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  • 1.
    Allansson, Marie
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala Univ, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala, Sweden..
    Melander, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala Univ, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala, Sweden..
    Themnér, Lotta
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala Univ, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala, Sweden..
    Organized violence, 1989-20162017In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 54, no 4, p. 574-587Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The dramatic increase in the number of fatalities in organized violence, seen between 2011 and 2014, did not continue in 2015 and 2016. Rather, the notation of some 131,000 fatalities in 2014 was followed by a steep decline, with just below 119,000 in 2015 and a little over 102,000 fatalities in 2016. Despite the decrease, the number was the fifth highest during the entire 1989-2016 period. Most of the fatalities - over 87,000 - were incurred in state-based conflicts, the main driver behind the trend. Just as the number of fatalities, the number of state-based conflicts, albeit remaining on a high level, continued to decrease in 2016, going from 52 to 49, with 12 of them reaching the level of war, with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. Also the non-state conflicts dropped in number in 2016, from 73 to 60. This was followed by a decrease in the number of fatalities, and only one conflict caused more than 1,000 deaths. Twenty-one actors were registered in one-sided violence, down by five from 2015. A number this low has only been recorded twice before; in both 2009 and 2010, 21 one-sided actors were listed in UCDP data. The number of fatalities also decreased, going from almost 9,800 to a little over 6,000.

  • 2.
    Amer, Ramses
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The Resolution of the Cambodian Conflict: Assessing the Explanatory Value of Zartman's ‘Ripeness Theory'2007In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 44Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Amer, Ramses
    Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning, Uppsala universitet.
    The United Nations’ Reactions to Foreign Military Interventions1994In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 31, no 4, p. 425-444Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study investigates how the United Nations (UN) has reacted to foreign military interventions. The term foreign military intervention is defined and criteria for the selection of cases are formulated, resulting in the selection of seven foreign military interventions: Vietnam in Kampuchea, Tanzania in Uganda, France in the Central African Empire (CAE), the USSR in Afghanistan, the USA and several Caribbean states in Grenada, the USA in Panama, and Iraq in Kuwait. The relevant provisions of the Charter of the UN are presented and interpretations of Article 2(4) and Article 51 are made for the purpose of this study. This is followed by an examination of the UN reactions to the seven cases through the Security Council's and the General Assembly's responses to the interventions. The reactions are categorized as active (Kuwait), extensive (Kampuchea and Afghanistan), single (Grenada and Panama), and no reaction (Uganda and the CAE). The next step of the analysis is the formulation of a Hypothesis. This is done from a legal and normative approach to explaining the UN reactions. The Hypothesis is operationalized and tested through the formulation of two specifications. The result of this testing is that the Hypothesis has been found untenable. This indicates that the Charter is not the sole factor guiding and generating the UN reactions to foreign military interventions. The study also shows that there is a basis for arguing that the UN reactions to the seven cases were not consistent.

  • 4.
    Andersson, Irene
    Malmö högskola, School of Teacher Education (LUT), Individual and Society (IS).
    Women's Unarmed Uprising Against War: A Swedish Peace Protest in 19352003In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 40, no 4, p. 395-412Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    During the summer of 1935, approximately 20,000 Swedish women mobilized in a peaceful action - the Women's Unarmed Uprising Against War. The manifestation was a protest against rearmament and, in particular, against a militarization of everyday life that might result from a civil defense buildup. Thus, in a spirit of solidarity; women were encouraged to refuse to use gas masks or evacuate into cellars and air-raid shelters in the event of an air raid. Only then would men realize their responsibility; lay down their weapons, and solve the conflict at the negotiating table, the action was connected to a radical pacifistic tradition in which male conscientious objectors, among others, and the example of Gandhi were prominent. Liberal and Social Democrat women and members of the Swedish section of the Women?s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) carried out the action. The action was formulated in such a manner that women across the country were asked to vote for those who could serve in a women?s parliament. The goal was to create an international uprising among women by influencing the League of Nations? delegates and the women?s organizations in Geneva. In the same year, the central body of WILPF had decided to support an international peace plan, the People?s Mandate to End War. The mandate's aim was to present demands for disarmament to governments in different countries. This article examines why the Swedish women assumed a more radical position than that stated in the people?s mandate; what kinds of peace efforts in Sweden made such a radical, pacifistic women?s action possible; and what went on when the initiators attempted to influence WILPF, on an international level, into incorporating the radical protest into the people?s mandate campaign.

  • 5.
    Bara, Corinne
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Incentives and Opportunities: A Complexity-oriented Explanation of Violent Ethnic Conflict2014In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 51, no 6, p. 696-710Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Existing research on the causes of violent ethnic conflict is characterized by an enduring debate on whether theseconflicts are the result of deeply felt grievances or the product of an opportunity structure in which rebellion isan attractive and/or viable option. This article argues that the question of whether incentive- or opportunity-based explanations of conflict have more explanatory power is fundamentally misguided, as conflict is more likelythe result of a complex interaction of both. The fact is, however, that there is little generalized knowledge about theseinteractions. This study aims to fill this gap and applies crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in order toidentify constellations of risk factors that are conducive to ethnic conflict. The results demonstrate the explanatoryleverage gained by taking causal complexity in the form of risk patterns into account. It takes no more than fourdifferent configurations of a total of eight conditions to reliably explain almost two-thirds of all ethnic conflict onsetsbetween 1990 and 2009. Moreover, these four configurations are quasi-sufficient for onset, leading to conflictin 88% of all cases covered. The QCA model generated in this article also fares well in predicting conflictsin-sample and out-of-sample, with the in-sample predictions being more precise than those generated by a simplebinary logistic regression.

  • 6. Birch, Sarah
    et al.
    Daxecker, Ursula E
    Höglund, Kristine
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Electoral violence: An introduction2020In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 57, no 1, p. 3-14Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Elections are held in nearly all countries in the contemporary world. Yet despite their aim of allowing for peacefultransfers of power, elections held outside of consolidated democracies are often accompanied by substantial violence.This special issue introduction article establishes electoral violence as a subtype of political violence with distinctanalytical and empirical dynamics. We highlight how electoral violence is distinct from other types of organizedviolence, but also how it is qualitatively different from nonviolent electoral manipulation. The article then surveyswhat we have learned about the causes and consequences of electoral violence, identifies important research gaps inthe literature, and proceeds to discuss the articles included in the special issue. The contributions advance research infour domains: the micro-level targeting and consequences of electoral violence, the institutional foundations ofelectoral violence, the conditions leading to high-stakes elections, and electoral violence in the context of other formsof organized violence. The individual articles are methodologically and geographically diverse, encompassing ethnography,survey vignette and list experiments and survey data, quantitative analyses of subnational and crossnationalevent data, and spanning Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

  • 7.
    Bjarnegård, Elin
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.
    Brounéus, Karen
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Melander, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Honor and Political Violence: Micro-level findings from a Survey in Thailand2017In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 54, no 6, p. 748-761Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Who participates in political violence? In this study, we investigate the issue at the micro-level, comparing individuals who have used violence in political uprising with those who have not. We develop our argument from the observation that men are strongly overrepresented in political violence, although most men do not participate. Literature on masculinities emphasizes the role of honor and its links to different forms of violence, such as domestic abuse, criminal violence, and violent attitudes. Building on this literature, we discern two separate but related aspects of honor: honor as male societal privilege and control over female sexuality, i.e., patriarchal values, and honor as ideals of masculine toughness, i.e., the perceived necessity for men to be fierce and respond to affronts with violence or threats of violence in order to preserve status. We argue that patriarchal values combined with ideals of masculine toughness together constitute honor ideology, which contributes in turn to the explanation of who participates in political violence. We present new and unique individual-level survey data on these issues, collected in Thailand. We find that honor ideology strongly and robustly predicts a higher likelihood of participating in political violence among male political activists. A number of previous studies find a macro-level relationship between gender equality and peacefulness in a society. This study provides evidence for one micro-level mechanism linking gender equality and political violence at the macro-level. Based on these results, we conclude that honor ideology endorsement is a driver of violence in political conflicts.

  • 8.
    Brosché, Johan
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Höglund, Kristine
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia2020In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 57, no 1, p. 111-125Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn violent in some countries but not in others? Thisarticle places legacies from the authoritarian past at the core of an explanation of when democratic openings becomeassociated with electoral violence in multi-ethnic states, and complement existing research focused on the immediateconditions surrounding the elections. We argue that authoritarian rule characterized by more exclusionary multiethniccoalitions creates legacies that amplify the risk of violent elections during the shift to multiparty politics.Through competitive and fragmented interethnic relations, exclusionary systems foreclose the forging of cross-ethnicelite coalitions and make hostile narratives a powerful tool for political mobilization. By contrast, regimes with abroad-based ethnic support base cultivate inclusive inter-elite bargaining, enable cross-ethnic coalitions, and reduceincentives for hostile ethnic mobilization, which lower the risk of violent elections. We explore this argument bycomparing founding elections in Zambia (1991), which were largely peaceful, and Kenya (1992), with large-scalestate-instigated electoral violence along ethnic lines. The analysis suggests that the type of authoritarian rule createdpolitical legacies that underpinned political competition and mobilization during the first multiparty elections, andmade violence a more viable electoral strategy in Kenya than in Zambia.

  • 9.
    Burns, Tom R
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology.
    Buckley, Walter
    University of Hampshire.
    The Prisoners Dilemma Game as a System of Social Domination1964In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 221-228Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 10. Cil, Deniz
    et al.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Hultman, Lisa
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Nilsson, Desirée
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Mapping Blue Helmets: Introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset2019In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Dafoe, Allan
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Kelsey, Nina
    Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms2014In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 51, no 5, p. 619-633Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Countries with open capital markets tend to have fewer militarized disputes and wars. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer propose that this association arises from the enhanced ability of states with open capital markets to credibly signal resolve through the bearing of economic costs ex ante to militarized escalation. We test this causal mechanism by qualitatively examining six crucial cases in which the mechanism is most likely to be operative and observable. We employ a formal case selection strategy designed to yield cases with high inferential leverage for our confirmatory test and to select cases for an exploratory analysis of scope conditions. Through analysis of media reports, government documents, and other sources, we evaluate the extent to which relevant individuals drew the appropriate inferences about market-mediated costs and resolve. We conclude that while market-mediated signaling may operate in major conflicts, it is unlikely to account for much of the association between capital openness and peace. Exploratory analysis of our cases identifies potential scope conditions, clarifies the role of different signaling mechanisms, and suggests other explanations for the peaceful behavior of countries with open capital markets.

  • 12. de Soysa, Indra
    et al.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Is the hidden hand an iron fist?: Capitalism and civil peace, 1970-20052010In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 47, no 3, p. 287-298Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There is surprisingly little empirical scholarship on the spread of capitalistic economic policies under the rubric of 'globalization' and domestic peace. While the classical liberals saw free markets leading to social harmony because of self-interest of individuals, who cooperate for profit, Marxists and others viewed markets as anarchical, requiring state intervention for obtaining justice and peace. The authors argue from an opportunity-cost perspective that the payoffs to rebellion are structured by how an economy is governed. Closed economies are likelier than more open ones to accumulate 'rebellion specific capital' because of high payoffs to organization in the shadows. Using an index of economic freedom that measures how free people are to transact in an economy, the authors find that countries more favorable to free enterprise have a reduced risk of civil war onsets, a result that is robust to the inclusion of institutional quality, per capita wealth, and sundry controls. The results hold up despite a battery of specification changes, alternative data, and testing methods. The findings do not suggest that states under conditions of capitalism lose their autonomy to provide the public good of peace, as skeptics of globalization claim. Peacemakers will do well to build institutions that reward productive investment over rent-seeking, alongside democratic institutions that ultimately gain their legitimacy on the back of good economic performance and well-functioning markets.

  • 13.
    Deglow, Annekatrin
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Localized legacies of civil war: Postwar violent crime in Northern Ireland2016In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 53, no 6, p. 786-799Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study explores the local effects of internal armed conflict on postwar violent crime in Northern Ireland. It argues that exposure to wartime violence will lead to higher levels of violent crime in the aftermath of conflict. Particularly, it claims that exposure to violence committed by armed groups challenging the state (anti-government groups) will have this effect, as it erodes the legitimacy needed for local law enforcement agencies to function effectively. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to the emergence of a postwar public security gap that lowers opportunity costs to resort to violent crime for a range of local actors. To evaluate these propositions, spatial statistics on a subnational dataset covering war-related fatalities for the period 1969-98 and police crime records for the postwar period 2002-06 are employed. The results indicate that the more an area has been exposed to violence, and the larger the proportion of this violence committed by anti-government groups, the more violent crime on the local level. This study hence contributes both to the burgeoning literature on the legacies of civil war and to recent research emphasizing the need to disaggregate non-state actors.

  • 14.
    Eck, Kristine
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    The law of the land: Communal conflict and legal authority2014In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 51, no 4, p. 441-454Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Common notions about the source of communal land conflict in Africa have long explained it as growing out of conditions of environmental scarcity. This article argues instead that the institutional structure of the legal system is central to understanding which countries are prone to experience communal land conflict. When competing customary and modern jurisdictions coexist in countries inhabited by mixed identity groups, the conflicting sources of legal authority lead to insecurity about which source of law will prevail. Because the source of law is contested, conflict parties cannot trust the legal system to predictably adjudicate disputes, which encourages the use of extrajudicial vigilante measures. Using new data on communal violence in West Africa, this argument is examined for the period 1990-2009. The results show that in countries where competing jurisdictions exist, communal land conflict is 200-350% more likely. These findings suggest that researchers should consider the role of legal institutions and processes in relation to social unrest and collective violence.

  • 15.
    Eck, Kristine
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    The origins of policing institutions: Legacies of colonial insurgency2018In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 55, no 2, p. 147-160Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article examines the impact of colonial-era armed conflict on contemporary institutions. It argues that when British colonial administrators were faced with armed insurrection they responded with institutional reform of the police, and that the legacy of these reforms lives on today. Violent opposition prompted the British colonial administration to expand entrance opportunities for local inhabitants in order to collect intelligence needed to prosecute a counterinsurgency campaign. This investment in human capital and institutional reform remained when the colonial power departed; as a result, countries which experienced colonial-era conflict have more efficient policing structures today. I demonstrate how this worked in practice during the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60. Archival data from Malaysia show that local inhabitants were recruited into the police force in greater numbers and were provided with training which they would not have received had there been no insurgency. This process was consolidated and reproduced upon independence in path-dependent ways. To expand the empirical domain, I statistically explore new archival data collected from the UK National Archives on police financing across colonial territories. The results show that armed insurgency during the colonial era is associated with higher percentages of police expenditure during the colonial era and higher perceived levels of contemporary policing capacity.

  • 16.
    Eck, Kristine
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Hultman, Lisa
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data2007In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 44, no 2, p. 233-246Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents new data on the direct and deliberate killings of civilians, called one-sided violence, in intrastate armed conflicts, 19892004. These data contribute to the present state of quantitative research on violence against civilians in three important respects: the data provide actual estimates of civilians killed, the data are collected annually and the data are provided for both governments and rebel groups. Using these data, general trends and patterns are presented, showing that the post-Cold War era is characterized by periods of fairly low-scale violence punctuated by occasional sharp increases in violence against civilians. Furthermore, rebels tend to be more violent on the whole, while governments commit relatively little violence except in those few years which see mass killings. The article then examines some factors that have been found to predict genocide and evaluates how they correlate with one-sided violence as conceptualized here. A U-shaped correlation between regime type and one-sided violence is identified: while autocratic governments undertake higher levels of one-sided violence than other regime types, rebels are more violent in democratic countries.

  • 17.
    Elfversson, Emma
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Providing security or protecting interests?: Government interventions in violent communal conflicts in Africa2015In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 52, no 6, p. 791-805Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What factors drive governments’ decisions to intervene in local conflicts within their borders? Communal conflict – that is, organized violence between non-state groups that are mobilized along a shared communal identity – kills thousands each year and severely impacts local livelihoods, at times threatening to spread and affect entire regions. Given the state’s assumed monopoly over the legitimate use of force, we should expect the concerned governments to be critical actors of the overall effort to restore peace in cases of local communal conflict, but empirical evidence indicates that central states tend to only intervene in some cases but not in others. This phenomenon has so far been understudied and the variations in states’ efforts to manage these conflicts remain unexplained. This article presents the first quantitative study of state intervention in communal conflicts. Building on existing scholarly work, I argue that state intervention is explained by a combination of strategic interests and state capacity, and that interests related to ethnic constituencies and land control play an important part in explaining governments’ strategies. These propositions find support in a statistical analysis covering sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2010.

  • 18. Elliott, Kaisa Hinkkainen
    et al.
    Kreutz, Joakim
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Natural resource wars in the shadow of the future: Explaining spatial dynamics of violence during civil war2019In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 56, no 4, p. 499-513Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous studies on natural resources and civil wars find that the presence of natural resources increases both civil conflict risk and duration. At the same time, belligerents often cooperate over resource extraction, suggesting a temporal variation in the contest over this subnational space. This study argues that parties fight over natural resources primarily when they expect that the conflict is about to end, as the importance of controlling them increases in the post-conflict setting. In contrast, belligerents that anticipate a long war have incentives to avoid fighting near natural resources since excessive violence will hurt the extraction, trade, and subsequent taxation that provide conflict actors with income from the resource. We test our argument using yearly and monthly grid-cell-level data on African civil conflicts for the period 1989-2008 and find support for our expected spatial variation. Using whether negotiations are underway as an indicator about warring parties' expectations on conflict duration, we find that areas with natural resources in general experience less intense fighting than other areas, but during negotiations these very areas witness most of the violence. We further find that the spatial shift in violence occurs immediately when negotiations are opened. A series of difference-in-difference estimations show a visible shift of violence towards areas rich in natural resources in the first three months after parties have initiated talks. Our findings are relevant for scholarship on understanding and predicting the trajectories of micro-level civil conflict violence, and for policymakers seeking to prevent peace processes being derailed.

  • 19.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985-992009In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 462, no 2, p. 199-218Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article argues that, contrary to received wisdom, political corruption is not necessarily associated with a higher risk of civil war in oil-rich states. Political corruption can be used to accommodate opposition and placate restive groups by offering private privilege in exchange for political loyalty. Since oil wealth is associated with large rents accruing in state treasuries, it provides an economic foundation for such clientelist rule. This article thus argues that oil-rich governments can use political corruption to buy support from key segments of society, effectively outspending other entrepreneurs of violence. Based on a logit analysis of civil war onsets, 1985-99, the article finds support for this 'co-optation argument'. A negative and statistically significant interaction term between oil production and political corruption is consistent across different models and robust to a number of specifications. While both variables per se increase the risk of conflict overall, higher levels of corruption seem to weaken the harmful impact of oil on the risk of civil war. This finding suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between natural resource wealth, governance and armed conflict. Political corruption has prolonged poverty and bred economic and political inequality in many oil-rich states, but it has also helped cement powerful alliances with a stake in the continuation of the corrupt regimes.

  • 20.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. PRIO, Oslo, Norway.
    Nilsson, Desirée
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    The Rise of Rebel Contenders: Barriers to entry and fragmentation in civil wars2018In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 55, no 5, p. 551-565Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Forsberg, Erika
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting2008In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 45, no 2, p. 283-300Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ethnic groups and conflicts often transcend country borders, indicating that notions of relative strength and resolve may also surpass such borders. This study focuses on the association between ethnic polarization and conflict in a widened strategic environment, encapsulating each state that experiences ethnic conflict and its neighboring states, and involving contagion processes. Two claims are presented. First, when a state experiences ethnic conflict, neighboring states that are ethnically polarized are more likely to also experience ethnic conflict. Second, when a group involved in ethnic conflict has a kinship tie to a group in a neighboring state, the latter group is increasingly likely to be inspired to challenge the government and end up in ethnic conflict. This should be especially likely if the group resides in a state characterized by ethnic polarization. To evaluate these claims, this article employs logit regression on a global dataset covering the period from 1989 to 2004. The empirical analysis supports the first claim; polarized states are indeed associated with an increased likelihood of contagion processes. The findings also demonstrate that kinship links make contagion more likely; however, this effect is not conditioned by the level of ethnic polarization. The results are robust to a series of alternative specifications. In conclusion, these findings point to the importance of incorporating a widened strategic setting in the analysis when examining the association between ethnic polarization and civil conflict.

     

  • 22.
    Forsberg, Erika
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Review of: Lacina, Bethany: Rival Claims: Ethnic Violence and Territorial Autonomy under Indian Federalism2017In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, ISSN 978-0-472-13024-5Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Hammarström, Mats
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Dieter Senghaas: Pioneer of Peace and Development Research2013In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 50, no 3, p. 431-432Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Harbom, Lotta
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Högbladh, Stina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements2006In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 43, no 5, p. 617-631Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2005, there were 31 ongoing conflicts, down by 1 from 2004. Notable for 2005 as well as for the previous year is that, while there were no major fluctuations in the number of conflicts, there were numerous changes when it comes to the conflicts listed. While ten of the conflicts recorded for 2004 were no longer active in 2005, nine conflicts restarted, four with action taken by new rebel groups and five by previously recorded actors. A total of 231 armed conflicts have been recorded since the end of World War II and 121 after the end of the Cold War. In one-third of the conflicts recorded after the Cold War, the conflicting parties have concluded peace agreements, solving, regulating, or deciding the incompatibility. Of the 144 accords, 70% were signed in conflicts over government; many of them were part of a peace process containing more than one agreement. In conflicts over government, the most common provision for resolving the incompatibility was the holding of elections. In conflicts over territory, the agreements often established local governance over the disputed territory.

  • 25.
    Harbom, Lotta
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Melander, Erik
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-20072008In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 45, no 5, p. 697-710Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2007, 34 armed conflicts were active worldwide, up by one from 2006 and by five from 2003, the year with the lowest number of active armed conflicts since the 1970s. While the number of conflicts increased, the number of wars, i.e. conflicts with over 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year, dropped by one to four. Five of the conflicts from 2006 were no longer active in 2007, but during the year, two previously recorded conflicts (in Mali and Pakistan) were restarted by new actors and two (in Angola and Peru) by previously recorded rebel groups. For the first time since 2004, two new conflicts were recorded: a conflict over governmental power in Niger and a territorial conflict in DRC. A conflict may involve one or more dyads or pairs of warring parties. In the 236 conflicts active since 1946, 487 dyads have been recorded in the new UCDP Dyadic Dataset. While most intrastate conflicts involve a single rebel group fighting the government, in 30 of the conflicts two or more dyads were active simultaneously. In 2002 and 2003, over 30% of the active conflicts involved more than one rebel group. The number of active rebel groups and changes in the set of groups are important elements of the complexity of any armed conflict, and the study of these aspects should be greatly facilitated with the new dataset. By adding the dyadic dimension to the study of conflicts, the analysis of a range of phenomena that have hardly been captured by previously available data is made possible.

  • 26.
    Harbom, Lotta
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Armed Conflict, 1946-20082009In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 46, no 4, p. 577-587Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Harbom, Lotta
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Armed Conflict, 1989–20062007In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 44, no 5, p. 623-634Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2006, 32 armed conflicts were active, a figure that has remained constant for three years. The decline in armed conflict observed through most of the post-Cold War period has ceased, at least temporarily. Many of the conflicts active in 2006 have a long history which may have made them more entrenched and thus more difficult to solve. In fact, in contrast to the situation in the early 1990s, no new conflicts have erupted in the last two years. No interstate conflicts were active in 2006, but five of the intrastate conflicts were internationalized. While four of the conflicts recorded for 2005 were no longer active in 2006, four conflicts restarted, two with actions taken by new rebel groups and two by previously recorded actors.

  • 28.
    Harbom, Lotta
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Armed Conflicts, 1946-20082009In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 46, no 4, p. 577-587Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2008, the number of active armed conflicts was 36, up by one from 2007. Over the past few years, the number of active conflicts has not seen any drastic changes from one year to the next. However, the number of armed conflicts has increased by nearly one-quarter since 2003, which was the year with the lowest number of active armed conflicts since the 1970s. While the number of conflicts continued to increase, the number of wars (i.e. conflicts with over 1,000 battle-related deaths) remained at a very low level, with only five recorded for 2008. Four conflicts listed in 2007 were no longer active in 2008, but during the year, two conflicts were restarted by previously recorded actors (in Burundi and in Georgia). Furthermore, three new conflicts erupted, one of which was fought between states (Djibouti-Eritrea). Thus, the record-long four-year interlude 2004-07 with no interstate conflict was broken.

  • 29.
    Hegre, Håvard
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
    Democracy and armed conflict2014In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 51, no 2, p. 159-172Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The article reviews the literature on the relationship between democracy and armed conflict, internal as well as interstate. The review points to several similarities between how democratic institutions affect both conflict types. It summarizes the main empirical findings and discusses the most prominent explanations as well as the most important objections raised to the finding, empirically and theoretically. To a large degree, the empirical finding that pairs of democratic states have a lower risk of interstate conflict than other pairs holds up, as does the conclusion that consolidated democracies have less conflict than semi-democracies. The most critical challenge to both conclusions is the position that both democracy and peace are due to pre-existing socio-economic conditions. I conclude that this objection has considerable leverage, but it also seems clear that economic development is unlikely to bring about lasting peace alone, without the formalization embedded in democratic institutions.

  • 30.
    Hegre, Håvard
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
    Allansson, Marie
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Basedau, Matthias
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    Colaresi, Michael
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. University of Pittsburgh.
    Croicu, Mihai
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Fjelde, Hanne
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Hoyles, Frederick
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Hultman, Lisa
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Högbladh, Stina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Jansen, Remco
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Mouhleb, Naima
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Muhammad, Sayyed Auwn
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Nilsson, Desirée
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
    Olafsdottir, Gudlaug
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Petrova, Kristina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Randahl, David
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Rød, Espen Geelmuyden
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Schneider, Gerald
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. University of Konstanz.
    von Uexkull, Nina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Vestby, Jonas
    ViEWS: A political violence early-warning system2019In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 56, no 2, p. 155-174Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.

  • 31.
    Hegre, Håvard
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. PRIO, Oslo, Norway..
    Metternich, Nils W.
    UCL, Dept Polit Sci, London WC1E 6BT, England..
    Nygard, Havard Mokleiv
    PRIO, Oslo, Norway..
    Wucherpfennig, Julian
    Hertie Sch Governance, Berlin, Germany..
    Introduction: Forecasting in peace research2017In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 54, no 2, p. 113-124Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Prediction and forecasting have now fully reached peace and conflict research. We define forecasting as predictions about unrealized outcomes given model estimates from realized data, and predictions more generally as the assignment of probability distributions to realized or unrealized outcomes. Increasingly, scholars present within-and out-of-sample prediction results in their publications and sometimes even forecasts for unrealized, future outcomes. The articles in this special issue demonstrate the ability of current approaches to forecast events of interest and contributes to the formulation of best practices for forecasting within peace research. We highlight the role of forecasting for theory evaluation and as a bridge between academics and policymakers, summarize the contributions in the special issue, and provide some thoughts on how research on forecasting in peace research should proceed. We suggest some best practices, noting the importance of theory development, interpretability of models, replicability of results, and data collection.

  • 32.
    Hegre, Håvard
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. PRIO, Oslo, Norway.
    Mokleiv Nygard, Håvard
    PRIO, Oslo, Norway..
    Flaten Raeder, Ranveig
    Off Auditor Gen Norway, Oslo, Norway..
    Evaluating the scope and intensity of the conflict trap: A dynamic simulation approach2017In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 54, no 2, p. 243-261Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Several studies show that internal armed conflict breeds conflict by exacerbating conditions that increase the chances of war breaking out again. Empirically, this 'conflict trap' works through four pathways: conflicts increase the likelihood of continuation, recurrence, escalation, and diffusion of conflict. Past empirical studies have underestimated the scope and intensity of the conflict trap since they consider the impact of conflict only through one of these pathways and rarely across sufficiently long time periods. This article shows that simulation and forecasting techniques are useful and indeed necessary to quantify the total, aggregated effect of the conflict trap, over long time periods and across countries. We develop a country-year statistical model that allows estimating the probability of no conflict, minor conflict, and major conflict, and the probabilities of transition between these states. A set of variables denoting the immediate and more distant conflict history of the country are used as endogenous predictors in the simulated forecasts. Another set of variables shown to be robustly associated with armed conflict are treated as exogenous predictors. We show that the conflict trap is even more severe than earlier studies have indicated. For instance, if a large low-income country with no previous conflicts is simulated to have two to three years of conflict over the 201518 period, we find that it will have nine more years of conflict over the 2019-40 period than if peace holds up to 2018. Conversely, if a large low-income country that has had major conflict with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in several of the past ten years succeeds in containing violence to minor conflict over the 2015-18 period, we find that it will experience five fewer years of conflict in the subsequent 20 years than if violence continues unabated.

  • 33.
    Himmelstrand, Ulf
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences.
    Tribalism, Nationalism, Rank-Equilibration, and Social Structure: A Theoretical Interpretation of Some Socio-political Processes in Southern Nigeria1969In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 6, no 2, p. 81-103Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Some aspects of Nigerian nationalism - particularly as espoused by the Ibo elite in the struggle for Nigerian independence and immediately after -- are here interpreted as an alternative or supplementary response to the same kinds of structural strains which have generated impulses to so-called tribalism. Rank-equilibration theory is utilized to provide the necessary causal links. Other approaches are also suggested to amount for the emergence of structural strains, and for the political exploitation of tribalist responses to such strains. Further discussed are a number of attendant micro- and macro-circumstances which might explain why rank-equilibration sometimes stimulates tribalism and secessionism, at other times seems to increase the appeals of a broader nationalism. Finally, it is maintained that a more durable form of nationalism appears only when based not on individual rank-equilibrating responses, but on the acceptance of common rules within a differentiated and well-balanced system of social exchange such as that hopefully emerging in the new twelve-state federal structure of Nigeria.

  • 34.
    Hultman, Lisa
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    UN peace operations and protection of civilians: Cheap talk or norm implementation?2013In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 50, no 1, p. 59-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Protection of civilians is now at the forefront of the responsibilities of the international community. There is a strong international norm that civilian populations should be protected from violence. But how committed is the United Nations to acting in line with this norm? I argue that the UN Security Council (UNSC) has an interest in demonstrating that it takes violence against civilians seriously. Through a broadened security agenda including human security, the legitimacy and the credibility of the UNSC hinges on its ability to act as a guarantor of civilian protection. As a consequence, the UN is more likely to deploy peace operations in conflicts where the warring parties target the civilian population. The argument is supported by a statistical examination of all internal armed conflicts in 1989-2006. The results show that the likelihood of a UN peace operation is higher in conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians, but this effect is mainly visible after 1999. This year marked a shift in the global security agenda and it was also when the UNSC first issued an explicit mandate to protect civilians. Conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians are also more likely to get operations with robust mandates. This suggests that the UNSC is not just paying lip service to the protection norm, but that it actually acts to implement it.

  • 35.
    Karlén, Niklas
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    The legacy of foreign patrons: External state support and conflict recurrence2017In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 54, no 4, p. 499-512Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Why do some armed conflicts that have ended experience renewed fighting while others do not? Previous research onconflict recurrence has approached this question by looking at domestic factors such as how the war was fought, howit ended or factors associated with its aftermath. With the exception of the literature on third-party securityguarantees, the influence of outside actors has often been overlooked. This article explores the role of external statesand suggests when and how their involvement is likely to affect the probability of renewed warfare. The mainargument is that the legacy of outside support creates an external support structure that affects the previouscombatants’ willingness as well as their opportunities to remobilize. This means that armed conflicts with externalstate support will experience a greater likelihood of recurrence compared to other conflicts which did not see externalsupport. The theory is tested using Cox proportional hazards models on global data of intrastate armed conflicts1975–2009. The findings suggest that external support to rebels increases the risk of conflict recurrence in the shortterm as groups receive or anticipate renewed assistance. The results also indicate that it is more important for rebelgroups to have had enduring support over the years in the previous conflict rather than access to multiple statesponsors. External support provided to governments is not associated with conflict recurrence.

  • 36.
    Kreutz, Joakim
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset2010In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 47, no 2, p. 243-250Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents new data on the start and end dates and the means of termination for armed conflicts, 1946-2005. These data contribute to quantitative research on conflict resolution and recurrence in three important respects: the data cover both interstate and intrastate armed conflicts, the data cover low-intensity conflicts, and the data provide information on a broad range of termination outcomes. In order to disaggregate the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict dataset into multiple analytical units, this dataset introduces the concept of conflict episodes, defined as years of continuous use of armed force in a conflict. Using these data, general trends and patterns are presented, showing that conflicts do not exclusively end with decisive outcomes such as victory or peace agreement but more often under unclear circumstances where fighting simply ceases. This pattern is consistent across different types of conflict, as is the finding that victories are more common in conflicts with short duration. The article then examines some factors that have been found to predict civil war recurrence and explores whether using the new dataset produces similar results. This exercise offers a number of interesting new insights and finds that the determinants for civil war recurrence identified in previous research are sensitive to alternate formulations of conflict termination data. The findings suggest that intrastate conflicts are less likely to recur after government victories or after the deployment of peacekeepers. If the previous conflict is fought with rebels aiming for total control over government or if the belligerents mobilized along ethnic lines, the risk of recurrence increases. The discrepancy in findings with previous research indicates the need for further study of conflict resolution and recurrence, for which this dataset will be useful.

  • 37.
    Kreutz, Joakim
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    The war that wasn't there: Managing unclear cases in conflict data2015In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 52, no 1, p. 120-124Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When collecting data, some observations will always be hard to confidently classify in accordance with stated definitions of war, civil conflict, or political violence. This research note draws on the experiences of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in the last decade in managing such unclear cases. After explaining the difference between unclear and non-cases, I describe the data generating process and how this uncertainty is distributed over time in the data. This exercise reveals that the 1980s may have been more conflict-filled than the 1990s, challenging arguments about the stability of the bipolar global order as well as the sudden ‘rise’ of warfare in the immediate post-Cold War era. The final section suggests different ways that researchers may use existing information regarding unclear cases as a way to conceptualize the nature of civil strife without having to engage in additional data collection.

  • 38.
    Kreutz, Joakim
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Hinkkainen Elliott, Kaisa
    University of Leeds.
    Natural resource wars in the shadow of the future: Explaining spatial dynamics of violence during civil war2019In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 56, no 4, p. 499-513Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous studies on natural resources and civil wars find that the presence of natural resources increases both civil conflict risk and duration. At the same time, belligerents often cooperate over resource extraction, suggesting a temporal variation in the contest over this subnational space. This study argues that parties fight over natural resources primarily when they expect that the conflict is about to end, as the importance of controlling them increases in the post-conflict setting. In contrast, belligerents that anticipate a long war have incentives to avoid fighting near natural resources since excessive violence will hurt the extraction, trade, and subsequent taxation that provide conflict actors with income from the resource. We test our argument using yearly and monthly grid-cell-level data on African civil conflicts for the period 1989–2008 and find support for our expected spatial variation. Using whether negotiations are underway as an indicator about warring parties’ expectations on conflict duration, we find that areas with natural resources in general experience less intense fighting than other areas, but during negotiations these very areas witness most of the violence. We further find that the spatial shift in violence occurs immediately when negotiations are opened. A series of difference-in-difference estimations show a visible shift of violence towards areas rich in natural resources in the first three months after parties have initiated talks. Our findings are relevant for scholarship on understanding and predicting the trajectories of micro-level civil conflict violence, and for policymakers seeking to prevent peace processes being derailed.

  • 39.
    Lilja, Jannie
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Beyond Settlement: Making Peace Last After Civil Conflict2010In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 47, no 1, p. 103-103Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 40.
    Lilja, Jannie
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Shields, Vanessa E & Nicholas D J Baldwin, eds, 2008. Beyond Settlement: Making Peace Last After Civil Conflict. Madison-Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 413 pp. ISBN 97808386418352010In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 47, no 1, p. 103-103Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 41.
    Lindberg Bromley, Sara
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Introducing the UCDP Peacemakers at Risk Dataset, Sub-Saharan Africa 1989-2009In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 42.
    Lindberg Bromley, Sara
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Introducing the UCDP Peacemakers at Risk dataset, sub-Saharan Africa 1989-20092018In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 55, no 1, p. 122-131Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article introduces new event data on violence against peacekeepers deployed to conflict-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 2009. While the practice of peacekeeping is often described as fraught with risk, a shortage of data has left scholars poorly equipped to study this important phenomenon. The Peacemakers at Risk (PAR) dataset records reported incidences of violence resulting in direct peacekeeping personnel fatalities, injuries and kidnappings. Information on the timing, location, outcomes and actors implicated is provided for each recorded event, including information on the nationalities of violence-affected peacekeepers. The dataset also charts reports of fatal violence by peacekeepers. This enables the study of peacekeepers' use of force and provides a new lens for examining wider questions related to peacekeeping effects and conflict dynamics. Peace operations deployed by the UN as well as other peacekeeping actors are included, allowing for a rich dataset that reflects today's diverse peacekeeping landscape. The PAR dataset makes possible the evaluation of reigning assumptions regarding peacekeeping intervention and risk, and allows scholars to pose research questions regarding the causes, characteristics and consequences of peacekeeper violence, within and across interventions. This article introduces the criteria and procedures guiding the data collection and presents the data. The article also highlights key patterns emerging from the dataset and identifies a number of potential applications and avenues for future research.

  • 43.
    Lundgren, Magnus
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?2018In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 55, no 4, p. 508-523Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I advance and test a theoretical argument of how participation in UN peacekeeping affects the likelihood of coup attempts in troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The argument highlights the interplay between the economic incentives of militaries in poor TCCs and the UN's preference for contributors with stable civil-military relations. Fearing the loss of UN reimbursement funds, militaries for which such funds are important will avoid visible acts of military insubordination, such as coup attempts, that would place their future participation in UN peacekeeping at risk. I test this proposition against time-series cross-sectional data on 157 countries in the 1991-2013 period using panel regression and matching. The data show that countries where the armed forces are more dependent on peacekeeping revenues experience fewer coup attempts than comparable peers, even when taking coup-proofing measures and other alternative explanations into account. I also find that the coup-restraining effect is only observed in periods where member states contribute enough troops to award the UN a real choice over alternative contributors. The study introduces a novel theoretic logic, presents empirical results at odds with the existing literature, and suggests important policy implications with regard to UN vetting and standards for troop-contributing countries.

  • 44.
    Melander, Erik
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Pettersson, Therese
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Themner, Lotta
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Organized violence, 1989-20152016In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 53, no 5, p. 727-742Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The alarming upward trend since 2012 in the number of fatalities incurred by organized violence did not continue in 2015. Indeed, 2014 saw more than 130,000 people killed in organized violence while in 2015 this figure was close to 118,000. This is still an unusually high number, the third-worst year in the post-Cold War period. The number of conflicts continued to increase from 41 in 2014 to 50 in 2015. This increase was by and large driven by the expansion of the Islamic State. Most of the fatalities, over 97,000, incurred in state-based conflicts. Non-state conflicts also increased, from 61 in 2014 to 70 in 2015, the highest number recorded in the 1989-2015 period. No non-state conflict passed the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths, but 11 state-based conflicts did - a decrease by one from 2014. Seven of the ten most violent state-based conflicts in 2014 became less violent. Twenty-six actors were registered in one-sided violence just as in 2014, while the number of fatalities decreased from over 13,500 to 9,500.

  • 45.
    Nilsson, Desirée
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements2008In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 45, no 4, p. 479-495Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decisionmaking calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with the theoretical expectations and show that whether an agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that, even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories' commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible.

  • 46.
    Nilsson, Marco
    Jönköping University, School of Education and Communication, HLK, Global Studies. Jönköping University, School of Education and Communication, HLK, Learning Practices inside and outside School (LPS), Communication, Culture & Diversity @ JU (CCD@JU).
    Causal Beliefs and War Termination: Religion and Rational Choice in the Iran-Iraq War2018In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 55, no 1, p. 94-106Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article analyzes the length of interstate wars and the process of reaching a mutually acceptable bargaining solution. Rational choice scholarship has mainly sought to explain long wars in terms of commitment problems and private information. This article complements these rational choice perspectives by arguing that causal beliefs—a variable not considered by previous research—can also prolong wars by increasing expectations of battlefield performance and slowing down information updating. The article illustrates the role of religiously based causal beliefs with the case of one of the longest interstate wars of modern time, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988. Even though commitment problems were present, they do not identify the root cause of Iran’s high expected utility of continuing the war, as religiously based causal beliefs played a more prominent role in prolonging the war. Religious causal beliefs constitute a real word mechanism that not only creates different priors about expected military capacity, but also slows down the process of updating beliefs, as battlefield events are not seen as credible information. Although the prevalence of religious conflicts has increased ove r time, the formation of beliefs and their effects on wars remains understudied when applying rational choice to real world conflicts.

  • 47.
    Ohlström, Bo
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences.
    Information and Propaganda: A content analysis of editorials in four Swedish daily newspapers1966In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 3, no 1, p. 75-88Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study is an attempt to measure information versus propaganda in Swedish news paper editorials dealing with the question of Swedish nuclear armament. In order to categorize the content a schema was developed identifying the following content ele ments: 1) the possible defense alternatives; 2) the situation categorized into sixteen exclusive situation variables which may be affected by the choice of defense alternatives; 3) evaluations of alternatives or situations, dichotomized into good or bad; 4) general value concepts, called 'ideologies.' The sample consisted of four papers, three of which endorsed Swedish nuclear armament. The fourth did not take an explicit position. Propaganda was defined as selectivity in the presentation of factual decision premises, i.e. the descriptive statements about the situation variables. (The more propagandistic argumentation is thus uneven, with high frequencies of statements for some variables, and low for others.) We expected to find the argumentation of the uncommitted paper less propagandistic than the other three papers, but data gave no support for this hypo thesis.

    A closer study of the evaluations made of consequences of different alternatives dis closed two facts: 1) the uncommitted paper could be considered as an opponent of Swedish nuclear armament, as it tended to evaluate consequences of a Swedish nuclear armament negatively and consequences of other alternatives positively. 2) By dividing the material into three time periods, it was found that all the papers became totally one-sided in their evaluations during the last time period. That is, they exclusively made positive evaluations of their endorsed alternative and negative evaluations of other alternatives.

    Considering the fact that the 'uncommitted' paper could be classified as an opponent of Swedish nuclear armament, we investigated to see if we could find a tendency toward polarization. Did those who endorsed Swedish nuclear armament tend to stress some situation variables, while the paper that was against this alternative tended to stress other variables? A very slight tendency in this direction could be found. Because the sample was very small, no generalizations can be made regarding the Swedish press in general.

  • 48.
    Pettersson, Therese
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Eck, Kristine
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Organized Violence 1989-20172018In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 55, no 4, p. 535-547Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article reports on trends in organized violence from data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). With almost 90,000 deaths recorded by UCDP last year, 2017 saw a decrease for the third consecutive year to a level 32% lower than the latest peak in 2014. This trend in declining levels of organized violence is driven by state-based armed conflict, and by the case of Syria in particular. Forty-nine state-based conflicts were active in 2017, down by four compared to 2016, and ten of these reached the level of war, with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. The overall decrease in fatalities lends support to the claim that conflict deaths are in decline and that the world is increasingly peaceful. This trend holds even more strongly when controlling for increases in world population. In contrast, non-state conflict has increased: a new peak of 82 active non-state conflicts was recorded in 2017 and fatalities have increased concurrently. Much of this is due to escalating violence in DR Congo and the Central African Republic. However, fatalities from non-state conflict remain but 15% of the total number of fatalities from organized violence. As for actors engaged in one-sided violence, their number also increased during 2017, although the number of fatalities remained at the same level as in 2016.

  • 49.
    Pettersson, Therese
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Högbladh, Stina
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Öberg, Magnus
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Organized violence, 1989-2018 and peace agreements2019In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 56, no 4, p. 589-603Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article reports on trends in organized violence and peace agreements collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The number of fatalities in organized violence decreased for the fourth consecutive year, to reach the lowest level since 2012. In 2018, UCDP recorded almost 76,000 deaths: a decrease of 20% compared to 2017, and 43% compared to the latest peak in 2014. State-based armed conflict drives this downward trend in organized violence, with Syria accounting for much of the change. The number of civilians killed in one-sided violence also dropped in 2018, reaching its lowest level since 2012. In contrast, non-state conflict remained on a high level. The general decline in fatalities from organized violence does not correspond with the trend in the number of active conflicts. In fact, the world has seen a new peak in the number of conflicts after 2014, matched only by the number of conflicts in the early 1990s. In 1991, the peak in the number of armed conflicts corresponded with a similar peak in the number of signed peace agreements. This was followed by a decrease in the number of conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, the most recent rise in armed conflicts has not been matched by a similar rise in the number of peace agreements. Two circumstances that characterize the recent rise in conflicts have also been found to make conflicts harder to solve: explicit religious claims and high levels of internationalization.

  • 50.
    Pettersson, Therese
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Wallensteen, Peter
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
    Armed conflicts, 1946-20142015In: Journal of Peace Research, ISSN 0022-3433, E-ISSN 1460-3578, Vol. 52, no 4, p. 536-550Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2014, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 40 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths, up by six from 2013. This is the highest number of conflicts reported since 1999, and 11 of these conflicts were defined as wars, that is, conflicts generating 1,000 or more battle-related deaths in one calendar year. Further, an escalation of several conflicts, coupled with the extreme violence in Syria, resulted in the highest number of battle-related deaths in the post-1989 period. Yet, compared to the large-scale interstate wars of the 20th century, the number of fatalities caused by armed conflicts in 2014 was relatively low. Additionally, seven conflicts identified in 2013 were no longer active in 2014. However, four new conflicts erupted in 2014, all of them in Ukraine, and three previously registered conflicts were restarted by new actors. Furthermore, six conflicts reoccurred with previously registered actors. A positive development, however, is the increase to ten of the number of peace agreements concluded and signed in 2014, which represents a further four compared with 2013. And although this increase is part of a positive trend since 2011, it is worth noting that several peace processes remained fragile by the end of the year.

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