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  • 1. Alger, I.
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.). Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists2017In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 8, no 3, article id 38Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot.

  • 2. Alger, Ingela
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    Kinship, incentives, and evolution2010In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 100, no 4, p. 1725-1758Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes.

  • 3. Alger, Ingela
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    A generalization of Hamilton's rule-Love others how much?2012In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 299, p. 42-54Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to Hamilton's (1964a, b) rule, a costly action will be undertaken if its fitness cost to the actor falls short of the discounted benefit to the recipient, where the discount factor is Wright's index of relatedness between the two. We propose a generalization of this rule, and show that if evolution operates at the level of behavior rules, rather than directly at the level of actions, evolution will select behavior rules that induce a degree of cooperation that may differ from that predicted by Hamilton's rule as applied to actions. In social dilemmas there will be less (more) cooperation than under Hamilton's rule if the actions are strategic substitutes (complements). Our approach is based on natural selection, defined in terms of personal (direct) fitness, and applies to a wide range of pairwise interactions.

  • 4. Alger, Ingela
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.), Mathematical Statistics. Toulouse Sch Econ, France.
    Evolution and Kantian morality2016In: Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN 0899-8256, E-ISSN 1090-2473, Vol. 98, p. 56-67Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable. We also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of Maynard Smith's and Price's (1973) notion of evolutionary stability of strategies.

  • 5. Andersson, O.
    et al.
    Argenton, C.
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.). Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game2018In: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, E-ISSN 1879-3118, Vol. 91, p. 1-5Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player's uncertainty about another player's strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. A strategy profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.

  • 6. Andersson, Ola
    et al.
    Argenton, Cedric
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    Robustness to strategic uncertainty2014In: Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN 0899-8256, E-ISSN 1090-2473, Vol. 85, no 1, p. 272-288Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.

  • 7. Asheim, G. B.
    et al.
    Voorneveld, M.
    Weibull, J. W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    Epistemically robust strategy subsets2016In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 7, no 4, article id 37Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Yi contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y-i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability.

  • 8. Demichelis, Stefano
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    Language, meaning and games - A model of communication, coordination and evolution2008In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 98, no 4, p. 1292-1311Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9. Dixit, Avinash
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    Political polarization2007In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, ISSN 0027-8424, E-ISSN 1091-6490, Vol. 104, no 18, p. 7351-7356Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy, whereas others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic contexts and consistent with Bayesian rationality.

  • 10. Dutta, Prajit
    et al.
    Matros, Alexander
    Weibull, Jörgen
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Long-run price competition2007In: The Rand Journal of Economics, ISSN 0741-6261, E-ISSN 1756-2171, Vol. 38, no 2, p. 291-313Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We generalize the standard repeated-games model of dynamic oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long-lived and forward looking. Each period leaves some residual demand to future periods and pricing in one period affects consumers' expectations about future prices. We analyze this setting for an indivisible durable good with price-setting firms and overlapping cohorts of consumers. The model nests the repeated-game model and the Coasian durable-goods model as its two extreme cases. The analysis is mostly focused on constant-price collusion but conditions for collusive recurrent sales are also identified.

  • 11. Fosgerau, M.
    et al.
    Lindberg, P. O.
    Mattsson, Lars-Göran
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport Science. KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Centres, Centre for Transport Studies, CTS.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.). Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    A note on the invariance of the distribution of the maximum2018In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, ISSN 0304-4068, E-ISSN 1873-1538, Vol. 74, p. 56-61Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many models in economics involve discrete choices where a decision-maker selects the best alternative from a finite set. Viewing the array of values of the alternatives as a random vector, the decision-maker draws a realization and chooses the alternative with the highest value. The analyst is then interested in the choice probabilities and in the value of the best alternative. The random vector has the invariance property if the distribution of the value of a specific alternative, conditional on that alternative being chosen, is the same, regardless of which alternative is considered. This note shows that the invariance property holds if and only if the marginal distributions of the random components are positive powers of each other, even when allowing for quite general statistical dependence among the random components. We illustrate the analytical power of the invariance property by way of examples.

  • 12.
    Fosgerau, Mogens
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport Science, Transport Planning, Economics and Engineering. KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Centres, Centre for Transport Studies, CTS.
    Lindberg, Per Olov
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport Science. KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Centres, Centre for Transport Studies, CTS.
    Mattsson, Lars-Göran
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport Science, Transport Planning, Economics and Engineering. KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Centres, Centre for Transport Studies, CTS.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    Invariance of the distribution of the maximumManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Many models in economics involve probabilistic choices where each decision-maker selects the best alternative from a finite set. Viewing the value of each alternative as a random variable, the analyst is then interested in the choice probabilities, that is, the probability for an alternative to give the maximum value. Much analytical power can be gained, both for positive and normative analysis, if the maximum value is statistically independent of which alternative obtains the highest value. This note synthesizes and generalizes previous results on this invariance property. We provide characterizations of this property within a wide class of distributions that comprises the McFadden GEV class, show implications in several directions, and establish connections with copulas. We illustrate the usefulness of the invariance property by way of a few examples.

  • 13. Huck, Steffen
    et al.
    Kuebler, Dorothea
    Weibull, Jörgen
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    Social norms and economic incentives in firms2012In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, ISSN 0167-2681, E-ISSN 1879-1751, Vol. 83, no 2, p. 173-185Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise.

  • 14.
    Mattsson, Lars-Göran
    et al.
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport Science, Traffic and Logistics.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    Lindberg, Per Olov
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Transport Science, Transport and Location Analysis. KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Centres, Centre for Transport Studies, CTS.
    Extreme values, invariance and choice probabilities2014In: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, ISSN 0191-2615, E-ISSN 1879-2367, Vol. 59, p. 81-95Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Since the pioneering work of McFadden (1974), discrete choice random-utility models have become work horses in many areas in transportation analysis and economics. In these models, the random variables enter additively or multiplicatively and the noise distributions take a particular parametric form. We show that the same qualitative results, with closed-form choice probabilities, can be obtained for a wide class of distributions without such specifications. This class generalizes the statistically independent distributions where any two c.d.f.:s are powers of each others to a class that allows for statistical dependence, in a way analogous to how the independent distributions in the MNL models were generalized into the subclass of MEV distributions that generates the GEV choice models. We show that this generalization is sufficient, and under statistical independence also necessary, for the following invariance property: all conditional random variables, when conditioning upon a certain alternative having been chosen, are identically distributed. While some of these results have been published earlier, we place them in a general unified framework that allows us to extend several of the results and to provide proofs that are simpler, more direct and transparent. Well-known results are obtained as special cases, and we characterize the Gumbel, Frechet and Weibull distributions.

  • 15. Myerson, Roger
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.). Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria2015In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 83, no 3, p. 943-976Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usually develop so that people tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention. For rational players to usually restrict attention to a block of conventional strategies, no player should prefer to deviate from the block when others are likely to act conventionally and rationally inside the block. We explore two set-valued concepts, coarsely and finely tenable blocks, that formalize this notion for finite normal-form games. We then identify settled equilibria, which are Nash equilibria with support in minimal tenable blocks. For a generic class of normal-form games, our coarse and fine concepts are equivalent, and yet they differ from standard solution concepts on open sets of games. We demonstrate the nature and power of the solutions by way of examples. Settled equilibria are closely related to persistent equilibria but are strictly more selective on an open set of games. With fine tenability, we obtain invariance under the insertion of a subgame with a unique totally mixed payoff-equivalent equilibrium, a property that other related concepts have not satisfied.

  • 16. Saez-Marti, Maria
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Discounting and altruism to future decision-makers2005In: Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN 0022-0531, E-ISSN 1095-7235, Vol. 122, no 2, p. 254-266Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Is discounting of future decision-makers' consumption utilities consistent with "pure" altruism toward those decision-makers, that is, a concern that they are better off according to their own, likewise forward-looking, preferences? It turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics literature. In particular, "hyperbolic" discounting of the form used by Phelps and Pollak (Rev. Econ. Studies 35 (1968) 201) and Laibson (Quart. J. Econ. 112 (1997) 443) is consistent with exponential altruism towards future generations. More generally, we establish a one-to-one relationship between discount functions and altruism weight systems, and provide sufficient, as well as necessary, conditions for discount functions to be consistent with pure altruism.

  • 17. Salomonsson, Marcus
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Natural selection and social preferences2006In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 239, no 1, p. 79-92Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups, where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true. The expected number of surviving offspring depends on own material payoff, but may also, due to cooperative breeding and/or reproductive competition, depend on the material payoffs to other group members. The induced population dynamic is equivalent with the replicator dynamic for a game with payoffs derived from those in the original game. We apply this selection dynamic to a number of examples, including prisoners' dilemma games with and without a punishment option, coordination games, and hawk-dove games. For each of these, we compare the outcomes with those obtained under the standard replicator dynamic. By way of a revealed-p reference argument, our selection dynamic can explain certain "altruistic" and "spiteful" behaviors that are consistent with individuals having social preferences.

  • 18. Sethi, R.
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.), Mathematical Statistics. Institute for Advanced Study, France; Stockholm School of Economics, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
    WHAT IS… Nash Equilibrium?2016In: Notices of the American Mathematical Society, ISSN 0002-9920, E-ISSN 1088-9477, Vol. 63, no 5, p. 526-528Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 19. Weibull, Jörgen
    Testing game theory2004In: Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments, and Bounded Rationality - Essays in Honor of Werner Guth / [ed] S. Huck, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    et al.
    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    Alger, Ingela
    Family ties, incentives and development: a model of coerced altruism2009In: Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, Vol. 2 / [ed] Kaushik Basu, Ravi Kanbur, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 178-201Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    et al.
    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    Vieille, Nicolas
    Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting2009In: Economic Theory, ISSN 0938-2259, E-ISSN 1432-0479, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 513-526Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Infinite horizon dynamic optimization problems with non-exponential time preferences may not only exhibit time inconsistency but may also have multiple solutions with distinct payoffs. We here show that such multiplicity is generic in the sense that it occurs in an open set of such decision problems, even with small state- and action-spaces. Non-exponential discounting allows for an "addictive" equilibrium alongside a "virtuous" equilibrium. We also provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems with general action spaces.

1 - 21 of 21
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