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  • 1.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    An access and transfer right to data—from a competition law perspective2022In: Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, ISSN 2050-0688, E-ISSN 2050-0696, Vol. 11, no Supplement_1, p. i57-i71Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    While business users face difficulties accessing and porting data on platforms, the Digital Markets Act has been hailed as the legislative tool enabling business users access and transfer the data they have generated on platforms controlled by gatekeepers. The tool provided by the Digital Markets Act is discussed in this article and the author argue that business users should have a more elaborated right to first access the data they produce on platforms and in ecosystems, and secondly transfer such data from platform to platform, cloud to cloud, thing to thing or in-house. A right to access and transfer data could have several benefits; it benefits dissemination of data, creativity and innovation in connected markets and it promotes competition between platforms, clouds and ecosystem providers. Creativity will be enhanced because necessary data-being the raw material for new innovations-will be more broadly disbursed. It will also benefit consumers having a disbursed and disseminated data commons for the development of ideas, innovations, and the exchange of knowledge.

  • 2.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Cloud services as the ultimate gate(keeper)2019In: Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, ISSN 2050-0688, E-ISSN 2050-0696, Vol. 7, no 2, p. 220-248Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the Internet of Things (IoT), the amount and smart use of data will determine whether or not a firm can compete successfully. Manufacturing firms will collect data through sensors in their devices and, at least in the cases of SMEs, likely store the collected data in the cloud, purchasing cloud services and storage from the large e-platform providers doubling as cloud providers. The e-platform providers will also collect data from users of their other services. These data are often generated by the same firms that purchase cloud services when they use the e-platforms to sell goods and services. Access to the data and to data analytics on fair business terms, and the possibility to switch cloud and service providers are vital for the SMEs and, in general, to create a competitive and vibrant IoT. However, cloud and e-platform customers seem to be facing difficulties. According to the EU Commission, SMEs are finding it particularly hard to engage cloud and e-platform providers, and to gain access to cloud services on reasonable, transparent terms. The contracts are skewed in favour of the cloud providers. The customers get locked in and may be obliged to agree not to assert any of their intellectual property rights vis-a-vis the cloud provider or the cloud provider's network. Moreover, the cloud and e-platform providers may under certain circumstances access and make use of the users' data, and that may give them a competitive advantage vis-a-vis the users, since the providers may have access to much more data, even data originating from the users' competitors, suppliers, customers, etc. They can thus use all the data available to them to obtain a fuller picture of whole industries, and they may use that advantage in data to leverage and enter users' markets. Indeed, they may use the data in the cloud for data-driven business strategies to enter the core market of the firms that have provided them with data in the first place. This article discusses whether competition law can address the conduct of the cloud and e-platform providers, so that firms may access and make use of all the possibilities that the IoT harbours.

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  • 3.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Competition and Data Pools2018In: Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, ISSN 2364-4710, Vol. 7, no 4, p. 146-154Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the Internet of Things (IoT), the amount and smart use of data will determine whether or not a firm can compete successfully. Firms, at least SMEs, will likely store their collected data in the cloud, purchasing cloud services and storage from the large e-platform providers doubling as cloud providers. Access to the cloud and to data analytics on fair business terms, and the possibility to switch cloud and service providers are vital for the SMEs and, in general, to create a competitive and vibrant IoT. However, cloud customers seem to be facing difficulties. According to the EU Commission, SMEs are finding it particularly hard to engage cloud providers, and to gain access to cloud services on reasonable, transparent terms. The contracts are skewed in favour of the cloud providers. The customers get locked in and may be obliged to agree not to assert any of their intellectual property rights vis-a-vis the cloud provider or the cloud provider’s network. Moreover, the cloud providers may under certain circumstances access and make use of the users’ data in the cloud, and that may put them in competitive advantage vis-a`-vis the cloud users since the cloud providers may have access to much more data even data originating from the cloud users’ competitors, suppliers, customers, etc. They can thus use all data available to them to obtain fuller picture of whole industries, and that may use that advantage in data to leverage and enter cloud customers markets. Indeed, they may use the data in the cloud for data-driven business strategies to enter the core market of the firms that haveprovided them with data in the first place. This article discusses whether competition law can address the conduct of the cloud providers, so that firms may access and make use of all the possibilities that the IoT harbours.

  • 4.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Competition law as the limit to standard-setting2015In: Competition Law as Regulation / [ed] Josef Drexl, Fabiana Di Porto, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, p. 365-396Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Data Access, Portability and EU Competition Law2020In: Antitrust Chronicle, E-ISSN 2168-1155, Vol. 2, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This short paper will discuss the right to access and port data under EU Competition Law and EU sector-specific regulations. While general Competition Law is not readily available, stipulating a difficult test for the plaintiff, the EU Commission seems very keen on granting access and portability rights to data under newly enacted sector specific regulations, without any scrutiny in reference to the competitive effects of such rights. Indeed, to access and port data under these sector specific regulations are available to any comers. The paper concludes that enacting sector-specific regulations granting access to data without utilizing competition law principles may prove disastrous, and the Commission should rethink the aim of granting access to data to all and everyone.

  • 6.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Data Collaboration, Pooling and Hoarding under Competition Law2019In: Regulating Industrial Internet Through IPR, Data Protection and Competition Law / [ed] Rosa Maria Ballardini, Petri Kuoppamäki, Olli Pitkänen, Wolters Kluwer, 2019Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    EU-domstolens praxis angående rabatter och andra prismissbruk under Artikel 102 EUF-fördrag2017In: Kilpailuoikeudellinen Vuosikirja 2016 [Konkurrensrättslig årsbok], Finnish Competition Law Association , 2017, p. 43-54Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    European Harmonized Standards as 'Part of EU Law': The Implications of the James Elliott Case for Copyright Protection and, Possibly, for EU Competition Law2017In: Legal Issues of Economic Integration, ISSN 1566-6573, E-ISSN 1875-6433, Vol. 44, no 4, p. 418-432Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to several Member States Copyright regimes, laws and regulations should be publicly accessible, free of charge, as only free access complies with basic standards of democracy, rule of law and transparency. Indeed, legal text is generally exempted from Copyright protection. However, what should we do with privately created rules, i.e. technical standards incorporated in laws by reference? Are technical standards incorporated by reference 'law', and exempted from Copyright protection, or something else? On the contrary, if such technical standards are not 'law', but the result of private intellectual creativity, access may restricted. Generally, Standard-Setting Organizations have been charging for access to technical standards claiming copyright protection. However, from the recent James Elliott case, we now know that EU harmonized standards, i.e. technical standards referred to in certain EU directives, forms part of EU law and may be interpreted by the European Court of Justice. So, no copyright? European harmonized standards are freely available for copying, uploading and downloading? Well, it depends. Indeed, the James Elliot case raises interesting questions of both constitutional and commercial character in reference to the status of technical standards incorporated by reference in law, of which some are discussed in this article.

  • 9.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    How Does the EU Protect Competition in the Digital Platform Economy?2021In: The European Union and the technology shift / [ed] Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt; Karin Leijon; Anna Michalski; Lars Oxelheim, Springer Nature, 2021, p. 113-133Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 10.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Hur skyddar EU konkurrensen i den digitala plattformsekonomin?2020In: EU och teknologiskiftet / [ed] Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Anna Michalski, Lars Oxelheim, Stockholm: Santérus Förlag, 2020Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    European University Institute, Italy.
    Joint research and development and patent pools under the antitrust laws of the USA and the competition rules of the European Union2010Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Great prosperity is derived from innovation, which in turn prospers in an environment with a large public domain of free knowledge, property rights and unfettered competition. Generally, this was the basic theory for prosperity under the antitrust laws with reference to joint R&D, technology transfer and technology standardization in the US and Europe for many years. This perspective was slowly abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s, replaced by a belief that the greatest wealth was derived from innovators having large resources to perform R&D, the ability to cooperate with competitors and the possibility of jointly protect and exploit newly discovered knowledge through intellectual property rights, technology standardization agreements and joint licensing schemes. The antitrust policies on both sides of the Atlantic have closely and swiftly been adapted to mirror this change of theory. The thesis illustrates this transformation by analyzing the modifications and amendments made to legal acts and guidelines, and the slow shift in the scant case-law detected both under the antitrust laws of the USA and the Competition Rules of the EU. The thesis shows that the prevailing antitrust policies towards R&D collaborations, technology standardization agreements and patent pools are very similar in the US and EU and they both mirror a lenient or even supportive attitude towards collaboration between competitors in reference to creating innovation.

  • 12.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Killer Acquisitions and Other Forms of Anticompetitive Collaborations (Part I): A Case Study on the Pharmaceutical Industry2021In: European Competition and Regulatory Law Review - CoRe, ISSN 2510-3148, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 186-199Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The article aims to address the problem of so-called killer acquisitions broadly, extending also to strategic alliances and other forms of collaborations. We find that ‘killer situations’ can appear in all forms of collaborations that imply a change of control of research results. We therefore conclude in this part I that for the Competition Authority to only focus on killer acquisitions in the form of mergers can be counterproductive. Both mergers and strategic alliances in the pharmaceutical industry would instead benefit from a more intense competition law scrutiny, and in part II we develop what is needed to intensify the competition law scrutiny of accquisitions and collaborations.

  • 13.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law. HSE-Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, Russia.
    Killer Acquisitions and Other Forms of Anticompetitive Collaborations (Part II):: A Proposal for a New Notification System2021In: European Competition and Regulatory Law Review - CoRe, ISSN 2510-3148, Vol. 5, no 4, p. 344-363Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In two consecutive articles, of which this is the second one, I analyse so-called ‘killer acquisitions’ and other collaborations detrimental to competition. In this article, I have analysed the merger rules and whether they can identify and capture the problematic cases identified in Part I. After concluding that this is not the case, I present a proposal that I believe would benefit competition and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. I suggest that certain firms in the pharmaceutical sector should be obliged to notify collaborations that imply change of control over research, research assets or research results, and that the focus under the merger rules should be on innovation and innovation results. A notification system should thus be put into place also for strategic alliances including license agreements and R&D collaborations in which the control over promising research or research capabilities is transferred to a large pharmaceutical firm. Such transfer is conducted through the covenants and restrictions of an R&D start-up and its key employees, even though there are no formal change of control of the start-up as such. I furthermore suggest that that ancillary agreements to such collaborations including shareholding agreements and option programmes that imply that leading researchers are locked-in by explicit or implicit non-compete and other forms of covenants should be scrutinised in the merger review.

  • 14.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Konkurrensrätt och nödvändiga patent: Kommentarer angående Huaweimålet2016In: Europarättslig tidskrift, ISSN 1403-8722, E-ISSN 2002-3561, no 2, p. 197-207Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    IT- och telekombranschen har väntat på att EU-domstolen ska ta ställning till den juridiska knäckfrågan om en innehavare av ett standardtekniskt nödvändigt patent kan driva en process om immaterialrättsligt förbudsföreläggande gentemot ett företag som vill nyttja standarden och vill ingå ett licensavtal med patentinnehavaren på s.k. FRAND villkor, eller om en sådan process kan anses utgöra missbruk av dominerande ställning enligt Artikel 102 FEUF. Det var därför många inom industrin och i akademin som med höga förväntningar såg fram emot EU-domstolens avgörande i Huawei-målet. Tyvärr verkar dock EU-domstolen i Huawei inte levt upp till förväntningarna, utan domen verkar snarare ge upphov till fler frågor och spekulationer än den besvarar.

  • 15.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law. Copenhagen Business School, Denmark.
    Post Danmark II, now concluded by the ECJ: clarification of the rebate abuse, but how do we marry Post Danmark I with Post Danmark II?2015In: European Competition Journal, ISSN 1744-1056, E-ISSN 1757-8396, Vol. 11, no 2-3, p. 557-573Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, the Post Danmark II judgment is discussed and analysed in the light of recent rulings by the Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (together CJEU). The article quickly resolves that it is clear that the ECJ with Post Danmark II has, generally and rather stubbornly, kept the competition law doctrine for rebates unchanged and, more specifically, made it obvious that the ECJ does not support a general exclusive as-efficient-competitor test in the rebate abuse arena. However, the article continues and concludes that by clinging on to the competition law doctrine regarding rebate schemes, while making changes to the price discrimination test in Post Danmark I, the ECJ creates unease in the interface between pricing abuses, rebate abuses and discrimination, according to Article 102(c) TFEU. The unease can only be resolved by acknowledging that judged under different tests selective low pricing, selective targeted rebates as exclusionary abuses, and price discrimination under Article 102(c) TFEU should, according to ECJ, be treated rather differently, making it difficult for dominant firms to respond to new entrants.

  • 16.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Postenmålet i ljuset av senare praxis från EU-domstolen2017In: Amicin Curiae: Marknadsdomstolen 1971-2016, Stockholm: Jure, 2017, p. 343-355Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law. EU Law Research Group, Norway.
    Public Law, European Constitutionalism and Copyright in Standards2019In: The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Further Intersections of Public and Private Law / [ed] Jorge L. Contreras, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 124-142Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Should technical standards decided and published by official Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) and referred to in Regulations, Directives or, generally, in EU law be regarded as “law” that must be accessible to the public, or could these standards still be private goods, licensed for royalties and, indeed, only accessible by a few? Access to technical standards may be the next hot topic for the European Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs) and the EU Commission. Some SSOs, as a way to finance their activities to develop technical standards, may charge firms or third persons to access and make use of the technical standards produced.

  • 18.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    R&D cooperation agreements concluded by SMEs – Exempted under the EU R&D  Block Exemption Regulation?: Final Report2022Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The issue addressed in this report is whether SMEs should be granted special status under the R&D BER to promote SMEs’ involvement in horizontal R&D cooperation agreements. Limiting the regulatory burden for SMEs may promote SMEs to join R&D cooperation agreements. The report therefore discusses three possible tests to identify R&D cooperation agreements between competing SMEs that should be exempted under the R&D BER.

    The report also considers whether, with regard to SMEs, the exception foreseen in Article 3(2) R&D BER for research institutes and academic bodies (i.e. limitation of the requirement of full access to R&D results) could also be made available to SMEs that are part of R&D cooperation agreements. 

  • 19.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Regulating Access and Transfer of Data2023Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Data collected and distributed on the internet is generally free, non-exclusive, and non-rivalrous. Yet online data is often difficult to access. This book examines the infrastructure for collecting, storing, and distributing data to show how it is embedded behind intellectual property and technological barriers. It proposes that the EU introduce an access and transfer governance right to data that can work in tandem with data protection rules. Chapters explore the subject matter of this protection, potential rights holders and the scope of the protection, and exceptions and limitations under intellectual property law and competition law. Comprehensive and timely, Regulating Access and Transfer of Data sets the foundations for a new legal system for our data-driven generation. 

  • 20.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Regulating competition in the digital economy: With a special focus on platforms2019In: Competition law for the digital economy / [ed] Björn Lundqvist, Michal S. Gal, Chelterham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, p. 2-28Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Standardization for the Digital Economy: The Issue of Interoperability and Access Under Competition Law2017In: Antitrust Bulletin, ISSN 0003-603X, Vol. 62, no 4, p. 710-725Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article discusses several aspects of the Digital Economy. First, the data industry and the business conduct of the approaching Internet of Things are presented. Second, the current standardization efforts promoted by the European Commission are discussed, for example, what the challenges are, how much should be standardized, and how prestandard consortia should be judged. Third, current and future competition law issues for the Digital Economy, in reference to standardization, are identified. The article states joint technology consortia for upper-layer standards, i.e. in the ecosystems, should benefit from heightened scrunity under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), while system leaders’ business conduct in the Digital Economy may be judged in reference to Article 102 TFEU. The article concludes that the main issue under general competition law in the Data Economy, at its current stage of development, is to create a level playing field by trying to facilitate the implementation of the Internet of Things. Thus, competition authorities should be cautious about the current ecosystem consortia driven standard-setting movement in the Digital Economy, while also facilitating the application of Article 102 TFEU when system leaders possibly abuse their dominance by not giving access to their respective ecosystems.

  • 22.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Standardization Under EU Competition Rules And US Antitrust Laws: The Rise and Limits of Self-Regulation2014Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Standardization under EU Competition Rules and US Antitrust Laws is a comprehensive and detailed legal analysis of standard-setting procedure and the regulation of standard essential patents. It deals with the competition law aspects of competitors' collaboration to create technical standards, as well as the contentious antitrust issues regarding access to standards and standard essential patents. The book shows that there is a clear difference between how standardization is scrutinized and judged in the two jurisdictions. In general, US courts use intellectual property law to address access to standard essential patents, while European courts utilize antitrust rules. Both avenues hold their specific benefits and disadvantages. However, the dichotomy between the tools used in the two jurisdictions also, according to the author, mirror a more fundamental change in attitude to central notions and values such as property, fairness, equity, public interest and competition. Offering in-depth analysis of the case law currently being written in courtrooms all over the world under the so-called ‘patent war’, the book puts forward a new method for applying competition law to standards and standard-setting – in both its collusive and monopolistic aspects – that will be of special interest to students, academics and practitioners.

  • 23.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law. Copenhagen Business School, Denmark.
    The interface between EU competition law and standard essential patents – from Orange-Book-Standard to the Huawei case2015In: European Competition Journal, ISSN 1744-1056, E-ISSN 1757-8396, Vol. 11, no 2-3, p. 367-401Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper the recent ECJ judgment in Huawei is discussed in light of the earlier case law from the EU and the US. The Huawei case has been long awaited and many in academia hoped that it would finally deliver answers to if, when and on what terms access to so-called Standard Essential Patents would be granted under EU antitrust law. However, the question is whether Huawei is that case. On the contrary, it seems that the ECJ ruling gives room for speculation even in reference to core issues, some of which are dealt with in this paper.

  • 24.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    The Proposed Digital Markets Act and Access to Data: A Revolution, or Not?2021In: IIC-International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law, ISSN 0018-9855, E-ISSN 2195-0237, Vol. 52, no 3, p. 239-241Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 25.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Andersson, Helene
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Access to Documents for Cartel Victims and Cartel Members – is the System Coherent?2015In: Harmonizing EU Competition Litigation: The New Directive and Beyond / [ed] Maria Bergström; Marios Iacovides; Magnus Strand, Hart Publishing Ltd, 2015, p. 165-184Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Gal, Michal S.
    Competition Law for the Digital Economy2019Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Murati, Erion
    Collaborative Platforms and Data Pools for Smart Urban Societies and Mobility as a Service (MaaS) from a Competition Law Perspective2020In: Smart urban mobility: law, regulation, and policy / [ed] Michele Finck; Matthias Lamping; Valentina Moscon; Heiko Richter, Berlin: Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2020, p. 191-226Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Lundqvist, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Murati, Erion
    Collaborative platforms and data pools for smart urban societies and mobility as a service (MaaS) from a competition law perspective2020In: Smart urban mobility: law, regulation, and policy / [ed] Finck, M., Lamping, M., Moscon, V., Richter, H. (eds), Berlin: Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2020, p. 191-226Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Nyberg, Sten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Friberg, Richard
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Teigland, Robin
    Konjunkturrådet 2021: Digitalisering och konkurrens2021Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Digitaliseringen har medfört stark marknadskoncentration, nya flaskhalsar och inlåsningseffekter där intäkter och marknadsmakt koncentreras till ett fåtal plattformar. I rapporten analyserar och diskuterar forskarna de lagförslag som bereds i Bryssel och Washington D.C. för att hantera detta, rättsprocesserna som pågår mot tech-jättarna på båda sidor om Atlanten och förutsättningarna för svenska företag att hävda sig i den globala konkurrensen.

    »Vägen ut till globala marknader går ofta via digitala plattformar såsom Alibaba, Amazon, Facebook och Google. Risken finns att det inflytande och den kontroll som dessa företag får på marknaderna används för att begränsa och snedvrida konkurrensen«, säger Sten Nyberg, professor i nationalekonomi vid Stockholms universitet och ordförande i SNS Konjunkturråd.

    Inom EU diskuteras för närvarande kommissionens förslag till ny konkurrensreglering, rättsakten om digitala marknader (Digital Markets Act). Om den går igenom kommer stora plattformar, så kallade grindvakter, åläggas kraftiga begränsningar i sitt agerande när det gäller att gynna sina egna tjänster på den dominerande plattformen. Den innebär också långtgående skyldigheter att dela med sig av data till kommersiella användare av deras plattformar.

    »Sverige bör stödja den plattformsreglering som nu tas fram inom EU. Det är viktigt att svenska företag får bättre tillgång till de data som de bidrar till att generera på plattformarna«, säger Richard Friberg, professor i nationalekonomi vid Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.

    Forskarna lyfter också att förvärvskontrollen, som syftar till att hindra att konkurrensen begränsas genom uppköp av konkurrenter och potentiella utmanare, inte har varit tillräckligt aktiv på det digitala området. Mängder av förvärv har kunnat genomföras utan att myndigheter har ingripit. Det mest kända fallet är Facebooks förvärv av Instagram som inte kontrollerades i EU.

  • 30. Stylianou, Konstantinos
    et al.
    Iacovides, MariosLundqvist, BjörnStockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Fintech Competition: Law, Policy, and Market Organisation2023Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 31. Trzaskowski, Jan
    et al.
    Savin, Andrej
    Lindskoug, Patrik
    Lundqvist, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Introduction to EU Internet Law2023 (ed. 3)Book (Other academic)
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