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  • 1.
    Capriola, Margherita
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Romance Studies and Classics, Institute of Latin American Studies.
    Climate Crimes: Climate change and deforestation: a case-study of state-corporate crime in Peru2017Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    During the last decades, climate change studies have been focusing more intensely on its anthopocenic essence, as the consequence of production and consumption patterns that require the intensive exploitation of the environment. In line with this school of thought, and new generations of studies on environmental crime, this work aims to present the environmentally and climate-related issues arising from land degradation in the Peruvian Amazon; focusing on those casual mechanisms developed from the collusion between Peruvian-economic policies and new private actors such as transnational corporations (TNCs). Relying on the assumption that: the processes moving the issue of climate change overcome the global space, and can be observed from regional, national or local point of view; this work's purpose is to analyze how a single country as Peru, currently considered of low ecological footprint, could, by means of the definition of national laws (environmentally and economic-related) burden climate change. The analysis focuses on a single case-study identified with the territory within the Northern Ucayali and Southern Loreto regions in Peru, and builds on the theory of state-corporate crime developed in the 1990s by Ronald C. Kramer and Raymond J. Michalowski to define the role of state-corporate relationships in the production of social harms. To show how this relationship is today shaping the globally spread issue of climate change, the analysis of the palm oil industry in Ucayali is presented as main example of a broader phenomenon of transgression and partnership between private and public spheres in Peru. In this optic, the purpose is to give further contributions to the studies of climate change as state-corporate crime, focusing on the analysis of those territory, as the Amazon, whose preservation has been identified as mayor tool against global warming and which is instead harmed by the relation between private and governments interests.

  • 2.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    A Nested Analysis of Electoral Donations2017In: Journal of Mixed Methods Research, ISSN 1558-6898, E-ISSN 1558-6901, Vol. 11, no 1, 77-98 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article reports the results of a nested analysis conducted to evaluate whether or not electoral donations are considered legal bribes. Introduced by Lieberman, nested analysis brings together the strengths of the regression analysis and the case study research by integrating large-N approaches (LNA) with small-N approaches (SNA). The nested analysis uses a sequential sampling model (QUANTITATIVE → QUALITATIVE) and a nested sampling design (case selection “on/off the line”). Here, Lieberman’s original model was extended to deal with an apparent paradox that emerged from the analysis. This inquiry included a cross-national examination among 78 countries, denoted as LNA, followed by an intranational analysis conducted in Colombia, where an SNA survey with 302 respondents and an SNA case study were carried out.

  • 3.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Corporate donations to electoral campaigns: A case study on white-collar crime2013In: State Crime, ISSN 2046-6056, Vol. 2, no 1, 52-71 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Mackenzie and Green (2008) and McBarnet (2006) have argued that it is possible for white-collar crimes to emerge from actions that are cloaked in legality. In this article I study this paradox, focusing on the case of corporate donations to electoral campaigns. In particular, I will present an intra-national study on corporate funding of elections in Colombia. The case examines the electoral donations from palm oil growers’ firms to the 2002 and 2006 presidential campaigns of Álvaro Uribe. It illustrates how legal donations delivered by corporations were reciprocated by incumbents through favourable legislation and policy outcomes. Although donors were not prosecuted for giving electoral donations, since it is a legal practice, administrative and judicial authorities have demonstrated that the donors communicated with incumbents with the intention to commit fraud.

  • 4.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Corporate tax avoidance: a crime of globalization2016In: Crime, law and social change, ISSN 0925-4994, E-ISSN 1573-0751, Vol. 66, no 2, 199-216 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article approaches tax avoidance as a crime of globalization. Tax avoidance is not just a problem originating in the corporation. Corporate tax avoidance is a practice that involves different corporations and different territories simultaneously and, as such, it has global consequences because these corporations do not pay their fair tax in the countries in which they operate. As it is seen here, the free-market creates opportunities for tax avoidance when nations and territories strive to attract international investment by changing their tax rules in favor of powerful corporations. Tax regulations have been re-written by tax authorities, financial controls have been removed, and secrecy has been guaranteed to provide a favorable atmosphere for investors. However, tax authorities only give total exemptions to foreign and non-domiciled corporations while taking taxes from their own citizens and national corporations. In all, the tax incentives offered are not the result of less state intervention in the economy but are instead the product of more state intervention in rewriting the rules of the economy in favor of the powerful.

  • 5.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Electoral Donations as Legal Bribes: Evidence from a Survey of Private Corporations in Colombia2012In: International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, ISSN 1929-4409, Vol. 1, 162-175 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I study why companies give electoral donations to support political leaders. I collected and used a unique data set on electoral financing at the corporate level in Colombia. The data show that firms consider electoral contributions to be "legal bribes". Consistent with the theory of bribery, these donations are made because of the low quality of election regulation, the high expectation of reciprocity, and the pre-existing relationships with incumbents. These features suggest "legal neutralization": donors can break the law without committing crime.

  • 6.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Is the top leadership of the organizations promoting tax avoidance?2016In: Journal of Financial Crime, ISSN 1359-0790, E-ISSN 1758-7239, Vol. 23, no 2, 273-288 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose – This paper aims to study the roles of CEOs, board of directors and accounting/auditing firms in the adoption of tax avoidance schemas.

    Design/methodology/approach – A cross-national analysis with data from 22 countries is used toexamine the relationship between tax avoidance and the ethical qualities of the top leadership of theorganizations, the firm’s profile and the tax/legal system characteristics.

    Findings – The results show that the board of directors is the actor that contributes more to control taxavoidance cross-nationally, whereas the CEOs’ role to contend this practice is less relevant. Theoutcomes for accounting/auditing firms reveal that the stronger standards these firms have, the moretax avoidance is observed.

    Originality/value – The methodology (cross-national analysis) and dimensions examined (role of theactors/instances of discretional power) in this inquiry offer a novel perspective to the analysis of taxavoidance, as most scholarly studies have taken a national approach and have mainly focused onstudying the characteristics of the firms involved in tax avoidance.

  • 7.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Legal bribes?: An analysis of corporate donations to electoral campaigns2013Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this research I analyse how the existence of regulations that allow private funding of election campaigns have created opportunities for crime. Three specific questions are addressed here: 1. Do electoral donations increase political corruption? 2. Why do companies give electoral donations? 3. How are electoral donors compensated? To address these questions, I adopted a nested analysis. This sequential, mixed method brings together the strengths of both regression analysis and case study research, while conducting a validity check—triangulation—by convergence of results via different methods and theoretical approaches. I first conducted a cross-national comparison of 78 countries; then, I conducted a survey of 302 private companies in Colombia; and finally, I documented one case that described how campaign contributions affect the political decision-making process.

    The main conclusion of this research is that electoral law creates opportunities for crime, because it legalizes the entrance of interested money into politics, disqualifies donors as perpetrators, and introduces regulations with null or limited deterrent effect on the delivery of undue reciprocities. Indeed, I demonstrated that electoral financing is used as a legal bribery by private corporations. The legal character of this political instrument is perverted when undue compensation is delivered to donors. This is not a crime with a single perpetrator; rather, donors and incumbents are equally involved. However, donors are protected by electoral law, because the money delivered as corrupt incentive is classified as legal. This suggests that the law is being used as a mechanism that neutralizes donors as perpetrators. This perspective points to the manipulative use of electoral law, or creative compliance, as the term is used by McBarnet (2006).

  • 8.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Political corruption2006In: Encyclopaedia of white-collar crime / [ed] J. Gerber, E. L. Jensen, Westport: Greenwood , 2006, 228-231 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Political Corruption and Campaign Financing2008Report (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Although political leaders, donors and some scholars would argue that there is nothing illegal behind the idea of giving and receiving campaign contributions, this research attempts to demonstrate the contrary. Here, I claim that small and large contributions constitute representations of political corruption because they are given for specific purposes either ideological or personal. Since the relationship between campaign financing and political corruption has not been studied worldwide, in this thesis I conduct a cross-country analysis of 83 countries and find that there is less political corruption: 1) in countries where elections are not funded with public resources; 2) in countries where the impact of legal campaign financing on public policy outcomes is lower; 3) in countries where regulations impose ceilings on election expenses and on the amount of money that parties/candidates can raise in each election; and 4) in countries where regulations make the public disclosure of campaign expenditures compulsory.

  • 10.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Political Corruption and Campaign Financing2008Licentiate thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Although political leaders, donors and some scholars would argue that there is nothing illegal behind the idea of giving and receiving campaign contributions, this research attempts to demonstrate the contrary. Here, I claim that small and large contributions constitute representations of political corruption because they are given for specific purposes either ideological or personal. Since the relationship between campaign financing and political corruption has not been studied worldwide, in this thesis I conduct a cross-country analysis of 83 countries and find that there is more political corruption: 1) in countries where elections are not funded with public resources; 2) in countries where the impact of legal campaign financing on public policy outcomes is greater; 3) in countries where regulations impose ceilings on election expenses and on the amount of money that parties/candidates can raise in each election; and 4) in countries where regulations make the public disclosure of campaign expenditures compulsory.

  • 11.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Political Corruption and Electoral Funding: A Cross-National Analysis2013In: International Criminal Justice Review, ISSN 1057-5677, Vol. 23, no 1, 75-94 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this article is to study the suspect nature of private campaign finance, understood as the donors’ hidden intentions and delayed exchange of reciprocities with incumbents. In particular, I explore whether electoral contributions from private corporations lead to political corruption. On the basis of a cross-national analysis, I find that, first, private financing reduces corruption because the use of this legal mechanism is enough to guarantee that the donors’ interests will be achieved. Second, donors recognize that they have gained influence over policy outcomes, although in the spirit of the electoral laws this is not intended to occur. This increases corruption because incumbents use their positions of power to bend the rules and to adjust regulations and decisions in favor of their financial supporters. This paradox suggests law neutralization.

  • 12.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    Political corruption as a form of state crime: A case study on electoral donations2015In: State crime: Critical concepts in criminology. Vol. II: Varieties of state crimes / [ed] W. J. Chambliss, C. Moloney, Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, 283-300 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this chapter, I analyze how state crimes emerge when incumbents utilize their offices to reciprocate electoral donors with undue benefits, favorable regulations, contracts, and job appointments. The problem, as it is seen here, is that (a) while electoral donations are cloaked with legality, they facilitate corruption, and (b) the delivery of undue benefits creates social harm, because it diverts the allocation of public resources and destroys confidence in the political system. Thus, I argue and demonstrate how the money delivered as electoral donations constitutes a corrupt incentive that should be classified as illegal.

  • 13.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    State Aid and Taxation of Transnational Companies: A Study of State-Corporate Crime2017In: Critical Criminology, ISSN 1205-8629, E-ISSN 1572-9877Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study examines the taxation of transnational companies from the perspective of state-corporate crime. As in Sutherland’s pioneering study on white-collar crime, the author relies, in this case, on administrative decisions issued by the European Commissioner for Competition regarding Fiat and Starbucks. According to the Commissioner, the tax advisors of these organizations prepared and submitted special tax rulings on behalf of their clients that were granted by the Luxembourg and Dutch tax authorities, respectively. However, these tax rulings were considered illegal under European law, as they constitute state aid. Therefore, the Commissioner fined Fiat and Starbucks. In this inquiry, state aid from tax rulings is conceived as a process of capital accumulation that arises from states’ regimes of permission based on the interactions between public sector and private sector actors. Thus, an observable symbiosis between tax authorities and transnational companies allowed the latter to use tax regulations in a manipulative way, while the former exercised weak/undue control. This study also unveiled the criminogenic role of tax advisors, an industry that is rarely held accountable for their actions.

  • 14.
    Evertsson, Nubia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.
    State Aid and Taxation of Transnational Companies: A Study of State-Corporate Crime2017In: Critical Criminology, ISSN 1205-8629, E-ISSN 1572-9877Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study examines the taxation of transnational companies from the perspective of state-corporate crime. As in Sutherland’s pioneering study on white-collar crime, the author relies, in this case, on administrative decisions issued by the European Commissioner for Competition regarding Fiat and Starbucks. According to the Commissioner, the tax advisors of these organizations prepared and submitted special tax rulings on behalf of their clients that were granted by the Luxembourg and Dutch tax authorities, respectively. However, these tax rulings were considered illegal under European law, as they constitute state aid. Therefore, the Commissioner fined Fiat and Starbucks. In this inquiry, state aid from tax rulings is conceived as a process of capital accumulation that arises from states’ regimes of permission based on the interactions between public sector and private sector actors. Thus, an observable symbiosis between tax authorities and transnational companies allowed the latter to use tax regulations in a manipulative way, while the former exercised weak/undue control. This study also unveiled the criminogenic role of tax advisors, an industry that is rarely held accountable for their actions.

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