Debunking and Disagreement
2015 (English)In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics or religion, is to provide a “debunking” argument against them. Another, even more familiar, way is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area. These types of challenge are often treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to. Yet, as they pursue similar conclusions one might well wonder how they are related. Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? The purpose of this paper is to argue that the latter is indeed the case and that appeals to disagreement have a crucial role to play in the debunking strategy.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Moral disagreement, moral realism, evolutionary debunking arguments
Research subject Ethics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-269714DOI: 10.1111/nous.12135OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-269714DiVA: diva2:885006
FunderSwedish Research Council, 2012-988