Federal Governments Should Subsidize State Expenditure that Voters do not Consider when Voting
2014 (English)Report (Other academic)
This short paper analyzes whether a federal transfer system can be designed to increase welfare, when state governments create political budget cycles to increase the likelihood of reelection. The results show how the federal government may announce a transfer scheme in advance for the post-election year that counteracts the welfare costs of political budget cycles.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Umeå universitet , 2014. , 10 p.
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 898
political economy, intergovernmental transfer, budget cycle
Economics and Business
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-107702OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-107702DiVA: diva2:849070
FunderRiksbankens Jubileumsfond, RS10-1319:1