling more unsafe. More women than men also avoid going out after dark, and the insecurity is highest in younger age groups. The most substantial difference in degrees of feeling unsafe and exposure to crimes appears if we compare women living in socially disadvantaged areas to men living in other urban

areas. The experiences from Japan show that such differences in perceptions of threats could be important during an evacuation as they affected, in particular, women's willingness to leave their homes. If we instead look at other types of crime, such as that of property, here men could potentially be more affected. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, men appeared to be more reluctant to leave their homes due to feeling that they had the role and responsibility to defend their property. Finally, research and the examples also reveal that becoming displaced means an increased risk of sexual violence, in particular, against women, girls, and boys. Hence, being able to estimate male and female roles, perceptions of safety, and risk of being the target of crimes in the context of different Swedish evacuation scenarios is key.

Recommendations: Ensure a nuanced understanding of men's and women's perceptions of security and ability to evacuate.

- ✓ Ensure that information about what the execution of the Swedish Armed Forces' mission and tasks can entail reaches both women and men.
- ✓ Scenarios for planning and exercises need to include nuanced depictions of an area of operations as regards the behavior of different population groups. In the forming of such scenarios these should consider that, on average, women are likely to be more afraid of leaving their homes due to insecurity, have less access to economic resources, are less likely to have access to a car, and are more likely to be the single caretaker of children than men. This could lead to a larger proportion of women and their children remaining in urban areas – in their homes or nearby shelters – and even being forced to stay in occupied areas.
- ✓ Total defense exercise scenarios including displaced populations should consider if and when sexual violence could target women, girls, and boys. In this regard, the distribution of labor and responsibilities between the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Police needs to be clarified (see below).
- ✓ The risk of sexual harassment and sexual violence is likely to play a central role in women's feelings of insecurity during an evacuation. Upholding professional conduct of the Swedish Armed Forces' personnel is critical for maintaining trust.

Recommendations on WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy:

Equal access to resources and support during relief and recovery, and equal rights to protection are strong themes in the WPS resolutions and in the Swedish gender equality policy.

- ✓ In an evacuation scenario where the Swedish Armed Forces supports civilian agencies, women's equal ability to prepare, act, and evacuate during a crisis or an attack must be considered.
- ✓ Evacuation scenarios need to contain sex-disaggregated information and analysis.

10.3. Understanding population safety

Preparing for an attack on Sweden: Handle violence against civilians

According to the White books, an armed attack will entail substantial stress and hardships on the population, particularly in areas directly affected by armed violence. Other areas will suffer from problems with access to food, as well as handling and housing internally displaced and the wounded (Försvarsberedningen 2017, 144). According to the Total Defense Bill, a final critical area concerns upholding health care during a crisis or an attack (Regeringen 2020a, 139-141).

Questions for discussion (read pages 119–122, 130–133, and boxes 9–11 below):

- ✓ How could an armed attack affect the population, and what are the effects of this violence for the Armed Forces' ability to carry out its task?
- ✓ Under what scenarios could we expect to see conflict-related sexual violence, and how should such violence be handled by the Swedish Armed Forces?
- ✓ How will the broader impact of an armed attack on the physical and psychological health of the population affect the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to carry out its tasks?

An armed attack on Sweden is unlikely, as was pointed out by key personnel consulted for this study; an attack on Sweden is therefore also difficult to even imagine. But if this is considered to be such an extreme scenario, how can we then prepare to handle the soldiers' reaction to operating on Swedish territory and to seeing violence directed at the Swedish population?

Violence during an armed attack can be expected to affect men and women in different ways due to variations in their labor roles and responsibilities in the Swedish society. This means that we can expect deadly violence, as well as the risk of being captured and torture to primarily be directed at men by an enemy force, as men will constitute the majority of those fighting. That being said, given women's involvement in politics and in total defense efforts, we could expect a high degree of loss in this group as well. Gender equality is found in research to directly affect the ability to mobilize women for political goals. Given the high level of political awareness in the population and the mobilization through existing social platforms, we can therefore expect both men and women to be part of potential population confrontations with enemy forces. Finally, as the White books suggest, since it is likely that an attack would take place in populated areas, we can expect a fairly high level of civilian casualties, particularly as evacuations are unlikely to be fully successful.

Box 9. Examples of civilian casualties and considerations of Swedish urban contexts

Research and the examples displayed key issues when a crisis and/or conflict struck urban areas.

- In Northern Ireland, women and men lived in the conflict areas throughout the war. A total of 3,532 people were estimated to have been killed. Men made up the vast majority (around 90%).
- In the Eastern part of Ukraine, larger parts of the territory have been affected by violence. It is estimated that approximately 7,000 civilians have been injured and 3,000 civilians killed thus far in the conflict. Between 25% and 40% of those have been women, between 75% and 60% have been male.
- In Sarajevo, during the Siege, a large number of civilians were killed and wounded. Some estimates of those killed point to 66% being men and 44% women. The estimated number of civilians wounded varies, with around 55% being men and 45% women.

The White books' scenarios identify Stockholm¹⁴⁸ and Gothenburg, two of Sweden's most populated areas, as probable areas for an attack and, hence, loss of civilian lives. As we discussed, it is unlikely that such large cities will be successfully evacuated in time. This also means that the Swedish Armed Forces will operate in populated areas.

If we look closer at one form of violence against civilians, conflict-related sexual violence, this form of violence could fall within the responsibilities of the Swedish Armed Forces (see box 10 for a discussion) under certain situations as outlined in the WPS resolutions. During an attack, such violence can be executed either by an enemy force or by a Swedish organized semi-military group (the latter is somewhat implied under hybrid threats in the existing Swedish Armed Forces' Military Strategic Doctrine, (Försvarsmakten 2016d, 36)). Concerning the expected targets of this violence, primarily women and girls, but also boys can be viewed as the primary groups, but this type of violence can take many forms where men sometimes constitute the main group. For example, sexual violence can take place in detention camps (where men and women can both be the victims), at checkpoints (often targeting women), or targeted at civilians moving in an area (women, girls, and boys).

Box 10: When is handling sexual violence a military responsibility?

In existing practice on preventing and handling conflict-related sexual violence, this would be classified as part of an armed attack when:

- “- Perpetrator being a combatant or affiliated with a state or non-state armed group.
- Victim being a member of the opposing political, ethnic or religious group.
- The act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign.

¹⁴⁸ For more information on evacuation in Stockholm see Länsstyrelsen Stockholm (2013).

- The crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrators official duties” (NCGM 2019, 3).

Under such a scenario, the military might be the only state actor able to operate. That is, the ability of the police to handle this form of violence under such conditions is likely to be severely limited (NCGM 2019). To ensure effective actions, the military personnel requested a clarification of the different mandates, responsibilities, and legal frameworks governing the Swedish Police and Swedish Armed Forces.

When preparing to handle this form of violence by an opposition force, research highlighted that it is important to be able to differentiate between violence which is the result of military leadership’s orders (a strategy/policy), and violence which is the result of the leadership’s lack of control, weak morale, and negative group dynamics among the soldiers concerned (a practice). These two forms can require somewhat different approaches to halt violence. Personnel consulted for the study raised a very important point concerning the distribution of labor and responsibilities between the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Police, which they felt needed to be clarified. Under what scenario is this form of violence the responsibility of the Swedish Police and when is it the responsibility of the Swedish Armed Forces? And in situations where the Swedish police is unable to function, how should encountering this form of violence be handled even when it cannot be classified as falling within the military mandate? The latter was deemed important to consider both from a legal and moral perspective, as it related to ensuring the functionality of a military unit and in meeting society’s expectations of stopping violence against civilians.

Finally, it is important to understand how an attack will affect the population’s general conditions and health, as this might impact on the population’s behavior and attitudes. There are here important variations between men and women. We can also expect a substantial impact on the mental health of the population with variation between men and women, in terms of form and in the willingness to seek help over time. Research further emphasized that during a crisis or an attack, pregnant women, women who have recently given birth, and infants need to be paid attention to in total defense planning, as they otherwise can constitute a substantial proportion of all excess deaths. This could mean a need for joint assessments and priorities between the Swedish Armed Forces and other agencies concerning the distribution of health resources between the military and civilian needs.

Recommendations: Prepare for handling violence against civilians and ensure a capacity to address conflict-related sexual violence.

- ✓ Include scenarios with antagonist violence targeting civilians in training and exercises with clear training objectives to ensure capacity to handle these types of violence.

- ✓ Clarify the roles of the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Police regarding conflict-related sexual violence and criminal sexual violence and include such scenarios in training and exercises to build capacity.
- ✓ Establish formats for collaboration and reporting to address sexual violence and violence against civilians in scenarios where the Swedish Police cannot operate.
- ✓ During an armed attack, the Swedish Armed Forces will be reliant on support from the health sector. There is a need for a joint assessment and priorities regarding resource distributions between military related care and civilian care.
- ✓ The risk of sharp increases in excess deaths related to childbirth among young women and infants is substantial and should be considered in the distribution of healthcare resources.

Recommendations on WPS resolutions and Swedish gender equality policy:

Protection from violence including from sexual violence is a core theme in both the WPS resolutions and the Swedish gender equality policy.

- ✓ In accordance with the WPS resolutions, the Swedish Armed Forces should develop its capacities to prevent/address the perpetration of conflict-related sexual violence by an antagonist during an armed attack. This can include checkpoints, detention camps, or violence targeting civilians in occupied areas.
- ✓ Considering conflict-related sexual violence also includes the military's own personnel. Hence, this should be included in the Swedish Armed Forces' own Codes of Conduct and terms of agreement with states that can by cooperation act upon the Swedish territory.
- ✓ The distribution of resources to healthcare and emergency care between military and civilian needs should consider differences in healthcare needs between men and women.

Box 11. Example of joint planning on Gotland: 'Populate your sector' exercise

According to the White books, Gotland constitutes a strategic area where an armed attack could take place (Försvarsberedningen 2017). In the context of jointly developing the territorial defense and total defense on the island, a cooperation between the regiment P18 and the County Administrative Board (Länsstyrelsen) in Gotland¹⁴⁹ was established, based on a Government mission. This cooperation included an exercise to form a joint assessment of the human terrain based on the need to: "Populate your sector." This meant to actively use statistics and discussions to place the population in the area of operations and review the consequences for each agency's

¹⁴⁹ For more information on the County Administrative Board in Gotland's work on gender equality, see the report "Kön spelar roll: Statistik om kvinnor och män på Gotland" (Länsstyrelsen Gotlands Län 2019) and "Jämställd och jämlik folkhälsa på Gotland – ett kunskapsunderlag" (Länsstyrelsen Gotlands Län 2018a).

tasks and priorities and to form joint assessments and expectations of the cooperation. The below is a summary of the critical expectations and questions that they have identified:

- **First: expect direct interaction (and potential clashes) between the civilian population and an enemy force.** Key points and questions to consider: a) How will the civilian population react during an attack? And how will the population be affected by an enemy force? Will there be situations where we can expect them to directly collide or interact? b) In relation to this, we then need to consider what role the Swedish Armed Forces should have in such a scenario? And what are the roles and responsibilities of the other agencies? And finally, c) How will the Swedish Armed Forces' personnel react emotionally to scenarios of civilian casualties? And how do their individual relations to the population play into their reactions?

- **Second: establish what kind of support the Swedish Armed Forces would need from the County Administrative Board and other agencies, in terms of handling potential effects on the population.** Key points and questions to consider: a) The Swedish Armed Forces must conduct an analysis of the consequences of their own planned actions for the population. b) The conclusions from this analysis need to be part of a joint dialogue on how to best protect the civilian population. Hence, how can the Swedish Armed Forces cooperate with other state agencies to mitigate or prevent any negative consequences? and finally, c) The outcomes of this dialogue need to be incorporated in the plans and in the communication to the population. This raises the key questions of: How should the instructions be formulated and communicated to the public? This should consider how to best reach both men and women.

Nuance the discussion further

This exercise can be adapted to estimate effects in other geographical settings. For example, the White books suggest that such discussions become even more complex when we consider variation between areas in Sweden. Therefore, we include here a suggested comparison of information from Gotland and Botkyrka (using data from the Public Health Agency of Sweden¹⁵⁰ 2018 and Rådet för främjande av kommunala analyser (RKA) 2020); the latter being a municipality with socially disadvantaged areas.¹⁵¹ Discuss the above questions again using the information below.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ In Swedish Folkhälsomyndigheten

¹⁵¹ As each socially disadvantaged area should be considered as having its own specific opportunities and challenges, the material on Botkyrka is only used because of the easily accessible data. The key point here is to just discuss the potential variation in needs and situation for the population depending on the specific area.

¹⁵² Rådet för främjande av kommunala analyser, Council for the furthering of municipal analyses (authors' translation).

Table 14: A comparison between Gotland, Botkyrka, and Sweden (national data)

	Gotland		Botkyrka		Sweden	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Total population in thousands (SCB 2020b)	29	29	48	46	5197	5131
Average age in years (SCB 2020b)	43.8	46	37.2	38.3	40.4	42.2
Born outside of Sweden (RKA)	8.3%	7.5%	43.3%	42.5%	19.5%	19.5%
Urban population (SCB 2020d) ¹⁵³	62.8%		98%		87.4%	
Fear of going out (RKA 2020) ¹⁵⁴	7%	31%	15%	44%	10%	40%
Violent crimes committed as per 100,000 citizens (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2018)	915		1346		1069	
Low income households (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2018) ¹⁵⁵	11.6%		19.4%		12.5%	
Unemployment (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2018) ¹⁵⁶	6%	5.2%	9.2%	11.4%	7%	6.9%
Electoral turnout, born outside Sweden (SCB 2019e) ¹⁵⁷	78%	82%	68%	71%	72%	75%

Note that as language has been considered an issue in effective communication on preparation and evacuation, the share of the population born outside of Sweden can provide an indication of the need for adapted messaging. In addition to these indicators, the presence of criminal networks is reported to hinder the work of state agencies in Botkyrka in various ways, which is a problem that is less prevalent in Gotland. This involves behavior such as treating weapons as status symbols, reacting violently to unexpected state interventions, and perceived slights by other criminal groups (Brå 2016).

¹⁵³ Urban population is based on the Swedish term *tätort*, which is defined as a continuous settlement with at least 200 citizens (SCB 2020d)

¹⁵⁴ Share of people who sometimes or often refrain from going outside alone for fear of being assaulted, robbed, or in some other way harassed. Data taken from Rådet för främjande av kommunala analyser (RKA 2020).

¹⁵⁵ Low income households are defined as having a disposable income that is below 60% of the median income. This was 113,426kr in 2018. The numbers shown are for the category 'other families with children at home under the age of 18.' The alternatives are 'single households with children at home under the age of 18,' 'single households without children under the age of 18' and 'pensioners.' Botkyrka has a higher share in all categories (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2018).

¹⁵⁶ Unemployment is defined as people without employment that could start working right away in the age range of 16 to 64. The Public Health Agency of Sweden combines data from statistics Sweden and the Swedish Public Employment Service together with their own calculations, which is why it might not be directly comparable to other sources. (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2018)

¹⁵⁷ Electoral turnout is here shown for those born outside of Sweden; it is worth noting that the gaps between the regions are reduced to 2–3% points for voters born in Sweden.

10.4. Strengthen the collection and use of sex-disaggregated data

This report has aimed to contribute to enhancing the human terrain analysis by demonstrating how issues related to men's and women's mobilization and support, resilience, and safety, can contribute to a better understanding of the operational environment in Sweden. This has included showcasing how sex-disaggregated data can be utilized in such efforts. The lack of explicit objectives and of such data in the current Total Defense Bill, the White books, and the Swedish Armed Forces' reports and policies remain a gap which directly affects progress. Furthermore, as the revised Swedish Armed Forces' gender equality policy for 2016-2020 (FM2019-9956:8) outlined that the WPS resolutions from then on should be incorporated in the Swedish Armed Forces' Strategic Direction in order to integrate these issues into regular decision-making processes under the responsibility of the senior leadership (see Försvarsmakten 2020c), the need to close the identified gap in the understanding of gender (FOI 2019c) became even more pronounced. As research is suggested to be an important tool in the continued development of the defense (Regeringen 2020a), this can also be used to further substantiate such efforts.

Questions for discussion:

- ✓ For which processes are sex-disaggregated statistics and information collected and analyzed in current planning and exercises, and where could the Swedish Armed Forces' use of such statistics be strengthened?
- ✓ How can cooperation between agencies in total defense planning be strengthened to ensure that issues related to men's and women's equal mobilization and support, resilience, and safety are consistently incorporated in planning and exercises?
- ✓ Are some differences in men's and women's mobilization and support, resilience, and safety in particular danger of falling between the responsibilities of the involved state agencies involved in national defense? If so, which ones and how can that be avoided?
- ✓ Are there critical areas where more information and research are needed?

Our study and the above examples of the work by the Swedish Armed Forces' Department of Communication and Public Affairs and by P18 on Gotland demonstrate four key points on using sex-disaggregated statistics. First, the collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated statistics and information need to be adapted to a specific process in order to be useful. Second, using sex-disaggregated statistics often primarily concern identifying differences in averages and degree of severity between men and women. This means that a specific planning process should assess where the differences between men and women are substantial and where the consequences of such differences can be severe. This will allow for assessing where gender constitute a prioritized problem and where the differences are so minor that other issues need to take priority. Third, indicators can vary substantially from one geographical area to another. For example, as illustrated by Box 11, there are clear differences between Gotland, Botkyrka, and the national Swedish average. This means that military planning needs to collect sex-disaggregated data that

are specific to the regional and local area in focus. Four, on continuing to build on the results of this study, there is a need for further analysis of how age, socio-economic background, or other factors play into gender dynamics. A continued in-depth analysis, therefore, is needed to obtain the level of granular and substantiated information on which targeted decisions and exercise scenarios can be built as the planning of the territorial and total defenses progress. This includes the necessity to conduct further statistical analysis of interactive effects and to control for when gender is the primary explanation and when other factors play a more critical role. For example, when are attitudes more related to ideological rather than gendered explanations (see, for example, Bjarnegård and Melander 2017). This means that there is a need for the Swedish Armed Forces to support advanced statistical research, in addition to qualitative studies on gender equality and total defense. As the review underlined, quantitative studies are quickly expanding but still remain underdeveloped in many areas.

Finally, our consultations and study underline that an increased collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated data and use of data-focused research are essential for the development of the total defense cooperation and in the development of the civilian defense. This can contribute to handling the complexity of establishing population safety and support. Furthermore, the use of sex-disaggregated statistics in joint assessments can contribute to handling the potential differences in perceptions and priorities that research find can exist between organizations in total defense planning. Furthermore, the existing risk that different agencies evaluate male and female perceptions and contributions in different ways could thereby also be limited (for a discussion, see Ericson 2020; Bondesson et al. 2019).

Recommendations: Ensure a consistent and aware integration of data on men's and women's mobilization and support, resilience, and safety in realizing the Total Defense Bill.

- ✓ Ensure a nuanced and granular use of sex-disaggregated statistics, including interactions with other factors such as age and background, in planning, and ensure that personnel have the capacity to make use of such statistics.
- ✓ Continue to support and use research on how women and men are affected by a severe crisis or an armed attack in Sweden. Both qualitative research and statistical studies should be commissioned and utilized.
- ✓ Consider the role of differences in priority, perceptions of risks, and language in cooperation between agencies involved in the national defense and how statistics can be used to create joint assessments.

Recommendations on WPS resolutions and the Swedish gender equality policy:

- ✓ Sex-disaggregated statistics have long constituted the foundation for Swedish gender equality work and are increasingly used in the implementation of the WPS resolutions. In preparations for the 20th anniversary celebrations of the first WPS resolution, the Secretary General called for a gender data revolution to ensure progress.

ANNEX I: A review of relevant National Action Plans

A review of the National Action Plans (NAP) of the U.S., Norway, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada, as well as policy work from NATO¹⁵⁸ and OSCE, underlines the relevance of the themes in focus of this report. The review also shows that very little of the existing WPS policies have been translated into a national security context.

Overall, most of the NAPs focus on conflict prevention and peace building and often refer to countries outside of their national borders. For example, the Netherlands identifies eight focal countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Furthermore, the national action plans often refer to conflict situations and humanitarian situations, rather than their domestic situations, and if and how women and men are at risk of being affected differently. An interesting exception is Canada, which specifically mentions domestic challenges in the form of indigenous rights in their national action plan 2017–2022.

With this being said, there are trends that can be found in all or almost all NAPs, as these relate to inclusion (i.e., to ensure women’s meaningful participation) and vulnerability (i.e., ensure protection of both men and women from the different types of threats that can affect them).

First of all, the *inclusion/participation* of women is one of the strongest trends that can be found in the national action plans on implementing UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. For example, the United States’ NAP on WPS from 2019 states that one goal is that women should be able to, in a meaningful way, participate in preventing, resolving, as well as mediating when it comes to conflict and countering terrorism. It emphasizes that this will help promote lasting and stable peace (2019). Similar statements are found in Finland’s NAP for 2018–2021 on WPS; two out of the five objectives in the action plans refer to participation, where women should have meaningful roles and that there should be an increased number of women in the military, and that a gender perspective within mediation, peace, and transition processes should be implemented. Furthermore, women should have a more meaningful role within conflict prevention and peacebuilding (2018). Participation of women is also mentioned in the Norwegian NAP, such as the percentage of women in the UN operations and missions (2019). Denmark’s NAP for 2014–2019 regarding the Armed Forces mainly focuses on the increase of women in the armed forces. Estonia’s NAP on the implementation of 1325 in Estonia 2015–2019 further emphasizes participation of women in positions that are related to security and peace within Estonia. Lithuania

¹⁵⁸NATO (2019) “Resilience and Resolution: A compendium of essays on women, peace and security”

NATO (2016) “Factsheet: NATO policy for protection of civilians”

NATO (2019) “Factsheet: Sexual violence in conflict”

NATO (2018) “NATO/EAPC Women, peace and security policy and action plan 2018”

NATO (2015) “Military guidelines on the prevention of, and response to, conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence”

follows the rest of the countries and mainly emphasizes female participation within the Armed Forces, as well as in other security sectors as important parts of implementing 1325. Germany also identifies participation as one of their focal points, that is, as participation and strengthening the leadership of women in all parts and levels of conflict resolution and prevention, as well as conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding. Germany also identifies equal leverage for women in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, recovery, etc. In addition, Canada identifies increased participation of women as well as women's organizations in conflict prevention, resolution, and state building post-conflict as one of their five key objectives 2017–2022. The OSCE guidance for military personnel also states that female participation is good in order to reach local women, add perspectives, and improve protection of civilians.

Secondly, *variation in vulnerability/protection* of women and girls and their rights is mentioned in almost all NAPs, where the WPS agenda is discussed. However, protection of women is often referring to women in a conflict or post-conflict situation, and not always necessarily within a national context. In the U.S. strategy on WPS from 2019, participation is mentioned as one of their goals: that women and girls are safer and better protected but also have better access to both government and private assistance programs, both in the U.S. and abroad (2019). Further, in Finland's NAP, it is also stated that women and girls should receive protection and have their rights protected. Protection and safeguarding of women's and men's rights are also mentioned in the Norwegian NAP (2019). In Estonia's NAP, protection is mentioned, in terms of supporting human rights and empowerment of women in conflict and post-conflict areas (2015–2019). Germany identifies five focal points in their action plan on implementing 1325 for the period 2017–2020, and protection is one of them; this relates specifically to protection from sexual and gender-specific violence at both the national and international level. In the Netherlands' third national action plan on WPS, for the period 2016–2019, protection of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situation, including protecting women from gender-based violence, is mentioned as the focal point. Supporting and training, as well as sharing and exchanging information, are mentioned as outputs of the Ministry for Defense. Promotion and protection of women's rights are also key objectives of the Canadian NAP 2017–2022. They also identify meeting the specific needs of girls and women in humanitarian settings, including sexual rights and health services.

An area where WPS and national gender equality policy could potentially meet concerns the call for *mainstreaming a gender perspective* in the NAPs. However, this call appears to primarily be directed at the external context. For example, in Finland's NAP, it is stated that the gender perspective should be integrated into the security sector and crisis management. This perspective is integrated in their crisis management training and develops gender advisors and focal points

(2018). The Norwegian action plan on 1325 also states that the WPS agenda will be applied in national contingency plans (2019). Specifically, the Norwegian NAP identifies that humanitarian crises such as conflicts and natural disasters affect women, men, boys, and girls in different ways; *and that the Armed Forces should, as a result, include the gender perspective in order to plan different operations* (2019). Other factors than gender, such as other social and cultural demographics, should also be included in the operations (ibid). Furthermore, the Norwegian NAP states that the gender perspective as such is used to “achieve results and attain goals” (chapter 3, 2019). Germany identifies analyzing and taking into account the concerns and interests of women and girls in development, peace, security, and humanitarian measures as focal points (2017–2020). They also identify that the WPS agenda should be strengthened and promoted at the national, regional, and international level.

On the Canadian Government’s website, it is stated that Gender-based analysis Plus (GBA+) is used as a tool for the Canadian Armed Forces. The GBA+ tool means considering gender in all stages of operations: planning, running, and evaluation operations, in order to see how policies, programs, practices, etc. might affect women and men differently. The “+” means also including other factors such as age, language, culture, income, schooling, and geography. By using GBA+, they state that they can better understand how people can be at risk in countries where they carry out missions and make it easier for the Armed Forces to reach their mission’s goals. This way of implementing the WPS agenda is also evident in the OSCEs “guidance for military personnel working at a tactical level in Peace Support Operations.” The OSCE guidance also states that gender perspectives and dimensions are used, and the tools are sex-disaggregated data in order to conduct analysis and promote situational awareness.

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