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Wirtschaftsspionage in Verhandlungen aus Informationsökonomischer und Wirtschaftsetischer Perspektive: eine Interdisziplinäre Analyse
Responsible organisation
2004 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)Alternative title
Industrial espionage in international negotiations (Swedish)
Abstract [en]

The dissertation examines a case of industrial espionage by one of the parties involved in a forthcoming international negotiation. We want to know what consequences a burglary has for the actual negotiation. The dissertation consist of five hypothesis, of which the three first were empirically tested. The discussion of thesis four and five is supported basically by research literature, but have also found indirect support in the empirical study. A game theoretical model of four information sets is used. Thesis 1: Pay-offs do not change significantly from one information set to the other. confirmed Thesis 2: Behavior do not change significantly from one information set to the other. confirmed Thesis 3: The perception of fairness do not change significantly from one information set to the other. confirmed Thesis 4: International negotiations is socially so complex that it only makes sense to study the phenomena from an interdisciplinary angle. confirmed Thesis 5: A descriptive evolutionary approach can be an alternative to neoclassical economic theory in understanding the study of international negotiations. confirmed The study also confirms that economic theory is correct in excluding the ethical dimension from their models, as these factors have little influence on the end price. Fairness plays only a minor role in international negotiations. **

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Karlskrona: Blekinge Institute of Technology , 2004. , 334 p.
Blekinge Institute of Technology Dissertation Series, ISSN 1650-2159 ; 9
Keyword [en]
Business Intelligence, Competitive Intelligence, International Negotiations, Game Theory, Information Sets, Industrial Espionage, Economic Theory, Evolutionary Economics, International Business
National Category
Business Administration
URN: urn:nbn:se:bth-00295ISBN: 91-7295-050-1OAI: diva2:837538

Forskarens hemsida: Disputerat vid Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Avhandlingen utgiven av BTH.

Available from: 2012-09-18 Created: 2005-09-06 Last updated: 2016-02-15Bibliographically approved

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