Coalitional Games in MISO Interference Channels: Epsilon-Core and Coalition Structure Stable Set
2014 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, ISSN 1053-587X, E-ISSN 1941-0476, Vol. 62, no 24, 6507-6520 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
The multiple-input single-output interference channel is considered. Each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly and the receivers are assumed to treat interference as additive noise. In this setting, noncooperative transmission does not take into account the interference generated at other receivers which generally leads to inefficient performance of the links. To improve this situation, we study cooperation between the links using coalitional games. The players ( links) in a coalition either perform zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding to each other. The epsilon-core is a solution concept for coalitional games that takes into account the overhead required in coalition deviation. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the strong and weak epsilon-core of our coalitional game not to be empty with zero forcing transmission. Since, the epsilon-core only considers the possibility of joint cooperation of all links, we study coalitional games in partition form in which several distinct coalitions can form. We propose a polynomial-time distributed coalition formation algorithm based on coalition merging and prove that its solution lies in the coalition structure stable set of our coalition formation game. Simulation results reveal the cooperation gains for different coalition formation complexities and deviation overhead models.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE Signal Processing Society, 2014. Vol. 62, no 24, 6507-6520 p.
Beamforming, coalition structure stable set, coalitional games, epsilon-core, interference channel
Other Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-158382DOI: 10.1109/TSP.2014.2367466ISI: 000345516000013ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84913553982OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-158382DiVA: diva2:779865
QC 201501132015-01-132015-01-072015-04-20Bibliographically approved