Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Inclusion of Gender Provisions

Isolde Tengbjer Jobarteh

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Supervisor: Elin Bjarnegård
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ABSTRACT

Are peace agreements more likely to include gender provisions if women participate in the peace negotiations? The international community, national governments and civil societies around the world have assumed that women's inclusion in peace negotiations result in higher quality peace agreements, where women's interests are better taken into consideration. To date, there is a lack of empirical underpinning of the assumption. This study uses a twofold research design, combining statistical and qualitative methods to examine the interrelation between women's descriptive and substantive representation in peace negotiations in the post-Cold War era. First, the statistical analysis suggests that peace agreements are more likely to include at least one gender provision referring to women's rights and security if women participate in the negotiation. At the same time, the agreements are not more likely to address a higher number of different areas for increased rights and security measures for women. Second, the qualitative analysis examining the mechanisms shows that there is no guarantee that women will push for gender provisions, but that their particular experiences and interests in conflict, and the expectations from others give them strong reasons to do so. Important factors for women to successfully push for gender provisions have to do both with their individual will and personal ability, and external factors relating to the presence of traditional gender norms and the power balance between men and women in the country of conflict.

Key words: Peace negotiation, peace agreement, UN, Security Council Resolution 1325, gender equality, women's participation, representation, female signatories, gender provisions, intra-state conflict.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	The African Union
BOCIDA	Bougainville Community Integrated Development Agency
CNR	National Reconciliation Commission
FBA	Folke Bernadotte Academy
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILOSTAT	International Labour Organization database
MARWOPNET	Mano River Women's Peace network
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
NOREF	Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution,
NWM	Nordic Women Mediators network
OAS	Organization of American States
UN	United Nations
UNSCR 1325	United Nations Security Resolution 1325
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
URNG	Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

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1. INTRODUCTION

The international community, national governments and civil societies around the world have in recent decades called for the increased inclusion of women in peace negotiations (USIP, 2018). Women's participation remains low despite the increased interest in their representation following the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in the year 2000. The resolution "stresses the importance of [women's] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security" (UNSCR 1325, 2000). Between 1990 and 2017 there was no more than 2 percent of female mediators, 8 percent of female negotiators and 5 percent of female witnesses and signatories in the major peace negotiations (UN Women and the Council in Foreign Relations, 2018). The substantive representation of women in peace agreements have remained low as well, when counting the number of agreements with references to women (Ellerby, 2016, p. 142).

Not only is the inclusion of women in peace negotiations argued to be a human right. Gender equality is increasingly used as a tool to achieve other ends (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2013). The quest for gender equality is also a quest for durable peace, since gender equal societies have shown to be more peaceful (e.g. Caprioli, 2005; Gizelis 2009, Hudson et al., 2012, Melander, 2005). Peace agreements are sometimes called "windows of opportunity" for women to demand change, and to achieve a higher level of gender equality (e.g. Anderson 2016, Arostegui 2013). There is a broad assumption that the participation of women in peace negotiations is crucial to the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements. Female participants are believed to promote provisions relating to gender equality leading to better peace agreement content, higher implementation rates, and longer lasting peace (Krause et al., 2018a). The former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed this expectation on the opening of the Security Council debate on "women, peace, and security" in 2009, saying that "women are likely to put gender issues on the agenda" (Ban Ki-Moon, 2009). However, the relationship between women's participation in peace negotiation and the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements have not been thoroughly tested statistically. There is a lack of evidence-based knowledge on the impact of women's participation in peace negotiations. As a result, peace negotiations are often designed based on untested hypotheses and normative assumptions (O'Reilly et al., 2015).

Aim

This study aims to address the research gap on the relationship between women's participation in peace negotiations and the quality of peace agreements from a gender perspective. It focuses on gender provisions that explicitly refer to women's rights and security. The study contributes with a statistical analysis of the effect of women's participation in peace negotiations, based on gender aggregated data from datasets recently completed. The results of the statistical analysis suggest a positive relationship between women's participation and the inclusion of at least one gender provision in peace agreements. At the same time, the results do not support that peace agreements refer to women's rights and security in a higher number of different areas when women participate. The mechanisms behind the statistical results are investigated through a complementary qualitative analysis. Together, the statistical and qualitative analysis contribute to a better understanding of the effects of women's participation in peace negotiations. This knowledge will hopefully contribute to more evidence-based commitments to increase the representation of women in peace negotiations.

Outline

The study proceeds as follows. The next chapter presents previous research on the role of women in achieving peace, and the effect of women's participation in peace negotiations on the quality of peace agreements. The chapter ends by presenting the research gap. In chapter 3, the theoretical framework and the concepts of women's substantive and descriptive representation will be explained. This will be followed by the twofold research design in chapter 4, where the statistical method and data collection carried out will first be described, followed by the qualitative method examining the mechanisms that can explain the statistical results. In chapter 5, the results of the statistical analysis will be presented, followed by the results of the qualitative analysis in chapter 6. The findings and limitations of the study will be discussed in chapter 7. This chapter also includes a brief reflection on how women's representation in peace negotiations is best studied. Finally, the study ends with concluding remarks and suggestions for future research in chapter 8.

2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

This chapter will give an account of previous research on the roles of women in conflict, as well as the effect of women as participants in peace negotiations on the quality of peace agreements. The chapter is concluded by an overview of the research gap within the research field.

2.1. The role of women in achieving peace

Many previous studies on women in conflict have focused on their roles as victims rather than as valuable actors for peace. Scholars have focused on women as the major victims of sexual war crimes (Cohen et al., 2013), victims of land mines (Peterson & Runyan, 2010, p. 171), displaced persons (Tickner, 2001, p. 50) and have described other situations where women are more vulnerable than men, for example as combatants in the military or in rebel groups characterized by a strong macho culture (Enloe, 2014; Moon, 1997).

Most studies on women working for peace focus on women in peace*building*, overlooking women's roles in peace*making* (Stone, 2014, p. 8). These are two different kinds of processes that includes two different populations of women. Women participating in peacebuilding activities focus on mobilization and activism at the grassroots level. These are local women who create women's civil society groups that are of great importance for the peacebuilding in a country. A larger group of women are potential peacebuilders since it refers to the everyday work and activism at the local level. Peacemaking on the other hand, has a narrower definition. Women in peacemaking take a more active role in the actual peace negotiations intended to end the violence. To be considered a participant in peace negotiations, it requires that the individual is a recognized leader of some kind, for example a political leader, a rebel leader or a leader from the civil society. This distinction is often overlooked in the literature on women in conflict, resulting in more general studies on women working for peace. This study focus on women in peace negotiations, a neglected field within the literature on women and peace (Stone, 2014).

Following a number of global and regional declarations calling for women's inclusion in peace negotiations, the research field on gender and peace have expanded in the recent decade (Aggestam & Svensson, 2018). This research is motivated by a rights-based argument as well as a results-based argument. The call for more women in peace building and peace negotiations is often motivated by the understanding that women and men have an equal right to participate in all stages and levels in the pursuit of peace. UN Women (2018) states that "women's full and equal participation at all levels of society is a fundamental human right". Moreover, the achievement of gender equal societies through the inclusion of women in peace negotiations is

not solely described as an end goal, but also as a way to achieve other goals. Equal societies have shown to be peaceful societies. Previous research has found that countries with a higher level of gender equality are more likely to be peaceful (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011; Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli, 2005; Gizelis 2009; Hudson et al. 2012; Melander 2005; Regan & Paskeviciute, 2003; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). Lately, scholars have also found a positive relationship between women's participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace (see Krause et al., 2018a and Stone, 2014).

Despite some advancement, the body of literature on women in peace negotiations remains limited. Previous studies have mostly been case studies, lacking an overall look at the available peace agreements that women have contributed to. They have focused on how to best include women rather than analyzing their effect on peace agreement provisions (Ellerby, 2013, p. 439). They have also focused on certain roles of women in peace negotiations more than other. Scholars have divided women's participation into four different roles: signatory, negotiator, mediator or witness (e.g. Stone, 2014; UN Women, 2012; UN Women and the Council in Foreign Relations, 2018). The literature on women's participation in peace negotiations have stressed mediation as the way to achieve women's inclusion (Aggestam & Svensson, 2018, p. 149). These studies aim at explaining the role of female mediators and where women mediate (Aggestam & Svensson, 2018; O'Reilly & Ó Súilleabháin, 2013), male and female mediators' perception of their work (Nelson et al., 2010; Picard, 2002), how male and female mediators are perceived by the counterparts (Stuhlmacher et al., 2008), and the differences in mediation style between women and men (Hermann et al. 2003; Wall & Dewhurst, 1991). Less attention have been dedicated to the small number of women signatories specifically, which might seem surprising given the signatories' central position in peace negotiations. Krause et al., (2018a) shift the focus towards female signatories representing the parties, and this study will further examine their role in peace negotiations.

2.2. Women's participation and the quality of peace agreements

Despite the wide-held assumption that the inclusion of women in peace negotiations would lead to higher quality peace agreements with a stronger focus on gender issues, few studies have actually tested this relationship. Earlier studies on actual peace agreements, whether they include gender provisions, and if women may influence the content of peace agreements are limited (Ellerby, 2013, p. 436). A reason for this has possibly been the lack of gender-disaggregated data (O'reilly et al., 2015). The trend of "counting women" in peace negotiations rather than investigating their actual influence over the agenda have recently started to shift

(Paffenholz; 2018). Paffenholz is one of the scholars that have called for this change. In her article, she describes different modalities of women's inclusion, and lists crucial factors for their ability to influence the agenda. Whereas some scholars claim that peace agreements are more likely to include the concerns of women if they participate in the negotiation, others either claim that the obstacles to women's influence are still too many, or that women do not necessarily bring other issues to the negotiation table than men. Previous research present mixed results, and the concepts of "women's participation" and so-called "women's issues" is defined slightly differently from one study to another, which makes it even more difficult to get an overview of the results. Some scholars focus on context-bound "women's issues" that may refer to the safety of the family, food, shelter, water, health and education etcetera, while other scholars have tried to find universal measures of "women's issues" referring specifically to gender equality, women, and women's rights and security, as will be seen in this chapter.

The few studies that have sought to analyze the relationship between women's participation in peace negotiations and the quality of provisions in peace agreements are often based on case studies (Ellerby, 2013, p. 438). Aggestam and Svensson (2018), analyze the effect of female mediators on the inclusion of gender provisions referring to women's rights and security in peace agreements in seven peace negotiations with clearly spelled out commitments to women's representation. The authors conclude that the inclusion of gender provisions are more likely in cases where women have exercised a strong influence over the negotiation process. Nakaya (2003) comes to a similar conclusion, finding that women's participation at the negotiation table in the two peace processes of Guatemala and Somalia in the 90s resulted in expressed commitment towards gender equality in the peace agreements or post-war constitutions. The implementation of these expressed commitments on the other hand seemed to be a more complicated matter. O'Reily et al. (2015) present a similar effect of women's participation, drawing on the examples of Burundi and Guatemala. In these processes, women's groups and female participants at the negotiation table successfully advocated for issues perceived as "women's issues". The authors conclude that women's participation had a positive effect on the peace agreement text. In line with these findings, O'Reily (2015) conclude that the inclusion of female participants results in more holistic peace agreements. However, O'Reily et al. (2015) underline that the participation of women's organizations in peace agreements is no guarantee for higher quality peace agreements. Even if the women's rights activist Luz Méndez, the sole woman at the negotiation table in Guatemala, could voice the concerns of local women's groups, it does not necessarily mean that all individual women will voice concerns other than the concerns voiced by men in the peace negotiations. As an example,

the authors mention the Indonesian Aceh conflict, where the sole woman participant Shaida Marhaban did not have the same effect on the peace agreement text. They conclude that women's organizations might be more likely to push for gender provisions than individual women in general.

Previous research on gender provisions in peace agreements have often been centered on UNSCR 1325 and the influence of the international community. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 is by some scholars believed to have a positive effect both on the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and on the quality of peace agreements. The resolution, adopted in 2000, expresses a strong commitment to increasing the number of women in peace negotiations and the adoption of a gender perspective in peace agreements. Several researchers have tried to conceptualize the resolution. In her study for UN Women, Bell (2015) examines what the "gender perspective in peace agreements" described in UNSCR 1325 really means. She argues that there is a need for differentiated provisions for women in peace agreements because of women's experiences of conflict which differs from the experiences of men. Bell compares the number of provisions referring to "women" or "gender" in peace agreements before and after the adoption of the resolution, finding that a larger percentage of agreements with such references were signed after the UNSCR 1325. In addition, Bell finds that agreements where the UN had a role as party or as third party more often refer to women and gender. Thus, she concludes that the international community influences the gender perspective in peace agreements. The methodology and results of this study closely follow the study of Bell & O'Rourke (2010).

Ellerby (2013) conceptualizes UNSCR 1325 into four specific ways for promotion of women's representation: representation (decision making), incorporation (gender balance), protection (safety and equality) and recognition (gender perspective). These four dimensions constitute the concept that she calls "(en)gendered security", which she uses to examine how women's security is addressed in peace agreements. Contrary to Bell who examines whether there is a reference to women and gender or not, Ellerby investigates where and how women are included in the peace process and *how many* of the four different dimensions that the agreements include. The more dimensions included, the better do the peace agreements live up to the commitments expressed by UNSCR 1325, and the higher quality of "(en)gendered security". She finds that peace agreements after 2005 refer to a higher number of different areas for women's (en)gendered security. Ellerby concludes that a seat at the table is not enough for (en)gendered security to be included in peace agreements. Like Bell, Ellerby believes that third parties like e.g. the AU, IGAD and UN have an influence over the inclusion of provisions relating to women. According to Ellerby, there is a need for demanding third parties, which can

support and mobilize women's groups. Nevertheless, women's formal access to the negotiation remains of importance for higher quality peace agreements (Ellerby, 2016).

As previously mentioned, scholars have been interested in the relationship between women's participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace. Researchers like Nilsson (2012), Stone (2014) and Krause et al. (2018a) have statistically examined this relationship. In her study, Nilsson focuses on the impact of the inclusion of civil society actors such as religious groups, human rights groups and women's organizations in peace negotiations, finding that peace is more likely to prevail when these actors are included in the process. Stone got mixed results when analyzing women's participation in peace negotiations in the roles of negotiator, mediator, witness and signatory. Krause et al. on the other hand, found a statistically significant positive relationship between women's direct participation and the durability of peace when focusing on local women's participation as signatories. Complementing with qualitative methods, Krause et al. examine whether this relationship can be explained by higher quality peace agreements as a result of the female signatories' participation. They conclude that the mechanism explaining the relationship is the link between female signatories and women civil society groups. The authors argue that women's civil society groups and female signatories have been crucial for the inclusion of provisions addressing women and gender inequality in peace agreements. Together, the female signatories and women's groups can successfully push for the inclusion of gender provisions. Ultimately, this link between women's groups and female signatories increases the chances of the implementation of the agreement, and the durability of peace. However, the relationship between female signatories and the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements was not statistically tested. This study aims to analyze this correlation further.

2.3. Research gap

Going through the body of literature on women in peace processes, it becomes clear that the effect of women's participation in peace negotiations has not been thoroughly studied. Previous research has not sufficiently analyzed women's roles in peace negotiations. Women are often depicted as everyday peacebuilders rather than peace negotiators (Stone, 2014), especially when it comes to local women. Few scholars have studied the content of actual peace agreements, even though they have shown to be crucial for the future of a conflict-torn country (Ellerby, 2013). There is a wide-held assumption that women's participation in peace negotiation has a positive effect on the inclusion of provisions referring to women and gender equality in peace agreements, both among scholars and the international community. However,

these assumptions are not evidence-based. Most previous studies have been case studies, and there is a lack of comprehensive large-N studies on women's participation and its effect on gender provisions in peace agreements. Scholars have focused on counting the number of women in peace processes, rather than examining their actual influence. As pointed out by Aggestam & Svensson (2018), there is a need for advanced knowledge about the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation in peace negotiations. Are women's specific issues of interest better taken into account when they have the possibility to participate in the negotiations? This study aims to address this research gap on the interrelation between women's participation and the inclusion of gender provisions.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: WHO SPEAKS FOR WOMEN?

This chapter describes the theoretical framework of the study. The concepts of women's substantial and descriptive participation are explained in more detail, and the hypotheses are presented.

Why should the inclusion of female participants matter for the inclusions of gender provisions in peace agreements? The international community, national governments, civil societies around the world as well as the body of literature on women and peace have been quick to jump to conclusions about the effects of women's inclusion in peace negotiations without in-depth evidence-based research on the subject. Essentially, this is a question about women's representation. Who can represent women? Do women have special interests separate from those of men? And if so, do women better represent the concerns of women? These are questions that have been discussed and theorized within the literature on political representation. This section aims to present this theory, and to explain why this theory may be usefully applied to the study on women in peace negotiations. Women's representation is believed to be multidimensional, but most researchers focus on the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation (Celis et al., 2008)**.** Therefore, this section will focus on these two dimensions of women's representation.

The starting point for the feminist approach to political representation theory is said to be Hanna Pitkin's seminal work from 1967, *The Concept of Representation* (Celis et al., 2008). In her book, Pitkin suggests that there is a crucial distinction between the descriptive and substantive representation of women. She refers to descriptive representation as "standing for" representation, focusing on *who* the representatives are. This kind of representation builds on the corresponding characteristics between the representatives and the represented. Pitkin urges that not too much focus should be put on the composition of the political representatives. She

argues that representatives can never be held accountable for who they are, but only for what they do. What really matters is therefore how the representatives act. To Pitkin, the true form of representation is substantive representation to which she refers as "acting for" representation. Some scholars, agreeing with Pitkin that the descriptive representation of women can be separated from their substantive representation, have used Margret Thatcher as an argument against the idea that women better represent women (Carroll, 2001). They argue that the "iron lady" did not have a gender-related impact, but acted just like any man. This shows, according to some, that women are not a homogeneous group and cannot be assumed to act in a specific way. It should be underlined thought, that theorists that do not think that women would act anyway different from men may still advocate increased participation for the reason of justice (Catalano, 2009).

However, not all scholars within the field of political representation agree that substantive representation is the only representation that really matters. Theorists have argued that the two are closely connected (e.g. Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Young, 2000). Even if women are not a homogeneous group, the core concept is that descriptive representation of women matters since women prioritize different issues than men. The reason for this is their particular life-experiences in the home, at the workplace and in the public sphere that they share (Lovenduski & Norris, 2004). Exactly what constitutes "women's issues" has been widely discussed within the field of political representation, but scholars have not agreed on any universal definition of what they constitute. While acknowledging the difficulty in defining "women's issues" that all women could agree on, Phillips (1995, p. 67-68) argue that some interests are clearly gendered such as child-bearing, the division of paid and unpaid labor, the exclusion from political and economic power, domestic violence and sexual harassments. Even if there is no guarantee that women will act for women, they share certain experiences and would therefore more likely better represent women's specific interests than men, according to this theory. Thus, if women are to be politically represented, it is of significance that women participate in the decision-making so that these experiences and views are taken into consideration. Some scholars therefore draw the conclusion that if more women are directly included in the political process, it would have an effect on the political outcome.

Theories about the substantive and descriptive representation of women have focused almost exclusively on women in national parliaments (Celis et al., 2008). Within this field, scholars have found that the descriptive representation of women affects the policy outcome. Women act differently from men addressing women's concerns in debates, proposing new bills, setting the legislative agenda, and in other ways addressing women's concerns (Bratton & Ray,

2002; Childs, 2002). At the same time, the mere inclusion of a greater number of women does not always result in policy outcomes that better represent their concerns because of constraints related to e.g. party affiliation, institutional norms and other circumstances (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Childs 2002) . Some scholars argue that what really matter is rather the presence of ”critical actors” that initiate policy proposals and push for women’s interests, and they do not necessarily have to be women (Childs & Krook, 2006; Childs & Withey, 2005). This means that individual men could be crucial for pushing women’s issues, according to this theory.

Women’s descriptive and substantive representation has not been as theorized when it comes to the study of women in peace negotiations. It can be argued that the peace negotiation, which is an even more male-dominated field, is an equally interesting subject for studies on women’s representation. In conflict too, women are marginalized in the negotiations, as stated by previous research. Moreover, scholars agree that the experiences of women in conflicts differ from the experiences of men, suggesting that women might bring other issues to the negotiation table. Naturally, some important things differ when it comes to the ability and constraints to women’s participation and influence in peace negotiations. Female participants are not democratically elected by the electorate to participate in peace negotiations the way that female MPs represent their voters and their political party. Whereas female MPs have certain considerations to take into account, such as following the party line or the chance of being reelected, women in peace negotiations might have other constraints to take into account. The question remains to be answered whether the same results concerning the effect of women’s participation can be expected when applying the theory on women in peace negotiations. Three hypotheses can be formulated based on political representation theory.

Following the logic of Pitkin, the research field on women in peace negotiations might have put too much emphasis on the relationship between women’s participation and the content of peace agreements. Maybe it is more about what the representatives do, and less about who they are? If descriptive and substantive representation can be separated as suggested by some scholars, women would not be more expected to act for issues primarily affecting women, than other actors. Thus, peace negotiations with all men participants could be just as successful to include gender provisions in peace agreements. The constellation of the participants in peace negotiations would not be crucial for the inclusion of gender provisions. Based on this theory, a first hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

H0: *Women's participation in peace negotiations have no impact on the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements.*

However, theorists arguing that there is a strong link between the descriptive and the substantive representation of women would argue that female participants are indeed more likely to promote the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements than men. Women have different experiences of conflict and therefore also different interests than men, which would have significant effect on the issues that they bring to the negotiation table. Women would push for issues that would ameliorate their situation, issues that might have gone unnoticed by men. Following this logic, the direct participation of women in peace negotiations would be expected to have an effect on the inclusion of gender provisions. A second hypothesis, which goes strictly against the first, can be articulated as follows:

H1: If women directly participate in peace negotiations, the agreements are more likely to contain at least one gender provision.

Since peace agreements are supposed to be encompassing roadmaps to post-conflict societies, and sometimes constitutes the embryo of a new constitution, a series of different issues could be brought up in a single peace agreement. This makes the content of a peace agreement a good indicator of the represented participants' commitments to women's rights and security. Logically, addressing only one area for increased rights and security for women shows less commitment than including a number of different categories of gender provisions. When analyzing the commitment to these issues, previous research has been interested in measuring not only if peace agreements represent women, but *how well* they represent women. Peace agreements with references to women in a higher number of areas are seen as having a higher quality from a gender perspective. This idea is expressed by UNSCR 1325 stating that women should be represented in all stages and areas of peace processes and peace agreements. For this reason, it is important to also test if there is a difference in the *number of different* categories of gender provisions included in peace agreements when analyzing the effect of women's participation in peace negotiations. How well do the peace agreements address different areas for increased security measures and rights for women when women participate in the peace negotiation? The hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

H2: *If women directly participate in peace negotiations, the agreements are more likely to contain a greater number of different categories of gender provisions.*

The relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation is tested using a twofold research design, which will be described in the next chapter.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN: A TWOFOLD APPROACH

This section presents the methodological choices of the study which consists of two parts: a statistical analysis examining the relationship between the participation of women and the inclusion of gender provisions, followed by a complementing qualitative analysis focusing on the mechanisms explaining the correlation found in the statistical analysis.

4.1. Statistical method

The methodological choices of the statistical analysis are presented in this section.

4.1.1. Data

The data in this study is based mainly on data from three datasets including the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) dataset on peace agreements, PA-X Peace Agreement Database and the sub-dataset PA-X Gender Peace Agreements Database.

The unit of analysis is the peace agreement. A peace agreement is a result of peace negotiations between the conflicting parties. A high percentage of the conflicts that have ended in the post-Cold War era have done so via peace agreements (Bell, 2006). The peace agreement functions as a kind of constitution for the transnational period or longer, making the content of the peace agreement crucial for whose interests that gets to be represented in the post-conflict era of a country. Not only does the content of the peace agreement set the standard for the effort and funds of international interveners, it has an effect on domestic political and legal institutions (Bell, 2015, p.5). Agreements are frequently referred to as "windows of opportunity", where the power balance between women and men can be reshaped (Aggestam & Svensson, 2018; Ellerby, 2013; Hughes, 2009). For these reasons, the content of the peace agreement is not only a good indication of women's substantive representation in peace negotiations, but it also reveals the commitments to women's future representation in port-conflict societies.

In this study, focus will be on peace agreements following intra-state conflicts. The definition of a peace agreement will be based on the definition by the UCDP. The UCDP is a database on organized violence and civil war widely used by researchers within the field of

peace and conflict around the world (Öberg, 2018). The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset covers "full", "partial" and "process" agreements between the years 1975-2011 that have been signed by two or more opposing primary warring parties (Högbladh, 2011). Many peace negotiatins leading up to a final agreement include several process and partial agreements. Previous research has underlined the necessity to collapse the extensive amount of negotiations leading to some kind of agreement into a few relevant peace agreement negotiations (Ellerby, 2013; Krause et al. 2018a). In this study, the procedure to collapse the many peace agreement negotiations from the UCDP into a smaller number of peace agreement negotiations follows the method of Krause et al., where "process agreements" are not included. Process agreements often solely regulate the negotiations without directly affecting the actual content of partial and comprehensive peace agreements. Furthermore, "partial peace agreements" in a peace negotiation leading up to a final agreement were censored, as performed by Krause et al. These agreements can be understood as being part of the same process, leading to the final decision on what provisions to include. Moreover, the dataset of Krause et al. contained valuable data for the independent variable on female signatories, together with some relevant control variables for this study which will be further discussed later on in this chapter. These variables were gathered from the authors' dataset which is publicly accessible online (see Krause et al. (2018b) in the list of references).

Yet, the cases of this study do not fully correspond with the cases presented in the study by Krause et al. (2018a). Some of the peace agreements drawn from the UCDP database, using the authors' method of collapsing peace negotiations as described above, were dropped as the data was merged with the two PA-X datasets. The full PA-X Peace Agreements Database and sub-set was launched in February 2018 and contains data on peace agreements between 1990 and 2016, with detailed coding of the provisions included in the agreements. The PA-X Gender Peace Agreement dataset is a sub-dataset of the PA-X Peace Agreement Dataset, and provides data specifically on gender provisions. All peace agreements included in this study have been matched between the PA-X datasets and the UCDP after careful scrutiny of the actual peace agreement documents. This was a necessity since some of the agreements had different names and/or dates in the different datasets. In some cases, the agreements had been translated to English in a slightly different manner, but the content of the agreements were the same and could therefore be coded as the same observation. Some documents also differed in length, where one database would include pages on e.g. appendix while another dataset would not. All variables relating to the provisions included in the peace agreements were coded from the PA-X Gender Peace Agreement dataset. The reason that some of the agreements were dropped is

that the UCDP and the two PA-X databases have different criteria for what constitutes a peace agreement. Not all peace agreements from the UCDP database were included in the PA-X databases. For this reason, some accords were dropped because they were not publicly accessible, which is a requirement for inclusion of a peace agreement in the PA-X datasets (Bell, 2017).[1] One accord was also dropped since the UCDP and the PA-X databases did not refer to the same document.[2] None of the agreements coded as signed by women were dropped as a result of a mismatch between the datasets. In the case of Mexico, the San Andrés Accords were recoded as one agreement in the PA-X datasets to match the UCDP dataset. The San Andrés observation was coded as containing a certain gender provision if any of the five San Andrés agreements in the PA-X dataset were coded this way. The full list of agreements included in the dataset of this study can be found in the case list in the appendix.

When having excluded agreements that are not the result of intra-state conflicts, the peace process agreements, the partial agreement followed by a final agreement, and agreements from the UCDP that was not included in the PA-X dataset, the dataset of this study includes 68 agreements between 1990 and 2011. Six of these agreements, divided in peace negotiations in six different countries, were signed by female signatories. Krause et al. (2018a) briefly describe who the female signatories represented in these peace negotiations. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, women participated as representatives of the conflicting parties, political parties and civil society groups. In El Salvador, they represented the rebel group FMLN. In Guatemala, Teresa Bolaños de Zarco represented the government-formed National Reconciliation Commission (CNR), and Luz Mendez representing the rebel group URNG. In Liberia, they represented the Mano River Women's Peace network (MARWOPNET) which consisted of women from different parts of society. In Papua New Guinea, the founder of the humanitarian network BOCIDA signed the agreement. Last, female signatories in the United Kingdom/Northern Ireland represented the political party Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and the government.

[1] Jalalabad agreement 1993, Mahipar Agreement 1996, El Geneina agreement 1992, Tripoli 1 agreement 1993, Bangui-2 agreement 1994, Donya agreement 1998, Reconciliation agreement 1999, Yebibou agreement 2005, Tripoli accord 2006, and Paris Accord 1993 were dropped since they were not included in the PA-X dataset.
[2] Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993.

Table 1 - Final agreements of peace processes with female signatories

FEMALE SIGNATORIES
Democratic Republic of Congo (2003)
El Salvador (1992)
Guatemala (1996)
Liberia (2003)
Papua New Guinea (2001)
United Kingdom/Northern Ireland (1998)

The time period, as well as the choice to include but intra-state conflicts, is guided by the availability of data in the different datasets as well as by earlier research (Bell, 2015; Ellerby, 2013; Krause et al. 2018a; Nilsson, 2012; Stone, 2014). The end of the Cold War was the beginning of a new era of negotiating practice focusing on values such as democracy, free-markets and the protection of human rights (Krause et al., 2018a). During the same period, the international machinery took a greater role in peace processes and post-conflict peace building (Bell, 2015). For these reasons, the year 1990 is a good starting point for this study.

4.1.2 Method

The three hypotheses are examined using t-tests followed by OLS regressions. Logistic regressions will not be used since all six agreements coded as signed by one or more women also include at least one gender provision. It would not be possible to use a logistic regression to analyze the relationship between female signatories and gender provision. This is due to the prerequisite of a variation in the outcome for this statistical analysis. The dependent variable, which in this study is *female signatory*, would perfectly predict success for one or more gender provisions, and would be omitted from the analysis. Thus, the analysis is carried out through t-tests and OLS regressions. Additionally, a negative binomial regression is used as a robustness test for the statistical analysis examining the relationship between female signatories and the number of different categories of gender provisions.

4.1.3. Dependent variable

The definition of so called "women's issues" has been an ongoing debate since Pitkin's seminal work in the 60s. In this study they constitute the set of different categories of gender provisions included in the PA-X Gender database, that all relate to women's rights and security. These categories of gender provisions are a good approximation of issues directly relating to the well-being of women in post-conflict societies around the world. This study will not be able to take into consideration "context-bound" women's issues, but will focus on gender provisions that explicitly refer to the rights and security of women.

In order to statistically test the first two hypothesis regarding the relationship between female signatories and at least one gender provision, the dependent variable *gender provisions* is coded as a dummy variable taking the value 0 if there is no gender provision, and 1 if there is at least one gender provision in a peace agreement. For the third hypothesis, testing the relationship between female signatories and the inclusion of *a greater number* of different categories of gender provisions, the dependent variable *gender provisions* will be coded 0-5 depending on how many different areas that the gender provisions address. Scholars have operationalized UNSCR 1325 seeking to determine how well peace agreements represents women's concerns – the more areas included the better. Rather than trying to fit peace agreements into a conceptualization of the UNSCR 1325, this study uses the data provided by the PA-X Gender database on the gender provisions included in the peace agreements.[3] The PA-X Gender dataset includes ten different categories of gender provisions.[4] These have been divided into five groups in this study, based on the area that they refer to. Table 2 consists of an overview of the five different areas "representation", "protection", "development", "international law & transnational justice" and "institutions", as well as a short description of the subcategories from the PA-X Gender database that are included in each category. For a full description of these subcategories, see the PA-X Gender dataset codebook (Bell, 2017).

[3] Note that peace agreements will not be coded as including the gender provision "implementation" if they are coded this way in the PA-X Gender dataset because they are signed by women [WggImplSign], since this is the independent variable of this study.

[4] Only the peace agreement of The Democratic Republic of Congo (2003) had gender provisions coded as the eleventh category "other" in the PA-X Gender database. The provision on increased marriageable age, and the provision of sexual harassment were recoded as "protection". The provision on the creation of a high media authority to broadcast with dignity of women was coded as "institution".

Table 2 - Overview of the 5 categories of gender provisions, and the subcategories as coded by the PA-X Gender Peace Agreement Database.

CATEGORIES OF GENDER PROVISONS	
REPRESENTATION	**Participation** *The mention of gender quotas, effective participation, citizenship or any other mention of women's participation.* **Implementation** *Implicates the mention of women's role and consideration in implementation of the agreement.*
PROTECTION	**Equality** *The mention of general political or legal equality, or social equality, property rights, health, financial or worker´s right with reference to women, or any other mention of gender equality.* **Particular groups of women** *The mention of indigenous/nomadic women, refugee/displaced women, pregnancy/maternity or any other mention of particular groups of women.* **Violence against women** *The mention of sexual violence, gender-based violence, protection of women or any other reference to women and violence.*
DEVELOPMENT	**Development** *The mention of development concerning women, rehabilitation and reconstruction, education, health, reproductive rights or any other mention concerning women and development.*
INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE	**International law** *The mention of international human rights laws, international humanitarian law, international law or international human rights standards with references to women, references to UNSCR 1325 or any other reference to women and international law.* **Transitional justice** *The mention of past focused mechanism or transitional justice mechanism, international criminal court reference, prison, prisoners or prisoners release or any other reference to women and transitional justice.*
INSTITUTIONS	**Institutional reform** *The mention of constitution-making/reform, emergency/criminal law/corruption reform, judiciary/judiciary reform, police or public administration with reference to women, or any other mention of women and institutional reform.* **New institutions** *The mention of institutions for women, women's infrastructure, women's role in reconciliation and peace or any other mention of women and institutions.*

4.1.4. Independent variable

The independent variable is *female signatories* of peace agreements. Earlier research on women's participation in peace negotiations have identified four different roles of female participation: signatories, witnesses, mediators or negotiators (Stone, 2014; UN Women, 2012). However, this study focuses solely on local women representing the government, rebel groups or the civil society, and excludes third-party representatives. This choice of independent variable builds on the assumption that women signatories take active part in official as well as unofficial negotiations, and that they have an actual influence over the provisions included in a peace agreement (Krause, 2018a, p. 987). Since the UCDP do not code the gender of the signatories, the data on female signatories is collected from the dataset of Krause et al. who have crossed-checked the names of signatories in the UCDP with the UN Peace maker database (Krause et al., 2018a, p. 994). Krause et al. identified thirteen agreements as signed by women following six peace negotiations in six different countries: the DR Congo (2003), El Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1996) Liberia (2003), Papua New Guinea (2001), and the UK/Northern Ireland (1998). Seven of these agreements were partial agreements that were followed by a durable full agreement and were therefore censored. Thus, six partial or full agreements signed by women are included in this dataset. If a woman signed any of the censored partial agreements but not the final agreement, Krause et al. still coded the full peace agreement as signed by a woman. This means that no important information about women's direct participation in a peace negotiation was lost. Furthermore, this way of coding eliminates the risk of overestimating the effect of women's participation.

4.1.5. Control variables

Previous research on gender provisions in peace agreements is modest. However, the few studies that do exist on gender provisions in peace agreements can provide some guidance on what control variables that are relevant for this statistical analysis. The first two control variables control for influence by the UN. First, the UNSCR 1325 has shown to have an impact on the number of gender provisions in peace agreements. In the study by Bell (2015) *UNSCR 1325* is controlled for by coding whether an agreement was signed before or after 31 October 2000, which is the date the resolution was adopted. However, this study will use time fixed effects for year, which is a more effective way to control both for the effect of the resolution, and for other effects that are the result of a peace agreements being signed a specific year.

Second, previous research has further suggested that *UN as party or as third party* to peace agreements would increase the likeliness of a gender perspective (Bell, 2015). Using the

information in the PA-X database, as done by Bell in her study, this variable was coded 0 if the UN was not a party nor a third party in the peace agreements, and 1 if it was. In the case of missing information about third parties in the PA-X database, the UCDP was used to fill the gaps. As pointed out by earlier research, it is not always clear who signed or acted as third party in a peace agreement (Bell, 2015). Because of this, only peace agreements where it was clearly stated who the third party or parties were are included.

Moreover, it is important to control for variables that refer to the level of gender equality in the country of the conflict. This is to make sure that it is not women's influence in the society rather than their influence in peace negotiations specifically that matters. The *female labor force* as a percentage of the total labor force is therefore controlled for. The data is based on information from the International Labour Organization database (ILOSTAT) and World Bank population estimates, and was retrieved from the World Bank's data bank (last update 2018-10-18). The labor force includes people of the age of 15 and above. The variable can take a value between 0-100.

Another control variable connected to women's influence other than through direct participation as signatories, is the number of *female combatants* in rebel groups. As argued by Krause et al., there is reason to believe that rebel groups with a higher level of female inclusion are more supportive of gender equality (Krause et al. 2018a, p. 996). Thus, representatives of these rebel groups should then generally be more supportive of gender provisions in peace agreements. This variable is gathered from the dataset of Krause et al. and is composed by data collected by Thomas and Wood (2017). It takes a value between 0-3, where no female combatants was coded as 0, less than 5% was coded as 1, between 5-20% was coded as 2, and more than 20% was coded as 3.

A third control variable connected to women´s influence is the level of *leftist ideology* within rebel groups. Earlier research has found that a leftist ideology among such groups correlates with higher numbers of women in the rebel groups, as well as with a stronger support of gender equality (Thomas & Wood, 2017). The variable is gathered from the dataset by Krause et al. and is a binary variable indicating a leftist ideology = 1, or the lack thereof = 0.

4.1.6. Robustness tests

The statistical analysis of this study aims to study the relationships between women's participation and the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements by testing 3 hypotheses. The first set of statistical models examine hypothesis "H0" and "H1". They focus on the inclusion of at least one gender provision. The second set of statistical models examine

hypothesis "H2" by testing the relationship between female signatories and the number of different gender provisions included in the peace agreements.

In the main models testing "H0" and "H1", the level of gender equality in the conflict-torn country is controlled for using the *female labor force* as a percentage of the total labor force. This macro measure of women's inclusion in the society is straight forward. As a robustness test, this variable will be exchanged in the OLS regressions. Instead, the percentage of *female legislators* in a country will be used. This is another common way to measure gender equality and women's political power. The variable is gathered from the dataset of Krause et al., and is a compilation of data by Paxton, Green & Hughes (2008) and the World Bank (Krause et al., 2018a, p.996). The variable *female legislators* takes a value between 0-4. If there are less than 5% percent female legislators, the variable was coded as 0. Between 5-15% female legislators was coded as 1. Between 15-30% female legislators was coded as 2. Between 30-50% female legislators was coded as 3. Last, more than 50% female legislators was coded as 4. This variable will be used instead of the variable *female labor force* in the robustness test.

There are two robustness tests for the main models testing "H2". In both of them, the variable *female labor force* as a percentage of the total labor force is exchanged with the percentage of *female legislators* as in the robustness test for the first set of models examining the hypotheses "H1" and "H0". In the first robustness test, the dependent variable *gender provisions* will be changed taking a value between 0-11 instead of 0-5. This means that the dependent variable will be measured using the 10 subcategories presented in Table 1 as well as the eleventh category "other" from the original dataset. The second robustness test consists of a negative binomial regression where the dependent variable take the value 0-5, as in the main model. Gender equality in a country is here measures as female legislators, and the UNSCR 1325 is controlled for using a dummy-variable taking the value 0 if the agreement was signed before it was adopted, and 1 if it was signed after.

4.2. Qualitative method

As will be presented in detail in the next chapter, the results of the statistical analysis show a positive relationship between the participation of female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision, but no correlation between the number of different categories of gender provisions included in peace agreements. The results raises the question about the mechanisms at play. Can the assumption that women push for gender provisions because of their specific experiences of conflict and self-interest explain this relationship, as expressed by some scholars within political representation theory? Or could there be other explanations to the statistical

results? To complement the statistical analysis, interviews were conducted with professionals knowledgeable about peace processes and with experience of peace mediation, in order to investigate the mechanisms behind the statistical results.

4.2.1. Informants

The informants are chosen based on their extensive knowledge on the topic of peace negotiations around the world. This study has not sought to contact any representatives of the conflicting parties in the six peace negotiations with female signatories, who might have knowledge about specific issues relating to the conflict in which they participated, but less general knowledge about processes leading to a peace agreement. The participants might also be hard to get in contact with, and they might not remember the details about the negotiations given that some of the agreements were signed almost two decades ago. Instead, the informants are four women with many years of experience about conflict resolution, knowledge obtained from their work – either as participant in peace negotiations or through other sources of information. The study is more likely to fulfil the requirement of validity with the chosen informants, since they have in-depth knowledge about women in peace negotiations from a range of different conflicts, and access up-to-date information on the research field. This should result in a more well-developed analysis of the mechanisms at play from their part.

The informants are all members of the Swedish Women Mediators network, which is the Swedish part of the Nordic Women Mediators network (NWM). The network was launched in 2015 and is coordinated by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) in collaboration with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The creation of the network is a reaction to the concerns expressed by the UN Security Council that despite some gains following UNSCR 1325, there are still persistent obstacles to women's participation in peace negotiations (FBA, 2018). The network is an initiative that shed light on the lack of female chief mediators, negotiators and signatories. The NWM actively promotes the increase of Nordic women in international peace-making processes and the strengthening of women's roles as mediators regionally an in international organizations. The Swedish Women Mediators network consists of 15 senior women with experience and/or extensive knowledge about mediation in peace negotiation and peacebuilding. The members are "Special Representatives for Inclusive Peace Processes" of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and they are expected to actively promote the inclusion of women in peacemaking and conflict resolution around the world (FBA and Swedish MFA, 2018).

Given their membership in NWM, there is reason to believe that the informants have knowledge about peace negotiations, and that they are used to analyze peace negotiations adding a gender perspective. Some of the informants have valuable experiences as mediators in peace negotiations, and could describe the power relations between men and women in peace negotiations as well as favorable conditions for the inclusion of gender provisions. This information is of importance in order to study the mechanisms at play that can explain the statistical results.

4.2.2. Interviews

The interviews were conducted during a two week period in November 2018. They were all carried out by phone. The length of the interviews varied between 25-40 minutes depending on how many minutes that the informants could spare. The interview questions were broad and open to answers that could reveal mechanisms other than the one suggested by political representation theory that women push for gender provisions. The questions related to four main questions relevant to analyze the mechanisms that could explain the statistical findings. The informants were not only asked about who pushes for gender provisions and why, but also who influence the agenda since previous research has underlined the importance of female participant's actual voice in peace negotiations (Paffenholz, 2018). The overarching questions can be formulated as follows:

Who pushes for gender provisions in peace negotiations and why?
Who influences the agenda?
What are the obstacles to successful inclusion of gender provisions?
What is needed for the successful inclusion of gender provisions?

The interview technique largely follows the technique for semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions recommended by Leech (2002). All interviews started with a short explanation of the aim of the study, and the question order went from easier to more complicated issues.

