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Political corruption as a form of state crime: A case study on electoral donations
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Criminology.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3400-9313
2015 (English)In: State crime: Critical concepts in criminology. Vol. II: Varieties of state crimes / [ed] W. J. Chambliss, C. Moloney, Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, 283-300 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In this chapter, I analyze how state crimes emerge when incumbents utilize their offices to reciprocate electoral donors with undue benefits, favorable regulations, contracts, and job appointments. The problem, as it is seen here, is that (a) while electoral donations are cloaked with legality, they facilitate corruption, and (b) the delivery of undue benefits creates social harm, because it diverts the allocation of public resources and destroys confidence in the political system. Thus, I argue and demonstrate how the money delivered as electoral donations constitutes a corrupt incentive that should be classified as illegal.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. 283-300 p.
Keyword [en]
political corruption, electoral financing, law neutralization
National Category
Political Science Other Social Sciences not elsewhere specified
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-110241ISBN: 9780415835541OAI: diva2:769952
Available from: 2014-12-09 Created: 2014-12-09 Last updated: 2015-03-02Bibliographically approved

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Evertsson, Nubia
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