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FROM GUILT TO REGRET: The impact of neuroscientific evidence upon our ideas of libertarian free will and moral responsibility
University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics.
2012 (English)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

In this essay I will investigate some different opinions about how or whether we should change our views concerning moral responsibility if neuroscience shows that contra-causal free will is implausible and also argue that holding people morally responsible is not the best method of making people act morally. A common approach is to argue that we can hold people responsible in a non-absolute sense and many argue that this has practical benefits (i.e. that people would act more morally). I evaluate different alternatives and conclude that there are different beliefs and opinions that cause disagreement in this question. I argue that moral responsibility is implausible without the existence of contra-causal free will (because it is then just a question of luck what actions you will perform) and that it is more practical to shift our focus to other ways of changing people and not blaming them.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. , 32 p.
Keyword [en]
Moral responsibility, free will, blame
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:his:diva-7175OAI: diva2:604098
Subject / course
Educational program
Consciousness Studies - Philosophy and Neuropsychology
Humanities, Theology
Available from: 2013-02-19 Created: 2013-02-07 Last updated: 2013-02-19Bibliographically approved

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fulltext(826 kB)175 downloads
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Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

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Hallin, Nathalie
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School of Humanities and Informatics

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