Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence
2016 (English)In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 4, 397-402 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This precis is a brief summary of the book's content.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 13, no 4, 397-402 p.
Hume, irreducible normativity, Mackie, moral error theory, queerness
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-132314DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01304001ISI: 000378815700001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-132314DiVA: diva2:951220