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Abstract

Many scholars have researched on the effects of individual mediation strategy following the categorization by Touval and Zartman (1985), and Bercovitch (1991). Despite the growing recognition of the potential synergetic effects among different strategies, not many systematic studies have been done on that aspect. This thesis contributes to this understudied aspect of mediation approach by asking *What is the impact of mediation strategy on quality peace after civil war?* The study adopts the method of structured, focused comparison along with the detailed process tracing on four cases of peace agreements and their mediation process from Northern Ireland, Mindanao, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Niger. The study aims to test a theoretical argument linking combined-application of mediation strategies with high quality peace. The empirical findings provide a modest support to hypothesis and a weak support to the causal mechanism, as not all cases, having applied all three strategies, have achieved high quality peace and have promoted third-party guarantee and inclusivity. While the empirical findings point to other contextual factors that may affect the peace agreement implementation, the findings also indicate a potential promising mediation approach that combines directive strategy either with communicative-facilitative or procedural strategy putting more weight on the latter strategy.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAs</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Coordination de la Résistance armée</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWM</td>
<td>Civil War Mediation Dataset</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLAA</td>
<td>Front de Libération de l’Aïr et l’Azaouad</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFA</td>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRP</td>
<td>Government of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>HACP</td>
<td>The High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFM</td>
<td>Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministries</td>
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<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>ICM</td>
<td>International Conflict Management dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>The Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IICD</td>
<td>Independent International Commission on Decommissioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNSD</td>
<td>Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>The Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORA</td>
<td>Organisation de la Résistance Armée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN_ID</td>
<td>Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Council for Implementation of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPCPD</td>
<td>The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>STV</td>
<td>Single Transferable Vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZOPAD</td>
<td>Mindanao Special Zone of Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>The United Nations Protection Force</td>
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1. Introduction

Many scholars have researched on the mediation effects from different angles such as conflict nature, parties’ characteristics and relations, and international landscape including third-party characteristics (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000; Duursma, 2014). The pioneer in the systematic study on the effects of mediation is Jakob Bercovitch. Based on typology developed by Touval and Zartman (1985), Bercovitch (2000) categorized and studies the effects of the three mediation strategies (a) communicative-facilitative strategy, (b) procedural strategy, and (c) directive strategy. Since then, different scholars have studied the effects of mediation following these extant categorizations and studies regarding mediation strategies.

Despite the accumulated knowledge on mediation effects, the holistic research on mediation effects has not been materialized. Most studies have focused on the effect of each mediation strategy, rather than the combined or sequenced effects of different mediation strategies. More specifically, there have not been much study on the potential of the combined or sequential mediation strategies. In this context, this thesis will try to fill this gap by analyzing the research question; What is the impact of mediation strategy on quality peace after civil war?

The aim of this Thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the potential of the combined or sequenced applications of directive, facilitative and procedural mediation strategies for attaining quality peace. Some scholars argue that power-based mediation or directive strategy relying on mediators’ political, economic or social leverage to impose a certain conflict settlement is most effective in reaching a short-term ceasefire. Others argue that for the long-term conflict resolution, facilitative strategy that helps building relationship among parties or procedural approach that facilitates dialogues is required. So there has been a consensus among scholars that all approaches have merits and demerits but there has been no consensus about which approach is most effective. Therefore, it is imperative to identify a way to produce a synergy among these different mediation strategies.

The Thesis develops its hypothesis from the major studies that have studied key factors yielding quality peace. While some studies evaluate quality peace based on the peace agreement implementation status, it has been commonly acknowledged that implementation of peace agreement provisions does not necessarily lead to quality peace due to the unresolved incompatibilities. And, quite a few scholars have identified third party guarantee for security and
peace agreement implementation as a key factor for successful implementation of peace agreement. Also, there has been a growing consensus that inclusive mediation process, especially the one engaging civil society, is another key factor for satisfactory peace agreement implementation for all the stakeholders. Furthermore,

From this theoretical framework, I argue that in order to achieve quality peace, mediators need to craft its strategies in a way to secure third-party guarantee and inclusivity for the mediation process. And to achieve this, the mediation approach should apply all the three mediation strategies because while communicative or procedural strategies can secure both third-party guarantee and inclusivity, directive strategy may not easily secure inclusivity due to its potential of pushing exclusive mediation procedure. On the other hand, both communicative and procedural strategies need to be aligned with directive strategy because only directive strategy could set the negotiation forum for intransigent parties. This theoretical premise leads to a hypothesis that 1) **Directive strategy, if applied in combination with communication facilitation or procedural strategy, is likely to achieve quality peace;** 2) **Communicative and procedural strategies need to be combined with directive strategy to achieve quality peace;** 3) **When all three strategies (directive-communicative-procedural) are applied in tandem or in sequence, it is very likely to achieve quality peace.** Quality peace in this Thesis will be measured in terms of the implementation status of peace agreement provisions that are related to an incompatible issue specific to each conflict.

To test the hypothesis regarding the correlation between mediation strategies and quality of peace, the method of structured, focused comparison will be applied. The qualitative analysis is conducted by referring to Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID, Joshi, Quinn and Regan, 2015) and Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (1946-2004) (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011) to select and analyze four cases for the comparative case study; Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement (GFA), General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovin; Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, and Mindanao Final Agreement. The four cases were selected based on the overall peace agreement implementation scores and the availability of data regarding mediation strategies applied. The detailed process tracing based on the secondary sources will assess each peace agreement and each mediation process. It will analyze the detailed process of mediation approach, how mediation approach influenced third party guarantee and inclusivity, and how whole mediation process
impacted the outcome of the mediation process, that is the level of implementation of peace agreement provisions related to each case’s incompatibilities.

Due to the data constraint, each case is different in many ways such as geographical location, and political, economic and cultural backgrounds, but they are similar in important points for this study; all cases were territorial conflicts and their conflict and mediation periods almost overlapped. The first point is crucial in since comparing conflicts over territory and over government is not feasible due to large differences in nature of conflict, and the latter point is important in that the same period of time would secure the similar international landscape such as international political and economic situations and power balance among major powers.

The empirical findings provide weak support for the hypotheses tested. First, the cases did not present variety in their independent variables, or mediation approach. All cases use all three strategies. This made it impossible to compare the cases with combined application of mediation strategies and solo-application of strategy or between cases using different combination of strategies. However, the close examination of the detailed application of the three mediation strategies within each case implies that an approach with more focus on communicative or procedural is more likely to lead to quality peace than an approach whose primary tool is directive strategy. The empirical findings also provide weak support for the causal mechanism. The combined-application of different mediation strategies does not necessarily promote inclusivity and third-party guarantee, and achieve quality peace as is theoretically argued and expected. There are other contextual factors beyond mediation strategies that affected the quality peace including national interests of mediators or other third parties, formidable power by the world leader, the domestic or internal political challenges including lack of funding, the military challenges, and bureaucratic inertia, and intransigent political stance of a regime. Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the study suffered from data constraint that has limited the validity in its theoretical argument and empirical findings. However, the realization about the data limitation for studying the correlation between mediation strategies and quality peace has shed important light in the future research direction. Since mediation process is complex, the carefully compiled data on each mediation episode in relation to other episodes and resultant mediation outcomes, be it peace agreement or other indicators, is strongly needed.

This thesis will first overview the extant research on mediation strategy and quality peace, followed by some discussion on research gaps. Based on these discussions and definition of key
concepts and variables, a theoretical framework will be presented with hypotheses regarding how mediation strategies contribute to inclusivity and third-party guarantee and how they affect the quality peace. Research design section will explain why and how a comparative case study is selected and applied in testing the hypotheses. After discussing the finding from comparative case studies, some discussion on alternative explanations, limitations or potential bias will follow.
2. Previous research on mediation strategies and quality peace

The effects of mediation have been researched from different angles such as in terms of conflict nature, parties’ characteristics and relations, and international landscape including third-party characteristics. Following the research initiatives by Touval and Zartman (1985), and Bercovitch (1991), quite a few scholars have devolved into this topic. Indeed, these extant studies have contributed to the understanding of the effect of each specific mediation strategy, that indicate the superiority of the power-cased mediation approach to other communication or process focused approach in attaining short-term peacemaking such as achieving peace agreement or halting violence, while the communication or process focused approach is more likely than power-based approach to achieve long-term stable peace through dialogue facilitation and re-building of relationship. This chapter will present these findings from previous research and identify the research gap that this thesis will aim to fill.

2-1. Typology of mediation strategies

Many studies have been done on regarding which mediation strategy is most effective since Touval and Zartman (1985) developed their typology of mediation, which categorizes three different mediation strategies into (a) communication strategies and behavior, (b) formulation strategies and behavior, and (c) manipulation strategies and behavior, on an ascending scale of mediator involvement. While Beardsley (2008) follows the typology by Touval and Zartman (1985), other different, but slightly similar typologies have been conceived by various scholars. Bercovitch (2000) categorizes the three mediation strategies as (a) communicative-facilitative strategy, (b) procedural strategy, and (c) directive strategy. Savun (2009) highlights the role of mediator as a communicator who, by providing relevant information, facilitates the information flow, reduces uncertainty among the conflict parties, and achieves peace agreements. On the other hand, Sisk (2009) highlights the role of power or force used in mediation that contains potential spoilers and violence through non-coercive measures such as purchase, insurance, and legitimation, or through coercive measures including pressures, sanctions, and military force (Sisk, 2009). Among the non-coercive measures, Sisk (2009) highlights the role of enforcer and/or monitor as an important function of ensuring the compliance of conflict parties with peace agreements. Finally, given that armed conflicts are not only about tangible issues such as land, resources, power, and security but
also about myths and fears, mediators’ role as a transformer of relationships or psycho-political
dynamics of conflict through confidence-building is crucial in addressing the emotional and
symbolic roots of armed conflict (Kaufman, 2006).

2-2. Functions and Effects of mediation strategies

In spite of these debates, there have been no consensus on which role mediators should
take to resolve conflicts (Duursma, 2014). However, the effects of each one of three key mediation
strategies have been well studied and debated. Although each study has named or categorized each
mediation strategy differently, the functions and effects of the three types of mediation strategies
will be summarized based on the mediation strategy categorization by Bercovitch and Houston
(2000), for the sake of organization and simplicity for the argument of this study. The reason for
employing Bercovitch and Houston’s (2000) categorization as a representative of other scholars’
categorizations is because Bercovitch’s Mediation Project (University of Canterbury, NZ), is one of
the few datasets that compiles detailed and structured data on conflict mediation efforts.

Communicative-facilitative strategy is defined as “a fairly passive role, channelling
information to the parties, facilitating co-operation but exhibiting little control over the more formal
process or substance of mediation” (Bercovitch, 2000). The tactics associated with this strategy
include communication with parties; facilitating interaction between parties; building trust and
confidence in the parties; ensuring each party’s needs and interests to be included in discussion;
developing a dialogue framework (Bercovitch, 2000). Facilitative mediation opens and maintains
lines of communication between disputants, by structuring the negotiation so that key issues are
given sufficient consideration. Information sharing through a facilitative mediation helps parties to
clarify individual positions, and evaluate more accurately about each other’s commitment, relative
power distribution and mutually acceptable solutions. As a result, facilitators help rebuild trust
between parties (Fisher, 1972), that would contain commitment problems over the long run. The
interaction opportunity created by facilitative mediation promotes parties to reach a resolution
independently, which is less vulnerable to potential external interferences (Beardsley, 2008).
Facilitative strategy could avoid bargaining failures without resorting to enforcement-based
strategies. It should be noted, however, that the dialogue opportunity created by facilitative
mediation may not necessarily achieve reconciliation or restructuring of parties’ relationship; in
other words, facilitative mediation may not resolve root causes of disputes (Zartman and Touval, 1985).

Procedural strategy is defined as making suggestions about, or exerting control over the mediation process, by making decision about the framework or structure of the meetings, constituency influences, media publicity, and the distribution of information. The tactics associated with this strategy include selecting meeting venues; controlling the pace and formality of meetings, and the physical environment; establishing protocols; suggesting procedures and agenda; and managing the process by keeping parties focused on issues (Bercovitch, 2000). Procedural strategy promotes or coordinates mutually acceptable concessions in a non-coercive manner. Procedural mediators re-define the issues to alter the substance of the bargaining game. As a result, bargaining stalemates and short-sightedness can be overcome, persuading ethnic parties to reconsider zero-sum positions. Procedural strategy’s tactics of suggestion and persuasion are perhaps most valuable during bargaining stalemates (Schelling, 1960).

Directive strategy is defined as influencing the content and substance of the bargaining process and behaviours of the parties by providing incentives for negotiation or disincentives for continued fighting. The tactics associated with this strategy include managing negotiations over concessions; incentivising parties about the costs of no-settlement; assisting the formulation of a framework for mutually beneficial solutions; promising or threatening using leverage of material resources; and offering compliance monitoring or verification service over with agreement (Bercovitch, 2000). Directive mediators can help parties to avoid stalemate (Zartman and Touval, 1996) by applying positive leverage to increase the benefits or decrease the costs of cooperation. The positive leverage includes covering some costs of formal agreements or providing side payments to the parties (Levy, 1996). By altering the parties’ incentives for fighting and/or cooperation, directive mediators can expand, and perhaps even create zones of agreement (Hopmann, 1996; Wilkenfeld et al., 2003). Beardsley (2008) argues that manipulation is most likely to achieve a formal agreement and crisis abatement. It should be noted, however, that forceful method of mediation tends to reach peace agreements that is contradictory to the military power distribution in reality among former belligerents, which may instigate another fighting (Werner and Yuen, 2005), as soon as one or both conflict parties start to perceive more benefits from continued fighting than conflict settlements. Power-based or directive mediation may hurry to get a quick
solution due to political, military, and economic interests of mediators, that is more likely to leave underlying causes of conflicts unaddressed (Gurses, Ros and McLeod, 2008).

To summarize, each strategy has different weakness and strength and functions depending different contexts and different time span in the peace process. In fact, the study by Qi (2007) proves that while, over the short-term, the directive strategy is the most effective followed by the communication facilitation strategy and the procedural strategy, over the long-term, the ranking is reversed with the communication facilitation strategy as the most effective and the directive strategy as the least effective. Considering that both halting violence by reaching a peace agreement and facilitated communication to improve relationship among former belligerents are necessary to achieve stable peace, it may be time to go beyond considering each mediation strategy as a separate and individual tool, and to investigate about the potential of the synergy among them.

2-3. Research gap
As the above section suggests, the extant studies have revealed different functions, and both strengths and weaknesses of each mediation strategy. And there has been an emerging consensus among some scholars that in order for each strategy to complement each other’s weakness and strength, mediation approach should be more integrative rather than silo attempts; different strategies should be either combined or sequenced.

Despite the rich research attempts and analysis on individual effect of each strategy, there has not been much study on the effects of combined or sequenced application of different mediation strategies. As Qi (2007) admits, mediation involves several different strategies in reality, but statistical analysis can become extremely complex if a study tries to cover all these strategies involved, and thus her study needed to limit the research scope to cases where only one mediation strategy was applied. A majority of other studies on mediation strategies have applied the same research approach as that of Qi’s (2007) for the sake of explicitness of the comparison of different strategies (Werner and Yuen, 2005; Beardsley et al., 2006). The actual feasibility or function of combined application of different mediation strategies should be investigated in more detail. Furthermore, peace agreements, one of the crucial mediation outcomes, also deserve further investigation as an indicator for measuring peace. Although many scholars have studies on what kind of peace provision is conducive to quality peace, such as power-sharing agreement or third-party security guarantee (Svensson, 2009; Hartzell et al., 2001), it would be beneficial to link the
study on peace agreement with that on mediation strategies. It should provide important policy implication regarding the correlation between mediation approach and peace agreement, or more specifically, what kind of approach mediators should take to achieve a type of peace agreement conducive to quality peace. The research gaps thus identified have motivated this thesis; the purpose of this study is to assess the effects of combined effects of different mediation strategies on quality peace, which is assessed based on the implementation status of a certain peace agreement provision.
3. Theoretical Framework

Based on the insights from previous research, this chapter will describe the theoretical framework with which the research question will be investigated; “What is the impact of mediation strategy on quality peace after civil war?” First, the growing debate and suggested approach regarding combined-application of different mediation strategies will be outlined. Then, the definition of quality peace will be discussed to point to the key roles third-party guarantee and inclusivity play for the realization of quality peace. Based on the conceptualization of third-party guarantee and inclusivity, the hypothesis is constructed. Figure 1 illustrates this theory-building path:

**Figure 1 Theory Building Path**

3-1. Approaching mediation and combined effects of mediation strategies

As discussed in the previous literature chapter, since the Bercovitch’s Mediation Project provides a quite comprehensive but detailed information on conflict mediation efforts, this thesis employs his categorization of three main mediation strategies: (1) communicative-facilitative strategy, (2) procedural strategy, and (3) directive strategy. Thus, it could be a natural course of reasoning and could be relevant to adopt the definition of mediation by Bercovitch et al. (1991) for this study, that has been widely cited among prominent scholars in the mediation field. Bercovitch along with Anagnoson, and Wille (1991, 8) define mediation as “a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law” (Bercovitch et al. 1991). As is demonstrated
in the definition by Bercovitch et al. (1991, 8), mediation is defined to handle many issues. For instance, mediation is expected to both stop violence and resolve incompatibilities of conflicts by manipulating cost-benefit analysis of parties and controlling the peace process (Carment et al. 2009). To counter to the above definitions that expect too much of mediation, Beardsley (2013) points out the impossibility of achieving both cessation of violence and stable resolution of root causes. Quinn et al (2013) concur by defining mediation as a temporary handling of immediate violence, instead of striving for long-term stability.

However, the above debates missed to recognize the variation in mediation strategies. The debates seem to have assumed that each peace process employs one mediation strategy only. As is described in the previous research section, three different mediation strategies have different functions and effects. If these strategies are applied together, that approach should solve potential challenges more effectively than solo-application of any one of the strategy, that would arise during the peace process toward securing quality peace. For instance, while directive mediation drives parties to negotiation tables, communicative and procedural mediation, once the negotiation table is set, facilitate the dialogues through trust building (Zartman and Touval, 1985). Power-based approach may hinder durable and democratic peace, while more modest approach focused on relationship-building may not be able to stop immediate violence that is a pre-condition for starting any negotiation or mediation (Sambanis, 2000). These arguments indicate the synergetic effects of different mediation strategies than individual effects to enhance mediation effectiveness. The different mediation strategies should be applied in sequence because they are not mutually exclusive (Beardsley, 2008). By adjusting the approach using different strategies, mediation could be an effective tool throughout the peace process ranging from managing a conflict, halting violence, resolving a conflict, coordinating trade-offs, providing prevention mechanisms for future conflict resumption, as defined in Bercovitch’s (1991) definition. In this regard, Bercovitch’s (1991) definition seems to grasp the true nature of mediation and is a relevant reference. Or it can be understood that Bercovitch’s (1991) has defined mediation as multifaceted phenomena, because it is the things of the reality on the ground.

In fact, communicative or procedural mediation strategies are applied as part of directive strategy (Quinn et al, 2013); for instance, procedural strategy may be necessary to maximize the credibility of leverage through reasoning and persuasion. Beardsley (2008) also points to the reality that facilitation and formulation strategies are often used as complimentary to manipulation
strategy; in other words, mediators have already been combining different mediation strategies to achieve conflict resolution or crisis management. The attention among scholars and practitioners has been shifting from a question on which mediation strategy to apply toward a question on how to apply them together to maximize the overall effectiveness (Duursma, 2014). It is recommended to use these strategies in tandem or in sequence for reaching peace agreements and durable institutional arrangements within these agreements (Beardsley, 2006, Carment et al., 2009, and Svensson, 2007: 244). Regarding mediation as a monolithic process has missed to acknowledge its real effectiveness (Regan and Aydin, 2006). Mediation is a complex process of multiple strategy options and coordination among alternative strategies (Regan and Aydin, 2006: 737). Mediation is indeed a “multidimensional strategic process” (Quinn et al, 2013: 390).

It should be noted however, that there is a variation in combined applications of mediation strategies; 1) it can be that the same mediator uses the different strategies in parallel during his or her tenure; 2) it can be that the same mediator uses the different strategies at different points in time during his or her tenure (sequencing); 3) it can be that multiple mediators apply different strategies at the same time, either in collaboration with each other or just as a separate endeavor; 4) it can be that multiple mediators apply different strategies at the different points in time during a peace process that leads to the peace agreement (sequencing). These various forms of combined-application of mediation strategies indicate the complex reality of mediation process.

3-2. Approaching quality peace
The goal of mediation is to attain peace, but the question is what kind of peace it would like to achieve. Indeed, it is difficult to find a definite definition of peace because peace means different for every person depending on his or her political, economic and cultural background. Quality peace is a concept that has been gaining attention among peace scholars and this concept may provide some insight on a kind of peace to be aimed for. Peter Wallensteen (2015) dedicated one book to delve into the concept of quality peace. Quality peace is defined as the postwar conditions where the incompatibility or root causes of dispute has been addressed in some way or another and the people’s relationships are improving, thus reducing the risk of resumption of wars between the same parties while increasing dignity, security, and predictability for people. After all, settlement of peace agreement needs incompatibilities to be addressed (Wallensteen and Eriksson, 2009). Conflicts
could resume if even one incompatible issue for any party is not addressed by peace agreements (Fortna, 2003; Hartzell et al., 2001).

While the consensus over the definition of quality peace has not been fully reached yet, scholars have tried to reach consensus at least on potential factors that would have some impact on the process or contexts conducive to achieving quality peace, that can be generalizable to as many cases as possible. Third-party guarantee is one of these factors that, a majority of scholars have touted, promote achieving of quality peace by overcoming commitment problem. Commitment problem is the major factor obstructing the realization of quality peace (Beardsley, 2008). Especially, laws and order are not in place in most civil war contexts due to the absence of central government, police or judicial systems (Walter, 1997). Under this condition, the post-conflict social condition tend to be anarchical that pose security threats to people (Hartzell, 1999). Furthermore, the negotiated settlement is likely to derive former belligerents of their military force and expose them to the threat of potential attack from other parties. These conditions make people fear of the possibility that other sides may negate the settlement deals and make it difficult for all parties to be truly committed to the agreements (Svensson, 2009). The heightened enmity and mistrust among the conflict parties under these post-conflict situations, security arrangements by external third parties play a crucial role to mitigate the commitment problems during the transitional period (Walter, 1997; Fortna, 2004b). Third parties could raise the cost of non-compliance with the agreement thus reducing the level of fear among people thus easing the commitment problems (Svensson, 2009). Furthermore, international monitoring and information verification submitted by belligerents could also be a good example of third-party guarantee that reduces the uncertainty among former combatants about each other’s military capability (Mattes and Savun, 2010). In fact, it is empirically proven that third-party guarantee enhances the possibility toward quality peace (Hartzell et al., 2001; Walter, 2002: 84; Fortna, 2004a: 188).

Another factor that has been commonly recognized as effective for achieving quality peace is inclusivity. Inclusivity attracts supports from wide spectrum of social population, includes provisions into peace agreements related to sociopolitical reforms, and ensures high implementation rates for agreement provisions during the post-conflict period (Krausea, Krauseb, and Bränfors, 2018). For instance, women’s direct inclusion in peace negotiations increases the quality and durability of peace; agreements with female signatories are likely to include provisions with regard to political, social, and economic reform by the inputs from women networks; these networks then
promote the inclusion and the implementation of provisions that are likely to lead to political reform and improve women’s status, thereby reducing the risk of renewed civil war (Krause, Krauseb, and Bränfors, 2018). The civil society inclusion secures legitimacy that makes the process agreeable and stable (Barnes 2002; Koppell 2007; McKeon 2004). Also, civil society could make the peace process transparent by keeping the wide society informed about agreement contents and their implementation plans and status, and thus holding warring actors accountable for the agreement.

Based on the insights from previous literature, this thesis defines the quality peace as the high level of peace agreement implementation regarding the incompatible issues. This ensures that quality peace is assessed purely based on whether people’s needs are satisfied under each specific context, not based on externally contrived indicators; sometimes, external evaluation rates a peace agreement as a success because most of its provisions have been implemented even when it has missed or failed to resolve the very core issues (key incompatibilities for the parties). And, in order to resolve root causes of war or incompatibilities, mistrust and fear among former belligerents need to be cleared and the peace process need to be transparent and legitimate for all people concerned to support the implementation. Based on the theoretical argument above, it can be prospected that third-party guarantee and inclusivity are the two prime factors that can have crucial impact for achieving quality peace. Since the two factors would be important part of assessing the quality peace, the next sections will conceptualize these concepts to be integrated in the empirical analysis of this study.

3-3. Conceptualizing third-party guarantee
As is discussed in the previous section, peace has a greater chance of enduring in the post-crisis setting if commitments are subject to enforcement. Based on the discussion from previous section, third-party guarantee can be conceptualized or defined as a form of security guarantee or oversight over peace agreement implementation to mitigate the commitment and information asymmetry problems which reduce the fear and threats among former belligerents. Security guarantees provides a general sense of safety (Regan and Aydin, 2006) that opens people’s eyes toward mutual benefits and possible compromises (Curran, 2002). Security guarantees can take the form of oversight committees for military-related provisions of agreements, or actual peacekeepers (Fortna, 2003, Smith and Stam, 2003). It aims to increase the cost of launching another conflict through separation of troops, border seals, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. The oversight over peace agreement
implementation can take the form of the post-conflict dispute resolution mechanisms in case of non-implementation or disagreements over the interpretation of key provisions thus preventing power-sharing institutions from faltering (Caspersen, 2017).

As a result of these engagements, third party can also keep people’s motivation to uphold the peace agreement through capacity building while keeping the international interest for the situations even after an agreement settlement (Wallensteen and Eriksson, 2009). Also, in case of heterogeneous regions, third party guarantee could protect the rights of local minorities and individuals that are vulnerable to the exploitation by the majority dominant group under the territorial autonomy of federation. Third party support is crucial for the territorial autonomy by securing local power-sharing (Wolff 2011).

3-4. Conceptualizing inclusivity
Inclusivity can take various forms depending on who to involve in the peace process, their level of engagement and the impacts or roles they are expected to have. Based on the theoretical argument in the precious section, inclusivity is defined or conceptualized as involvement of the civil society that plays a role of a societal watchdog, a pressure group or a monitor of the implementation of agreement provisions. Civil society can witness the signing ceremony or being trained in conflict resolution workshops parallel to the peace talks as well as in the post-war phase. Such training could cultivate new thinking on ways to solve future disputes (at least on a local level) (Wallensteen and Eriksson, 2009). These civil society engagements can hold parties responsible for the implementation of peace agreements since parties would not want to lose their credibility (Wallensteen and Eriksson, 2009). Furthermore, civil society can mobilize society, empower people, and implement small-scale development projects that could reduce the risk of conflicts that may arise as a consequence of poverty and marginalization (Cagoco-Guiam, 1999). In fact, civil society inclusion reduces the risk of violence that may be instigated by the excluded groups from the peace process (Nilsson 2008).

3-5. Constructing hypothesis
Based on the theoretical arguments constructed above, I argue that when one or more of the three mediation strategies are combined or sequenced in a way to complement each other’s strengths and weakness, it would promote the third-party guarantee and inclusivity that would enhance the implementation prospects of key peace agreement provisions regarding key
incompatibilities. More specifically, since some of the three mediation strategies can be more likely than other strategies to promote third party guarantee and inclusivity, the strategies should be strategically combined so that they could complement with each other.

Directive mediators are likely to secure third party guarantee, or they may need to do so because there is a high risk of war resumption without their continued engagement and support; as has been discussed, directive mediation may not be able to solve root causes due to their pushy and forceful approach. Therefore, to make sure their engagements to bear fruits or not to falter, the external oversight or Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is essential to contain unrest and uneasiness among people that may arise from unresolved incompatibilities. Or as a natural course of directive mediation process, the peace agreement enforced by directive mediators may just contain the provision on third party guarantee. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether directive mediators can promote inclusivity. On one hand, since directive approach is often used to exert leverage (can be both stick and carrot) over either side of warring parties to comply with the peace process, the mediators sometime exclude some groups from the negotiation process. On the other hand, if directive mediators use their leverage to push all parties concerned to negotiation process, the directive mediation can promote inclusivity.

Communicative strategy is expected to promote inclusivity because they focus on building trust among parties and credibility to the mediators and mediation process that encourages parties to participate in the negotiation process. It is not sure if communicative mediation can secure third party guarantee, because their impact is mainly over the dialogue process itself and not so much over decisions or outcomes that come out of the dialogue process; in other words, the agreement or arrangement regarding third party guarantee may be out of the scope of their engagement. These arguments lead to the first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1: Directive strategy, if applied in combination with communicative-facilitative strategy, is likely to achieve quality peace.**

Procedural mediators, on the other hand, can secure both third-party guarantee and inclusivity. Procedural strategy is expected to secure third party guarantees because it is their role to adjust or arrange the mediation process and thus, they have great influence over the related decisions and arrangement that are made during the mediation process. They are in a position to
suggest a provision on third party guarantee or persuade its importance in case of rejection by parties. And also because of their control over the mediation process, such as venues, participants or agenda, they can ensure inclusivity as well by controlling the participants and the level of engagement of their engagement and roles. However, although procedural strategy can by itself secure both third party guarantee and inclusivity, procedural strategy may need to be combined with directive strategy, because parties can be forced to the negotiation only by the leverage exerted by directive strategy; the functions of procedural strategy to control negotiation process through consultation and consensus can only be activated only after the negotiation process is kicked off by the directive strategy. Also, directive strategy needs procedural strategy because only after parties have achieved a general formula for mediation process, the power of the mediator to maintain the ceasefire could function to the success of the mediation. These arguments lead to the second hypothesis;

**Hypothesis 2: Directive strategy, if applied in combination with procedural strategy, is likely to achieve quality peace.**

To summarize, since directive strategy may not be able to secure inclusivity, it would be better to be combined with either communicative or procedural strategy. Directive strategy would need to be combined with either of other strategies also because they can complete and maintain the negotiation process kicked off by directive strategy, through facilitating dialogues, tackling underlying issues, and building relationship among parties. The below causal mechanism summarizes the above two hypotheses;

**Figure 2 Causal mechanism**
4. Research Design

4-1. Methodology

In order to test empirically the theoretical argument on the correlation between mediation strategies and quality of peace, the method of structured, focused comparison will be applied for between-case analysis along with a process tracing method for within-case analysis. According to George and Bennett (2005, 215, 218-219), the structured, focused comparison method applies a set of the same questions to all targeted cases regarding a certain topic of interest, which enables scientific, systematic and targeted analysis on different cases on a particular theme of interest. Specifically in this study, the same questions are asked to each selected case regarding the mediation strategies used, their contribution securing third-party guarantee and inclusivity, and implementation status of peace agreement provisions related to incompatibilities, to test the causal mechanism between combined-application of mediation strategies and quality peace. The in-depth process tracing is applied to examine the detailed process on how different application of mediation strategies affect the level of third-party guarantee and inclusivity, and how the links between mediation approach and third-party guarantee and inclusivity affects the implementation progress of the peace agreement provision or the resolution of incompatibilities.

It is crucial that this study uses this methodology of comparative case study with process tracing for the following four reasons. First of all, the cases selected for this study vary in basic characteristics or nature such as geographical locations, culture or political system due to data constraint, and thus require a systematic approach to identify and prove a certain trend among them or establish a theorem. Secondly, the focus of the study, the comparison between the combined and solo-application of mediation strategies, has not been studied much and thus the specification of particular aspect of mediation strategies and approaches is crucial. An understudied topic especially requires an in-depth qualitative analysis to pose potential causal mechanisms and leave important implications for future research (George and Bennett 2005, 219-220). This is exactly why this study applied the structured, focused comparison along with a process tracing method for within-case analysis. Thirdly, since the dependent variable in my study is difficult to operationalize, qualitative approach is relevant or only this approach can reveal the correlation which is as close as to the true value. This study’s dependent variable, the quality of peace, is very difficult to categorize dichotomously or ordinally; the concept will contain various aspects or dimensions and requires delicate discussion for evaluation on its relation to mediation approach. Finally, due to the difficulty
to combine different datasets on mediation, a large-n quantitative study had to be set aside. The incompatibility among the datasets made it difficult to attain or compile relevant dataset for this study. In fact, the effort was made toward quantitative analysis by combining Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID, Joshi, Quinn and Regan, 2015), Civil War Mediation dataset, 1946-2004 (CWM, DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011) or Peace Agreement Dataset, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, Pettersson and Öberg, 2020) with Bercovitch’s International Conflict Management data (ICM, 1999) that has been the prime source of reference for most extant studies on mediation strategy. However, it became apparent that it is difficult or would take much more time than is expected for the time scope for this Thesis work to match ICM data with that of PAM_ID, CWM or UCDP dataset. First of all, while ICM dataset focuses on civil and interstate wars, PAM_ID and CWM dataset, focus on civil wars only. Secondly, there exist differences in the timeframe and in the ways of structuring data among different datasets; for instance, while UCDP dataset contains the information on the names of peace agreements while ICM does not; furthermore, one civil war episode can contain multiple mediation efforts. For instance, PAM_ID and UCDP datasets contains data on an overall mediation process that led to a peace agreement, ICM dataset contains data on sub-sets of many mediation episodes under the overall peace process. These factors complicate the data matching process among the different data sources.

To summarize, the method of structured, focused comparison will make it possible to examine my cases varying in characteristics through a set of carefully structured questions about different mediation approaches and quality peace, and to reveal the potential correlation between the two variables through the value comparison of the variables of interests (George and Bennett 2005, 215, 218-219).

4-2. Data Source/timeframe
Mainly, two data sources will be referred to for the qualitative analysis, PAM_ID, and CWM dataset. PAM_ID, which is also called “annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords” contains 34 Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPAs) reached between 1989 and 2012 that meets the following conditions. According to Darby & Mac Ginty (2000: 7), the agreements need to be “comprehensive” in a sense that “all the major parties to the conflict were involved in the negotiations leading to the agreement” and “substantive issues or root cases of the
Conflict were included in the negotiations. “The major party” are defined as those who possess “sufficient mobilizational capacity and influence to alter the outcome of a peace process – for better or worse”, and the “substantive” issues are defined as core contended issues underlying the dispute (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2000: 7). The Table 1 lists 34 CPAs identified that meet the above conditions.

The PAM_ID presents implementation information for 51 different types of provisions addressed in CPAs. Peace agreements are assessed based on the implementation status of each provision included; the level of implementation (minimum, intermediate or full) is assessed by the end of each year up until 10 years after the agreement settlement. Minimum implementation status means that with little viable progress made in a given year in relative to the full implementation. Intermediate implementation means a certain progress made toward reaching full implementation. Full implementation means a completed or nearly completed process (Joshi, Quinn and Regan, 2015). As a result of the above assessment, PAM_ID gives scores to each CPAs. The aggregate implementation score is created by summing the implementation scores for each provision in each accord each year, and then dividing that sum by the number of provisions in each accord multiplied either by 1 (minimum implementation), 2 (intermediate implementation) or 3 (full implementation) with 1 showing the minimum implementation score and 3 showing the maximum possible implementation score. This yields a normalized score that ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 is the best possible score for a country that fully implements the entire accord (Joshi, Quinn and Regan, 2015).
Table 1 List of comprehensive peace agreements (PAM_ID)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Peace agreement</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Luena memorandum of understanding</td>
<td>4 Apr 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Luena memorandum of understanding</td>
<td>4 Apr 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord</td>
<td>2 Dec 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>General framework agreement</td>
<td>21 Nov 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Pretoria protocol on outstanding political and security issues in Burundi</td>
<td>2 Nov 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Ouagadougou political agreement</td>
<td>4 Mar 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Agreement on ending hostilities in the Republic of Congo</td>
<td>29 Dec 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Erdut agreement</td>
<td>12 Nov 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Agreement for the reform and civil concord</td>
<td>12 May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale</td>
<td>26 Dec 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Chapultepec peace agreement</td>
<td>16 Jan 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Accord for a firm and lasting peace</td>
<td>29 Dec 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Abuja peace agreement</td>
<td>1 Nov 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Bodo accord</td>
<td>20 Feb 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>MoU between Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement</td>
<td>15 Aug 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Taif accord</td>
<td>22 Oct 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Accra peace agreement</td>
<td>18 Aug 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Ohrid agreement</td>
<td>13 Aug 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>National pact</td>
<td>11 Apr 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>General peace agreement</td>
<td>4 Oct 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Comprehensive peace agreement</td>
<td>21 Nov 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Agreement between the Republic Niger government and the ORA</td>
<td>15 Apr 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Bougainville peace agreement</td>
<td>30 Aug 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Mindanao final agreement</td>
<td>2 Sep 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Arusha accord</td>
<td>4 Aug 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>General peace agreement between the Republic of Senegal and MFDC</td>
<td>30 Dec 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Loué peace agreement</td>
<td>7 Jul 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Interim constitution</td>
<td>17 Nov 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan comprehensive peace agreement</td>
<td>9 Jan 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>General agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord</td>
<td>27 Jun 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste (East Timor)</td>
<td>Agreement on the question of East Timor</td>
<td>5 May 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Good Friday agreement</td>
<td>10 Apr 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CWM is the first resource to focus solely on civil war mediation fought over territory (secession or autonomy) that includes the data on mediation start and end dates, the identity of mediators, mediation strategy, number of previous mediation attempts, and mediation outcome after two and five years. The important aspect of this dataset for this study is that it specifies mediation strategies. Based on Bercovitch (2000) definitions of strategies, CWM dataset identifies the mediation strategies based on the assertiveness of the mediator, ascending from directive, procedural and communicative/facilitative strategies (DeRouen et al., 2011). The key point of CWM dataset is that it distinguishes the combined application of different mediation strategies from the solo-application of a mediation strategy. The dataset covers all the possible or potential mediation approaches; directive, procedural, communicative/facilitative, directive and procedural, directive and communicative/facilitative, procedural and communicative/facilitative. The
availability of data on both combination and solo application of mediation strategies is crucial to test this study’s hypothesis that compares the relative effectiveness of the two types of mediation approaches.

Furthermore, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset is referred to for triangulation purposes. Since CWM dataset does not contain data on a specific name of a peace agreement that each mediation episode has reached in the end, UCDP dataset was necessary to make sure to match CWM mediation episodes with CPAs identified by PAM_ID, under which a specific mediation episode from CWM was undertaken. Besides, although there was an incompatibility between the ICM dataset, and CWM and PAM_ID datasets, the CWM dataset contains variables describing mediation incidences for all civil war episodes in the UCDP Dataset. UCDP dataset covers peace agreements for armed conflicts that have been active between 1975-2018. The dataset contains information on peace agreement name and dates when the agreements was signed. The dataset also specifies the date when the agreement collapsed if it failed, and provides the background information about the failure; i.e. if any party started military offensives again”; “if any of the signatory party invalidated the agreement; or if any party officially disengaged itself from a peace agreement (UCDP, Pettersson and Öberg, 2020). These descriptive data provide important insight for the subsequent comparative case study which investigates the cofounding variables such as contextual factors other than the main independent variables of mediation strategies, which may influence the quality of post-conflict peace.

For comparative case studies among the selected four cases, sources such as reports by UN and international Non-Governmental Organizations, and peer-reviewed academic journal articles will be consulted to reveal causal mechanism between a certain mediation approach and quality of peace in the post-conflict period.

Since the case selection is based on the 34 CPAs from PAM_ID, the baseline time frame for this study is that of PAM_ID, that is between 1989 and 2012. Based on this time frame, the assessment of the mediation approach and quality peace is demarcated into two different time frames. First, PAM_ID calculates the CPA implementation score annually up until 10 years after the agreement settlements. And since more than 10 years have passed for all four cases selected for this study, the dependent variable or quality peace will be measured at the point of 10 years or more after the agreement settlements of the four CPAs. Second, the assessment of mediation strategies refers to the time period during which actual mediation attempts have taken place that has been
recorded in CWM dataset. Based on the data from CWM and PAM_ID, the entire time frame for this study encompassing the two different timeframes will be 1973-2008. The specific information regarding the time period of all four cases is summarized in Table 2.

**Table 2 Time frame of four cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation start date</th>
<th>Mediation end date</th>
<th>CPA signed date</th>
<th>10 years after CPA settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

DeRouen, Bercovitch, Pospieszna, 2008

**4-3. Case Selection**

The cases for this study are selected based on the most similar cases design. Since this study is interested in mediation strategy and implementation status of peace agreement provisions, the case selection process is based on PAM_ID and CWM that provide information specifically on these variables. While CWM provides detailed information on mediation strategies employed, PAM_ID provides information on the implementation status of peace agreement provisions. The case selection process started with the 34 CPAs identified by PAM_ID. The 34 cases are then crosschecked with the mediation episodes in CWM to see if they can be matched and that the CWM data on mediation strategy can supplement the data on the 34 CPAs, which mediation strategies were applied to reach each 34 cases. This leaves 9 cases out of 34 CPAs as is listed in Table 3.
To investigate on how different mediation approaches affects the quality peace after conflicts, it is decided to choose cases from the 9 cases based on the performance of post-conflict CPA implementation; in other words, cases are selected that have achieved the two top highest (higher than score 90) and two lowest scores (lower than 70 score) among the 9 cases. This selection criteria consequently ensures a variation in the value of dependent variables, and leaves the following 4 cases: Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, and Mindanao Final Agreement. The case of Northern Ireland GFA hit the highest score of 95.24 among the selected four cases. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina hit the second highest score of 93.06. Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA gets 64.58 score. Mindanao Final Agreement hit the lowest implementation score of 59 among the four cases (summary in Table 4).
Table 4 Selected four cases (CPA scores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>CPA implementation score (0-100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
<td>95.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>93.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA</td>
<td>64.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Final Agreement</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DeRouen, Bercovitch, Pospieszna, 2008

However, it should be acknowledged that selecting cases based on the dependent variables may cause the selection bias. As King et al (1994) point out, cases should be selected on the basis of the explanatory variables to avoid selection bias. In addition, CPAs, from the beginning, are more likely than other forms of conflict settlements such as partial agreement or ceasefire, to reach quality peace. Mediation that has concluded with a comprehensive peace agreement are highly likely to achieve conflict resolution (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011). In this regard, starting off the case selection with the list of 34 CPAs increases the risk of selection bias to some extent. However, the problem with case selection based on the dependent variable can be mitigated by the fact that it is made sure to ensure the variation in the value of dependent variable. Selecting two cases each from the extreme points of the score scale within the nine cases – more than 90 and less than 70 – ensures the variation in dependent variables and thus reduces the risk that cases are selected just to prove the hypothesis by selecting cases with combined-application of mediation strategies that are ex-ante obvious to achieve high implementation rate of CPA.

Another concern with the selected four cases is related to the principle of most similar cases design that this study tries to follow. The basic principle of the design is that cases should be selected that are identical in every aspect except for the independent variable value of interest and the outcome (Powner, 2015). In the case of this study, the cases should be selected that share as many similar characteristics as possible with each other such as conflict issues and intensity, warring parties’ characteristics and relations, or international landscape to prove the correlation between mediation strategies and quality peace. The selected four cases, however, vary in terms of explanatory variables and thus it is difficult to hold them constant; the four cases vary in terms of
geographical locations, and national characteristics such as in politics, economy, ethnicity and religion. Not only the mediation approach, but these characteristics may influence the mediation process and the post-conflict peace process including CPA implementation status. However, in spite of the variation in many aspects, the four cases are similar in one crucial aspect; since this study’s case selection is based on CWM that targets only conflicts over territory, all four cases are conflict over territory. The distinction between the conflicts fought over government and territory has been essential for the conflict analysis since the difference in this regard affect the development and consequence of conflicts and peace process in many ways. According to DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011), civil wars fought over territory are more likely to be persistent, less likely to achieve durable peace, and more likely to be mediated than those fought over government. As a result, many datasets have included the variables that distinguish whether a conflict is over government or territory. For instance, UCDP defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties” (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002).

Also, all the four CPAs got signed around the same period - 1995-98 – that ensures the similar international landscape for all the four cases such as political or economic context or superpower relations; the international landscape can have huge impact on mediation process. For instance, international political system and norms can influence how civil wars end (Howard and Star, Winter 2017/18). During the Cold War period (1946-89), civil wars tended to end in complete military victory, because the point of fighting was to convince each other about opposing ideas on appropriate governance, using both economic and military means, in the context of superpower ideological war. During the Post–Cold War Democratization period (1990–2001), following the legacy of the Cold War having ended in negotiated settlement, political solutions through dialogues were advocated by international mediators. After 2002, the time period characterized by the War on Terror, the ideological type of terrorism enables the spread of non-democratic norms of conflict resolution that is based on liberal, pluralistic norm of negotiated settlement. As a consequence, achieving stabilization arose as an approach to ending civil wars (Howard and Star, Winter 2017/18). Since the selected four cases all fall within the Post–Cold War Democratization period, it can be expected that all cases were settled based on the same international norm emphasizing political solutions through dialogues.
Furthermore, since this study takes new approach to investigate the effects of mediation approach – distinguishing solo- and combined- applications of different mediation strategies, the available data source is limited. This makes the compromise to some extent reasonable regarding the variety in explanatory variables, if it is the result of basing the case selection on the datasets that provide the crucial information on the key variables for the study. Consequently, the unit of analysis for this study is on the comprehensive peace agreement level.

4-4. Operationalization

4-4-1. Operationalization of the independent variable

The independent variables of this study will be analyzed as a dichotomous variable:

\[ X = 1, \text{ when mediation approach includes any combination or sequence of mediation strategies} \]
\[ X = 0, \text{ when mediation approach includes only one of the mediation strategies.} \]

CWM and such secondary sources as peer-reviewed academic articles and reports by international organizations are referred to assess the value of the independent variable. As described in the data source section, CWM provides information on the mediation strategies employed in each mediation episode, which cover both solo- and combined- application of mediation strategies. The combined-application means either 1) communicative/facilitative AND procedural, 2) communicative/facilitative AND directive, 3) procedural AND directive, or 4) communicative/facilitative AND procedural AND directive. The solo-application means either 1) communicative/facilitative, 2) procedural, or 3) directive. CWM’ coding on the mediation strategies is based on “explicit identification by the mediator or other observers of the strategy when possible or by analysis of descriptions of the mediation event” (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2018: 4). Following Bercovitch’s (2000) definition, the main three mediation strategies are defined as following:

1) Communication Facilitation – at the low end of the intervention spectrum where mediators exert little control over the more formal process of mediation and take a fairly passive role including facilitation of information or cooperation.

2) Procedural – strategy to bring both parties together to some neutral environment by mediators with some control over the conflict management process such as timing,
agenda, meeting place and arrangements, media publicity, the distribution of information, and the formality or flexibility of the meetings.

3) **Directive** – the most powerful form of intervention where a mediator shapes the content and nature of a final outcome by offering incentives, promises of support, or threats of diplomatic sanctions against warring parties.

(Bercovitch, 2000: 175-176)

The table 5 summarizes the indicators for independent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5 Indicators for independent variable</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Research questions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the mediation approach solo-application of a mediation strategy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the mediation approach combined application of several different mediation strategies?</td>
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4-4-2. Operationalization of the intervening variable

The intervening variables of this study, third party guarantee and inclusivity, will be analyzed as a dichotomous variable;

Y=1, when mediation approach secured third party guarantee.
Y=0, when mediation approach did not secure third party guarantee.

Z=1, when mediation approach achieved inclusive process.
Z=0, when mediation approach did not achieve inclusive process.

The value of the intervening variables will be assessed based on the conceptualizations of third party and inclusion (See Theoretical Framework chapter), by reviewing the secondary courses such as International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) or United Nations (UN) reports and peer-reviewed academic journals. The table 6 summarizes the indicators for intervening variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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</table>
| Did mediation approach secure third party guarantee? | 1) Did mediation secure third-party security guarantee? *(ie: PKO, military training)*
2) Did mediation secure third-party guarantee over peace agreement implementation? *(ie: post-conflict dispute resolution, protection of minority rights)* |
| Did mediation approach promote inclusivity? | 1) Did mediation invite civil society in the negotiation tables?
2) Did mediation process engage civil society outside official negotiation process? *(ie: capacity building, information sharing, assigning post-conflict monitoring role)* |
4-4-3. Operationalization of the dependent variable

The dependent variable, quality peace, will be analyzed as a scale variable. Following the scoring system of PAM_ID, a relevant provision related to an incompatible issue, will be assessed based on a three-level scale; minimum, intermediate or full. Minimum implementation status means inconceivable progress made in a given year. Intermediate implementation means some progress, but not full implementation achieved. Full implementation means a completed or nearly completed process (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015).

The value of the dependent variables will be assessed based on the implementation status of an incompatible issue for each case, also by reviewing the qualitative data analysis of PAM_ID and secondary courses such as INGO or UN reports and peer-reviewed academic journals. The table 7 summarizes the indicators for dependent variables.

**Table 7 Indicators for dependent variable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Has a peace agreement provision related to an incompatible issue been resolved as a consequence of mediation attempts? | 1) What is the level of implementation (minimum/intermediate/full) of Decentralization/Federalism? (Niger, Mindanao, Bosnia, Northern Ireland)  
2) What is the level of implementation (minimum/intermediate/full) of Territorial Power-sharing? (Bosnia)  
3) What is the level of implementation (minimum/intermediate/full) of Electoral/Political Party Reform (Northern Ireland)? |
**4-4-4. Internal validity and external reliability of indicators**

Internal validity means that an indicator applies the intended concept for all the targeted cases within a study. External reliability ensures that the same set of rule or mechanism can be applied or work across cases under different conditions (Powner, 2015). As Powner (2015) points out, achieving both reliability and validity in qualitative measurement is more difficult than in quantitative measurement, because most variables in qualitative studies are intended for measurement of gradations, characteristics, or nuances, and thus the values for data tend to become subjective and open to interpretation. In this study, the internal validity and reliability of independent variable indicators (mediation strategy) should be high since it is based on the clearly articulated definition by Bercovitch (2000), which has been widely cited among scholars. The mediation strategies - directive, procedural, communicative/facilitative or combination of any of these – can be observed and evaluated in the same manner across different mediation episodes and across different conflict episodes or countries. The internal validity of intervening variable indicators (third-party guarantee and inclusivity) would be quite high because their assessments refer to the clearly conceptualized definition of concepts for all cases, but the reliability can be influenced by an individual interpretation or perception. Also, the internal validity of dependent variable indicator (quality peace) may be high since the assessment uses the PAM_ID’s scoring system is based on an objective and clearly defines procedure, but the reliability may be low because the status of a certain provision may be influenced by the different level of expectation each person has for an outcome of a provision depending on the person’s positions or relation to the provision. However, some weakness in the validity and reliability would be overcome by the detailed examination of the mediation process and the CPA implementation process of each case to reveal potential causal chain. This process tracing procedure will provide a reasonable explanation of the link between the mediation approach and quality peace and its generalizability to other cases outside the scope of this study.

**4-5. Structure of Analysis**

The empirical analysis of this thesis consists of four parts. First, individual case will be examined and described. More specifically, each CPA and mediation process leading up to that CPA will be described in detail along with brief but precise background information about the conflict and peace processes. The focus of the analysis is to evaluate variables regarding the quality
peace of the four cases through the questions and indicators prepared for the analysis. The dependent variable, quality peace, of each case will be discussed based on the implementation status of specific provisions related to each case’s incompatibility. The main findings will be summarized as a form of a table. The individual case analysis will conclude with the analysis on the link between the independent and dependent variables, namely the correlation between the mediation approach and quality of peace. Secondly, the individual case study will be followed by the between-case comparative analysis among the four cases. The analysis will focus on testing the applicability of the theoretical argument of this study for the four cases; whether or not there is a positive correlation between the combine-application of mediation strategies and quality of peace. In other words, the comparative case study will investigate the causal mechanism between mediation strategies and quality peace or implementation status of a specific provision related to an incompatible issue. The focus will be on the detailed examination on the process or mechanism; how a certain mediation approach relates to third party guarantee and inclusion, and whether or not it leads to quality peace or resolve an incompatibility of a conflict. In more concrete terms, it will analyze how the process or progress of an implementation of a provision regarding an incompatibility can differ depending on the mediation approaches, through either directive, communication-facilitation, procedural strategy or combination of them, in relation to, or affected by other contextual factors. Thirdly, the individual and comparative case analysis will be supplemented by the further discussion on the implications of the findings, the alternative or additional explanations that may present new insights through different explanatory variables from those of this study. Finally, the empirical analysis section will be completed with the discussion on the theoretical, methodological, and empirical limitations and weaknesses of this study.
5. **Empirical finding**

As is summarized in the previous chapter, the empirical findings will be presented through the individual case analysis and the between-case comparative analysis, that will be supplemented by the discussion on the alternative or additional explanations along with the theoretical, methodological, and empirical limitations and weaknesses of the study. This chapter will start with the individual case analysis, the detailed process tracing of mediation processes of the four cases based on the research questions and related indicators set for independent, intervening and dependent variables. The process tracing is organized to investigate each case from the four angles; context, mediation approach applied, third-parry guarantee, inclusivity and outcome/quality peace.

5-1. **Northern Ireland**

i) **Context**

The civil war in Northern Ireland lasted for three decades, during which the unionists (mostly Protestant) fought for the province to remain part of the United Kingdom and in union with England, while Catholics (or nationalists) sought for the province as a part of Ireland. Between 1969 and 1998, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other militant groups aiming for united Ireland fought with the British police and military forces in Northern Ireland. The incompatible stance over decommissioning hampered formal and informal peace talks; while the British government and Protestant parties required IRA’s full decommissioning to start negotiation, Sinn Fein claimed for talks before decommissioning (Curran, 2003). When Prime Minister Tony Blair relaxed its demand on decommissioning in 1997 (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson 2002, 231), the IRA announced a halt on military actions. Finally, all-inclusive peace got under way involving Sinn Féin and a comprehensive peace agreement, GFA, was approved by all parties in 1998 (Mahieu, 2007).

ii) **Mediation approach applied**

According to Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015), the mediation process leading to GFA applied all three strategies. This data matches with the empirical findings from the secondary sources.

The U.S., represented by the Senator George Mitchell, was a key mediator for Northern Ireland conflict. Mitchell used all the three approaches during the course toward reaching the
GFA, but with special focus on procedural strategy. While Mitchell’s communicative-facilitative strategy could be observed in his efforts to ease the polarization by creating forum for joint discussion for all sides, he prioritized the process over substance, by devoting a majority of his time to establishing the “ground rules” for discussing “procedures”, establishing procedures and agenda, and developing outline items for agreement and preliminary issue statements (Curran, 2003). Mitchell pursued an issue strategy that is separating the difficult issue of decommissioning from the negotiations, in order to keep the unionists in the talks, while relaxing a pre-condition for Republicans to enter into the talks.

Mitchell also employed communicative-facilitative strategy through a timing strategy or a quite patient approach. His “as long as it takes” approach gave time for relatively less compatible procedural issues and mediating the interactions in order to foster communication and at least basic understanding of each other’s interests (Curran, 2003). Also, Mitchell was firmly focused on designing a participative process, getting to know the key players and building mutually beneficial relationships (Curran, Sabenius & Watkins, 2004). Mitchell skillfully applied his problem solving and logical thinking skills and succeeded in establishing relationships based on trust and confidence particularly with the unionist/loyalist parties. Mitchell’s patience and persistence kept parties engaged in the process (Corry, 2018).

iii) Third party guarantee
The peace process toward GFA secured good third-party guarantee. In 1997, following the recommendation by an international body chaired by Mitchell, British and Irish governments established the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) that oversees, facilitates and monitors decommissioning. As a consequence, GFA stipulates the commitment by all parties to the disarmament of paramilitary groups within two years, whose verification was commissioned to the IICD (nerve centre).

iv) Inclusivity
The mediation process to GFA also secured inclusivity. After the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, peace negotiations started to include the Irish government and Republicans (Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army), and the British and Irish governments made efforts to involve both mainstream political parties and the rival paramilitary groups into a problem-solving process (Byrne, 2006). And these efforts were strengthened by U.S. and
European Union (EU) economic and political backing. President Clinton and Mitchell used their political and economic leverage to bring all parties including the Catholic and Protestant paramilitaries to the negotiating table (Byrne, 2006). Mitchell devoted substantial energy to inclusivity of the mediation process both for decommissioning and all-party talks and both at the intercommunal and regional levels. Furthermore, Mitchell made sure to design the election for the all-party talks to involve up to ten parties regardless of size, including those with even marginal electoral support (McCartney 1999). Mitchell also ensured to engage civil society such as the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition. In order to address various interests of the parties involved in the talks, Mitchell also established an informal group working with key stakeholders who were related to both unionists and republican and were informally assisting joint problem solving and joint understanding of the decisions (Curran, 2003).

v) Outcome/quality peace

The GFA in 1998 covers 28 provisions, and its implementation score after 10 years (as of 2007) is 95.24 (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015). Among the 4 cases in this Thesis, it hit the highest score. The incompatibility in the Northern Ireland Dispute was the political system; while the Catholic parties envisioned a political system uniting Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic where the two governments share the executive powers, the Protestant parties aimed for a ruling by British government or a Northern Ireland Assembly based on majority elections (Curran, 2003). As of 2007, among the 28 provisions, the related provisions to the incompatibility, “Decentralization/Federalism” and “Electoral/Political Party Reform” had been fully implemented (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015), and thus this incompatibility had been resolved.

