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  • 1.
    Gylfason, Thorvaldur
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Comepting Wage Claims, Cost Inflation, and Capacity Utilization1982Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a theory of competing wage claims and cost inflation, and attempts to integrate this theory into the core of modern macroeconomic analysis. Specifically, the paper proposes an explanation for wage rigidity and wage interdependence based on an application of duopoly theory to labor union behavior into a macroeconomic general equilibrium model with goods, money, and bonds as well as two kinds of labor. Special emphasis is placed on the interplay between demand and cost factors in the inflation process and on the implications of wage competition among labor unions for the relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run.

  • 2.
    Gylfason, Thorvaldur
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Money, Exchange Rates, Wages, and Games1987Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper is focused on the interaction of monetary policy and wage determination in open economies with strong labor unions. Applying some elements of game theory, the paper views both government and labor as endogenous utility maximizers, and studies the macroeconomic consequences af their interaction. In particular, the paper shows (a) how labor unions adjust wages optimally to prices following monetary expansion or devaluation; (b) how the ultimate effectiveness of policy is reduced (without necessarily being destroyed) by optimal union reactions; and (c) how the interplay of government and labor can create a persistent tendency to unemployment and inflation simultaneously.

  • 3.
    Gylfason, Thorvaldur
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Macroeconomic Consequences of Endogenous Governments and Labor Unions1982Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between government spending, wages, employment, and prices under different assumptions about the behavior patterns of governments and labor unions.

    For this purpose, we analyze the interaction between utility-maximizing labor unions and welfare- (or vote-) maximizing government from a game-theoretic point of view within a fairly general macroeconomic framework. Within this framework, both labor unions and the government are assumed to maximize objective functions subject to constraints imposed by the macroeconomic environment. Rational behavior requires each to react to changes in the behavior of the other. The aim of studying the process by which unions react and counterreact to government behavior and vice versa is to attempt to shed new light on the apaprently persistent inflationary bias of the economies of the industrial countries, the gradual increase in the size of the public sector of these countries over the years, and the role that changes in the preferences and the "world view" of governments, as well as in the political and economic strength of labor unions, have played in these developments.

  • 4.
    Gylfason, Thorvaldur
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wage Rigidity and Wage Rivalry: An Oligopolistic Approach1982Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this paper is to present a theory of wages based on an application of oligopoly theory to labor unions, and to use this theory to explain why nominal wage rigidity in the short run does not necessarily imply money illusion or other forms of irrational behavior. Specifically, the paper shows formally that if workers are concerned about relative wages, rational behavior does not require them to demand full compensation for all price increases unless they expect all other workers to be fully compensated.

  • 5.
    Gylfason, Thorvaldur
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wages, Money, and Exchange Rates: With Endogenous Unions and Governments1986Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the role and macroeconomic impact of monetary and exchange rate policy as well as of wage formation in open economies where wages are primarily determined through collective bargaining among powerful labor unions and relatively weak employers. Applying some elements of game theory, the paper treats the government and unions as endogenous, and explores the macroeconomic consequences of their interaction. In particular, the paper argues, and demonstrates by numerical examples, that the ultimate effects of monetary expansion or devaluation (as well as of exogenous wage hikes) on incomes and prices depend cricually in the reaction patterns of both unions and government.

  • 6.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Stability and Optimality of Alternative Pension Systems1997Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In an analysis of the risk-sharing properties of different types of pension systems, we show that only a fixed-fee pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems can provide intergenerational risk sharing for living individuals. Under some circumstances, however, other PAYG pensions systems can enhance the expected welfare of all generations by reducing intergenerational income variability. We derive conditions for this to occur. We also analyze the stability of actuarially far PAYG pensions systems. It is shown that if an actuarially fair pension with a non-balanced budget system is dynamically stable, its accumulated surpluses will converge to the same fund as in a fully funded system. We also show that the welfare loss due to labor market distortions will, surprisingly, increase if the implicit marginal return in a compulsory system raised above the average return.

  • 7.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Optimal Actuarial Fairness in Pension Systems1996Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A rationale for a compulsory pension system is that the government wants to correct supposedly myopic behavior by the individuals. Given such a system, we calculate the optimal relation between marginal contributions and benefits, i.e., the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness, for the individuals or for the government. We show that the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness increases in the rate of return in the social security system and also decreases in the government's rate of time preference. It is also shown that labor supple always increases when the link between marginal contributions and benefits is strengthened.

  • 8.
    Lidén, Kerstin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Archaeological Research Laboratory.
    Linderholm, Anna
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Archaeological Research Laboratory.
    Götherström, Anders
    Pushing it back. Dating the CCR5-delta 32 bp deletion to the Mesolithic in Sweden and it's implications for the Meso/Neo transition2006In: Documenta Praehistorica, no XXXIII, p. 29-37Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 9.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics2003Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The expansion of welfare-state arrangements is seen as the result of dynamic interaction between market behaviour and political behaviour, often with considerable time lags, sometimes generating either virtuous or vicious circles. Such interaction may also involve induced (endogenous) changes in social norms and political preferences. Moreover, the internationalization process not only limits the ability of national governments to redistribute income; they also increase the political demands for international mobility of welfare-state benefits and social services. I also discuss the dynamics of reforms and retreats of welfare-state arrangements.

  • 10.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Changing Tides for the Welfare State: An Essay2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Socioeconomic conditions and values have changed considerably since the emergence of elaborate welfare-state arrangements during the first decades after World War II. For instance, recent socioeconomic changes have created new needs (justifications) for intertemporal reallocations of income as well as for protection against new types of income risks. Some socioeconomic changes have also undermined the financial viability of a number of traditional welfare-state arrangements. This paper emphasizes developments in the labor market and changes in the structure and preferences of the family. A number of alternative welfare-state reforms are considered in the paper.

  • 11.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    China's Reformed Economy2007In: CESifo Forum, Vol. 1Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Economic-Social Interaction during China’s Transition2007In: Journal of Comparative Studies, Vol. 33Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Economic-Social Interaction in China2008In: Economics of Transition, Vol. 16Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ekonomi är att välja: memoarer2012Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 15.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ekonomisk politik och politisk ekonomi: ett personligt perspektiv2010In: Ekonomisk debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, no 5Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Endogenous Politicians and the Theory of Economic Policy1973Report (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fenomenet Piketty2014In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, no 7, p. 11-19Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Full Employment and the Welfare State1996Report (Other academic)
  • 19.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. Institutet för näringslivsforskning, Sverige.
    Hur avveckla hyreskontrollen?2016In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 44, no 7, p. 17-28Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Vad som fordras för en någorlunda väl fungerande marknad för hyreslägenheter är ett omfattande reformpaket som bl a innefattar en gradvis avveckling av hyreskontrollen, ett ökat stöd till låginkomsttagare (eventuellt i form av riktade hyressubventioner) och en mindre byråkratisk byggnadslagstiftning. En viktig fördel med att locka tillbaka privata investerare till marknaden för nybyggda hyresfastigheter är att den offentliga sektorn därmed frigör resurser för investeringar i offentligt finansierad infrastruktur och i anläggningar för sociala tjänster, som utbildning, sjukvård och äldrevård.

  • 20.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Improving the Performance of the European Social Model: The Welfare State over the Life Cycle2003Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The achievements of social-welfare arrangements in Western Europe are well known: considerable income security, relatively little poverty and, in some countries, ample supply of social services. But there are also well-known weaknesses and hence considerable scope for improvement. Three types of weaknesses are considered in this paper: social-welfare arrangements are often not financially robust to shocks; individuals make undesirable behavioural adjustments in response to welfare-state arrangements and their financing; and social-welfare arrangements are often poorly adapted to recent changes in socio-economic conditions and preferences of individuals. I discuss these weaknesses, and alternative methods to mitigate them, in the context of various types of welfare-state arrangements that the individual may encounter over the life cycle.

  • 21.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behaviour1997Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In a broad psychological perspective, both economic incentives and social norms may be regarded as giving rise to purposeful, or "rational" behavior. By this I simply mean that individuals act in accordance with expected reward or punishment, even though the form these take differs substantially in the two cases. Whereas economic incentives imply "material rewards", or favors that can be traded for such rewards including leisure, social norms imply "social rewards". The latter basically take the form of approval or disapproval from others and related feelings of pride or shame. Moreover, once a social norm has been internalized in an individual's own value system, behavior in accordance with, or against, the norm will also result in feelings of self-respect or guilt. All this suggests that not only economic incentives but also social norms may be analyzed by means of utility theory, as will be illustrated below.

    Many social norms may not have much to do with economic incentives (Elster, 1989). In some cases, it is, however, useful to study the interaction between them. Indeed, this is the basic message of the paper. My discussion to three norms of apparent importance for household behavior: (i) work norms; (ii) norms against wage underbidding; and (iii) saving and consumption norms. Thus, the paper deals with norms concering willingness to work, ability to get a job and the use of income.

  • 22.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Incentives in the Welfare-State: Lessons for would-be welfare states1996Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with economic incentives and welfare-state arrangements in OECD countries; it also offers some lessons for would-be welfare states. These arrangements differ, of course, among OECD countries. In particular, there is wide variation in the extent to which countries rely on four basic institutions - the state, the firm, the family and the market. Countries also differ in their reliance on (i) a common safety net, often in the form of flat-rate benefits tied to specific contingencies; (ii) means-tested benefits for low-income groups; and (iii) income protection, i.e., benefits that are tied to previous income. Another distinction between corporatist welfare states, where benefits are tied to labor contracts, and universal welfare states in which benefits are conditional on residence or citizenship. This distinction is blurred, however, by recent tendencies in corporatist welfare states to extend coverage to individuals who have very weak attachment to the labor market, and in universal welfare states to tie benefits to previous or contemporary work under the slogan "workfare" rather than "welfare".The degree of generosity of benefits is another important distinction. Of course, the lower the benefit levels, the stronger the incentives for citizens to opt for voluntary (market) solutions, in the form of private saving and private insurance arrangements.When considering incentive problems in connection with various types of welfare-state arrangements, this paper emphasizes what may be called "dynamic" issues, i.e., incentive effects that evolve over time. These also include endogenous changes in social norms among individuals and endogenous adjustments in political behavior. This approach also makes it necessary to broaden the analysis to fields outside conventionally defined "economic analysis".

  • 23.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Individual Freedom and Welfare State Policy1987Report (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lärdomar av finanskrisen2010In: Ekonomisk debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, no 4Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 25.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Microfoundations of Unemployment Theory1991Report (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nationalekonomi: vad är det?2012In: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens årsbok, Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2012, p. 103-112Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Overshooting, Reform and Retreat of the Welfare State1993Report (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change2000Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In developed countries, pensions systems emerged as a political response to socioeconomic changes brought about by industrialization and urbanization in the late 19th and early 20th centruries. Today, new socioeconomic changes create both rationales and political forces for revisions of existing pensions systems. Changes in demography, real wage growth and real interest rates are perhaps the most obvious examples. Increased instability of the family, more heterogeneity among individuals, greater internationel mobility of labor and capital, and amibitions to ecourage individual responsibility also have important implications for pensions systems.

    When discussing these issues, it is useful to set up a more elaborate classification of pension systems than the usual distinction between defined-benefit (DB) and defined-contribution (DV) systems. The choice of an appropriate taxonomy depends, of course, on the issues to be raised. One question that is focused on in this paper concerns the consequences of socioeconomic shocks on the distribution of income and the sharing of income risk among generations. it turns out that the distinction between pensions systems with exogenous and endogenous contribution rates (tax rates) then becomes crucial. Bu the paper also deals with socioeconomic changes that are induced by the pension system itself via behavioral adjustments of individuals - and the feedback of these changes on the pension system. When dealing with such adjustments, highly relevant features of pension systems are the degree to which they are actuarial and funded, respectively - two aspects that are related but not the identical.

    Six generic pension systems are classified in Section I, highlighting the distinctions mentioned above. The contribution rate is exogenous in two of these systems, while it is endogenous in the other four systems. Each of the six pension systems can ba varied considerably, both by incorporating elements from other systems and by introducing restricitions on contributions or benefits. Section II turns to the consequences of socioeconomic changes for the distribution of income and macroeconomic balance, while sections III and IV examine alternative pension reforms aimed at mitigating some of these consequences. A few of these reforms are "marginal" in the sense that certain rules of a pension system are modified, including both ad hoc policy measures and the introduction of various automatic adjustment mechanisms. Other reforms are "radical" since they imply shift to different types of pensions sytems. Section V concludes.

