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  • 1.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Oxford, UK.
    Superiority in Value2005In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 123, no 1-2, p. 97-114Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Should the probabilities count?2012In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 159, no 2, p. 205-218Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers; rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery, or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a non-aggregating contractualist way. This paper expands the debate beyond well-known number cases to previously under-considered probability cases, in which not (only) the numbers of people, but (also) the probabilities of success for saving people vary. It is shown that, in these latter cases, both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion, which makes probabilities count in a problematic way. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well. Finally, it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases, it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified. This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a non-aggregating manner.

  • 3.
    Besson, Corine
    et al.
    University of London, UK.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    University of Oxford, UK; St Hilda’s College, Oxford, UK.
    The open future, bivalence and assertion2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 167, no 2, p. 251--271Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.

  • 4.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Good-making and organic unity2017In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 174, no 6, p. 1499-1516Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable wholes and it is suggested that we should distinguish between two kinds of wholes, collections and complex unities, where the latter can involve values that do not pass on their value to the greater whole in which they are included. Given this distinction we are then able to distinguish between two kinds of organic unity phenomena, the first involving a form of goodness that emerges on the level of the whole, the second involving a form of goodness that is embedded on the level of parts. In order to properly understand the latter form of goodness, there is also a need to distinguish final value from inherent value.

  • 5.
    Båve, Arvid
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?2009In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 145, no 2, p. 297-310Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).

  • 6.
    Cantwell, John
    Philosophy and History, KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy. Swedish Coll Adv Study, Thunbergsvagen 2, SE-75238 Uppsala, Sweden..
    Making sense of (in)determinate truth: the semantics of free variables2018In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 175, no 11, p. 2715-2741Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that truth value of a sentence containing free variables in a context of use (or the truth value of the proposition it expresses in a context of use), just as the reference of the free variables concerned, depends on the assumptions and posits given by the context. However, context may under-determine the reference of a free variable and the truth value of sentences in which it occurs. It is argued that in such cases a free variable has indeterminate reference and a sentence in which it occurs may have indeterminate truth value. On letting, say, x be such that x(2) = 4, the sentence 'Either x = 2 or x = -2' is true but the sentence 'x = 2' has an indeterminate truth value: it is determinate that the variable x refers to either 2 or -2, but it is indeterminate which of the two it refers to, as a result 'x = 2' has a truth value but its truth value is indeterminate. The semantic indeterminacy is analysed in a 'radically' supervaluational (or plurivaluational) semantic framework closely analogous to the treatment of vagueness in McGee and McLaughlin (South J Philos 33: 203-251, 1994, Linguist Philos 27: 123-136, 2004) and Smith (Vagueness and degrees of truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), which saves bivalence, the T-schema and the truth-functional analysis of the boolean connectives. It is shown that on such an analysis the modality 'determinately' is quite clearly not an epistemic modality, avoiding a potential objection raised by Williamson (Vagueness, Routledge, London, 1994) against such 'radically' supervaluational treatments of vagueness, and that determinate truth (rather than truth simpliciter) is the semantic value preserved in classically valid arguments. The analysis is contrasted with the epistemicist proposal of Breckenridge and Magidor (Philos Stud 158: 377-400, 2012) which implies that (in the given context) 'x = 2' has a determinate but unknowable truth value.

  • 7.
    Egeland, Jonathan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended2019In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 176, no 12, p. 3141-3158Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for mentalism, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon one's non-factive mental states, using Lehrer and Cohen's (Synthese 55(2):191-207, 1983) New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then asks whether you nevertheless have justification for your beliefs about the external world. Internalists and externalists agree that there is something that is epistemically good or valuable about both your actual beliefs and your beliefs in the demon scenario. Internalists claim that the epistemic property which these sets of beliefs share most intuitively should be thought of as sameness of justification. Externalists, on the other hand, reject this claim, usually either by challenging the internalist intuition directly, or by arguing that there is a more plausible way to think about the epistemic property in question. Recently, both kinds of externalist objection have been raised against the argument from the New Evil Demon Problem for mentalism. The goal of this paper is to defend the argument against three prominent objections-a pair of which is offered by Littlejohn (Can J Philos 39(3):399-434, 2009) and one by Williamson (in: Timmons M, Greco J, Mele A (eds.) Rationality and the good: critical essays on the ethics and epistemology of Robert Audi, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; in: Dutant J, Dohrn D (eds.) The new evil demon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016).

  • 8.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
    The Existence of PersonitesIn: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Eklund, Matti
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    What Vagueness Consists In2005In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 125, p. 27-60Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 10.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification2016In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 173, no 4, p. 1007-1030Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).

  • 11.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered2017In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 174, no 1, p. 219-236Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any coherent moral framework. I propose an impersonal population axiology to underpin the asymmetries, which sidesteps the problematic issue of whether or not people can be harmed or benefited by creation or non-creation. This axiology yields perfect asymmetry from a deliberative perspective, in terms of expected value. The axiology also yields substantial asymmetry for large and realistic populations in terms of their actual value, beyond deliberative relevance.

  • 12.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
    Coherence in epistemology and belief revision2006In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 128, no 1, p. 93-108Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to all beliefs in coherentist phrases such as all beliefs support each other have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, coherentists have to accept a weak version of epistemic priority, that sorts out merely derived beliefs. Furthermore, it is shown that in belief revision theory, coherence cannot be adequately represented by logical closure, but has to be represented separately.

  • 13.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Superseded Departments, History of Science and Technology.
    The modes of value (Decision theory)2001In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 104, no 1, p. 33-46Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Contrary to the received view, decision theory is not primarily devoted to instrumental (ends-to-means) reasoning. Instead, its major preoccupation is the derivation of ends from other ends. Given preferences over basic alternatives, it constructs preferences over alternatives that have been modified through the addition of value object modifiers (modes) that specify probability, uncertainty, distance in time etc. A typology of the decision-theoretical modes is offered. The modes do not have (even extrinsic) value, but they transform the value of objects to which they are applied. A rational agent's total set of preferences should be coherent, but from this it does not follow that her preferences over mode-containing objects have to be derivable from her preferences over mode-free objects.

  • 14.
    Huovinen, Erkki
    et al.
    University of Minnesota.
    Pontara, Tobias
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Musicology.
    Methodology in aesthetics: the case of musical expressivity2011In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 155, no 1, p. 45-64Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Hurtig, Kent
    University of Oxford.
    Internalism and accidie2006In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 129, no 3, p. 517-543Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Bernard Williams has famously argued that there are only ‘internal’ reasons for action.  Although Williams has produced several, slightly different versions of internalism over the years, one core idea has remained the same: the reasons a person has for acting must be essentially linked to, derived from, or in some other way connected to, that person’s ‘subjective motivational set’.  I have two aims in this paper.  First, after having cleared up some initial ambiguities, I try to show that both these interpretations are inadequate.  The first interpretation is incompatible with certain claims that supposedly provide the reasons why we should accept internalism in the first place.  The second interpretation faces other problems: given the essential link between reasons and motivation, this interpretation cannot adequately deal with the phenomenon of accidie.  Furthermore, those who subscribe to this interpretation of internalism are, on pain of inconsistency, forced to accept an implausible account of reasonable regret.

  • 16.
    Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen
    Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and IdeasUniversity of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.
    Epistemic modals and credal disagreement2015In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 172, no 4, p. 987-1011Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Considerations involving disagreement, as well as related considerations involving correction and retraction, have played an important role in recent debates about epistemic modals. For instance, it has been argued that contextualist views about epistemic modals have problems when it comes to explaining cases of disagreement. In response to these challenges, I explore the idea that the relevant cases of disagreement may involve credal disagreement. In a case of credal disagreement, the parties have different degrees of belief or credences. There does not have to be a difference in outright beliefs in order for the parties to disagree. I argue that the idea of credal disagreement allows us to make sense of otherwise problematic cases of disagreement involving epistemic modals. I also discuss how these ideas can be extended to cases of correction and retraction.

  • 17.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument2019In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the most influential arguments against compatibilism is Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Professor Plum, the main character of the thought experiment, is manipulated into doing what he does; he therefore supposedly lacks moral responsibility for his action. Since he is arguably analogous to an ordinary agent under determinism, Pereboom concludes that ordinary determined agents lack moral responsibility as well. I offer a hard-line reply to this argument, that is, a reply which denies that this kind of manipulation is responsibility undermining. I point out that fully fleshed-out manipulated characters in fiction can seem morally responsible for what they do. This is plausibly because we identify with such characters, and therefore focus on their options and the reasons for which they act rather than the manipulation. I further argue that we ought to focus this way when interacting with other agents. We have no reason to trust the incompatibilist intuitions that arise when we regard manipulated agents from a much more detached perspective.

  • 18.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The Agential Perspective: A Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument2019In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the most influential arguments against compatibilism is Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Professor Plum, the main character of the thought experiment, is manipulated into doing what he does; he therefore supposedly lacks moral responsibility for his action. Since he is arguably analogous to an ordinary agent under determinism, Pereboom concludes that ordinary determined agents lack moral responsibility as well. I offer a hard-line reply to this argument, that is, a reply which denies that this kind of manipulation is responsibility undermining. I point out that fully fleshed-out manipulated characters in fiction can seem morally responsible for what they do. This is plausibly because we identify with such characters, and therefore focus on their options and the reasons for which they act rather than the manipulation. I further argue that we ought to focus this way when interacting with other agents. We have no reason to trust the incompatibilist intuitions that arise when we regard manipulated agents from a much more detached perspective.

  • 19.
    Johansson, Jens
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Parfit on Fission2010In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 150, no 1, p. 21-35Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Parfit on Fission2009In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 150, no 1, p. 21-35Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about “fission.” One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper I shall provide a critique that does not rely on either of these contentions. There are other, interrelated reasons to reject Parfit’s defense of the two theses. In particular, the availability of the following view creates trouble for Parfit: I determinately survive fission, but it is indeterminate which fission product I am.

  • 21.
    Johansson, Jens
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Risberg, Olle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves2019In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Johansson, Jens
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Risberg, Olle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    The Preemption Problem2019In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 176, no 2, p. 351-365Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and that the preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account.

  • 23.
    Möller, Niklas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    All that jazz: linguistic competence and improvisation2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 167, no 2, p. 237-250Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, theorists have pointed to the role of improvisation in practical reasoning and in gaining new moral knowledge. Laura and Fran double dagger ois Schroeter have gone even further by suggesting an account of competence with evaluative terms based on holistic improvisation. I argue, however, that they fail in their task. Through a challenge of their key claim against Allan Gibbard's alternative account, I demonstrate that Schroeter and Schroeter provide only partial constraints on competence, and thus that their account lacks the content to provide an alternative to substantive accounts in metaethics such as minimalism and neo-descriptivism.

  • 24.
    Needham, Paul
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reduction and Emergence: A Critique of Kim2009In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 146, no 1, p. 93-116Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent critique of the doctrine of emergentism championed by its classic advocates up to C. D. Broad, Jaegwon Kim (Philosophical Studies 63:31–47, 1999) challenges their view about its applicability to the sciences and proposes a new account of how the opposing notion of reduction should be understood. Kim is critical of the classic conception advanced by Nagel and uses his new account in his criticism of emergentism. I question his claims about the successful reduction achieved in the sciences and argue that his new account has not improved on Nagel’s and that the critique of emergentism he bases on it is question-begging in important respects.

  • 25.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pragmatic Enrichment as Coherence Raising2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 168, no 1, p. 59-100Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the phenomenon of pragmatic enrichment, and has a proposal for predicting the occurrence of such enrichments. The idea is that an enrichment of an expressed content c occurs as a means of strengthening the coherence between c and a salient given content c’ of the context, whether c’ is given in discourse, as sentence parts, or through perception. After enrichment, a stronger coherence relation is instantiated than before enrichment. An idea of a strength scale of types of coherence relations is proposed and applied.

  • 26.
    Parry, Jonathan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Liability, community, and just conduct in war2015In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 172, no 12, p. 3133-3333Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Those of us who are not pacifists face an obvious challenge. Common-sense morality contains a stringent constraint on intentional killing, yet war involves homicide on a grand scale. If wars are to be morally justified, it needs be shown how this conflict can be reconciled. A major fault line running throughout the contemporary just war literature divides two approaches to attempting this reconciliation. On a ‘reductivist’ view, defended most prominently by Jeff McMahan, the conflict is largely illusory, since such killing can be justified by aggregating individuals’ ordinary permissions to use force in self- and other-defence. In opposition, a rival ‘nonreductivist’ approach holds that these considerations are insufficient for the task. One prominent version of non-reductivism grounds the permission to kill in combatants’ membership in certain kinds of group or association. The key claim is that participation in certain morally important relationships can provide an independent source of permission for killing in war. This paper argues that non-reductivism should be rejected. It does so by pushing a dilemma onto non-reductivists: if they are successful in showing that the relevant relationships can generate permissions to kill in war, they must also jettison the most intuitive restrictions on conduct in war—the constraint on intentionally killing morally innocent non-combatants most saliently. Since this conclusion is unacceptable, non-reductivism should be rejected.

  • 27. Peterson, Martin
    Indeterminate preferences2006In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 130, no 2, p. 297-320Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn's and Isaac Levi's arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz's recent criticism.

  • 28. Sharon, Assaf
    et al.
    Spectre, Levi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. The Open University of Israel, Israel.
    Evidence and the openness of knowledge2017In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 174, no 4, p. 1001-1037Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of evidential support is not closed under known entailment. Therefore the evidence-for relation is deductively open regardless of whether evidence is probabilistic or not. Given even a weak dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, we argue that empirical knowledge is also open. On this basis, we also respond to the strongest argument in support of knowledge closure (Hawthorne 2004a). Finally, we present a number of significant benefits of our position, namely, offering a unified explanation for a range of epistemological puzzles.

  • 29.
    Spectre, Levi
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Sharon, Assaf
    Mr. Magoo's Mistake2008In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, ISSN 0031-8116, Vol. 139, no 2, p. 289-306Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (namely, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.

  • 30.
    Spectre, Levi
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Sharon, Assaf
    Stanford University, Department of Philosophy .
    The Puzzle of Dogmatism Repuzzled2010In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 148, no 2, p. 307-321Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.

  • 31.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser2017In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 174, no 4, p. 853-859Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both these claims are false.

  • 32.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now2019In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 176, no 10, p. 2539-2550Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since (a) they construe consciousness as consisting (partly or wholly) in ‘‘relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time’’, whereas (b) consciousness is ‘‘concrete’’ and ‘‘here and now’’. Papineau defends instead a kind of ‘‘qualia theory’’ according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They (also) derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception.

  • 33.
    Tanyi, Attila
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Desires as additional reasons?: The case of tie-breaking2011In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 152, no 2, p. 209-227Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the two theses entail that desires are based on reasons, which they transmit but to which they cannot add. In the paper I deal with a counterexample to the second premise: tie-breaking desires. I first distinguish two interesting cases and argue that only the second challenges the premise. Then I move onto analyze this challenge by focusing on Ruth Chang's recent employment of it. I show that contrary to its counterintuitive appearance, the challenge can be sustained. However, I also argue that Chang overlooks the full potential of one particular response to the challenge: the introduction of higher-order reasons determining the normative significance of these desires. At the same time, I show that this response has a problem that Chang does not consider. As a result, the response can only partially disarm the challenge of tie-breaking desires; or not at all, depending on what significance we attribute to the counterexamples.

  • 34.
    Tersman, Folke
    Uppsala University, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Coherence and disagreement1992In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 65, no 3, p. 305-317Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 35.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie’s arguments from queerness2015In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 172, no 2, p. 347-357Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    If there is such a thing as objectively existing prescriptivity, as the moral realist claims, then we can also explain why — and we need not deny that — strong (conceptual) internalism is true. Strong conceptual internalism is true, not because of any belief in any magnetic force thought to be inherent in moral properties themselves, as Mackie argued, but because we do not allow that anyone has (in the practical sense) ‘accepted’ a normative claim, unless she is prepared to some extent to act on it (to see to it that it is satisfied).

  • 36.
    Zheng, YJ
    Linkoping Univ, Dept Philosophy, S-58183 Linkoping, Sweden.
    Akrasia, picoeconomics, and a rational reconstruction of judgment formation in dynamic choice2001In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 104, no 3, p. 227-251Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper contrasts a picoeconomic approach to the explanation of akrasia with Davidson's divided-mind approach and defends the former in a wider context. The distinctive merits of a picoeconomic model of mind lie in the following aspects: First, it relies on a scientifically well-grounded discovery about motivational dynamics of animals for its explanation of preference change, which elucidates or materializes some philosophers' speculations both about the possible mismatch between valuation and motivation and about the relevance of temporal factors to akrasia. Second, it grounds the necessity of endogenous higher-order constraints, expressible in forms of judgment, in an intrapersonal dynamic process of interactive first-order temporary preferences. Thus the motivational basis for the normative construction of the rationality of 'best judgment'c an also be illuminated with this model.

  • 37.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Communication and indexical reference2010In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 149, no 3, p. 355-366Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the debate over what determines the reference of an indexical expression on a given occasion of use, we can distinguish between two generic positions. According to the first, the reference is determined by internal factors, such as the speaker’s intentions. According to the second, the reference is determined by external factors, like conventions or what a competent and attentive audience would take the reference to be. It has recently been argued that the first position is untenable, since there are cases of mismatch where the intuitively correct reference differs from the one that would be determined by the relevant internal factors. The aim of this paper is to show that, contrary to this line of argument, it is the proponent of the second position that should be worried, since this position yields counterintuitive consequences regarding communicative success in cases of mismatch.

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