The Agreement set for a 108-member elected assembly in Northern Ireland accorded with executive and legislative authority that is expected to protect the rights and interests of all communities. According to the accord, the assembly was to be elected by using the Proportional Representation Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system. As of 2007, the 1998 Act had maintained the STV electoral system in Northern Ireland. Elections were held in 2007 based on this electoral system (BBC News, March 9, 2009). According to the Agreement, a First Minister, Deputy First Minister, and up to ten Ministers would cancel the executive authority of the assembly. The proportional distribution of committee members in the assembly was also recommended by the Agreement to ensure the interest and rights of all communities. The
Secretary of State was accorded with the power to represent Northern Ireland’s interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet to ensure that the United Kingdom would keep its compliance with international obligations. The decentralization provision of the accord was implemented in 1998, with the assembly being elected, although Northern Ireland’s Executive was not appointed until 29 November 1999. The committee members were appointed on 29 November 1999 based on the power-sharing provision of the Agreement. As of 2000, the United Kingdom had been committed to Northern Ireland’s devolution status. Between 2001 and 2005, the assembly and the executive were suspended, but on 7 March 2007, Northern Ireland elected a new assembly (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015).

5-2. Mindanao
i) Context
From 1968 to 1971, Moro student-led political started to organize campaigns for the recognition of the Moros’ right to self-determination, that led to the establishment of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). On September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law against the growing insurgency. The MNLF responded with armed counter-offensives calling for recognition for an independent state for the Bangsamoro. In December 1976, the Marcos government and the MNLF reached Tripoli Agreement that stipulated the establishment of autonomy in 13 provinces and 9 cities in the southern Philippines. But the issue of the agreement implementation remained, particularly on the issue of a plebiscite. Finally in 1996, the Fidel Ramos regime and the MNLF agreed on Final Mindanao Agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement that regulated a formula for autonomy that the MNLF could accept (Bacani, 2005).

ii) Mediation approach applied
According to Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015), the mediation process leading to Mindanao Final Agreement applied only communicative-facilitative strategy. However, the empirical finding reveals the process included all three strategies.

The Organization of Islamic Council (OIC), a main mediator for the conflict in the Philippines, used facilitative approach by urging the Government of the Philippines (GRP), or Marcos Regime, to pursue a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 1999). OIC utilized regional arrangement and appealed to its member states, Indonesia and
Malaysia, to raise the issue of the Philippine dispute on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agenda. Also, OIC member states, Libya and Indonesia, requested world leaders to use their ‘good offices’ with the GRP. The governmental panel chairman testified that OIC’s approach emphasized promotion of personal relationship among parties. MNFL Chairman Misuari also testified to the OIC’s communicative approach through persuasive diplomacy without imposition (Santos, 1999). Also, President Ramos testified the ASEAN’s procedural mediation approach based on consultation and consensus applied by Indonesia was most productive. It aimed to build up consensus from easier issues and to use that momentum to achieve consensus on more difficult issues where parties could build confidence and personal friendship (Santos, 1999).

OIC also used directive strategy. Although OIC is a separate organization from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), some of OIC member states belong to OPEC as oil-producing states. Thus, Saudi Arabis used its leverage of lifting the embargo for the Philippine to push GRP to negotiate with MNLF. Also, the resolution by the OIC’s Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministries (ICFM) requested OIC member states to exercise their economic, social and political pressure over GRP to urge it to implement the Tripoli Agreement. Furthermore, OIC used its leverage both over GRP and MNLF regarding the issue of MNFL’s membership or status within OIC. OIC had recognized MNFL as the only and legitimate representative of the Moro people in the Philippines and granted it observer status and participation in OIC’s Islamic Summits and ICFMs. OIC had urged MNLF to compromise on autonomy provision instead of secession deal by hinting the potential of granting MNLF full membership in OIC, while urging GRP to conform to the Agreement Implementation by threatening with the possibility of granting MNLF the full membership into OIC (Santos, 1999). To prevent MNFL from gaining full OIC membership, the government was forced to comply with OIC mediation. Aquino’s emissaries emphasized that the autonomous arrangement was in align with the principle of the Tripoli Agreement, and in the end, in 1991, the OIC acknowledged the government’s efforts to bring peace in Mindanao (Quimp, 2000).

iii) Third party guarantee
OIC mediated peace process leading to 1976 Tripoli Agreement institutionalized OIC participation in its implementation; that was the financial support from OIC member states for
post-war reconstruction. Also, Final Agreement provided that Indonesia served as a third-party guarantor or observer on behalf of OIC for interim ceasefire by deploying its Army in addition to its diplomats at its embassy in Manila (Santos, 1999).

However, the third-party guarantee was not sufficient for the Mindanao autonomous government, such as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), that was suffering from lacking in financial resources, training and authority that were supposed to be accorded by the Final Agreement provisions. The lack of funding, the military challenges, and bureaucratic inertia have deprived the 1996 Agreement of the chance to work (Gutierrez, 1999). The Philippine Congress obstructed the delegation of powers over security forces as well as fiscal autonomy, that was agreed in Final Agreement (Lara & Champain 2009). This lack of internal authority and resources made it difficult for the external third party to sufficiently support capacity building training for security provision or public service provision through financial assistance. As a consequence, the Mindanao autonomous government was “neither autonomous nor capable of governing”. The legitimacy of the agreement was negatively affected by the autonomous government’s failure to ensure law and order, and to provide other public services (Lara & Champain 2009). SPCPD’s peacekeeping was weak due to the lack of authority, destabilizing the post-conflict security situation (Muslim, 1999).

iv) Inclusivity
The Mindanao mediation process was not inclusive. The Agreement was only between GRP and MNLF that was just one of various religious groups against GRP including Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf and Islamic Command Council. The GRP started negotiation with MNLF with the intension to have negotiations with other militarily weaker groups at the later stage of the peace process; GRP hoped to demonstrate its intension to satisfy the general demands of Moro and Muslim ethnic groups by settling conflicts first with MNLF that had been recognized by OIC as an organization representing Moro ethnic groups both domestically and internationally. However, the strategy left other groups a feeling of being excluded from the official peace process. Besides, the consensus and consultations were confined only to negotiation parties and not extended to civil society organizations, which hampered popular understanding and support for the Final Agreement (Conciliation Resources, 2013). The marginalized sectors such as women or minority ethnic groups such as Lumads were not directly
consulted by the official negotiation process, although some civil society organizations were engaged in the independent committee monitoring the ceasefire between the GRP and MILF. The establishment of the SPCPD that was to oversee development projects in SZOPAD, was rejected by the excluded civil society (Cagoco-Guiam, 1999). Also, ARMM (The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) policy during Ramos regime failed because autonomy was granted only for Muslims excluding all other ethnic groups (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 1999).

After all, the Mindanao Peace Agreement failed to achieve inclusivity in spite of its positive spirit in the text. The agreement aimed for more responsive governance for all ethnic groups including Muslims, Christians and Highlanders in the Mindanao Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), but its inclusivity was not materialized during its implementation stage (Muslim, 1999). Its exclusive negotiation with MNLF and exclusion of civil society caused rejections to some of the Agreement Provisions regarding the SPCPD and ARMM policy. What is needed for quality peace in the Philippine is consensus from various key players, GRP, Congress, MNLF, local politicians, civil society organizations and international society (Gutierrez, 1999).

v) Outcome/quality peace
The Mindanao Final Agreement in 1996 covers 24 provisions, and its implementation score after 10 years (as of 2005) is 59.00 (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015). Among the 4 cases in this Thesis, it hit the lowest score. The incompatibility in the Mindanao conflict was the recognition of the Moros’ right to self-determination. As of 2005, among the 24 provisions, the related provision to the incompatibility, “Decentralization/Federalism”, had been fully implemented (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015) and thus this incompatibility had been resolved.

The Agreement provided further decentralization of power and increased autonomy for the people of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The final scope of areas with autonomy was to be determined based on a referendum after the several-year’s transition phase. The peace agreement designated the current ARMM (4 provinces) along with 10 other provinces and nine cities to be a SZOPAD. In 2001, the Filipino legislature passed the Republic Act 9054 or Expanded ARMM Law in 2001, and the plebiscite to determine which provinces would join the new ARMM was conducted in August 2001. As a result, among the 14 provinces and 9 cities in the SZOPAD that voted in the referendum, only one additional province (Basilan)
and one city (Marawi) voted for inclusion in the new expanded ARMM. Following the referendum in 2001, no further changes were made to the provincial boundaries of the ARMM as of 2005 (Tuminez, 2007).

5-3. Bosnia and Herzegovina
i) Context
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was one of the six autonomous republics that made up Yugoslavia. In 1992, following two other republics' declarations of independence, the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence that led to a war. The UN humanitarian intervention was launched in 1992 in response to the deteriorating Bosnia’s situation. As the war intensified, the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance representing the UN and former United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen representing the European Union, developed a consociational plan, which was rejected by all parties. In 1994, the Contact Group composed of five Western powers in collaboration with Russia presented its own new peace plan. While Milošević’s government supported the plan, the Bosnian Serbs opposed. The collapse of the Contact Group plan drove all three sides to be offensive again. As the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) ceasefire began to falter, Former US President Jimmy Carter mediated “Cessation of Hostilities Agreement” over the winter of 1994-1995, that could not prevent a final military clash (Harland, 2017, p. 21). In 1995, high-level peace talks, sponsored by the U.S. and mediated by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, finally brought about a cease-fire and ultimately, a peace agreement. The Dayton Accords established the general governmental structure of the new BiH state, which is a federal constitution.

ii) Mediation approach applied
According to Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan, 2015), the mediation process leading to the Dayton Agreement applied only procedural strategy. However, the empirical finding suggests the process included all three strategies.

The international community's mediation effort before 1994 was conducted through the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) that used diplomatic mediation or facilitative or procedural approach (Touval, 1996). The mediation failure by ICFY, UN and EU demonstrated the inapplicability of communicative strategy and the need for the directive approach for the peace process in Bosnian war (Greenberg and
McGuinness, 1999). In Bosnia, the power imbalance and strongly incompatible stance of all parties and their unfair proposals made it illegitimate to treat all parties equal and made it more appropriate to use leverage to equalize the incentives and gains of each party.

The U.S. directive approach was to use military power to manipulate the peace process by labeling the unequal power balance among the parties by defeating the Bosnian Serbs by leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign and to facilitate the Muslim and Croat victories. The U.S. also trained Muslim and Croat forces, allowing them to plan the operations even under the UN embargo (New York Times, October 28, 1995: 1, 5). The U.S. also used leverage over Slobodan Milosevic, threatening him with the potential devastating effects of the economic embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), convincing him to exert some control over the leadership in Pale. Against Bosnian President Izetbegovic, the U.S. also used leverage regarding lifting of arms embargo to come to the final negotiating stage, while threatening to stop its military support in case of no cooperation (Greenberg and McGuinness, 1999).

The U.S. also used procedural strategy. The procedural mediation approach was needed to devise the mechanisms for managing disagreements on the interpretation of the peace agreement (Kostić, 2009). As to the venue for the final peace conference, the cite in the U.S., Dayton, was selected to maintain its leverage such as physical and psychological control of the process. As to the negotiation participants, the U.S. chose Milosevic as the only official party to have direct negotiations, because the U.S. had leverage over Milosevic, who were seeking for ending the international embargo against the rump-Yugoslavia to rebuild its domestic economy (Greenberg and McGuinness, 1999). The U.S. confined the participants exclusively to heads of the states (exclusive-elitist procedure) to prevent the parties from delaying or avoiding responding to proposals (Touval, 1996). Holbrooke effectively applied procedural strategy by managing the negotiation process to lay a ground for a general framework for later negotiations, while ensuring the third-party guarantee by indicating the continued U.S. support for NATO bombing until the Bosnian Serbs would conform to a real cease-fire (Greenberg and McGuinness, 1999).
iii) Third party guarantee
The mediation process in BiH secured good third-party guarantee both for security and peace agreement implementation. Even about 15 years after the first international military deployment, peacekeeping operation by the international military forces had remained on the ground, i.e., NATO and the European Union Force (EUFOR). The PKO missions were well armed and demonstrated a credible threat against the breach of the Agreement, thus promoting the peace agreement implementation (Caspersen, 2017). And external power had led the post-war stabilization missions including dialogues (Kostić, 2009). Furthermore, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), was established as an internationally run institution that was accorded with the responsibility over the implementation of the civilian provisions and with the final authority to interpret the Dayton Accords. It had authority or power over the coordination of the international assistance including the Implementation Force (IFOR), restructuring of the governmental structures, and even dismissal of BiH government employees who are deemed obstructive (Austermiller, 2006).

Furthermore, the Dayton Accord provided that the first elections, to be held no later than nine months after the signing of the agreement, would be monitored by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Provisional Election Commission. Council for Implementation of Peace (PIC), composed of all the states and organizations attending the conference, would subsume the role and authority of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. Since a high level of mistrust had existed among communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is crucial to ensure the presence of strong peacekeeping forces to stabilize peace and at least create momentum for the early stage of the agreement implementation (Kostić, 2009).

iv) Inclusivity
The peace process in BiH was not inclusive; many laws are passed without a great deal of local participation or input. Although the agreement created decent laws, its implementation was poor with little observance (Austermiller, 2006). Kostić (2009, 13) concurs that the U.S. exclusive negotiations may have negatively impacted the legitimacy and ownership of the peace process; it dealt primarily with the three regional leaders, Izetbegović representing the Bosniaks and the Government BiH, Milošević representing the Bosnian Serbs and Tudman, representing the Bosnian Croats. Hoolbrooke’s shuttle diplomatic initiatives to gain acceptance of the US
principles of a future peace agreement also involved only the three main leaders while excluding Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats (Kostić, 2009). The Dayton agreement was an elite deal between the same three ethno-national elites and was not endorsed by the public population. The voices of non-nationalists, the smaller communities, or women or civil society were not represented through consultation, review or approval process (Harland, 2017).

v) Outcome/Quality Peace
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 covers 23 provisions, and its implementation score after 10 years (as of 2005) is 93.06 (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015). Among the 4 cases in this Thesis, it hit the 2nd highest score, that, exceeding the score of 90.00, is a high score in general term as well. The incompatibility in the Bosnian Conflict was the general governmental structure of the new BiH among the three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats). As of 2005, among the 23 provisions, the related provisions to the incompatibility, “Decentralization/Federalism” had been fully implemented, while the implementation status of “Territorial Power-sharing” was intermediate (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015), thus this incompatibility has been almost resolved.

After the post-conflict elections on 14 September 1996, the institutional arrangement of the confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was completed at federal, entities, and canton levels, with most responsibilities, such as taxation, education, and police force, assigned to the canton level. The cantons (five Bosniak, three Croat, and two mixed) were created as a result of the Washington Agreement, that included all three dimensions of power sharing; military power sharing, political power sharing, and territorial power sharing (Pospieszna and Schneider, 2011). The Dayton Agreement included two power sharing dimensions—the political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and territorial specifications of a confederation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republika Srpska (RS) (Pospieszna and Schneider, 2011).

The implementation of territorial power-sharing has remained at an intermediate level due to the different level of decentralization of power between the Federation and RS; while RS is a centralized entity in the Federation BiH, most responsibilities such as taxation, education, and police force have been placed on the level of cantons comprising the federation (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015).
5-4. Niger

i) Context
The Tuareg started their rebel movements against the Nigerien government in October 1991 when the Front de Libération de l’Aïr et l’Azaouad (FLAA) was created to claim for a federal system with greater autonomy as well as for better economic conditions for the Tuareg population (Mahieu, 2007). The Tuareg had been a minority in the most peripheral and driest regions with high drought risks far away from the capital. The Nigerian political structure of bureaucratic elite preoccupied with financing its clientelist networks and excluding the Tuareg, had prevented good relations from materializing between the Tuareg and the postcolonial state (Crook, 1988). The newly elected president in 1993, Mahamane Ousmane, tried negotiations with the Coordination de la Résistance armée (CRA) composed of four rebel-organizations (Krings, 1995). After the two-year negotiations between CRA and delegations from Algeria, Burkina Faso, France and Mali, the final agreement was signed on 15 April 1995 between the government and the Armed Resistance Organization (Organisation de la Résistance Armée, ORA), a coalition of Tuareg rebel groups. The agreement focused on such issues as national reconciliation, the role of the defense and security forces, and economic and social development plan including for the northern regions (Baudais et al., 2021).

ii) Mediation approach applied
According to Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015), the mediation process leading to the Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA applied communicative-facilitative and procedural strategy. However, the empirical finding suggests the process included all three strategies.

Driven by the interests of the regional mediator whose domestic situation may be threatened by the development in the conflict situation in Niger, directive strategy was mainly used. In fact, all the rebellions in Niger were halted by the leverage presented by the regional mediators driven by their own national interests. Algeria has played a leading role in the Nigerien peace process, whose Tuareg population may be stimulated by the movement in Niger and may make Algeria’s territorial integrity vulnerable (Baudais et al., 2021).

While using directive strategy through elitist co-optations to contain rebellions, Algeria and Libya also used communicative-facilitative strategy to facilitate dialogue among communities and among the armed group leaders through their patronage networks within the
rebel groups and by their means of pressure (border closure, crackdown of trafficking, blockade of supplies, etc.) (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2018).

On the other hand, a mediation team of France, Algeria and Burkina Faso used formulative mediation to make substantive proposals that protected the territorial integrity of Niger while promoting the development of areas populated by Tuaregs, leading to a comprehensive peace agreement in 1995 (Quinn et al., 2013). As part of formulative strategy, a phased approach was applied in the Niger’s 1995 agreement that relates the implementation of the disarmament agreement to the implementation progress of territorial autonomy; development programs; the creation of special, integrated, military units; and the reintegration of former combatants (article. 13) (Caspersen, 2017).

iii) Third party guarantee
The third-party guarantee for Nigerian peace process was not strong but secured a certain mechanism. Since the main mediators, Algeria and Libya, were preoccupied with their own national interests and short-term order and stability, their engagement could not go beyond peacemaking stage to peacebuilding. In fact, Algeria and Libya reduced their involvement in managing the longer and more sensitive phase of the peace process, that is the post-conflict peace building. Also, the coordination problem among many actors without viable peacekeeping plan, hampered the UN intervention in Niger, whose logistical and security supports are usually regarded effective in promoting local mediation efforts, limiting local armed clashes and monitoring of peace agreement implementation (Baudais et al., 2021).

On the other hand, the Peace Agreement provided an innovative tension control and conflict prevention tool, or a decent third-party guarantee system. The High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP) has a monitoring-evaluation framework managed by the European Union to monitor projects undertaken over time. It has served as a key channel for international sponsors or as one-stop-shop for former rebels who need international assistance. It has implemented a number of small projects for the benefit of local actors (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2018). HACP is a promising post-conflict mechanism in promoting quality peace. Peace durability requires a permanent institutional architecture, so that the peacebuilding process withstands changes in the political regime. In this regard, the HACP has maintained its continuity in Niger, which has maintained its current form throughout several regime changes by
managing the issues of tribal rivalries (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2018). Overall, therefore, the level of third-party guarantee has been intermediary in Nigerien case.

iv) Inclusivity
The inclusive peace process has not been fully achieved in Niger, although it has established a delegation mechanism of power to local or grassroot population. The fact that Algeria and Libya did not dedicate themselves to long-term peacebuilding indicates the weak inclusivity in the Nigerien peace process, since inclusive process requires a long-term vision. For instance, integrations in the army without a plan for the promotion or recruitment of future generations would falter. Also, the insufficient third-party guarantee due to the self-interests of Algeria and Libya, caused their inability to secure fairness. Since fairness is based on taking into account all the interests, this is an indication that the Nigerien peace process has not been inclusive (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2018). It is hoped, however, HACP would provide a formal forum for bridging the decision-makers and their constituencies in peripheries coordinated by Nigerian elite intermediaries (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2018).

v) Outcome/quality peace
The Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA in 1995 covers 16 provisions, and its implementation score after 10 years (as of 2004) is 64.58 (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015). Among the 4 cases in this Thesis, it hit the 2nd lowest score. The incompatibility in the Nigerien Conflict was the Tuareg people’s claim for greater autonomy as well as for better economic conditions. As of 2005, among the 16 provisions, the related provision to the incompatibility, “Decentralization/Federalism” had been implemented at the intermediate level (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015), thus this incompatibility had been almost resolved.

The agreements provided for the decentralization of the government so that the Niger Tuareg community could manage the northern areas of the country in a more autonomous way (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015). Until 2000, the decentralization bill had not yet passed by the National Assembly that delayed the local election. In 2002, the National Assembly passed a series of other related decentralization bills, that provided the distribution of administrative powers among 265 communes (local councils); the establishment of regions and departments as decentralized entities; and a new electoral code that reflects the decentralization context (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015). In 2004, municipal elections were held in which some 3,700 people
were elected to new local governments in 265 newly established communes; among them, the majority was the ruling Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement (MNSD) party, but opposition parties also made significant gains (US State Department, 2010).

The reason the implementation status has been recorded as intermediate may be because the main bill related to decentralization in the aftermath of the conflict settlement has not been passed. Instead, only other related programs and laws were passed in 2001 regarding the restructuring of government through a policy of decentralization, the introduction of new local authorities, establishment of 229 new councils, of which 178 of them were set up in rural areas with devolved power at regional, district and commune levels (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan. 2015). Peace cannot be attained in Niger unless the government fully concedes autonomy in the northern regions and the proportional participation of the Tuareg in the political, administrative, military and judiciary institutions (Krings, 1995).
Table 8 Summary of Indicators
(Mediation approach/third-party guarantee/inclusivity/peace agreement implementation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good Friday Agreement</th>
<th>1. Procedural (US)</th>
<th>Achieved: Communicative strategy → forum for joint discussion for all sides</th>
<th>Full implementation of ‘Decentralization/Federalism’ and ‘Electoral/Political Party Reform’ (Assembly in Northern Ireland with executive and legislative authority, elected by STV electoral system)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Procedural (US)</td>
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<td>3. Communicative (ICFY)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Achieved: US strong political and economic leverage ≥ well-armed PKO and UN-sanctioned OHR</td>
<td>NOT achieved: exclusive negotiation process based on U.S. leverage ≥ hampered consultation</td>
<td>Full implementation of ‘Decentralization/Federalism’ for ‘Territorial Power-sharing’ (Confederation institutional arrangement completed, but levels of decentralization of power differ between the Federation and ES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1. Directive (US)</td>
<td>Achieved: 1. National interests of Algeria/Libya &gt; Hinder long-term commitment 2 Coordination problem &gt; inactive UN engagement</td>
<td>Intermediate implementation of ‘Decentralization/Federalism’ (Decentralization of the government for Tuareg community to manage the northern areas in a more autonomous way, but main bills related to decentralization has not been passed by the National Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Communicative (Algeria/Libya)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Procedural (Mediation team of France, Algeria and Burkina Faso)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement Between the Republic of Niger Government and the ORA</td>
<td>NOT achieved: Exclusive nature of negotiation: too strong for ASEAN’s consultation consensus approach to overcome</td>
<td>Full implementation of ‘Decentralization/Federalism’ (Further decentralization of power and increased autonomy for the people of the ARMM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mindanao Final Agreement</td>
<td>1. Communicative (OIC)</td>
<td>NOT achieved: Not enough support for SPCPD</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Procedural (ASEAN)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Directive (OIC)</td>
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6. Comparative Analysis

Based on the empirical findings regarding the variables of interest of the four case studies, this chapter will show the comparative analysis. The empirical results suggest ambiguous results regarding causal mechanism being tested; although all cases contain both combination of directive and communicative-facilitative strategies and the combination of directive and procedural strategies, only one case, Northern Ireland, have secured both inclusivity and third-party guarantee while other cases have showed mixed results. On the other hand, the empirical findings suggest modest support towards the hypothesis; among the four cases, two cases have achieved full implementation of peace agreement provision related to their incompatibilities, while other two cases have gained intermediate achievement. As will be discussed in this chapter, the empirical findings suggest a new perspective of looking at the different mediation approaches, while also pointing to other contextual factors beyond mediation that would influence the overall peace process.

6-1. Case-by-Case Analysis - Connecting the mediation approach with the quality peace 6-1-1. Northern Ireland

The prime mediator, the U.S. used all the three approaches during the course toward reaching the GFA, with special focus on procedural strategy. The U.S. mediator Mitchell’s focus on procedural strategy created forum for joint discussion for all side that made the peace process inclusive. And Mitchell’s communicative approach demonstrated his patience and respect for all parties that gained him a confidence and trust by the parties. Based on this high reputation, the recommendation made by an international body chaired by Mitchell, and the British and Irish governments was accepted that led to the establishment of IICD that oversees, facilitates and monitors decommissioning. IICD is an exemplification of a good third-party guarantee. As a consequence of realization of both inclusivity and third-party guarantee, the incompatibility regarding political system has been fully resolved. Only Northern Ireland case, among other three cases, fits with the theoretical argument that the combined approach of the three mediation strategies would promote inclusivity and third-party guarantee thus achieving the quality peace, which is defined as the full implementation of a provision related to the incompatible issue. However, it has been pointed out that the “devolved coercive consociational power-sharing government” (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995; O’Leary and McGarry, 1993) has been suspended,
while the representative assembly system based on STV electoral system has failed to protect the rights and interests of all communities and build trust among them.

6-1-2. Mindanao
The key mediator, OIC used directive approach through economic sanctions or the issue of MNFL’s OIC membership, and also used communicative approach mainly focusing on relationship building. Based on its Islamic solidarity principle, OIC was committed to the peace process and thus its mediation process institutionalized OIC’s third party guarantee through financial support for post-war reconstruction. In parallel to OIC’s mediation effort, ASEAN applied procedural approach based on consultation and consensus. As a representative from ASEAN, Indonesia’s procedural strategy promoted confidence-building and relationship-building among parties. The high reputation as a key mediator, got Indonesia appointed as a key third party guarantor for interim ceasefire in Mindanao. However, the third-party support, either financial or logistical, was not sufficient for SPCPD and the Mindanao autonomous government to play their roles in the post-conflict development. The inclusivity was also not sufficient in Mindanao peace process. The multi-faceted mediation approach applying directive, communicative and procedural strategies by OIC and ASEAN could not help parties to overcome the negative impacts from the exclusive nature of its negotiation process. Especially, it was unfortunate that ASEAN’s procedural strategy appraised for its consultations and consensus focus was not influential enough to extend the civil society engagement in the mediation process. After all, the ASEAN style mediation based on consensus and consultation did not bring about enough inclusivity while OIC’s strong leverage was not enough to bring about sufficient international support or guarantee for the Mindanao’s autonomous governments to gain people’s confidence and secure the long-term peace. As a result of the plebiscite in 2001, only one additional province and one city voted for inclusion in the new expanded ARMM, and no further changes have not been made to the provincial boundaries since 2001 (Tuminez, 2007). It has been pointed out that the issue of representation and rights of Lumads and Christians in a Muslim-led autonomous regions has remained (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 1999). Although the decentralization provision has been fully implemented, the Mindanao case also did not demonstrate the positive relationship between the combined-application of mediation approach and high-quality peace through the mechanism of inclusion and third-part guarantee.
6-1-3. **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

All three mediation strategies were used; ICFY used diplomatic or facilitative approach whose ineffectiveness called for the needs for directive approach that was applied by the U.S. The U.S. used its leverage related to economic and arms embargo to get the parties to comply with the peace process and the proposal by the U.S. In order to maximize its leverage, the U.S. also used procedural strategy to make it easier for it to manipulate the process. Thanks to the strong leverage, military and financial power and interests of the U.S., the Dayton Accord ensures the good third-party guarantee, well-armed PKO mission that demonstrated a credible threat against the breach of the Agreement, and an UN-sanctioned institution, OHR, with strong authority over the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Accord. The U.S. enforcement, on the other hand, had a detrimental effect on inclusivity. Its exclusive negotiation process based on the U.S. leverage hampered consultation, review or approval by non-nationalists, the smaller communities, or women or civil society and thus produced an elite deal only among the three ethno-national elites. As a result of the mediation process, the incompatibility over Decentralization/Federalism and Territorial Power-sharing has been almost resolved, but the federal structure has not been stabilized due to the different levels of decentralization of power between the Federation and RS. This Bosnian War case may indicate that the combined application of all three mediation strategies did not necessarily ensure quality peace if any of the strategy was applied more heavily than other strategies; in Bosnian case, the power imbalance among parties and the consequent unfair demands from all sides made it impossible and inappropriate to apply communicative and procedural strategies. As a result, the mediation process was mainly focused on directive strategy. While the directive strategy has ensured good third-party guarantee, it hampered inclusivity. As a consequence, the lack of inclusivity hindered the full implementation of the provision related to the incompatibility, in spite of the strong third party backing. Also, the directive strategy designed and enforced an institutional set-up that has stimulated conflicts among the three ethnic groups by granting the Bosnian Serbs, an autonomous republic while pushing the Bosniaks and Croats into a complex federal arrangement. These intensified nationalistic interests preventing the three ethnic groups from achieving interethnic reconciliation and deeper mutual understanding (Kostić, 2009). As a consequence, the
complicated and cumbersome governmental structure was externally enforced, leaving the issues of political paralysis, economic stagnation in the BiH’s post-conflict path (Austermiller, 2006).

6-1-4. Niger
All the three mediation strategies were used; directive strategy used by Algeria and Libya to co-opt elitists, contain rebel groups’ violence and push the armed groups’ leaders to the peace agreement compliance through their patronage networks and the means of pressure; facilitative method was used also by Algeria and Libya for inter-community mediation; formulative approach was used by a mediation team of France, Algeria and Burkina Faso in a form of phased approach to tackle disarmament issues. However, mainly due to the self-interests, the main mediators Algeria and Libya, did not provide a good and fair third-party guarantee, and due to the coordination problem, the UN actors also could not provide effective guarantee. The self-interests of Algeria and Libya also hindered inclusivity in the peace process; their self-interests avoided long-term commitment and long-term vision, which are required for inclusive peace process. As a result, the success level of Nigerien peace mediation was intermediate in terms of the implementation status of “Decentralization/Federalism”. While the Nigerien case may have proved that without inclusivity and third-party guarantee, quality peace cannot be achieved, it defies the hypothesis linking the combined-mediation approach and quality peace; although the combined approach was used in Nigerien mediation process, both inclusivity and third-party guarantee were not materialized to resolve an incompatible issue. After all, the autonomy in the northern regions and the proportional participation of the Tuareg in the political, administrative, military and judiciary institutions has not been fully materialized. The Nigerien case demonstrates that there are contextual or cofounding factors beyond mediation strategies that may affect peace process such as the self-interest of mediators.

6-2. Between case comparison – Implications to the theory tested
The empirical findings on the four case studies gave modest support to the hypothesis that either the combination of directive and communicative-facilitative strategies or combination of directive and procedural strategies is likely to achieve quality peace. However, the limitations and the presence of potential alternative explanations would reveal the complex causal mechanism between mediation and quality peace that involves broader contextual factors surrounding peacemaking and peacebuilding. Still, the finding on the complexity prompted the
closer examination of the relative relationship among strategies within one mediation episode that affirms the effectiveness of the combined-application of mediation strategies if the application of these strategies in relation to each other within one mediation approach is adjusted based on a particular formula as will be explained in this chapter.

6-2-1. Implications for the hypothesis
The findings from the four cases did not provide a clear answer regarding the two hypotheses that the mediation approach that combines different strategies should be more likely to achieve quality peace. Contrary to the CWM data, the empirical findings did not show the variety in the independent variables, or mediation strategies among four cases, and thus, the comparison between cases with combined approach and cases with solo-application of strategy was not possible in this study. The empirical findings suggest that all four peace agreements were reached through the combined or sequenced application of all three strategies, with different results. While Niger and Bosnia case did not achieve full implementation of the provision on decentralization and territorial power-sharing, the Mindanao and Northern Ireland cases have resolved their incompatibilities through full implementation of provisions related to decentralization and electoral/political reform.

These findings did not clearly show the different effects that different mediation approach through different combination/sequence of strategies were expected to present over the quality peace. However, it may imply that the varying mode of strategy application explain the different outcomes. In other words, even in the case where all three strategies were used, each mediation strategy was given different level of weight in terms of their application during a mediation process. In Bosnian case, for instance, the directive strategy was the primary approach and the procedural approach was meant to complement the directive strategy; the effect of the U.S. leverage to drive parties to negotiation tables and agreements were the key factor for the reaching the Agreement. Without the U.S. power, the peace talks would have not even got started due to the stark power imbalance among parties and the consequent bloody violence. The procedural strategy was used to avoid impasse once the process got underway. Also, the communicative strategy used by ICFY was just a prelude for the U.S. directive strategy; it played the role of convincing the international community that forceful intervention was more needed for the Bosnia War than communicative strategy. In Niger case as well, the directive strategy
was the main approach used by the regional powers, Algeria and Libya that have the high stake in the conflict. While the two countries also used communicative strategy to facilitate peace talks and a mediation team of France, Algeria and Burkina Faso used formulative mediation to make substantive proposals, the basic approach of the key mediators in Niger was pressure and elitist co-optations that effectively halted the violence by rebel groups.

On the other hand, in the Mindanao case, although directive strategy was applied through the issues related to oil embargo and MNLF’s OIC membership, OIC’s prime approach was communicative and procedural, that in the end were highly appreciate by the parties. The consultation and consensus, and utilization of regional framework of “good offices” gained parties’ confidence and trust that paved the way toward the peace agreement. Also, Mitchell in Northern Ireland conflict focused on procedural strategy in order to avoid impasse during the talks and maintain the dialogue process. Furthermore, Mitchell’s communicative approach focused on relationship building won him trust and confidence among parties that was the key factor for the successful peace process. Of course, as the President Clinton’s appointed envoy, Mitchell could have used strong U.S. economic and political leverage, but these were just complementary tools for his other primary approaches, communicative and procedural strategies.

These findings show that Bosnia and Niger cases that applied directive strategies more heavily than other two strategies, have not achieved full implementation of peace provision related to their incompatibilities, while Northern Ireland and Mindanao case that used communicative and procedural strategies more heavily than directive strategies, have achieved full implementation of peace provisions related to their incompatibilities. This finding may imply that when all three strategies are applied, mediators should use communicative or procedural strategy as a prime approach while keeping the directive strategy as supplementary. It should be noted that these findings do not negate the hypothesis on the effects of combined application of mediation strategies, because all four cases have achieved quite good level of implementation status. Even in cases where communicative and procedural strategies were the prime approach (Mindanao and Northern Ireland), directive strategy played an important driving force in the mediation process. In Mindanao, OIC’s leverage over oil embargo or MNLF’s membership issue pushed the mediation process. In Norther Ireland, without the U.S. economic and political leverage behind Mitchell’s communicative and procedural approach should have had quite an impact on parties’ psychology.
To summarize, the close examination of the detailed application of the three mediation strategies within each case may imply that a combined-strategy mediation approach would be effective, but the approach should put more focus on communicative or procedural than directive strategy to achieve quality peace.

6-2-2. Implications for the causal mechanism
Regarding the causal mechanism linking the three mediation strategies and quality peace through the two intervening variables, the empirical findings presented mixed results. Contrary to the theoretical argument, the directive strategy did not necessarily ensure well-intentioned and effective third-party guarantee when there was a strong third-party national interest or a lack of coordination among external actors. The procedural and communicative strategy cannot always ensure inclusivity and third-party guarantee, when the concerned state has determined to negotiate with only a certain segment of rebel groups or civil society for strategic reasons.

More precisely, the Nigerien case demonstrates that the directive strategy could not secure strong third party guarantee due to the national interests of its main mediators, Algeria and Libya and the weak coordination among third parties. The national interests of Algeria and Libya also hindered inclusivity in spite of the application of the communicative and procedural mediation strategies. The two countries were reluctant to commit their countries to long-term Nigerien peace process, and thus did not have long-term vision necessary for the inclusivity to materialize in the peace process.

In the Bosnian case, the directive approach secured strong third-part guarantee, such as NATO and EUFOR, and the diplomatic or communicative approach by EU and UN led to the third-party guarantee over peace agreement implementation such as UN-sanctioned OHR, OSCE, the Provisional Election Commission, and PIC. However, inclusivity was hampered by the directive strategy of the U.S. to exclusively negotiate with the three regional leaders while excluding non-nationalists, the smaller communities, or women or civil society. This exclusive nature of the mediation could not be overcome by the communicative or procedural strategy, probably because the U.S. power was too strong to be challenged.

In case of Mindanao, the all-combined application of the three strategies could not secure sufficient third-party guarantee. The financial support from OIC member states for post-war reconstruction, and a third-party guarantee for interim ceasefire by Indonesia was not
sufficient enough for the autonomous government to fully function. This was due to the domestic challenges GRP was facing including lack of funding, the military challenges, and bureaucratic inertia. The delegation of powers over security forces as well as fiscal autonomy was blocked by the Philippine Congress. The delegation of power was supposed to be the foundation for third-party guarantee to function; in other words, the authority and financial resources accorded to the autonomous government were too little for the third-party guarantee such as capacity building training for security provision or financial support for public service provision, to achieve quality peace. Also, the procedural strategy based on the consultation and consensus and communicative strategy focusing on “good offices” within regional framework did not contribute to inclusive peace process. The government’s strategy to exclusively negotiated with MNLF had negated the consensus and consultations framework for civil society.

Only Northern Ireland case gave full support to this study’s theoretical argument regarding causal mechanism. Mitchell’s high credibility gained through his communicative and procedural approaches led to the establishment of the IICD that secured a good third-party guarantee. The U.S. political and economic leverage contributed to bringing all parties including the Catholic and Protestant paramilitaries to the negotiating table and also the procedural strategy secured the inclusivity through setting up the system for the inclusive election of parties to the all-party talks, and an informal group working with key stakeholders related to both unionists and republican. Furthermore, the case of Northern Ireland confirms the theoretical argument that directive strategy’s impact on inclusivity would depend on the type of leverage used; if directive strategy’s leverage is used only for a certain group, it may exclude a certain group from the negotiation process; if the leverage was used equally to all parties to encourage their engagement, the directive strategy would promote inclusivity. The Northern Ireland case presented the latter scenario where the U.S. leverage was used to include all parties involved.

To summarize, there exist confounding factors beyond mediation strategies that could negate the causal mechanism such as national interests of mediators or other third parties, formidable power by the world leader, the U.S., the domestic or internal political challenges including lack of funding, the military challenges, and bureaucratic inertia, and a determined stance or political decision by a regime for exclusive negotiation.
6-3. Broadening the analysis – alternative explanations and additional observations
As the analysis above demonstrates, the empirical findings provide a modest support to hypothesis but not clear implication to the causal mechanism. However, the empirical findings have directed our attention to a new perspective regarding the how combined application of mediation strategies could contribute to quality peace. More specifically, the communicative-facilitative or procedural strategy should be given more weight in its application when being applied in combination with directive strategy. The findings also point to a more nuanced way of looking at the complex mechanism under which mediation approaches function in relation to other contextual factors such as national interests of mediators or other third parties.

6-3-1. Alternative explanations
It should not be hard to imagine that mediation is not the only determinant factor for quality peace, as was discussed in the implication for causal mechanism. The context surrounding a conflict and its peace process are usually very complex, involving different actors, their power-relationship and international political and economic landscape that could influence the peace process. For instance, in the case of Northern Ireland, there were other contextual factors beyond mediation that contributed to the conclusion of GFA, that was “hurting stalemate” between the IRA and the British army (English 2003, 307–313; Arthur 1997; Ginty, Muldoon and Ferguson 2007, 6). While the republicans realized that they were unable to attain their goals at either the military or the political level (Todd and Ruane 2006), the British recognized that the IRA had become too powerful to handle (O’Brien 1995, 301). This gave incentive to all parties to negotiate rather than resort to violence making the moment ripe for the ceasefire to last until the end of a mutually beneficial negotiation process (Mahieu, 2007). Also, the U.S. mediation could not have yielded the same outcome as it did without the close political relationship and negotiations between the two Prime Ministers, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern before 1998. It is estimated that 80% of the principles and concepts embedded in GFA is derived from the official negotiations between the British and Irish governments over the previous fifteen years of GFA settlement (Corry, 2018). In case of Bosnian War, there were also other crucial factors beyond the U.S. mediation efforts that paved the way to the Dayton Accord. First, Europe and the US overcame the differences over the mediation approaches to the conflict. And the improved collaboration between the EU and the U.S. made UNPROFOR more conducive for Western intervention and a durable ceasefire.
6-3-2. *Additional observations*

The fact that all the four cases turned out to have applied all three strategies, contrary to CWM dataset, reveals the complex reality of combined-application of mediation strategies. The way three mediation strategies are applied in a mediation process varies and this variation should have led to the different outcomes in terms of quality peace. In case of Mindanao, OIC used all three strategies almost in parallel throughout the mediation process. In case of Northern Ireland, Mitchell also applied the three strategies almost in parallel through his mediation endeavors. In case of Bosnia, the ICFY used communicative strategy prior to the U.S. mediation that applied directive and procedural strategies in parallel. In case of Niger, while Algeria and Libya mainly utilized directive strategy along with communicative strategy, the mediation team of France, Algeria and Burkina Faso were using formulative mediation strategy.

In addition to the different timing and actors with which each mediation strategy is applied, the empirical findings present another aspect of combination strategy that may affect the mediation outcome for quality peace; the relative weight distributed among different strategies used in a mediation process. In other words, when more than two strategies are used in the same mediation process, it should usually be the case that a mediator use any one of the strategies more often or more heavily than other strategies. And this variation in the relative weight accorded to each strategy should prompt different mediation outcomes; even when two mediation processes apply the same combination of strategies, the results may differ if mediators in each case prioritize different strategies over other strategies.

And the empirical finding that mediation processes that prioritize communicative or procedural strategy are more likely to achieve quality peace (full implementation of peace provisions related to incompatibilities) than the mediation processes that prioritize directive strategy further imply the higher effectiveness of communicative and procedural strategies over directive strategy for achieving quality peace. And this argument may be confirmed by another empirical finding that almost all four cases point to the remaining problem of social reconciliation and development that have been lingering more than 10 years after the peace agreement settlement. Even in the most successful case of Northern Ireland, the GFA has been instable due to the lack of trust and refusal to build cross-political ties and the fragmentation of Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries into rival splinter groups. What the parties needed was to
overcome suspicion and build trust (Byrne, 2006). In case of Niger, the key stages of peacebuilding have not been completed such as national reconciliation process and disarmament with weak state’s post-peace commitments, such as from the Regional Council, the National Assembly or the Prime Minister (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2018). In case of Mindanao, the negative legacy from the exclusive mediation has persisted long after the peace agreement settlement due to the unresolved incompatibilities between RGP and Moro rebel groups other than MNLF such as MILF and Abu Sayyaf. The dialogues have not been facilitated with these Moro rebel groups to re-build relationship and with non-Muslims to take into their concerns into the post-conflict social reconstruction (Quimpo, 2000). In case of Bosnia, the society has been suffering from considerable social distress and division where school curriculum and the media reinforce grievances and fears among communities; rates of divorce and depression are high; and the rate of recruitment to jihadi organizations is the highest in the world (Harland, 2017). The lingering challenges these four cases have been facing are social reconciliation, relationship reconstruction, and equal and fair political, economic and social development in the post-conflict societies. Overcoming these challenges requires continued dialogue and coordination and cooperation among people in a society or community. Based on the theoretical argument presented in this Thesis, the foundation of dialogue, coordination and cooperation could be best nurtured through communicative or procedural mediation process. In this regard, for mediators aiming for securing long-term quality peace, communicative and procedural strategies should be applied at some point of a mediation process by making sure to give these strategies more weight than directive strategies in case applied in combination.

It should be noted, however, the primacy of the communicative and procedural strategies does not negate the power of directive strategy and the superiority of the mediation approach combining all three strategies to the solo-strategy approach. The directive strategy is essential to lay the foundation for the communicative and procedural strategies to function, and to resolve impasses the other two strategies may not be able to handle due to the weak or moderate power they possess or are supposed to demonstrate compared to the directive strategy. The potential best solution would be to use all three strategies with either communicative or procedural strategy as a prime strategy and directive strategy as a supplementary tool.
6-4. Limitations and biases of the study
As the broadened analysis demonstrated, the analysis of four cases that have been selected under the data constraint may have weakened the credibility of the empirical findings. It may have complicated the judgement about factors that have had real impact on peace process, mediation attempts or other contextual factors. Although the limitation regarding data is the main challenge in this study, other limitations related to theory will also be discussed, that concerns the gap between the theory and practice regarding the mediation approach and quality peace.

6-4-1. Limitations and biases in the research design
The main limitations related to the research design are the generalizability and representativeness of the case selection due to the data constraint. As is explained in the previous section, due to the availability and inconsistency among dataset regarding the data on mediation strategies, case selection inevitably had to prioritize the level of data availability and matching between PAM_ID and CWM, rather than the principle of most-similar case selection criteria. Furthermore, the way the final four cases were selected out of 9 cases is questionable; the selection was made based on the PAM_ID score regarding the overall score of peace agreement implementation; the cases with the 2 highest scores and case with the 2 lowest scores among the 9 cases were selected. Strictly speaking, they may not be the highest and lowest scores among 34 cases because some of the cases may be left out due to the data availability and data inconsistency, that may hit the score higher or lower scores than the finalist cases. If this is the case, it should not be fair to say that the finalist 4 cases exemplify the “success” or “failure” example on a relative term among the 34 CPAs. This may question the generalizability and representativeness of the 4 cases.

Also, due to the data constraint in the case selection process, not much attention could be paid to make selected cases as similar as possible. The data availability had more influence over the determination of the final 4 cases, more than the scientific assessment on the characteristics of each case to make them as similar as possible. However, it has to be argued that since PAM_ID covers only conflicts over territory and thus the selected cases can be automatically similar in this crucial point; all cases are conflicts over territory, not over government. Furthermore, another important aspect is consistent among the four cases; period of mediation process and thus the surrounding international landscape; the mediation periods of all four cases somehow overlapped between 1973-1996, and their peace agreements were concluded
around the same time, between 1995-1998. Therefore, it can be said that the selected four cases have satisfied the most-similar case selection criteria after all.

6-4-2. Empirical limitations
The empirical limitation is the incompatibility of data between CWM and PAM. While PAM’s data focus on a specific peace agreement, CWM dataset include all the mediation episodes without indicating which episode led to which specific agreement. This makes matching the two datasets complicated and cumbersome. There are usually multiple mediation attempts by the same mediator or by different mediators before parties reach a peace agreement, as recorded in CWM. However, PAM dataset does not contain information on the detailed mediation process leading up to each peace agreement. Therefore, when analyzing one peace agreement, it is a challenge to decide which mediation episodes from CWM to include in the analysis of a peace agreement from PAM_ID, whose mediation strategies may have impacted the agreement settlement and its implementation. The efforts were made to make the dataset matching as accurate and concise as possible by checking exact periods of each mediation episode (start and end date) and by confirming key mediators involved in each mediation episode recorded in CWM dataset; in other words, only the mediation episodes were included in the analysis whose periods and actors involved were reasonable enough to be considered as part of a peace process that led to a specific peace agreement. In spite of these efforts, however, it cannot be certain whether each peace agreement has been matched perfectly with relevant mediation episodes that were part of its mediation process. Some of the analysis on either of the four agreements may have included mediation episodes that were conducted that were unrelated to the intended peace agreement, or the analysis of some of the peace agreements may have not covered all the related episodes. That may have been the reason why there were discrepancy in the empirical finding and CWM data regarding the mediation strategies applied in each case; while the empirical findings suggest that the mediation process for all the four peace agreements applied all three strategies, CWM dataset indicates only the mediation process leading up to GFA used all three strategies while other applied only one or two of them; Bosnian case and Mindanao case both used only one strategy, procedural or communicative respectively, while Niger case applied communicative and procedural strategies. However, again, all the efforts were made to match each mediation episode with a relevant peace agreement to which it was meant to achieve, by
checking exact periods of each mediation episode and by confirming key mediators involved in each mediation episode recorded in CWM dataset.

6-4-3. **Theoretical limitation**

The theoretical limitation is related to the difficulty in grasping the whole mediation process, or mediation strategies applied within one process. As is explained, grasping the overall detailed picture of the mediation approach with the three main mediation strategies, reveals the complexity of the mediation attempts. It is blurred which mediation approach by whom has led to which agreement or accord. It is a difficult task with a risk of being arbitrary and thus requires a nuanced approach. Comparing a case with one mediator using multiple strategies with a case with multiple mediators using the different strategies may not reveal the true causal mechanism between a certain mediation approach and quality peace. This complexity of getting the information on the whole mediation process may be the reason there was a mismatch or inconsistency between empirical findings and the CWM data in this study. That result may also indicate the difficulty in grasping all the details or what was happening both in mediators’ actions, speeches and minds that, from time to time, can or have to be nuanced due to the secret nature of mediation, and indicate that even a very sophisticated dataset, such as CWM, that has been contrived by prominent researchers, may not hold of all the details.

Also, the definition of quality peace remains a limitation. The PAM_ID data, to which this study’s data analysis refers, is based on the peace agreement implementation score, ranging from 0-100. The scoring system is consistent and systematic, but the empirical findings revealed the gap between the PAM_ID evaluation and the post-conflict reality on the ground. Even the Norther Ireland with the highest score among the selected cases has faced some post-conflict obstacles such as social mistrust, separation and reconstruction. There seems a hidden gap between agreement implementation and true reconciliation and social and economic development. To counter this limitation, this study has tried to assess the quality peace by focusing attention specifically on key incompatibilities in each case. It can be said that narrowing down focus only on peace provisions related to incompatibilities or most difficult issues should have provided more accurate prospects for post-conflict peace, because looking at the overall implementation status of CPA by aggregating each specific provision, can obscure whether key incompatibilities have been addressed. It has been often the case that even if the overall score is
high, the very incompatible issue has not been addressed, whose consequence is the lingering grievances and mistrust among people in the post conflict society driving the resumption of wars. And this seems to have been the major reason for the post-war country that have achieved high overall peace agreement implementation score but experienced resumption of war, due to the unresolved root causes.

6-4-4. Policy implication
The theory limitation regarding the quality peace leads to one important implication for policy makers who aim to go beyond conflict-management to achieve conflict-resolution. The implementation of peace provisions indeed is crucial step toward post-conflict recovery, but it does not necessarily resolve mistrust, fear and commitment problem among former conflict parties and general public. One way to fill the gap between agreement implementation and quality peace is to re-calibrate the weight of application among the three mediation strategies. As this study’s theoretical argument and empirical findings indicate, all three strategies are necessary for achieving quality peace, but if the lack of trust or commitment problem tend to linger after the settlement which create the gap between the agreement implementation and the unstable situation on the ground, it may be good to practice a combined-application of directive and communicative or procedural strategy that put more weigh on communicative or procedural strategy over directive strategy throughout the mediation process. Once the momentum for negotiation is set by directive strategy, communicative strategy promotes dialogue or interaction for people to build the relationship and trust, and procedural strategy helps people to understand each other and jointly conceive a mutually beneficial solution. Throughout the process, directive strategy would supplement other two strategies in case of stalemate. In fact, the qualitative analysis of some of the four cases, that focused more on the communicative or procedural strategy than directive strategy, demonstrates the illuminative process where parties have re-established relationship or trust through dialogues, and in the end have achieved full implementation of incompatibility provisions. To summarize, mediators aiming for quality peace, should combine directive strategy either with either communicative or procedural strategy applying communicative or procedural strategy as a primary strategy over the directive strategy.
7. Conclusion

The effects of mediation on conflict resolution have long been a focus of quite a few scholars who have analyzed it from various angles including conflict nature, parties’ characteristics and relations, and international landscape. Despite the rich research done on the effects of each of the three main mediation strategies categorized by Bercovitch (2000), there has not been much study on the potential synergetic effects of the three mediation strategies. This Thesis has aimed at contributing to filling this research gap by analyzing and comparing the effects of the combined or sequenced applications of directive, facilitative and procedural mediation strategies for attaining quality peace.

The Thesis has specifically focused on examining the different effects of different mediation approach; combined-application of some or all of the three mediation strategies vs. solo-application of one mediation strategy, or comparison between mediation approaches applying different combinations of mediation strategies. Following the common consensus among previous research on key factors for achieving quality peace and on the necessity to resolve incompatibilities or root causes of conflict for full resolution of disputes, this Thesis bases hypothesized that three mediation strategies should be combined to achieve quality peace; more specifically, while directive strategy requires either of other two strategies, both communicative and procedural strategies also need to be combined with directive strategy respectively. The Thesis analyzed the four cases of peace agreements and their mediation processes, selected based on the overall peace agreement implementation scores and the availability of data regarding mediation strategies applied, using the method of structured, focused comparison in the most similar cases setting.

The empirics of this Thesis did not allow for the comparison of the effects of different mediation approaches such as between those applying combined approach and those using solo-application of a strategy and comparison between mediation approaches combining different mediation strategies. However, the empirical findings suggests that mediation processes focusing more on communicative or procedural strategy are more likely to achieve quality peace than the mediation processes putting more weight on directive strategy. Also, the empirical findings did not fully support the causal mechanism tested in this Thesis; all strategies do not necessarily secure inclusivity and third party guarantee as theoretically expected and also the complimentary effects among the three strategies have not necessarily materialized for securing inclusivity and
third-party guarantee. The empirical findings thus point to the impacts of other contextual factors beyond mediation strategies that may influence the outcome regarding quality peace such as national interests of mediators or other third parties, the global power of the U.S., and the domestic or internal political challenges including intransigent state leaders.

The contribution of this study to peace and conflict research field would be related to the evaluation or assessment of quality peace. Many scholars have approached the concept and tried to evaluate it from different angles, and peace agreement implementation is one of these indicators applied by some scholars to evaluate peace. However, although many scholars have indicated the importance of solving incompatibilities for achieving stable peace, the evaluation of peace agreements have tended to be holistic, as PAM _ID present overall implementation scores aggregating all provisions included in a peace accord. The overall score is, of course, essential to get the holistic view of the implementation progress of each peace agreement. However, it obscures the progress of each provision in it. As a majority of the failure cases of post-conflict peace process have demonstrated, unless a root cause of a war or its incompatibility is resolved, the society is highly likely to relapse into another war, even when the total or aggregated score for peace agreement implementation shows relatively good score. In this regard, this study goes a step further to focus its analysis focus only on a peace agreement provision related to incompatibilities of each case. Given the reality that donor funding and international engagement has been shrinking globally for post-conflict peace process, the targeted approach and support focusing on incompatibilities should be given more attention in the peace and conflict field both among scholars and practitioners.

Regarding the implications of my study, given the reality that implementation of peace agreement does not automatically lead to quality peace due to the unresolved incompatibility or failure of relationship or trust building among people, the recommendation of this Thesis is quite indicative that the combined application od al three strategies with more weight on communicative and procedural strategies that are more likely than directive strategy to help parties to talk to each other and re-build the trust and relationship. Regarding the implication for future research, the difficulty this study has faced in regard to the data availability and incompatibility between CWM and PAM, has shed some crucial lights on the future direction for studies on mediation strategies. It was revealed that before everything, that there has been not much dataset containing detailed information on mediation strategies. Even the dataset that has
tried to cover mediation information missed substantive amount of data. This indicates the difficulty to get the accurate and detailed information regarding mediation strategy that, by its nature of secrecy or complexity involved, tends to hinder systematic recording of the procedure. Since even the original dataset on mediation has limitation in its scope and quality, it becomes even more difficult and complicated to match that dataset with other dataset to study the impact of the mediation strategies, be it a dataset on peace agreement implementation (in the case of this study) or other dataset such as on democracy or economic development. The difficulty in the data analysis of this Thesis calls for the need for more refined dataset that comprehensively compiles data on mediation strategy that can be accurately traced or matched with its exact outcome. This process of developing such a detailed dataset would require a lot of time and dedication from researchers and cooperation from practitioners, but it would worth all the commitment considering the significant contribution of such a deliverable to revealing the detailed mediation process and its real effects on quality peace in relation to other contextual factors.
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