5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In this chapter, the results of the statistical analysis will be presented. The chapter consists of brief descriptive information followed by two sections presenting the statistical analysis. The first section examines hypothesis "H0" and "H1", while the second section examines hypothesis "H2".

In order to give a better overview of the data, some brief descriptive statistics will be presented before turning to the results of the statistical analysis. The first thing to ask might be how common it is that peace agreements include at least one gender provision? As shown in Figure 1, almost half of all peace agreements (circa 48.5 percent) have at least one gender provision. At the same time, only 5.9 percent of the peace agreements included all five different categories of gender provisions. There is a difference in the inclusion of gender provisions between agreements signed by women, and agreements not signed by women. As explained in the method chapter, all six peace agreements signed by women also include at least one gender provision. When it comes to the peace agreements with no female signatory, only 43.5 percent include at least one gender provision.

Figure 1 – Bar chart: Percentage of the number of different categories of gender provisions included in peace agreements.



5.1. Female signatories and the inclusion of gender provisions

In order to answer the first two hypotheses referring to the effect of women's participation in peace negotiations on the inclusion of at least one gender provision, this section starts with a t-test of the difference in means between the peace agreements that are signed by women and the peace agreements without female signatories. Recall that all six peace agreements with female signatories also have at least one gender provision. This is a condition called perfect prediction in which the outcome does not vary at some levels of the independent variable. The mean of the group of peace agreements with women signatories is therefore 1. In the group of 62 peace agreements not signed by women, far from all of the agreements included at least one gender provision. The mean of this group is 0.44. As shown in Table 3 below, the mean difference between the two groups is -0.56 and the p-value is 0.008. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected on the 0.05 significance level. It can be concluded that there is indeed a difference in mean of gender provision inclusion between the group of peace agreements with female signatories, and the group of peace agreements without female signatories. In other words, the mean of gender provision inclusion is higher for peace agreements with female signatories than the peace agreements without female signatories, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.

Table 3 – Mean difference between peace agreements signed by women and peace agreements not signed by women.

Variable	Mean (SD) no female signatory	Mean (SD) female signatory	Mean difference	t (df)	*P* value*	95% C.I.
Test result	0.44 (0.50)	1 (0)	-0.56	-2.75(66)	0.008	(-0.97, -0.15)

*independent t test, SD = standard deviation

Note: the variable *gender provision* is coded as a dummy-variable.

Next step of the analysis is to run an OLS regression on the correlation between female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision in peace agreements. Before adding control variables, it might be interesting to analyze the pure regression of this relationship. This regression is tested in **Model 1**. As can be seen in Table 4, there is a positive correlation between female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision which is significant at the 0.01 significance level.

The question is whether this correlation holds when adding the control variables. In **Model 2**, the following control variables are included in the regression: *UN as a party or as a third party, female labor force, female combatants* and *leftist ideology*. The regression also includes a time fixed effect for *year*. The results presented in Table 4 show a significant positive effect of female signatories on the inclusion of at least one gender provision in peace agreements when including the control variables. The coefficient for female signatory is 0.74, indicating that the probability of gender provisions increase by 74 percentage point when peace agreements have a female signatory. The correlation is significant on the 0.05 significance level. This means that hypothesis "H0" proposing that "*women's participation in peace negotiations have no impact on the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements",* is rejected since there is indeed a significant effect of female signatories on the inclusion of at least one gender provision in peace agreements. Instead, hypothesis "H1" suggesting that "*if women directly participate in peace negotiations, the agreements are more likely to contain at least one gender provision"* is accepted.

An interesting result of this regression is that there is also a significant negative correlation between female labor force as a percentage of the total labor force, and the inclusion of at least one gender provision in peace agreements. It is possible that a high percentage of female labor force is not always a result of gender equal societies in conflict-torn countries. According to previous research, it could also be the result of men being recruited to the military or armed groups and excess male mortality, which forces women to enter the labor force because of decreased household income (e.g. Buvinic et al., 2013) Further examination of the relationship between female labor force and the inclusion of gender provisions is a question for future research.

As a robustness test, the variable *female labor force* is exchanged with another variable of women's influence and power in a country in **Model 3**. *Female labor force* is therefore exchanged with the percentage of *female legislator.* This variable is another common way to measure the level of gender equality in a country, and it is used in the study by Krause et al. (2018a). As seen in Table 4, the positive relationship between female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision is no longer significant. The p-value of 0.054 is slightly higher than the 0.05 significance level. However, it must be taken into account that when changing from the variable *female labor force* to the variable *female legislator,* observations are dropped as a result of missing values. Only one observation had missing values for *female labor force.*[5] The variable *female legislator* on the other hand have missing values

[5] Kosovo Peace Agreement 1, no gender provision.

for 8 observations, 4 which did not include gender provisions and 4 which did.[6] None of the agreements with female signatories were dropped. Comparing the results of Model 2 and Model 3, the robustness test shows no drastic change in p-value. The drop of observations affects the coefficient and standard error, and could be the difference between significance and non-significance.

Table 4. OLS regressions: Female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision

Dependent variable: *Any gender provision*	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Female signatories	0.56 ***	0.74 **	0.81
	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.40)
UN as party or third party		0.05	-0.19
		(0.18)	(0.23)
Female labor force		-0.02 **	
		(0.01)	
Female legislators			-0.06
			(0.15)
Female combattants		0.09	0.14
		(0.09)	(0.12)
Leftist ideology		-0.18	-0.17
		(0.37)	(0.41)
	R^2: 0.10	R^2: 0.46	R^2: 0.43
	N=68	N=58	N=52

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; p < 0.10

[6] The variable *female labor force* have missing values for the following observations: Afghanistan 1993, Comoros 2003, Democratic Republic of Congo 1999, Democratic Republic of Congo 2002, Democratic Republic of Congo 2003, Somalia 1993, Somalia 1997 and Tajikistan 1996.

To summarize, all regressions in this section show a positive coefficient for female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision. Even if the relationship was not significant in the robustness test (Model 3), it is fairly possible that this is the result of dropped variables due to missing data when changing from one measurement of gender equal societies to another. It can thus be concluded that the statistical analysis indicates a positive relationship between female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision. In the next section, the relationship between women signatories and the number of different categories of gender provisions included in peace agreements will be tested.

5.2. Female signatories and the inclusion of a greater number of different categories of gender provisions

The same procedure as in the previous section is used to answer the third and last hypothesis suggesting that the participation of female sigantories in peace negotiations leads to a greater number of different categories of gender provisions. A t-test followed by OLS-regressions are run. In the following tests, the dependent variable takes the value 0-5 depending on how many different categories of gender provisions that are included in the peace agreements. As can be seen in Table 5, the mean of the group of peace agreements signed by women is 2.67, and the mean of the group of peace agreements without female signatories is 1.05. The difference in mean between the two groups is -1.62. The null hypothesis is rejected since the difference in mean of the number of different categories of gender provisions between the peace agreements with female signatories, and the peace agreements without female signatories is significant on the 0.05 level. When women participate as signatories in peace negotiations, the mean of different gender provisions included in the peace agreements are 2.67 out of 5 different categories. When there are no female signatories, the mean is slighly more than 1 category.

Table 5 - Mean difference between peace agreements signed by women and peace agreements not signed by women.

Variable	Mean (SD) no female signatory	Mean (SD) female signatory	Mean difference	t (df)	*P* value*	95% C.I.
Test result	1.05 (1.49)	2.67(1.63)	-1.62	-2.53(66)	0.014	(-2.90, -0.34)

*independent t test, SD = standard deviation

Note: the variable *gender provision* is coded as a count variable (0-5).

Moving on to the OLS regression, there is a significant positive relationship between female signatories and the inclusion of a greater number of different categories of gender provisions when no control variables are included (**Model 4**). This regression results in a coefficent of 1.62 and a p-value of 0.014.

When adding the control variables from previous section in **Model 5**, it results in a positive coefficient for female signatory of 1.58. However, this correlation is not statistically significant. The hypothesis "H2" proposing that "*if women directly participate in peace negotiations, the agreements are more likely to contain a greater number of different categories of gender provisions"* is therefore rejected. The results of this regression indicates that there is no significant positive relationship between the direct paricipation of women in peace agreements and the inclusion of a greater number of different categories of gender provisions.

As a robustness test, the dependent variable *gender provisions* is measured using the 11 subcategories of different categories of gender provisions as coded in the PA-X Gender dataset in **Model 6**. Recall that the 11 subcategories are found in Table 2 in the method chapter. Additionally, the variable *female labor force* is exchanged with the percentage of *female legislator* as in the previous robustness tests. The results presented in Table 6 show a positive correlation between female signatories and the inclusion of a greater number of different categories of gender provisions. However, the relationship is not significant in the robustness test either. This further strengthens the conclusion drawn from the previous regression model that hypothesis "H2" does not hold true.

An additional robustness test using a negative binomial regression is run, and the results are in line with the results of the OLS regressions in model 5 and 6. The negative binomial test shows a non-significant positive relationship between peace agreements with female signatories and peace agreements without female signatories. The detailed results of the negative binomial regression are found in Table A.1. in the appendix.

Dependent variable: *Number of different categories of gender provision*	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
Female signatories	1.62 **	1.58	0.40
	(0.64)	(1.06)	(1.95)
UN as party or third party		0.44	0.57
		(0.58)	(1.10)
Female labor force		-0.05	
		(0.03)	
Female legislators			-0.33
			(0.71)
Female combattants		0.06	-0.09
		(0.29)	(0.57)
Leftist ideology		-0.06	1.04
		(1.19)	(1.97)
	R^2: 0.09	R^2: 0.46	R^2: 0.37
	N=68	N=58	N=52

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; p < 0.10

The results of the statistical analysis in this chapter show a positive relationship between female signatories and the inclusion of at least one gender provision that is significant in the main model, and with a p-value slightly higher than the 0.05 significance level in the robustness test. Even if the positive relationship did not hold in the robustness test, it is fairly possible that the non-significance is the result of dropped observations due to missing values. The regressions on the relationship between female signatories and the number of different categories of gender provisions included in peace agreement had positive coefficients as well. However, this correlation was not statistically significant. The results of the statistical analysis raises the question about the mechanisms at play. Why do peace agreement with female signatories seem to be more likely to include at least one gender provision? Do female signatories push for gender provisions to be included in peace agreements as suggested by some theorists? How come that there is not a stronger positive relationship between women's direct participation in peace agreement and the inclusion of a greater number of different categories of gender provisions? These are some of the questions that will be studied in the qualitative analysis in the following chapter.

6. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS

This chapter will discuss possible mechanisms at play that could explain the results of the statistical analysis. Drawing on interviews with members of the Swedish Women Mediators network, the chapter aims to investigate who pushes for gender provisions in peace negotiations and why, as well as under what circumstances these issues can be successfully included in peace agreements. The four informants will be called informant A, B, C and D since not all of them wanted to be directly cited. The name of the four informants are found in the reference list.

6.1. Who pushes for gender provisions and why?

This section presents the results of the interviews, aiming to answer who the crucial actors are for the inclusion of gender provision. The reason for women to push for these issues are examined.

6.1.1. Reasons for women to push for gender provisions

During the interviews, several reasons for women to push for gender provisions were mentioned, suggesting that women should be more expected to push for these issues than men. However, the informants also gave examples of cases where women in peace negotiation did not act as were expected of them.

Knowledge about "women's issues" through self-experience

All informants seemed to agree that women's experiences of conflict differ from the experiences of men. As an example, informant B and C pointed out that women in conflict are often left in charge of the household as male family members are recruited to the military or armed groups. Another example mentioned by both respondent C and A was sexual violence, which was described as an increasing warfare strategy which targets women specifically. The informants described how women and men have knowledge about different effects of the same conflict, because of their different experiences. Does this gender-specific experience make women more likely to push for the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements? According to the respondents, women's particular experiences may have an effect on the issues that they bring to the negotiation table. The case of Colombia as an example of a peace process with successful participation of women and their perspective was brought up by three of the network members (A, C and D). In Colombia, a gender Subcommittee consisting of representatives from the parties themselves was established in 2014, to include the voices of

women in the peace negotiation (NOREF, 2017). The informants mentioning the Colombian peace process said that they did not believe that certain issues relating to women would have been put on the agenda without the establishment of the Subcommittee.

It should be mentioned that informant A was keen to make a distinction between *issues* and *perspectives*. She did believe that women could bring new issues to the agenda like in the case of Colombia, but at the same time, she underlined that women sometimes rather bring different *perspectives* on issues brought to the negotiation table.

Women might be more likely to push for gender provisions because they have knowledge about the existence and the severness of problems relating to women's rights and security, a knowledge that their male counterparts may not have. However, the informants agreed that even if women do have experiences that differ from the experiences of men, it is still not a guarantee that women would push for gender provisions. As will be clear in the remaining part of this chapter, several other circumstances affect whether female participant push for these issues or not.

Self-interest

Are women more likely to push for gender provisions, not only because they have a deeper understanding of the problems, but because they are directly affected by issues that refer to their rights and security? Three of the respondents talked about women's fight for gender provisions in terms of self-interest. Informant B claimed that all parties in peace negotiations fight for their self-interests, and that women are no different. Informant C said that women bring other perspectives to the negotiation table because of self-interest, but underlined that it is not the same as trying to gain power or to make money at the expense of others. This is more about the principles, she argued. Informant D explained that in successful peace negotiations, all parties have to get something that they have pushed for – women too. She mentioned influential and well-organized women's groups as an example. These are groups that have a clear agenda for women's issues that the parties would have to take into consideration. Informant A and B argued that peace negotiations are about power balances. Even if equal societies might not only benefit women in the long run, some actors might think that the power balance would change to the favor of women as women would be given more rights. It follows logically from this argumentation by informant A and B that women might perceive that they have more to win from the implementation of gender provisions than men.

Women's exclusion from discussions on "hard" topics

Pushing for gender provisions rather than other issues might be a well-considered decision by well-informed female participants. However, the results of the interviews show that it could also be the effect of the role that women often have in peace negotiations, and the phase in which they usually enter the negotiations. Informant B explained that women tend to enter peace negotiations in other roles and in other phases than men. Women are often victims rather than aggressors, and they are therefore less likely to represent that kind of party and to bring issues associated to that role to negotiations. Few women are part of armed groups, giving them little to say about issues such as ceasefire and arms control in peace negotiations. Instead, they might enter at a stage where they can push for "soft" issues related to their experiences of conflict as women. Informant B mentioned issues such as schools, health care, safe routes and environmental damage as examples of such issues. Thus, the fact that women often enter the peace negotiations in other roles and in other phases might have an effect on what issues they can and cannot bring to the negotiation table. Informant C agreed that women are less likely to have experience and knowledge about military and weapon issues, and that they are therefore less likely to push for such issues in peace negotiations. Informant D underlined that this is not about what interests women. She claimed that it is even rude to suggest that women only care about so called "women's issues", or that they do not push for other issues. She underlined that female participants can be experts too, having extensive knowledge about e.g. law, economics and military issues. Accordingly, informant C mentioned how women can be found in leading roles in rebel groups such as *FARC* in Colombia or *Lord's Resistance Army* in Uganda. But as explained by informant D, women seldom participate in peace negotiations in these roles.

Expectations of female participants

Yet another reason for women to push for gender provisions that have nothing to do with any special interest in women's issues as opposed to men, is the expectations that others have of female participants in peace negotiations. Women are expected to push for certain issues related to women and gender equality. Informant D focused on the expectations from other participants and external actors in peace negotiations. In her experience, there is often a quiet expectation from male participants that women are included in peace talks only to push for issues related to women and gender equality. She recalled a situation where this expectation was openly expressed. After having discussed a wide range of different issues, not necessarily relating to "women's issues" together with a group of women from the civil society, they presented their thoughts to some of the civil society group's male members. A highly recognized male leader

then dropped a mean comment about how women should take over the warfare from men, so that the men would not have to do it, indicating that the women knew nothing about war and should stick to the "softer" issues. In situations like these, it becomes evident how difficult it might be for women to be "allowed" to discuss their concerns if they are not perceived as "women's issues". Informant C focused on the expectations on female participants from local women not taking part in the peace negotiations. In her experience, women in poorer villages that are more vulnerable in conflict have high expectations that their concerns are brought to the negotiation table. However, as became clear in the last section, women do not always live up to the expectations of being peaceful and pushing for issues relating to women's rights, but may be part of violent rebel group. This reminds of the argument by theorists within the field of political representation who uses Thatcher the "iron lady" as an argument against the perception that women as a group always care about, and push for "women's issues". Informant C underlined that whereas some of the women might be part of such groups voluntarily, it should also be mentioned that others are recruited by force. The expectations of female participants in peace negotiations seem to be another important factor to take into consideration when analyzing the mechanism explaining women's participation and the inclusion of gender provisions.

6.1.2. International and regional organizations

The visions of international and regional organizations could also have an effect on the quality of peace agreements, as pointed out by two informants. Informant A argued that international and regional organizations may express their vision and expectation that the parties include gender provisions in peace agreements. Since a big part of peace agreements include some kind of financial aid from international or regional organizations like for example the UN and AU, the participants in peace negotiations have incentives to consider the expectations from such organizations. Having experience from Colombia, she mentioned the importance of the regional organization OAS in the Colombian peace process. Informant D emphasized the importance of the initial process before a peace negotiation officially starts, where the terms of the process are decided. According to her, the actors that initiate a peace negotiation have great influence both over who is included in the process, and what will be included in the agreement. Peace negotiations can be initiated by external forces such as the UN, which could then push for both the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and the inclusion of gender provisions. She underlined that peace negotiations are not often well-planed. Nevertheless, actors that manage to plan the process at an early stage could have influence also over the actual peace negotiation.

Informant D also mentioned that a higher number of peace negotiations are handled regionally, where the involvement of regional organizations such as for example the AU become more important.

6.1.3. Why male participants may be reluctant

Even if the informants mentioned several reasons why women might be more likely to push for issues related to women and gender, some of them underlined that it did not mean that these issues could not be pushed by men. Informant B argued that men, just like women, need to have knowledge about the problems facing women as well as knowledge about human rights in order to push for "women's issues". She rejected the idea that women, but not men, need training programs to successfully participate in peace negotiations. According to the informant, men too could benefit from such training programs. She believed that men would push for gender provisions if they had substantive knowledge about women's security issues and human rights. Except for knowledge, it takes a man with great confidence that is tough enough to stand up for his possibly unpopular believes. Men too can care for the safety and respect of women, according to her point of view. At the same time, she underlined that it in some peace negotiations it almost felt as if the only thing that the male participants could agree upon was not to let women participate. Informant B also said that human rights issues in general seemed to be a difficult topics to push for. These issues were sometimes framed as something else in order to make them more accepted. Both respondent A and B believed that an important reason for this negative view on gender provisions is the fear of losing power to new actors. Reluctant male participants is one of several hindrances to women's participation and influence. The obstacles to women's influence in peace negotiations will be further discussed in the next section.

6.2. Female participants' influence over the content of peace agreements

So far, this chapter has examined *who* have reasons to push for gender provisions and *why*. The results suggest that there is no guarantee that women will push for gender provisions, but that they have many reasons to do so. As stated by previous research, simply pushing for gender provisions is no guarantee that such provisions will be included in peace agreements. In order to investigate the mechanisms explaining the relationship between female signatories and the inclusion of gender provisions, the actors' actual *influence* in peace negotiations needs to be studied. As described earlier, human rights and gender equality are often unpopular topics to bring to the negotiation table since some participants might feel that they have too much to lose

from giving rights and power to other actors. This section examines necessary circumstances for women to successfully push for gender provisions in peace negotiations. The results suggest that their individual will and personal ability to push for gender provisions, as well as external factors relating to the presence of traditional gender norms and the power balance between men and women in the country of conflict are key factors.

6.2.1 Traditional gender norms and power balances

The informants identified traditional gender norms as an obstacle both to women's participation, and their influence in peace agreements. In many parts of the world, the idea that women have an equal right to the peace process is not a given, according to informant A. Traditional views on gender roles could prevent women from having an actual say in peace negotiations. Informant C described it in a similar way, explaining that some ideas about gender equality are unheard of in some traditional patriarchal societies. She explained that political attitudes of the participants is an important factor for how well such issues are included in peace agreements. Informant B stressed that the level of respect for human rights in general could affect how difficult it would be for the participants to successfully push for gender equality. In some countries, there is a considerable opposition towards human rights. A reason for this resistance has to do with power, as already shortly mentioned in the last section. As mentioned by informants A and B, some powerful actors feel that they have a lot to lose from giving rights to groups that have previously had limited influence in the society. It is safe to say that women is often one these groups. Thus, there is reason to believe that the traditional gender norms, and power balance between men and women in the country of conflict have an impact on the participants' ability to push for gender provisions in peace negotiations.

6.2.2. Individual capacity of female participants

The informants also suggested several critical abilities of the female participants in peace negotiations for them to successfully influence the agenda, despite obstacles like traditional gender norms.

Knowledge about rights and the political system

All four informants emphasized the importance that participating women have extensive knowledge about political processes, and expertise in relevant fields, to successfully push for gender provisions in peace negotiations. Informant A emphasized the importance that

participants have the required knowledge and experience to have influence over the agenda. This was supported by informant B, who underlined the importance of the participants' knowledge about women's rights, and their knowledge about the effects of signing an agreement, in order for them to take action in the first place. Informant C described the knowledge about the political and economic system as important factors enabling women to push for relevant issues. Last, informant D pointed out that participants with expertise within a relevant field have a clear goal of what they want to achieve in the peace negotiation, which is necessary to effectively push for a specific issue. In other words, knowledge about how societies are run are crucial for the participants to effectively push for relevant issues that would be possible to implement. Participants wishing for change must know how the political and economic system works. Moreover, it is essential that the participants have knowledge about human rights, as emphasized by informant B. She also emphasized that the argument that all citizens have human rights, and that gender equality is a human right, should be used more often in peace negotiations. The informants agreed that the sole participation of a woman in a peace negotiation, willing to push for women's issues, would not be enough for the inclusion of gender provisions in the peace agreement. They need to possess relevant knowledge and expertise.

Strategic skills

Not only do female participants need to have great knowledge about human rights and the political and economic system. As underlined by informant C, for women to obtain greater influence they also need to possess great strategic skills. Informant B emphasized that successful female participants have a detailed agenda and a clear plan on what they want to achieve. She also described how actors successfully pushing for human rights often avoid to call them "human rights", but use other wordings. As an example, she said that human rights issues could be talked about in terms of economic profitability. Such tactic skills may be useful to convince the other participants. Recall the argument by informant D from the section about self-interest, that even if peace is the common goal of all parties in a peace negotiation, all parties also have to gain something from peace. Using the right words might be a good tactics to make the opponents feel that they gain, rather than lose from the inclusion of gender provisions. Strategic skills like these might be of importance for female participants to successfully influence the content of peace agreements.

Signatories have something of value to other parties

This study focuses on women's inclusion in peace negotiations as signatories, since they can be assumed to have had significant influence in the peace negotiations according to previous research. Informant D confirmed this theory by defining signatories as persons that have had a leading role, and a big opportunity to influence the agenda in peace negotiations. In order to have a significant role in peace negotiations and to eventually sign the agreement, the participants need bargaining power. Informant C explained that signatories have something that they can give up or promise, such as to hand over weapons or promise ceasefire or political commitments. Thus, not all women can become signatories. This is less of an ability, and more about an important circumstance for the individual signatory. Informant C described signatories as actors that have the power to realize significant commitments towards peace. As has already been stated in this study, women are less likely to hold such positions. The informant underlined that women that cannot become signatories could still mobilize. She said that they could create women's civil society groups that demand issues to be put on the agenda from outside the negotiation room, but that they would probably not be as influential as actors that can offer something of value to other parties.

7. DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the findings of the study will be discussed as well as its limitations. The chapter ends with a discussion about how women's descriptive and substantive representation in peace processes is best studied.

7.1. Reflections on the results

The results of this study suggest that peace agreements with female signatories are more likely to include at least one gender provision than peace agreements with no female signatory. The regression models all show a positive correlation, even if the results are not significant in the robustness test. However, it is rather possible that the lack of significance is due to the specification of one of the variables, which results in several omitted observations. No relationship was found between female signatories and the inclusion of a greater number of different categories of gender provisions. This means that even if agreements with female signatories are more likely to have at least one gender provision, they are not more likely to include a higher number of different categories of gender provisions in peace agreements. In

other words, agreements with female signatories are not more likely to touch upon more areas where women's rights and security could be improved.

The result of the first set of regressions, showing that peace agreements where women participate in the negotiations are more likely to include at least one gender provision, corresponds to the assumptions of scholars in the field of women and peace, as well as the assumptions of governments, international organizations and civil societies around the world. The result is also expected from scholars within the field of political representation who believe that the descriptive and substantive representation of women is closely connected. This study does not only statistically test the effect of women's participation in peace negotiations, it also contributes to the understanding of the mechanisms at play by analyzing *why* women might be more likely to push for women's issues. According to political representation theory, the positive relationship between women's participation and the successful inclusion of women's issues in peace agreements can be explained by women's ability to better represent their own interests since they have experiences that differ from the experiences of men. This corresponds to the findings in the qualitative analysis suggesting that women often have different roles than men. Women are more likely to take care of the household, whereas men are often recruited to the military or armed groups. Women are also more vulnerable to certain forms of violence such as sexual violence. Thus, they have a self-interest in pushing for these issues.

However, the results show that the reasons why women might push for gender provisions are more complex than solely the difference in experience allowing for new perspectives, and self-interest. Other reasons why women might be more likely to push for gender provisions identified by some of the members of the Swedish Women Mediation network, is the role that women often have in peace negotiations and the phase in which they are invited to peace negotiations. Since women are more often victims than aggressors taking active part in armed violence, it affects the role that women have as well as the phase in which women enter the peace negotiation. They are less likely to represent a conflicting party, and to be invited to peace negotiations on "hard" issues such as ceasefire. There are also expectations on women to represent "women's issues", especially from other participants and from local women. In other words, there seems to be several reasons to believe that women rather than men push for gender provisions. The results also suggest that some men might feel like they have reasons not to push for gender provisions, since they believe that it would change the power balance between the sexes to their disadvantage.

Yet, there is no guarantee that all women participating in peace negotiations push for gender provisions according to the findings. Individual women do not always live up to the

expectations to push for issues relating to women. This goes against the theory that women as a group can be expected to act in a specific way based on shared experiences, presented by scholars who believe in a strong link between the descriptive and substantive representation of women. Instead, this result was anticipated by scholars rejecting the interrelation, and who often uses Thatcher, the "iron lady" as an example of a woman who did not act the way she was expected to as a woman. This shows that the mechanisms explaining the relationship between women's participation in peace agreement and the inclusion of gender provisions are complex, and cannot be entirely explained by one of the camps within the political representation theory presented in this study.

According to previous research, an important factor critical for women to successfully push for gender provisions is that they have significant power over the agenda. Women pushing for gender provisions is not on its own an explanation to the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The informants were therefore also asked about women's ability to influence the peace negotiations. The results of the qualitative analysis suggest that traditional gender norms can make it difficult for women both to push for gender provisions, and to be invited to the negotiation table in the first place. The individual capacity of the women participating in the negotiations is also important for their ability to influence the peace agreements, according to the results. Influential women have knowledge about human rights and the political and economic system. They have a clear agenda, and strategic skills to achieve their goals. Signatories also have something of value to other parties, for example the possibility to hand over weapon, being able to agree on a ceasefire, or promise political commitments. Going back to chapter 4, the female signatories represent rebel groups, political parties, the government and leaders of women's civil society groups. Women representing rebel groups, political parties and the government can be assumed to have a good negotiation position, having something to offer the other parties. Especially politicians and government officials can be expected to have great negotiation skills and knowledge about rights as well as about the political and economic system. Too little is known about the signatories representing the two women's groups to say anything about their bargaining power. There is reason to believe that they had a well-developed plan for what issues to push for, given their interest and knowledge about women's issues. The critical circumstances for women's influence in peace negotiations found in this study largely follows some of the factors identified by Paffenholz (2018), and further nuances other. The knowledge about the reasons for women to push for gender provisions, and the necessary circumstances for them to succeed found in this study, complements the findings of Krause et al. who identified the support from women's

organizations not officially included in the peace negotiations as an important factor for the signatories' successful fight for gender provisions.

The results of the second set of regressions indicating that agreements with female signatories are not more likely to include a greater number of different categories of gender provisions, do not correspond to the hypothesis. Previous research on the quality of peace agreements from a gender perspective has been interested not only in whether the agreements refer to women and their concerns or not, but also how many different areas that are addressed with gender provisions. This interest comes from the normative values expressed by UNSCR 1325, that women need to be represented in all stages and areas in the peace negotiation and peace agreements. This, together with the widespread assumption that peace agreements with female participants are more holistic since they bring other issues than men to the negotiation table, especially relating to women and gender equality because of their gender-specific experiences of conflict, gave this study a reason to test the relationship between female signatories and a greater number of different categories of gender provisions. No evidence that this is the case was found, and the results of the qualitative analysis can only give vague hints of what the mechanisms explaining this result might be. There might be a limit for how many gender provisions that can be accepted in unfavorable settings, since traditional understandings of the roles of men and women was showed to have an effect on the inclusion of gender provisions. Given the importance of strategic skills of the female signatories, they might carefully choose their battles, and only push for the most important gender provisions for strategic reasons. Some gender provisions might also be easier to push for, maybe because they can more easily be framed as something else. These are interesting questions for future research.

This study addresses the research gap on the interrelation between women's descriptive and substantive representation in peace negotiations, a relationship that has almost solely been examined in the field of political representation in parliaments. To date, work and research within the field of women and peace processes has been based on untested hypotheses and normative assumptions. The evidence-based knowledge about the relationship between women's participation in peace negotiations, and the inclusion of at least one gender provision in peace agreements presented in this study provides valuable information for the future work of international organizations, national governments, civil society groups and others that call for increased representation of women and gender provisions in accordance with UNSCR 1325.

7.2. Limitations and alternative explanations

As became clear in the previous section, this study has some limitations when it comes to answering the question why peace agreements with female signatories are not more likely to include a greater number of different categories of gender provisions. This is to some extent due to methodological limitations. The detailed information about the strategies of female signatories needed to answer this question might be difficult for the informants included in this study to know. This kind of information might only be possible to obtain from the signatories themselves, or people that were closely involved in the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, this study still contributes with some initial information about the relationship, and suggestions about possible explanations that can be further studied. The accessible data on different gender provisions allows for many future studies on the subject, and this study might have brought interest to the issue.

Another limitation is that the study has not been able to completely rule out the possibility that actors other than the female signatories might have an effect on both the inclusion of women in peace negotiations, and on the inclusion of at least one gender provision in peace agreements. More knowledge about the effect of the initial processes that precedes the actual peace negotiation, and the influence of the actor or actors involved in this process, is needed. The findings of the qualitative analysis suggest that the UN could be such an actor. At the same time, the statistical analysis control for the inclusion of the UN as a party or a third party in peace negotiations. More knowledge about the ways that the UN can influence the negotiations other than as an official party or third party is needed. Furthermore, the findings suggest that regional organizations not controlled for in this study, might have influence over peace negotiations. More knowledge is therefore needed also on the influence of regional organizations.

7.3. Reflections on how to study women's representation in peace processes

In this section, some thoughts about how to best study women's descriptive and substantive representation will be presented. The complexity in finding the most useful operationalization of *participation* was raised in one of the interviews. The informant underlined that female signatories must have something of value to offer. This makes it difficult to increase the number of female signatories as a way to fulfil UNSCR 1325, since signatories often have a position and negotiation power in a society that not many women possess. How useful is it then to operationalize women's participation as female signatories? The advantage is that these women can be assumed to have had a significant influence over the peace negotiations because of the

fact that they have signed the agreements. This allows for a statistical analysis of the relationship between the participation of women and the inclusion of "women's issues" in peace agreements, which builds on the assumption that the women could actually influence the peace agreements. Even if it might be hard to promote the inclusion of women that have the required knowledge and power to eventually sign the peace agreement, this study contributes to an understanding of the effects and mechanisms of women's participation that could be of value for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Increasing the number of women is not enough, according to the findings of this study. In order to achieve the goals of UNSCR 1325, other actions would be needed as well.

Similarly, the definition of *"women's issues"* is a contested concept. On the one hand, context-based women's issues are important to take into consideration. Women might push for issues that do not specifically refer to women's rights and security, but are issues where women are more likely to be targeted in a specific context. The informants mentioned safe routes and schools as examples of issues that women might push for because of their experienced of problems with these issues. Such issues have not been possible to take into account in this study. On the other hand, defining the variety of context-based women's issues around the world is most probably an impossible task, especially since these issues might be rather changeable over time in the changeable environments of conflict-torn countries. The advantage of measuring "women's issues" as issues that relate directly to women's rights and security is that they are less subjective and easier to define. It allows for large-N studies and comparability from one peace negotiation to another. Even if a universal definition of women's issues might be hard to find, the definition used in this study made it possible to statistically analyze the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation in peace negotiations. In the end, this is an inevitable trade-off between validity and reliability.

8. CONCLUSION

The call from the international community, national governments and civil societies around the world to increase the participation of women in peace negotiations, and the representation of women in peace agreements since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 have led to a growing body of literature on women and peace. At the same time, little research on the interrelations between the descriptive and substantive representation of women in peace negotiations have been conducted. Important decisions to implement the commitments of UNSCR 1325 are still based on assumptions about women's participation in peace negotiations rather than empirics.

In a twofold approach, this study has contributed with a large-N analysis of the effect of women's participation on the quality of peace agreements from a gender perspective, and an examination of the mechanisms at play. Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the study. First, the statistical analysis suggests that peace agreements with female signatories are more likely to include at least one gender provision. At the same time, peace agreements with female signatories are not more likely to include a greater number of different categories of gender provisions.

Second, the mechanisms that could explain the statistical results are connected to the participating woman's individual will to push for gender provisions, her personal abilities and external circumstances. Women have reasons to push for gender provisions out of self-interest, given their particular experience of conflict. Furthermore, the pressure and expectations from other participants and local women are additional reasons for women to push for these issues. Women are also often restricted to discussions on "soft issues" since they are less likely to have a role in conflict that would get them invited to talks on for example weapons and ceasefire. However, women simply pushing for gender provisions are not enough for them to successfully include gender provisions in peace agreements. Traditional gender norms, as well as the participating women's expertise, negotiation skills, and negotiation power affect their influence on the content of peace agreements. Men with knowledge about gender inequalities and human rights, and with a commitment to gender equality, can push form women's issues too. However, men often seem to believe that they have too much to lose from the change in power balance between the sexes that the implementation of gender provisions would result in, according to the findings. For this reason, women should be more expected to push for gender provisions than men. It should be underlined thought, that despite the reasons for women to push for issues relating to women's rights and security, examples have shown that there is no guarantee that they will. More information is also needed to understand why peace agreements with female participants do not include a greater number of different categories of gender provisions.

Of course, the quest for women's inclusion in peace negotiations should not be based on their positive effect on peace agreements. Women's right to participate is a human right. The knowledge about women's effect on the inclusion of gender provisions, and the mechanisms at play, are important for the understanding of the necessary circumstances for the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements. This knowledge is valuable to everyone who wish to push for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace agreements, and increased gender equality in post-conflict societies.

Additional studies are needed to investigate the mechanisms that can explain the interrelation between women's descriptive and substantive representation in peace negotiations. Future research is suggested to focus on 1) the actors involved in the initial processes prior to the start of the actual peace negotiations, 2) the influence of international and regional organizations.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1. Negative binomial regression: Female signatories and the inclusion of a greater number of different categories of gender provisions

Dependent variable: *Number of different categories of gender provision*	**Model 7**
Female signatories	0.76 (0.47)
UN as party or third party	0.07 (0.34)
Female labor force	-0.01 (0.02)
Female combattants	0.13 (0.17)
Leftist ideology	0.61 (0.57)
	Pseudo R^2: 0.04
	N=58

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; p < 0.10

Table A.2: Case list

UCDP	PA-X
07mar1993 **Islamabad accord**	07mars1993 Afghan Peace Accord (Islamabad Accord)
01aug2006 **Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province**	01augusti2006 Memorandum of Peace and Understanding in Cabinda Province
20nov1994 **The Lusaka Protocol**	15nov1994 Lusaka Protocol
04apr2002 **Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Intent**	04april2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol)
02dec1997 **Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord**	02dec1997 Agreement between the National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts Constituted by the Government and The Parbattya Chattagram Janasanghati Samity
01mar1994 **The Washington Agreement**	01mar1994 Framework Agreement for the Federation (Washington Agreement or Contact Group Plan)
14dec1995 **The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)**	21nov1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement)
28aug2000 **Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi**	28aug2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
02dec2002 **Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie**	02dec2002 Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil National pour la Defence de la Democratie-Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie

08oct2003 **The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi**	08oct2003 The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi
02nov2003 **The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi**	08oktober2003 The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi
16nov2003 **The Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Government and the Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Mr. Nkúrunziza**	16nov2003 The Global Ceasefire Agreement
07sep2006 **Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL**	07sep2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu - FNL
04dec2008 **Declaration of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region on the Burundi Peace Process**	04dec2008 Déclaration du Sommet des chefs d'Etats et de gouvernements de l'initiative régionale sur le processus de Paix au Burundi
23oct1991 **Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"**	23oct1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict or Paris Accords)
07jan2002 **Tripoli 2 agreement**	07jan2002 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chad and the Movement for Democracy and justice in Chad (MDJT) (Tripoli Agreement)
15feb1991 **Acuerdo final Gobierno Nacional-Ejército Popular De Liberación**	15feb1991 Acuerdo Final entre el Gobierno Nacional y el Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL
20dec2003 **Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros**	20dec2003 Agreement on the Transitional Arrangements in the Comoros (Maroni Agreement)
29dec1999 **Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités**	29dec1999 Ceasefire and ending hostilities agreement between the High Command of the Security Forces and the High Command of the Self-defence Forces of Resistance (FADR)

12nov1995 **The Erdut Agreement**	12nov1995 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium ('The Erdut Agreement')
26dec1994 **Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale**	26dec1994 Accord de Paix et de reconciliation nationale
12may2001 **Accord de reforme et concorde civile**	12may2001 Accord de Réforme et de Concorde Civile
10jul1999 **Lusaka Accord**	10jul1999 Ceasefire Agreement (Lusaka Agreement)
16dec2002 **Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo**	16dec2002 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo ('The Pretoria Agreement')
02apr2003 **Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act**	02apr2003 Intercongolese Negotiations: The Final Act ('The Sun City Agreement')
23mar2009 **23 March 2009 Agreement**	23mar2009 Peace Agreement between the Government and Le Congres National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)
16jan1992 **The Chapultepec Peace Agreement**	16jan1992 Chapultepec Agreement
04apr1994 **Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict**	04apr1994 Declaration on Measures of a Political Settlement of the Georgia-Abkhaz Conflict
29dec1996 **The Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace**	29dec1996 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace
01nov1998 **Abuja Peace Agreement**	01nov1998 Agreement between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the Self-proclaimed military junta ('Abuja Accord')
23aug1993 **Memorandum of Settlement - 23 August 1993**	23aug1993 Memorandum of Settlement

09dec2002 **Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement**	09dec2002 Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement
15aug2005 **Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement**	15aug2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the Goverment of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (Helsinki MOU)
30jul2004 **Accra III**	30jul2004 Accra III Agreement on Cote d'Ivoire
04mar2007 **Ouagadougou Political Agreement**	04mar2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement
17aug1996 **Abuja II Peace Agreement**	17aug1996 Supplement to the Abuja Accord
18aug2003 **Accra Peace Agreement**	18aug2003 Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties (Accra Agreement)
13aug2001 **The Ohrid Agreement**	13aug2001 Framework Agreement (The Ohrid Agreement)
11apr1992 **Pacte National**	11apr1992 Pacte National conclu entre le Gouvernement de la République du Mali et les mouvements et fronts unifiés de l'Azawad consacrant le statut particulier du Nord au Mali
16feb1996 **The San Andrés Accords**	16feb1996 Actions and Measures for Chiapas Joint Commitments and Proposals from the State and Federal Governments, and the EZLN Agreement Regarding the Joint Proposals between the Federal Government and the EZLN Commitments for Chiapas by the State and Federal Governments and the EZLN under Paragraph 1.3 of the Rules of Procedure

	Joint Declaration that the Federal Government and the EZLN shall submit to National Debating and Decision-making Bodies Joint Proposals that the Federal Goverrment and the EZLN agree to remit to the National Debating and Decision-Making Bodies in accordance with paragraph 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure
08may1997 **Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria**	08may1997 Joint Statement of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Connection with the Signing of the Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria
04oct1992 **The Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP)**	04oct1992 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique
21nov2006 **Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006**	21nov2006 Comprehensive Agreement concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
15apr1995 **Accord e´tablissant une paix définitive entre le gouvernement de la republique du Niger et lórganisation de la résistance armée**	15apr1995 Accord établissant une paix définitive entre le Gouvernement de la République du Niger et l'Organisation de la Résistance Armée
30aug2001 **Bougainville Peace Agreement**	30aug2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement
02sep1996 **Mindanao Final Agreement**	02sep1996 Final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
18aug1992 **The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law**	18aug1992 Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF on the Rule of Law
04aug1993 **Arusha Accords**	04aug1993 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front ('Arusha Agreement')

10nov2000 **Abuja Ceasefire Agreement**	10nov2000 Agreement of Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities between the Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) ('Abuja Ceasefire Agreement')
30nov1996 **Abidjan Peace Agreement**	30nov1996 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan ('Abidjan Accord')
07jul1999 **Lomé Peace Agreement**	07jul1999 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) (Lome Agreement)
27mar1993 **Addis Ababa Agreement**	27mar1993 Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia
22dec1997 **The Cairo Declaration on Somalia**	22dec1997 Cairo Declaration on Somalia
26nov2008 **Decision of the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement**	25nov2008 Decision on the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement
18nov1993 **Interim Constitution**	18nov1993 South African Constitution of 1993 (Interim Constitution)
25sep2003 **Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period**	25sep2003 Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period
26may2004 **Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on Power Sharing**	26may2004 Protocol between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing
09jan2005 **Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement**	09jan2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Naivasha Agreement)

18jun2005 **Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Agreement)**	18jun2005 Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Cairo Agreement)
05may2006 **Darfur Peace Agreement**	05may2006 Darfur Peace Agreement
23dec1996 **Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E.S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik-Opposition, S.A. Huri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow 23 December 1996**	23dec1996 Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikstan, E.S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik-Opposition, S.A.Huri, on the Results of the Meeting held in Moscow on 23 December 1996
21feb1997 **Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation**	21feb1997 Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation
18may1997 **Protocol on political issues**	18may1997 Protocol on Political Issues
27jun1997 **The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan**	27jun1997 General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan
24dec2002 **Yumbe Peace Agreement**	24dec2002 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the National Rescue Front II (Yumbe Peace Agreement)
02may2007 **Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army/Movement**	02may2007 Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the LRA/M
10apr1998 **The Good Friday Agreement**	10apr1998 The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations (Good Friday Agreement or Belfast Agreement)
03jun1999 **Kosovo peace agreement 1**	03jun1999 Kosovo Peace Plan