Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Bargains and Management by Objectives: On political steering, civil servant influence and public procurement in the City of Stockholm
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Stockholm Business School.
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Stockholm Business School.
2015 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

Title: Bargains and Management by Objectives: On political steering, civil servant influence and public procurement in the City of Stockholm.

Background: Much research on NPM has been devoted to understanding and explaining the worldwide diffusion of NPM reforms. Less attention has been directed towards analysing the impact of NPM reforms on the internal logic of the public administration or its relationship with its political masters. Using the concept of PSB as a theoretical framework enables an additional interpretation of the relation.

Research Question: How does bargains between politicians and civil servants, working with procurement, affect Management by Objectives?

Aim: The aim of this study is to shed light on how the relationship between politicians and civil servants, working with public procurement, affects MBO. The concept of NPM, which has influenced public management in Sweden, is based on a principal-agent assumption but in this study we investigate if the concept of PSB may offer a more nuanced way to interpret and understand the relationship.

Method: A qualitative case study performed through eleven semi-structured interviews with ten civil servants and one politician in the City of Stockholm.

Conclusion: The PSB concept (Hood, 2000b) nuances the perspectives and the use of formal managerial tools in a principal-agent relation, highlighting instead the cooperation and bargains between politicians and civil servants. Through sharing competence and loyalty, the civil servants are able to substantially influence political decision-making, thus in practice relaxing the strong principal-agent assumption.      

Keywords: PSB, Public Service Bargains, NPM, Procurement, Public Administration

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. , 65 p.
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-114933OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-114933DiVA: diva2:795273
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2015-03-16 Created: 2015-03-15 Last updated: 2015-03-16Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(1070 kB)119 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 1070 kBChecksum SHA-512
a10393c33fce567aeea6a2b274436bff3c4c9d5dd3143c2afedabeb776081674b35c4c2843ce912b11609c22c4b8148d18be941715c6dcf1528280a8c1aec8ba
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

By organisation
Stockholm Business School
Business Administration

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 119 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 1916 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf