Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Voting, Taxes and Heterogeneous Preferences: Evidence from Swedish Local Elections
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Statistics.
2016 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A standard finding in the literature on political agency is that voters punish incumbents who raise taxes. Typically, only the reaction of a representative voter is considered, with the notion that all voters dislike high taxes because the revenue is, at least on the margin, spent on rent-seeking activities. In this paper we question this interpretation by considering the heterogeneous responses to tax changes in the electorate. Using high-quality panel survey data from Swedish local politics we find that voters who, ex ante, prefer a small public sector punish incumbents who raise taxes, while voters who prefer a large public sector actually reward tax hikes. This result holds also conditional on individuals’ past voting behavior and for voters who have low condence in politicians, indicating that Swedish voters interpret tax changes based on their own policy preferences, rather than as going to wasteful activities.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. , 30 p.
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975 ; 2016:5
Keyword [en]
Electoral accountability; local taxation; voter preferences; political agency
National Category
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-281791OAI: diva2:915568
Available from: 2016-03-30 Created: 2016-03-30 Last updated: 2016-05-02Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext 2016-05-02(447 kB)21 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT02.pdfFile size 447 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf
fulltext 2016-03-30(908 kB)98 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 908 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf
fulltext 2016-05-02(439 kB)7 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT03.pdfFile size 439 kBChecksum SHA-512
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Mörk, EvaNordin, Mattias
By organisation
Department of EconomicsDepartment of Statistics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 126 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 404 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link