Social identity, education and tax policy
2014 (English)Report (Other academic)
This paper analyzes the implications of social identity and self-categorization in the context of optimal redistributive income taxation. A two-type model is supplemented by an assumption that individuals select themselves into social categories, in which norms are formed and education effort choices partly depend on these norms. Optimal tax policy is analyzed under two different assumptions about the social objective function: a welfarist objective based on consumer preferences and a paternalist objective that does not reflect the consumer preference for social identity. We show how the welfarist government implements a tax policy to internalize the externalities arising from social norms, while the paternalist government uses tax policy to make individuals behave as if their preferences for social identity were absent.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Umeå universitet , 2014. , 32 p.
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 891
optimal income taxation, education, social identity, self-categorization
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-92091OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-92091DiVA: diva2:739542