Adaptation, taxation and public goods
2014 (English)Report (Other academic)
This paper shows how the first-best and second-best rules for optimal public good provision depend on the adaptation to private and public consumption. Adaptation in private consumption typically leads to over-provision relative to the Samuelson condition, while adaptation in public consumption works the other way around. The two sources of adaptation only cancel out in the extreme case of full adaptation.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Umeå universitet , 2014. , 6 p.
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 902
Public goods, adaptation, habit-formation, optimal taxation
Economics and Business
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-107704OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-107704DiVA: diva2:849074
FunderSwedish Research Council, 421-2010-1420