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Sharing profit in parallel and serial transport networks
Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, Society, environment and transport, Transport economics Stockholm.
2011 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper studies the incentives for different countries to cooperate concerning pricing in transport systems, and how to handle the profit from such cooperation. Two types of simple networks with congestion are considered; one with parallel links, and one serial network with a number of consecutive links. The owner of each link tolls the traffic using the link. First the incentives for cooperative behavior among the countries are studied, and shown to be considerable. This is done by using non-cooperative game theory. Second, cooperative game theory is used to analyse solution concepts for allocating the resources raised from cooperation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, S-WoPEc, Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics , 2011. , 47 p.
CTS Working Paper, 2011:7
Keyword [en]
Transport network, Transnational network, Road pricing, Reward (incentive), Profit, Mathematical model, Games theory
National Category
Research subject
Road: General works, surveys, comprehensive works, Road: Economics
URN: urn:nbn:se:vti:diva-641OAI: diva2:669336
Available from: 2013-12-03 Created: 2013-12-03 Last updated: 2014-03-17Bibliographically approved

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