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  • 1.
    Ballantyne, Angela
    et al.
    University of Otago Wellington, Bioeth, Wellington, New Zealand.
    Eriksson, Stefan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Research ethics revised: The new CIOMS guidelines and the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki in context2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 310-311Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 2.
    Bognar, Greg
    La Trobe University, Australia.
    Fair Innings2015In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 29, no 4, p. 251-261Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In many societies, the aging of the population is becoming a major problem. This raises difficult issues for ethics and public policy. On what is known as the fair innings view, it is not impermissible to give lower priority to policies that primarily benefit the elderly. Philosophers have tried to justify this view on various grounds. In this article, I look at a consequentialist, a fairness-based, and a contractarian justification. I argue that all of them have implausible implications and fail to correspond to our moral intuitions. I end by outlining a different kind of consequentialist justification that avoids those implications and corresponds better to our considered moral judgments.

  • 3.
    Cutas, Daniela
    Department of Philosophy, University of Gothenburg.
    On a Romanian attempt to legislate on medically assisted human reproduction2008In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 22, no 1, p. 56-63Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper presents and briefly analyses some of the provisions of a Romanian legislative proposal which arrived at the Presidency for ratification twice, in slightly different forms, and which was rejected twice: the first time at the Presidency in October 2004, and the second at the Constitutional Court in July 2005. The proposal was finally dropped in February 2006. My intention here is to point to some of the most problematic deficiencies of the legislative document in the hope that this may assist with future debates and regulations on assisted reproduction either in Romania or elsewhere. I have isolated the features to be discussed under two headings: (1) whose are the rights to reproduce, that the document claimed to 'acknowledge, regulate and guarantee' and (2) what is the status of the embryo, the child and the surrogate mother?

  • 4.
    Cutas, Daniela
    School of Law, University of Manchester, UK.
    Postmenopausal motherhood: immoral, illegal? A case study2007In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 21, no 8, p. 458-463Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper explores the ethics of post-menopausal motherhood by looking at the case of Adriana Iliescu, the oldest woman ever to have given birth (so far). To this end, I will approach the three most common objections brought against the mother and/or against the team of healthcare professionals who made it happen: the age of the mother, the fact that she is single, the appropriateness of her motivation and of that of the medical team.

  • 5.
    de Snoo-Trimp, Janine
    et al.
    VU University Medical Centre, Department of Medical Humanities and the Amsterdam Public Health Research Institute, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
    Widdershoven, Guy
    VU University Medical Centre, Department of Medical Humanities and the Amsterdam Public Health Research Institute, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
    Svantesson, Mia
    Örebro University, School of Health Sciences. Örebro University Hospital. University Health Care Research Center, Region Örebro County, Örebro, Sweden; Division of Health Sciences, Warwick Medical School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.
    de Vet, Riekie
    Department of Medical Humanities, VU University Medical Centre, Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam Public Health Research Institute, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
    Molewijk, Bert
    Department of Medical Humanities, VU University Medical Centre, Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam Public Health Research Institute, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
    What Outcomes do Dutch Healthcare Professionals Perceive as Important Before Participation in Moral Case Deliberation?2017In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 31, no 4, p. 246-257Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Background: There has been little attention paid to research on the outcomes of clinical ethics support (CES) or critical reflection on what constitutes a good CES outcome. Understanding how CES users perceive the importance of CES outcomes can contribute to a better understanding, use of and normative reflection on CES outcomes.

    Objective: To describe the perceptions of Dutch healthcare professionals on important outcomes of moral case deliberation (MCD), prior to MCD participation, and to compare results between respondents.

    Methods: This mixed-methods study used both the Euro-MCD instrument and semi-structured interviews. Healthcare professionals who were about to implement MCD were recruited from nursing homes, hospitals, psychiatry and mentally disabled care institutions.

    Results: 331 healthcare professionals completed the Euro-MCD instrument, 13 healthcare professionals were interviewed. The outcomes perceived as most important were more open communication', better mutual understanding', concrete actions', see the situation from different perspectives', consensus on how to manage the situation' and find more courses of action'. Interviewees also perceived improving quality of care, professionalism and the organization as important. Women, nurses, managers and professionals in mentally disabled care rated outcomes more highly than other respondents.

    Conclusions: Dutch healthcare professionals perceived the MCD outcomes related to collaboration as most important. The empirical findings can contribute to shared ownership of MCD and a more specific use of MCD in different contexts. They can inform international comparative research on different CES types and contribute to normative discussions concerning CES outcomes. Future studies should reflect upon important MCD outcomes after having experienced MCD.

  • 6.
    Eriksson, Stefan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    On the need for improved protections of incapacitated and non-benefitting research subjects2012In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 15-21Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, it is claimed that the protective provisions for adults with impaired decision-making capacity are misguided, insofar as they do not conclusively state whether research on this group should be permitted only as an exception, and as they arbitrarily allow for some groups to benefit from such research while others will not. Moreover, the presumed or former will of the subject is given insufficient weight, and the minimal risk standard does not make sense in this context.

    Because of these problems, the present guidelines allow for the possibility of vulnerable people being exploited, something that is hidden behind a guise of solidarity. Instead we need to address the real issues at stake by rewriting the present statutes.

    It is suggested that new guidelines should be in some continuity with earlier efforts. However, in order to protect these subjects there is additional need for appointed representatives who monitor research and for legal obligations to compensate for any injuries suffered.

    Without these or similar measures we won’t have an adequate system in place for the protection of non-benefiting persons who are unable to consent to research.

  • 7.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Swedish Def Res Agcy, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Peterson, Martin
    Risk and Mid-level Moral Principles2012In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 8-14Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Guntram, Lisa
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Thematic Studies, Technology and Social Change. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Williams, Nicola Jane
    Univ Lancaster, England.
    Positioning uterus transplantation as a more ethical alternative to surrogacy: Exploring symmetries between uterus transplantation and surrogacy through analysis of a Swedish government white paper2018In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 32, no 8, p. 509-518Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Within the ethics and science literature surrounding uterus transplantation (UTx), emphasis is often placed on the extent to which UTx might improve upon, or offer additional benefits when compared to, existing treatment options for women with absolute uterine factor infertility, such as adoption and gestational surrogacy. Within this literature UTx is often positioned as superior to surrogacy because it can deliver things that surrogacy cannot (such as the experience of gestation). Yet, in addition to claims that UTx is superior in the aforementioned sense it is also often assumed (either implicitly or explicitly) that UTx is less fraught with ethical difficulties and thus should be considered a less morally problematic option. This article seeks to examine this assumption. Given that much UTx research has been performed in Sweden, a country where surrogacy is effectively although not currently explicitly forbidden, we do this through an analysis of the arguments underpinning a 2016 Swedish white paper which considered amending existing policy such that altruistic surrogacy arrangements would be permitted. By applying the white papers arguments for a restrictive position on altruistic surrogacy to the case of UTx using living altruistic donors we find that such arguments, if they hold in the case of surrogacy, apply similarly to UTx. We thus suggest that, for reasons of consistency, a similar stance should be taken towards the moral and legal permissibility of these two practices.

  • 9.
    Gustavsson, Erik
    Linköping University, Department of Medical and Health Sciences, Division of Health Care Analysis. Linköping University, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences.
    Patients with multiple needs for healthcare and priority to the worse off2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 33, no 2, p. 261-266Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There is a growing body of literature which suggests that decisions about healthcare priority setting should take into account the extent to which patients are worse off. However, such decisions are often based on how badly off patients are with respect to the condition targeted by the treatment whose priority is under consideration (condition-specific severity). In this paper I argue that giving priority to the worse off in terms of condition-specific severity does not reflect the morally relevant sense of being worse off. I conclude that an account of giving priority to the worse off relevant for healthcare priority setting should take into account how badly off patients are when all of their conditions are considered (holistic severity).

  • 10.
    Jaarsma, Pier
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Medical and Health Sciences, Division of Health Care Analysis. Linköping University, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences.
    Welin, Stellan
    Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, Arts and Humanities. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Editorial Material: Autism, Accommodation and Treatment: A Rejoinder to Chong-Ming Lims Critique in BIOETHICS, vol 29, issue 9, pp 684-6852015In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 29, no 9, p. 684-685Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We are very grateful to Chong-Ming Lim for his thoughtful reply published in this journal on one of our articles, which motivated us to think more carefully about accommodating autistic individuals and treating autism. However we believe there are some confusions in Lims argument. Lim uses the accommodation thesis, according to which we should accommodate autistic individuals rather than treat autism, as the starting point for his reasoning. He claims that if the accommodation thesis is right, then we should not treat autistic individuals for their autism, not even low-functioning (i.e. intellectually disabled) ones, because this would be disrespectful to all autistic individuals. We should instead limit ourselves to accommodate all autistic individuals. However, the opposition between accommodation and treatment is not valid in the case of autism, because of ambiguity in the concepts of accommodation and treatment. Moreover there is confusion in Lims reasoning caused by omitting important facts about the practice of treating autism.

  • 11.
    Johnsson, Linus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Family Medicine and Preventive Medicine.
    Eriksson, Stefan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Autonomy is a Right, Not a Feat: How Theoretical Misconceptions have Muddled the Debate on Dynamic Consent to Biobank Research2016In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 30, no 7, p. 471-478Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Should people be involved as active participants in longitudinal medical research, as opposed to remaining passive providers of data and material? We argue in this article that misconceptions of 'autonomy' as a kind of feat rather than a right are to blame for much of the confusion surrounding the debate of dynamic versus broad consent. Keeping in mind two foundational facts of human life, freedom and dignity, we elaborate three moral principles - those of autonomy, integrity and authority - to better see what is at stake. Respect for autonomy is to recognize the other's right to decide in matters that are important to them. Respect for integrity is to meet, in one's relationship with the other, their need to navigate the intersection between private and social life. Respect for authority is to empower the other - to help them to cultivate their responsibility as citizens. On our account, to force information onto someone who does not want it is not to respect that person's autonomy, but to violate integrity in the name of empowerment. Empowerment, not respect for autonomy, is the aim that sets patient-centred initiatives employing a dynamic consent model apart from other consent models. Whether this is ultimately morally justified depends on whether empowerment ought to be a goal of medical research, which is questionable.

  • 12.
    Johnsson, Linus
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Helgesson, Gert
    Stockholm Centre for Healthcare Ethics, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm.
    Hansson, Mats G.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Eriksson, Stefan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Adequate trust avails, mistaken trust matters: On the moral responsibility of doctors as proxies for patients' trust in biobank research2013In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 27, no 9, p. 485-492Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Sweden, most patients are recruited into biobank research by non-researcher doctors. Patients’ trust in doctors may therefore be important to their willingness to participate. We suggest a model of trust that makes sense of such transitions of trust between domains and distinguishes adequate trust from mistaken trust. The unique position of doctors implies, we argue, a Kantian imperfect duty to compensate for patients’ mistaken trust. There are at least three kinds of mistaken trust, each of which requires a different set of countermeasures. First, trust is mistaken when necessary competence is lacking; the competence must be developed or the illusion dispelled. Second, trust is irrational whenever the patient is mistaken about his actual reasons for trusting. Care must therefore be taken to support the patient’s reasoning and moral agency. Third, some patients inappropriately trust doctors to recommend only research that will benefit them directly. Such trust should be counteracted by nurturing a culture where patients expect to be asked occasionally to contribute to the common good.

  • 13.
    Kuhlau, Frida
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Eriksson, Stefan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Evers, Kathinka
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Höglund, Anna T.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Taking due care: Moral obligations in dual use research2008In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 22, no 9, p. 477-487Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the past decade, the perception of a bioterrorist threat has increased and created a demand on life scientists to consider the potential security implications of dual use research. This article examines a selection of proposed moral obligations for life scientists that have emerged to meet these concerns and the extent to which they can be considered reasonable. It also describes the underlying reasons for the concerns, how they are managed, and their implications for scientific values.Five criteria for what constitutes preventable harm are suggested and a number of proposed obligations for life scientists are considered against these criteria, namely, the obligations to prevent bioterrorism; to engage in response activities; to consider negative implications of research; not to publish or share sensitive information; to oversee and limit access to dangerous material; and to report activities of concern.

    Although bioterrorism might be perceived as an imminent threat, the analysis illustrates that this is beyond the responsibility of life scientists either to prevent or to respond to. Among the more reasonable obligations are duties to consider potential negative implications of one's research, protect access to sensitive material, technology and knowledge, and report activities of concern. Responsibility, therefore, includes obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable harm. A central conclusion is that several of the proposed obligations are reasonable, although not unconditionally.

  • 14.
    Kuhlau, Frida
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Höglund, Anna T.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Evers, Kathinka
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Eriksson, Stefan
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    A precautionary principle for dual use research in the life sciences2011In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 25, no 1, p. 1-8Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Most life science research entails dual-use complexity and may be misused for harmful purposes, e.g. biological weapons. The Precautionary Principle applies to special problems characterized by complexity in the relationship between human activities and their consequences. This article examines whether the principle, so far mainly used in environmental and public health issues, is applicable and suitable to the field of dual-use life science research. Four central elements of the principle are examined: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action. Although charges against the principle exist - for example that it stifles scientific development, lacks practical applicability and is poorly defined and vague - the analysis concludes that a Precautionary Principle is applicable to the field. Certain factors such as credibility of the threat, availability of information, clear prescriptive demands on responsibility and directives on how to act, determine the suitability and success of a Precautionary Principle. Moreover, policy-makers and researchers share a responsibility for providing and seeking information about potential sources of harm. A central conclusion is that the principle is meaningful and useful if applied as a context-dependent moral principle and allowed flexibility in its practical use. The principle may then inspire awareness-raising and the establishment of practical routines which appropriately reflect the fact that life science research may be misused for harmful purposes.

  • 15.
    Leibetseder, Doris
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Centre for Gender Research.
    Queer Reproduction Revisited & Why Race, Class and Citizenship Still Matters: A Response to Cristina Richie2018In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 32, no 2, p. 138-144Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the dialogue between Timothy F. Murphy and Cristina Richie about queer bioethics and queer reproduction in this journal, significant points of the emergent and extremely important discussions on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) and queer bioethics are raised. Richie specifies correctly that queer bioethics can either complement or contradict LGBT bioethics and the queer standpoint against heteroconformity and heterofuturity is decisive here. As the field of queer bioethics is such a recent and essential part of consideration for bioethics and as it is still evolving, the objective of this intervention is to provide both an overview of important milestones of queer bioethics and to highlight that queer bioethics is not mono-logic and monolithic. To exemplify queer bioethic's ‘many-headed monsters’, queer reproduction is revisited and complemented by a European viewpoint. It is central to my argument and here I disagree with Richie that to be against heterofuturity does not necessarily mean to be against queer reproduction. However, I also argue that there are other reasons why queer reproduction should not be pursued at all costs. Finally, I discuss the most recent debates on race, class and citizenship, for example, queer necropolitics. These points still need to be addressed in queer bioethical agendas.

  • 16.
    Malmqvist, Erik
    entre for Studies on Meaning,Ethics and Society, Université Paris Descartes, in Paris, France.
    Are bans on kidney sales unjustifiably paternalistic?2014In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 28, no 3, p. 110-118Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper challenges the view that bans on kidney sales are unjustifiably paternalistic, that is, that they unduly deny people the freedom to make decisions about their own bodies in order to protect them from harm. I argue that not even principled anti-paternalists need to reject such bans. This is because their rationale is not hard paternalism, which anti-paternalists repudiate, but soft paternalism, which they in principle accept. More precisely, I suggest that their rationale is what Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer call ‘group soft paternalism’. Group soft paternalistic policies restrict the freedom of autonomous individuals, not for their own good (hard paternalism), but as an unavoidable consequence of seeking to protect other, non-autonomous individuals from harms that they have not voluntarily chosen (soft paternalism). Group soft paternalism supports prohibiting kidney sales on three conditions: (1) that such sales are potentially harmful to vendors, (2) that many vendors would suffer impaired autonomy, and (3) that distinguishing between autonomous and non-autonomous vendors and interfering only with the latter is unfeasible. I provide reasons for thinking that these conditions will often hold.

  • 17.
    Munthe, C.
    et al.
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden; .
    Nijsingh, N.
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden; .
    de Fine Licht, Karl
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden; KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
    Joakim Larsson, D. G.
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden; .
    Health-related Research Ethics and Social Value: Antibiotic Resistance Intervention Research and Pragmatic Risks2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 335-342Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider the implications for the ethical evaluation of research programs of two fundamental changes in the revised research ethical guideline of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. The first is the extension of scope that follows from exchanging "biomedical" for "health-related" research, and the second is the new evaluative basis of "social value," which implies new ethical requirements of research. We use the example of antibiotic resistance interventions to explore the need to consider the instances of what we term the pragmatic risks of such interventions to evaluate the social value of certain kinds of health-related research. These (pragmatic) risks severely threaten the social value of interventions in every area where human and social responses significantly impact on their effectiveness. Thus, the social value of health-related research needed to demonstrate its effectiveness depends on the extent and successful management of such risks. Research designed to take into account the management of pragmatic risks also gives rise to similar types of risks, and the potential for social value in light of those risks needs to be considered in ethical reviews based on the new guidelines. We argue that, to handle this new expanded task, the international system of research ethical review addressed by the guidelines needs institutional development.

  • 18.
    Munthe, Christian
    et al.
    Univ Gothenburg, Dept Philosophy Linguist & Theory Sci, Box 200, SE-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden. unthe, Christian; Nijsingh, Niels; Larsson, D. G. Joakim.
    Nijsingh, Niels
    De Fine Licht, Karl
    KTH.
    Larsson, D. G. Joakim
    Health-related Research Ethics and Social Value: Antibiotic Resistance Intervention Research and Pragmatic Risks2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 335-342Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider the implications for the ethical evaluation of research programs of two fundamental changes in the revised research ethical guideline of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. The first is the extension of scope that follows from exchanging "biomedical" for "health-related" research, and the second is the new evaluative basis of "social value," which implies new ethical requirements of research. We use the example of antibiotic resistance interventions to explore the need to consider the instances of what we term the pragmatic risks of such interventions to evaluate the social value of certain kinds of health-related research. These (pragmatic) risks severely threaten the social value of interventions in every area where human and social responses significantly impact on their effectiveness. Thus, the social value of health-related research needed to demonstrate its effectiveness depends on the extent and successful management of such risks. Research designed to take into account the management of pragmatic risks also gives rise to similar types of risks, and the potential for social value in light of those risks needs to be considered in ethical reviews based on the new guidelines. We argue that, to handle this new expanded task, the international system of research ethical review addressed by the guidelines needs institutional development.

  • 19.
    Munthe, Christian
    et al.
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Nijsingh, Niels
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden; Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich, UK.
    de Fine Licht, Karl
    RISE - Research Institutes of Sweden, Built Environment, Energy and Circular Economy. Chalmers Institute of Technology, Sweden; KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
    Larsson, DG Joakim
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    The Ethics of Antibiotic Resistance: Towards an Agenda for Feasible and Justified Global Health Policy2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 33, no 7, p. 731-733Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Munthe, Christian
    et al.
    Univ Gothenburg, Dept Philosophy Linguist & Theory Sci, Box 200, SE-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden..
    Nijsingh, Niels
    Univ Gothenburg, Dept Philosophy Linguist & Theory Sci, Box 200, SE-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden.;Univ Gothenburg, Ctr Antibiot Resistance Res, CARe, Gothenburg, Sweden.;Ludwig Maximilians Univ Munchen, Inst Eth Hist & Theory Med, Munich, Germany..
    Licht, Karl de Fine
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy. Chalmers Inst Technol, Gothenburg, Sweden.;Res Inst Sweden RISE, Gothenburg, Sweden..
    Larsson, D. G. Joakim
    Univ Gothenburg, Ctr Antibiot Resistance Res, CARe, Gothenburg, Sweden.;Univ Gothenburg, Dept Infect Dis, Inst Biomed, Gothenburg, Sweden..
    The Ethics of Antibiotic Resistance: Towards an Agenda for Feasible and Justified Global Health Policy2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 33, no 7, p. 731-733Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Nikku, Nina
    et al.
    Linköping University, The Tema Institute, Media and Communication Studies. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Eriksson, Bengt Erik
    Linköping University, The Tema Institute, Media and Communication Studies. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Microethics in Action2006In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 169-179Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The future development of bioethics has been discussed in a number of articles in recent years, principally with regard to the trend towards empirical studies. However, what is meant by empirical studies in this context and how it is to be used concretely have been subject to varying interpretations. The purpose of this article is to develop what we term the microethical approach as a concrete method for an empirically driven bioethics. By adopting a microethical perspective, we will illustrate an analytical concept for describing and demonstrating how, as a result of contextual circumstances and forms of understanding, different individuals in their everyday life adopt different coping strategies and behavior patterns in relation to ethical values. From a deepened perspective, the complexity of human behavior becomes apparent, and knowledge is gained about how moral problems are perceived and construed by those whom they in fact affect.

    We intend first and foremost to develop the microethical methodology by elucidating the methods and approaches that can help in clarifying moral dilemmas on a microethical level, and how the relationship between the empirical material and the ethical analysis evolves over the course of the analysis. This is exemplified by a study of caregivers’ entrance into patients’ private lives through the provision of care and assistance in the home.

  • 22.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköping University, Department of Medical and Health Sciences, Health and Society. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Comments:Standard circumstances and vital goals: comments on Sridhar Venkatapuram’s critique2013In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 27, no 5, p. 280-284Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article is a reply to Venkatapuram's critique in his article Health, Vital Goals, Capabilities, this volume. I take issue mainly with three critical points put forward by Venkatapuram with regard to my theory of health. (1) I deny that the contents of my vital goals are relative to each community or context, as Venkatapuram claims. There is no conceptual connection at all between standard circumstances and vital goals, as I understand these concepts. (2) Venkatapuram notes that I stop short of filling the framework of vital goals with any content and thereby make my concept of health less concrete. I reply that some vital goals are indeed universal, viz. the ones which are necessary conditions for survival. Many other vital goals are individual and cannot therefore be included in a universal list. (3) Venkatapuram claims that my definition of vital goals is too broad, since it entails that some persons without any disease can be regarded as ill. However, in my understanding health is a relational concept from a state of complete health to a state of maximal illness. In this framework, a minor reduction of a state of complete health does not entail illness. This article also contains a comparison between my theory of health and Martha Nussbaum's theory of capabilities for dignity.

  • 23. Racine, Eric
    et al.
    Dubljevic, Veljko
    Jox, Ralf J.
    Baertschi, Bernard
    Christensen, Julia F.
    Farisco, Michele
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Jotterand, Fabrice
    Kahane, Guy
    Muller, Sabine
    Can Neuroscience contribute to practical ethics?: A critical review and discussion of the methodological and translational challenges of the neuroscience of ethics2017In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 2017, no 31, p. 328-337, article id 5Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Neuroethics is an interdisciplinary field that arose in response to novel ethical challenges posed by advances in neuroscience. Historically, neuroethics has provided an opportunity to synergize different disciplines, notably proposing a two-way dialogue between an "ethics of neuroscience" and a "neuroscience of ethics". However, questions surface as to whether a "neuroscience of ethics" is a useful and unified branch of research and whether it can actually inform or lead to theoretical insights and transferable practical knowledge to help resolve ethical questions. In this article, we examine why the neuroscience of ethics is a promising area of research and summarize what we have learned so far regarding its most promising goals and contributions. We then review some of the key methodological challenges which may have hindered the use of results generated thus far by the neuroscience of ethics. Strategies are suggested to address these challenges and improve the quality of research and increase neuroscience's usefulness for applied ethics and society at large. Finally, we reflect on potential outcomes of a neuroscience of ethics and discuss the different strategies that could be used to support knowledge transfer to help different stakeholders integrate knowledge from the neuroscience of ethics. 

  • 24.
    Salles, Arleen
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Melo Martin, Inmaculada
    Moral Bioenhancement: Much Ado about Nothing?2015In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 29, no 4, p. 223-232Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, some have proposed moral bioenhancement as a solution to the serious moral evils that humans face. Seemingly disillusioned with tradi- tional methods of moral education, proponents of bioenhancement believe that we should pursue and apply biotechnological means to morally enhance human beings. Such proposal has generated a lively debate about the permissibility of moral bioenhancement. We argue here that such debate is specious. The claim that moral bioenhancement is a solution – whether permissible or not – to the serious moral problems that affect human beings is based on several problematic framing assumptions. We evaluate here three of such assumptions: the first rests on a contested understanding of morality, the second consist in a mistaken conception of human moral problems, and the third relates to problematic presuppositions grounding the interpretation of existent scientific evidence presented to defend moral bioenhancement. Once these framing assumptions are iden- tified and critically evaluated, it becomes clear that the moral bioenhancement debate is misguided. 

  • 25.
    Sandman, Lars
    Linköping University, Department of Medical and Health Sciences, Division of Health Care Analysis. Linköping University, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences.
    The importance of being pregnant: On the healthcare need for uterus transplantation2018In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 32, no 8, p. 519-526Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Researchers have recently provided proof of concept for uterus transplantation, giving rise to a discussion about priority setting. This article analyses whether absolute uterine-factor infertility (AUFI), the main indication for uterus transplantation, gives rise to a healthcare need and the extent to which such a need places justified claims on public funding in a needs-based welfare system. It is argued that, regardless of the concept of health to which one subscribes, there is a healthcare need for uterus transplantation in women with AUFI. The provision of alternative ways of addressing this need, such as surrogacy and adoption, reduces its severity. Hence, where such alternatives are publicly funded, uterus transplantation is unlikely to become cost-effective. However, where surrogacy and adoption are not publicly funded, uterus transplantation should be given a similar priority level to other assisted reproductive technologies. In these circumstances, public funding for uterus transplants may well be justified, particularly in well-funded healthcare system with relatively generous cost-effectiveness thresholds.

    The full text will be freely available from 2020-10-15 11:32
  • 26.
    Sandman, Lars
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Medical and Health Sciences, Division of Health Care Analysis. Linköping University, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences.
    Liliemark, Jan
    Linköping University.
    Withholding and withdrawing treatment for cost-effectiveness reasons: Are they ethically on par?2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 33, no 2, p. 278-286Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In healthcare priority settings, early access to treatment before reimbursement decisions gives rise to problems of whether negative decisions for cost-effectiveness reasons should result in withdrawing treatment, already accessed by patients. Among professionals there seems to be a strong attitude to distinguish between withdrawing and withholding treatment, viewing the former as ethically worse. In this article the distinction between withdrawing and withholding treatment for reasons of cost effectiveness is explored by analysing the doing/allowing distinction, different theories of justice, consequentialist and virtue perspectives. The authors do not find any strong reasons for an intrinsic difference, but do find some reasons for a consequentialist difference, given present attitudes. However, overall, such a difference does not, all things considered, provide a convincing reason against withdrawal, given the greater consequentialist gain of using cost-effective treatment. As a result, patients should be properly informed when given early access to treatment, that such treatment can be later withdrawn following a negative reimbursement decision.

  • 27.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ought We to Enhance Our Cognitive Capacities?2009In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 23, no 7, p. 421-432Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ought we to enhance our cognitive capacities beyond the normal human range? There is no denying that it might be a good idea to level out differences between people with respect to cognitive capacities, and there is no denying that some persons' reaching beyond normal capacities may have some good side-effects on society at large (but also bad side-effects, of course). But is there any direct gain to be made by having ones cognitive capacities enhanced? Will this as such make our lives go better? No, I argue, or, at least, there doesn't seem to exist any evidence suggesting that it would. And it doesn't matter whether we consider the question from a narrow hedonistic perspective, from a more refined hedonistic perspective, from a desire-satisfaction view, or if we adopt some reasonable objective list view of what makes a life go well. Only on an extremely perfectionist — and implausible —view of what makes our lives go well could any direct value in cognitive enhancement find support. Finally, there are no good reasons to do with our sense of identity to enhance even our capacity to remember. So, cognitive enhancement as such would not make our lives go any better.

  • 28.
    Viberg, Jennifer
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Segerdahl, Pär
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Langenskiöld, Sophie
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Health Economics.
    Hansson, Mats G
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics.
    Freedom of Choice about Incidental Findings can frustrate participants’ true preferences2016In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 30, no 3, p. 203-209Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ethicists, regulators and researchers have struggled with the question of whether incidental findings in genomics studies should be disclosed to participants. In the ethical debate, a general consensus is that disclosed information should benefit participants. However, there is no agreement that genetic information will benefit participants, rather it may cause problems such as anxiety. One could get past this disagreement about disclosure of incidental findings by letting participants express their preferences in the consent form. We argue that this freedom of choice is problematic.

    In transferring the decision to participants, it is assumed that participants will understand what they decide about and that they will express what they truly want. However, psychological findings about people's reaction to probabilities and risk have been shown to involve both cognitive and emotional challenges. People change their attitude to risk depending on what is at stake. Their mood affects judgments and choices, and they over- and underestimate probabilities depending on whether they are low or high. Moreover, different framing of the options can steer people to a specific choice.

    Although it seems attractive to let participants express their preferences to incidental findings in the consent form, it is uncertain if this choice enables people to express what they truly prefer. In order to better understand the participants' preferences, we argue that future empirical work needs to confront the participant with the complexity of the uncertainty and the trade-offs that are connected with the uncertain predictive value of genetic risk information.

1 - 28 of 28
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