It is commonly believed that tax arbitrage is anti-egalitarian. The present paper shows that this is not necessarily true; tax arbitrage might actually reduce inequality as well as increase efficiency. It is also shown that the introduction of tax arbitrage will linearize the tax system. Thus complicated, non-linear tax scedules in the spirit of Mirrlees (1971) cannot be sustained.

In this paper, we analyze government budget balance within a simple model of endogenous growth. For the AK model, simple analytical conditions for a tax cut to be self-financing can be derived. The critical variable is not the tax rate per se, but the "transfer-adjusted tax rate". We discuss some conceptual issues in dynamic revenue analysis, and we explain why previous studies have arrived at seemingly contradictory results. Finally, we perform an empirical study of the transfer-adjusted tax rates of the OECD countries to see which country has the highest potential for fiscal improvements; it turns out that only a few countries have any potential for such "dynamic scoring".

We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the basic labor supply model. We show that tax arbitrage has potentially dramatic implications for positive, normative and econometric analysis of how taxes affect work incentives.

We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the emipircal study of labor supply. We discuss the implications for tax policy analysis, and we show that a failure to account for avoidance responses may lead to huge errors when predicting how tax reform affects labor supply, tax revenue, and the welfare cost of taxation. in conclusion we argue that our model may explain a number of otherwise hard to understand dimensions of tax payer response.

Do males differ from females in terms of self-confidence? The structure of the Economics I exam at Stockholm University provides an opportunity to shed some light in this question. By answering an extra, optional question, the students can aim for a higher mark. We find a clear gender difference in that male students are inclined than female students to take this opportunity. This difference in self-assessment is more pronounced among younger than among older students.

I en nyligen publicerad bok presenterar och avfärdar samhällsdebattören Pär Ström vad han betraktar som sex olika "feministiska myter". I denna artikel granskas framställningen. Vi finner att den på en rad punkter vilar på en mycket svag empirisk grund. Pär Ström använder sig av statistik och citat på ett selektivt vis och verkligheten är mer komplicerad än vad han vill ge sken av.

We study the effects of experimental design on male and female behavior in a dictator game. Following social identity we investigate how experimental procedure may affect outcome through gender priming, i.e. the activation of gender stereotypes specifying that women behave altruistically and men egoistically. We prime subjects by asking them to indicate their gender in a questionnaire, before playing the game. In our experiment, such gender priming is effective (i.e. creates a gender difference in generosity) in gender-mixed environments, but not in single-sex environments. Further, men are more sensitive to priming than women are.

While there is ample evidence of a society-wide cooperation norm, it is not as clear who upholds this norm. In the present paper, we investigate whether there are gender differences with respect to norm enforcement. We let 1403 subjects play games of punishment and reward, individually or in groups with varying gender composition. Broadly, the results indicate that there are no clear gender differences: men are about as inclined as women to punish norm-breakers. However, behavior is context-dependent: men acting among other men are less inclined to uphold a cooperation norm than are women, or men in gender-mixed groups.

I en serie experiment har vi visat att människor lätt kan manipuleras att bete sig i enlighet med välkända könsstereotyper. I synnerhet är det män som låter sig påverkas av ”oskyldiga” förändringar i den experimentella miljön. Ett resultat visar att män omgivna av andra män blir mer förlåtande mot normbrytare. Ett annat resultat visar att män i könsblandade miljöer blir mindre generösa när de påminns om sitt kön. Slutsatsen är att könsspecifikt beteende till viss del är en social konstruktion.

The paper analyzes the effects on the demand for owner-occupied housing that are likely to result from the Swedish 1983-85 tax reform. This is done by means of a microsimulation model which takes into account the dichotomous nature of the demand for housing: the consumers choose the mode of tenure (owning versus renting) as well as the quantity of housing conditional on the choice of the mode of tenure. The tax reform consists of a general reduction of marginal tax rates (i.e. an increase in disposable income) together with limitations in the deductibility of mortgage interests. The simulations show that this will cause an increase in home-ownership in the sense that more households will demand owner-occupied housing. At the same time, however, the households will demand smaller houses in the average, and thus aggregate demand for small and medium-sized units will increase while demand for large units will fall sharply.

We investigate product quality under different market forms (monopoly vs. perfect competition) and under different risk-sharing regimes (replacement warranty vs. no warranty). Because of our particular representation of quality we can determine optimal quality and optimal risk-sharing within one single model. Quality differes between risk-sharing regimes and not between market forms, but the market form determines optimal risk-sharing and therefore optimal quality. it can be optimal to place all risk with the risk-averse consumer instead of with the risk-neutral prducer(s). Given the market form, the risk-sharing regime that is optimal for the producer(s) is also optimal for the consumers.

In order to get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism and not just on contracted hours should be taken into account. In particular, the effects on absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. In this paper we examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using time-series data for Sweden spanning a long period (1955-99) with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects of the expected sign. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permament increases in total sick leave per person employed and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983-91 period.

In this paper we treat an individual's health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is assumed that the individual is either able or unable to work. A continuous treatment of an individual's health sheds new light on the role of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in the traditional, dichotomous models. In particular, we show that moral hazard is not necessarily outright fraud, but a gradual adjustment of the willingness to work, depending on preferences and the conditions stated in the insurance contract. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims, and it clarifies the conditions for the desirability of insurance in the first place.

We develop a simple yet realistic model of income insurance, where the individual’s ability and willingness to work is treated as a continuous variable. In this framework, income insurance not only provides income smoothing, it also relieves the individual from particularly burdensome work. As a result, the individual adjusts his labor supply in a continuous fashion to the implicit tax wedge of the insurance system. Moral hazard, in the sense that an individual receives insurance benefits without actually being fully qualified, also becomes a matter of degree. Moreover, our continuous framework makes it easy to analyze both the role of administrative rejection of claims, and the role of social norms, for the utilization of insurance.

In this paper we treat an individual’s health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual’s health sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place.

We analyze how insurance arrangements, labor supply, moral hazard, and outright cheating are affected by social norms. One question is under what conditions norms may improve social welfare. Another is under what conditions people should be allowed to opt out of social insurance. We introduce an informal production sector to analyze the consequences of alternative assumptions about the information available to norm enforcers. This highlights one important aspect of norms, namely, that they may compensate for the insurer's limited information.

We classify social security pension systems in three dimensions: actuarial versus non-actuarial, funded versus unfunded, and defined-benefit versus defined contribution systems. Recent pension reforms are discussed in terms of these dimensions. Shifting to a more actuarial system reduces labor-market distortions, although limiting the scope for redistribution. Shifting to a funded system may increase saving, redistribute income to future generations and distort contermporary labor supply. A partial shift to a funded system helps individuals diversify their pension assets. A shift from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution system means that income risk will be shifted from workers to pensioners.

All European countries have some form of compulsory insurance against the loss of income due to temporary disability. The insurance schemes vary widely between countries both in terms of measurable entities (such as the compensation level) as well as in unmeasurable traits concerning the actual implementation of the programs. In this paper we use European Labour Force Survey data to study how the measurable differences in the programs is associated with differences in absence rates. We also summarize the theoretical literature on insurance principles in this field. Based on the empirical literature we then discuss how different forms of incentives may affect the work absence rate.

2010-2012 års europeiska skuldkris har lett till gigantiska överföringar av pengar i syfte att »rädda euron«.

I denna debattbok diskuterar Mats Persson överföringarna och han menar att de i första hand har gynnat ägarna till de banker som spekulerat i sydeuropeiska statsobligationer. Därigenom har åtgärderna uppmuntrat skadligt risktagande, vilket inverkar på valutaunionens stabilitet. Problemen har förvärrats av de krav på nedskärningar som tvingats på skuldländerna; dessa krav har skapat politiska slitningar mellan nationerna.

För att få valutaunionen att fungera krävs att man går tillbaks till Maastrichtfördraget 1992: andra länder ska inte lägga sig i hur ett enskilt euroland sköter sin ekonomi. Och några överföringar av pengar – för att lösa ut länder som misskött sig eller för att »rädda euron« – ska inte ske. Boken avslutas med en diskussion av hur en sådan politik ska kunna fungera i praktiken.

Contrary to what is assumed in traditional microeconomic theory, social rank seems to play a large role in actual human interaction. In the present paper I analyze the implications of a relative consumption, or relative income, externality (i.e., relative consumption c_i/c_j, and not only absolute consumption c_i, enters into the utility function of agent _i). This means that people will tend to work too much. In an optimal taxation framework, i show that a fairly high marginal tax rate can be Pareto efficient.

This paper discusses five examples of the conventional wisdom that has often been expressed in the social security debate, even among academic economists. These are: 1. The major problem in most social security systems is that of demography: people simply live too long. 2. Disregarding the issue of demography, a Pay-As-You-Go system is inferior to a fully funded system since the former usually has a lower rate of return. 3. Disregarding the porfolio aspect (which might favor a PAYG system), a funded system dominates a PAYG system in a world of certainty. 4. The social security system is a suitable isntrument for intergenerational risk-sharing. 5. The government is a safe and reliable provider of insurance.

This paper studies the provision of a public good from three points of view: (i) The maximum level of production of the public good consistent with a Pareto optimum, (ii) The level of production of the good maximizing a social welfare function, and (iii) The level of production of the public good that will be the result of a democratic system with majority voting. The paper analyzes how these three levels of production differ from each other.

This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy – the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment – can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying policies with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our resuklts with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).

This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labour supply and income distribution in the context of the rank-order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non-zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society’s welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.

An intertemporal general equilibrium model of criminal behavior is used to analyze the effect on crime of changing policy parameters. The policy parameters are the length of the prison term, the severity of punishment, and the amount of police resources. The number of crimes in society can be decomposed into an incentive part, an incarceration part, and a crime competition part. The magnitudes of these three components are studied by means of empirical data from England and the US.

Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in Becker’s (1986) model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and sometimes quite low. In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical observations.