Change search
Refine search result
1 - 8 of 8
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1. Alger, I.
    et al.
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.). Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
    Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists2017In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 8, no 3, article id 38Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists, we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and, by a moralist, we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot.

  • 2. Asheim, G. B.
    et al.
    Voorneveld, M.
    Weibull, J. W.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
    Epistemically robust strategy subsets2016In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 7, no 4, article id 37Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Yi contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y-i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability.

  • 3.
    Aurell, Alexander
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.), Mathematical Statistics.
    Mean-Field Type Games between Two Players Driven by Backward Stochastic Differential Equations2018In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 9, no 5Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, mean-field type games between two players with backward stochastic dynamics are defined and studied. They make up a class of non-zero-sum, non-cooperating, differential games where the players’ state dynamics solve backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE) that depend on the marginal distributions of player states. Players try to minimize their individual cost functionals, also depending on the marginal state distributions. Under some regularity conditions, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria. Player behavior is illustrated by numerical examples, and is compared to a centrally planned solution where the social cost, the sum of playercosts, is minimized. The inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, compared to socially optimal behavior, is quantified by the so-called price of anarchy. Numerical simulations of the price of anarchy indicate how the improvement in social cost achievable by a central planner depends on problem parameters.

  • 4.
    Brännström, Åke
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics.
    Johansson, Jacob
    Lund University.
    von Festenberg, Niels
    The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Adaptive Dynamics2013In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, no 4, p. 304-328Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Adaptive dynamics is a mathematical framework for studying evolution. It extends evolutionary game theory to account for more realistic ecological dynamics and it can incorporate both frequency- and density-dependent selection. This is a practical guide to adaptive dynamics that aims to illustrate how the methodology can be applied to the study of specific systems. The theory is presented in detail for a single, monomorphic, asexually reproducing population. We explain the necessary terminology to understand the basic arguments in models based on adaptive dynamics, including invasion fitness, the selection gradient, pairwise invasibility plots (PIP), evolutionarily singular strategies, and the canonical equation. The presentation is supported with a worked-out example of evolution of arrival times in migratory birds. We show how the adaptive dynamics methodology can be extended to study evolution in polymorphic populations using trait evolution plots (TEPs). We give an overview of literature that generalises adaptive dynamics techniques to other scenarios, such as sexual, diploid populations, and spatially-structured populations. We conclude by discussing how adaptive dynamics relates to evolutionary game theory and how adaptive-dynamics techniques can be used in speciation research.

  • 5.
    Choutri, Salah eddine
    et al.
    KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.), Mathematical Statistics.
    Hamidou, Tembine
    A Stochastic Maximum Principle for Markov Chains of Mean-Field Type2018In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 9, no 4, article id 84Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We derive sufficient and necessary optimality conditions in terms of a stochastic maximum principle (SMP) for controls associated with cost functionals of mean-field type, under dynamics driven by a class of Markov chains of mean-field type which are pure jump processes obtained as solutions of a well-posed martingale problem. As an illustration, we apply the result to generic examples of control problems as well as some applications. 

  • 6.
    Coder Gylling, Kira
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics.
    Brännström, Åke
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics. Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria.
    Effects of Relatedness on the Evolution of Cooperation in Nonlinear Public Goods Games2018In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 9, no 4Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Evolution of cooperation has traditionally been studied by assuming that individuals adopt either of two pure strategies, to cooperate or defect. Recent work has considered continuous cooperative investments, turning full cooperation and full defection into two opposing ends of a spectrum and sometimes allowing for the emergence of the traditionally-studied pure strategies through evolutionary diversification. These studies have typically assumed a well-mixed population in which individuals are encountered with equal probability. Here, we allow for the possibility of assortative interactions by assuming that, with specified probabilities, an individual interacts with one or more other individuals of the same strategy. A closely related assumption has previously been made in evolutionary game theory and has been interpreted in terms of relatedness. We systematically study the effect of relatedness and find, among other conclusions, that the scope for evolutionary branching is reduced by either higher average degree of, or higher uncertainty in, relatedness with interaction partners. We also determine how different types of non-linear dependencies of benefits and costs constrain the types of evolutionary outcomes that can occur. While our results overall corroborate the conclusions of earlier studies, i.e. higher relatedness promotes the evolution of cooperation, our investigation gives a comprehensive picture of how relatedness affects the evolution of cooperation with continuous investments.

  • 7.
    Farjam, Mike
    et al.
    Linnaeus University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Social Studies.
    Mill, Wladislaw
    University Jena, Germany.
    Panganiban, Marian
    Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Germany.
    Ignorance Is Bliss, But for Whom? The Persistent Effect of Good Will on Cooperation2016In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 7, no 4, article id 33Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Who benefits from the ignorance of others? We address this question from the point of view of a policy maker who can induce some ignorance into a system of agents competing for resources. Evolutionary game theory shows that when unconditional cooperators or ignorant agents compete with defectors in two-strategy settings, unconditional cooperators get exploited and are rendered extinct. In contrast, conditional cooperators, by utilizing some kind of reciprocity, are able to survive and sustain cooperation when competing with defectors. We study how cooperation thrives in a three-strategy setting where there are unconditional cooperators, conditional cooperators and defectors. By means of simulation on various kinds of graphs, we show that conditional cooperators benefit from the existence of unconditional cooperators in the majority of cases. However, in worlds that make cooperation hard to evolve, defectors benef

  • 8.
    Realpe-Gómez, J.
    et al.
    Instituto de Matemáticas Aplicadas, Universidad de Cartagena, Bolívar, Colombia.
    Vilone, D.
    LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, National Research Council (CNR), Rome, Italy.
    Andrighetto, Giulia
    Mälardalen University, School of Education, Culture and Communication, Educational Sciences and Mathematics. LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, National Research Council (CNR), Rome, Italy.
    Nardin, L. G.
    Department of Informatics, Brandenburg University of Technology, Cottbus, Germany.
    Montoya, J. A.
    Instituto de Matemáticas Aplicadas, Universidad de Cartagena, Bolívar, 130001, Colombia.
    Learning dynamics and norm psychology supports human cooperation in a large-scale prisoner’s dilemma on networks2018In: Games, ISSN 2073-4336, E-ISSN 2073-4336, Vol. 9, no 4, article id 90Article in journal (Refereed)
1 - 8 of 8
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf