PAPER ONE
The discursive and social power of news discourse – the case of Aljazeera in comparison and parallel with the BBC and CNN

"Language makes possible the disclosure of the human world."
(Taylor 1995: ix)

1. Introduction

The analysis of media discourse from a critical viewpoint has mostly centered on the selection of particular texts and the scrutiny of their discursive features which are used as indicators of the sociocultural practices and contexts. Discursive practices are critically analyzed based on their grammatical functionality to infer the practices of discourse particularly at the macro levels of production and consumption. Mainstream Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) literature focuses excessively on different segments of textual material. Prominent discourse analysts consider news discourse in terms of mainly grammatical features, topics, or themes to sort out their textual materials and organize their discussions (c.f. Fowler 1990; Fowler and Kress 1979; Kress 1994; Fowler et al. 1979; van Dijk 1988a, 1988b; Fairclough 1995, 1989, 1998). In this study, I argue that for the sake of plausibility, critical readings of media texts, particularly the hard news type, have to be grounded in the interplay between the discursive and the social mainly through ethnographic observation and analysis.

This is not because critical analysts do not recognize the significance of sources other than selected textual materials. On the contrary, they have long acknowledged the importance of discourse practices at macro discoursal levels of production, aiming to understand the social world of discourse ethnographically by closely observing the experiences of those creating it. For example, van Dijk (1988b), Gee et al (1992) Gee (2001) and Hodge (1979) urge analysts not to wholly rely on textual evidence in order to arrive at the social assumptions behind textual materials. Fairclough (2003), though he does not use ethnography in his CDA, urges researchers to resort to it whenever possible (c.f. also Martin and Wodak 2003; Blommaert 2005; Flowerdew 2008). Relying solely on the language of the text as a final product conceals how ideological power is discursively exercised in media organizations producing it. A CDA study

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of how and why systematically repeated discursive patterns are manufactured in news is certain to shed much more light on the holders of editorial power in media organizations. As Wieder and Prat (1990) point out critical analysts need to have a fairly good idea of who the writers are and what they are doing in order to make sense of what they have done or written.

This study pursues a textual analysis of the online news output of mainly Aljazeer (henceforth the term is used to refer to the network’s English and Arabic channels) in comparison and parallel with the online news output of both the BBC and CNN. But the study steers away from mainstream CDA literature by focusing on aspects other than texts. The analysis, as we shall see, triangulates CDA with ethnographic research which includes observation, stories, field visits, interviews and important secondary data such as media reports and samples from style guidelines. The ethnographic angle is found to be crucial in unraveling both the social and discursive worlds of Aljazeera, the BBC and CNN. It has helped the researcher to draw conclusions that extend and occasionally contradict commonly held views with regard to how the three networks create and disseminate hard news and the ideas and concepts mainstream CDA literature employs to explain and understand these processes. I will start first by laying down the theoretical and methodological framework of the study through a concise overview of the literature and the thinkers CDA scholars have relied on to develop the discipline. Then I discuss CDA’s limitations before detailing the scope of issues and questions the study wants to answer. Thereafter, I deal with the issues of method and data before moving to a detailed critical analysis of Aljazeera, comparing and paralleling the findings with my earlier publications and within the context of its two international rivals, namely the BBC and CNN.

1.1 Macro vs. micro discourse levels

Investigations at the macro-level of discourse are lacking in CDA literature. Much of the critical focus has centered on how to obtain the ideological significance and meaning of discourses through an analysis of micro-textual elements such as lexis and grammar. Discourse significance lies in the interaction between language as a micro-structure and its broader context as a macro-structure. Fowler (1991: 228) says if critical analysts are fundamentally concerned with the ideological significance of news, “it will be immensely important to study that discourse’s relationships with its journalists’ sources”. “This means,” according to Fowler (1991: 90), “finding out what one can about the institutional and economic structure of the newspaper industry, its political relations, and the political or other relevant circumstances of the events being reported, and so on.” Discourse is a reflection of social reality and as Berger and Luckmann (1966) point out empirical facts and factors intervene in its
Fairclough (1989: 37), aware of the significance of this interaction, constructs a theory in which he connects the orders of discourse – a Foucualt’s (1971) term referring to motives and conventions of how discursive patterns are selected from a variety of available linguistic options – and their relationships with the orders of society. He finds a dialectical relationship between the two and says critical investigations involving both are better positioned to reveal “power relationships and … power struggle” and how discursive structures are determined by the power holders who see their authority over discourse as a means to sustain their power.

But Fairclough, like other prominent critical analysts, relies mainly on the micro-elements of discourse to reveal the social forces behind their selection. Fairclough does draw a distinction between internal and external relations of power but his revelations focus almost solely on features of the discursive practices of political discourse and its relations with other orders of discourse, i.e. how discourse orders interface between various macro-aspects influencing the selection, inclusion and absence of discursive practices. My argument is that critical investigations relying on the internal features of texts and their micro lexical and grammatical elements to expose the external or macro relations of news discourse, no matter how thorough, will fail to give a good picture of how inter macro and micro relations of power are exercised. And to my knowledge this has been a gap which prominent critical analysts and thinkers have recognized but hardly operationalized (c.f. Thompson 1991). Fairclough (2003: 15-16) is mindful of this shortcoming in CDA literature, hence his belief that

{textual analysis is best framed within ethnography. To assess the causal and ideological effects of texts, one would need to frame textual analysis within, for example, organizational analysis, and link the ‘micro’ analysis of texts to the ‘macro’ analysis of how power relations work across networks of practices and structures.}

1.2 Context and discourse

CDA pays due attention to the context in which the discourse is used and how it is recontextualized. An analysis of the text in CDA terms has to bear in mind the relations the discursive patterns have to the social and historical context (Fairclough 2003; Wodak 2002). This “backstage knowledge”, according to Chilton (2004: 154), is important because all the essential elements of discourse, e.g. writer/speaker, reader/listener/viewer, make sense of the text in relation to their previous experiences,
knowledge and even future expectations. Discourse has a tremendous ability to contextualize and recontextualize. Once carried from one location to another, transmuted from one form to another, handled by rival institutions, etc. it invites a new reading (c.f. Fairclough 2003; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Blackledge 2005; Barkho 2006). Some CDA analysts go as far as saying that “as soon as one writes or speaks about any social practice, one is already recontextualizing. The moment we are recontextualizing, we are transforming and creating other practices,” (Caldas-Coulthard and Carmen 2003: 276).

1.3 Voices and discourse

When discourse is contextualized, voices taking part in it do not enjoy equal opportunity to power, emphasis and authority. Hard news discourse is an ‘amalgam’ of voices, as we shall see, and to understand how these voices operate I will turn to the Russian philosopher Bakhtin (1994; 1984). Discourse for Bakhtin is not a set of shapes or structures. It is always material and social practices and to understand it properly one has to examine how people use it. Therefore any speech or writing (Bakhtin uses the term utterance) is always a dialogue involving several elements: speaker, writer, listeners/readers and the type of relations between them. In his theory, Bakhtin contrasts and parallels his concept of dialogue with that of monologue which includes utterances written or spoken by a single person or entity.

Analyzing literary texts, namely the novel genre, Bakhtin arrives at concepts which have become central in literary and critical analyses in various social science disciplines. Central to his theory are notions of dialogism and heteroglossia in which utterances or discourses even at the micro level of single words are an interaction of voices situated in their contexts. He contrasts both notions with monologism or monoglossia, the discourse of a single and unified source. Two other important Bakhtinian notions, I find quite appropriate in analyzing news, are the discoursal forces, which he terms centripetal and centrifugal. Both, he says, are in operation, when language is used, with the centripetal force prone to bring elements, whether social or discursive, closer to the central monologic point, while the centrifugal force has the propensity of spreading these elements towards a multiple, varied and dialogic central point:

*Every utterance participates in the “unitary language” (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). Such is the fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a school and so forth. It is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of any utterances, once*
having exposed it as a tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in language (Bakhtin, 1981: 272)

We are aware that hard news discourse is of multiple voices but need to see how these voices are represented, their delineations, how discoursal forces tend to navigate within media organizations producing discourse and whether these voices push the social and discursive elements towards the center of power in an organization or in different directions. Bakhtin does not specifically speak about news discourse in his theory. His focus is literature, particularly the novel genre. He uses the concepts in his own work of literary theory. But they do not apply only to literature as for Bakhtin language in itself operates in dialogical relationships and can be realized not only in entire utterances but also in any meaningful fragment of an utterance including a single word, “if we hear in that word another person’s voice” (1973: 152). Voices in the news have at least four discursive levels at their disposal to use for expression (Barkho 2007) but since they are discursively and socially contextualized within the news discourse, this transformation, Bakhtin (1984: 78) tells us, in one of his often-quoted statements, must invite a new reading:

The speech of another, once enclosed in a context, is – no matter how accurately transmitted – always subject to certain semantic changes. The context embracing another’s word is responsible for its dialogising background, whose influence can be very great.

Bakhtin draws our attention in the above quote to the divisions and relationships that may exist between the voice doing the reporting, whether verbatim or paraphrase, and the voice being reported. Fairclough (1995: 58) uses the phrase “boundary maintenance” to distinguish between primary and secondary voices and says their merging in media discourse can mean the merging of the voices as if they were employing a somewhat similar discursive and social practice despite the fact that they are divergent in actual reality. While it is easy to keep the voices apart discursively, it is rather difficult to divide them socially. Discursively, the boundary between the speech doing the reporting and the speech being reported is quite obvious in news at the quoting level of discourse but as Bakhtin says that boundary may not be that visible contextually. At the paraphrasing level, the boundaries are blurred both discursively and socially due to grammatical transformations such as back-shifting and the use of totally new words and utterances to represent the original speech. Paraphrasing furnishes new discursive elements and weaves them into new contexts as do other layers of news discourse such as background, comment and even quoting (Barkho 2007; 2008a).
1.4 The novel and hard news

While Bakhtin helps us to understand and clarify how language or discourse operates in novels, this study attempts to extend the notion to how discourse functions in hard news. Bakhtin has left indelible remarks on critical studies in general and is one of the oft-cited thinkers in CDA. But operationalizing Bakhtin has to bear in mind the discursive and social differences between the novel and media discourses particularly the hard type of news. Clearly, language and discourse do not operate in the same manner in novels and hard news. They are two different genres and their assumptions and perceptions of how meaning is created are not the same.

CDA analysts, operationalizing Bakhtin, seldom offer a comparison between what a novel does and what a hard news story does. Bakhtin’s point of departure is the differences that set poetry, as an aesthetic and beautiful genre, and novel as a rhetorical form, apart. A concise and short discussion of the divisions between the discourses of the novel and hard news discursively and contextually might be in order. True, hard news, like the novel, can also be called a ‘story’ but they operate at two quite different levels dialogically, discursively, and contextually. The discourses of both are presentational, but their representations of material and social practices diverge at more than one level.

Novel prose is encompassing and may include many of the discursive patterns that are among the most distinguishing features of hard news. But hard news stories are much more restrictive discursively and schematically. Novel writers produce discourse with the aim of persuading, passing judgments, opinion, views and arguing, while hard news writers ostensibly shun these pursuits and claim their only purpose is to ‘inform.’ While the dialogism of the novel is discursively created by one single author, there is almost always more than one hand (perhaps several hands) involved in the discursive structure of hard news dialogue. The sources in the novel and their discourses are mostly ‘fictional’ in nature which the author himself/herself creates; hard news sources are supposed to have real world representations, sometimes quoted verbatim and others paraphrased by the journalist. Novel prose is ‘timeless’ with sometimes a universal appeal to fit different times and different audiences. Hard news, on the other hand, is ‘transient’ in the sense its validity is short-lived (mostly 24 hours) and it is seldom of a universal appeal.

Divisions between the two discourses are discernible at other more important discursive and contextual levels. Reporters, who produce hard news discourse, are members of institutions and their professional achievements and even livelihood often depend on their ‘acquiescence’ to institutional rules and duties. These institutions have their own contextual and discursive ‘checks and balances’ some of them put in place by
the institutional power holders and others can be traced to the geo- and socio-political contexts of these institutions. Novel discourse writers may have their own constraints but the spontaneity of hard news discourse places its creators under a lot of pressure to meet the demands set by editorial power holders, competition from rivals over scoops, being first to report, etc. Other divisions relate to hierarchical power in place in both the newsroom and the field with bureau chiefs and senior correspondents having the upper hand in the field and senior editors having the upper hand in the newsroom to the extent that often very little of the initial author’s contextual and discursive practices remain in hard news discourse output. Novelists, on the other hand, exercise much of the hierarchical power media institutions exercise whether in the field or the newsroom by themselves.

One other major division relates to the target of discourse. Bakhtin (1984) points out that in fictional discourse writers and speakers direct their dialogism towards readers and listeners. In news discourse, reporters apparently first direct their dialogism towards the holders of editorial power by first trying to mould the news in a way that meets the social and discursive conditions of their style guidelines.

This is not an exhaustive list of divisions between the novel and hard news, but they are enough to say that critical analysts need to approach Bakhtin from a somewhat different angle than that of literary criticism of the novel. This is not to say that Bakhtin is not aware of the dialogism of hard news discourse or that his notions are not applicable here due to these differences. On the contrary, operationalizing Bakhtin, while bearing these divisions in mind, is most illuminating, as we shall see. As Zappen (1996: 66) says Bakhtin’s notions of “context, utterance, and dialogue as a broad concept (are) applicable to all human discourse.”

One of the key issues to address, as Bakhtin has done in his study of Dostoevsky, is to spend time exploring the representing authorial discourse of news. The exploration should attempt to answer questions like whether the bylines represent the exact authors. If they do not, how then can we differentiate between the authorial voice and other voices in the news? The degree of the autonomy authorial voices enjoy in creating news discourse? What relationships are there between the authorial voice and the discourse of the voices reported? How much power the reported voices have in the creation of the discursive and social elements of discourse in comparison to the authorial power?

1.5 Investigating role of power in news discourse

Another key theoretical paradigm underpinning this study, besides Bakhtin, relates
to the theoretical and methodological framework French sociologist Bourdieu has developed to clarify relations of power in language and discourse. I argue that a marriage between Bakhtin’s dialogism and Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field and symbolic violence is most suitable to clarify and understand the workings of discourse in global broadcasters like the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera. The divisions between the novel, Bakhtin’s object of analysis, and hard news discourse, the core output of these global broadcasters, necessitates augmenting Bakhtin with Bourdieu’s notions of the dynamic relationships between the discursive and social elements of discourse. Bourdieu is not only a theorist. He is also a methodologist and field analyst who relies on extensive ethnographic observation to formulate his concepts. Bourdieu is the philosopher who provides the methodological framework on how to apply his own concepts through extensive ethnographic research. The Weight of the World (1999), one of his most defining books of the 20th century, includes dozens of interviews and encounters with people living in squalor conditions, on the dole, performing menial jobs which Bourdieu intersperses with essays that have helped to propel him into one of the world’s most acclaimed sociologists.

Bourdieu’s advice to CDA scholars is that reliance on textual material alone is not enough to clarify the role of symbolic violence, hegemony and common sense that occur in discourses among them media. A proper understanding of discourse requires investigating the institutional contexts in which it is produced:

*It follows that any analysis of ideologies in the narrow sense of ‘legitimizing discourses’ which fails to include an analysis of the corresponding institutional mechanisms is liable to be no more than a contribution to the efficacy of those ideologies.*

(Bourdieu 1990: 133)

Bourdieu believes, and so argues this author, that two stages will have to be involved to unravel the powers and ideologies of discourse. Discourse has at least two main actors in news: the actors with power to issue discursive instructions and the actors with lesser power who are to transform the instructions into news reports. Bourdieu uses the example of a game where the players, though under obligation to comply with the rules, still have some room to improvise:

*The source resides neither in consciousness nor in things but in the relationship between two stages of the social, that is, between the history objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and in the history incarnated in bodies, in the form of that system of enduring dispositions which I call habitus.*

(Bourdieu 1990: 190)
Thompson (1991: 28-29) in the kind of a ‘veiled warning’ which unfortunately CDA scholars have apparently ignored summarizes Bourdieu’s position as follows:

_it would be superficial (at best) to analyze political discourses or ideologies by focusing on the utterances as such, without reference to the constitution of the political field and the relations between this field and the broader space of social positions and processes. This kind of ‘internal analysis’ is commonplace … as exemplified by … attempts to apply some form of semiotics or ‘discourse analysis’ to political speeches … all such attempts … take for granted but fail to take account of the sociological conditions within which the object of analysis is produced, constructed and received._

Fairclough agrees with Thompson and the quotation above is prominently highlighted in his seminal _Language and power_ (989: 177). He says mainstream CDA literature has overlooked many aspects of Bourdieu’s concepts by failing to operationalize them properly. But he later argues (2003) that while social theorists (such as Bourdieu, Derrida, Bernstein, Foucault, Giddens, Gramsci and Habermas) draw particular attention to the crucial role of language in society, they do not examine the linguistic features of texts. My argument is that Bakhtin extensively examines the discourse of the novel genre and other thinkers, particularly Bourdieu go as far as questioning the validity of analyses solely based on textual evidence. Therefore, this study holds that a critical analysis of the discursive features and practices of discourse, though important, has to add empirical evidence that goes beyond the textual materials if the analysis is going to have the required reliability and validity to be fed back to the objects under investigation. Therefore, CDA should also examine how media organizations arrive at the sets of social assumptions and discursive practices and what prompts them to make specific textual choices. In other words we need to know how editors and journalists make sense of their world and how they experience that world in their discourse. “It often makes sense to use discourse analysis in conjunction with other forms of analysis, for instance ethnography or forms of institutional analysis” (Fairclough 2003: 2). I argue that blending Bakhtin and Bourdieu can help clarify how power is enacted in the discourse of global media organizations which are the target of this study. This we can do by visiting the journalists in their organizations, talking to them and trying to get hold of their instruction manuals and guidelines. The ethnographic data can be used as part of the case study to grasp an idea about editorial power holders and how they exercise their discoursal power. A media outlet’s macro world plays a pivotal role in how discourse is transmuted and shaped before it reaches the consumers. Critical analysts have broadly neglected approaching this world ethnographically relying mostly on textual evidence, i.e. using the final product as a means to reach the broader social assumptions and processes.
1.6 Power and ‘systems’

How ‘systems’ control people’s lives plays an important part in Habermas’s analysis of modern capitalist society (1984; 1989). Habermas in fact uses the word ‘colonization’ to characterize the way these systems, i.e. institutions or organizations, their power and money and even discourse control and shape our life. We could easily add, and this can be gleaned from Habermas’s analysis, that words or discourse for certain institutions are as important in the process of ‘colonization’ as physical power, money and armies.

In a modern capitalist society, Habermas says, our lives are not free as we are made to believe because of the power the ‘systems’ play in having us do and not do things. We rarely are aware of how the holders of this power control our lives. We grow to accept what the “systems” impose on us as natural and common-sense. In this respect, the concept of hegemony (Garfinkel 1967; forgacs 1988, Gramsci 1971) is also helpful as a theory of power and domination. It emphasizes that there are two major ways through which individuals and organizations exercise their power, coercion and consent; it is the latter to which power holders resort in reinstating their cultural and social dominance, mainly through discourse (Said 1979). The hegemony model in media organizations has mostly been analyzed and arrived at in the light of how diverse discursive practices of discourse are articulated and how they can be linked to those sustaining relations of power. I argue that for one to see how consent, which is a form of hegemonization, is expressed or rather represented, it is necessary to examine the strings connecting the holders of editorial power with the holders of political and economic power and the struggle of both on how to win the consent of the mass of reporters and audiences.

1.7 The business narrative factor

Organizational discourse or textuality as it is sometimes referred to has received a lot of attention recently in business and management studies as critical analysts’ work on discourse-power relationships is acknowledged across social science disciplines (c.f Czaniawska, 1966; Gabriel 1995; De Certeau, 1988; Georgekopoulou 2007). These studies show that organizations can be studied and understood by investigating their discourse. The discourse and stories of the more powerful, more influential and more domineering elements, these studies tell us, construct organizations from a social and cultural point of view. But these studies rely mainly on the discourse power holders produce. And they have a point because the organizations they study aim to maximize profits or production of mainly physical commodities, the thing that sets them apart from media organizations investigated in this study whose writ is the production of
cultural and social commodities with their own distinctive features and traits (c.f. Picard 2002; Caves 2001).

Institutional identity can be established through the discourses and stories of power holders (c.f. Czarniawska 2004, Brown 2006, Boje, 2006, Barry and Elmes, 1997) but this paper argues that in the case of media companies bent on discourse production that is not enough. To establish that identity, we need to examine the discourse or stories they sell and selling discourse is the core business of organizations like the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera. A study of a network like Aljazeera, for example, will have to note that at an early stage the prevalence of two discourses, the one spoken or written by power holders and the one they persuade the mass of reporters to produce and sell. And this is what sets this study apart as it examines the discourse of power holders as well as the discourse the much lesser powerful elements churn out and trade. This is a major characteristic which international broadcasters like Aljazeera, the BBC and CNN share and which clearly distinguishes them from firms involved in the production of physical things.

Power as a notion affecting strategy and positioning receives prominent attention in business literature (c.f Hardy and Clegg 1966, Pfeffer 1981). In the preface to his book Power In and Around Organizations, Mintzberg (1983: xv) notes:

> Power in and around organizations is a subject which interests all kinds of scholars — management theorists, sociologists, political science, economists, lawyers, philosophers, anthropologists — not to mention the practitioners themselves who work in organizations.

Mintzberg’s “in and around organizations” can be interpreted as the presence of internal and external holders of power who would like to see the organization being steered in a path that suits their interests, aims or ambitions. In the case of media organizations, external and perhaps a few internal actors, will represent the macro-aspects of discourse — those who decide the dos and don’ts of discursive practices and the mass of internal actors would include the floor reporters and producers and even editors whose task is to make sure that discoursal production includes all the options editorial power holders have made with regard to the array of available discursive practices. In a media setting, involving organizations like the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera, critical analysts are required to re-examine their assumptions about the dialectical and interactive relationships of the hierarchy of newsroom power and in turn the discoursal authority.
1.8 Strategic positioning and discourse

Another area where critical analysts can make use of is the business management literature in order to assess the basic strategic conceptions organizations pursue. There is empirical evidence that the strategic positioning of a firm influences its standing among competitors and impact on markets (c.f. Johnson and Scholes 1999; Porter 1980; Whittington 1989; Whittington and Whipp 2001). Broadly, strategy scholars identify four basic approaches or perspectives. The first, called classical, views strategic plans, leadership, and production and profit maximization as stable, formal and irreversible. The second, called processual, is crafted and changeable relying much on learning with marked influences from psychology and internal politics. The third approach is called evolutionary which is Darwinian in character paying more attention to the external or market factors than internal forces. The last perspective is called systemic which is an embedded approach concentrating on the local characters such as society and culture with roots in sociology (c.f. Whittington 2001).

One way to arrive at the kind of strategic perspective an organization pursues is to examine mainly power holders’ discourses and stories through interviews. Critical discourse literature has rarely examined a media firm’s strategic positioning and the impact that strategy may have on discourse. It is likely to be very illuminating to our critical analyses if we try to find out how media firms position themselves from a strategic point of view when analyzing their discourse critically.

How power is played out in discourse has been at the center of media critical studies since their emergence in the early 1970s. But as outlined above these studies have avoided using insights from business literature to delve into the media firms’ discourse. Critical discourse analyses of media texts have centered on the description of the discursive practices available in these texts and how this description can be used to arrive not only at the texts’ social assumptions but also those of the authors and their institutions. But while the texts have received tremendous attention, attempts to analyze the institutions producing them and the power relations between their actors have been sorely lacking. And this state of affairs, I argue, has hindered the discipline from operationalizing propositions by social science philosophers at the level of discourse media institutions employ and sell. While scholarly work is abundant on the analysis of textual material, little is known on how and why media institutions choose those particular discursive practices and not others (c.f. Bhatia et al. 2008; Flowerdew 2008).
2. Limitations of Critical Discourse Analysis

The discussion in the above two sections shows that critical analysts have yet to operationalize and apply social science theory concepts, particularly those by Bakhtin and Bourdieu. For these reasons, the analyses and findings of critical research so far relying mainly on pan-textual investigation in search for ideological power in discourse have been criticized. Critics charge that discourse scholars read too much into the language of the texts they analyze and in order to arrive at the major features of power they examine a wide array of linguistic structures whose ideological power consequences appear to be the same in different texts (Simpson 1993; Fish 1981). More criticism has centered on the narrow perspective to textual material as most studies would select two or three stories to identify their discursive features and links with the sociocultural context (c.f. Bell 1991; Fowler 1991, 1985; Fairclough 1995; Kress and Hodge 1979).

Other problems, which critics say are plaguing CDA, despite its focus on inequality and ideological power manifestations particularly in media texts, include the almost total reliance on the First World with regard both to the theorists furnishing the conceptual frameworks and the selection of material for analysis. In other words, as Blommaert (2005) argues, CDA has become almost the exclusive arena for the voices of the First World while those from the Third World are almost totally ignored. When Aljazeera Arabic (henceforth AljA) started in 1996, it raised the motto of giving “voice to the voiceless” that is the Arab speaking part of the Third World. When Aljazeera English (henceforth AljE) hit the airwaves in 2006, it adopted the same motto this time to provide a voice to the “voiceless” in the impoverished south.”

Even harsher criticism has come from Schelgloff (1997), Widdowson (1995, 1998, 2000) and Toolan (2002), warning against the dangers of bias in CDA and charging that CDA makes it possible for researchers to arrive at foregone conclusions due to their own ideological positions, and the selection for analysis only the textual samples backing that particular position by subjecting them to complex analyses which only a few can comprehend.

CDA scholars are aware of the criticism but some like van Dijk (2001: 96) remain unperturbed. Since CDA is concerned with social problems, then it must be represented as “discourse analysis with attitude … CDA does not deny, but explicitly defines and defends its own sociopolitical position. That is, CDA is biased – and proud of it.” Other CDA scholars agree (c.f. Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Meyer 2001). They counter that since it is rather difficult to conduct research that is free from ideological assumptions and judgments, CDA has to start from a pre-ordained ideological position.
But most recently, scholars have begun taking the criticism seriously and have attempted to devise new methodological frameworks to respond to CDA limitations. Bhatia et al (2008) and Flowerdew (2008), for example, see CDA as of a controversial nature since analysts have so far failed to argue that their results and findings should be of some practical use so that they can be relayed to the objects of their analyses. They contend that feeding the findings back to the objects of analysis is not yet possible because there is more to be done for the findings to be right.

Reliance on a selected number of texts denies critical analysts the necessary validity and reliability demonstrating that the discursive features and their social assumptions have a systematic tendency over an extended period of time in response to the mechanism and games of discoursal power. Several questions are left unanswered in analyses with ‘biased’ and ‘pre-ordained’ and ‘foregone’ conclusions in relation to the motivations behind the selection of particular discursive practices, the role of the groups with an interest in having them produced in that particular way, who makes the choice and why, and how and in what context.

This undue emphasis on the part of critical analysts on the analysis of textual material and lack of practical procedures to alleviate the risk of bias has alienated members of media practitioner community, who see little ‘credibility’ in the results and findings of these analyses as they overlook the real processes involved in how texts are actually produced. “You take one or two of our stories and write several thousand words about them while we produce hundreds of stories every day,” says BBC World’s Head of News Richard Porter. BBC College of Journalism’s Director Vin Ray says academics overlook many aspects of news discourse in their studies. “They (academics) are critical but they rarely come up with an alternative means of telling … stories.”

Senior editors, particularly the ones with the power of selecting and imposing discursive features, do not share views commonly held by critical analysts with regard to bias or lack of impartiality and balance. For the BBC, for example, crucial issues like these cannot be determined through the analysis of a few stories. “Balance comes over time,” says the corporation’s Head of Region, Africa and Middle East Jerry Timmins. BBC’s producers’ guidelines say the corporation’s ambition is to provide balance over a long period, adds BBC’s Senior Editorial Adviser Malcolm Balen.

2.1 Issues to solve

The preceding review raises numerous issues on the conceptual, business, operational and practitioner levels. This study’s theoretical and methodological framework draws heavily on the following dimensions in order to understand how ideological power is
sustained and reproduced in media discourse.

- CDA in this study is not confined to textual material. It is framed within ethnography involving both ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of discourse. The causal effects of ideology and power can be best assessed if framed within organizational analysis where the two discoursal levels are linked. I find the merger of discursive and ethnographic practices in analyzing discourse interaction as quite suitable to reveal how power relations work across the different editorial levels of media organizations (Barkho 2008; 2007).

- Power considerations come to the fore in the presence of divergent and conflicting discursive practices where voices with power normally have the privilege of positive and ‘benign’ discourse while the ‘powerless’ are bestowed with negative or ‘malignant’ discourse. But this discursive ‘rule’ prominently highlighted in CDA literature as formulating and being formulated by social reality has its exceptions (Barkho 2008; 2007).

- Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism of speech and writing are suitable tools for analysis when merged with Bourdieu’s notions of habitus, field and symbolic violence and how discourse shapes and is shaped by social reality.

The theoretical and methodological framework is set in a manner to respond to the issues raised above. These are summarized in the 10 points below which also represent the type of questions this study raises and attempts to answer:

1. What kind of relationship exists between the internal and external holders of discoursal power?

2. How is discoursal power opposed or resisted in media organizations and does this discoursal power struggle take place within or outside the organization?

3. How is power enacted among the two major actors holding it?

4. What strategic perspective does a media firm assume in its approach and how does this strategic positioning influence the discoursal power and authority?
5. How are the dialectal ties of discourse played out with regard to certain discursive practices? How is this relationship established in terms of coercive and persuasive power?

6. How are social structures and discursive patterns shaped in media discourse with relation to editorial power holders, discourse producers and consumers?

7. When and how does a change or twist in media-related social structures occur and what impact will that change have on discursive practices and the interests of power holders?

8. How are discursive practices employed through the different tiers of discourse in terms of social and linguistic consciousness?

9. What degree of power do the mass of reporters exercise in media institutions and how do editorial power holders see and assess their position?

10. How hidden and unclear are power relations enacted in media discourse and at which levels of discourse they can be described as covert?

3. Data and method

This study pursues CDA as a major method to analyze Aljazeera’s online news output and have it compared whenever possible with that of the BBC and CNN. The approach is designed in a manner to respond to as many of the criticisms of CDA as possible. Similarly with the scope of the data. The aim is first to answer the research questions and then provide a new perspective less prone to criticism and more credible in the eyes of discourse practitioners with regard to the sociocultural and institutional links and contexts and the selection of discursive features. It tries to respond to the criticism lodged against CDA and which the discipline’s opponents have used to pillory the discipline. Moreover, it attempts to ally the misgivings practitioners have about CDA and the questions they raise regarding its research methods, data and findings.

The task at first glance may look formidable and impractical. But the scrutiny of CDA’s limitations and the criticism mounted against it make this difficult task doable. Therefore for an adequate CDA of media discourse to be practical it has to be selective in its choice of analytical framework and settle on a limited number of desiderata of functional grammatical categories rather than include as many of them as possible. This study concentrates essentially on lexis and occasionally draws on
a few other functional linguistic features when vocabulary fails to address issues raised in section 3. Focusing only on a limited number of discursive features out of the array of desiderata available for analysis will enable the analyst to spend more time triangulating data and method for the sake of validity and reliability (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).

Politicizing has been one of the main charges lobbed at CDA which the critics attribute to the lack of triangulation in analysis. Weiss and Wodak (2003: 22) have attempted to respond to the criticism by suggesting a triangulatory approach comprising four levels or stages of analysis. They urge analysts to tackle extra-linguistic and broader socio-political and historical issues in investigating a text’s language and its intertextuality. But the authors stop short of calling on analysts to assume the role of observant participants in institutions producing discourse or holding interviews with the speakers and writers, the approaches which are the mainstay of the analysis of this study. The fact that three international broadcasters are included in the study along with three sets of data and the fact that it focuses on a giant Third World broadcaster, namely Aljazeera, is to solidify the triangulatory approach, helping the researcher “to ask the same questions of another body of data, to explore whether things work the same way there” or differently (Johnstone 2007: 22).

3.1 Visiting and observing

I spent a fortnight (12 May to 26 May 2007) in the newsrooms of AljA founded in 1996 and AljE launched on November 15, 2006. The access was almost unfettered. During my two-week stay at Aljazeera, I was also given the chance to play the role of a participant observer (Silverman, 2006; Delamont 2004). I freely moved around, used the available facilities. I was assigned a special desk with a laptop in a room where senior information officers had their desks. I attended two editorial meetings and had access to AljA and AljE’s internal style guidelines, portions of which are analyzed below. And apart from the most senior editors, who I needed to meet through appointments, I had the opportunity to talk to employees whether off or on the record.

3.2 The researcher’s role

This study is essentially qualitative in nature despite the occasional reliance on frequency counts of certain lexical items and other discursive patterns such as headlines, quoting, paraphrasing, etc. But the counts, as Johnstone (2007: 22) tells us, will be meaningless “if not grounded in qualitative analysis.” And all qualitative researchers are philosophers in the sense that human beings are led by “highly abstract
principles” and not factual or objective theorems (Bateson 1972 cited in Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 20). Qualitative research is hermeneutic and interpretive research through which subjects (investigators) strive to record as accurately as possible the meanings those researched give to their life and experiences. The way to achieve this aim, according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), relies on the subjective meaning derived from the written and verbal texts. This subjectivity has haunted qualitative research since its birth in early 20th century.

As such there is always the risk for biases, values and judgments of the researcher to creep into the study. It is important therefore to explicitly state how close the subject of the study has been to the objects and the texts examined. Locke, Spirduos and Silverman (1987) urge qualitative researchers to be as open as possible to alleviate the risk of subjectivity. I was no stranger to the three global broadcasters and already had some idea of news gathering, processing and producing. I was a Reuters bureau chief for seven years and a staff writer at the Associated Press and Dow-Jones News wires for three years before moving to academia. I also need to stress that although my mother tongue is not Arabic, I speak the language fluently and have translated and published two major works – one on literary criticism and the other on archaeology – into it. My reporting background knowledge of how news is manufactured and my fluency in Arabic closed the distance between me and my informants who were happy to know that they were talking to someone who once was more or less in a similar situation.

Why did I choose the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera? The choice of setting, in the words of Holliday (2002:9), “is central for qualitative research.” There are plenty of companies of the sort selected for this study. But it was not hard to choose since the three companies selected here are more representative of the research strategy when measured in terms of ratings and world-wide influence. Moreover the inclusion of Aljazeera shifts part of CDA focus from the First World to the Third World, making it possible to see how a leading Third World global broadcaster shapes its discourse in comparison to global counterparts from the First World. Initially, there was a lot of resistance to grant the degree of access that would have satisfied the needs of the research (Barkho 2006). The companies expressed fears that their strategies and practices might be exposed via an in-depth investigation meant to bring to light their innate discursive and social assumptions.

While my previous experience as a journalist worked quite well with the respondents, it was first viewed with skeptical eyes by the executives who only agreed to be interviewed on condition that the information will strictly be used for academic and not journalistic purposes. Another condition was to let them have a look at the citations to make sure that no sensitive information would pass to rivals. The three
broadcasters are tough competitors in a market with relatively easy entry particularly in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 attacks as Western powers rushed to win the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims the world over, using television and the Internet as their major media.

3.3 Textual material

To boost the study’s validity and reliability, hard news stories dealing with Israeli-Palestinian issue and the Iraq war run by Aljazeera, the BBC and CNN websites for a period of over 130 days, nearly four and a half months (15 March to 31 July, 2007), were collected and subjected to critical analysis. AljA had 203 stories on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and 295 stories on the Iraq war. AljE had 116 on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 117 on the Iraq war. The BBC had 183 stories on Iraq and 178 on Israel and Palestine. BBC Arabic had 199 stories on Iraq war and 253 stories on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. CNN Arabic had 286 stories on Iraq and 90 on the Palestinian and Israeli issue while CNN International stories were 131 on Iraq and 88 on Israel and Palestine (Table 1). The aim was two fold: first to provide a quantitative comparison of the volume of related material the three broadcasters put out in both Arabic and English and also shed some light on the frequency of how some discursive features have been produced over this period. CDA has rarely been about counting (Gee 2001) but indicating even a crude form of frequency of occurrence may signal some sort of consistency in the way media represent certain groups and the kind of ideology and power they espouse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israel/Palestine</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers of articles</td>
<td>Column Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC Arabic</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AljA</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AljE</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN Inter.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN Arabic</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At face value, the table above indicates that BBC Arabic has more Israel and Palestine stories (253) than AljA (203) and CNN Arabic (90). Similarly AljA has more Iraq related stories (295) than CNN Arabic (268) and BBC Arabic (199). But frequency counts like these, no matter how accurate, rarely give an even-handed picture of how voices in the story are represented. Even a count of the times voices are mentioned, or volume of space given to each, will fail to assess equity and balance of reporting (Fairclough 1995). It is the assessment of how different voices are represented in discourse, the social and cultural implications of such representations at the levels of discourse and discursive practices and their motivations which matter.

3.4 Media as a source

To further triangulate data and method, the websites of major British, U.S. and Arabic newspapers were searched for related articles with a bearing on the three broadcasters. Newspaper reports are often an essential source of information about media companies. As we shall see, important discursive aspects and the way power is exercised in the corridors of Aljazeera, the BBC and CNN can be gleaned from newspapers (Barkho 2008).

3.5 Interviews

During my visits and observations (seven days at the BBC, 14 days at Aljazeera and one day at CNN), I held semi-structured interviews with senior editors of the three channels (Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a). The questions were aimed at determining the type of strategic perspective the three broadcasters pursue and the power, motivations and reasons behind their discursive options. Excerpts from the interviews with the three broadcasters will also be used to augment the analysis and to help readers envisage how the three multilingual global broadcasters position themselves in terms of ideological power strategies and their manifestations in their discourses in comparison with Aljazeera. In the qualitative research literature, a line is usually drawn between case studies involving interviews and those using written texts as empirical material. Interviews take precedence over written texts in qualitative research. We live, as Silverman (1993) maintains, in an “interview society” in which writers whether of mass media or social sciences use interviewing as a major means to generate information. As early as 1986, Briggs estimated that nearly 90 percent of social science researchers relied on interviewing in their studies. The role of interviews as a method in social science research to interpret data is well documented (c.f. Rapley 2004; Noaks and Wincup 2004; and Silverman 2006).
Here is a list of the editors quoted in this study along with their positions in their respective outlets. Their first and second names as well as their titles will be mentioned when first referred to in the text and then they will only be referred to by their last names:

1. Nick Wren, Managing Editor – Europe, Middle East and Africa (CNN)
2. Susann Flood, Director of Press, Europe, Middle East and Africa (CNN)
3. Tom Fenton, Executive Producer, Europe, Middle East and Africa (CNN)
4. Maclolm Balen, Senior Editorial Adviser (BBC)
5. Jeremy Bowen, Editor, Middle East (BBC)
6. Hosam El Sokkari, editor in chief (BBC Arabic)
7. Adel Sulaiman, Editor, Day News Program (BBC Arabic)
8. Jerry Timmins, Head of Region, Africa and Middle East (BBC)
9. Richard Porter, Head of News, BBC World (BBC)
10. Vin Ray, Director of College of Journalism (BBC)
11. Kevin March, Editor, College of Journalism (BBC)
12. Ahmad Sheik Editor-in-chief (AljA)
13. Aref Hijjawi, Director of Programs (AljA)
14. Ayman Gaballah, Deputy Chief Editor (AljA)
15. Gaven Morris, Head of Planning (AljE)
16. Ibrahim Helal, Deputy Manager, director, News and Programs (AljE)
17. Russel Merryman, Editor-in-chief, Web and and New Media Department (AljE)
18. Sameer Khader, Program editor (AljA)
19. Wadah Khanfar, Managing Director (Aljazeera)
20. John Pullman, Head of Output (AljE)

The following sections provide a concise critical analysis of the news output of both AljA and AljE. The analysis incorporates the interviews and visits by the author not only to Aljazeera but also its Western rivals and counterparts, the BBC and CNN. The study correlates and corroborates the analysis and findings with those of the
BBC and CNN (Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a and 2008b) to see whether the three broadcasters do discourse the same way or differently, whether they view the social world of objects they study in the same way or differently and finally to see whether they employ similar or different discursive strategies and patterns in representing similar events.

4. Analysis - AljA

4.1 The interface of editorial power and political power

There are persistent attempts on the part of the editors to persuade the power holders of the consequences once their ‘independence’ is dented. But the balance of power between the editorial and political actors is tilted in favor of the latter that hold the strings not only to the purse but also to discourse. The Qatari royals occasionally and overtly deploy their power to nip at the network to force it to toe shifts in their strategic political alliances (New York Times, 2008). Editors sense the pressure though it is hard to have them admit it. “Our main concern is our integrity, editorial integrity … Actually the present policy is (that) we are not going to compromise,” says Editor in Chief Ahmad Sheikh. The compromise he has in mind relates to both commercial and political pressure from the host country. Besides losing the ‘channel’, the Qatari power holders are bound, according to Ibrahim Helal, Deputy Manager, director, News and Programs (AljE), to forsake their influence in the Middle East and beyond if they tried to control editorial output:

> What is the interest of Qatar to have Aljazeera? Qatar ... doesn’t have a lot of influence in the region. So to keep having Aljazeera as an objective, accurate source of information is like having a nuclear weapon ... And to enjoy the power of having a nuclear weapon you stop thinking of using it, because once you use it you lose it.

There are struggles and contradictions in the relationship between the political order under which Aljazeera works and the discursive practices it employs to represent the world of the events it covers particularly when it concerns sensitive issues with political repercussions. The tension is there in the sense of ‘insecurity’ the employees feel with regard to their jobs and editorial independence. Many employees, including senior editors, are certain that they owe their jobs to the political order of the host country and that nothing is stable in politics particularly in a volatile and unpredictable region like the Middle East. But it has to be noted that the political order is also aware of the ‘interface’ in the struggle for power, with editors warning that the politicians are also bound to lose if they exercised their economic and political clout to ‘tame’ AljA
and AljE. Asked what would happen if the political order meddled in Aljazeera’s editorial policy, Ayman Gaballah, AljA’s Deputy Chief Editor said:

*The equation is very simple. You give freedom, you get the channel. You take freedom, you lose it. There are some other channels in the region and they lost. If someone tries to play with the freedom, they lose the channel. It is very simple.*

During my two-week stay at both AljA an AljE, editors would boast of their editorial independence and how the political order financing the network steered away from meddling in their editorial decisions. They reiterated that the editorial business of *dos and don’ts* was theirs and the Qatari royals had nothing to do with it. “We never had any interference during the most sensitive time of our history; we never had it,” says AljE’s Helal. Helal was a former editor-in-chief of the AljA. Asked whether AljA and AljE faced any political constraints editorially, Wadah Khanfar, the network’s Managing Director said, “Aljazeera has learned during the last 10 years that the political and financial are not really constraints.”

Qatar and its ‘nuclear bomb’

Many Aljazeera executives, editors and journalists believe that the host country, Qatar, cannot dispense with their services and will not go back on promises of granting them what they see as ‘total’ editorial independence. They would not skirt questions on how secure their jobs and independence are, expressing belief that Qatar will not renege on vows of ‘full’ freedom of coverage. Helal compared the power of Aljazeera in the hands of the Qatari royals to that of a ‘nuclear bomb’. Gaballah said meddling in the channel would mean losing it for ever. Khanfar said he did not foresee any ‘political’ problems ahead.

Four months later Qatari Emir visits Saudi Arabia, Aljazeera’s main opponent in the region, and the target of its investigative and critical reporting. As the Saudis either own or control most pan-Arab Media in the region (Hammond 2007), Aljazeera was the only source for its nearly 40 million viewers on the ‘secretive’ world of the Saudi monarchy. Early 2007, it aired and issued a daring report on secret payments of hundreds of millions of pounds U.K.’s biggest arms dealer, BAE systems, had made to Prince Bandar bin Sultan, a powerful ruling family figure (BBC, 7 June 2007). When I was there the editors bragged that the second part of the same program would be aired by the end of the year with further ‘damning’ evidence of how ‘corruptive’ the Saudi Royal family is. But that program remains to be aired and may never hit the air waves.

The rival monarchs, the Qatari Emir and Saudi Arabia King, resolve their political differences in the October 2007 unprecedented visit. Qatar will prevent Aljazeera from criticizing the
Saudi monarchy and Saudi Arabia would tell its extensive television and print network to halt attacks on Qatar.

“Repercussions were soon felt at Aljazeera,” writes the New York Times. “Orders were given not to tackle any Saudi issue without referring to the higher management,” one Aljazeera newsroom employee wrote in an email. “All (Saudi) dissident voices disappeared from our screens.”

When the Associated Press (10 February 2008) runs a report that a federal judge blocks a portion of the same prince’s property in the U.S. worth hundreds of millions of dollars, that story, which topped international news highlights, is shunned in the Arab world, and strangely enough by both AljA and AljE.

4.2 Lexis and power

According to Fowler (1991: 80), the use of vocabulary to classify media voices and participants “amounts to a map of the objects, concepts, processes and relationships” through which media producers experience and see the world of the events they carry. This map, Fowler adds, sorts out classes of the social assumptions, common senses and concepts reporters, writers and speakers entertain concerning the communicative events they deal with. For Halliday (1973, 1995, 1970), the British linguist whose systemic theory critical discourse scholars take as the base for their critical analysis, the vocabulary of a language is instrumental in revealing speakers’ or writers’ ideas, stands and viewpoints of their own world and that around them. But apparently media discourse differs from other discourses and Halliday’s theory as well as CDA’s major names such as Fowler, van Dijk, Fairclough, Kress, van Leeuwen and Wodak, among others, have overlooked the degree of discursive control editorial power holders exert on the selection or rejection of lexical items, particularly those of a controversial, emotive or loaded nature. The lexical options made in media discourse may not necessarily express the writer or speaker’s world. On the contrary, they may be in opposition to it (see 4.13, 5.2 and 5.7).

We now turn to the issue of vocabulary and how AljA employs it as a vehicle to carry out its ideological strategies of power and control and how these are manifested in its discourse. AljA pursues what Fairclough terms (1989: 113) ‘oppositional’ wording practices in its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict though the oppositional discourse is much less discernible in its Iraq reporting. Palestinian acts are worded from the perspective that they are the ‘prey’ of a state exercising massive and disproportionate power and, nonetheless its ‘repressive’ policies have
the West’s blessing. When it comes to vocabulary, particularly in the representation of Palestinians and Israelis, we are confronted with two ‘adversarial’ discourses (Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b). The discursive patterning is not arbitrary, natural or commonsensical because, as Sheikh explains, AljA cannot treat both sides on a plane level because one of them, the Palestinians, is a ‘victim’ while the other, the Israelis, is the ‘victimizer:

_We on our behalf we know that this is the sort of conflict that we have in this region. And we know who the victim is and who is being victimized._

The concept of ‘victim’ and ‘victimizer’ permeates AljA’s lexis. The Palestinians who fall in fighting Israel are _martyrs_, their suicide bombing attacks are _martyrdom operations_, and their opposition of Israeli occupation is invariably described as ‘muqama’ or _resistance_. Palestinian groups use names with cultural, historical and religious connotations and these are frequently repeated by AljA giving Arab Muslim audiences the impression that the discourse is meant to serve some religious purpose: _Islamic Resistance Movement, the Jihad Movement, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, al-Quds Battalion Activists, Saladin Brigades_ (c.f. Barkho 2006). Palestinian groups generally adopt terms immersed in Islamic religion and Arab history to describe themselves and their actions. The crude missiles they fire at Israeli towns, for example, are named after _Qudus_, or _Aqsa_, (one of the holiest shrines in Islam). A frequency count of the 203 Arabic stories on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict issued over 130 days reveals that terms with religious and historical implications occur more than 1000 times, that is about five for each story.

Aljazeera’s mission, according to Khanfar, is to give “voice to the voiceless” and one way of carrying out that mission is through the selection of vocabulary. The issue of which word or term to use and not to use with regard to the Middle East is “very sensitive and pivotal for (international) media in general and the Aljazeera in particular,” he adds. Why is it so important particularly for Aljazeera, I asked. He said:

_The way to use expressions and labeling is of paramount importance ... because of the prestige they have among Arab viewers and their fondness of them ... Aljazeera always seeks to have a clear scientific, historic or artistic reference for the selection of this expression or that label._

When analyzing AljA’s Iraq reporting, the sense of ‘victim’ and ‘victimizer’ is not as easily discernible as the channel’s coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The word ‘occupation’ for example is very rarely used and Iraqis U.S. troops kill are not called _martyrs_. Groups fighting the U.S. are not _resistance_ and their men are
armed men rather than resistance fighters. Names of different Iraqi armed groups, most of them coined with religious and historical reference in mind, are used as they are without epithets whether negative or positive, e.g. Islamic Army, al-Qaeda, the Mahdi Army, Sadr supporters. Al-Qaeda’s fiery rhetoric is mediated to suit its discourse when covering speeches by its leaders with plenty of scare quoting (c.f. Barkho 2006; 2008b).

Aljazeera, like the BBC and CNN, ‘strives’ to avoid ‘value-laden’ or ‘loaded words’ in its discourse. These words reveal a certain degree of bias for their semantic potential of characterizing speakers or voices in media either negatively or positively. For example, lexical items such as terrorist, jihadist, militant, insurgent, fundamentalist, Islamist, etc. all have pejorative or negative connotations in English. But once rendered into Arabic, they lose their derogatory character – of course apart from terrorist. AljA, unlike BBC Arabic and CNN Arabic, has no problem with translation, as almost all of its Middle East news output is originally written in Arabic. The situation is different for AljA’s rival Arabic services of the BBC and CNN where a high proportion (approx. 70%) of news output is translated (Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b).

The use of ‘controversial’ and ‘value-laden’ words and phrases is deterministic and the three broadcasters’ select their discursive options among numerous languages like Arabic or English make available. The choice is not part of ‘common-sense’ which organization members share or they view as ‘natural’. Editors of the three broadcasters admit that each network has its own discursive policy makers, particularly with regard to the Middle East (see BBC’s four wise men; the power of Atlanta; see also Barkho 2007). While choices at levels of clauses and sentences could be nothing but arbitrary, the selection of words like these is none but intentional (see 4.13 and 5.2).

4.3 Lexical strategy

AljA’s strategy, whether with regard to discursive practices or commercial interests, is based on the cultural, religious and historical systems emanating from the region where it has most of its audiences and exercises the most influence. It pays particular attention to the social systems of the environment it targets. For its manager and editors the discoursal strategy will make little sense if it is dissociated from the socio-cultural composition of audiences. They firmly believe that they owe their success to their respect of and association with the cultural, social and religious systems prevalent in their region (c.f. Swedberg et al. 1987; Whittington and Whipp 1992). The following excerpts from the responses I had to the question on whether AJLA respects and adheres to the social, cultural, religious and local system of the region it
targets confirm this viewpoint:

*Of course, of course, if you do not respect one of these actors that you have mentioned, you start losing a segment of your audience.*

(Sameer Khader, Program Editor)

*It is the need of the region ... When it comes to religion we must have in mind what our viewers would say ... Yes, it is very important to us, the Islamic, Arabic culture is something important.*

(Aref Hijjaw, Director of Programs Department)

*We understand the thinking. We understand how the people in this part of the world think. We have an advantage over them (rivals) because we are part of this culture.*

(Sheik)

The best way to exercise ideological power in a conservative region like the Arab world, where Aljazeera is most influential, is to learn how to traverse language with the social power by relying on cultural and religious signs. This is what makes AljA’s culture and religion-based discourse legitimate and natural in the eyes of millions of its viewers (Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b).

Let us now turn to how Israelis are represented at the vocabulary level. AljA’s discourse represents the Israelis as ‘oppressors’ and ‘victimizers’. For example, Israelis who have opted to live on occupied Palestinian land are called ‘mustautinoun’ a word with colonial implications in Arabic. There is also *jidar al-fasil* or Segregation Wall a reminder of the regime of apartheid in South Africa. But perhaps AljA’s most striking discursive practice is the way the word *ihtilal* or occupation is used. This is one of the commonest representations of the Israelis. The word enters into a variety of noun and adjectival combinations and is transferred metaphorically to mean different things (Hodge and Kress 1979).

Here are a few examples: *occupation forces, occupation prisons, occupation soldiers, occupation troops, special occupation forces, occupation army, occupation radio*, etc. And occupation is personified, thus metaphoric instances like *occupation kills, occupation maims, occupation detains, occupation invades, fighting or resisting occupation, martyred by bullets of occupation* are quite common. A survey by the author of the 203 stories on Palestinian-Israeli conflict reveals that the word *ihtilal* and its derivatives are mentioned about 800 times, nearly four times for each story. In only one story (28 February 2007) they are repeated 18 times. What prompts AljA to highlight the ‘negative’ colonial representation of Israel-related discourse and the
‘positive’ religious and cultural representation of Palestine-related discourse?

*It is unethical, it is unacceptable, (and) it is unprofessional to equate the victim with the victimizer. The Palestinian people are the only people on this planet under occupation and who are being punished at the same time. It is the first incident of its sort in the history of mankind.* (Sheik)

“Sometimes yes of course,” said Khader, when asked whether AljA takes sides. “Let me give you this example. Last summer (2006) during the war between Israel and Hizbollah, we tried our best to be neutral but nobody can help but feel that something in our coverage that is pro-Hizbollah, not as Hizbollah but as Arabs fighting Israel”.

The Arabic services of both the BBC and CNN have yet to develop their own discursive strategy. While there is no obvious discursive attempt to ‘scorn’ Islamic or Arabic religious or cultural symbols, both broadcasters dissociate themselves from AljA’s discursive patterns treating such symbols with deference. Measured against AljA, the BBC’s and to a greater extent CNN’s Arabic versions seem contrary to the reality of the situation in Arab and Muslim eyes and ‘incompatible’ with the type of lexis they see as ‘common sense’, ‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’ (c.f. Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b). The BBC as a giant multilingual broadcaster – it currently broadcasts in 33 languages – is much less sensitive to the religion, culture and traditions of its Arabic audiences for example. It strives to have a unified discursive strategy across all services, particularly with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict regardless of audience and language (see the Power of Atlanta and Barkho 2008a). Balen, the top BBC ‘wise man’ on the region, says:

*And we certainly in the Middle East have had a much more concerted attempt to have one BBC language ... We have now reconciled the language and the policy ... Does (this) apply to other conflicts in the region well not specifically. This is a language that has been drawn up for the long-running Israeli and Palestinian conflict.*

The three broadcasters have glossaries especially prepared for the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The only difference is that while Aljazeera has two separate vocabularies for the conflict, one for AljA and one for AljE (see 4.13 and 5.2), the BBC and CNN have one unified list of words and phrases which their discursive policy makers would like to see used across regions and languages. Says Susanna Flood, Director of Press, CNN Europe, Middle East and Africa: “In all our channels, whether English or those broadcasting in other languages, we do talk the same language and we use the same language” (see The Power of Atlanta and 5.3).
The lists by the BBC and CNN as well as the one by AljA categorize the voices in the conflict differently (Barkho 2007). For AljA, as we have seen it is a matter of ‘ethics and principles”, for the BBC (c.f. Barkho 2008a; 2007) and CNN (Barkho 2007) it is a matter of power. Asked why CNN cannot treat both adversaries (Palestinians and Israelis) on an equal discursive level, Tom Fenton, CNN Executive Producer and former Jerusalem bureau chief said:

Because one is a state and one is a people that aspires to become a state.
There is a difference between a state and an organization. It is a conflict between a state and people under occupation.

### 4.4 Symbolic terms

Ideological power is even more evidently displayed in lexis through the use of symbolic words and terms (Kramsch 1988). In the conflicts covered in this study most of these words are cultural symbols with different nuances and connotations to groups of different histories and different political leanings. The legitimacy of discursive patterns containing symbolic language is bound to reflect the social, cultural and political differences separating the discourse of writers, speakers and audiences. But how symbolic news affects and is affected by power relations stems largely from the power struggles inside the newsroom.

For example, while words and expressions like *resistance fighters, martyrs, al-Aqsa Brigades* (c.f. 4.2 and 4.3) are legitimate and natural for AljA, they are not viewed in the same way by the BBC and CNN (Barkho 2006, 2007, 2008a). If there are no lexical alternatives available to hedge the impact of symbolic language, editorial power holders mainly through instructions and guidelines ‘contrive’ discursive means to water down their discoursal power. Note the frequent use of *occupation* and its derivates to represent Israeli activities by AljA (see 4.3) and also note the BBC and CNN’s discursive methods to hedge the ideological power behind many of the symbolic words and expressions the Palestinians use (Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a).

But the power of symbolic language is perhaps nowhere as obvious as in the coverage of the Iraq war. AljA drops all its hedging discursive techniques in Iraq war reporting. In its 295 Iraq stories, the lexical sense of ‘victim’ and ‘victimizer’ is hard to detect at the discursive level. Moreover, and contrary to BBC and CNN’s discursive practices towards both conflicts (Barkho 2006), the channel refrains from employing epithets or explanations as to where it stands regarding these symbolic expressions.

For example, the military code names the U.S. gives its military operations in Iraq
are translated as they are despite some of them being merely euphemisms with a ‘deliberate’ attempt to avoid the negative values of more representative discursive patterns. Note for example *Operation Iraqi Freedom* the code name the U.S. gave to its invasion of Iraq. Similarly, note *Majalis al-Sahwa* or ‘Awakening Councils’, the code name the U.S. gives to the Sunni Arab militia it finances, arms and trains. Other symbolic terms include the various names the U.S. gives to its ongoing military operations in Iraq and Iraqi locations. A main street in Baaquoba is code named *Route Coyote*, the heavily fortified quarters housing U.S. administrative and military offices in Baghdad is called the *Green Zone* or ‘al-mantaqa al-khadhraa’, a 23 June 2007 offensive was code-named *Phantom Thunder* and a 24 June 2007 offensive was code-named *Arrowhead Pipper* which AljA literally translated and transliterated.

### 4.6 Rival discourses

The representation at the discursive and social levels of both conflicts on the part of AljA even splits Arab and Muslims into two different categorizations. The Palestinians who are Arab and Muslim have greater human and moral value discursively than the Iraqis who are also mostly Arab and Muslim. The bifurcation of negative/positive or benign/malignant and the context of these asymmetrical power relations represented in ‘us/them’ or ‘self/other’ (Schieffelin and Doucet 1998) is here a distinctive feature of discourse not only when pitting Arabs and Muslims against their enemies but also in representing Arabs and Muslims themselves. Arabs and Muslim audiences have come to see AljA’s binary discourse in representing them also as natural and commonsensical, evidenced by the persistent high statues the channel enjoys among Arab viewers (Barkho 2008b).

The analysis agrees with Bourdieu’s concept of the divisions of power even at the level of monolingual ideologies in language and discourse and how audiences, through their complicity, see this discursive and social split in representation as natural and therefore hardly worth paying any attention to. But the discoursal categorization (see 4.13, 5.2 and 5.3) is not that invisible and natural to its creators and here the analysis departs from Bourdieu’s theory. Following Bourdieu, CDA analysts have mostly viewed discoursal power as invisible and that it can only be brought to the surface through the ‘preying’ eyes of critical scholars. But that is not the case with the creators and practitioners of discourse in the BBC, CNN and Aljazaera where the discoursal bifurcation of voices is so deliberate and visible that reporters have learned what they need to do in order to practice it when moving from one outlet to another (see 5.4). The hegemonic ideology is intentionally produced by these organizations and to have it practiced they have devised their own ‘gate-keeping’ procedures in the form of style guidelines, quality units, editorial advisers and policy makers whose
main task is to ensure that these discursive divisions are maintained and adhered to in discourse.

### 4.7 Audience identity

AljA does not shy from claiming common identity with its audiences who are mostly Arab and Muslim. True, it gives voice to both sides of the story but textual indicators, particularly at the level of lexis, often tell on which side of the fence it stands. But this should not be viewed as a new discovery in critical analysis since its editors say it loud and clear. Likewise, the slanting is not a characteristic of AljA only. Textual indicators of the kind of words the BBC and CNN select to report the conflict also signal a tilt towards Israel, a ‘bias’ editors of both networks find hard to hide (c.f. Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b). The only difference is that AljA works hard to ‘domesticate and localize’ its discourse.

Besides the bifurcation of lexis and its opposing nature, there is the issue of the distinctive character of how certain words are made to co-occur. For example, items like campaign, drive, operation, list, group, etc. mostly collocate with adjectives and nouns with a military, aggressive or violent character. Campaigns, in AjLA discourse are not for the eradication of illiteracy or immunization of children. They are mainly of a military, raiding, storming, attacking, arming, disarming, detaining, etc. purpose. Lists are of prisoners and wanted people. Groups are of armed men, suspects, activists, prisoners and so on and so forth.

These ‘collocational patterns’ are an important part of media discourse vocabulary but they have so far received little attention from media critical analysts (Gee 2001:29). How noun, adjective and verb combinations are used to create discursive patterns is in my opinion, a good indicator of how voices and reality are classified in terms of power. One can assess their relevance to relations of power through the linguistic concept of transposition (Simpson 1993:76) in which consecutive or stand-alone items are juggled or alternated to see what effect they have on the semantics of the newly formed expression. Compare ‘prisoner list’ with ‘student list’, ‘raiding campaigns’ with ‘peaceful campaigns’ and ‘military drive’ with ‘scientific drive’. Such juggling speaks volumes not only of the nature of discourse but also of the reality and representations of the events it carries.

### 4.8 ‘Macabre’ discourse

One related but more ‘troubling’ feature of AljA’s discourse is the predominance of lexical items, particularly verbs, representing death and killing. One can place all these
textual indicators under ‘macabre’ discourse signaling the discoursal representations of the horror of gruesome attacks and representations of people killed, maimed, wounded or displaced in both conflicts. According to Quirk et al (1985), verbs in any language can broadly have two major meanings when referring to situations. The authors draw a distinction between verbs with stative senses, such as know, have, and verbs with dynamic senses such as attack and drive. The author’s survey of the 295 Iraq stories shows that there are nearly 2000 non-reporting verbs of which nearly 1,500 are of the dynamic ‘macabre’ type. In the 203 Palestine-Israel stories there are about 800 non-reporting verbs and the vast majority of them have ‘macabre’ assumptions. Here are a few examples:

kill, killed, died, arrest, arrested, injure, injured, wound, wounded, crashed, destroy, destroyed, (martyr, martyred in case of Palestine), strike, struck, storm, stormed, attack, attacked, set fire, come across headless bodies, kidnap, kidnapped, hit, shoot, mutilate, mutilated, maim, maimed, assassinate, assassinated, bomb, bombed, fire, fired, dump (bodies)’ and the list goes on. These dynamic non-reporting verbs, unlike reporting verbs as we shall see, occur mainly in the paraphrasing, and occasionally in the quoting of sources. The class of AljA’s ‘macabre’ verbs, that is almost equally represented by rivals when reporting similar events (Barkho 2006), does not include their noun and participle derivatives, such as ‘killing, death, destruction, maiming, bodies, the wounded,, etc.’ Though no attempt is made to count these derivatives their frequency is bound to be very high.

4.9 Reporting verbs

AljA does not rely on the ‘neutral’ say or add as the reporting verbs most commonly used in quoting and paraphrasing, the two discourse layers (c.f. Barkho 2007) on which hard news writers rely to cover communicative acts from voices other than their own ( though having the reporters’ voice in both layers is no longer unusual, see 4.10). Reporting verbs like urge, describe, warn, demand, denounce, confirm, emphasize, acknowledge, consider, discuss, explain, reject, affirm, express, stress, point out are more frequently used than say or add in the coverage of both conflicts. These verbs refer to the reporter’s attitude towards or opinion about what is quoted or paraphrased. They have an interpersonal function in Halliday’s functional grammar and for linguistic philosophers such as Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) they express a mode of action or an act of speech on the part of the speaker or writer. But in media, the attitude of the agent of the ‘speech act’ is not that of the voice that is paraphrased or quoted but of the reporter or editor who chooses the reporting verb as a way to ‘intrude’ into the voices paraphrased or quoted.
4.10 Reporters as speakers

In reporting news, reporters ostensibly strive to distance themselves from the speakers or voices they report. In Fairclough’s words (1995: 81) they maintain “boundaries between representing discourse and the represented discourse – between voices of the reporter and the persons reported.” For van Dijk (1988: 191) this is “one important clue about the perspective of the media” as it tells the occurrence and identity of who is allowed to speak.

Reporters have two discursive tools at their disposal through which people can air their voices, namely quoting and paraphrasing, each with its distinctive discursive and cognitive constraints (c.f. Quirk et al. 1985). But hard news reporters do not only quote or paraphrase. Barkho (2007) identifies two more discourse layers – comment and background – which reporters resort to and which they can easily ‘manipulate’ to air their own voices.

But it seems there is no limit to the reporters’ ‘insatiable desire’ to have their voices heard in the story. It is no longer unusual to come across quotations and paraphrases telling reporters’ speech and thought in order to render, summarize and transform their own discourse into news. In paraphrasing normally very little remains of the authorial and orthographic clues of the original discourse apart from the source which now can also be that of the reporter. Note the following examples from AljA:

**Aljazeera correspondent said the occupation troops mounted a wide campaign in search of two young people hurling burning bottles on Israeli vehicles and arrested 13 Palestinians from the village of Aur ...** (13 April 2007)

**Aljazeera correspondent in the West Bank has maintained that three Israelis have been injured when their patrol came under fire in the colony of Mualiya Adomeem ...** (17 April 2007)

These are good examples of how reporters occasionally assume the role narrators of literary fiction play, changing position from outside the text to within the text (Genette 1980). Such positioning and switching from external to internal reporting roles (c.f. Fowler 1985 and Uspensky 1973) is another major source of bias in news besides contrasting lexical categorization. Reporters say (as advised by their style guidelines) that they do their best to stay outside the communicative event or the story they are covering. But the frequent occurrence of reporters reporting themselves in the story is surging. For example, AljA relies on its own discourse (via comment or reporting) 329 times in the 203-story corpus on Israel-Palestine conflict.
This role is even more evident at the comment layer of discourse where reporters express overt opinion in news towards one of the protagonists. The slanting is obvious once the comment is transposed and made to apply to the other speaker or side in the story (Barkho 2007). It is unlikely that AljA would deploy similar discursive comment to represent the Israelis in the following:

**Huge numbers of Israeli troops stormed the city of Nablus amid random shooting and began a campaign of arrests and house raids.** (4 April 2007)

**Occupation troops had killed five Palestinians in the West Bank city of Jenin and its camps most of them affiliated to al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and one from al-Qudus Battalions and among yesterday’s martyrs was a 17-year old girl who became a martyr when occupation troops barged into her family house in search of her brother and when they did not find him there opened fire in the house killing the girl.** (9 May 2007)

Reporters insert their own statements into the hard news discourse, sometimes turning themselves into illicit or covert speakers – comment has no reporting verbs as it is unsourced. Their statements carry authority with no attempt of employing some hedging devices to tone them down. They as speakers are as assertive as the speakers they report. The degree of interest reporters display to be represented in the story is no less emphatic than that of the speakers involved in the communicative act (c.f. Brown and Levinson 1978).

How is power enacted at the different layers of the hard news discourse? One particular layer, namely paraphrasing, is of considerable interest here and is now attracting greater attention from discursive policy makers in global media outlets such as the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera. Attribution is now almost ‘a must’ in CNN. It is there in the style guidelines and editorial power holders are keen to impose it. Nick Wren, CNN’s Managing Editor – Europe, Middle East and Africa, says:

*We do not do opinion. CNN International does not do opinion. For our journalists, reporters and editors to avoid opinion they need to attribute, attribute and attribute. I certainly try to make sure that almost everything in a story is attributed. These are the rules.*

But most of CNN’s attribution, as is the case with Aljazeera and the BBC, is at the paraphrasing layer where the speakers’ words and possibly ideas are refined by reporters so that they can pass through the ‘sieve’ of editorial guidelines and controls (c.f. Barkho 2007, 2008a). Besides comment, paraphrasing is the layer where the ideological power struggle in news discourse is enacted, as it illustrates how reporters
try to subject speakers’ statements they do not want to quote to the ‘perforated metal’ of editorial control.

The role of quoting layer is receding in news discourse. There are only 66 quotations in AljA (37 quote Palestinian sources and 29 quote Israeli sources). It is being replaced by paraphrasing which reporters reserve for the discursive items they prefer not to pass through their editorial ‘sieve’. (AljA has 1315 paraphrase, 551 for Israel and 764 for Palestine and 261 scare quotes, 184 for Palestine and 77 for Israel). Note the following examples:

The remark was in response to the U.S. embassy spokesman in Tel Aviv in which he said the U.S. was ready to deal with the unity government ministers who do not belong to Hamas which Washington considers “a terrorist organization.” (19 March 2007)

Israeli occupation troops have announced that they have foiled what they described as “a big terrorist aggression” that was to be carried out by a car bomb in Tel Aviv last month. (10 April 2007)

Why do editors or journalists put expressions like a terrorist organization or a big terrorist aggression in scare quotes and what impact do they have on readers? First, reporters want to warn readers that these expressions are problematic and at the same time quite representative of the speaker’s discursive patterns. Second, they want to distance themselves from these expressions, making it quite clear that they are not their own property. The use of scare quotes vindicates the reporter from the inclusion of such expressions in news discourse. The media outlet cannot be held accountable for the use of scare quoted expressions. The BBC, CNN and AljE include the voices of their reporters in the field mainly through paraphrase and occasionally through quoting and comment (Barkho 2007). AljA does not include its reporters’ voices in its Iraq copy because it has no presence there as its team was thrown out of the country in 2006.

4.11 Texts within texts

An important aspect of dialogism (Bakhtin 1984) is how a new text accommodates an older text which, in news, is represented in the reporting of the speech through quoting, scare quoting and paraphrasing (Barkho 2007). But as we have seen reporters do not only include others’ speech or writing in their discourse. Reporters now paraphrase or even quote themselves particularly in the case of generic anonymous sourcing when the subject of the quotation or paraphrase is said to be for example, ‘analysts’,
‘officials’, ‘diplomats’, ‘experts’ or simply ‘sources’. The role of *generic sourcing* of sources, analysts or officials say commonly used in today’s news reporting to generalize paraphrasing is an ‘attitudinal’ and ‘modal’ one through which reporters “mitigate and disclaim responsibility … by attributing to unspecified others” (Fairclough 1995:5). In reality there is little that is ‘new text’ in news apart perhaps from the event being reported. Even quotations are old and are usually framed to be part of the general thrust of the report. Comments are made by reporters only if they meet the set of guidelines for practices of discourse and background information is usually inserted if it has already been mentioned by the same broadcaster issuing the news (Barkho 2007).

There is a clear tendency to reduce to the minimum the repetition verbatim of ideas or arguments of voices in news. The tendency to attribute is still a characteristic of the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera’s online news (Barkho 2007) but it is mainly done through paraphrasing where ideas or arguments are summarized or expanded through comments, evaluated, legitimated or invalidated. Although there is much more room for a reporter to transform an idea via paraphrasing, this does not mean verbatim reporting is not affected when removed and inserted in a new context. In Bakhtin’s theory verbatim reporting is part of discourse transformation and an invitation for new meaning:

> Given the appropriate methods for framing, one may bring about fundamental changes even in another’s utterance accurately quoted. Any sly and ill-disposed polemicist knows very well which dialogising backdrop he should bring to bear on the accurately quoted words of his opponent, in order to distort their sense.

(Bakhtin 1984: 78)

The dialogic process is presented at all the four layers of hard news discourse (Barkho 2007) and in Bakhtin’s theory the language deployed to represent the voices shapes the social world of the broadcaster as itself it is being shaped and informed by the voices it reports. But it is essential here to remember that unlike the novel genre, the selection of themes, their schematic structure and the voices constructing the three broadcasters’ social worlds are normally selected by reporters in the light of a set of rules either given verbally or in writing. This rather ‘intentional’ selection is more evident at the level of discursive patterns particularly in lexis as ‘inscribed’ in the style guidelines with which the broadcasters’ final news product has to comply.
4.12 Schematic structure

Viewed schematically, AljA’s online hard news seems to have developed some optional and some obligatory discursive stages that set it apart from counterparts in the BBC, CNN or AljE (see 5.2 and 5.3). To analyze discourse in terms of steps, stages or structures is an essential component of critical analysis normally referred to as genre studies (c.f. Labov and Waletzky 1967; van Dijk 1988 ; Fowler 1985). The genre or schematic structure of a news article, according to Fairclough (1995: 85) for example consists of “Headline + Lead + Satellites + Wrap-up. The order of these four stages is fixed”. But AljA’s news output shows a rather different routine and a formulaic schematic structure, reducing the events it covers to news formats which, though still somewhat rigid, are nothing like traditional news genres. AljA tends to go for complex headlines with two different pegs or elements worthy of attention. For example:

A

Palestinian ceasefire accord and one martyr in raid on Gaza (headline, 3 June 2007)
Lead + seven satellites

Martyr and threats (sub-headline)
Lead + nine satellites

B

Four U.S. soldiers killed and Zaibari admits slow pace of reforms (headline, 15 June 2007)
Lead + three satellites

Security developments (sub-headline)
Lead + two satellites

Samarra explosions (sub-headline)
Lead + two satellites

Slow reforms (sub-headline)
Lead + six satellites

The two elements in the complex headlines above have very little in common and would normally be treated as two different stories or at least one of them would have been turned into a sub-headline by AljE and the Arabic and English services of both the BBC and CNN (Barkho 2007). The AljA lead would usually summarize one
of the two pegs or elements of the headline, mainly the initial one. The headline’s second peg is turned into a sub-headline with its own lead and satellite paragraphs which may follow immediately as in A or with new sub-headlines inserted in between as in B. The ‘Wrap-up’ which is normally optional, is usually turned into another sub-headline with its own lead and satellite paragraphs giving the story a rather complex and diversified schematic view:

**Headline** (two pegs) + **Lead** (first peg) + **Satellites** (first peg) + **Sub-headline** (second peg) + **Lead** (second peg) + **Satellites** (second peg) + **Sub-headline** (new peg) + **Lead** (new peg) + **Satellites** (new peg) …

This schematic structure is not rigid as **Sub-headline** (new peg) may be inserted between **Headline** (two pegs) and **Sub-headline** (second peg). Note we may sometimes have more than one **Sub-headline** (new peg) separating them as in B. This format is quite common in AljA. Of the 203 headlines on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 83 of them were of the two peg type. Of the 293 Iraq war stories, 167 of them had the same schemata.

While critical analysts have the tools to unravel the news formats journalists reduce world events into, the social assumptions behind these structures still need to be tested. The schematic structure of news is of particular importance “both in production and in the reception of news reports” (van Dijk 1988: 188). One can easily assume that elements like **Headline**, **Leads**, **Sub-headlines** and **Sub-leads** would attract most attention from readers and hence they are given informationally prominent positions in the story since readers, as van Dijk says, would normally read these elements first. It is to be noted that the schematic layout above is peculiar to AljA and is not shared by the BBC, CNN or AljE.

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**Aljazeera and Royal Decree**

May 22, 2007, was not a usual day for AljA. Almost everyone was looking for a copy of the Qatari al-Watan newspaper. The Information Department where I had my desk was bent on translating an Emiri decree and an accompanying comment into English. But the topic the officials wanted to treat somewhat stealthily.

When I went to my hotel I asked for al-Watan. On the front page there was the Emiri Decree reshuffling AljA board of directors, denying the Palestinian-born Managing Editor Wadah Khanfar membership. The comment was harsh on the network, accusing Khanfar of turning AljA into a ‘nest for Palestinian journalists’ and urging the Emir to “Qatarize” the network.
The next day the decree and the comment were part of the conversations I had with my respondents. “Those people here at this newspaper, those people have a personal grudge against him,” said Sheikh. His deputy Gabalah said: “If we pay attention to every word written on us in the newspapers we should have stopped working in this field.”

But in a region whose information ministers convene in February, 2008, on how to control pan-Arab media particularly satellite television and issue orders that criticizing Arab world’s symbols whether religious, cultural or political, including heads of state and governments was no longer permissible (al-Qudus al-Arabi 8 February 2008), al-Watan’s glee and comment on the network could not have come without official sanctioning.

There is now change in the map of historical Palestine which Aljazeera would show without the name ‘Israel’ on it. Israel is now included as a state within the pre-1967 international borders. And, as the New York Times (4 January 2008) tells us, Aljazeera’s coverage has “gradually evolved and grew moderate, partly for internal reasons and partly in response to American pressure.”

### 4.13 ‘lexical’ power holders

How are relations of power and ideology enacted in AljA’s discourse? These relations, particularly at the level of vocabulary, which critical analysts see as the most outstanding in exhibiting power and control, are not arbitrary in news-producing media as critical analysts have long been saying. They are deliberate because the textual indicators referring to them are chosen among a host of options the language provides. These choices are ‘engraved in tablets’ in the form of guidelines to which reporters and journalists will have to adhere. A further illustration is when journalists move from one media outlet to another, let us say from AljA to BBC Arabic or vice versa where the choice of language to describe both conflicts particularly at the level of lexis is very different mainly due to style guidelines which are mostly kept for internal use (Barkho 2008a). Here are a few examples from AljA guidelines which mainly deal with the choice of words, some of them were read out for me from the system by the editor-in-chief since they were sent out electronically very recently:

1. *When referring to the embargo or sanctions in occupied territories you must say, ‘The embargo against the Palestinians and not the embargo against the Palestinian government of Hamas’. The embargo is not confined to the government. Everybody is affected in Palestine. I need everybody to abide.*

2. *Do not say the Indian Kashmir or the Pakistani Kashmir. Say the*
Indian-controlled Kashmir ...

3. When we have two stories, the editor-in-chief should be asked to choose which to go first.

4. We use ‘martyr’ to refer to Palestinians killed by Israel. Refrain from using the term in other conflicts involving Arabs and Muslims like Iraq and Afghanistan.

5. When talking about the current affairs in Gaza and the clashes between Palestinian groups some say that Palestinian fighters are armed men. This does them injustice. Therefore we have to refer to them as being the ‘men of resistance’ or ‘resistance people’ at least.

6. Instead of saying the kidnapped or captured Israeli soldier, we would better say ‘Israel kidnaps’ and not ‘seizes eight or ten ministers.’ They ‘kidnapped’ them; they did not ‘arrest’ them.

7. Do not say ‘Amman government, Cairo government or Khartoum government. This is pejorative. Say the Jordanian government, the Egyptian government and the Sudanese government.’ This can be kind of political bias against that government. It is politically charged.

8. Sunnis and Shiites. When talking about Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, our policy is to refer to the two words as follows: We do not say ‘Arab Shiites or Arab Sunnis. It suffices to say Sunnis and Shiites.

9. You cannot show this sort of story. It is inhuman. You want to kill that animal, kill it in a friendly manner as the Prophet once said ‘Be as merciful as possible when you butcher an animal.’ You cannot show this on air. It is not good for our nation and our people.

10. Write short sentences. They are easier to read. They are easier to cut for pictures. They go to mind easily. I do not have to remind you once again of the saying in our tradition, ‘The best speech is the one which gives the best meaning in a fewer number of words.’


12. Your headline should not exceed maximum eight words.

13. Do not use words like ‘probably, likely, perhaps’ in the headline.

14. Economize on the use of prepositions in the headline.

15. Do not use foreign words in the headline unless necessary.

16. You must comply with editorial policies and guidelines.
Simpson (1993:46) argues that the ‘feel’ of a text depends on the type of point of view it shows and which a critical analysis can reveal from the text’s linguistic features. The use of modal auxiliaries such as *should* in 3 and 12, *must* in 1 and 16, *have to* in 5 and 10, *cannot* in 9 indicates that for the person with the editorial power the propositions are nothing but the truth with the expectation that they will be viewed and (heeded to) from that perspective by the addressees (reporters). In Halliday’s linguistics this is a major exponent of the language’s ‘interpersonal’ function.

Journalists brag about their ‘factual’ and ostensibly objective reporting which is generally void of features of language which point to interpersonal propositions such as the lexical items inferring shades of modality and other language means conveying subjectivity and point of view. That is not the case in the journalists’ guideline discourse where lexical and grammatical features expressing the writers’ ‘authoritarian’ attitude toward their interlocutors and their subject matter is quite evident. The discourse of AjlA and AjlE’s guidelines (see 4.13 and 5.2) or the BBC for that matter (see 5.3) bears many traces of the conversations that take place between a teacher and students in the classroom and can even be compared to that between a police officer and a suspect or an army officer and cadets. The style guideline writers, like teachers, doctors, police officers and army officers address their interlocutors from a vantage point of authority who expect their words not to fall on deaf ears. The exercise of power is not hidden in the guideline discourse with bare infinitive such as *do not*, *write*, *refrain* and *economize* as in 1, 4, 10 and 14 marking how the holders of discoursal power express their authority explicitly through imperative sentences in the form of demands and requests. And note how *Dos* and *don’ts* with regard to lexis and other related issues are expressed through *say* in 2, 3 and 7 and *do not say* in 2, 7, 8, 11, 13 and 15. A comprehensive critical analysis of the AljA’s guidelines is beyond the scope of this study but their overt ‘authoritarian power’ is quite clear.

### 4.14 The dialogism of style guides

Media organizations, namely those dealing with news reporting, usually keep their style books or guidelines away from public eyes and scrutiny. That is the case with the BBC, particularly its Middle East guide of terminology (Barkho 2008), CNN and Aljazeera. They are meant for internal use and electronically they are only accessible to those concerned. And as the AljA sample and other samples analyzed in this study (see 4.13, 5.2 and 5.3) show they mostly deal with controversial, evaluative and loaded discourse which clearly exhibits both discursive and social traits these organizations prefer to use with regard to certain voices.

Once the style book discourse is inserted in the body of the story it assumes further
significance due to its dialogic power which shapes and re-shapes the social world from the outlet’s point of view (Bakhtin 1973). This is an important feature of political and media discourse since it relies heavily on reporting what other voices say (Barkho 2007; 2008b) which often makes it difficult for analysts to draw a line between the discourse being reported and the discourse doing the reporting. Moreover, reporters are constrained in their discursive options by their own style guides which they have to refer to when writing their stories. Voloshinov, a contemporary of Bakhtin whose writings some believe were authored by Bakhtin himself, describes such discourse as “speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also speech about speech, utterance about utterance” (1973: 115). The dialogism of voices is ostensibly rather intricate in news but it is centripetal in Bakhtin’s terms as it drives almost all discourse forces towards the center which in our case is represented in the style guidelines and the holders of the strings of editorial and political power who attempt to bring the most important discoursal elements, whether social or discursive, toward their central monologic point.

One important dialogic aspect of hard news discourse is the type of dialogic relationships that exist between the representing or reporting discourse and the represented or reported discourse in news. For both Bakhtin (1994) and Voloshinov (1973) the discourse of reported voices is effective and real when it meets the discourse of the reporting voice (the author in the novel genre and reporters in hard news) and both enter into some sort of mutual constitution whereby they shape, inform and are shaped and informed by each other. But hard political news differs from the novel in several aspects (see 1.4) with balance of shaping and informing the discourse tilting drastically towards its creators in the newsroom guided by their style handbook and the presence of quality monitors who in the case of the three broadcasters report directly to the editorial or political power holders.

Language furnishes a variety of options particularly when it comes to vocabulary. Particular options at the level of lexis or vocabulary are made by editors and written in style guides, which provide the preferred sets of the lexical categories to use and not to use. Languages have different ways of how to word a social reality and it is our particular selection from among so many available choices that characterizes voices and participants in the discourse differently from different ideological perspectives. The options indicate representations of the world from the networks’ ideological viewpoints often determined by those holding the reins of power.

As the BBC and CNN strive to speak the same language their Arabic services do not have their own special glossaries or style guidelines. Their editors say they have put in place some electronic form of guidelines but these are mostly translations of their English counterparts. Only AljE has drawn its own glossary and style guidelines
which are different from those of AljA., the mother company.

The following dwells mainly on AljE, analyzing its discourse and a sample of its style guidelines in the context of counterparts the BBC and CNN.

5. Analysis - AljE

5.1 One logo two discourses

AjE is the sister company of AljA. Its mission, according to Khanfar, is also to give “voice to the voiceless” in English particularly to countries in the south (the developing world). The two companies’ logo is the same but there are marked differences in their discourse. AljA’s discursive strategy as illustrated above is to respond to the social, cultural and religious needs of the region where it is most influential – the Middle East and North Africa. AljE’s strategy is to be immersed in the cultures of the south with the Middle East as an important part. The two channels are separate with two, albeit very close, but quite different premises; different budgets; different editorial policies and guidelines. What brings them together is the fact that both owe their existence to a generous donation from the Qatari Royal family.

A close look at the newsrooms of the two channels provides a good idea of how they have positioned themselves strategically differently. The AljA is made up of Arabs from various Arab states. The AljE newsroom includes mostly English-speaking people from more than 50 nations. The AljA newsroom has no regional specialized desks other than the Middle East. In AljE’s newsroom, the Middle East is attached to a much bigger international desk. There are of course important differences with relation to equipment, kind of building, furnishings, privileges, treatment and even security. These issues though important and certainly with some bearing on discourse production, are beyond the scope of this study. However, it was not difficult for me to detect the high level of tension they have created where AljA employees, housed in an older building, are served with occasionally inundated bathrooms.

AljE is not an English copy of AjlA (c.f. Barkho 2006; 2007). It has its own style guide which as we shall see differs a great deal from that of AjlA particularly at the level of vocabulary. There is tension in relations, with AjlA editors very reluctant to comment on AljE which they euphemistically call “the channel over the road”. There is evident jealousy of the sudden glamour AljE enjoyed the moment it was launched and the extensive media coverage with which it was received while the world-wide influence, reputation and brand were already firmly established by AljA
and its Arabic journalists. None of my AljA’s respondents was willing to answer AljE-related questions while AljE’s editors were very forthcoming when asked on relations with AljA. Asked whether AljE feels attached to the culture and traditions of the Middle East the way AljA does, Atef Dalgamouni, AljE’s Middle East consultant said:

You cannot apply that to English because the mission of the English Channel is worldwide and transmits to the world. It cannot be a copy of the Arabic Channel because the viewers are different; they do not have the same feeling about Arab issues as the Arab public do.

Gaven Morris AjlE’s Head of Planning puts it succinctly:

We have different ideas about the content of issues we put on air ... We are not just ‘over the road’. We are in two separate buildings, conducting our operations in two different kinds of way. That is the way they set this place up because they wanted the two channels to have distinct identities because we are serving different audiences.

AljE editors – and style guideline – do not shy from declaring their independence with regard to strategy. Their insistence on their ‘distinct identity’ which they do not want to share with AljA both discursively and socially they attribute to the difference in language and audience and the power holders seem to be happy with the autonomous turf the channel has carved out for itself. But the Arabic services of both the BBC and CNN cannot claim to enjoy this degree of autonomy, though in the case of the former Arabic broadcasting is one of the oldest foreign language services. BBC’s Arabic radio began broadcasting in 1938, 16 years after the founding of the corporation. Adel Sulaiman, Editor, Day News Program (BBC Arabic), says: “We don’t have guidelines specific to Arabic by the way. We are governed, ruled by one BBC editorial guideline.” Hosam El Sokkari, Editor in Chief of BBC Arabic Service, says: “We are not independent from the BBC values and guidelines” but at the same time “we have different audiences to cater for and have competition that is working side by side with us now”. The introduction to the BBC guidelines on the Net says: “The BBC Editorial Guidelines apply to all of our content whoever creates or makes it and wherever and however it is received”. http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/edguide/aboutguidelines/

5.2 AljE’s style guide

One better way to examine AljE’s ‘distinct identities’ is first to investigate some of
the discursive practices of its style guideline and then see how the channel responds to the instructions it contains with regard to vocabulary and how these instructions are embodied in its discursive practices. Here are a few excerpts from the short introduction written by John Pullman, AlJE’s Head of Output:

- We need to speak with one voice.
- We must watch every word we say.
- It is the responsibility of every journalist to understand our in-house guidelines.
- Read and remember what is written here.

Here are some samples of guidelines on the use of vocabulary:

- **Extremist** – avoid characterizing people.
- **Fundamentalist** – do not use. The word has been hijacked.
- **IDF** – do not refer to the IDF or Israeli Defense Force. Call it the Israeli army.
- **Martyr** – we will NOT use.
- **Militants** – do not use unless the subject agrees with the description.
- **Disputed territories** – Israel prefers the term. We will not use.
- **The Wall** – we will refer to the barrier Israel is erecting along its borders as a barrier or wall. Calling it a fence does not convey its purpose adequately.
- **Suicide bomber** – this phrase is not always used by the Arabic channel. The reasons are complicated ... These issues do not arise in English. We will use the term suicide bomber.
- **Fatwa** – is simply a legal degree in Islam by a religious authority or court and issued by a mufti. (It is NOT a death sentence).
- **Jihad** – means an inner spiritual struggle for perfection NOT a holy war. It is not by tradition a negative term. It also means the struggle to defend Islam, to rally against things challenging it. It does not always need translating – we can simply use the word jihad.
- **Resistance** – do not use when talking about Iraq. Use armed groups, fighters etc. instead.
- **Settlements** – the settlements established by Israelis in land occupied by Israel in 1967 are illegal settlements. That is what we will call
them.

- **Different** – Doha is very different from Dublin, not different to.

The sentences above are a classic example of what Fowler calls “context of authority-differential” (1991:189) grammatically represented in the use of command signals through imperative structures *do not, avoid, call* etc. Note the obligatory use of modals such as *will, must and need*. The samples are tantamount to *dos* and *don’ts* and the guidelines whether for AjlE or AjlA, the BBC or CNN are a good example of how guideline discourse producers believe that they are endowed with authority and superior knowledge than other members of the organization. It borders on ‘authoritarian didacticism’ in the discursive practice of which editorial power holders resort to the discursive repertoire of the instructional ideology of language. Note how explanations are imposed on journalists not only through imperatives but declarative sentences as in the last example on the use of *Different* which is an elementary form of instruction found in elementary grammar books written for those whose knowledge and proficiency of language is very poor.

Though written by one person it is not difficult to see how the first four sentences, for example, are written in opposition as if they respond to or anticipate participation from the voices they target, i.e. reporters involved in the final output before it is disseminated (Barkho 2008b). Although we have short single utterances which lack subjects and reporting verbs necessary for quoting or paraphrasing, they are involved in what Bakhtin describes as “hidden dialogism” which is difficult to tell from the surface structure of guideline discourse. The utterance of the writer is there but the response of the other is discursively absent. Nonetheless, the reader can sense the conversational character of the discourse as the writer targets other discursively hidden voices and one can sense that the writer even anticipates what their responses would be:

*Although only one person is speaking, we feel that this is a conversation, and a most intense one at that, since every word that is present answers and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible interlocutor, it points outside itself, beyond its own borders to the other person’s unspoken words.*

(Bakhtin 1973: 163)

Besides, the guideline discourse takes into consideration opposite discursive patterns of rival channels, particularly AljA, the BBC and CNN. It is contentious and argumentative and in Bakhtin’s terms (1994: 108) “internally polemic” in a visible discursive bid to distinguish itself from ‘others’ and in a sense rejecting the validity of their discursive options in explaining terms like *Militants, The Wall, Fatwa* and *Jihad* for example. In terms of Bakhtin, AljE guideline writer is aware of how ‘others’
employ similar terms and is in a kind of dialogue with them:

> The individual manner in which a person structures his own speech is determined to a significant degree by his peculiar awareness of another's words.

(Bakhtin 1994: 108)

Also note the insistence with which the guideline writer ‘inculcates’ editorial power holders’ position of what is incumbent on journalists to pursue in case they come across similar situations in the future as in the explanations regarding the use of words *suicide bomber* and *Jihad*. To show that editorial power holders are serious, note the repetitive use of *NOT* in upper case *We will NOT, It is NOT* demonstrating they are the ones who have the power to decide. The authoritarian discourse of the guidelines is illustrated in the absence of the kind of modal verbs or other lexical items indicating probability or equivocal expressions such as *may, might, probably, possibly, likely, maybe*. Thus there are no markers of tentativeness in the short snap sentences and even the verbs in the declarative are indicators of an omniscient writer who is so certain and knowledgeable about the subject as in *It is the responsibility of every journalist to …, That is what we call them, These issues do not arise in English.* These features coupled with modality of obligation give the addressees (journalists) no room to argue, question or negotiate whether the explanations, orders or claims are true, representative of the reality of the communicative events or not.

It is to be noted that discursive parallels are quite easy to draw when comparing the discourse of AljE’s guidelines with those of the AljA, the BBC and CNN. The only difference is that AljE’s guidelines, unlike those of AljA, the BBC or CNN which are voluminous, are condensed in about 20 pages. But this is due to the very short period AljE has been in business. The longer a media organization is operational, the bigger the size of its guidelines.

Why is it that only AljE has its style guidelines while the Arabic services of both the BBC and CNN have yet to design their own? AljE is still in its infancy when compared to the BBC Arabic which was the first language BBC World Service launched beyond English nearly 70 years ago. We can explain this through Bourdieu’s (2000; 1991) notions of symbolic power and domination which says that powerful and universal languages have more value, prestige and consideration than lesser powerful languages and varieties. Not only some language varieties are of greater worth (standard English) but also some languages are universally seen more valuable than others. A lingua-franca like English belongs to dominant groups while Arabic is the language of dominated groups. Symbolically linguistically less powerful groups accept the hegemony of linguistically more powerful groups.
This explains why AljE has its separate style guide while both BBC Arabic and CNN Arabic have to rely on the guidelines originally designed for the English services. AljE enjoys as much power as AljA. It is in fact established as a fully independent and separate entity and it operates solely on its own with its separate and independent news gathering and broadcasting services, special salary-scale and more importantly its own distinctive discourse. The Arabic services of the BBC and CNN operate within the orbit of their mother English channels and still a large portion of their output is merely a translation of the English text. At Bush House in London, languages beyond English are usually referred to as ‘periphery broadcasts’. AljE is not on the ‘periphery’ of AljA. It is truly independent editorially, administratively and operationally from the ‘hegemony’ of the AljA, the mother channel.

The BBC’s four ‘wise men’

In the corridors of the BBC’s Bush House or the White City in London, no talk about Middle East reporting, and especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is possible without the euphemistic phrase ‘the four wise men’. So who are these ‘four wise men’ and how is their ‘wisdom’ in the selection of words and terms to describe the conflict used and received by the corporation?

The ‘wise men’ are Malcolm Balen, Senior Editorial Adviser; Jerry Timmins, Head of Region, Africa and Middle East; Jeremy Bowen, Editor, Middle East; and Hosam el-Sokkari, Head, Arabic Service. Under Balen’s supervision, the four editors have compiled the Israeli-Palestinian glossary, the first list of words ever by the BBC on an on going conflict (c.f. Barkho 2008a). I met each of the four editors separately and they were keen to indicate that BBC’s reporters and editors were not under obligation to stick to their ‘suggestions’.

“I don’t send tablets of stone on how to cover stories,” said Bowen. “I am not here as a sort of a dead hand on the shoulder of editors, saying, do this do that,” said Balen. The glossary for Timmins represents “the current collective wisdom in the organization … but we never say you must use this word or you must not use this word.”

But the reality of the situation is different. The discursive analysis of BBC output shows that the vocabulary is strictly adhered to (c.f. Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a). Secondly, the glossary is still for internal use and only 24 terms have been made public so far. Thirdly, a critical analysis of the guidelines will leave readers with the impression that they are under obligation to follow the rules (see 5.3).

Moreover, the glossary’s unquestionable ‘authoritarian’ character is manifested in the significance the BBC College of Journalism attaches to it. It makes up the bulk of the Middle East module. For the right answers to questions, exercises and multiple choices, students are referred to this massive glossary of hundreds of terms. “It is a straight forward quiz actually
where you are asked questions, and given four options and then you either get it right or don’t get it right,” says Vin Ray, the college’s director.

5. 3 BBC guidelines

The BBC, unlike newspapers and other media outlets, does not have a single style guide. According to Kevin March, Editor, BBC College of Journalism, there are six style guides within the BBC, ranging from online services to marketing and publicity. The portions that are accessible electronically are not hugely different. But none of these has generated the kind of interest and controversy at the same time like the guidelines related to the Middle East coverage (Barkho 2008a). The giant public broadcaster has persistently resisted demands to make this particular handbook known as Guide to Facts and Terminology on Israel and the Palestinians: Key terms public. And of the hundreds of words, phrases and terms, the BBC has only agreed to publicize 24 of them following recommendations from a key panel BBC Governors had set up to look into the impartiality of BBC coverage of the conflict. Here are a few samples and excerpts from their explanations as they appear on BBC website along with some others which the author obtained through private conversation. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/newswatch/ukfs/hi/newsid_6040000/newsid_6044000/6044090.stm)

- **Targeted killing** - The phrase “targeted killing” is sometimes used by Israel and should be attributed.
- **Barrier** - ... BBC journalists should try to avoid using terminology favored by one side or another in any dispute ...
- **BORDER** - Be careful with this word. Do you mean boundary? See Green Line.
- **EAST JERUSALEM** - ... For example, the Foreign Office says it “regards the status of Jerusalem as still to be determined in permanent status negotiations between the parties ... Avoid saying East Jerusalem “is part” of Israel or suggesting anything like it. Avoid the phrase “Arab East Jerusalem”, too, unless you also have space to explain that Israel has annexed the area and claims it as part of its capital ...
- **GREEN LINE** - ... In describing the situation on the ground take care to use the most precise and accurate terminology ... To that end, we can call the Green Line “the generally recognized boundary between Israel and the West Bank” ...
• **Intifada** - ... So, for example, it is preferable to say that “Sharon’s visit and Palestinian frustration at the failure of the peace process sparked the (second) intifada or uprising” rather than it “led” to it or “started” it ... Generally it’s a good rule to question the use of any adjective. Use it only if it is vital to the understanding of the story and you are confident that it precisely applies in this context ...

• **OUTPOSTS** – Be careful that you don’t mean settlements. They are very different. Some of these outposts are called “unauthorized outposts” by the Israeli government – generally meaning no permission was granted for them. You can describe an outpost as unauthorized by the Israeli government ...

• **PALESTINE** - ... So be careful with the use of the word “Palestine” as its meaning can depend on the context.

• **SETTLEMENTS** - ... Settlements are residential areas built by Israelis in the occupied territories. They are illegal under international law: this is the position of the UN Security Council and the UK government among others - although Israel rejects this.

• **Legal position of the settlements** - The U.N. believes that settlements have no legal validity and obstruct the peace process (e.g. Security Council Resolution 446, 22 March 1079) ... The Foreign Office gives this statement on its website: “Our policy on settlements is clear: settlements are illegal under international law and an obstacle to peace ... continuing illegal Israeli settlement activity threatens the prospects for a two-state solution and is an obstacle to peace.”

• **SETTLER NUMBERS** - Because of disputes and sensitivities about the status of East Jerusalem, the following construction is useful: “There are thought to be around 430,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and another 20,000 in the Golan Heights.”

• **TERRORISTS** - We should try to avoid the term, without attribution. We should let other people characterize while we report the facts as we know them. We should convey to our audience the full consequences of the act by describing what happened. We should use words which specifically describe the perpetrator such as “bomber”, “attacker”, “gunmen”, “kidnapper”, “insurgent” or “militant.”

• **Eretz Israel** - This phrase literally means the Land of Israel (Hebrew: Eretz Yisrael) and refers to the ancient kingdoms of the Bible. According to the Bible, the Kingdom of Israel was the nation formed around 1021
BC from the descendants of Jacob, son of Isaac, who was given the name Israel, meaning struggles with God.

- **Dome of the Rock** - Islamic tradition says that the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven from the post marked by the Dome of the Rock.

The major discursive difference between BBC’s Middle East guidelines and those of AljE is in their detail. While AljE’s explanations are short, the BBC (see The BBC’s four ‘wise men’) apparently exerts much more effort to prove that the selected lexis is ‘correct’ and ‘legitimate’. One important issue needs highlighting before giving a short analysis of the samples above. The BBC has no such glossary in place but for the Middle East and it has come into being in response to power struggle and lobbying inside and outside the corporation (Barkho 2008a). The struggle culminated in the imposition of a specific discursive and social vision of the world of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which the BBC sees as ‘legitimate’ and in line with the international law. The glossary, which has almost become non-negotiable and authoritative in the corporation’s ranks, is meant for internal use with only a few terms made accessible through the Web. A detailed critical analysis of these ‘key’ terms in BBC’s Middle East discourse is beyond the scope of this study, but it is worth underpinning a few points.

First, Fowler’s (1990) “authority differential” is as vividly displayed here as in AljE or AljA’s guidelines. Note the ‘warning’ nature of the command and instruction discourse *Be careful, avoid saying, avoid the phrase, take care to use, use it only if, so be careful with the use*, etc. Note likewise the frequent use of obligatory modal verb *should* (five times). But more important is the way the writer or writers of vocabulary guidelines assume the role of omniscient ‘scholars’ with the ability to suggest how Middle East reporters should write and what to include in their reports, e.g. the suggestions on how to describe *INTIFADA*, and occasionally they ‘prescribe’ ready made clauses (quotes) for the reporters to use such as the suggested quotations in *GREEN LINE* and *SETTLER NUMBERS*.

Secondly, BBC’s discursive policy, as editors point out, is to shun the use of ‘emotional’ or ‘judgmental’ words such as ‘TERRORISTS’ unless attributed. But the guidelines are not consistent in this regard as they allow the use of lexical items which are no less loaded such as *militant, insurgent, Islamist, kidnapper, bomber*, etc. But what is striking about these value-laden words is that they surface mainly in the discourse describing the Palestinians fighting Israeli occupation and Iraqis fighting foreign troops (Barkho 2006, 2007, 2008a). They and others like *extremist, fundamentalist*, etc. are not deployed to characterize other voices in discourse even if those voices carry out events or harbor ideologies that are not so much different from
those of Palestinian or Iraqi groups that are normally labeled as such.

Thirdly, what is more striking is the emphasis the BBC places on the ‘religious’ character of the conflict. Note the explanation about Eretz Israel which is wholly based on Biblical texts which despite their being ‘unauthenticated’, the BBC guideline discourse views them as historical ‘fact’. The ‘historicity’ of Israeli claim to the land is dated to 1021 BC. Similarly, note the definition of the Dome of the Rock and the story of the Prophet Muhammad which the BBC attributes to Muslim tradition but in fact it has its roots in the Koran, Muslims’ holy book. Of course there must be many other expressions where the BBC assumes the role of a ‘religious’ teacher to explain their meanings to its army of nearly 10,000 reporters in the samples above. These include the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif; Western or Wailing Wall; Al-Aqsa mosque among others. It is worthwhile comparing this portion of the guidelines with those of AljA where the editor-in-chief uses the Prophetic Tradition and traditional Arab sayings to drive his message home but refrains from relying on the Koran, the Muslims’ Holy Book in providing the explanations the way the BBC does in its leaning on the Bible (see 4.3).

Finally, the style guideline is straightforward about the role of political power, the British government which decides the license fee and the Foreign Office which finances the World Service. Note how their opinion counts with regard to the information the BBC wants to pass to its reporters in relation to SETTLEMENTS and their legal position. Note how the guidelines permit reporters to use the word unauthorized with regard to outposts and authorized with regard to settlements which may leave the reader with the impression that the activities carried out by the hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers are benign and ordinary. There is little in the BBC discourse that gives the settlers a semblance of ‘malignant discursive practices’ despite their illegal presence on occupied Palestinian land while there is an abundance of such discursive practices with regard to Palestinian groups (Barkho 2008a, 2007). The opinion of the U.K government and the Foreign Office also surfaces in legal position of settlements and EAST JERUSALEM.

The power of the ‘Foreign Office’

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001 attack on the U.S., BBC World Service received clear instructions – as well as financial support – to upgrade its Persian and Pashto services – the key languages of Afghanistan. Shortly after the end of the war in Afghanistan in October 2001, the Foreign Office faxes a statement to the Head of the BBC Eurasia Region.

The statement was a speech by the then Foreign Office Secretary Jack Straw. Minutes later the
Eurasia Region head receives a call in which he is instructed to have the statement translated into Persian and Pashto, read out as it is and as many times as possible, without editing, over the BBC services directed at Afghanistan. The order was implemented immediately.

“This was a scandal. That should not have happened in the BBC. Do they want to turn periphery services into propaganda tools?” wondered a BBC employee who only agreed to speak on condition of anonymity.

There are many in the Middle East who now fear the newly launched BBC Arabic television will be part of ‘Western propaganda’ since it is being financed directly by the Foreign Office. The only difference in the funding of the new BBC channel and AljE is in the source of finance – the Foreign Office in the case of the former and the Qatari Royal family in the case of the latter.

The BBC Arabic Television comes into being following a grant of more than $50 million and the closure of several World Service radio channels in Eastern Europe to fund the new venture (The Times 6 March 2000). It is not the first Western satellite news channel directed at the Middle East. The U.S., France and Russia have their own Arabic television services. They try to chip away at AljA’s growing and influential market but apparently they have all but failed (Barkho 2006).

AljA’s success in the Arab World where, according to BBC’s Richard Sambrook, Global News Director, “events … affect all of us in some way, from terrorism and war, to oil prices and trade” is not due to the Qatari royals’ coffers but mainly attributed to the channel’s distinct discursive and social strategy which rivals are not willing to adopt in order to compete (Barkho 2006, 2007 and 2008a).

The Grant-in-Aid and a say in key appointments clearly give the British government some leeway to exercise some influence. “There is still some issue over the BBC independence,” says one editor who asked not to be identified. BBC Middle East guidelines often refer to Foreign Office attitude (see 5.3) in a tacit reminder that its voice counts, too.

5.3.1 *Shaping others’ discursive and social worlds*

The frequent references to international law, U.N. Security Council resolutions and the British government are part of the writers’ attempt to weave the discursive options into a ‘sensible’ world despite the fact that the corporation’s habitus and field might be viewed quite ‘insensible’ by the voices that see the discursive patterns representing them as negative and ‘malignant’. But as Bourdieu (1990: 66) says the most powerful at various levels of the society see “everything” as “sensible: full of sense and objectivity directed in a judicious direction.” How is power enacted in
discourse? Power is most evident and visible in discourse when the use of discursive patterns (or even a language or a variety for that matter) is backed by regulations and instructions. In the case of the three broadcasters, their style guidelines assume such role and their power is almost tantamount to that of law (c.f. Bourdieu 2000).

The effects of texts “inculcating and sustaining” power and changing ideologies has received a great deal of attention from CDA (Fairclough 2003: 9). But in media firms like the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera the causal effects of texts promoting, sustaining and maintaining ideological power is deliberate and intentional and the question of intent hitherto overlooked in the critical analysis of texts (c.f Blackledge 2003; Fairclough 2003; Eagleton 1991, Thompson 1984, van Dijk 1998) is a crucial factor in the creation and dissemination of news discourse. The style guidelines are written with a special intent and purpose in mind which the power holders, editorial or political, are keen to see manifested in discourse both discursively and socially. Of course the issue of intention at the level of discursive strategy will remain obscure and hidden if we merely restrict our analysis to the text itself and derive what we know about its world through its intertextual relationships to other texts, discourses and genres.

5.4 The interface of discursive and social strategy

The presence of two distinct style guidelines in Aljazeera and the presence of cross-channel guidelines in the BBC and CNN show that even within the types of field that can be identified in social world, according to Bourdieu, there are certain sub-divisions. The different structures and set of rules churning out different products, discursively and socially, produce the type of habitus that is only suitable to the particular field the broadcasters position themselves in. Thus it follows while Aljazeera has developed for itself two field structures (AljE and AljA) and two sets of rules, or habitus, to respond to those structures, the BBC and CNN, despite their multilingual and global approach revolve within the structures of one field and their style guides impose one unified set of rules of habitus to respond to it (Bourdieu 1999; 2000).

One important question to address here is what happens if the habitus of the members of an institution runs contrary to the structures of the field. In organizational settings where discourse is the core business, it is not necessary for the members’ habitus to share the structures of the field in order to become effective participants. Those with alternative habitus systems in these organizations, unlike in other social settings, have the chance for effective participation despite the discrepancy that may be found in relation to the values and beliefs normally associated with discursive patterns they have grown to accept as part of their field.
Thus, the production and reproduction of social order as represented in institutional media discourse may not always give the illusion of common sense as Bourdieu (2000) and other CDA scholars have argued. The players (reporters) of the field in media are quite aware of the discursive and social constraints imposed on them. As a dominated group they are, as Bourdeu says, in complicity with the dominating actors and their attempts to impose their set of rules but this ‘consent’ is not commonsensical for them as evidenced in AljE discourse whose creators and participants less than two years ago were ‘in complicity’ with different habitus that was inscribed for them in the set of rules consistent with the social field of their former dominating discursive and social groups.

This is better illustrated through the analysis of Aljazeera discourse since most of the actors now holding the discoursal power have flocked to the network from institutions where relations between habitus and field were different, namely the BBC for AljA and both the BBC and CNN for AljE. It is also clearly seen in the movement of journalists from one institution to another, particularly from the BBC and CNN to Aljazeera and vice versa. For example, Salah Najem, the renowned Arabic editor, started first with the habitus and field of the BBC, then moved and established AljA as editor-in-chief, and has spearheaded the launch of the BBC Arabic Television with the social arena of BBC habitus and field once again. Khader has moved back and forth between the BBC, AljA and other news networks. He says with every move, he had to be prepared for a different ‘mindset’ and his main guide in this has been the outlets’ style guides. I asked if he could elaborate, he said:

> Every situation has its own merits and it is judged on its own merits. For example each situation has a short handbook of style which describes to every journalist in the institution what kind of vocabulary and terminology one should use in dealing with a particular event ... For example, it is allowed here (AljA) to say ‘a battle between Shiites and Muslim factions in Iraq. It is not allowed to say ‘there is a battle between Jews and Muslims in Palestine.’ It is not allowed to say ‘the Shiite Hizbollah’. It is just ‘Hizbolla’. So for every situation we have a particular set of terminology.

Khader’s statement illustrates that he had in fact to transform his common-sense as he moved from one organization to another. And the transformation, for him, has occurred at the levels of both habitus and field as he had to ‘transform’ his habitus, his way of being, with every move he made, in order to familiarize himself, first with the habitus, through the discursive rules in the style handbook and then the field, the organization’s social arena. The relation between the discursive strategies and practices of the habitus and the field may not have been part of his common-sense
social reality but with every move he tries to acquire the habitus by learning the rules necessary to adapt to the new field.

This process of transforming one’s ‘mindset’ habitus in the light of the ‘situation’ field, in Khader’s words, is evident in the discourse of the three global media firms. How can we then explain Bourdieu’s symbolic violence under which hegemonic ideology and power are both socially and discursively reiterated until they become part of the common-sense that members of the field take for granted? Media discourse of the BBC, CNN and Aljazeer, like any other discourse, reinforces hegemonic ideologies, but this disoursal hegemony and power assume different relations in news since they are produced and reproduced by reporters not necessarily arbitrarily and as part of their common sense but in fact consciously and deliberately since they know exactly what they are doing.

The production and reproduction of symbolic violence through discourse for the BBC, CNN, AljA and AljE is not all the way through “an illusory representation” neither implicit nor taken-for-granted consent, as Bourdieu (2000: 181) says. Symbolic domination in discourse can be visible as it has been for Khader and Salah as they move from one media outlet to another as they accept to ‘inscribe’ new habitus rules to meet the new social fields they happen to be in. Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic value and violence are echoed by Gramsci (1971) who uses ‘hegemony’ as an equivalent term. Both philosophers speak of symbolic domination in discourse and say that discoursal power relations are invisible and go without saying for interlocutors; however they instantly add that total reliance on textual evidence is not enough to unravel these relationships.

The way discoursal power is enacted and context formed in the BBC, CNN, AljA and AljE shows that van Dijk’s (2004:349) notion of “mental representation or model” is not suitable to clarify the different intent and motivation of the three broadcasters’ strategy to link their habitus with field and the manner they exercise their symbolic power and violence. Individual reporters will have to transform their mental models, expressed discursively, regardless of the social, cultural and historical dimension of which these models have been constructed in order to be consistent with the habitus and field of their institutions. Their mental models, in terms of habitus and field, might be very much different from those constructed as part of their historical, cultural and even linguistic development (see also 6.7).

For the writers of the style guidelines (see the BBC’s four wise men and Barkho 2008a, for example) the discursive options they make are the ‘best’ and most ‘appropriate’ and ‘impartial’ ones language provides them with. The purpose of the guidelines, as Balen says, is to “reconcile language and policy” which to editorial power holders
is natural and commonsensical so long as it expresses the corporation’s ideological strategy. That is, the discursive strategy and policy is rational as it is the only option that is linguistically ‘available’ and suitable from among scores of others the language may provide. This is the kind of discourse which Fowler (1991: 52) describes as a façade for “consensual ideology.” The option to choose the set of rules that make up the habitus of the three broadcasters is in the hands of a few individuals and is imposed on thousands of journalists (about 10,000 in the case of the BBC) but is presented as if it has a ‘unanimous’ character while this unanimity, Bordieu (2000) tells us, is nothing but an illusion.

The BBC and language

BBC News Management, in a document for the independent panel on the impartiality of the BBC coverage of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, outline the corporation’s overall editorial strategy of the Palestine-Israel crisis. With regard to language, they say: “The choice of language in covering this part of the world is often seen as a determinant of impartiality, or its failure” (BBC 2005). But the BBC editors and journalists I interviewed were not that aware how language, particularly at levels other than vocabulary, could be a good measure of impartiality. The only guidance they have is a “key points guide” which in essence is a glossary of words and expressions advising producers what language is appropriate and what is not. The following conversation I had with a senior English news editor shows that language for the BBC is merely the choice of lexical items that are purportedly neutral in their description. The editor asked for anonymity with regard to this particular part of the interview. Here are excerpts:

Barkho: How much attention is paid to language and at what level?

Editor: I think we pay a great deal of attention to language and the whole way the BBC does in order not to pass, to make judgments in the way we use language about what is happening. We tend not to use words like ‘claim’ or ‘imply’ and so on.

Barkho: BBC attention to language goes as far as the lexicon. Little attention is paid to how structures of language bigger than words such as nominalizations, phrases and clauses can introduce features of bias and non-impartiality.

Editor: What we write is constantly monitored and looked at. And I don’t believe it’ll be possible to lay down rules about precisely what phrases and language we can use. It’ll be completely formulaic.

Barkho: But in your output you tend to use passive headlines a lot mainly when it concerns Palestinian casualties and particularly when the Israelis are the agents or perpetrators of actions.

Editor: (with surprise) Particularly the Israeli actions!
Barkho: In fact many people are surprised to see such headlines repeated frequently when reporting Palestinian casualties.

Editor: Give me one single example.

Barkho: Well, like “5 militants killed in Gaza raid” instead of “Israel kills 5 Palestinians”.

Editor: Certainly space is an issue. Under our style, every headline must be 30 to 31 characters.

Barkho: I have also noticed a tendency to resort to a certain type of adverbial clauses or modification in giving the Israeli context which is not always matched when reporting the Palestinian side. I have several examples where the Israeli action is accompanied by a subordinate clause beginning with “following …, in the wake of …, after …, in retaliation …, as …” as you try to explain the action. The ‘why’ is there for Israel but not for Palestine.

Editor: I don’t agree.

Barkho: Well.

Editor: It seems you’re seeing patterns of the way we write which to you betray some kind of bias or something. Just isn’t true. Just isn’t true. I mean I’ve watched and well there are people or journalists in this room … they don’t have a political agenda, you know, if you are right to say that if umm, umm, if an attack is in retaliation or something else, we normally do not say so. But this conflict in the Middle East, everything is retaliation and goes back as far as you know.

Barkho: I am not saying there is bias. I am just laying down facts … And I believe it is done unconsciously.

Editor: (extremely surprised) I’d hope there isn’t a bias anyway. You’re saying it is unequal

Barkho: Yes, in the choice of linguistic structures.

Editor: And you’re saying we use different structures regarding who we are talking about.

Barkho: Yes, I do.

Editor: Well, I am asking you in your perception which side do we favor?

Barkho: I don’t know which side you favor. I am saying if you have a headline like ‘Three Palestinians killed in Gaza raid’ and then you have another headline ‘Israel kills three children’ and that is actually what happened the representation is quite different. They are totally different, two different ways of reporting the same thing.

Editor: Well if that is your conclusion, I’m not necessarily agreeing with you.

Barkho: I am not talking about conclusions. Let’s talk about language in general. Let’s say this is not the BBC, or CNN or Aljazeera. Let’s talk about two persons giving two statements about the same event. The first person says, “Three killed in an air raid” and the second person says, “X kills three children”. There is a difference between these statements by the two people about the same event, Isn’t there?

Editor: Umm, yes.
5.5 Less ‘loaded’

AljE’s discourse at the level of vocabulary is less ‘emotive’ and ‘loaded’ than AljA’s. Labeling and naming are carried out in a way that is not disparaging to the sides of both conflicts. Compare the following lexical patterns AljE employs to describe both Israelis and Palestinians with those of the AljA (see 4.2 and 4.3): ‘Israeli Army, Israeli radio, Palestinian fighters, Israeli troops, local Hamas fighters, prisoner list, Hamas fighters killed, etc.’

Moreover, words like martyr and resistance or resistance fighters are not employed in representing the Palestinians unless attributed or part of the appellation of a Palestinian group, e.g. al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Front. Similarly the word occupation is not attached to almost every mention of Israel and its institutions as in AljA (see 4.3) and is used very sparingly, 28 times in the corpus of 116 stories.

There are differences in number of stories AljA and AljE issue on the two conflicts. AljA issues nearly three times the number of stories on Iraq than AljE (295 to 117) and nearly twice as many with regard to the Israeli Palestinian conflict (203 to 116). (For details on the BBC and CNN frequency of coverage, see Table 1).

5.6 Type of verb

With regard to the type of verb and its use for reporting functions, AljE and AljA pursue almost the same patterns to produce discursive means indicating what I have called the ‘macabre’ discourse in covering both conflicts. Most of non-reporting verbs are of the dynamic type referring to death, murder, assassination, killing, destruction, firing to kill, shooting, bombing, explosion, wounding, injuring, etc. They are so preponderant. The author’s count reveals an average of four such verbs per story.

The two channels’ discursive practices at the level of vocabulary, while very divergent with regard to the coverage of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, do not seem to be that different concerning the conflict in Iraq. Both pursue almost the same discursive policy vis-à-vis the labeling of different groups and the representations of events taking place there to the extent that one might mistake AljE’s naming practices to be a translation of AljA’s: suicide bombing for both is suicide bombing, and both refrain from describing Iraqis who fall due to fighting the U.S., each other or sectarian violence as ‘martyrs’.
5.7 ‘Unnatural’ before now ‘natural’

AljE, now in its second year, is a classic example of how the lure of position and economic benefits may coax media workers to move to organizations whose ‘ideational’ experience of the world runs contrary to those of the institutions they used to work in. AljE has lured big names from both CNN and BBC whose habitus and field (discursive patterns and social world) differ a great deal from those of Aljazeera (Barkho 2007; 2006). And for many it is a new world of discourse which previously they had seen as ‘illegitimate or unnatural’ but once experiencing it, it became ‘legitimate’ and part of the ‘common sense’. I asked Russel Merryman, AljE’s editor-in-chief (Web and New Media), and a former BBC senior editor, what he thought of the ‘cognitive or ideational’ and discursive relationships in the new place in comparison with those he had at the BBC:

_When you were with the BBC that was the mindset there. When you came here you had to change the mindset or to adapt it to the traditions of this place._

This ‘mindset’ Khanfar describes as giving “voice for the voiceless. The Arabic Channel started that and the English Channel is following in the same direction”. Khanfar has overseen the growth of Aljazeera from a single Arabic Channel into a giant broadcaster with multiple services.

Khanfar is known among the network’s senior editors for his “explanatory paradigm” which both AljA and AljE try to translate into discursive and social reality. Discursively, both channels are required to position themselves strategically within this paradigm. For Khanfar it is not a matter of objectivity or subjectivity,

_it means the context of culture, the context of language, the linguistics, the context of history, the context of human being himself and his diversity. We do not want to be reductionists, we do not want to fall in the trap of immediacy, we do not want to look at reality from afar and say ‘look this is the Middle East.’_

How is this ‘cultural embeddedness’ practiced at the level of discursive strategy? It is done in two main ways. Firstly, by selecting the type of discursive practices to show the channel is not a copy of the BBC and CNN (Barkho 2007). Morris, a former CNN’s News Editor puts it this way:

_We have to come up with alternative ways of covering the story that is of interest to people outside Britain and perhaps outside the Anglo-
American sphere of thinking. And so we really have to wrack our brains every time: we’ve got to come up with a different angle, we’ve got to report this from the people and from a perspective that is very different from the English perspective perhaps sort of the Anglo-American axis that I think exists between the BBC and CNN.

Secondly, to respond to Khanfar’s ‘explanatory paradigm’, AljE has followed AljA’s strategy of relying on indigenous reporters as far as possible to give its coverage the cultural and social nuances of the regions it covers mainly the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Helal, who oversaw AljE’s recruitment, says:

AljE tries to paint the world differently from other networks whether CNN, BBC, Sky or whatever ... It means reporting from people, by people which means we have correspondents, producers and editors from different societies and different religious background, different ethnic background and different cultural background.

The ‘power of Atlanta’

Who holds the reins of discursive power in CNN? Who decides that almost every mention of Israeli army must be “Israel Defense Force” regardless of the kind, place and nature of the military operation they undertake? Who decides on how and when emotional and value-laden words and expressions such as “militant, extremist, terrorist, jihadist, Islamist, militant group, extremist Muslim groups” should be used? Who decides on the language and content of every story before it is being aired?

While it was difficult to gain access to CNN’s closely guarded internal style guide, some inkling of how discursive power and strategy are enacted in the giant broadcaster can be gleaned from the interviews.

No piece in the field is broadcast unless it is first checked for language and balance by Atlanta, says Fenton. CNN, like the BBC, has developed its own Middle East glossary, he adds. It is this glossary which makes it incumbent on reporters to say security barrier or security fence in describing what AljA calls segregation wall and the BBC merely terms barrier. I asked Fenton, a former Jerusalem bureau chief, if he really thought security fence was appropriate from his own experience, he said: “Well, even if it is a fence it is nothing like a garden fence. You could see how it prevents a Palestinian family who could no longer go to their field.”

Why would ‘Atlanta’ exercise such a domineering discursive and social role that almost strips correspondents of the power to use their own language? “We are extremely careful with language. Choice of language and terms and expressions is in the hands of Standards and
Practices Department in Atlanta. The people there deal with our language. Every package has to go there to ensure it meets the rules of objectivity and balance,” says Wren.

The author failed to gain access to CNN’s Standards and Practices Department in Atlanta despite repeated requests.

6. Conclusion

One has to draw a distinction between internal and external power relations in the composition of discursive practices particularly at the level of lexis or vocabulary. These relations are not dialectical. Journalists and editors have to respond to the needs, whether political or economic, of those to whom they owe their existence regardless of their ‘ideational’ assumptions. Communication between the holders of political and discoursal power in the case of the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera on the one hand and the journalists and editors involved in discourse production on the other hand is mostly one way. This does not mean there is no room for tension and even some form of ‘resistance’ on the part of the newsroom people, but power holders always have it their own way and experience as well as empirical evidence show that journalists occasionally are ‘coerced’ rather than ‘persuaded’ in carrying out power holders’ discursive policies. Discoursal ‘complicity’ between media and politicians is an area which critical analysts have tackled extensively, but their assumptions have always been that of hidden power relations based on commonsensical ‘consent’ rather than ‘coercion’.

The study illustrates how instrumental vocabulary is in conveying the ideological power of media. The categorization of Palestinians and Israelis on the one hand and of the different voices in the Iraq reporting on the other divides up the reality of the protagonists in the light of the ideological representations the networks make of them. Editors and reporters deny that they work as an agency for ideological power but the ‘compulsory’ nature of their internal guidelines and the editorial mechanisms they have in place show the opposite.

Prominent critical analysts see the unequal categorization resulting from the use of vocabulary as one of the most ideologically significant traits of power in discourse. The Israelis and Palestinians in AljA discourse belong respectively to two different ideological orders and hence the conflicting lexical discursive practices employed in their representations. The discursive scrutiny of the conflicting vocabulary give one the impression that the ideological gap is almost unbridgeable because the power behind it is so overwhelming rendering compromise unrealizable.
Language furnishes a variety of options particularly when it comes to vocabulary. Particular options at the level of lexis or vocabulary are made by editors and written in style guides, which provide the preferred sets of the lexical categories to use and not to use. Languages have different ways of how to word a social reality and it is our particular selection from among so many available choices that characterizes voices and participants in the discourse differently from different ideological perspectives. The options indicate representations of the world from the networks’ ideological viewpoint which is often determined by those holding the reins of power.

How can we then approach the problem of power relations in global media firms like Aljazeera, the BBC and CNN? Fairclough (1995), drawing on Bourdieu, raised the same question more than a decade ago and his answer was (and it is still seen as valid in the mainstream literature) that traces of power and ideology are hidden in media texts and the more they are hidden the most effective they become. But what about the ‘commands’ Sheikh sends out now and then? What about the way he intersperses his ‘discourse of command’ with sayings from the Prophet and Arabic and Muslim tradition? What about the overt tilt by the BBC on the Bible to drive home to its reporters its own inherent social assumptions of the conflict between Israel and Palestine? What about the three networks’ guidelines bearing obvious ‘authoritarian’ discursive features that are linguistically akin to the language of the Biblical ‘10 Commandments’? The power of discourse is visible to media people and is consciously ‘manipulated’ in terms of representation. And moreover, media people themselves believe that they and to a certain extent their audiences are aware of this power ‘manipulation’. This straightforward exercise of discoursal control by power holders is discernible in the corridors of power in the three global multilingual media organizations.

Aljazeera’s vocabulary is a case of one organization with two divergent discourses selected from a host of options to address issues of power relations and ideology. It is indeed a conscious attempt by the power holders to respond to the realities of the English speaking audiences in the case of AljE and Arabic speaking audiences in the case of AljA. The Arabic services of the BBC and CNN are not seen as valuable by their power holders as AljE is to Aljazeera as a network. BBC and CNN’s Arabic services adhere to style guidelines written for the main English service. They, from both social and discursive strategic perspective, are peripheral orbits in the domineering English habitus and field.

The strategic perspective particularly of AljA is embedded in its discourse as the selection of lexis – names, labels and other terms – is rooted in the culture, religion and tradition of the region. AljE attempts to draw on the same discursive tradition but bears in mind that discursively it has to address English language speakers. It is less
embedded than AljA but its systemic positioning drives its discourse quite apart from that of the BBC and CNN (Barkho 2007, 2008a).

While hard news discourses of AljA, AljE, the BBC and CNN differ, there are marked discursive similarities in their guideline discourse. The three guideline samples analyzed in this study share a lot in their discursive patterns but differ in their social practices.

In organizational settings, powerful actors in Habermas’s ‘systems’ exercise their authority in a manner that is largely invisible and hardly felt by lesser powerful actors. Reporters are usually aware of how the holders of power in organizations like the BBC, CNN and Aljazeera control their lives. They have not grown to accept the ‘systems’ imposed on them as natural or commonsensical as Gramsci and Garfinkel argue because they feel the weight of power all around them.

While the three global broadcasters exercise discoursal power almost in the same way, they do discourse differently due to the huge discursive discrepancy between their style guidelines and as a result they view the social world of the Middle East from different perspectives. There are stark differences, with regard to discursive and social strategies, between AljA on the one hand and the BBC and CNN on the other. There are also marked differences between AljE and AljA on the one hand and AljE and the BBC and CNN on the other.

Selection of discourse particularly at the level of lexis is ‘deterministic’ as reporters are under obligation not to steer away from their style guidelines when manufacturing the news. Therefore, the choice may run contrary to the common sense prevalent among members of the organization or ‘systems’. Choices at levels other than lexis could be nothing but arbitrary; however empirical evidence shows that the bifurcation of discourse at the level of lexis into positive/negative and benign/malignant could be a factor for similar divisions at higher levels particularly nominalization and agency (Barkho 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b).

While AljE is independent of AljA, the Arabic services of the BBC and CNN still revolve in the orbit of their main English language services. They have to follow the same reporting standards and procedures and go by the style guidelines written specifically to meet needs of English speaking audiences of their English speaking channels. AljA exerts no effort to impose its habitus and field on AljE while BBC and CNN’s Arabic services have to adopt the rules (habitus) that cope with the social arena (field) even if both contradict the reality of the situation with regard to audiences.

Following Bourdieu, CDA analysts have mostly viewed discoursal power as invisible
and that it can only be brought to the surface through the ‘preying’ eyes of critical scholars. But that is not the case with the creators and practitioners of discourse in the BBC, CNN and Aljzaera where the discoursal bifurcation of voices is so deliberate and visible that reporters have learned what they need to do in order to practice it when moving from one outlet to another. The hegemonic ideology is intentionally produced by these organizations and to have it practiced they have devised their own ‘gate-keeping’ procedures in the form of style guidelines, quality units, editorial advisers and policy makers whose main task is to ensure that these discursive divisions are maintained and adhered to in discourse.

There is a clear tendency to discursively bring the reporting or representing voice to the surface as the three networks rely more on paraphrasing, keeping quoting to the minimum. Bakhtin’s ‘hidden dialogism’ is discernible mainly in the discourse of style guidelines and the comment layer of news discourse. But despite the presence of multiple voices, there is a clear tendency in hard news discourse of the three broadcasters to steer discoursal elements (lexis and other layers) toward the center of power, employing centripetal rather than centrifugal force so that both discursive patterns and their social assumptions point toward the central themes of style guidelines.

Once the style book discourse is inserted in the body of the story it assumes further significance due to its dialogic power which shapes and re-shapes the social world from the outlet’s point of view. This is an important feature of political and media discourse since it relies heavily on reporting what other voices say which often makes it difficult for analysts to draw a line between the discourse being reported and the discourse doing the reporting.

AljA has developed a peculiar schematic structure where more than two news pegs may be present in a headline and developed separately, each with its own leads and satellite paragraphs.

Discursive parallels are quite easy to draw when comparing the discourse of AljE’s guidelines with those of the AljA, the BBC and CNN. The only difference is that AljE’s guidelines, unlike those of AljA, the BBC or CNN which are voluminous, are condensed in about 20 pages. But this is due to the very short period AljE has been in business. The longer a media organization is operational, the bigger the size of its guidelines.

A striking feature is the emphasis the BBC and AljA place on the ‘religious’ character of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict in their style guidelines. AljA relies on Prophetic Tradition to force the ‘consent’ of reporters with regard to lexical and other choices.
Similarly, the BBC relies heavily on the Bible to explain lexical options with regard to Israel and to a lesser degree on Islamic tradition with regard to Palestinians.

The way discoursal power is enacted and context formed in the BBC, CNN, AljA and AljE shows that van Dijk’s notion of “mental representation or model” is not suitable to clarify the different intent and motivation of the three broadcasters’ strategy and how they link their habitus with field and the manner they exercise their symbolic power and violence. Individual reporters will have to transform their mental models, expressed discursively, regardless of the social, cultural and historical dimension of which these models have been constructed in order to be consistent with the habitus and field of their institutions. The institutional mental models, in terms of habitus and field, might be very much different from those the reporters have constructed for themselves as part of their historical, cultural and even linguistic development.

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Strategies of power in multilingual global broadcasters

Paper 1

CA: Sage


