The belief that people are generally fair and trustworthy has generated plenty of scholarly attention in recent decades, particularly in the Scandinavian countries, which are often known for high levels of social trust. This article draws attention to the current discussion in the literature on whether social trust is a stable cultural trait marked by persistence or is based on experiences and subject to change throughout life. Based on unique longitudinal data from five different cohorts of young people in Sweden, ranging in age from 13 to 28 years, this article provides an empirical contribution on how social trust develops over time. The results show that there is a greater degree of instability in social trust between 13 and 15 years of age than in other age groups, and that social trust appears to stabilize with age. Findings also indicate that there are substantial inter-individual differences in social trust among young people within the same age group, both in initial levels and in the rates of change over time. The article concludes that although social trust is relatively stable it tends to crystallize in early adulthood, highlighting the relevance of the impressionable-years hypothesis.
Past research has shown that, although a majority of citizens in democracies support the idea of democracy as a form of governance, some tend to be distrustful of democratic institutions and express dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. It is argued in this article that to better understand the role of various groups of dissatisfied citizens in the democratic functioning of a society, one should examine their democratic characteristics. Based on youth's dissatisfaction with the performance of political institutions and the principles of democracy, four distinct groups of citizens are identified. These groups are then compared in terms of their political engagement, knowledge and interest, values and attitudes, and disposition to break the law. The results showed that youths with high levels of principle- and performance-driven dissatisfaction were less likely to participate in politics, less knowledgeable and interested in political issues, and more likely to break the law, even if people got hurt compared with other groups. In contrast, youths who were only dissatisfied with the performance of democratic institutions were more likely to participate in politics, and had higher tolerance towards immigrants, and political interest and knowledge. They were also more likely, peacefully and without harming other people, to break the law to change society. Overall, by examining distinct groups of dissatisfied citizens and their democratic characteristics, this study contributes to the general debate on the role of dissatisfied citizens in democracies.
Political participation is higher among men than women in most parts of the world. However, earlier research has shown that this does not hold true in Scandinavia, including Sweden, where gender differences are remarkably small. This article studies the causes of the Swedish situation. A conventional hypothesis is formulated based on research from other parts of the world. It assumes that gender-equal participation in Sweden can be explained by the lack of gender differences in certain political resource and motivational factors that are often analyzed. However, this hypothesis is not supported by the data, which instead indicates a female disadvantage with regard to both resources and motivation. Two alternative hypotheses are developed and shown as empirically viable. The first assumes that women more often adhere to norms that emphasize the importance of being politically active, which promotes their participation in politics. The second focuses on collective mobilization based on interests specific to women. In line with this hypothesis, only women are shown to be members of women's organizations and hold more radical opinions on issues related to gender equality and reproduction. These factors have a positive impact on women's participation, and together they explain a noticeable amount of the male advantage with regard to conventional explanatory factors. Therefore they are important contributory causes of gender-equal participation in Sweden, although other factors, not discussed here, also contribute. Quantitative methods are used in the analyses, and the study material is the 1997 Swedish Citizenship Survey.
This article presents survey results on Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians' perceptions concerning their influence over domestic decision making in European Union (EU) matters. In the literature the parliaments in Sweden and Finland are classified as powerful ones that can exert considerable influence over domestic EU policy making. Moreover, Finland and Sweden joined the EU at the same time. Therefore the overall expectation is that the parliaments should be equally powerful. However, the results from this survey indicate a significant difference in perceived influence between the two parliaments. It is obvious that Swedish parliamentarians perceive themselves as more marginalised in relation to the government than Finnish parliamentarians. After trying different explanations, it is concluded that the differences can be ascribed to the parliaments' different organisational set-ups for government oversight.
In this article we present survey results on the Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians' perceived influence over domestic decision-making in EU-matters. In the literature the parliaments in Sweden and Finland are classified as powerful parliaments that can exert considerable influence in the domestic EU policy-making. Moreover, Finland and Sweden joined the EU at the same time. Therefore the overall expectation is that the parliaments should be equally powerful. However, the results from our survey indicate a significant difference in perceived influence between the two parliaments. It is obvious that the Swedish parliamentarians perceive themselves as more marginalized in relation to the Government than the Finnish parliamentarians. After having tried different explanations we conclude that the differences can be ascribed to the parliaments' different organisational set-ups for the oversight of the Government.
The term ‘think tank’ represents a heterogeneous concept and is used to characterise a diverse group of organisations. This diversity also characterises the Swedish organisations and institutions that currently fall under the think tank umbrella. In the Swedish political context, most organisations known by the public and news media as think tanks are advocacy organisations with an unambiguous ideological and political profile. Further, during the last decade, we have seen a proliferation of independent, self‐declared think tanks with more specific policy agendas, such as the environment and health care. However, according to the broader understanding used in global rankings, the Swedish think tank landscape includes a range of research institutions in different policy areas. Some receive funding from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, corporations and private donors; others are government‐funded, with Stockholm's International Peace Research Institute as a prominent example. The aim of this article is to map the Swedish think tank landscape and its borders and analyse the roles of different types of think tanks in consensual or confrontational policymaking. Strategic differences among these types are related to historical background and funding. While government‐funded and some policy‐sector think tanks typically represent a tradition of consensual policymaking, those funded by the Corporation of Swedish Enterprise and other business interests represent a post‐corporatist development advocating neoliberal ideas and assuming a confrontational role in the expansion of private ownership and market solutions.
Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies into the framework of principal-agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.
Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies in the framework of principal-agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.
In this article, the aim is to enhance our understanding of who has power over leaderselection in political parties. To this end, we apply an analytical framework in which theselection process is divided into three phases: gatekeeping, preparation and decision.The focus is on determining the extent to which each of these phases is influential for theoutcome and thereby locating the distribution of intra‐party power. Underpinning theanalysis is the conviction that the comparison of leader selection is too limited if it reliessolely on information about formal procedures, including the composition of theselectorate. We should also take the preselection phase of leader selection into account.Empirically, we examine a sample of recent selection processes in Europeanparliamentary democracies. In contrast to previous research on intra‐party politics,which has suggested an ascendancy of the party in public office, our results suggest anenduring strength of the party on the ground and the party in the central office.
In this article, the aim is to enhance our understanding of who has power over leader selection in political parties. To this end, we apply an analytical framework in which the selection process is divided into three phases: gatekeeping, preparation and decision. The focus is on determining the extent to which each of these phases is influential for the outcome and thereby locating the distribution of intra-party power. Underpinning the analysis is the conviction that the comparison of leader selection is too limited if it relies solely on information about formal procedures, including the composition of the selectorate. We should also take the preselection phase of leader selection into account. Empirically, we examine a sample of recent selection processes in European parliamentary democracies. In contrast to previous research on intra-party politics, which has suggested an ascendancy of the party in public office, our results suggest an enduring strength of the party on the ground and the party in the central office.
When faced with organised racism, liberal democracies attempt to strike a balance between combating extremism and protecting core values such as freedom of association. Earlier research has argued that states that have experienced nondemocratic regime control in the twentieth century—either through a domestic takeover or a foreign occupation—are more likely to take a repressive approach to racist associations. In this study, I show that the previously overlooked Nordic region speaks against this explanation. Finland, which managed to avert a domestic authoritarian threat, is more repressive of racist associations than are the Scandinavian countries. The latter, two of which faced Nazi occupation, take a more liberal approach, which targets illegal actions rather than associations. These findings lead me to argue that the explanatory power of historical legacies cannot be reduced to a binary indicator such as nondemocratic regime control. I conclude by proposing a direction for future research on state repression of organised racism.
This article presents a framework for analysing party-organisational culture, with a special focus on the elite level. The framework is based on an interpretation of Mary Douglas’ Grid/Group model, and is empirically supported by an extensive study of the seven party groups in the Swedish parliament. The model identifies two fundamental cultural dimensions: the level of submission by individual group members to the group as a collectivity; and the principle that dictates the distribution of status and prestige within the party (a distribution here correlating with views on knowledge). The study shows that the parties distribute themselves on the cultural map in ways that do not coincide in any straightforward way with other well-known variables of party politics, such as ideology, origin or size. The methodological innovations presented in this article pave the way for a new framework for analysing party politics in which hitherto neglected aspects of party organisation are highlighted.
The article contributes to two central and interrelated discourses in welfare state theory and housing policy. One concerns the meaning of a ‘right to housing’, and the other concerns the meaning of the dichotomy ‘universal’–‘selective’ in housing policy. The right to housing is best seen as a political ‘marker of concern’ pointing out housing as an area for welfare state policy. The more precise meaning of the idea is always defined socially, in a specific national context of relations between state, citizen, and markets in housing provision. Two alternative interpretations of a right to housing are suggested, each related to a certain logic of housing provision. In a selective housing policy, the state provides a ‘protected’ complement to the general housing market, and the right to housing implies some legalistic minimum rights for households of lesser means. In a universal housing policy, the state provides correctives to the general housing market in order to make housing available to all types of households, and the right to housing is best seen as a social right in Marshall’s meaning of an obligation of the state towards society as a whole. The concepts of ‘universal’ and ‘selective’ may be applied to either the political discourse or the social outcome of policies. Furthermore, they may refer to different political levels (e.g. welfare state level, sector level, and policy instrument level). If the dichotomy is not specified in those two respects, the distinction between a universal and a selective policy will always be seriously blurred.
Trust is a crucial asset for any society, and the quest to generate and uphold trust is as crucial as ever. Several contemporary societal developments are proposed as being particularly challenging for upholding and restoring the levels of trust in society, including increasing ethnic diversity, rising inequality and the related geographical segregation. It has been convincingly argued that democratic institutions may generate trust by neutralizing some of these effects. This article explores how the mechanisms of trust differ in segregated, disadvantaged neighbourhoods as opposed to the surrounding general society. The empirical material consists of individual-level data from a segregated neighbourhood (Vivalla) in a medium-sized city in Sweden (Örebro), with a random sample from the population of the city (the Vivalla area excluded) as the comparison reference point, representing the general society. In the article we introduce perceived safety as an important mediator between trust in legal and government institutions and generalized trust, through which the differing mechanisms become evident. In the disadvantaged neighbourhood, we show that trust in government institutions has the function of primarily decreasing crime-related insecurity, which in its turn affects generalized trust. Thus, the relationship is indirect. In the city population, the effect instead goes directly from trust in government institutions to generalized trust. The results suggest that the potentials of different means to build and restore trust are dependent on local context.
In 1980, Sweden was a highly regulated economy with several state monopolies and low levels of economic freedom. Less than twenty years later, liberal reforms turned Sweden into one of the world's most open economies with a remarkable increase in economic freedom. While there is resilience when it comes to high levels of taxes and expenditure shares of GDP, there has been a profound restructuring of Sweden's economy in the 1980s and 1990s that previous studies have under-estimated. Furthermore, the degree of political consensus is striking, both regarding the welfare state expansions that characterized Sweden up to 1980, as well as the subsequent liberalizations. Since established theories have difficulties explaining institutional change, this article seeks to understand how the Swedish style of policy making produced this surprising political consensus on liberal reforms. It highlights the importance of three complementary factors: policy making in Sweden has always been influenced by, and intimately connected to, social science; government commissions have functioned as `early warning systems', pointing out future challenges and creating a common way to perceive problems; and, as a consequence, political consensus has evolved as a feature of Swedish style of policy making. The approach to policy making has been rationalistic, technocratic and pragmatic. The article concludes that the Swedish style of policy making not only explains the period of welfare state expansion - it is also applicable to the intense reform period of the 1980s and 1990s.
This article compares and analyzes voter turnout in the 2013 elections to the Sami parliaments in Norway and Sweden, using data from voter surveys. Is voting in these elections motivated by the same factors that explain turnout in national parliamentary elections? First, the study showed that a common election day for national and Sami elections is an important reason for the higher turnout in Norway. Second, involvement in Sami society was the most important factor for explaining turnout in both countries. General political resources and motivation had some explanatory power in Norway, but not in Sweden. This possibly reflects a more far-reaching difference between Sami politics in Norway and Sweden. In Norway, the Sami electorate seems to be more politically integrated in the national polity, and the institutional ties between Sami and national politics are stronger. This may be explained in part by the historical legacy of each state's policy.
Early in the twentieth century, parliamentary democracy developed within an 1809 constitution based on separation of powers. By the mid-1970s, the last remnants of this constitution had disappeared. After that, measures such as more openness in candidate nominations, positive preference voting and more scrutiny by parliamentarians were introduced to strengthen the democratic chain. But a weakening of political parties and an increased importance of external constraints are again moving Sweden towards a de facto separation-of-powers system. There is once again a considerable discrepancy between the written constitutional framework and the ‘working constitution’. In particular, local and supranational constraints on national policy making provide reason for a reconsideration of the constitutional framework.
European politics is still dominated by representative and parliamentary national systems of policy making. These systems can be seen as chains of political delegation from citizens through parliamentarians and executive office holders to civil servants. In these chains, a major trend for the past thirty years, and more strongly during the second half of that period, is a strengthening of agents’ accountability to the principals. But, simultaneously, citizens’ ability to exercise accountability through parliamentary democracy is eroding because of a decline in political party cohesion. Concurrently, constraints external to both the constitutional chain and political parties are growing stronger.The changes along these three dimensions lead to a situation in which democratic principals commonly decide more about less. Thus, while reforms have strengthened the constitutional parliamentary chain of governance, there is also an ongoing de-parliamentarisation of modern politics. The main motivation for this special issue is to investigate this general phenomenon through a set of focused case studies of the Nordic (here known as ‘Scandinavian’) countries. These analyses show important differences in how these trends have been manifest. In one country, Finland, the parliamentary chain has actually grown in strength and importance in the last decade.
European politics is still dominated by representative and parliamentary national systems of policy making. These systems can be seen as chains of political delegation from citizens through parliamentarians and executive office holders to civil servants. In these chains, a major trend for the past thirty years, and more strongly during the second half of that period, is a strengthening of agents’ accountability to the principals. But, simultaneously, citizens’ ability to exercise accountability through parliamentary democracy is eroding because of a decline in political party cohesion. Concurrently, constraints external to both the constitutional chain and political parties are growing stronger.
The changes along these three dimensions lead to a situation in which democratic principals commonly decide more about less. Thus, while reforms have strengthened the constitutional parliamentary chain of governance, there is also an ongoing de-parliamentarisation of modern politics. The main motivation for this special issue is to investigate this general phenomenon through a set of focused case studies of the Nordic (here known as ‘Scandinavian’) countries. These analyses show important differences in how these trends have been manifest. In one country, Finland, the parliamentary chain has actually grown in strength and importance in the last decade.
The power resource approach (PRA) claims that the labour movement continues to be the most prominent defender of the welfare state. The new politics thesis (NPT), on the other hand, claims that the welfare state has created new interest groups in the form of welfare clients whohave taken over as the most prominent welfare state upholders. In an attempt to empirically evaluate these claims, we present a study of the extent to which clients and the labour move-ment have been involved in protests against cutbacks in the Swedish sickness benefit from 2006 to 2019. The article contributes to the welfare state literature by studying a most likely case forPRA- style interest group mobilization both in terms of country (Sweden) and policy area (sickness insurance). It also tests the claim from PRA scholars that client interests are uncommon in these contexts. Our results show that protest engagement among client groups is greater thanthe engagement among the labour movement when looking at protests directed specifically against cuts in the sickness benefit programme. However, when broader protests against cut-backs in several transfer programmes are taken into account, the number of protests initiated by clients and by the labour movement is comparable. Overall, our results suggest that both the PRA and the NPT are needed to explain current developments in social democratic welfare states like Sweden
This article explores why supporters of small, non-established parties choose to vote for different parties in the elections to the European Parliament (EP) and elections to the national parliament. It uses individual-level data with open-ended questions from an online survey on supporters of Feminist Initiative (Fi) – a comparatively small and new Swedish feminist party – to map voters’ own motivations for split-ticket voting in the 2014 elections. Contrary to expectations based on second-order election theory, it is found that voters ticket-split in both directions: there are those voting for Fi in the EP election but not in the national election, and those voting for Fi in the national election but not in the EP election. These voters take the same types of considerations into account but nevertheless end up making opposite voting decisions. Voters clearly distinguish between the two levels – for example, by prioritizing different issues.
This article demonstrates the analytical advantages of studying not only the degree to which people oppose immigration in a country, but also the character of their opposition. Using Latent Class Analysis and data from the European Social Survey, Nordic patterns and trends are examined with the aim of identifying different kinds of immigration attitudes and how they develop in different national contexts. The Nordic countries are interesting to compare as, while they are similar in many respects, they also diverge significantly from each other in areas theoretically considered important to the formation of attitudes towards immigration. Studying the character of immigration opposition reveals five different types of immigration attitudes. These are differently distributed between the Nordic countries as well as over time, and include nativist opposition (opposition only towards immigrants of ethnic/racial groups other than that of the majority population) and economic opposition (opposition that entails a separation between immigrants considered to be an economic resource and an economic burden). By demonstrating how immigration opposition in the Nordic countries varies not only in degree but also in character, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of the nature of immigration opposition as well as of how different attitudinal profiles evolve under different contextual circumstances.
With the increased electoral success of anti-immigration parties, questions regarding whatimpact the parties actually have naturally follow. Previous research has rarely explored thisquestion. Furthermore, within this body of research, one is given different answers. While someargue that anti-immigration parties have made an impact on public policy, others find no suchevidence. This article shows that some of this inconsistency is a consequence of the method-ological strategies that have been employed. Previous studies are either single case studies orcomparisons of a small number of countries. Consequently, different parties in different insti-tutional settings are compared, making it difficult to estimate the actual impact of the party ofinterest. In order to circumvent such methodological problems, this article explores the ques-tion of anti-immigration party impact on a local level and asks if the Sweden Democrats (SD)have managed to influence decisions on refugee reception in Swedish municipalities. Theanalysis shows mixed results. First, while unable to find an independent effect of the size ofthe representation of the SD, it appears that the party’s impact is conditioned by them holdingthe balance of power. Second, the SD’s impact is not dependent upon whether there isright-wing or left-wing rule, although local migration policy is stricter when the main right-wingparty has strong support.
Junior partners in a coalition government are torn between an eagerness to profile themselves, and to show loyalty to the coalition. We investigate when, how and why junior coalition parties affect foreign policy and profile themselves despite demands for national unity. We study two Swedish centre-right governments in 2006–2010 and 2010–2014. The parties' foreign policy positions in election manifestos are compared to the foreign policy positions presented in the joint Alliance manifesto and yearly government declarations. An explorative analysis of possible explanations for junior parties' influence is based on elite interviews. The results indicate that junior coalition parties might influence the foreign policy in symbolic value related issues, but less so in issues with real policy implications. Our analysis reveals the importance of the leading member of the coalition and how junior parties converge over time towards the position of the senior coalition member.
Accountability processes after crisis events sometimes entail harsh criticism from public and political players alike, forcing cabinet ministers to be on top of the political game and sometimes even resign. However, harsh accountability processes are just as likely to leave ministers undamaged. This article combines two existing theories that propose different factors to account for variation in outcomes: ministerial resignations as a consequence of cabinet formation and individual positions; or resignations as a result of blame management strategies involving individual actors within the cabinet and beyond. Ten crisis episodes in Sweden are analysed and compared. The findings suggest that individual political power bases and experience matter to how well blame management strategies can be employed, while the composition of the government gives structural constraints. The dynamic interplay and framing battle between incumbent decision makers, and external arenas and the skill with which individual ministers engage and frame responsibility, play a key role in determining their post-crisis careers.
Rational choice accounts of political participation identify two major solutions to “the paradox of participation” — collective incentives and selective incentives. Prior findings regarding the viability of these solutions are seemingly inconclusive and contradictory. In our view, one important reason for this is that the applicability of these solutions varies across participatory modes. In this paper, we make a first attempt to develop a theoretical answer to the question of why this may be the case. We then test our predictions across four different modes of participation, using longitudinal data that eliminate or reduce the biases inherent in cross-sectional designs. Our results show different types of incentives to strike with distinctly variable force across different modes of participation. Most importantly, we find that whereas electoral modes of participation (voting and party activity) are affected by selective incentives only, the non-electoral modes (contacting and manifestations) are the consequence of both collective and selective incentives.
Rational choice accounts of political participation identify two major solutions to 'the paradox of participation': collective incentives and selective incentives. Prior findings regarding the viability of these solutions are seemingly inconclusive and contradictory. One important reason for this could be that the applicability of these solutions varies across participatory modes. In this article, a first attempt is made to develop a theoretical answer to the question of why this may be the case. The predictions are then tested across four different modes of participation, using longitudinal data that eliminate or reduce the biases inherent in cross-sectional designs. The results show different types of incentives to strike with distinctly variable force across different modes of participation. Most importantly, whereas electoral modes of participation (voting and party activity) are affected by selective incentives only, the non-electoral modes (contacting and manifestations) are the consequence of both collective and selective incentives.
Despite almost unanimous adherence to the principle of gender equality in contemporary Denmark, a society with a long historical record of gender equality policies and almost 40 percent women in parliament, are there still divergences to be found among the members of parliament concerning gender equality principles and policies? This article argues that in order to identify underlying cleavages it is necessary to pose fundamental questions that go beyond the day-to-day disagreements on policy issues. Based on a new survey of the members of the Danish parliament, this study finds that the support for gender equality is not just a matter of lip service insofar as few MPs hold traditionalist views on women. However, the study reveals conflicting perceptions, left-right cleavages and gender gaps, sometimes also within the parties. A new discourse is identified, supported by a large minority that includes all of the male MPs from the four right-wing parties; this minority considers gender equality to be a closed case' - that is, as having by and large been achieved. This may provide clues to the puzzle of the stagnation in gender equality reforms in spite of the general support for gender equality'. The article discusses the possible connection between the closed case' discourse, present neoliberal trends in society and the recent construction of gender equality as an intrinsic Danish value' - an argument familiar in other countries with a harsh debate over immigration.
Official declarations state that Sweden is today a multicultural society. At the same time, ethnic hierarchies have become increasingly conspicuous in contemporary Sweden. Recently, a governmental inquiry on structural discrimination in Swedish society presented a report analysing the relationship between the multi-ethnic composition of the Swedish population and participation in Swedish politics. This article discusses some of the main findings of the report. On the basis of a number of case studies, it illustrates how inequalities in terms of participation and influence in Swedish politics are (re)produced. One of the main conclusions drawn in the article is that all citizens that participate in Swedish politics are faced with a series of routines, conventions and idea(l)s categorising citizens according to their perceived closeness to a Swedish `normality'. Thus, democracy not only constitutes a formalised system of impartial procedures and conventions, routines and norms that regulate the political process in a way that guarantees freedom and equality to all participants. Rather, political participation also reflects exclusionary practices long well-documented in, for example, the housing and labour markets. In order to understand these practices, it is necessary to examine the historical interconnections between nationalism and democracy. By means of the recurrent characterisation of Swedish democracy as specifically Swedish, it becomes the job of Swedes to `enlighten' the `immigrants' to become `Swedish democrats'. This specific conceptualisation of democracy is founded on the ideal of an archaic national community, which in contemporary multi-ethnic Sweden is not capable of including the whole population on equal terms.
Official declarations state that Sweden is today a multicultural society. At the same time, ethnichierarchies have become increasingly conspicuous in contemporary Sweden. Recently, a governmentalinquiry on structural discrimination in Swedish society presented a report analysing therelationship between the multi-ethnic composition of the Swedish population and participationin Swedish politics. This article discusses some of the main findings of the report. On the basisof a number of case studies, it illustrates how inequalities in terms of participation and influencein Swedish politics are (re)produced. One of the main conclusions drawn in the article is that allcitizens that participate in Swedish politics are faced with a series of routines, conventions and idea(l)scategorising citizens according to their perceived closeness to a Swedish ‘normality’. Thus, democracynot only constitutes a formalised system of impartial procedures and conventions, routines andnorms that regulate the political process in a way that guarantees freedom and equality to allparticipants. Rather, political participation also reflects exclusionary practices long well-documentedin, for example, the housing and labour markets. In order to understand these practices, itis necessary to examine the historical interconnections betweennationalismanddemocracy. Bymeans of the recurrent characterisation of Swedish democracy as specifically Swedish, it becomesthe job of Swedes to ‘enlighten’ the ‘immigrants’ to become ‘Swedish democrats’. This specificconceptualisation of democracy is founded on the ideal of an archaic national community, whichin contemporary multi-ethnic Sweden is not capable of including the whole population on equal terms.
This article studies recent trends in the composition and uses of Swedish commissions of inquiry in preparing policy for the government. For much of the 20th century, commissions with representatives of major parliamentary parties and other policy stakeholders served as an arena of negotiation and compromise between the government, the opposition parties, and organised interests. Drawing on a unique data set of 2,087 commissions appointed between 1990 and 2016, we show that their representativeness has declined significantly. We also document a significant decrease in the inclusion of politicians and an increase in the presence of civil servants. Governments have also increased their control over commissions by issuing more directives. We further document a dramatic decline of reservations and dissenting opinions in the commission reports. This may be due to a combination of including fewer potentially dissenting voices and restricting commissions' scope. We conclude that commissions are no longer the arenas of compromise-seeking that they were for most of the 20th century.
This article uses social network data to study the integration of local elites in four Swedish municipalities. Four research questions are asked. First: How integrated are the elites? While the results modify the picture that there are two rather distinct elites in Sweden - that is, a political elite dominated by the labour movement and an economic elite dominated by business and the large business organizations - it is interesting to note that integration between elite spheres is lowest for the relation between politicians and business representatives. To a considerable degree, integration between political and economic elites is indirect, mediated through the administrative elite. The second question is: Are the inner elite circles dominated by the political, economic or administrative elite? The study indicates that local elites in Sweden are strongly dominated by political elites, and also by administrative elites. This is reassuring, since it would indicate a democratic deficit if the structural power of decision making in municipalities resided predominantly in economic actors and administrators. The third question is: What is the role of friendship relations in creating elite integration? The study indicates that private relations among elites both reinforce professional networks and extend them in important ways. The final question is: Is elite integration contingent on political stability and/or the structure of local business? The results are surprisingly stable across the four municipalities, even though the largest distinction was found between elite core and periphery in the politically most stable municipality, which was also the one with the lowest economic diversity.
The point of departure for this paper is US evidence claiming that citizens do not possess an adequate understanding of the concept of progressive taxation. Using the format of standard survey questions, most respondents preferred progressive taxes. When faced with similar questions framed in concrete terms, a majority rejected progressive taxes. By analysing data from Sweden, it is shown that irrespective of whether abstract or concrete measures are applied, most citizens support progressive taxation. There is no evidence indicating that Swedes in general do not understand the concept of progressive taxation. To explain why US citizens are more ignorant about progressive taxation than Swedish citizens, it is suggested that the Swedish welfare state institutions and the surrounding political environment may be exercising a substantially stronger educational influence on the meaning of redistributive concepts.
Claims have been raised from different perspectives that the welfare state suffers from eroding public support. From an examination of public attitudes towards taxation in Sweden by utilising survey data spanning the period 1981-1997, it is concluded that no long-term trend of increased tax discontent can be distinguished. There are, however, some indications that discontent with taxation has increased during the most recent years. Social conflicts over the preferred distribution and levels of taxes vary in intensity over time, but are foremost structured by class, income, and, to a lesser extent, sector of employment. It is argued that the observed attitude patterns can to some extent be understood as responses to changes in lax and welfare policy.
This article examines the occurrence of political non-attitudes in Sweden and identifies the population segment possessing a 'something for nothing' (SFN) mentality regarding social spending. Sweden – often regarded as epitomizing the advanced welfare state – constitutes an ananalytically interesting case, providing a useful counterpoint to the predominantly American based evidence on the subject. It is argued here that national political institutions fundamentally affect the prevalence – and social base – of the SFN segment. To identify SFN sentiments, two question batteries measuring social spending preferences are used. One battery contains 'priced' items emphasizing the cost of public spending, while the other set of 'unpriced' items does not explicitly connect increased public spending with increased taxes. The patterning of attitudes across these items is explored in order to determine whether SFN sentiments are common in the Swedish electorate. The observed attitude patterns are then linked to broader sets of attitudes to the welfare state, testing whether the degree of ideological coherence differs fundamentally between the SFN segment and other groups. The analysis then explores the individual-level determinants associated with different attitude patterns. The overall results show that: SFN sentiments are not dominant among the Swedish citizenry; the quality of the SFN segment’s belief system, in terms of ideological coherence, does not represent a deviant case; and the background characteristics associated with SFN sentiments suggest that members of this segment should rather be viewed as free riders in economically vulnerable positions than ignorant and politically confused citizens.
Restructuring of central and local government relations has occurred in a number of countries during the 1980s, and has been a striking phenomenon even in such different countries as Poland, Sweden and the US. In the first part of the article a resource framework is presented, designed to make basic comparisons of these relations between different countries. Five sets of resources are identified: constitutional-legal, regulatory, financial, political and professional resources. It is argued that local-government disposal of such resources provides a potential for local discretion. The applicability of the framework is illustrated by reference to a study of Poland, Sweden and the US, focusing on the restructuring of central and local government relations in these countries during the 1980s. The conclusion is that decentralization has occurred in all three cases, especially in terms of regulatory and other non-financial resources. However, in Sweden and the US this trend has been counterbalanced by centralization of financial control. In Poland the post-communist revolution has paved the way for a restoration of the pre-war local self-government system. Democratic elections at the local level are seen as crucial to break down the old, centralized party-state system, and to reintroduce a dual local government system. In all three cases economic pressure, related to the individual countries' positions in the world capitalist system, seems to have been the main driving force beind the decentralization processes. However, the forms, magnitude and effects of decentralization must be seen in relation to the specific political economies and histories of the three countries. Thus, to understand the causes, mechanisms and effects of central–local government restructuring in depth one has to relate the resource approach to a broader theoretical framework.
Recent developments in Swedish local government and central-local government relations have been characterized by re-regulation and cut-back strategies on the one hand and decentralization and deregulation on the other. In this article these developments are analysed as a dynamic process with contradictory features. Swedish society is becoming more and more differentiated and specialized with fewer mechanisms of collective socialization, but with more economic and strategic calculations on the part of central and local authorities, interest organizations and individuals. New formal rules are developed in order to handle conflicts and enhance public sector legitimacy. In the communes we can identify an ideological shift from viewing the commune as a political institution to regarding it as a service-producing company. In addition, citizens are increasingly looked upon as individual consumers rather than political citizens. Corresponding organizational solutions such as depoliticization, privatization and freedom of choice have been developed. However, as a reaction to communal consumerism there is also a growing interest in communitarian values. There is an increasing number of examples of people participating in matters of common nature and expressing their belonging to a community. An interesting question for future research is whether the observed contradictory tendencies will increase or decrease the legitimacy of the traditional democratic institutions at the communal level.
Under what conditions are quests for secession successful? Current debates in Scandinavia on the appropriate size of municipalities are taken as a point of departure for answering this question. I set out to analyse what processes are triggered through mergers of small political units into larger ones. The Swedish experience is analysed as an empirical illustration. A game-theoretical model is constructed, in which I highlight questions of ideology, power and strategy when analysing secessions. I conclude that mergers, such as those in Sweden between 1952 and 1974, create a built-in conflict in the larger unit. Certain geographical parts of the political unit get the worst of it in a conflict concerning resources, which will create tension based on geographical location. If these conflicts are not solved, questions of secession will inevitably be raised. In the Swedish context the law is phrased in such a way that the government decides whether or not secession will be allowed. The game-theoretical model therefore suggests that campaigns for secession will be successful if the seceding part (SP) (a) meets the required physical criteria (which concern size and financial predisposition), (b) the quest for secession enjoys strong public support and (c) the party in government takes a benevolent view of municipality separations.
In the beginning of 2007, the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities (CPSR) presented its final report on the future organization of the intermediate level of government in Sweden. The CPSR, which consisted of representatives from all parties in parliament, recommended replacing the existing structure of 20 county councils with six to nine regional municipalities. The committee's proposal is paradoxical in light of the resistance to regions that exists within the country's two largest parties: the Social Democrats and the Moderates. The purpose of this article is to describe and explain the CPSR's unanimous proposal to establish regional municipalities despite this resistance. How was it possible to achieve a unanimous proposal? In order to explain this paradox, I use the multi-level party' theoretical approach. The empirical study, consisting of a qualitative case study of the actions of the Moderates and the Social Democrats on territorial policy, supports this theoretical construct. It is evident from the empirical record that groups within the parties had different views about territorial policy. Within the CPSR, the advocates for regions took control, which made a unanimous proposal possible. The research findings improve our understanding of party organization in a polity characterized by multilevel governance. When the central level delegates more power and responsibility to subnational levels, the balance of power within parties changes. New regional and local elites arise, which makes it possible for a single party to communicate different messages on territorial policy depending on which group is in charge within a particular arena.
Soft law, or non-legislative modes of policy making, is becoming increasingly common today. The Nordic countries have a long tradition soft law, not least in central–local relations, where non-binding agreements are frequently used to coordinate policies. A key question springing from soft law theory is that of compliance. Why do independent actors comply if they are not formally obliged to do so, and what happens if they do not comply? This article addresses the question of how compliance can be achieved during policy conflict between actors at different governing levels by investigating a case of health care reform in Sweden. An important finding in the study is that compliance was reached ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. The central government resorted to the threat of regular legislation to force the county councils to comply. This finding points to the fact that sanctions and the presence of a hierarchical order may play an important role even in soft law governance. The study also shows that an additional important reason that the voluntary agreement between the county councils and central government was honoured in the end by both parties can be attributed to the efforts of a mediating actor: the organization representing the county councils in their negotiations with the government. Finally, the study also illustrates how various forms of informal social pressures such as shaming, peer pressure and moral responsibility can help enforce local compliance in a case of open policy conflict. Arguably, all these compliance mechanisms also have relevance outside the Nordic setting.