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Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also Listened To?
Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics. (Centre for Labour Market and Discrimination Studies)ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8973-1410
Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany.
2015 (English)Other (Other academic)Text
Abstract [en]

There are legal grounds to hear competitors in merger control proceedings, and competitor involvement has gained significance. To what extent this is economically sensible is our question. The competition authority applies some welfare standard while the competitor cares about its own profit. In expectation, there is neither a pure conflict  nor a complete alignment of interest. We distinguish hard and soft information and ask whether hearing the competitor might convey valuable but non-verifiable information to the authority. We find that the authority will mostly have to ignore the competitor's cheap talk but, depending on the authority's own prior information, strictly following the competitor's selfish recommendation can improve the authority's decision. Under a consumer welfare standard, non-verifiable information should be ignored. Complementary to our analysis, we provide empirical data of competitor involvement in EU merger cases and give an overview of the legal discussion in the EU and US.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
SSRN , 2015. , 52 p.
, SSRN Working Paper Series
Keyword [en]
Merger control, Antitrust, European Commission, Signaling, Efficiency, Competitors, Rivals
National Category
Research subject
Economy, Economics
URN: urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-49424DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2569832OAI: diva2:898840
German Research Foundation (DFG), CRC 649
Available from: 2016-01-29 Created: 2016-01-29 Last updated: 2016-04-11Bibliographically approved

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Giebe, Thomas
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