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Variable pay as a predictor of earnings management
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Business Studies.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Business Studies.
2016 (English)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation – in the form ofvariable pay – and earnings management. Since most research is done on Americancompanies, and Swedish companies are adopting a more Anglo-American compensationstructure, we would like to study this in Sweden. We hypothesize that CEOs with highervariable pay are more likely to engage in earnings management. This study is done onSwedish companies listed on Large- and Mid-Cap. Using data from the companies’ annualreports we find no significant relationship between variable pay and discretionary accrualsusing our regression.

Abstract [sv]

Denna studie undersöker relationen mellan kompensation till ledande befattningshavare –den del av lönen som är rörlig - och manipulering av intäkter. Då större delen av tidigareforskning har fokuserat på amerikanska företag, och svenska företag anammar en mer angloamerikanskstruktur av kompensation, vill vi undersöka detta i Sverige. Vi kommer fram tillen hypotes där vi antar att en VD med högre rörlig lön är mer trolig att manipulera intäkter.Studien är gjord på svenska företag listade på Large och Mid Cap. Genom att använda datafrån företagens årsredovisningar och Datastream hittar vi genom våra regressioner ingasamband mellan rörlig lön och diskretionära periodiseringar.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. , 34 p.
Keyword [en]
Earnings management, Discretionary accruals, Variable pay, Compensation, Modified Jones model, Agency-principal theory
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-297733OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-297733DiVA: diva2:943367
Subject / course
Business Studies
Educational program
Bachelor Programme in Business and Economics
Supervisors
Available from: 2016-06-29 Created: 2016-06-27 Last updated: 2016-06-29Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf