The purpose of this thesis is to test two hypotheses about how work affects political participation. The first concerns unemployment, and states that unemployment has strong and negative effects on political activity. The second hypothesis is found in theories of participatory democracy, and claims that more democratic workplaces lead to more political participation. Existing empirical evidence on both of the hypotheses is not conclusive. Furthermore, studies have mainly been carried out using data collected in the United States. Here empirical tests of the hypotheses are undertaken using a Swedish survey.

The results confirm the first hypothesis; unemployment has negative effects on political participation. The reasons for these negative effects are that the unemployed become less active in organisational life, fall outside of the recruitment networks where people are being asked to participate in politics, and experience a decrease in income. The second hypothesis is not supported. Workplace participation does not affect political participation, according to the analyses. The results are surprising for both hypotheses, and contradict previous empirical findings. The differences in results are likely due to differences in research design and differences in approaches to analysing political participation. Previous studies are inadequate in these perspectives, it is maintained.

The thesis ends with a discussion of the results from the perspective of normative democratic theory. It is argued that the lack of political equality is particularly acute when the low participation among the unemployed is considered.

Interethnic contacts are generally assumed to reduce discrimination and prejudice. According to this optimistic view – and in conflict with Allport’s well-known theory – contacts have positive effects even when they are rather distant. However, findings of recent experimental field research indirectly cast doubt on this belief. To our knowledge, this is the first field experiment thoroughly investigating close as well as more distant contacts simultaneously. In a correspondence study (n = 3015), Swedish elementary school principals were randomly contacted by fictional parents with Arabic- or Swedish-sounding names asking school-related questions. The unique design also used registry data (e.g., on ethnicity). The results support Allport’s more pessimistic view: working closely with minority members of school management was associated with lower levels of ethnic discrimination regarding important qualitative aspects of the principals’ communication with the school parents, but no such pattern was observed for more distant workplace contacts with minority teachers.

Poor health is generally believed to cause political passivity. Prior studies that satisfactorily acknowledge the causality problems involved are mainly limited to considering turnout and the U.S.A., so we lack knowledge of how non-electoral participation is affected in other countries. This article considers Sweden, characterized by a generous welfare state and an extensive public health system. Using unique panel data, which allow more thorough analyses of causality, poor health was found to have a negative effect on voting but not on non-electoral participation. By primarily focusing on other countries than Sweden and the U.S.A., it is a task for future longitudinal research to show whether the belief that poor health lead to political passivity is incorrect—or whether Sweden is an exceptional case, due to the barriers to participation being particularly low there.

Several schools of thought claim that citizens can develop their democratic skills at the workplace. Here I focus on the hypothesis put forward by Carole Pateman and by Sidney Verba and colleagues that state that by practicing civic skills and democratic decision-making at the workplace, citizens become more active in politics. I test the hypothesis with a nationally representative panel survey of the Swedish population. My findings contradict previous empirical research as no impact on political participation was discovered. I argue that the effects may have been overestimated in prior studies because the tests were based on cross-sectional data: insufficient care was taken with a number of significant methodological problems. The study points to the importance of using panel models when investigating the causes of political participation.

Några av 1980-talets oftast förekommande styrningsfilosofier inom den offentliga sektorn diskuteras. I fokus står Arbetsmarknadsverket (AMV), som under 1980-talet befann sig i frontlinjen med att införa sådana förändringar. Slutsatsen är att styrningsfilo

Enligt tidigare forskning används demokrati- och jämlikhetsargument sällan när övergripande reformer på skolområdet motiveras. Det är dock okänt om detta gäller även de rödgröna oppositionspartierna, och inte bara den borgerliga regeringen. Här studeras riksdagsdebatten och propositionstexten rörande den senaste centrala gymnasiereformen från år 2009. Undersökningen visar att även oppositionen – likt den borgerliga regeringen – i liten utsträckning använder demokrati- och jämlikhetsargument. Resultaten är i linje med farhågor om att demokratiuppdraget försummas när framtidens utbildning utformas.

A common thought is that political participation must be equally high among different social groups - such as women and men or various socioeconomic groups - in order for political equality to be fulfilled. This approach has, however, been criticized for being too crude. Several scholars argue that one must also study the reasons behind group differences in participation. If these differences are explained by differences in resources - and not political motivation - political equality is threatened, as this points to structural inequalities determining participatory differences. Using this perspective, I make an empirical investigation into the political participation of women and men in Sweden, a country known for unusually far-reaching political gender equality. In spite of this, men devote more of their political activities to areas of production, such as questions relating to working life, and I find that this difference may be explained by a male advantage in political resources (civic skills, primarily). The conclusion is that political equality has not yet been fully realized between women and men in Sweden. Hence, future studies should consider separating between different policy areas, when empirically evaluating the status of political equality. Quantitative methods are used in the empirical analyses.

Previous research has convincingly shown that residential segregation and unfavorable political structures are important factors when explaining the occurrence of riots. Still, structural factors such as these cannot, in themselves, explain why riots take place instead of peaceful protests or complete inactivity. In this paper I argue that more scholarly attention should be paid to the immediate triggers of riots, specific events that almost always involve actors within local government institutions of social control —in the form of the police, politicians, or the courts. The actions undertaken by these actors must be considered, because these actions are crucial in causing riot outbreaks and are undertheorized in previous research, I argue. The aim of this paper is to develop this theoretical approach and illustrating the approach with empirical data on the 1992 Los Angeles riot, the most violent riot in the U.S.A. since the 1960s.

I rapporten testas hypotesen att arbetslöshet orsakar politisk passivitet i Sverige. Datamaterialet för undersökningen utgörs av de svenska Levnadsnivåundersökningarna, och i första hand de data som samlades in 1991. Resultaten ger föga stöd åt hypotesen.

For some time been it has been hypothesized that involvement in civic associations creates generalized social trust. Yet, prior panel data studies, based mainly on data collected in Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have found little support for the existence of such an effect. This article adds further empirical knowledge, focusing on Sweden. The evidence presented here is the first to provide support for the hypothesis using a survey that allows panel data models. In the conclusions, it is discussed whether the differing findings may depend on Sweden being a particularly favourable environment, considering its comparatively democratic and prosperous associational life; or if the reason is that the data at hand do not allow using exactly the same panel models as in some of the prior studies.

Political participation is higher among men than women in most parts of the world. However, earlier research has shown that this does not hold true in Scandinavia, including Sweden, where gender differences are remarkably small. This article studies the causes of the Swedish situation. A conventional hypothesis is formulated based on research from other parts of the world. It assumes that gender-equal participation in Sweden can be explained by the lack of gender differences in certain political resource and motivational factors that are often analyzed. However, this hypothesis is not supported by the data, which instead indicates a female disadvantage with regard to both resources and motivation. Two alternative hypotheses are developed and shown as empirically viable. The first assumes that women more often adhere to norms that emphasize the importance of being politically active, which promotes their participation in politics. The second focuses on collective mobilization based on interests specific to women. In line with this hypothesis, only women are shown to be members of women's organizations and hold more radical opinions on issues related to gender equality and reproduction. These factors have a positive impact on women's participation, and together they explain a noticeable amount of the male advantage with regard to conventional explanatory factors. Therefore they are important contributory causes of gender-equal participation in Sweden, although other factors, not discussed here, also contribute. Quantitative methods are used in the analyses, and the study material is the 1997 Swedish Citizenship Survey.

Utbildningens positiva effekter på demokrati och jämlikhet har traditionellt framhållits som viktigti Sverige. Aktuell forskning tyder dock på att reformer på skolområdet allt mindre motiveras utifrån demokrati-och jämlikhetsaspekter, medan samhällsekonomiska hänsyn ges allt större utrymme. Dessa studier är tämligen översiktliga och kompletteras här med en mer detaljerad textanalys av en av de senaste decenniernas mest genomgripande gymnasiereformer i Sverige. Den genomdrevs år 1991,av Socialdemokraterna, och innebar att praktiska program förlängdes med ett tredjeår samt försågs med betydligt fler timmar inom teoretiska ämnen. Givetden svenska socialdemokratiska traditionen skulle man kunna vänta sig en diskussionmed hänvisning främst till demokrati-och jämlikhetsvärden, speciellt då reformen beskrivits som en utpräglad jämlikhetsreform. Samhällsekonomiska tillväxtaspekter visar sig dock dominera, i linje med den internationella trend som annan forskning påvisat.

Demokrati- och jämlikhetsargument intar en alltmer marginell roll när reformer på skolområdet diskuteras. Det är dock okänt om detta även gäller vänsterblocket, och inte bara de borgerliga partierna. Här studeras debatten kring den centrala gymnasiereform som den borgerliga regeringen genomförde 2009 (”Högre krav och kvalitet i den nya gymnasieskolan”). Undersökningen visar att Socialdemokraterna och Miljöpartiet, i likhet med högerpartierna, gav liten tyngd åt demokrati- och jämlikhetsresonemang. Undantaget var Vänsterpartiet, som riktade kraftfull kritik mot reformen utifrån ett jämlikhetsperspektiv. Demokratiuppdraget sägs försummas när framtidens utbildning utformas, en farhåga som stöds av resultaten i den här studien.

For several decades after WWII, Swedish education reforms were justified extensivelybased on democratic and equality arguments. The Social Democrats, the partyin governing power during this era, considered a uniform education system crucialto their endeavors towardsa greaterdemocracy and greater equality. According to current research, arguments of this kind are being used increasingly rarely to justify general reforms to public primary and secondary education. It is however unknown whether this is also true forthe leftist/green opposition parties and not only the current center-right governingparties. The subject of this study is parliamentary debate and the text of the government bill concerning the latest keyupper-secondary school reform of 2009, which entailed greater differentiation between students. Consequently, strong criticism from the leftistopposition from the democraticand equality perspectiveswas to be expected. On the contrary, this study shows that the opposition –like the center-right government –used democratic and equality arguments only to a minor extent. The results areconsistent with fears,expressed with regard toSweden and globally,that the democratic mandate is being ignored in the design ofeducation systems forthe future.

Educated individuals are believed to be more tolerant towards ethnic minorities-a finding widely inferred from standard survey items. We propose a new approach that helps mitigate the risk of socially desirability bias (SDB), using a multifactorial survey experiment with name-based vignette dimensions. The experiment is strategically inserted into a question about a social dilemma not related to ethnicity. By embedding our experiment into an established survey-the Swedish part of the European Values Survey-we show that individuals with a high level of education are more tolerant towards ethnic minorities, even under a lower risk of SDB. The study strengthens findings in prior research and supports the hypothesis that education can further ethnic tolerance.

This study presents an innovative field experiment exploring ethnic discrimination in contacts between public officials and members of Swedish society. Using a correspondence study design, fictitious individuals with Arabic- and Swedish-sounding names contacted Swedish municipalities via email, asking questions about access to preschools. The findings indicate disadvantageous treatment of individuals with Arabic-sounding names in terms of the informal tone of the replies, as Swedish-sounding names were replied to in a friendlier, more welcoming way. Regarding the more formal aspects of the emails—i.e., whether they were replied to at all and the questions posed were directly answered—no statistically significant signs of discrimination emerge (although twice as many Arabic- as Swedish-sounding names did not elicit replies). Still, informal disadvantageous treatment is sufficient cause for concern and especially remarkable in the case of Sweden, with its reputation as being particularly egalitarian, immigration friendly, and democratically well-functioning.

Scholarly findings suggest that immigrants in Western countries, in general, participate less in politics and show lower levels of political efficacy than native-born citizens. Research is scarce, however, when it comes to immigrants´ knowledge about politics and public affairs in their new home country, and what happens with this knowledge over the years. This article focuses on immigrants in Sweden, a country known for ambitious multicultural policies, but where immigrants also face disadvantages in areas such as labor and housing markets. Utilizing particularly suitable survey data we find that immigrants, in general, know less about Swedish politics than natives, but also that this difference disappears with time. Exploring the influence of time of residence on political knowledge, the article shows that the positive effect of time in Sweden among immigrants remains after controlling for an extensive set of background factors. Moreover, the article examines this political learning effect through the lens of an Ability-Motivation-Opportunity (AMO) model. The findings suggest that the development of an actual ability to learn about Swedish politics - via education in Sweden, and by improved Swedish language skills - is an especially important explanation for the increase in political knowledge.

Recent studies report high levels of political trust among immigrants in Western Europe. Notably, such confidence tendto be particularly pronounced among immigrants from countries without democratic institutions and poor records in terms of corruption level. Yet over time, members of these population categories tend to express decreasing levels of political trust. Following previous research, such a pattern may be explained by high initial—although with time retreating—expectations concerning the quality of institutions in Western Europe. Analyzing Swedish survey data—particularly appropriate in the light of competing hypotheses concerning acculturation and barriers to integration, including discrimination—this paper presents additional support for the importance of expectations when it comes to political trust. Our analyses suggest that the gradual development of more modest expectations regarding institutional performance in the new country is a trustworthy explanation of the falling levels of immigrants‘ political trust.

Recent studies report high levels of political trust among immigrants in Western Europe. Notably, such confidence tend to be particularly pronounced among immigrants from countries without democratic institutions and poor records in terms of corruption level. Yet over time, members of these population categories tend to express decreasing levels of political trust. Following previous research, such a pattern may be explained by high initial—although with time retreating—expectations concerning the quality of institutions in Western Europe. Analyzing Swedish survey data—particularly appropriate in the light of competing hypotheses concerning acculturation and barriers to integration, including discrimination—this paper presents additional support for the importance of expectations when it comes to political trust. Our analyses suggest that the gradual development of more modest expectations regarding institutional performance in the new country is a trustworthy explanation of the falling levels of immigrants‘ political trust.

Political trust among immigrants in Western Europe seems to be surprisingly high, especially among immigrants from non-democratic countries with institutions plagued by corruption. Over time, however, trust tends to diminish among these individuals. In this paper we argue that this may neither be explained by acculturation nor by experiences of discrimination. Analysing Swedish survey data we instead conclude, although tentatively, that falling expectations regarding the performance of host country institutions is a fruitful explanation. Such expectations presumably become more modest the longer one has been living in Sweden, causing a time-related drop in the overall confidence in Swedish political institutions.

This paper empirically evaluates the idea that individual level political tolerance is influenced by the overall tolerance in a given society. The expectation is that more tolerant attitudes would be developed as a consequence of exposure to a social environment in which people in general are more inclined to accept freedom of speech, also when a specific message challenges one’s own values and beliefs. A theoretical learning model is formulated, according to which more broad-minded and permissive attitudes, from a democratic point of view, are adopted as a result of (1) an adjustment stimulated by mere observation of an overall high-level of political tolerance in society (‘passive learning’), and (2) an adjustment due to cognition and interaction within important spheres in society (‘active learning’). Using survey data, we explore empirically how length of residence among immigrants in the high-tolerance country of Sweden is related to measures of political tolerance. Further, we examine to what extent a time-related effect is mediated through participation in a set of ‘learning institutions’—focusing on activities related to education, working-life, civil society and political involvement. In concert with expectations, the empirical findings suggest that a positive effect of time in Sweden on political tolerance may be explained by a gradual adoption of the principle that political rights should be recognized. Importantly, however, such an adoption seems to require participation in activities of learning institutions, as we find that passive learning in itself is not sufficient.