A large-population fictitious play model with the single update property
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
The paper presents a large-population analog of fictitious play in which players learn from personal experience. In each period, onlyone player updates his beliefs about the strategy distribution in the population. Through analysis and examples, we justify the relevance of the single update property. The model can be used as a variant of playing the field, where the players progressively learn about the population, or to study asymmetric coordination games with highly asymmetric stakes. We study the long-run behavior of the model under different specifications and focus primarily on coordination games.
fictitious play, coexistence of conventions, urn models, selection dynamics, coordination games, private histories
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-133003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-133003DiVA: diva2:956072