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  • 1.
    Adenfelt, Maria
    et al.
    FOI.
    Holmström Lind, Christine
    Uppsala universitet.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Rovira Nordman, Emilia
    Handsdelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Förutsättningar för innovation och tillväxt i små- och medelstora företag i försvars- och säkerhetsområdet2012Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    I Sverige finns högteknologisk kompetens inom försvars- och säkerhetsområdet och en betydande del av denna kompetens står små- och medelstora företag för. Studier har visat att små- och medelstora företag är av betydelse för innovation och tillväxt, dock saknas kunskap om förutsättningarna för innovation och tillväxt i denna grupp av företag. Syftet med denna studie är således att undersöka förutsättningarna för innovation och tillväxt för små och medelstora företag i försvars- och säkerhetsområdet. Detta gjordes dels genom att kartlägga pågående policyarbete i Sverige och i EU gällande tillväxt och innovation, dels genom en enkätundersökning av små- och medelstora företag i försvars- och säkerhetsområdet. Resultaten från studien visar på tre områden inom vilka förutsättningarna för innovation och tillväxt i SMEs kan förbättras: 1) exportstöd och bilateralt samarbete, 2) personal- och kompetensförsörjning och 3) ökad involvering i kluster och affärsnätverk.

  • 2.
    Andersson, Kent
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Silfverskiöld, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Military-Technology Division. Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    The Military Utility Assessment Method for Future Technologies2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this report is to describe the Swedish Defence University (SEDU) Military Utility Assessment Method for Future Technologies (MUAFT). The report describes the actions taken in each step of the process and ends with references and a template for the technology memos used as basis for assessment.

  • 3.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Adenfelt, Maria
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Lusua, Jens
    FOI.
    Realisering av effektivare materielförsörjning: Användning av kategorisering och effektmål2012Report (Other academic)
  • 4.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Finn Khan, Malek
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Olofsson, Mats
    FOI.
    Förmåga till snabb anpassning av försvarsmateriel2015Report (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Industrial effects of direct military offset in defence materiel export2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Rapporten presenterar en studie med syftet att identifiera industriella effekter av samarbeten som är direkt relaterade till export av försvarsmateriel. Fyra stora exportaffärer av försvarsmateriel från Sverige har studerats. De fyra fallen är Saabs export av Gripen till Sydafrika, Kockums export av ubåtar till Australien, Kockums export av ubåtar till Singapore samt Hägglunds export av CV90 till Nederländerna.

    Studien visar att: varje köparland skapar unika krav och upplägg för genomförandet av militär offset; köparländerna vill t.ex. utnyttja offset till att skapa arbetstillfällen och att öka den inhemska försvarsindustrins konkurrenskraft; den största delen av produktutvecklingen sker hos det säljande företaget; en stor del av produktionen sker i Sverige.

    Slutsatser för företagsnivå är framför allt att långsiktiga industriella åtaganden skapas i och med att affärerna ofta varar cirka tio år. Efter leveransens slut finns inget entydigt mönster om fortsättningsaffärer. Slutsatser för policynivå är bl.a. att försvarsmaterielexport av komplexa system innebär: 

    – vidareutveckling av kompetens inom försvarsindustrin i Sverige; 

    – att exportsamarbeten inte leder till att kompetens flyttas från försvarsföretag i Sverige; 

    – att köparlandet förväntar sig att det säljande företagets utvecklingsförmåga långsiktigt finns kvar. 

  • 6.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Industrial repositioning from OEM to supplier2009Report (Other academic)
  • 7.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Industriella effekter av direkt militär offset vid försvarsmaterielexport2009Report (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Internationaliserad materielförsörjning: Förutsättningar för försvarsmaterielsamarbeten mellan företag2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna studie har genomförts på uppdrag av Försvarsdepartementet. Internationellt samarbete har sedan mitten av 1990-talet har utgjort en allt viktigare del av det svenska försvarets materielförsörjning. Detta är en utveckling som sannolikt fortsätter. Som stöd för framtida beslut om internationellt materielsamarbete behövs en analys av hur internationella materielsamarbeten mellan företag i praktiken genomförs.

    Det specifika syftet med rapporten är därför att:

    • Identifiera faktorer som påverkar genomförandet av internationella försvarsmaterielsamarbeten mellan företag.

    Rapporten bygger på åtta fallstudier av internationella materielsamarbeten: Iris-T, Joint Strike Fighter, Meteor, MidCas, Neuron, NFR-90, Taurus, Viking.

    Centrala slutsatser avseende förutsättningar för genomförande av internationella försvarsmaterielsamarbeten mellan företag är att ett samarbetsprojekt har större förutsättning för framgång om: företagen ser samarbetet som strategiskt, företagen har tidigare erfarenheter av samarbete och ett enskilt företag är huvudansvarigt för samarbetet.

    Faktorer som skapar förutsättningar men som inte har en direkt påverkan på det operativa genomförandet är exempelvis: materielens innovationsgrad, antalet deltagande företag och antalet deltagande stater.

    Baserat på resultaten rekommenderar vi beslutsfattare inom Regeringskansliet och myndigheter att inför beslut om deltagande i internationella materielsamarbeten att fr.a.: analysera företagens motiv att samarbeta, utvärdera om företagen har gemensamma motiv med samarbetet, om företagen är på jämförbar teknologinivå, ställa krav på att ett företag är huvudleverantör.

  • 9.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Adenfelt, Maria
    FOI.
    Jonsson, Ulf
    FOI.
    Utvärdering av Försvarsmaktens materielförsörjningsstrategi2011Report (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Carlsen, Henrik
    FOI.
    Eriksson, E. Anders
    FOI.
    Lindgren, Fredrik
    FOI.
    Industristrategier för en osäker framtid - scenarioplanering för försvarsindustri i Sverige2002Report (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Khan, Malek
    FOI.
    Olofsson, Mats
    AMOLO Consulting.
    Förutsättningar för snabb anpassning av försvarsmateriel2014Report (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Olsson, Per
    FOI.
    Öhrn-Lundin, Josefin
    FOI.
    Förutsättningar för undervattensförmåga - dagens resurser och morgondagens effekter2018Report (Other academic)
  • 13.
    Axelson, Mattias
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Schröder, Karin
    FOI.
    Snabb anpassning av materielsystem - effektivt samarbete med leverantörer2017Report (Other academic)
  • 14.
    Belin, Jean
    et al.
    Chaire Economie de défense.
    Hartley, Keith
    University of York.
    Lefeez, Sophie
    IRIS.
    Linnenkamp, Hilmar
    SWP.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Masson, Hélène
    FRS.
    Maulny, Jean-Pierre
    IRIS.
    Ungaro, Alessandro
    IAI.
    Defence industrial links between EU and US2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The European Commission’s initiatives in the field of armament should lead to a deeper integration of European DTIBs in the coming years. In parallel, the links between European and American DTIBs take the form of technological and armament cooperation, and of capital links between European or American companies. This report aims at analysing the links between the US DTIB and the EU DTIB, and the consequences these links carry on cooperation between European DTIBs.

    These links vary by country. France has strived to preserve its strategic autonomy when developing its DTIB. Its technological and capability-related reliance on the United States has thus remained limited. Nonetheless, cooperation is sought when it is mutually beneficial while French companies seek to invest in the US market, as do other European DTIBs.

    The German DTIB was rebuilt belatedly after World War II, partly on the basis of French-German cooperation. German industry is now privatised and the scope of the German DTIB’s partnerships has widened to other European countries and to the US. The German supply chain is now well established in American armament programmes.

    The Italian DTIB has consistently pursued a policy of active cooperation, whether with the US or with EU member states. Links with the US have notably been built in the context of NATO and through bilateral agreements. In parallel, Italy has developed partnerships with European countries. Rome’s cooperation policy is thus inclusive, and has considered diverse factors such as political links, capability requirements, the need to develop certain technologies and to preserve industrial capabilities and jobs in Italy.

    The British DTIB has historically enjoyed deeper links with US industry, as a result of the cultural closeness between the UK and the US, and of the strategic proximity that dates back to the end of World War II. The links between US and UK DTIBs thus follow a model of strategic partnership. Nevertheless, the UK’s industrial and defence policy is also pursued within a European framework. The missile manufacturer MBDA is nowadays considered as the deepest model of transnational industrial and defence integration in Europe.

    While Sweden seeks to preserve its industrial capabilities in two sectors – submarines and military aircraft – it appears to be most technologically reliant on the US among the surveyed countries. It is worth noting also that these links are long-standing, dating back to the cold war and the Soviet threat, despite Sweden not being a NATO member state.

    The links with the US are thus very different from one country to another, and carry varying implications. While the costs of acquiring American equipment can be low despite their high technological grade, there are often constraints on their use and restrictions on technologies that will not be transferred, or that will be unusable for other partnerships.

    These links are also formalised through bilateral agreements promoting armament cooperation, as is the case for UK-Italian cooperation. For its part, Sweden has signed interstate agreements with the US in the field of technological cooperation.

    DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL LINKS BETWEEN EU AND US / September 2017

    3

    Since the European Council meeting in December 2013 and in its 2016 Global Strategy, the EU has set itself the task of developing "a certain degree of strategic autonomy" supposed to encourage greater competitiveness of European DTIBs.

    In order to promote the development of this European defence industrial policy, we must seek to ensure that the links between US and EU DTIB are mutually beneficial. To do this, two conditions must be met:

    -That the rules governing relations between US and EU DTIB be based on the principle of reciprocity and on equal rules of regulation of respective DTIBs.

    -That the rules governing relations between US and EU DTIB be defined in the context of a dialogue between the European Union and the United States and not bilaterally between each European country and the United States.

    Today the multiplication of bilateral agreements between the United States and European Union member states are potential obstacles to the establishment of a level playing field governing the relations between European DTIBs;

    There is also a lack of reciprocity and equal regulation of EU and US DTIB. This concerns different areas: access to advanced capabilities, unrestricted use of exported armament, access to cooperated technologies, rules governing investment in US and European companies, rules governing property rights over technologies, rules governing export controls.

    Organizing the transatlantic relationship in the field of armaments in order to have a more balanced and profitable relationship, can be achieved in two complementary ways.

    At the European level, the European Defence Research Program (EDRP) will have strong implications for the relations between the companies of the US DTIB and the EDTIB. The rules governing access to finance and the ownership of intellectual property rights (IPR), which will be adopted for collaborative R&T projects involving European defence companies, will result in a common framework governing the relationship between these companies and the US EDTIB: the more Europeans will collaborate among themselves in the field of defence research, the more they will be able to set common and mutually beneficial rules in their relationship with the United States.

    It may also be considered that some EU States will decide to engage in enhanced cooperation in the industrial defence field which could include the following rules:

    -Obligation to achieve a level of 30% R&T in common among the members of the enhanced cooperation, which means 10% more than the target that was defined 10 years ago by the European Defence Agency and that is regularly reminded in the objectives of the European Union;

    -Obligation to inform members of enhanced cooperation of agreements on defence R&T cooperation concluded with the United States so as to ensure compatibility of these agreements with existing agreements between members of enhanced cooperation. The objective is to prevent agreements with the United States from subsequently restricting the scope of existing agreements between European countries;

    DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL LINKS BETWEEN EU AND US / September 2017

    4

     

    -Obligation to systematically consider the acquisition of military equipment manufactured by one of the member countries of enhanced cooperation. This should be accompanied by reinforced security of supply rules;

    -The need to bring the export policies of the member states of the enhanced cooperation closer together.

    These rules, complementary with, and not contradictory to, those which are being defined at European Union level, would accelerate industrial defence consolidation in Europe and make it possible to consider on a more balanced, mutually equally beneficial, basis relations between the United States and the European Union in the field of armaments. These rules would also be inspired by political principles: to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the European Union when necessary. Far from forbidding cooperation between the US and the EU DTIB, such enhanced cooperation would be facilitated because cooperation between US EDTIB and EU DTIB would not be a brake on European cooperation, as it is currently still too often the case.

  • 15.
    Castelacci, Fulvio
    et al.
    Department of International Economics, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
    Fevolden, Arne
    Department of International Economics, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    How are defence companies responding to EU defence and security market liberalization?: A comparative study of Norway and Sweden2014In: Journal of European Public Policy, ISSN 1350-1763, E-ISSN 1466-4429, Vol. 21, no 8, p. 1218-1235Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A new European Union Directive (Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC) intends to liberalize the European defence market. This article investigates whether this Directive leads to a more liberalized European defence market and how the defence companies respond to these changes, by carrying out a set of interviews with a selected sample of some of the most important defence contractors in Norway and Sweden. The article points out two main results. (1) The defence companies believe that the liberalization of the European defence market will at best be partial and fear that the new regulations might end up favouring the larger nations (e. g., Germany, the United Kingdom and France) at the expense of the smaller countries (e. g., Norway and Sweden). (2) The companies' scepticism and response to the Directive vary according to the defence industrial policy regime they are part of and their position in the defence industrial value-chain.

  • 16.
    Eriksson, E Anders
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Johansson, Mattias
    FOI.
    Civil-military synergies in research and technology: Comparison of Sweden to six European nations2014Report (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Khan, Malek
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Hellström, Jerker
    FOI.
    Sällsynta jordartsmetaller - betydelse för det försvars- och säkerhetspoolitiska området2012Report (Other academic)
  • 18. Lundmark, Martin
    Absorbing New Military Capabilities: Defense technology Acquisition and the Asia-Pacific2016In: Emerging Critical Technologies and Security in the Asia-Pacific / [ed] Richard A. Bitzinger, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 37-52Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 19. Lundmark, Martin
    Accept the Gap2003In: Transforming NATO Forces: European Perspectives / [ed] C. Richard Nelson, Jason S. Purcell, Washington D.C.: The Atlantic Council , 2003, p. 113-131Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Acquiring and Absorbing New Military Capabilities: Defence Technology Acquisition for Defence-Aspiring Asia Pacific Nations Through Technology Policy and Bilateral Partnering2013In: Policy Brief / [ed] Richard A. Bitzinger, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies , 2013Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).
    CMTC Policy Renewal: A study of Civil-Military Technology Cooperation (CMTC) policies, and planning and management, in Korea, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the European Defence Agency2016Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This report compares the policies for civil-military technology cooperation (CMTC) of six nations (France, Germany, Russia, South Korea, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and the European Defence Agency (EDA). ADD, Korea, commissioned FOI, Sweden, to perform the study.

    The concept of ‘dual-use’ is treated quite differently in different nations. In this report, we see dual-use as three different flows of technology:

    spin-on denotes that technology developed in the non-military sector can be utilized in military applications;

    spin-off denotes that technology developed in the defence sector can be utilized in the non-military sector;

    spin-up denotes that there is a shared commitment and interest among actors from both sides to develop a certain technology. Actors from each side will contribute with their knowledge and technology – both sides will learn from the other and also strive to mutually create some novel technology combination.

    The standpoint in this report is thereby that dual-use concerns the unidirectional flows between civil and military technology, whereas CMTC also comprises the spin-up phenomenon.

    The study shows that France and Korea have clear national policies and invest heavily in CMTC-related activities with a yearly budget of about USD 90 million. Korea is however expansive, whereas France’s efforts in CMTC have been shrinking in recent years. Sweden has had, for more than two decades, a strong commitment towards CMTC in aerospace technology, but has no explicit dual-use policy in general. The UK has a clear policy of only searching for non-military technologies that can be used in defence. The UK does not invest in spin-off or spin-up at all; the MoD is only allowed to fund very specific defence technology. The UK puts resources into identifying technologies for spin-on. Germany has non-transparent, decentralized CMTC activity, performed by institutes and industry. Defence R&D is a sensitive issue in Germany; there is CMTC-relevant innovation, but there is no explicit policy to support it. Russia has strong rhetoric about strengthening its defence-industrial base and its defence-relevant innovation. Russia invests in broad development in bio- and nano-technologies, which are intended to produce civil as well as military technologies in the long run. Russia, however, has fundamental difficulties in maintaining its innovation infrastructure, and its visions for CMTC have limited credibility.

    The CMTC policies of these nations and EDA have been compared, based on eleven competitive factors: CMTC policy consistent with defence policy, triple helix infrastructure, defence-related clusters of companies, access to CMTC funding, internationalization of CMTC investments, internationalization of defence industry, SME growth initiatives, human capital (CMTC relevant), dual-use demonstrators, CMTC match-making and processes for CMTC procurement.

    Based on these comparisons, we recommend that the CMTC institute at ADD:

    - increases the participation of academia in their CMTC activities;

    - strives to increase the degree of internationalization of its CMTC activities, with Germany, France and Sweden (in that order) as the best targets;

    - strives to increase the domestic support from other ministries by more clearly showing the benefits for both civil as well as military innovation.

  • 22.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Defending Sweden under the new government coalition2015In: Défense & Industries, Vol. No 3, no Mars 2015, p. 12-12Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Intégration et désintégration de la sécurité transatlantique–impact sur l’industrie de défense2003In: Géoéconomie, no No 26, p. 85-108Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 24.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Is there a need for a new definition of what constitutes a “European defence company”?2013Report (Other academic)
  • 25.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Kockums: the Repatriation of the Swedish Underwater Crown Jewel (Part.1)2014Other (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Nordic defence materiel cooperation2003In: The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden / [ed] Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg och Elisabeth Davidson, Stockholm: FHS , 2003, p. 207-230Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Saab Kockums' maiden voyage (Part.2)2014Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 28.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    The defence industry integration: The institutional and industrial integration of a politico-industrial market2008Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    The Future of the European Defence Industry2014In: The Global Arms Industry in 2030 (and beyond): Event Report, Singapore: Rjaratnam School of International Studies , 2014, p. 24-27Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 30.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    The need for rapid adaptation - organizational solutions2017Other (Other academic)
  • 31.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    The Swedish defence industry - drawn between globalization and the domestic pendulum of doctrine and governance: - drawn between globalization and the domestic pendulum of doctrine and governance2019In: The Economics of the Global Defence Industry / [ed] Hartley Keith & Belin, Jean, Routledge, 2019, 1, p. 290-311Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 32.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    The Transatlantic Defense Industry Market: Future Modes of Integration2002In: Breakthroughs, Vol. XI, no 1, p. 11-21Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    To be or not to be - The integration and the non-integration of the French defence industry2004Report (Other academic)
  • 34.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Handelshögskolan, Stockholm, Sweden..
    Transatlantic defence industry integration - Discourse and action in the organizational field of the defence market2011Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 35.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Amann, Daniel
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Dansarie, Marcus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Löfgren, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Sturesson, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Technology Forecast 2018: Military Utility of Future Technologies2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Summary

    Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have been reviewed by staff at the Military Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a timeframe up to the year 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective.

    In the review, we assess the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios.

    The technologies are grouped into four classes of military utility: potentially significant, moderate, negligible or uncertain.

    The following technologies were assessed to have the potential for significant military utility:

    • Rapid field      identification of harmful microorganisms
    • Hypersonic      propulsion

     

    The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility:

    • Non-line-of-sight      imaging
    • Artificial      intelligence for military decision support

     

    The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain military utility:

    • Structural      energy storage
    • Triboelectric      nanogenerators

     

    No technology was found to have negligible military utility.

    The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. A new methodological step this year was for each reviewer to discuss the assigned technologies with researchers from FOI. This proved to be a valuable enhancement for understanding the technologies’ present state and likely future development.

    The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here, ‘the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios’ has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

    Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the six technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

    The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

    Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

  • 36.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Bull, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Dansarie, Marcus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Technology Forecast 2019 – Military Utility of Future Technologies: A report from seminars at the Swedish Defence University’s (SEDU) Military Technology Division2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Four technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute and two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have been reviewed by staff at the Military Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a timeframe up to the year 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective. The assessment centred on 5G has the perspective 2030, due to the rapid development of telecommunication standards.

    In the review, we assess the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios.

    The technologies are grouped into four classes of military utility potential: significant, moderate, negligible or uncertain.

    The following technology was assessed to have a potential for significant military utility:

    • Cognitive Radar

    The following technology was assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility:

    • 5G technologies in military applications

    The following technology was assessed to have an uncertain potential military utility:

    • Multi-Domain UxS

    The following technologies were assessed to have negligible military utility.

    • Blockchains
    • Optical Atomic Clocks

    The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. A new methodological step this year was for each reviewer to discuss the assigned technologies with researchers from FOI. This proved to be a valuable enhancement for understanding the technologies’ present state and likely future development.

    The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here, ‘the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios’ has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

    Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the six technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

    The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

    Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

  • 37.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    FOI.
    Axelson, Mattias
    FOI.
    Karlsson, Christer
    HHS.
    Khan, Malek
    FOI.
    Teknologipolicy för ledningsområde mark2012Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Sammanfattning: I denna rapport presenteras ett förslag till en teknologipolicy som har syftet att tydliggöra regeringens mål för ledningsområde mark och att stödja en tillämpning av regeringens ambition. Teknologipolicyn avser den långsiktiga inriktningen för ledningsområde mark. Bakgrunden är regeringens beslut från 23 juni 2010: "Sverige ska inte sträva efter att vara ledande inom förmågor och funktioner som är kopplade till det nätverksbaserade försvaret utan snarare delta i, följa och anpassa sig till den internationella utvecklingen inom ledningsområdet."1 En policy är grundläggande principer för handlande och utgör således ett ramverk för beslutsfattande. En teknologipolicy kan sägas bestå av principer för val av teknologier och därtill hörande frågor såsom kunskapsnivåer, investeringsnivåer, förnyelsefrekvenser, genomförandeprocesser och organisationer, samt källor för valda teknologier. Teknologipolicyn innehåller sålunda en portfölj av val - av beslut - som ska möjliggöra förverkligandet av uppställda mål och samtidigt hantera uppkommande hot och möjligheter. Denna rapport vänder sig till personer som arbetar med tillämpning av regeringens inriktning. Det innebär tjänstemän på Försvarsdepartementet och personer inom försvarsmyndigheterna som arbetar med ledningsområde mark. Den teknologipolicy som presenteras här ger förslag på hur regeringens beslutade ambition för ledningsområde mark kan implementeras. Förslaget utgår från ambitionen att materiel som anskaffas eller vidareutvecklas inom ledningsområde mark i hög grad ska följa den internationella utvecklingen men inte leda den I rapporten föreslås bland annat att materiel inom ledningsområde mark ska ha internationellt hög funktionalitet, men ej nödvändigtvis vara i paritet med de teknologiskt främsta försvarsmakterna. Funktionaliteten ska vara tillräcklig för att klara kraven vid nationella och internationella insatser. En central princip är att tyngdpunkten förflyttas från ett utvecklings- och teknologiperspektiv till att i högre grad behärska köp och framtagning av integrerade system. Anskaffningsbeslut skall inriktas mot teknologi som är framgångsrikt beprövad, med hög funktionalitet och tillförlitlighet. Dominant design ska följas; dvs. lösningar som används av andra för Sverige väsentliga samarbetspartners utgör riktlinjer för val av teknologi. Det innebär att Sverige inte satsar på teknologiskt omogna områden. Därmed bör både risker och kostnader reduceras i anskaffningen av materiel inom ledningsområde mark. För att realisera de principer som föreslås i teknologipolicyn behövs tydliga val avseende centrala aktiviteter, resurser, processer och organisatoriska enheter med ansvar och förmåga till systemintegration av ledningssystem. Enheter med ansvar och förmåga till detta bör vara fristående från enheter som arbetar med produktsystem och delsystem. Hur systemintegration ska genomföras är väsentligt att analysera närmare.

  • 38.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    FOI.
    Giovachini, Laurent
    DGA, Frankrike.
    The development of the French defence industry in the 20th century2005Report (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    FOI.
    Heisbourg, Francois
    FRS.
    Masson, Hélène
    FRS.
    Daguzan, Jean-Francois
    FRS.
    The European Defence Industrial Base and ESDP: Restructuring of the European defence industry2003Report (Other academic)
  • 40.
    Lundmark, Martin
    et al.
    FOI.
    Oxenstierna, Susanne
    FOI.
    Koordinering och prioritering av internationella samarbeten inom materiel- och logistikområdet2016Report (Other academic)
  • 41.
    Masson, Hélène
    et al.
    Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Base industrielle et technologique de défense suédoise: défis et priorités d’action du gouvernement Löfven2015Report (Other academic)
  • 42.
    Masson, Hélène
    et al.
    FRS.
    Marta, Lucia
    FRS.
    Léger, Patrick
    FRS.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    The “Transfer Directive”: perceptions in European countries and recommendations2010Report (Other academic)
  • 43.
    Schröder, Karin
    et al.
    FOI.
    Lundmark, Martin
    FOI.
    Lusua, Jens
    FOI.
    Försörjningstrygghet för mängdmateriel: En studie av förutsättningar vid fredstida grundberedskap och höjd beredskap2016Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Det poängteras i inriktningsbeslutet att enskilt viktigast under försvarsinriktningsperioden 2016 t.o.m. 2020 är att öka den operativa förmågan i krigsförbanden och att säkerställa den samlade förmågan i totalförsvaret.”1 Erfarenhetsmässigt vet vi att logistiken inte sällan har en gränssättande inverkan på operativ förmåga2 och med den nya styrningen ställs krav på försörjningstrygghet i såväl fredstida grundberedskap som vid höjd beredskap. Behovet av försörjningstrygghet för mängdmateriel och hur denna ska skapas är i dagsläget inte tydligt i fred och framförallt inte vid höjd beredskap vilket kan få konsekvenser för krigsförbandens operativa förmåga nu och framöver. I denna rapport beskrivs och analyseras en försörjningskedja för mängdmateriel översiktligt och de huvudsakliga utmaningar som försvarsmyndigheterna möter i arbetet med att uppnå en tillräcklig försörjningstrygghet i grundberedskap och vid höjd beredskap diskuteras.

    De huvudsakliga utmaningar som behöver adresseras för uppfyllande av målbilden handlar dels om det strategiska planeringsarbetet i omvandlingen av försörjningskedjan och dels om upphandling, ledtider och lagernivåer på mängdmateriel. Intervjuer, dokumentstudier samt studiebesök pekar på en hög grad av kompetens på området försörjningstrygghet i myndigheterna. Styrningen behöver dock stödja pågående arbete mot en fortsatt god utveckling för att uppnå en tillräcklig försörjningstrygghet. Förslag lämnas på riktade åtgärder och rekommendationer för att uppnå kostnadseffektiv försörjningstrygghet via exempelvis riskhantering och kategoristyrning för mängdmateriel.

    1 Försvarsdepartementet, Regeringsbeslut 7, Inriktning för Försvarsmaktens verksamhet för åren 2016 till och med 2020, Fö2015/00953/MFI, 2015-06-25

    2 Försvarsmakten t.ex. Grundsyn logistik, 09 833:67228, 2007-04-24 och Handbok Logistik vid insats 2016, FM2015-689:8, 2016-07-01

  • 44.
    Silfverskiöld, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Liwång, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Hult, Gunnar
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Command and Control Section.
    Sivertun, Åke
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Bull, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Sigholm, Johan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Lundmark, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    von Gerber, Carl
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Applications Section.
    Andersson, Kent
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Sturesson, Peter
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section.
    Technology Forecast 2017 - Military Utility of Future Technologies: A Report from Seminars at the Swedish Defence University’s (SEDU) Military-Technology Division2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Two technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute, three reports from the Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI) and two publications from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have been reviewed by staff at the Military-Technology Division at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). The task given by the Defence Material Administration (FMV) was to assess the military utility of the given technologies in a time frame to up 2040, from a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) perspective.

    In the review we assessed the military utility of certain technologies as possible contributions to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, based on identified and relevant scenarios. Because a new capability catalogue is under development at the SwAF Headquarters, this report only presents general assessments of the capability impact of the technologies studied.

    The technologies were grouped into four classes: potentially significant, moderate, negligible, or uncertain military utility.

    The classification uncertain military utility was given to technologies that are difficult to put in the other three classes, it was not because the technology readiness level (TRL) will not bereached by 2040.

    The following technologies were assessed to have the potential for significant military utility:

    - Nanocarbons for photonic applications

    The following technologies were assessed to have a potential for moderate military utility;

    - Internet of things (IoT)

    - Materials and technologies for protection against chemical agents

    The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain military utility;

    - Post-quantum cryptography

    - New applications for hyperspectral image analysis for chemical and biological agents

    No technology was found to have negligible military utility.

    The method used in this technology forecast report was to assign each report to one reviewer in the working group. Firstly, each forecast report was summarized. The Fraunhofer assessment of technical readiness level (TRL) in the time period was held to be correct. Each technology was then put into one or more scenarios that were assessed to be suitable for assessing the military utility as well as indicating any possibilities and drawbacks. Based on a SWOTanalysis, the assessed contributions to the fundamental capabilities, and to the factors DOTMPLFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability), were listed. Furthermore, the expected SwAF R&D requirements, to facilitate the introduction of the technology are given. The Military utility was assessed using a model developed by the Military-Technology Division. Finally, conclusions and an overall rating of the potential military utility of each technology were presented.

    The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition used here (“the military utility of a certain technology is its contribution to the operational capabilities of the SwAF, within identified relevant scenarios”) has been used in our Technology Forecasts since 2013.

    Our evaluation of the method used shows that there is a risk that assessments can be biased by the participating experts’ presumptions and experience from their own field of research. It should also be stressed that the seven technologies’ potential military utility was assessed within the specific presented scenarios and their possible contribution to operational capabilities within those specific scenarios, not in general. When additional results have been found in the analysis, this is mentioned.

    The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used are believed to provide a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies being studied. This report should be seen as an executive summary of the research reports and the intention is to help the SwAF Headquarters to evaluate the military utility of emerging technologies within identified relevant scenarios.

    Overall, the research reports are considered to be balanced and of high quality in terms of their level of critical analysis regarding technology development. These reports are in line with our task to evaluate the military utility of the emerging technologies.

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