    As always when designing social insurance systems, it is necessary to strika balance between conflicting considerations, such as distribution, risk sharing and incentives. But it is also important to be concerned with the balance between paternalism and individual freedom of choice (and hence individual responsibility). This also raises the more general question of the appropriate role of government in society as a whole, including the control of capital markets and government intervention in the management of firms.

  • 29.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Prospects for the Welfare State2008Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is useful to distinguish between exogenous and endogenous factors behind contemporary and expected future problems for the welfare state. This paper tries to identify major problems of both types and to indicate alternative reform possibilities to deal with them. At the same time as several governments struggle with such reforms, new demands on the welfare state emerge. Although the basic structure of today’s welfare-state arrangements certainly can be kept, the reforms required are sufficiently large to create considerable conflicts across interest groups.

  • 30.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Public Finance for Market-Oriented Developing Countries1986Report (Other academic)
  • 31.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Redistribution Policy and the Expansion of the Public Sector: The Political Economy of the Welfare State1984Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    During the first part of this century life-cycle and insurance-type considerations seem to have dominated redistribution policy, in particular when we look at the consequences for the expansion of public spending. By contrast, during recent decades, "fragmented horizontal redistributions" between various minority groups have probably been the most important mechanism. The self-interest of different groups of the electorate seems to have provided the most powerful motive behind these various policies, though welfare altruism and what in this paper is called considerations of "consequential externalities" have probably been important motives behind redistribution in favor of the poor.

  • 32.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Reflektioner om nationalekonomins styrka och begränsningar2012In: Ekonomisk debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 40, no 7, p. 17-25Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Remaining Puzzles and Neglected Issues in Macroeconomics1988Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyses the "chain" of transmission mechanisms of economic policy actions to financial markets, output and employment and, finally, unemployment -- in an attempt to identify "remaining puzzles" and "neglected issues" in macroeconomics. The paper emphasizes the consequences of fiscal and monetary policy actions on real variables, including real interest rates and real exchange rates. An attempt is made to explain why product demand shocks often tend to have faster effects on output and employment than on prices. The paper also discusses why demand-induced increases in output and employment are not systematically connected with a "reduction" in the product wage rate. The paper ends with a discussion of various supply-side considerations in macroeconomics.

  • 34.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sociala normer och socialförsäkringar – Teori och svenska erfarenheter2008In: Ekonomisk Debatt, no 6Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 35.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Stabiliseringspolitiken i teori och praktik2007In: Tillämpad makroekonomi, 2007Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 36.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Stabilization Policy in an Open High-Employment Economy: Swedish Experiences1971Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to try to reach some conclusions about the possibilities of a successful stabilization policy in an open high-employment eceonomy by drawing on the expereinces from one particular country, namely Sweden. An attempt is made to concentrate on aspects and experiences of a general theoretical interest rather than trying to report in detail on specific Swedish problems.

    We shall mainly study two basic prerequisites for a successful stbilization policy: (1) adequate scope and timing of policy action, and (2) ability to solve conflicts of goals. the paper will be organized around these two issues.

  • 37.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sustainable Social Spending2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper discusses a number of threats to the financial sustainability of social spending: increased internationalization of national economies, gradually higher relative costs of producing a number of human services, the ”graying” of the population, slower productivity growth in the private sector, low employment rates, and various types of disincentive effects related to the welfare state itself, including services and disincentive effects of welfare-state arrangements, in particular moral hazard and benefit dependency, are more difficult to deal with than the other threats. I also discuss the choice between ad hoc policy reforms and automatic adjustment mechanisms, delegated to administrative bodies, for dealing with these threats.

  • 38.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Swedish Lessons for Post-Socialist Countries1998Report (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Swedish Lessons for Post-Socialist Countries1998Report (Other academic)
  • 40.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Swedish Lessons for Post-Socialist Countries1998Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    When reforming their own countries, several observers, ideologues and politicians in former socialist countries have pointedf to Sweden as a blueprint. It is then believed that Sweden, or the "Swedish model", has combined the efficiency, dynamism and flexibility of capitalist market economies with the economic security and egalitarianism so highly evaluated by many social liberals and socialists. An analysis of the Swedish experience, and its relevance for former socialist countries, may therefore be of rather general interest.

    When addressing this issue, it is important to realize that basic features of the economic and social system in Sweden have changed considerably over time. Though attempts to divide history into periods are hazardous, in this paper I partition modern economic and social history in Sweden into three periods. The first is the century-long time span from about 1870 to 1970, which may be called "the period of decentralization and small government". During this period, the economic system in Sweden did not differ much from those in other countries in Western Europe, although Sweden was probably one of the least regulated economies in this part of the world. The second period, from 1970 to 1985/90, may be characterized as a "period of centralizaion and large government". In this time span, Sweden acquired idiosyncratic features, though still within the framework of a capitalist market economy. The third period, from 1985/90 onwards, may be regarded as a "period of transition" due to deregulation of markets for capital and foreign exchange, intensified importance of private saving and private supply of capital, comprehensive tax reforms (with lower rates, a broader base and fewer asymmetries), a shift of the macroeconomic policy regime towards greater emphasis on price stability, a stricter budget process in the public sector, as well as some (modest) attempts to reform and rewind various welfare-state arrangements.

    The paper deals mainly with the last two periods. By way of introduction, I will make a few comments on the first, century-long period, as it was largely then that the foundation of today's affluence in Sweden was established. Some of the experience from this period is also highly relevant for post-socialist countries.

  • 41.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Advanced Welfare State1987Report (Other academic)
  • 42.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The European Social Model: Lessons for Developing Countries2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Developing countries, in particular the least developed ones, probably have more to learn from special policies in Europe during the early 20th century than from the elaborate welfare-state arrangements after World War II. In addition to macroeconomic growth and stability, the main ambitions must be to fight human deprivation, including illiteracy, malnutrition, poor access to water and sanitation – and, in some cases, also weak, incompetent and/or corrupt governments. It is also important that informal systems in the fields of transfers and social services are not destroyed when developing countries embark on more formal systems in these fields in the future. The European experience also warns against the creation of social systems that are so generous that disincentives, moral hazard and receding social norms seriously distort the national economy, including the labor market.

  • 43.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The National State in an Internationalized World Economy1973Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Three lectures at the Candido Mendes University, Rio de Janeiro, March 1973.

  • 44.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The National State in an Internationalized World Economy1973Report (Other academic)
  • 45.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Price in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel - 1969-19981999Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In conjunction with its tercentenary celebration in 1968, Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) instituted a new award, "The Central Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel" in the basis of an economic commitment by the bank in perpetuity. The award is given by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences according to the same principles as for the Nobel Prizes that have been awarded since 1901.

    The procedures for selecting the laureates are also the same. Each year the Academy receives some 250 nominations, usually covering a little more than one hundred nominees. (Unsolicited suggestions from persons who have not been asked to submit nominations are not considered.) The Economics Prize Selection Commitee of the Academy (with five to eight members) commissions expert studies of the most prominent candidates, sometimes by Swedish experts but usually by foreigners. The prize committee presents its report, with an extensive survey of the main candidates that are considered for a prize. The report motivates the proposal and includes all the solicited expert studies. Finally the entire Academy meets to take the final award decision, usually in October.

    Which critera have guided the awarts so far? And what have been the main problems when selcting the laureates?

    It is useful to start a discussion of these issues with a rough classification of the various types of economics prize awards given so far. It should be kept in mind, however, that all such classifications are rather arbitrary since the multidimensional nature of scientific contributions makes it difficult in avoid overlap.

  • 46.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Recent Slowdown of Productivity Growth1982Report (Other academic)
  • 47.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Swedish Experience1990Report (Other academic)
  • 48.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Unemployment Problem1994Report (Other academic)
  • 49.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Welfare State and the Employment Problem1994Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Social security, provision of public sector services, job security legislation, minimum wages and centrally regulated (bargained) relative wages are important elements of the modern welfare state -- each designed, often quite successfully, to enhance economic security and to redistribute income. The consequences of these policies for the unemployment issue are the topic of this paper.

  • 50.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The West European Employment Problem1996Report (Other academic)
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