Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Managerial Incentive Systems: Reasons Behind Use and Design
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Business Studies.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Business Studies.
2015 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

Managerial incentive systems have for a long time been criticized by different fields within the academia for contributing to a short-term focus among managers, which undermines the long-term interest of shareholders. Despite the critique put forward by business scholars and behavioral scholars, short-term structures are still prevalent within managerial incentive systems. This study explores why large cap firms have not aligned their managerial incentive systems to the critique from business scholars and behavioral scholars. Furthermore, this study aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the existence and development of managerial incentive systems. In order to address the aim of the study, eight small case studies were conducted at eight large cap firms. The findings of the study indicate that short-term structures are considered pivotal in attracting and retaining managerial talent, directing the attention of managers to important targets in generating shareholder value and motivating the managers to perform at the top of their capacity. Furthermore, the study shows that the short-term structures, criticized within the academia, are reinforced and institutionalized by stakeholder pressure and organizational contingencies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. , 61 p.
Keyword [en]
Managerial incentive systems, short-term structures, agency theory, motivation crowding theory, institutional theory, stakeholder pressure, qualitative approach
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-256321OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-256321DiVA: diva2:825011
Educational program
Master Programme in Business and Management
Supervisors
Available from: 2015-06-23 Created: 2015-06-22 Last updated: 2015-06-23Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(873 kB)267 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 873 kBChecksum SHA-512
71d7d9e4c2a728ceabd561d3e268e20cf208af7acb19773a9ad32b24d0512d418837b0ca75dd9bcd08f8b741eaac2dfa3bf80fde0d289a3ba2fec623158a7516
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

By organisation
Department of Business Studies
Business Administration

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 267 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 489 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf