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  • 1. Cohnitz, Daniel
    et al.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie2007In: Abstrakt Exakt Obskur: Philosophische Gedankenexperimente & Kunst, Logos, Berlin , 2007Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 2. Cohnitz, Daniel
    et al.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thought experiments in current metaphilosophical debates2018In: The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments / [ed] Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige, James Robert Brown, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018, p. 406-424Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A Model for Thought Experiments2009In: Canadian journal of philosophy, ISSN 0045-5091, E-ISSN 1911-0820, Vol. 39, no 1, p. 55-76Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Actions, properties, and causes1998In: Not Without Cause: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Paul Needham on His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Lars Lindahl, Jan Odelstad, Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 1998, p. 66-74Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Anomalous Monism2013In: Encyclopedia of the Mind / [ed] Harold Pashler, Sage Publications, 2013, p. 33-34Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Anomalous monism (henceforth AM) was proposed by the philosopher Donald Davidson and holds that individual mental events are identical to individual physical events. But AM denies that psychological concepts may be reduced to, or analyzed in terms of, physical concepts, however complicated. AM is a monistic theory: In contrast to dualistic theories, it holds that what exists does not comprise more than one sort of thing. But Davidson has rejected the classification of AM as materialist—in his view, there is no basis for saying that everything is “really” or “fundamentally” physical. The following three sections will outline the main claims of AM, survey some of Davidson's reasons for the irreducibility of the mental, and briefly relate an objection to AM.

  • 6.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    But Is It Interpretivism?2017In: Studia Philosophica Estonica, ISSN 1406-0000, E-ISSN 1736-5899, Vol. 10, no 2, p. 8-17Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this critical notice I raise a couple of questions concerning Mölder's ambitious metaphysics, aimed at underpinning his Ascription Theory. I argue that some of the points he takes to depend on this metaphysics are in fact independent of it. I further question whether the relation between the mental and the physical is quite so unlike relations between special science entities and physics as Mölder suggests. Finally I relate Mölder's Ascription Theory in very compressed form and suggest that although its loosening of the strictures on what evidence an ascriber of mental attitudes may avail herself of, it is not clear that the theory can really do without rationality considerations of the sort emphasised by Davidson and Dennett – at least if it is to count as a species of interpretivism.

  • 7.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Judgements, expertise, and counterfactuals2015In: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 58, no 7-8, p. 741-754Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), Tim Williamson has offered a sophisticated account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology. More recently, he has also engaged in a variant of the so-called ‘expertise defence’ of traditional philosophical methodology. In this paper I argue that if Williamson’s account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology is right, this seriously undermines his version of the expertise defence.

  • 8.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kinds, projectibility and explanation2005In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 5, no 13, p. 71-87Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two ways of characterizing natural kinds are currently popular: the Kripke-Putnam appeal to microstructure and Boyd’s appeal to causal homeostasis. I argue that these conceptions are more divergent than is often acknowledged, that they give no credence to essentialism, and that they are both faulty.  In their place, I sketch an alternative view of natural kinds, which I call bare projectibilism. This conception eschews the appeal to explanation common to microstructuralism and the causal homeostasis view, but is still compatible with scientific realism.

  • 9.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Modal Knowledge and the Form of Thought Experiments2009In: The A Priori and Its Role in Philosophy / [ed] Nikola Kompa, Christian Nimtz, Christian Suhm, Paderborn: Mentis Verlag GmbH, 2009, p. 53-68Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 10.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Modality and Similarity2004In: Modal Epistemology / [ed] Erik Weber, Tim De Mey, Bryssel: Contactforum , 2004, p. 63-76Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Kripke famously rejects similarity-based accounts of trans-world identity, or the need for similarity comparisons in modal epistemology. Instead, he invokes the semantic rigidity of names (and natural kind terms) in order to motivate the claim that ”possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered”. But in fact, I argue, Kripke’s own modal metaphysics – and hence, epistemology – makes extensive use of similarity comparisons. The question is whether this should lead us to reject Kripke’s modal semantics and accept counterpart theory. I suggest that we needn’t draw this conclusion. Instead, I argue, the pervasive dependance on similarity undermines the currently orthodox creed that we have a clear notion of de re modality.

  • 11.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av S. Holst, Tankar som ändrar allt2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of George Schlesinger, The Sweep of Probability1992In: Canadian Philosophical Reviews, p. 215-218Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of Kathleen Wilkes, Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments1993In: Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, ISSN 0012-2173, E-ISSN 1759-0949, Vol. 32, p. 171-176Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Teleosemantics: Etiological Foundations2013In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 8, no 1, p. 73-83Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Teleosemantics is a naturalistic research programme in the philosophy of mind and language. Its ambition is to achieve a reduction, first, of mental content to teleological function; second, of teleological function to non-teleological notions. This article explores the second step, particularly as envisaged by Millikan’s etiological theory of function.

  • 15.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The A Priori Thesis: A Critical Assessment2007In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, Vol. VII, no 19, p. 47-61Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent debates about thought experiments have focused on a perceived epistemological problem: how do thought experiments manage to provide knowledge when they yield no new empirical data? A bold answer to this question is provided by James Robert Brown’s platonism, according to which a certain class of thought experiments allow a sort of intellectual perception of laws of nature, understood as relations between universals. I suggest that there are three main problems with platonism. First, it is restricted to a very small class of thought experiments; hence, it largely fails to address the general epistemological problem. Second, it is not quite clear what it is supposed to explain. Third, its explanatory value in any case seems dubious, since what the mechanisms it postulates (i) appear to raise issues more difficult than what they would explain, and (ii) would seem to obviate the very need for conducting thought experiments. I also argue that it fails to give an accurate account of Brown’s flagship example, Galileo’s thought experiment on falling bodies. In conclusion, I suggest that although platonism about thought experiments is an exciting thesis, it is at present unconvincing.

  • 16.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thought experiments2013In: Encyclopedia of pilosophy and the social sciences / [ed] Byron Kaldis, Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2013, p. 1001-1003Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thought Experiments2007In: The Principles of Knowledge Creation: Research Methods in the Social Sciences, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, MA, USA , 2007Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thought Experiments, Formalization, and Disagreement2019In: Topoi (Dordrecht), ISSN 0167-7411, E-ISSN 1572-8749, Vol. 38, no 4, p. 801-810Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the last decade, philosophers have offered a number of proposals concerning the logical form of hypothetical cases, or thought experiments, as these are used for purposes of testing philosophical claims. In this paper, I discuss what the desiderata for a formal proposal are. Employing a comparison with general philosophy of science, I suggest that one important desideratum is to highlight recurrent patterns of disagreement surrounding cases. I advocate a proposal in propositional modal logic which, I argue, better meets this desideratum than competing proposals. I also sketch how this proposal may be extended into more fine grained analyses, employing counterfactual conditionals yet avoiding certain problems due to so-called "deviant realizations".

  • 19.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thought experiments in philosophy1996Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Cohnitz, Daniel
    Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu.
    The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy2009In: Studia Philosophica (Tartu), ISSN 1406-0000, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 1-14Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Experimental Semantics: The Case of Natural Kind Terms2015In: Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language / [ed] Jussi Haukioja, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, p. 109-138Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Externalism and a posteriori semantics2007In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 67, no 3, p. 373-386Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual’s external environment. Recently a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we dub ‘a posteriori semantics.’ The suggestion is that not only does a term’s meaning depend on the external environment, but so does its semantics. One motivation for this is the aim to account for cases where a putative natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind: The term may have a standard externalist semantics (if it picks out a natural kind) or a more descriptivist one (if it does not). Knowing which semantics applies will therefore require detailed empirical knowledge. This move has also been employed in cases where a singular term, such as a name, fails to have a reference. We argue that a posteriori semantics is inherently implausible, since the type of semantics common terms should be given ought not to be conditional on details of chemistry or physics. A number of difficulties for the position—‘metaphysical,’ epistemological, and methodological—are articulated. Finally, we suggest that a posteriori semantics misconstrues the way in which semantics is empirical.

  • 23.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms: Myth and Reality2018In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0007-0882, E-ISSN 1464-3537, Vol. 69, no 4, p. 911-933Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and that the currently popular homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds is correct only to an extent that fails to vindicate the Kripke–Putnam account. This undermines the metasemantics required for anti-descriptivist semantics.

1 - 23 of 23
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